Criminal Law Case Digests HernandoBar2023-2

SEPTEMBAR 2023
Chair's
Cases
Criminal 20
Law 23
Digest of cases penned by
Associate Justice Ramon #HernanDoIt
Paul Hernando #Hernandonuts
SEPTEMBAR 2023
BAR OPERATIONS: HERNANDO

SIBLINGS EDITION
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Special thanks to the following contributors:
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El Filibusterismo TinayTinapay
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Limecooler Oikooiko
Atorniquet
Cyffin
Sandysundae
Bonana
ML
Tinee
Pong
Twistafate
Khateyyy
Nashmera Lewi
TheGreyQueen Quagmire4
OraEtLabora Cara V
Celyn Wom
Pancit Melptjdatty
Attysako Abonjoc
"Always remember, chance favors the #HernanDoIt

prepared one." - J.Hernando #Hernandonuts
All the best to all Bar 2023 takers.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Topics Page
I. Book I [Articles 1-99 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)]
B. Felonies
2. Circumstances affecting Criminal Liability
c) Mitigating Circumstances
● EDWIN TALABIS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 1

G.R. No. 214647, March 4, 2020
d) Aggravating Circumstances
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDDIE MANANSALA 3

G.R. No. 233104 September 02, 2020
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GERALD MORENO Y 5

TAZON G.R. No. 191759, March 02, 2020
D. Execution and Service of Sentence
1. Three-Fold Rule
● GIL MIGUEL VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF 7

PRISONS UDK-15368, September 15, 2021
2. Probation Law (PD 968, as amended)
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENATO WAD-AS GR. No.

221428, February 13, 2019 9
4. An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and

Damage on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines
Imposed Under the Revised Penal Code (RA 10951)
● TEDDY AND TEOFILO GRANA VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 202111, November 25, 2019 11
II. Book II (Articles 114-365 of the RPC) and Related Special
Laws
D. Crimes Against Public Interest (Arts. 161-187)
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENE MONDEJAR G.R. Nos. 13

245931-32, April 25, 2022
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MA. CONSUELO TOROBA PALMA 16

GIL-ROFLO G.R. No. 249564 & 249568-76, March 21, 2022
E. Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs
3. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 [RA 9165, as

amended byRA10640;Section 21 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) only]
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DONATO C. HERNANDEZ 20

G.R. No. 258077, June 15, 2022
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KEVIN CASTILLO Y 23

GALANG G.R. No. 242520, November 15, 2021
● EMILY ESTORES Y PECARDAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE 25

PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192332, January 11, 2021
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEX BALUYOT Y 27

BIRANDA G.R. No. 243390, October 05, 2020
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHNNY ARELLAGA Y 30

SABADO G.R. No. 231796, August 24, 2020
G. Crimes Committed by Public Officers (Arts. 203-245)
1. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as

amended)
b) Corrupt Practices of Public Officers [Sec. 3]
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENE MONDEJAR 33

G.R. Nos. 245931-32, April 25, 2022
● PEOPLES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RICHARD R ENOJO 35

G.R. No. 252258, April 6, 2022
● DOMINADOR G. MARZAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE 38

PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 226167, October 11, 2021
H. Crimes Against Persons (Arts. 246-266)
● GIL MIGUEL VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS 41

UDK-15368, September 15, 2021
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZZZ G.R. No. 232329, April 28, 2021 42
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIO PANIS, FLORES, SANTIAGO, 44

AND GALINGANA G.R. No. 234780, March 17, 2021
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y RANAY G.R. 46

No. 242513, March 4, 2021
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX G.R. No. 218277 November 09, 47
2020
48
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ZZZ G.R. No. 226144, October 14, 2020
51
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VALENTINO CATIG Y GENTERONI
G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020
54
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMEO DE CASTRO DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 224212, November 27, 2019
56
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNABE EULALIO y ALEJO G.R.
No. 214882, October 16, 2019
57
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NOLI VILLEGAS, JR. Y LACRETE
G.R. No. 218210, October 9, 2019
58
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENATO WAD-AS G.R. No. 221428,
February 13,2019
1. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA 9208, as

amended by RA 11862)
61
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX G.R No. 248815, March 23,
2022
63
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX AND YYY G.R. No.
225288, June 28, 2021
65
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BELINA BAWALAN y
MOLINA, BBB and CCC G.R. No. 232358, May 12, 2021
2. Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of

2004 (RA 9262)
b) Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children [Sec. 5]
● XXX VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R No. 221370, 68
June 28, 2021
I. Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security (Arts.
267-292)
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAE AL-SAAD Y BAGKAT G.R. No. 71

242414, March 15, 2021
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y RANAY G.R. 73

No. 242513, March 4, 2021
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HECTOR CORNISTA y REOTUTAR 74

G.R. No. 218915, February 19, 2020
J. Crimes Against Property (Articles 293-332)
● ERIC WU VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 207220-21, March 76

16, 2022
● ELIZABETH HORCA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 224316, 78

November 10, 2021
● SPOUSES ISIDRO DULAY III AND ELENA DULAY VS. PEOPLE OF THE 80
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021
● ROSELLA BARLIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 207418, 83

June 23, 2021
● RAMON H. DEBUQUE VS. MATT C. NILSON G.R. No. 191718, May 10, 2021 86
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AVELINA MANALANG G.R. No. 89

198015, January 20, 2021
● FERNANDO PANTE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 218969, 90

January 18, 2021
● LUIS T. ARRIOLA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199975, 93

February 24, 2020
● TEDDY AND TEOFILO GRANA VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 97

G.R. No. 202111, November 25, 2019
K. Crimes Against Chastity (Arts. 333-334, 336-346)
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNABE EULALIO y ALEJO G.R. 98

No. 214882, October 16, 2019
2. Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,

Exploitation, and Discrimination Act (RA 7610, as
amended)
a) Child Prostitution and Other Acts of Abuse [Sec. 5,
RA 7610, as amended by RA 11648]
(1) Compare Prosecution for Acts of

Lasciviousness Under Art. 366, RPC, and RA
7610, as amended
● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNABE 99

EULALIO y ALEJO G.R. No. 214882, October 16,
2019
L. Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons (Arts. 347-352)
● LUISITO G. PULIDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 220149, 101
July 27, 2021
Case Digests
J. Hernando - Criminal Law
I.B.2.C. Mitigating Circumstances
EDWIN TALABIS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 214647, March 4, 2020
By: Kerplunk31
DOCTRINE:
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following

elements must be present, to wit:
1. the accused has not been actually arrested;
2. the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and
3. the surrender is voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and
the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture
Failure to assert issues and arguments "within a reasonable time" warrants a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
FACTS:
Leonora Edoc (Leonora) and Rhoda E. Bay-An (Rhoda) filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint against
petitioner and Arsebino before the Office of Provincial Prosecutor Felix T. Cabading of La
Trinidad, Benguet. After preliminary investigation, petitioner and Arsebino were charged with
the crime of violation of Section 68 of PD 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines. After trial on the merits, the RTC found petitioner and Arsebino guilty as
charged. Petitioner and Arsebino filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC in its December 1, 2009 Order. The CA affirmed with the MODIFICATION that appellant
Edwin Talabis is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
years of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Petitioner, thus sought reconsideration of the January 16, 2014 Decision of the CA. In his Motion
for Reconsideration, petitioner imputed error on the CA for its failure to appreciate two
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and old age in modifying and imposing the
proper penalty against him. The CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration racionating
in this wise:
“An exhaustive review of the record and the Decision rendered by this Court revealed that x x x
the two (2) mitigating circumstances mentioned in the instant motion were never raised by the
appellant during his trial as part of his defense. There is, thus, no compelling reason to modify,
reverse, or set aside the assailed Decision.”
Criminal Law_HernandoBAR2023 Page 1 of 103

Case Digests
Undeterred, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of old age and of voluntary
surrender.
RULING:
Petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration of the January 16, 2014 Decision of the CA where,
for the first time, he brought to the attention of the CA the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and old age for the purpose of modifying and imposing the proper penalty against him.
As his motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner now imputes fault on the CA for not
appreciating the two mitigating circumstances in his favor.
The CA was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the belatedly raised issue of whether or not
petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. "Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of
the lower court x x x need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for
the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule."
Thus, if such mitigating circumstances were considered by the CA, or this Court for that matter,
the prosecution would be denied due process as it would have been denied the opportunity to
present evidence to disprove that petitioner did surrender spontaneously and voluntarily to the
authorities.
In any event, issues raised for the first time on appeal are barred by estoppel. Failure to assert
issues and arguments "within a reasonable time" warrants a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
Accordingly, the supposed failure on the part of the CA to appreciate the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender in petitioner's favor cannot now be raised as an assignment of error in the
present petition.

Case Digests
I.B.2.D. Aggravating Circumstances
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDDIE MANANSALA

G.R. No. 233104, September 02, 2020
By: Cyffin
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence dictates that the elements of murder are as follows:

1. that a person was killed;
2. that the accused killed him;
3. that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248; and
4. that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Thus, for the charge of Murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that:
1. the offender killed the victim,
2. through treachery, or by any of the other five qualifying circumstances, duly alleged
in the Information.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a
swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements
must be present:
1. at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
2. the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him. x x x
The elements of evident premeditation are:

1. a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime;
2. an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and
3. a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution
sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When it is not
shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it
was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. "Evident premeditation must
be based on external acts and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate
planning."

Case Digests
FACTS:
While Edward was watching Mananquil play his guitar he heard a gunshot inside the house. He
then saw Manansala facing towards the direction of the stairs and holding a gun aimed upwards.
After Edward saw Manansala running towards Lico Street, the former went back to the place
where the gunshot was heard and there he saw the victim face down on the ground bloodied and
unconscious. Blood was oozing from the victim's left chest.
Mananquil, on the other hand, after hearing the gunshot turned to his right and saw Manansala
coming out from the house of the victim. When Manansala was no longer in the vicinity of the
shooting, Mananquil went back to the victim's house. There he saw the victim lying down.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not treachery is present
RULING:
YES, treachery is present
In this case, it could be seen from the footages that Manansala stealthily entered the house of the
victim and shot him while he was going upstairs.
Medical findings also indicated that the fatal wound was inflicted from behind since the entry
point was located at the back lumbar region while the exit point was at the front portion of the
victim's body with the trajectory traversing upwards. These clearly indicate that the victim was
going upstairs with his back towards the assailant when he was shot. We are thus in agreement
with the OSG that treachery attended the killing as the victim's position rendered him defenseless
from the sudden attack from behind.
2. Whether or not evident premeditation is present
NO, evident premeditation is absent
As for the elements of evident premeditation, it was not present in the case at bar. The only basis
for the RTC and the appellate court in finding evident premeditation as attendant to the crime
was the confrontation between the victim and Manansala one day before the killing. The trial
court merely surmised that Manansala must have harbored feelings of resentment towards the
victim and has clung to that thought and killed the victim.
Nevertheless, despite the absence of evident premeditation, the killing remains to be murder in
view of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERALD MORENO Y TAZON

G.R. No. 191759, March 02, 2020
By: Limecooler
DOCTRINE:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself/herself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.
In order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following

requisites must be shown:
1. the employment of means, method, or manner of execution that would ensure the
safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, and
2. the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted
by the offender. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to
escape.
Treachery must still be appreciated even if the victim was able to retaliate as a result of his
reflexes, so long as he did not have the opportunity to repel the initial assault.
FACTS:
Adelriza was awakened from her sleep when a hard object hit her head. When she turned on the
lights, a man, wearing khaki shorts and white t-shirt, leap on their bed and repeatedly stabbed her
husband, Mijares, on the leg and chest. Mijares was able to kick the man out of the room and
even close the door. Immediately thereafter, Mijares collapsed and fell on the floor. Adelriza
shouted for help and their neighbor came to their rescue. Mijares was brought to the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH). Unfortunately, Mijares died while undergoing treatment.
During police investigation, a cartographer drew a sketch of the killer’s face. As a result,
Moreno, who fitted the description of the suspect, was then invited by the police to the station for
an interview regarding the killing incident. At the station, Moreno was positively identified by
Adelriza as the one who stabbed her husband.
Moreno denied the accusation. His mother and brother corroborated his story. He said that while
he was sleeping, a robbery occurred nearby. He went out wearing black pants and a gray T-shirt.
A neighbor asked him to get a taxi.
He then helped carry Cecil inside it. Afterwards, he went back to sleep. At around 11am of the
same day, the police invited him to the station, where Alderiza identified him as the killer.

Case Digests
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime was attended with treachery
RULING:
Yes, treachery attended the attack on Mijares which qualifies the crime to Murder.
Appellant's sudden attack on Mijares while asleep in his own home amply demonstrates
treachery in the commission of the crime. Mijares had no inkling of the impending attack that
night; or any peril to his person as he felt secured in his home. Mijares was not able to put up an
effective defense. Although he kicked and pushed the appellant out of their room, this did not
negate the presence of treachery. In People v. Baltazar, We ruled that treachery must still be
appreciated even if the victim was able to retaliate as a result of his reflexes, so long as he did
not have the opportunity to repel the initial assault.
Further, We find that the appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or form of attack in order to ensure the execution of the crime. He stabbed Mijares
several times so that he would not be a risk to himself. He lodged a bladed weapon on the
victim's chest and back. Indeed, the attack on Mijares was treacherous thereby qualifying the
killing to murder.

Case Digests
I.D.1. Three-Fold Rule
GIL MIGUEL vs. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS

By: bonana
DOCTRINE:
The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve
as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the
three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties.
FACTS:
Petitioner Miguel was found guilty of the crime of Murder and was sentenced to imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua. He was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on
January 15, 1994. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Miguel filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court.
He alleged that his continued detention no longer held legal basis because of Republic Act No.
10592 or the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law (GCTA Law). His argument was two-fold:
1. Applying the GCTA Law, he had already served a total of 38 years, 10 months, and 1 day
which is more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua; and
2. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua at 30 years.
Hence, having served a total of thirty eight (38) years, which is eight (8) years more than the
supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concludes that he has fully served his
sentence and his detention no longer holds legal basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 70 of the RPC caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at 30
years.
RULING:
No, Article 70 does not cap the perpetual penalties at 30 years.
Miguel argues that Article 70 of the RPC caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at
thirty (30) years only. He is referring to the last paragraph of said provision, which states:

Case Digests
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena
perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years.
Here, the SC explained that the said provision merely provides that in applying the three-fold
rule, the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at 30 years.
Guided by jurisprudence, it is evident that the penalty of reclusion perpetua requires

imprisonment of at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes only eligible for
pardon, and not for release. This is in stark contrast to Miguel's claim that a convict meted with
the penalty of reclusion perpetua must serve only thirty (30) years.
To recap, Miguel was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison on January 15, 1994. Therefore, as
of August 15, 2021, he has only served a total of twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7) months
of his sentence. Hence, having been punished to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
Miguel's continued detention is valid and justified. He has utterly failed to show that he is
illegally confined or deprived of his liberty.

Case Digests
I.D.2. Probation Law (PD 968, as amended)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO WAD-AS

GR. No. 221428, February 13, 2019
By: tinee
DOCTRINE:
Section 9(a) of the Probation Law is clear that the benefits of probation shall not extend to
those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years.
Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, intends to put a stop to the practice of
appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable, for the
purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in
his bid. An accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation.
FACTS:
In the evening of April 16, 2002, after an altercation with her father CCC, 12-year-old AAA left
home and went to the barangay hall of Barangay II, San Mateo, Isabela. After 10 minutes, AAA
proceeded to the park, sat beside the fountain, and cried for about 30 minutes. Accused-appellant
approached AAA and introduced himself as "Jun-jun." When AAA refused his invitation for
them to go to the plaza, he then invited her to the market place but, again, the latter refused.
Accused-appellant then forcibly pulled AAA towards the market place. AAA tried to free herself
from the accused-appellant's grasp but she was unable to escape. At that time, there were about
12 people nearby but AAA did not cry out for help because the accused-appellant threatened to
kill her.
Accused-appellant managed to pull AAA towards a parlor in the market place. The parlor was
already closed and had no lights on. Accused-appellant removed his clothes, laid AAA on the
ground, and started removing her shorts and shirt. AAA tried to resist but the accused-appellant
threatened to kill her with a knife that was protruding from his bag. After removing AAA's
clothes, accused-appellant went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to
push accused-appellant away but was unsuccessful.
At the time of the incident, witness Borja was driving his tricycle, with a passenger on-board,
witness Garlitos, when they saw accused-appellant pulling AAA towards the market place. They
immediately reported the incident to the victim's parents and also accompanied AAA's father,
CCC, to the place where they last saw AAA. The trio saw AAA and accused-appellant sitting on
a wooden bench outside Naty's Restaurant (N's Restaurant). They confronted accused-appellant
and brought him to the police station. AAA was crying and her hair was rumpled; she also
appeared to be in a state of confusion.

Case Digests
When AAA's mother, BBB, arrived at the police station, she asked AAA what happened but she
did not respond. Only when a lady police officer arrived did AAA disclose that she was raped by
accused-appellant.
On the other hand, the defense presented the accused-appellant himself, accused-appellant's
live-in partner, Realyn Acosta (Acosta), and Teddy Santos (Santos) as witnesses.
According to the evidence for the defense, accused-appellant was on his way home from work on
April 16, 2002 when he saw AAA crying beside a fountain at the public park. Accused-appellant
asked AAA to come with him to N's Restaurant, which was just across the fountain. She agreed
and went with him. She then asked him to buy bread because she was hungry. However, after a
few minutes, AAA's father and his two companions arrived and suddenly boxed
accused-appellant. Thereafter, accused-appellant was brought to the municipal police station.
Acosta and Santos both testified that many people go to the park at night since there are several
mini-stores and eateries in the area.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Accused-Appelant’s appeal can be withdrawn on the ground of his eligibility
for parole and/or probation
RULING:
NO, the SC denied the accused-appellant's prayer for withdrawal of his appeal as he is
ineligible to apply for either parole or probation.
Accused-appellant, as he is sentenced herein to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, cannot

apply for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 explicitly states that "[p]ersons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
Accused-appellant is likewise disqualified from applying for probation since the sentence
of reclusion perpetua imposed on accused-appellant in this case exceeds six (6) years of
imprisonment.
Jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies because the law is
unmistakable about it. The law is very clear and a contrary interpretation would counter its
envisioned mandate.
Thus, even assuming that herein accused-appellant is qualified to apply for parole, he has already
availed himself of the remedy of appeal twice, by appealing the RTC judgment of conviction
before the Court of Appeals, and then appealing the Court of Appeals decision affirming his
conviction before this Court, which already proscribes him from applying for probation.

Case Digests
I.D.4. An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on
Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal
Code (RA 10951)
TEDDY AND TEOFILO GRANA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 202111, November 25, 2019
By: el filibusterismo
DOCTRINE:
The penalty imposed on persons found liable for Malicious Mischief under Article 327 and
penalized under Article 329 is amended to read as follows: xxx “By arresto menor or a fine
of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than Forty thousand pesos
(P40,000), if the amount involved does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) or cannot
be estimated."
FACTS:
Complainant Bolbes and the five accused (Teddy, Gil, Ricky, Olive, and Teofilo) were neighbors
Bolbes claimed to have purchased the property subject of this controversy evidenced by a
Contract to Sell. Bolbes declared that Teddy and accused Gil and Ricky, upon the order of
Teofilo and Olive and without Bolbes's consent, entered the subject property by destroying the
iron fence, removing the cement foundation and made diggings until it reached a portion of the
foundation of his apartment, thus, exposing his apartment to danger of being destroyed in case of
heavy rains.
The defendants argued that Teofilo is the owner of the subject property, having purchased it as
evidenced by a contract of lease with option to purchase. He declared that he is the owner of the
said parcel of land and that he made some diggings and destroyed the fence because Bolbes built
them without his consent.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA is correct in affirming the penalty imposed by the MeTC and RTC
RULING:
No, the penalty imposed must be modified in accordance with RA 10951, Section 88.
In this case, the value of the damage caused to private complainant by petitioners is only
P7,500.00.

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Consequently, pursuant to Article 329 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 10951, petitioners'
original sentence of a straight penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months should be reduced to
arresto menor or imprisonment of one (1) day to thirty (30) days.

Case Digests
II.D. Crimes Against Public Interest (Arts. 161-187)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENE MONDEJAR

G.R. Nos. 245931-32, April 25, 2022
By: Nashmera
DOCTRINE:
Falsification of Public Document is committed when the public document is simulated "in a
manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading
others to errors as to its authenticity.
In Falsification of Public Documents under paragraph 2, Article 171 of the RPC, the
prosecution must prove the existence of the following elements:
1. that the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. that he takes advantage of his official position;
3. that he falsified a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated
in any act or proceeding; and
4. that such persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.
FACTS:
On June 16, 1996, the Sangguniang Barangay of Naslo, Maasin, Iloilo, enacted Resolution No. 9
requesting IBC to rechannel the path of the Tigum River to protect the barangay from the usual
overflow during typhoon season. As payment for its services, IBC was granted the authority to
extract surplus sand and gravel supply.
On June 17, 1996, the Municipal Development Council (MDC) of Maasin, Iloilo City adopted
Resolution No. 9 also requesting: (a) IBC to perform the rechanneling of the Tigum River path;
and (b) the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to issue the
Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in connection with the rechanneling project.
Consequently, on June 21, 1996, the SB of Maasin, Iloilo enacted: (1) Resolution No. 30-A,
which endorsed the resolutions of Barangay Naslo and MDC;25 and (2) Resolution No. 30-B
authorizing Mondejar to use his emergency powers to negotiate with IBC for the rechanneling
project.
On June 27, 1996, the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with IBC, through Lee Tan, for the rechanneling project. The parties agreed that IBC
would proceed with the project with no monetary consideration provided it would get the surplus
supply of sand and gravel taken out from the river after the necessary dike had been constructed.

Case Digests
On September 25, 1997, a Letter-Petition was filed with the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo by the
residents of Mabini-Rizal, Maasin, Iloilo, airing their grievances for the continued exploitation
and destruction of the Tigum River caused by the massive quarrying activities done by IBC in
Barangay Naslo, Maasin, Iloilo.
October 21, 1997, the Provincial Government of Iloilo issued their Investigation Report finding
that the Municipality ofMaasin, Iloilo violated Sections 3 and 6 (d) of Provincial Ordinance No.
11, series of 1997, by quarrying without the necessary permit from the governor, and by
quarrying within a distance of one kilometer from the bridge and other infrastructures.
Thereafter, criminal complaints for Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC, and violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
(OMB-Visayas) against all the accused involved in the rechanneling of the Tigum River path,
including Partisala.
On May 31, 1999, the OMB-Visayas issued a Resolution recommending the filing of
Informations for Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019 against all the accused.
In the case of Falsification of Public Documents, Mondejar, Partisala, Tolentino, Espejo,

Gumapas, Piolo, and Velasco were criminally charged for making it appear in the Minutes of the
Regular Session of the SB of Maasin, Iloilo, held on June 21, 1996, that Resolution No. 30-A
and Resolution No. 30-B were deliberated, approved, and/or enacted by the SB on said date.
Apparently, no such resolutions were passed and/or enacted. Arguably, the authority given to
Mondejar to enter into a MOA with IBC for the rechanneling of Tigum River path was to grant
an authority to IBC to engage into massive quarrying activities without the necessary permit.
With the foregoing falsification done by the accused, they were also charged with violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for giving unwarranted benefits and advantage, and displaying
manifest partiality, in favor of IBC by entering into a contract grossly disadvantageous to the
government, particularly to the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, which was unduly deprived of the
revenues out of the hauling activities of IBC for sand and gravel by reason of such MOA.
On November 23, 2018, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision 41 convicting Partisala of
Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Partisala, with his co-accused public officers conspired with each other
in falsifying the Minutes of the Regular Session of the SB of Maasin, Iloilo.
RULING:
Yes, accused Partisala with his co-accused public officers conspired with each other in
falsifying the Minutes of the Regular Session of the SB of Maasin, Iloilo.

Case Digests
Admittedly, Partisala was a public officer, being the Vice-Mayor of Maasin, Iloilo City, at the
time material to the case. He took advantage of his official position as the vice mayor, together
with his co-accused, to falsify the Minutes of the SB on the session held on June 21, 1996 by
making or preparing or intervening in the preparation thereof, to make it appear that the SB
deliberated on the issuance of Resolution No. 30-A and Resolution No. 30-B giving Mondejar
the authority to enter into a contract with IBC with respect to the rechanneling of Tigum River.
Contrary to Partisala's contention, there is no need to present the alleged true copy of the Minutes
of the session held on June 21, 1996, i.e., Exhibit "B,"nor it be identified by Malaga in order for
him to be held liable for Falsificationof Public Documents. It is undisputed, and in fact admitted
by Partisala himself,that he took part in executing Exhibit "8" and even signed it. However, as
per the testimonies of the SB members Trojillo and Albacete, Exhibit "8" contained items which
were not discussed during the session held on June 21, 1996, thereby causing them to participate
in a session which approved the assailed Resolution Nos. 30-A and 30-B wherein fact they did
not participate.
Also, it bears noting that Resolution No. 30 recommended the approval of Resolution No. 10,
series of 1996 issued by the MDC, while Resolution No. 30-A recommended the approval of
Resolution No. 9, series of 1996 issued by the MDC. Patently, Resolution No. 30 and Resolution
No. 30-A referred to different issues and/or subjects as contained in the resolutions issued by the
MDC. It is also worth pointing out that Resolution No. 30-A and Resolution No. 30-B were
allegedly taken from the excerpts of the Minutes of Regular Session on June 21, 1996 at 1:30
p.m., or thirty minutes ahead of Resolution No.30, which was taken up at 2:00 p.m. on June 21,
1996. If indeed the SB had taken up and deliberated the matter of rechanneling of Tigum River
ahead of construction of farm to market roads, then there is no wisdom in issuing another
"Resolution No. 30" when "Resolution No. 30-A and Resolution No. 30-B"were already enacted,
especially when these three resolutions were not at all related.
Falsification of Public Document is committed when the public document is simulated "in a
manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to
errors as to its authenticity." Clearly, Partisala's participation in the falsification of the minutes
cannot be denied, as he himself persuaded Trojillo to sign it to make it appear that there are two
resolutions justifying the MOA entered into by Mondejar with IBC.
As a rule, the Court considers as conclusive the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan unless
they fall under certain exceptions, which is not present in the case at bar. The Court accorded
great respect and weight to the Sandigabayan's findings as it had the better opportunity to
examine and evaluate the evidence presented before it.

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. CONSUELO TOROBA PALMA GIL-ROFLO

G.R. No. 249564 & 249568-76, March 21, 2022
By: twistafate
DOCTRINE:
Falsification of Public Documents has the following elements:

1. the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. the offender takes advantage of his or her official position; and
3. the offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts enumerated in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
To warrant a conviction for Falsification of Public Documents by making untruthful

statements in a narration of facts under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements:
1. the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of
facts;
2. he or she has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him or
her; and
3. the facts narrated are absolutely false.
In Falsification of Public Documents, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of

his or her official position in making the falsification when
1. he or she has the duty to make or prepare or, otherwise, to intervene in the
preparation of a document; or
2. he or she has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
Settled is the rule that Falsification of Public Documents is an intentional felony committed
by means of "dolo" or "malice" and could not result from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill. Intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus — that the
act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice
aforethought. This felony falls under the category of mala in se offenses that requires the
attendance of criminal intent. In fine, criminal intent is required in order to incur criminal
liability under Article 171 of the RPC
FACTS:
Raul M. Antopuesto (Antopuesto), a media practitioner in Davao, filed a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman regarding the alleged ghost employees in the office of Consuelo T.
Palma Gil-Roflo (Roflo), who was then a Sanggunian Panlalawigan member of the Provincial
Government of Davao Oriental.

Case Digests
Antopuesto claimed that Rosie Bajenting (Bajenting), former Administrative Aide Officer III in
the Office of Roflo in Davao Oriental, informed him that accused-appellants Jerico O. Ebita
(Jerico), Norman Jay Jacinto P. Doral (Norman), Derrick P. Andrade (Derrick), Sergio U.
Andrade (Sergio) and Chona Andrade Tolentino (Chona) are ghost employees of Roflo.
On the strength of Antopuesto's complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended the
filing of criminal charges against Roflo with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, and Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents.
The Informations alleged that Roflo, as a member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan Davao
Oriental, conspired with Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona, by making it appear that
they are legitimate job order employees in the office of Roflo, when it truth, they worked as
house helpers of Roflo and her family in their houses in Davao City. Bajenting averred that she
was instructed by Roflo to submit the names of Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona, to
the Human Resources Department (HR Department) for the issuance of contracts of services in
their favor, representing them to be job order employees of Roflo. Bajenting signed the contract
of service of Chona while a certain Bobong Morales (Morales) signed on behalf of Jerico,
Norman, Derrick and Sergio. Utilizing the falsified DTRs and ARs, Jerico, Norman, Derrick,
Sergio, and Chona, were able to collect salaries from the provincial government of Davao
Oriental, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
On cross-examination, Bajenting admitted that Roflo dismissed her (Bajenting) from the service
on February 19, 2003, for certain anomalies she committed in the performance of her duties. As
a consequence, criminal charges were filed against her for Qualified Theft and Falsification
between March 6-10, 2003. Bajenting filed the instant complaint against Roflo on March 26,
2003, days after the Qualified Theft and Falsification cases were filed against her by Roflo and
former Governor Elena Palma-Gil (Palma-Gil).
For their defense, Roflo claimed that Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona, were
legitimate job order employees of the provincial government of Davao Oriental assigned in her
(Roflo) Satellite Office in Davao City during the period relevant to the case. The purpose of the
satellite office was to provide public service to her constituents in Davao City. Specifically, the
satellite office gives assistance to the indigent patients of Davao Medical Center requiring
financial help, transportation assistance, and medical needs. The satellite office was open 24
hours a day to cater to the needs of their constituents especially in cases of emergency.
The Sandiganbayan found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
violation of Sec. 3 (e), RA 3019 and falsification of a public document under Article 171 (4) of
the RPC. The Sandiganbayan, however, exonerated Roflo from the charge of Estafa with Abuse
of Confidence for failure of the prosecution to establish all the elements of the crime.
The Sandiganbayan found accused-appellants to have conspired with one another in committing
the crime of Falsification of Public Documents. The elements of the crime were sufficiently
established by the prosecution.

Case Digests
First, that Roflo is a public officer at the time material to the case. Second, a DTR is a public
document that anyone who accomplishes it has the legal obligation to faithfully and truthfully
state the data required therein. Third, the entries in the DTRs and ARs of Jerico, Norman,
Derrick, Sergio, and Chona, which were certified correct by Roflo were absolutely false
considering that they did not actually render service. Fourth, Despite the non-rendition of work,
Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona, received salaries to the damage of the government.
Fifth, Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona uniformly claimed that they signed their
contracts of services, DTRs and ARs, and admitted that they received their respective salaries.
The Sandiganbayan found the signatures of Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona in their
contracts of services, DTRs and ARs as forgeries. All the elements of the crime of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 have also been established by the prosecution.
Roflo acted with evident bad faith when she repeatedly signed the DTRs, ARs and contracts of
service of Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona despite their non-rendition of work. As a
result thereof, the Provincial Government of Davao Oriental suffered damage in the total amount
of P349,250.00 representing the salaries of Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona.
Moreover, Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona's participation in the conspiracy was
similarly established by their admission that they received their salaries notwithstanding the fact
that they did not actually render work for the government of Davao Oriental
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents (Art. 171)
RULING:
The accused-appellants here are not guilty because the element of malicious intent on the
part of accused-appellants is sorely wanting.
As sufficiently established by the uniform testimonies of the defense witnesses, Roflo's satellite
office in Davao City had been operating since 1992 to cater to the needs of the constituents of
former Representative Palma-Gil in Davao City for convenience. This has been the constituents'
go-to-place to ask for help. Said satellite office is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week to
entertain requests for financial, medical, hospitalization, and other needs of the residents of
Davao City, who do not have the means to travel to Davao Oriental to obtain the help that they
need. It bears stressing that this fact had not been rebutted nor denied by the prosecution. In fact,
Bicoy testified that the maintenance of satellite offices outside the provincial capitol of Davao
Oriental. And the assignment of job order employees outside the province is not prohibited, but
in fact is already an established practice.
Accused-appellants cannot be held criminally culpable for Falsification of Public Documents by

making untruthful statements in a narration of facts in the absence of a clear showing that they
acted with malicious intent when they affixed their signatures on the contested documents.

Case Digests
To be sure, Jerico, Norman, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona, were acting in good faith and in the
honest belief that they were permitted to work outside the agency's prescribed office hours
pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 020790, and as confirmed by the HR Department.
In addition, they cannot be faulted for indicating in their DTRs that they worked from 8:00 a.m.
to 5:00 p.m. because this was the directive of the accounting office, otherwise, their salaries
would not be processed. While it is true that the defense failed to present a witness from the
Accounting Office to confirm this statement, We cannot just simply ignore the fact that
accused-appellants consistently testified to this, which testimonies were sufficiently corroborated
by HR Manager Bicoy.
Accordingly, no criminal intent may be imputed against accused-appellants for merely relying on
previous practice. To reiterate, these customs or processes were already in place in the provincial
government of Davao Oriental when Jerico, Nonnan, Derrick, Sergio, and Chona joined the
agency. There is likewise no reason for them to distrust or to suspect the directives of the HR
Department and the Accounting Office simply because they are authorities in this aspect.

Case Digests
II.E.1. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DONATO C. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 258077, June 15, 2022
By: Celyn
DOCTRINE:
In cases involving Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that it is the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the
corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.
To ensure the integrity of the seized drugs, the prosecution must account for each link in
the chain of custody, as follows:
1. the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
2. the tum-over of the seized illegal drug to the investigating officer;
3. the tum-over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and
4. the tum-over and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the
court.
FACTS:
On September 15, 2017, Senior Police Officer 2 Lorenzo D. Colinares, Jr. (SPO2 Colinares), of
the Calamba City Police Station received a phone call from a confidential informant (CI) that
Donato was engaged in selling drugs.
SPO2 Colinares relayed the information to their Officer-in-Charge, Police Superintendent

Sancho Celedio, who immediately formed a buy-bust team for the arrest of Donato. During the
briefing, PO1 Villarino was designated as the poseur-buyer, while PO2 Elauria would serve as
his back-up. PO1 Villarino then prepared a P500.00 bill to be used as buy-bust money, which he
marked with his initials "JV." The planned buy-bust operation was thereafter coordinated with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
The buy-bust team then proceeded to the target area in the company of media representative
(Trinidad) and barangay chairman (Manalo). Upon their arrival at the target area, POl Villarino
and PO2 Elauria, together with the CI, went to Donato's house while the rest of the team
remained outside. The CI then introduced the two police officers to Donato as prospective buyers
of shabu.

Case Digests
Donato asked PO1 Villarino "Magkano kukunin niyo" to which the latter replied "Limang piso
lang boss." PO1 Villarino handed the marked money to Donato, who in turn, invited them inside
the house.
While POI Villarino and PO2 Elauria were inside Donato's house, the CI, pretending to buy a
cigarette, left the house to inform the back-up team to proceed to Donato's house. Meanwhile,
Donato took one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu from a black
pouch on top of the table, and gave it to PO1 Villarino, who immediately placed it in his right
pocket. Upon receipt of the merchandise, PO1 Villarino introduced themselves as police officers
and arrested Donato. Thereafter, the back-up team, together with Trinidad and Manalo, arrived.
Upon frisking Donato, PO1 Villarino recovered the buy-bust money. The search of the black
pouch also yielded four more plastic sachets suspected to contain shabu.
After the arrest, POI Villarino conducted the marking and inventory of the seized items in the
house of Donato, in the presence of Trinidad and Manalo. POI Villarino marked the plastic
sachet he bought from Donato with "JPV-BB." The remaining four sachets were marked with
"JPV-1," "JPV-2," "JPV-3 "and "JPV-4" and the black pouch with "JPV-5."
Subsequently, Donato was brought to the barangay hall and eventually to the police station. At
the station, PCINSP Malayo prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of
the plastic sachets, as well as the Request for Drug Test. Thereafter, POI Villarino and PO2
Elauria turned over the seized items to Police Office 2 Comia of the Regional Crime Laboratory,
Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna.
Upon examination conducted by forensic chemist, Police Chief Inspector Huelgas (PCI
Huelgas), the specimens tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, as per Chemistry Report No. D-1339-17.
During trial, however, the parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of PCI Huelgas, and in
lieu thereof, stipulated on the qualifications of PCI Huelgas as the forensic chemist who
examined the specimens and concluded that the substance tested positive for shabu.
The RTC rendered a Decision which was affirmed by CA finding Donato guilty as charged. It
gave· credence to the positive testimony of POl Villarino over Donato's defense of denial.
ISSUE:
Whether Donato's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
No, Donato’s guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

Case Digests
The Court notes that the first link had been complied with by the police officers. The necessary
witnesses - an elective government official, Manalo, and a member of the media, Trinidad, were
present during the conduct of inventory, which was done immediately after seizure. Both
witnesses signed the Receipt of Physical Inventory. While the markings made on the items were
not exactly as directed in the PNP Manual, the markings made by PO1 Villarino using his initials
still served the purpose of making the seized items visually and physically distinct, separating
them from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence.
Similarly, there was no break in the second link.
PO1 Villarino should have endorsed the seized items to the investigating officer, PCINSP
Malayo, who shall then turn it over to the crime laboratory. Nonetheless, the Court held in
Casilang that there was substantial compliance with the second link considering that the
prosecution was able to ecord the movement of the seized item at each stage, from the time of
seizure to its receipt by the forensic laboratory. The identities of the persons who held the seized
item in custody were stablished, as well as the date and time when transfer of custody was made.
In the instant case, while there was no turnover to the investigating officer, the movement of the
seized items was duly recorded and the identities of the persons who had custody thereof as well
as the date and time when transfer was made were appropriately established. Besides, the
testimony of PO1 Villarino sufficiently ensured that the integrity of the seized items was
preserved while in his custody.
Likewise, in People v. Macaspac, the Court decreed that the failure of the apprehending officer
to tum over the seized item to an investigator if he (apprehending officer) remained in custody of
the same until the evidence was submitted to the Crime Laboratory, was not a breach in the chain
of custody.
Here, POI Villarino took charge of the seized items from the moment of confiscation up to its
submission to the crime laboratory.
However, the prosecution failed to demonstrate observance of the third and fourth links in the
chain of custody.
Anent the third link, POI Villarino testified that he and PO2 Elauria personally delivered the drug
specimens to the crime laboratory, together with the Requests for Laboratory Examination and
Drug Test. While it appears that the requests were stamp received by PO2 Comia, the latter was
not presented in court to shed light on the condition of the contraband when it was received, as
well as the necessary precautions employed to ensure that the seized illegal drugs were not
contaminated, changed, or altered while in PO2 Comia’s custody. Accordingly, absent the
testimony of P02 Comia, the person who supposedly received the illegal drugs from PO1
Villarino, makes the third link in the chain of custody flawed.
The Court held that the prosecution failed to comply with the fourth link in the chain of custody.

Case Digests
The fourth link refers to the tum-over and submission of the dangerous drug from the forensic
chemist to the court. Here, the testimony of PCI Huelgas was dispensed with because the defense
admitted her proposed testimony. However, PCI Huelgas' stipulated testimony only covered her
findings on the drug sample submitted by PO1 Villarino. She did not discuss how she handled
the specimens from the time of receipt until their presentation in court. There was further no
description of the method she utilized in analyzing the chemical composition of the drug sample.
The failure of the prosecution to place PCI Huelgas on the witness stand raised nagging
questions regarding the post-examination custody that were left unanswered by the prosecution
evidence, in particular, who exercised custody and possession of the specimens after the
chemical examination, and how they were handled, stored, and safeguarded pending their
presentation as evidence in court. Consequently, there was a missing link from the point when
the drugs were in the hands of PCI Huelgas, to the point when the same were submitted to the
court. Thus, it was not convincingly shown whether the specimens submitted to the court were
the same plastic sachets of shabu that were actually recovered from Donato.
In sum, the foregoing lapses in the chain of custody of the illegal drug purportedly seized from
Donato, fatally compromised its integrity and evidentiary value. Hence, Donato's acquittal is
warranted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KEVIN CASTILLO Y GALANG

G.R. No. 242520, November 15, 2021
By: OraEtLabora
DOCTRINE:
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the following elements must be
established:
1. the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and consideration; and
2. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. Additionally, in
prosecutions for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the State bears the
burden of not only proving the elements of the offense of sale of dangerous drugs,
but also of proving the corpus delicti, the body of the crime. The dangerous drug
itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
To establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti, the proper handling of
the confiscated drug must be shown. When substantial gaps occur in the chain of custody
as to raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court, the prosecution
does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the corpus delicti.
The chain of custody rule is prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 as amended by
RA 10640.

Case Digests
The prosecution must establish the following links in the chain of custody:
1. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recm1ered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
2. The turnover of the illegal drugs seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
3. The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and
4. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court
Deviations from the clear-cut procedure may be allowed, the same however:
1. must be satisfactorily explained by the prosecution;
2. the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had been preserved; and
3. the justifiable ground for noncompliance is proven as a fact.
Moreover, it must be alleged and proved that earnest efforts were made to secure the
attendance of the necessary witnesses.
FACTS:
An Information was filed against Castillo for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 or
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. On or about the 11th day of December 2015, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, without lawful authority, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport, or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point fifty (0.50) gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On September 28, 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Castillo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 or Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
The RTC found that the prosecution convincingly established the elements of the crime and that
the chain of custody of the subject drugs had not been broken.
Aggrieved by the RTC's decision, Castillo appealed to the CA. On February 27, 2018, the CA
affirmed in toto the RTC's Decision and held that the prosecution substantially established every
link in the chain of custody of the seized items through testimonial and physical evidence.
According to the CA, there was nothing to convince the court that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items could have been jeopardized. The CA also upheld the validity of the
buy-bust operation and discredited Castillo's defense of denial.
Dissatisfied with the CA's ruling, Castillo filed a notice of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Castillo is guilty of illegal sale of shabu.

Case Digests
RULING:
The appeal is meritorious.
Castillo was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
The testimony of PO3 Lazo and the physical evidence presented in trial confirms the presence of
the first two elements of Illegal Sale. There is no doubt that Castillo delivered 0.50 gram of
shabu to PO3 Lazo, who in exchange gave marked bills amounting to P2,500.00 as
consideration.
However, contrary to the ruling of the CA, the SC finds that the prosecution failed to establish
the apprehending team's compliance with the chain of custody rule, particularly regarding the
required witnesses.
The first link involves the seizure, marking, physical inventory, and photographing of the seized
items.
In this case, the apprehending team's explanation is hardly satisfactory. There was no showing of
an imminent danger to their life. Also, the law enforcers' allegation that the place was unsafe was
self-serving. It was not established as a fact. Hence, it does not merit any credence.
Having failed to establish the integrity of the first link in the chain of custody, it is no longer
necessary to discuss the subsequent three links in the chain. Since the first link in the chain is
already shrouded in doubt, the rest of the links in the chain suffers the same infirmity; the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items already became doubtful.
In fine, the failure of the apprehending team to observe the procedural requirements set forth in
Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165, as amended by R.A. 10640, puts into serious doubt the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items casting reasonable doubt on Castilio's guilt.
Thus, this Court is constrained to acquit Castillo.
EMILY ESTORES Y PECARDAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192332, January 11, 2021
By: thegreyqueen
DOCTRINE:
In the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 16, Article III, in
relation to Section 2(e) (2), Article I of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the
prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the
drugs.

Case Digests
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of
the accused.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found.
FACTS:
On July 5, 1999, upon the order of PCI Tambungan, then the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Interdiction Group,
PO2 Lagran and the confidential informant (CI) conducted a test buy operation against petitioner
Emily and accused Miguel and Josefina in their residence located at No. 12 Pusoy St.,
Masambong, Quezon City. PO2 Lagran successfully bought a P5,000 worth of shabu from
accused Miguel which, when submitted for laboratory examination tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thereafter, PCI Tambungan instructed SPO2 Conlu to apply
for a search warrant with the depositions of PO2 Lagran and the CI, the sketch of the given
address and the result of the laboratory examination as supporting documents.
On July 14, 1999, Executive Judge Manuel Fernandez, Jr. of the RTC of Las Piñas issued Search
Warrant No. 99-0059 against petitioner Emily and accused Miguel and Josefina at their
three-storey residence located at No. 12, Pusoy St., Masambong, Quezon City.
On July 15, 1999, at around 9:30 in the morning, PCI Tambungan formed a team and conducted
the search upon the house located at No. 12, Pusoy St., Masambong, Quezon City.
They searched the room in the third floor in the presence of petitioner Emily and accused Miguel
where SPO2 Conlu found a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance in one of the
drawers of the cabinet.
SPO2 Conlu marked the confiscated item with his initials "AC" and submitted it to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. The results yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Subsequently, petitioner Emily together with her co-accused Miguel and Josefina
were charged with violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article 1 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
ISSUE:
Whether Emily has “constructive” possession and knowledge of the prohibited drugs.

Case Digests
RULING:
Yes, Emily has “constructive” possession and knowledge of the prohibited drugs.
In this case, the illegal drugs were found in the cabinet inside Emily's room which she admittedly
shared with Miguel. The fact that Emily shared with Miguel the room where the illegal drugs
were found will not exculpate her from criminal liability. First, Emily exercised control and
dominion over the said room where the illegal drugs were found as she was the occupant. Emily
herself admitted that Miguel did not permanently stay therein as he normally would stay out for
two to three months. Lastly, she testified that when the search was conducted, she was sleeping
inside the room where the illegal drugs were found while accused Miguel was in another room.
These circumstances sufficiently lead to the conclusion that Emily knew of the existence of the
illegal drugs in her room and had constructive possession of the seized illegal drugs.
Based on the foregoing, the evidence clearly shows that Emily was caught in constructive
possession of illegal drugs found in her room by virtue of a search and seizure conducted by the
police officers. The testimonies of the SPO2 Conlu and PCI Tambungan also proved that the
identity and evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs were duly preserved. The
testimonies of the police officers were consistent with and corroborated each other.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEX BALUYOT Y BIRANDA

G.R. No. 243390, October 05, 2020
By: Pancit
DOCTRINE:
To successfully prosecute the offense of Sale of Illegal Drugs under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, the following elements must be present:
1. the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration;
and
2. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In a buy-bust operation, the
receipt by the poseur-buyer of the dangerous drug and the corresponding receipt by
the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
What matters is the proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence
The failure to comply with the three-witness requirement produces a gap in the chain of
custody of the seized items that adversely affects the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items.This raises doubts that the integrity of the seized items may have been
compromised.
FACTS:

Case Digests
On March 5, 2013, a confidential informant (CI) of PDEA informed the team of Intelligence IO1
Bitong about the drug activity of a certain Alex in Caloocan City. IO1 Bitong's team is based in
Camp Olivas, Pampanga. IO1 Molina was assigned as the poseur-buyer for the operation while
Intelligence Officer 1 Regie Pinto (IO1 Pinto) was designated as the arresting officer. There were
three to four other members of the team. Two fivehundred peso (P500.00) bills were given to
IO1 Molina to serve as buy-bust money. He then placed his initials, "REM," on the left portion of
the bills.
At around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, IO1 Molina and the CI walked to the house of Alex while
the other team members proceeded to their positions. The sale took place. Alex handed the
sachet to IO1 Molina. In turn, IO1 Molina gave the marked five-hundred peso bill to Alex as
payment. Shortly thereafter, IO1 Molina called up the cellphone of IO1 Pinto, giving the signal
for the arrest to proceed.
IO1 Pinto and the other team members rushed to the scene and arrested Alex. IO1 Pinto
recovered the marked five-hundred peso (P500.00) bill from Alex and handed it to IO1 Molina.
Another medium-sized plastic sachet containing two smaller plastic sachets of shabu was
recovered from Alex's black sling bag. However, IO1 Pinto stated in his testimony that he was
not able to see the contents of the black sling bag at the time of the operation until IO1 Molina
subsequently opened it. IO1 Molina marked the plastic sachet subject of the illegal sale as "EXH
A REM 3/5/2013," and the medium plastic sachet as "EXH B-2a REM 3/5/2013" when they
were already in the PDEA National Headqua11ers in Quezon City, as they opted to leave the site
because of the possible danger. He did not mark the two smaller plastic sachets inside the
medium plastic sachet. He then executed an inventory receipt. He also prepared the requests for
laboratory examination of the seized items and drug test on Alex, which were signed by IO1
Bitong.
Chemist Erno found that the specimens in the plastic sachets given to her are positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride. Also, the drug test that she conducted on Alex also
yielded positive results as to the use of dangerous drugs.
On March 7, 2013, an information was filed against Alex for violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165 or Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs in the RTC of Caloocan City.
On the same date, a second Information was tiled against Alex for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165 or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Criminal Case No. 89535
in the same RTC.
On April 5, 2013, Alex was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to both charges. On August 1,
2013, pre-trial was held. Trial followed.
Alex contends that: (1) the identity of the allegedly seized plastic sachets of shabu was not
established because the chain of custody rule was not followed by the PDEA officers when the
subject drugs were not immediately marked after seizure, and there were only two witnesses
during the marking;

Case Digests
Conversely, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintains that: (1) the
prosecution had sufficiently preserved the integrity of the seized illegal drugs and the chain of
custody thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the chain of custody rule was followed by the PDEA officers when the subject drugs
were not immediately marked after seizure and there were only two witnesses during the
marking
RULING:
No, the chain of custody rule was not followed.
The prosecution's setback in this case lies in the failure of the drug enforcement officers to
observe the chain of custody rule, specifically in proving the identity of the object of the sale,
i.e., the dangerous drugs. The Court agrees with Alex that the chain of custody rule was not
properly observed during the operation.
Related to establishing the identity of the object of the illegal sale is the observance of the chain
of custody rule. The chain of custody rule in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 has been amended
on July 15, 2014 by RA 10640 to the extent that the witness requirement during the marking of
the seized items has been relaxed. But the applicable rule for this case is Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 prior to its amendment as the transaction happened on March 5, 2013.
The said provisions provide that the marking, photographing, and inventory of the seized items
must be done immediately after seizure and confiscation of the items in the presence of three
witnesses-a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
official. The purpose of this rule is to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
dangerous drugs in order to fully remove doubts as to its identity.
The Court notes that the PDEA officers failed to observe the three-witness requirement during
the marking of the seized items. This lapse in procedure warrants the acquittal of Alex.
To reiterate, under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 prior to its amendment, three (3) witnesses
are required to be present during the marking, photographing, and inventory of the seized items-a
representative from the media, the DOJ, and any elected official. It goes without saying that the
accused or his representative or counsel should also be present
Indubitably, this strict requirement is subject to exceptions as well. The case of People v. Lim
holds that in the event of absence of one or more of the witnesses, the prosecution must allege
and prove that their presence during the inventory of the seized items was not obtained due to
justifiable reasons.

Case Digests
In this case, only two (2) witnesses were present during the marking of the seized items.
Kagawad Jose Ruiz of Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City was the elected public official; Mr.
Jimmy Mendoza was the representative from the media. There was no representative from the
DOJ. The records did not show that the prosecution explained or justified the absence of said
representative from the DOJ during the marking, photographing, and inventory of the seized
items. In fact, IO1 Molina, when asked during his cross examination, admitted that there were
only two (2) witnesses present during the inventory of the seized items.Neither did IO1 Molina
nor IO1 Pinto provide any explanation to justify the absence of a representative from the DOJ.
Furthermore, the PDEA officers had sufficient time to procure a third witness. The records show
that the operation was scheduled, and was in fact conducted late in the afternoon of March 5,
2013 with the actual buy-bust conducted at night. They had the whole day to procure the third
witness after they were informed of the alleged illegal activities in the morning of the same day;
yet, they have failed to do so.
The failure to comply with the three-witness requirement produces a gap in the chain of custody
of the seized items that adversely affects the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.This raises doubts that the integrity of the seized items may have been compromised.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOHNNY ARELLAGA Y SABADO

G.R. No. 231796, August 24, 2020
By: Attysako
DOCTRINE:
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, the prosecution must establish the following elements:
1. the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration;
and
2. the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is important is that
the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the object of the
transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be same drugs
seized from the accused.
With regard to the charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must be established:
1. the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs;
2. such possession was not authorized by law; and
3. the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous
drugs
R.A. No. 9165, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 10640 on July 15, 2014, is the law
applicable as the alleged crimes in this case were committed on May 23, 2013.

Case Digests
The original version of Section 21 requires the presence of three witnesses during the
inventory and photograph taking:
1. media representative;
2. representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and
3. any elected public official.
For the saving clause to apply, however, the following must be present:
1. the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict
compliance; and
2. the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending team.
FACTS:
On or about May 23, 2013, Accused Johhny Sabado was caught in possession of shabu which is
contrary to law.
Version of Prosection:
Based on a tip by a confidential informant that appellant was looking for a buyer of shabu, PO2
Reyes conducted a buy-bust operation against the appellant where he himself posed as the poseur
buyer of shabu. After PO2 Reyes handed to appellant the P500.00 bill marked with his initials,
"RR," appellant went to his motorcycle and retrieved a coin purse from its compartment.
Appellant opened the coin purse and pulled out four heat-sealed transparent sachets containing
what appeared to be shabu. After inspecting one sachet, PO2 Reyes touched his left ear to signal
the rest of the buy-bust team that the sale had been consummated.
PO2 Reyes then introduced himself as a police officer and arrested appellant. He then frisked the
appellant and recovered from him the marked money and the coin purse containing three more
heat-sealed sachets. PO2 Reyes marked the sachet he bought from appellant with "JSA," while
the other three sachets found in appellant's possession were marked as "JSA-1," "JSA-2," and
"JSA-3."
PO2 Reyes then took photos of the crime scene and the evidence recovered from appellant. PO2
Reyes also accomplished an Inventory of Property/Seized Evidence.
Thereafter, he turned over the seized evidence together with the Chain of Custody form to PO3
Baladjay upon arrival at the police station.
Version of Defense:
Appellant claimed that he and Nica (his stepdaughter) were at the house of his mother-in-law
watching television when suddenly, PO2 Reyes and PO3 Baladjay barged in.

Case Digests
One of the police officers pointed a firearm at him while PO2 Reyes proceeded to search the
second floor of the house. Appellant claimed that due to the unwarranted invasion and search of
the house, personal items such as cellular phones, jewelry, and cash were lost and presumably
stolen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in convicting the accused when the attesting officers failed
to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
RULING:
YES, the lower courts erred in convicting the accused when the attesting officers failed to
strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
In this case, the Court finds that the buy-bust team failed to establish the presence of the three
required witnesses at the time of the inventory and photograph taking of the drugs. Neither was it
shown that there were justifiable grounds for their absence.
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of proving compliance with the
requirements of Section 21. In case of deviation from or non-compliance with the said
requirements, the prosecution must provide a sufficient explanation why Section 21 was not
complied with. The Court has held in People v. Lim that the following are justifiable reasons for
not securing three witnesses during the inventory and photograph taking:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their
safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate
retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest
efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official
within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no
fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5)
the constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even
before the offenders could escape.
The IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides for a saving clause to ensure that not every non-compliance
with the procedure for the preservation of the chain of custody will prejudice the prosecution's
case against the accused.
In this case, the prosecution did not explain the absence of the three required witnesses nor did it
try to justify the police's deviation from the mandatory procedure outlined in Section 21. Without
the three witnesses, there is reasonable doubt on the identity of the seized drugs itself. Without
the three witnesses, the Court is unsure whether there had been planting of evidence and/or
contamination of the seized drugs. Because of this, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised. Consequently, appellant must be acquitted.

Case Digests
II.G.1.b. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers [Sec. 3]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENE MONDEJAR

G.R. Nos. 245931-32, April 25, 2022
By: Nashmera
DOCTRINE:
The following elements of the offense falling under Section 3(e) of RA 3019:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or
judicial functions;
3. The act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
4. The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
FACTS:
On June 16, 1996, the Sangguniang Barangay of Naslo, Maasin, Iloilo, enacted Resolution No. 9
requesting IBC to rechannel the path of the Tigum River to protect the barangay from the usual
overflow during typhoon season. As payment for its services, IBC was granted the authority to
extract surplus sand and gravel supply.
On June 17, 1996, the Municipal Development Council (MDC) of Maasin, Iloilo City adopted
Resolution No. 9 also requesting: (a) IBC to perform the rechanneling of the Tigum River path;
and (b) the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to issue the
Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in connection with the rechanneling project.
Consequently, on June 21, 1996, the SB of Maasin, Iloilo enacted: (1) Resolution No. 30-A,
which endorsed the resolutions of Barangay Naslo and MDC;25 and (2) Resolution No. 30-B
authorizing Mondejar to use his emergency powers to negotiate with IBC for the rechanneling
project.
On June 27, 1996, the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with IBC, through Lee Tan, for the rechanneling project. The parties agreed that IBC
would proceed with the project with no monetary consideration provided it would get the surplus
supply of sand and gravel taken out from the river after the necessary dike had been constructed.
On September 25, 1997, a Letter-Petition was filed with the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo by the
residents of Mabini-Rizal, Maasin, Iloilo, airing their grievances for the continued exploitation

Case Digests
and destruction of the Tigum River caused by the massive quarrying activities done by IBC in
Barangay Naslo, Maasin, Iloilo.
October 21, 1997, the Provincial Government of Iloilo issued their Investigation Report finding
that the Municipality ofMaasin, Iloilo violated Sections 3 and 6 (d) of Provincial Ordinance No.
11, series of 1997, by quarrying without the necessary permit from the governor, and by
quarrying within a distance of one kilometer from the bridge and other infrastructures.
Thereafter, criminal complaints for Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC, and violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
(OMB-Visayas) against all the accused involved in the rechanneling of the Tigum River path,
including Partisala.
On May 31, 1999, the OMB-Visayas issued a Resolution recommending the filing of
Informations for Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019 against all the accused.
In the case of Falsification of Public Documents, Mondejar, Partisala, Tolentino, Espejo,

Gumapas, Piolo, and Velasco were criminally charged for making it appear in the Minutes of the
Regular Session of the SB of Maasin, Iloilo, held on June 21, 1996, that Resolution No. 30-A
and Resolution No. 30-B were deliberated, approved, and/or enacted by the SB on said date.
Apparently, no such resolutions were passed and/or enacted. Arguably, the authority given to
Mondejar to enter into a MOA with IBC for the rechanneling of Tigum River path was to grant
an authority to IBC to engage into massive quarrying activities without the necessary permit.
With the foregoing falsification done by the accused, they were also charged with violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for giving unwarranted benefits and advantage, and displaying
manifest partiality, in favor of IBC by entering into a contract grossly disadvantageous to the
government, particularly to the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, which was unduly deprived of the
revenues out of the hauling activities of IBC for sand and gravel by reason of such MOA.
On November 23, 2018, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision 41 convicting Partisala of
Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of SB Members, including herein accused Partisala, in authorizing then
Mayor Rene Mondejar to enter in the Memorandum of Agreement, has given unwarranted
benefit and/or advantage to Helen Edith Lee Tan in violation of R.A. No. 3019.
RULING:
Yes, the act of SB Members, including herein accused Partisala, in authorizing the Mayor
Rene Mondejar to enter in the Memorandum of Agreement, has given unwarranted benefit
and/or advantage to Helen Edith Lee Tan in violation of R.A. No. 3019.

Case Digests
Partisala is the Vice Mayor of Maas in Iloilo at the time material to the offense charged. A
perusal of the records reveal that he deliberately acted with manifest partiality and bad faith
when he, as the presiding officer of the with manifest partiality and bad faith when he, as the
presiding officer of the SB, signed Exhibit "8" and persuaded the other sangguniang members to
sign it, knowing fully well that there were certain items not included nor discussed on the regular
session held on June 21, 1996, specifically the enactment of Resolution No. 30-A and Resolution
No. 30-B.
As a result thereof, Mondejar was given the authority to enter into a MOA with IBC with respect
to the rechanneling of Tigum River, which was grossly disadvantageous to the government. IBC
was given unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference by virtue of the MOA to rechannel the
Tigum River, not in the form of monetary compensation, but by getting the surplus supply of
sand and gravel extracted from the river, despite not having the necessary permit to do so. As per
Section 138 of the Local Government Code, the permit to extract sand, gravel, and other quarry
resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, by virtue of an ordinance of the
sangguniang panlalawigan.
With the enactment of Resolution No. 30-A and Resolution No. 30-B, which paved the way for
the execution of the MOA, the SB of Maasin, Iloilo clearly acted without authority, and caused
undue injury to the government, when it authorized IBC to extract sand and gravel from Tigum
River. As per the Investigation Report dated October 21, 1997 and Final Investigation dated
November 18, 1997 issued by the Provincial Legal Office,IBC was able to extract sand and
gravel without any permit from the provincial government and/or payment of any tax, on the
pretext that it was doing a rechanneling project for the benefit of the municipality as per the
MOA. Clearly, the execution of the MOA contemplates unwarranted benefit, advantage, or
preference given to IBC, which is proscribed by RA 3019. The said benefit, advantage, or
preference would not have been probable without the participation of Partisala, as the presiding
officer of the SB of Maas in, Iloilo, in enacting Resolution No. 30-A and Resolution No. 30-B,
through falsification of the minutes of the regular session dated June 21, 1996.
PEOPLES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD R ENOJO

G.R. No. 252258, April 6, 2022
By: clairefrance
DOCTRINE:
The elements of the crime under Sec. 3 (a) of RA No. 3019 are the following:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform an
act, or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to
commit an act; and

Case Digests
3. the act performed by the other public officer, or committed by the offender,
constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority, or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter
Section 3(a) requires a deliberate intent on the part of the public official concerned to
violate those rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority, or to commit
an offense in connection with official duties
FACTS:
On January 15, 2013 certain Dauin Point Lan Corporation (DPLC), represented by its directors
bought a land from Ramon Regalado with city address at Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental (Neg
Or), an approximate area of 7,081 square meter situated in District II Dauin, Neg Or. (designated
as lot 934). DPLC, through one of the Board of Directors, Ralph Gavin Hughes, applied for
fencing from the municipality of Dauin. While pending from the issuance or permit, the
municipality received a letter from Atty. Richard Enojo who was claiming for the land as he
acquired it as payment for his legal services of Ramon Regalado in the civil case docketed
CC-188 pending before MCTC Dauin.
The municipality referred the issue DILG Region 7 which resulted in the issuance of a fencing
permit in favor of DPLC as there was no proof of ownership submitted by Atty Enojo. In the
meantime, on February 27, 2013, Atty. Enojo went to the Dauin Police Station asking for the
conference with Hughes, his legal counsel Atty. Violeta, and Ramon Regalado thru SPO4
Proculito Briones. Consequently, SPO4 Briones, in adherence to the request of Atty Enjo, sent a
radio message to Dumaguete Police Station asking for the following named persons.
Aggrieved by Enojo’s request for conference and by involving Dauin Police Station in the land
dispute, Hughes filed a criminal and administrative case before SandiganBayan (Visayan region)
for violation Sec3 (a) of the RA 3019, for persuading, inducing and influencing another public
official to perform an act contrary to the rules and regulation promulgated by the competent
authority in connection with official duties or allowing himself to be persuaded , influenced and
induced to commit such offense, which related to his conviction and elevating the ace before SC
after the denial of his MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Enoj is guilty for violation of Section 3 (a) of RA 3019.
RULING:
Atty. Enojo is not guilty for violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019.
The second element of the charge is not present- persuading, inducing and influencing another
public officer.

Case Digests
The Court cannot agree with the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan that Enojo had persuaded or
induced SP04 Briones into sending the radio message requesting Hughes, Violeta, and Regalado
for a conference. In his testimony, SP04 Briones himself denied being persuaded by Atty. Enojo
and explained why he had acted on the latter's request.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that the second element of persuasion or inducement is absent
in the instant case. While SP04 Briones actually performed the act in question, i.e., sending the
radio message, he did so not because Atty. Enojo told him to, but because he believed that it was
his office's SOP to entertain and provide assistance to any person who comes to the police for
help. SP04 Briones fm1her testified that it was not because of Atty. Enojo's status or position that
he performed the said act. In other words, SP04 Briones made the invitation on the mistaken
belief that it was his duty to do so, which necessarily negates the presence of any undue
influence.
The first element is obtaining here considering that Enojo was a Provincial Legal Officer when
the purported crime was committed.
Meanwhile, the third element is likewise present, given that Enojo's request to call in Hughes,
Violeta, and Regalado for a conference, and SPO4 Briones' subsequent act of sending a radio
message to the Dumaguete Police Station to summon said persons, constituted a violation of
rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority. Particularly, these acts went
beyond the scope of the powers and functions of the Philippine National Police (PNP), as
enumerated in Section 24 of RA 6975.
Here, the circumstances show that Enojo's purpose of requesting SP04 Briones to schedule a
conference does not correspond to any of the above duties of the PNP. What Enojo actually
wanted to accomplish was to "extract information from Gavin Hughes, Merlinda Regalado, and
Atty. Violeta" with regard to his alleged ownership of a portion of Lot 394.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Enojo's act was purely to advance his own
personal interest or agenda, and was not for any official or legitimate police purpose as provided
in Section 24 of RA 6975.
SP04 Briones' act of sending a radio message to invite Hughes, et al. to come to the police
station runs directly counter to established police protocol as enumerated in the PNP's published
Citizen's Primer on Law Enforcement (Primer). Among the police operations that may be
conducted in relation to the public, SP04 Briones' act most appropriately falls under "Citizen
Contact." The said Primer provides that citizen contact may be initiated "only for legitimate
police-related purposes to engender citizen support in solving crimes." Here, there was no crime
or criminal investigation involved at all. Rather, there was merely an alleged dispute involving
the subject property in which Enojo believed he had interests over.
In this case, both Enojo, with his presumed knowledge of the law as a lawyer, and SPO4 Briones,
with his 20 years of police experience, should have been well apprised of the boundaries of
police authority in the settlement of civil disputes. Their acts clearly evinced deliberateness
which cannot be countenanced.

Case Digests
DOMINADOR G. MARZAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 226167, October 11, 2021
By: Kerplunk31
DOCTRINE:
The elements of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 are:

1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an
act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
an act;
3. The act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender
constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promoted by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter.
The crime of violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either of the
following modes:
1. when the offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the public
officer; or
2. when the public officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to
perform said act which constitutes a violation of rules and regulations promulgated
by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
public officer.
In reference to the second mode of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, it is immaterial whether the
one who induced him was likewise a public officer or a private individual
FACTS:
Dominador Marzan, a Jail Officer, was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section
3(a) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with his act of
releasing from detention without Court Order two detainees. Marzan claimed that a document
entitled “Recognizance” and an unsigned Commitment Order were shown by his superior,
Renato Goyo, to him. Thereafter, the latter instructed him to release the detainees to which he
obliged. The Sandiganbayan convicted Marzan of the crime charged and dismissed his Motion
for Reconsideration. Marzan then filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari and argued
that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he allowed himself to be
persuaded, induced or influenced to release the detainees.

Case Digests
ISSUES:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in convicting Marzan despite the prosecution’s alleged
failure to prove all the elements of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES, we find that the prosecution duly established the existence of the foregoing elements.
Both Marzan and Atty, Rupisan were charged with Violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, in view
of the Recognizance which was issued in violation of the Rules of Court. As a consequence
thereof, detention prisoners Cyrus and Pascua were released in clear violation of the BJMP
Manual.
Firstly, it is undisputed that Marzan was a public officer at the time of the commission of the
crime. The parties have stipulated that Marzan was a Senior Jail Officer 3 (SJ03) of the BJMP,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, while Atty. Rupisan was the Provincial Legal Officer of the Province
ofNueva Vizcaya.
On the part of Atty. Rupisan, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty under the first mode of
Section 3(a) of RA 3019 in view of his unauthorized intervention in the processing of the release
of Cyrus and Pascua in the form of a Recognizance despite the pendency of the preliminary
investigation. As Provincial Legal Officer of Nueva Vizcaya, he had considerable authority and
influence over other public officials in the province especially when it came to legal matters. His
issuance of the Recognizance undoubtedly demonstrated sufficient persuasion, inducement and
influence which led his co-accused SJO3 Dominador G. Marzan to release Cyrus Dulay and
Wendell Pascua.
As regards Marzan, the Sandiganbayan likewise correctly found him liable under the second
mode of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 for allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced
by Atty. Rupisan who unlawfully issued the Recognizance and consequently caused the release
of both Cyrus and Pascua. The law is clear that the second mode merely requires that the
offender who allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced, is a public officer, such as
Marzan.
Marzan unlawfully released Cyrus and Pascua. To stress, Cyrus and Pascua were lawfully
detained pursuant to a duly issued commitment order of a court of law and yet they were
released pursuant to an improperly issued Recognizance, without an accompanying Court Order,
in violation of the law and BJMP rules and regulations. Marzan allowed himself to be persuaded,
induced or influenced to perform said act which constitutes a violation of the rules and
regulations or an offense in connection with his official duty. As a jail officer, Marzan was bound
by the provisions of the BJMP Manual on the Manner of Releasing prisoners. Marzan, as a jail
officer, should know the import of the BJMP Manual, in particular Section 2(d) of Article 13
thereof. It was his duty to apply this provision despite the influence exerted by Atty. Rupisan, or
Ciriaco, or the alleged pressure he received from his superior, Goyo.

Case Digests
In the instant case, all the elements of the offense under Section 3(a) of RA 3019, established his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Contrary to Marzan’s claim, there was a Commitment Order duly
signed and issued by the Acting MTC Judge of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the detention of
Cyrus and Pascua. He then released them without a proper court order by virtue of a
Recognizance signed by Atty. Rupisan. These acts were in blatant violation of the procedure
provided by law for the issuance of a recognizance and contrary to the BJMP Manual.

Case Digests
II.H. Crimes Against Persons (Arts. 246-266)
GIL MIGUEL VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS

By: bonana
DOCTRINE:
Heinous Crimes are crimes which are grievous, odious, and hateful to the senses and which,
by reason of their inherent and or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, including crimes which are mandatorily
punishable by Death under the provisions of RA No. 7659, as amended, otherwise known as
the Death Penalty Law, and those crimes specifically declared as such by the Supreme
Court. (2019 Revised IRR)
FACTS:
Petitioner Miguel was found guilty of the crime of Murder and was sentenced to imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua. He was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on
January 15, 1994. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Miguel filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court.
He alleged that his continued detention no longer held legal basis because of Republic Act No.
10592 or the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law (GCTA Law). His argument was two-fold:
3. Applying the GCTA Law, he had already served a total of 38 years, 10 months, and 1 day
which is more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua; and
4. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua at 30 years.
Hence, having served a total of thirty eight (38) years, which is eight (8) years more than
the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concludes that he has fully served
his sentence and his detention no longer holds legal basis.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Murder is a heinous crime.
RULING:
Yes, murder is a heinous crime.

Case Digests
Article 248 of the RPC provides that any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death if committed with any of the attendant circumstances mentioned. Murder is mandatorily
punishable by death. It falls within the definition of heinous crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZZZ

G.R. No. 232329, April 28, 2021
By: subsilentio
DOCTRINE:
While R.A. No. 7610 is a special law specifically enacted to provide special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other
conditions prejudicial to their development, the Court hold that it is contrary to the
legislative intent of the same law if the lesser penalty (reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua) under Section 5(b) thereof would be imposed against the perpetrator of
sexual intercourse with a child 12 years of age or below 18.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353, is not only the more recent law, but also deals more particularly with all rape
cases
FACTS:
Sometime in January to April 2008, ZZZ forcibly brought AAA to a big copra kiln where, after
undressing them both, he mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. To prevent her from
screaming, accused-appellant covered her mouth with his hand and inserted his penis into her
vagina. After he removed his penis from her vagina, AAA's vagina was swollen with the
presence of blood and a white sticky substance. ZZZ gave AAA P50.00 and instructed her not to
tell her father about the incident.
Also, in the afternoon of May 3, 2008, ZZZ fetched her from their house and dragged her
towards the river. While crossing the river midway, AAA saw her siblings. However, ZZZ
immediately covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting and calling their attention. As soon
as they reached the side of the river, ZZZ undressed them both, mounted AAA and inserted his
penis into her vagina. After he was done, the accused-appellant once again told the victim not to
report the incident to her father. This time, he threatened AAA with death should she inform her
father. He also gave AAA P20.00.
Since she could no longer bear the pain in her swollen vagina, AAA told her father of what ZZZ
had done to her. AAA and her father then went to the barangay to file a complaint. AAA was
also examined by Dr. Virginia Barasona who testified at the trial that her medical findings were
consistent with AAA's claim of rape and that she had issued a medical certificate thereon.

Case Digests
On accused’s contentions, he claimed that he could not have raped his granddaughter, AAA,
since he was already sixty-seven (67) years old in 2008 and his penis was no longer capable of
erection due to a cyst near his inner thigh which caused chronic pain in his legs.
Accused-appellant further testified that on May 3, 2008 he was at his house which is located
some distance away from AAA's family home.
On June 18, 2015, the trial court rendered its judgment convicting accused-appellant ZZZ of two
(2) counts of Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
Case Nos. 08-1636-37 (see the two informations in the full text of the case).
However, ZZZ filed an appeal maintaining his innocence and decried the trial court's finding of
guilt despite the prosecution's failure to establish with particularity the date of commission of the
rape and the inconsistent testimony of AAA. He argued that the trial court erred in not
considering his defense of denial. In the alternative, assuming without admitting that he is guilty
of raping his granddaughter, the penalty imposed should be that provided in Section 5(b), Article
III of RA 7610. But the appellate court sustained ZZZ's conviction for two counts of rape
Hence, this appeal by ZZZ raising the same assignment of errors contained in his Appellant's
Brief before the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant shall be penalized under the penalty provided in Section
5(b) of RA No. 7610.
RULING:
The accused-appellant shall not be penalized under the penalty provided in Section 5(b) of
RA No. 7610.
Notably, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of "Rape in relation to RA 7610". The appellate court affirmed this ruling of the trial court
At this point, it must be pointed out there is a need to fix the error in the nomenclature of ZZZ's
crime. As corrected, accused-appellant should be held criminally liable for two (2) counts of
Rape under Article 266-A, Paragraph 1(a) penalized under Article 266-B (1) of the RPC. The
correlation to RA 7610 is deleted.
The Court recently settled in People v. Ejercito (Ejercito) that RA 8353 amending the RPC
should now be uniformly applied in cases involving sexual intercourse committed against
minors, and not Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. The Court declared that while RA 7610 has been
considered as a special law that covers the sexual abuse of minors, RA 8353 has expanded the
reach of our rape laws.

Case Digests
The Court thus clarified that these existing rape laws should not only pertain to the old Article
335 of the RPC but also to the provision on sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b) of RA No.
7610 which, applying the characterization in Quimvel v. People39 of a child "exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other abuse," covers the rape of a minor.
Significant to this case, the provisions of RA 8353 already accounted for the circumstance of
minority under certain peculiar instances. The consequence therefore is a clear overlap with
minority as an element of the crime of sexual intercourse against a minor under Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610. However, as it was earlier intimated, RA 8353 is not only the more recent statutory
enactment but more importantly, the more comprehensive law on rape; therefore, the Court
herein clarifies that in cases where a minor is raped through sexual intercourse, the provisions of
RA 8353 amending the RPC ought to prevail over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 although the latter
also penalizes the act of sexual intercourse against a minor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIO PANIS, FLORES, SANTIAGO, AND

GALINGANA
G.R. No. 234780, March 17, 2021
By: GN
DOCTRINE:
To be convicted of the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established, to wit:
1. a person was killed;
2. the accused killed him;
3. the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended; and
4. the killing constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The Court enumerated the following elements that must be established for treachery to be
appreciated:
1. at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
2. the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him.
FACTS:
Artemio, Jr, testified that his father died as a result of a shooting incident. He narrated that he
heard gunshots coming from the house of his brother, Jhonny.

Case Digests
When he went out to check what happened, he saw his father, Artemio, Sr., lying down on the
ground and being assisted by his brother. They hurriedly placed their father in a hammock and
boarded him in a truck bound for Villa Concepcion.While on their way Artemio, Sr. was still
alive and was able to identify the persons who shot him. However, when they reached the Ester
Garcia Hospital, Artemio, Sr. was declared dead on arrival.
Jhonny corroborated the testimony of Artemio, Jr. According to him, his father was shot while on
his way back to his house after he had coffee with him. When Jhonny he looked at the direction
where the gunshot reports came from he saw Santiago and Parris holding long firearms.
Santiago proffered a different account of the incident and professed alibi and denial as his
defense. He narrated that at the time of the incident, he was asleep in his house, together with his
wife and children.
Santiago's daughter, Angeline, corroborated the testimony of his father that at the time of the
incident they were at home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not treachery is present.
RULING:
YES, treachery attended the commission of the crime thus qualifying the offense to
Murder.
Jhonny's straightforward testimony positively and categorically identified Santiago as having

shot Artemio, Sr. suddenly and without any provocation at all, hitting the victim at the back.
Undoubtedly, this showed that the attack was treacherous. The victim's death certificate showing
that Artemio, Sr. suffered multiple gunshot wounds in his left scapular, 4th thoracic and right
infrascapular corroborated Jhonny's narration. Moreover, the post-mortem findings showed that
the entry points of the gunshot wounds were all at the back of the victim.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the fact that Santiago was positioned at a
particular location and particular time while holding a rifle, showed that he consciously and
deliberately adopted the means to commit the crime. Thus, Santiago's sudden attack on Artemio,
Sr. constitutes treachery thereby qualifying the killing to the crime of Murder.

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO BUEZA Y RANAY

G.R. No. 242513, March 4, 2021
By: oikooiko
DOCTRINE:
Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Section 9 of RA 7659. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of
the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and
Rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.
The following elements must concur in the crime of Robbery with Rape:
1. the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
2. the property taken belongs to another;
3. the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
4. the Robbery is accompanied by Rape
FACTS:
On or about August 31, 2013, Bueza robbed AAA, who was then 17 years old at the time of the
incident, with two mobile phones and cash amounting to P4,000. And while on occasion of the
robbery, Bueza pointed a knife at AAA and brought her to a public restroom. Despite attempts to
escape and begging, and while still at knifepoint, Bueza removed her clothes and inserted his
penis into the victim’s vagina. AAA, accompanied by her landlord, went to the police station to
report the robbery but not the accompanying rape. On September 4, 2013, Bueza approached
AAA and told her that he would kill her the next time he sees her. Thereafter, she went to the
police station and reported that Bueza threatened, robbed, and raped her. AAA was subjected to a
physical and genital examination but there was no evident signs of injuries and no laceration on
the victim’s hymen. However, the examiner did not preclude the possibility of sexual abuse.
The RTC ruled that Bueza is guilty of Robbery with Rape and Grave Threats. The CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bueza is guilty of Robbery with Rape
RULING:
YES, Bueza is guilty of Robbery with Rape
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court agrees with the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court, which were affirmed by the appellate court.

Case Digests
The prosecution sufficiently established the elements of the crime of Robbery with Rape, to wit:
that on August 31, 2015, Bueza, while armed with a knife, forcibly took private complainant's
two (2) cellular phones and wallet containing ₱4,000.00.
Accused-appellant points out that the results of the medical examination done on the victim
showed that she did not suffer bodily injuries or external signs of trauma. He stresses that there
were no hymenal lacerations nor traces of semen in her private parts.
The Court finds Dr. Guno's medical findings that there was no laceration on the victim's hymen
insufficient to disprove the crime of Rape. The absence of hymenal laceration is inconsequential
since it is not an element of the crime of Rape. The Court has consistently held that mere
touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient
to constitute carnal knowledge. Thus, when a penis comes in contact with the lips of the victim's
vagina, the crime of Rape is considered consummated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. XXX

G.R. No. 218277, November 09, 2020
By: tinee
DOCTRINE:
The elements of Qualified Rape are: "

1. sexual congress;
2. with a woman;
3. done by force and without consent;
4. the victim is under [eighteen] years of age at the time of the rape; and
5. the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.
When the offender is the victim's father, as in this case, there need not be actual force,
threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious crime of rape against his
own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his
moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation.
FACTS:
The victim, AAA, was at home with her two brothers, her grandmother and her father, herein
accused. Her mother, BBB, was out selling barbecue. While AAA's brothers were at the
basketball court, her father instructed AAA to go up to the bedroom. Then he ordered her to
remove her shorts. After AAA complied, accused inserted his penis into her vagina which caused
her pain. AAA shouted and pleaded. Accused stopped but threatened her not to tell her mother
about what happened. When BBB returned home that night, AAA did not report anything as she
feared that her father might do something to her mother.

Case Digests
AAA finally told her mother the truth out of fear that her mother would leave her since her father
was sending BBB away, already. AAA disclosed to her what her father had done to her. AAA
likewise revealed that it was not the first time it happened since her father has been sexually
assaulting her since she was five years old and that she did not tell her mother about it since he
threatened to kill BBB if she did.
Accused insisted that BBB concocted the rape allegations in order to exact revenge against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused committed Statutory Rape.
RULING:
NO, the crime committed was Qualified Rape.
The crime was Qualified Rape precisely because of the concurrence of both the minority of the
victim and the relationship of the parties, i.e., as father and daughter.
In this case, AAA was below eighteen years old when the crime was committed against her,
which was verified by her birth certificate. Accused, who admitted that he is AAA's father,
sexually took advantage of her without her consent, likely relying on the authority he holds over
her. Relevantly, "when the offender is the victim's father, as in this case, there need not be actual
force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious crime of rape against his
own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his moral
ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation." Undoubtedly,
accused-appellant's relationship with the victim should be considered in assessing his criminal
liability
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZZZ

G.R. No. 226144, October 14, 2020
By: subsilentio
DOCTRINE:
Premarital relationships do not necessarily entail sexual intimacy. Neither can the sexual
behavior of a rape victim reverse her violator's criminal culpability. It must always be
remembered that the lack of consent is the line crossed in non-Statutory Rape. Romantic
affairs voluntarily engaged into by a rape victim, whether before, during, or after the rape
incident, will not overwrite the established fact that her violator forcibly obtained carnal
knowledge of her without her consent.

Case Digests
Sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years old, as defined under Article 266-A,
Paragraph 1(d) of the RPC, is Statutory Rape. Where the victim is below 12 years old, the
only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took place. Under the law, carnal
knowledge is the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a
woman. The victim's consent to the vile act holds no relevance here - it is settled that a
child's consent is immaterial because of his or her presumed incapacity of discerning evil
from good
FACTS:
ZZZ was charged with three (3) counts of Rape under Articl]e 266-A, Paragraph 1(a) of the
RPC, in relation to RA 7610. Upon prodding of her mother, victim AAA filed an Affidavit of
Desistance to withdraw the case against ZZZ. Despite this, arraignment proceeded. ZZZ pleaded
not guilty to the charges.
AAA was born on October 14, 1991. She identified ZZZ as her stepfather. She and her mother
began living with ZZZ when her mother separated from her biological father. While able to recall
only three specific occasions, AAA testified that ZZZ started perpetrating the acts complained of
when she was in grade 5 or since she was 10 years old. It happened at least twice a week to as
often as every night in their house and usually whenever her mother was not around. ZZZ would
wake AAA up, tell her to keep quiet, remove her shorts and panty, and then insert his organ into
her private part. ZZZ would force himself on AAA even if her stepsister, BBB, was sleeping
with them, and it never occurred to AAA to wake BBB up during those times. ZZZ always
threatened to kill her and her mother if she would disclose the incidents to anyone. She also
narrated that accused-appellant committed these sexual acts sometime before her birthday or on
September 13, 2007. She was 16 years old when she was last molested on November 6, 2007. It
was only after she disclosed incidents to her boyfriend (who in turn told AAA’s mother) that she
was able to leave their house, submit herself to a physical examination, and file the complaint.
ZZZ on the other hand denied the accusations against him. He averred that he was sleeping at the
times he allegedly committed the sexual acts against AAA. He always slept beside his daughter,
BBB, and while AAA slept on the same banig (mat) and in the same room, the latter stayed in a
spot farther away from him. He was strict over AAA and was against her relationship with her
boyfriend as he believed that the latter was already married to another person. The sexual acts
imputed by AAA against him were lies, since she and her boyfriend disliked his stern demeanor
over their relationship.
The RTC convicted ZZZ as charged and sentenced the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The RTC found his defense of denial and alibi too weak as against the victim’s positive
identification and categorical testimony of Rape. The trial court also disbelieved ZZZ’s
unsubstantiated theory that the filing of the Rape charge was motivated by AAA’s hate for him
and his manner of discipline.
ZZZ appealed to the CA.

Case Digests
The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment of conviction. It found ZZZ’s bare denial as opposed to
AAA’s positive testimony without evidentiary value, and that ill motive will not overturn an
established charge of Rape, the appellate court, however, deleted the award of exemplary
damages in the absence of an aggravating circumstance. ZZZ thus appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ZZZ's guilt for the crimes charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
ZZZ is guilty of the crimes charged.
There is no reason for the Court to doubt that ZZZ had repeatedly obtained carnal knowledge for
the victim, a minor, by means of coercion, threats, and intimidation.
No exact account was made in open court anent the alleged September 13, 2007 and November
6, 2007 incidents. Even so, AAA was still able to lay out the sordid circumstances and the
pertinent specifics of her Rape during the said dates in her initiatory Sinumpaang Salaysay. AAA
identified this Sinumpaang Salaysay as her own on the witness stand. It thus formed part of her
direct testimony, and its contents were subjected to cross-examination by the defense. In open
court, she readily recognized and pointed ZZZ as her violator. She recounted the harrowing
nights that tormented her for six years of living with ZZZ. The examining physician’s
Medico-Legal Report, which stated “blunt force or penetrating trauma” in AAA’s ano-genital
examination, corroborated the latter’s testimony. The Court sees no compelling motive for the
victim to lie. After all, no person, especially one of tender age, would ordinarily cry “rape” and
subject oneself to the consequent rigors and embarrassments of medical examination and public
trial, if not for the quest for rightful justice.
Moreover, ZZZ miserably failed to overturn the burden of evidence against him. His defenses
were threefold: denial, alibi, and imputation of ill motive against the victim. All such defenses,
however, disintegrate on their own.
First, denial is an inherently weak defense. While a conviction rests not on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the evidence against the accused, the Court finds that the
prosecution has fully discharged its evidentiary duty.
Next, it is not physically impossible for the rapist to sexually abuse the victim even in the
presence of another person. Criminal lust does not discriminate. Undaunted by age, sex,
relationship, place, distance, time, aesthetic preferences, or moral considerations, sexual
predators attach with reckless abandon and surprising ingenuity, always impelled by the sole aim
of having their worldly fill. Perverse desires find ways. A mere arm-span distance from the
victim or a lack of privacy will not deter a rapist who has been consumed by entirely by lust.

Case Digests
Lastly, that the victim harbored animosity against the rapists’s fatherly discipline hardly dents the
evidence proffered against him by the prosecution. Ill motive becomes inconsequential in the
face of an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim, who had already clearly
established the liability of the accused. Moreover, ZZZ’s theory is specious at best. It was never
corroborated, and bare allegations deserve scant consideration for being self-serving.
ZZZ faces conviction for three specific charges: one count of Rape committed against the victim
when she was 15 years old under Criminal Case No. 5635-09, and another count of Rape in
Criminal Case No. 5636-09 when the victim at the time was a 16-year-old. Article 266-A,
Paragraph 1(a) of the RPC applies to these two charges
He is also found liable for a third count of Rape in Criminal Case No. 5637-09 which he
committed when the victim was only eight years of age. Article 266, Paragraph 1(d), not 1(a),
now operates.
Withal, the rectification of ZZZ's conviction for three counts of Rape under a single criminal law
provision is in order. ZZZ is liable for two counts of Rape defined in Article 266, Paragraph 1(a)
of the RPC in Criminal Cases Nos. 5635-09 and 5636-09, and one count of Statutory Rape under
Article 266, Paragraph 1(d) of the RPC, for Criminal Case No. 5637-09. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case as imposed by the courts below are unaffected and retained.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALENTINO CATIG Y GENTERONI

G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020
By: Regal_Nerd
DOCTRINE:
The elements of the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC are as follows:
1. the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
2. the said act was accomplished
a. through the use of force or intimidation, or
b. when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
c. when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and
characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. It
manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily demands of the individual's own social
environment. Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical
and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.
Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the
latter term is usually reserved for those without recognizable brain pathology.

Case Digests
It is not required for a rape victim to undergo a comprehensive medical examination so as

to prove that he/she is a mental retardate. The Supreme Court has repeatedly pronounced
that mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence,
such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court. However, the
conviction of an accused of rape based on the mental retardation of the victim must be
anchored on proof beyond reason able doubt of the same.
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:

BBB (AAA’s sister) asked AAA to fetch water from appellant's house. AAA complied. Upon
arriving at appellant's house, the latter instructed her to go inside. Once inside, he laid her on the
bed, took off her shorts and panty, touched her vagina, and raped her. After he was done with his
bestial act, appellant gave AAA money and sugarcane. AAA then went home.
When she arrived at their house, BBB noticed that AAA's shorts were worn backwards with
bloodstains on it. When BBB asked AAA what happened, AAA suddenly cried and told BBB
that she was raped by appellant. She further narrated that appellant gave her money and
sugarcane.
After hearing the horrid story, BBB and AAA immediately sought assistance from barangay
authorities and the MSWDO. AAA was brought to the Municipal Health Center for a physical
examination. Dr. Yap physically found hymenal bleeding and laceration indicative of a recent
penetration of the victim 's vaginal canal. Subsequently, BBB and AAA went to the police to
report the incident.
Version of the Defense:

Appellant denied raping AAA. He alleged that on the day of the incident, he went home in the
morning after plying his tricycle all night. While sleeping in the sala, he beard someone calling
him. When he stood up, he saw AAA who was looking for his daughter but his daughter was not
around. AAA then asked for sugarcane from appellant. During their conversation, appellant
noticed bloodstains on AAA's hand and shorts. When asked about it, AAA simply ignored him.
AAA then went to the water pump outside their house where she found two one-peso coins left
by his daughter. AAA got the coins and went to the direction of the sugarcane field. Appellant
thereafter closed the door of their house and went back to sleep.
Three policemen went to their house informing him that someone is accusing him of rape.
Appellant voluntarily went with the police. It was only then that he learned that AAA was his
accuser.
Appellant claimed that he was being accused of the crime because he refused to lend BBB his
bicycle and to give her his dog which she previously asked from him.

Case Digests
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

The RTC found appellant guilty as charged. It gave credence to AAA's testimony on how she
was allegedly raped by appellant.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court but found appellant criminally liable of the crime
of Simple Rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b), and not under Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). AAA, as ruled by the appellate court, is mentally deficient. Thus,
she should be considered a person "deprived of reason" which falls under Article 266-A, par.
1(b), and not one who is "demented".
Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime charged.
RULING:
Yes, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime charged.
The Court sees no reason to depart from the trial court's finding that AAA is a credible witness.
She narrated in a dear, categorical and straightforward manner how she was subjected to the
bestial act by appellant. She likewise identified appellant with certainty as her perpetrator before
the court.
Much leeway should be given to AAA's testimony considering her age and mental capacity.
Thus, although AAA did not describe the incident of rape in more detail, it is apparent from her
testimony that appellant was successful in having carnal knowledge of her. Although AAA was
13 years old, she had the mental capacity of a 4-5-year old child. The lower courts, and this
Court as well, could therefore not expect AAA to narrate and describe the exact details of how
she was raped the way a 13-year old child could do.
The presence of a hymenal laceration at 3 o'clock position due to penetration further strengthens
AAA's testimony that she was raped. It is worthy to note that the results of AAA's physical
examination which was conducted on the very same day that the rape incident happened
corroborates her testimony that she was sexually molested by the appellant. Dr. Yap even
categorically stated that AAA's vagina was still bleeding when she was brought to him for
personal examination, thus proving that the act of rape was consummated.

Case Digests
On the other hand, the defense miserably failed to impeach AAA's credibility during
cross-examination. If indeed AAA fabricated her story, it would have been easy for the defense
to destroy her credibility, "for the ability to sustain such fiction would require a quick and
insidious mind, and her mental condition certainly precluded such possibility."
However, although it was proven and admitted during trial that appellant knew of AAA's mental
retardation, the same cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance for it was not
specifically alleged in the Information that he was aware of AAA's mental retardation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO DE CASTRO DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 224212, November 27, 2019
By: TinayTinapay
DOCTRINE:
The elements of qualified rape are:

1. sexual congress;
2. with a woman;
3. done by force and without consent;
4. the victim is under [eighteen] years of age at the time of the rape; and
5. the offender is [either] a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted),
[ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent] of the victim."
The minority of the victim and his or her relationship with the offender should both be
alleged in the Information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during trial in order to
qualify the rape charge as these circumstances have the effect of altering the nature of the
rape and its corresponding penalty. Otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon
the offender
Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not
pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances since the
latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to
be informed of the charges against him and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is
charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although the attendant
circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged
in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
FACTS:
The RTC and CA convicted (the accused) Romeo De Castro De Guzman for two counts of
Qualified Rape.

Case Digests
On May 11, 2011, the accused with lewd designs had carnal knowledge of AAA, a 15 year old
minor without her consent by means of force of threat and intimidation, and by taking advantage
of his moral ascendency over her, being her stepfather, subjecting her to sexual abuse; an act that
is prejudicial to the physical, psychological and moral development of the said minor which
degrades her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. De Guzman appeals the conviction,
the accused appellant denies all charges and claims that his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of Qualified Rape
RULING:
No, appellant De Guzman is not guilty of Qualified Rape but Statutory Rape and Simple
Rape.
The case at bar, AAA’s minority was properly alleged and indisputable being 18 years old and
below when the crime was committed against her. It was also proved with evidence that the
accused appellant forced AAA into engaging in by threats and intimidation, without her consent,
an addition to his moral ascendancy towards AAA.
it was alleged in the Informations that De Guzman was AAA's "stepfather." A "stepfather" is the
"husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken
of is the offspring. It presupposes a legitimate relationship between the appellant and the victim's
mother."
However, during trial, the prosecution failed to establish this stepparent-stepdaughter

relationship between De Guzman and AAA. No proof of marriage was presented in order to
establish De Guzman's legal relationship with BBB. In other words, De Guzman cannot be
considered as the stepfather of AAA as alleged in the Informations. On the contrary, records
show that De Guzman was actually the common-law spouse of BBB as he was not legally
married to her. Since De Guzman's relationship with AAA as alleged in the Informations was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, De Guzman cannot be convicted of Qualified Rape, only
Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape. Stated differently, "the crime is only simple rape,
although the State successfully proves the common-law relationship, where the information does
not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the
female. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him is inviolable.

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE EULALIO y ALEJO

G.R. No. 214882, October 16, 2019
By: ChingkayJim07
DOCTRINE:
The elements of Statutory Rape are:

1. the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
2. the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was
force, threat, or intimidation or grave abuse of authority.
It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. As
the law presumes absence of free consent when the victim is below the age of 12, it is not
necessary to prove force, intimidation or consent as they are not elements of statutory rape
FACTS:
11-year old AAA was playing in the street when accused-respondent Eulalio summoned her to
his house. When AAA refused, accused threatened AAA that he would kidnap one of her
siblings. Out of fear, AAA went along. There, accused Eulalio had carnal knowledge of AAA.
Thereafter, he instructed AAA to put her clothes back and sent her home. AAA did not reveal the
incident to anyone out of fear from the threats insinuated by the accused.
A month later, AAA was being summoned again by Eulalio who was waiting at AAA’s house.
Eulalio did not undress her. Instead, he made AAA lie on the bed and kissed her. Eulalio and
AAA were in this compromising position when AAA's father and mother arrived.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Eulalio is guilty of the crime of statutory rape under Art. 266-A (1) (d)
of the Revised Penal Code with respect to the first incident.
RULING:
Accused Eulalio is guilty of the crime of statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the
Revised Penal Code in the August 2004 incident because in statutory rape, it is sufficient
that the age of victim is proven and there was sexual intercourse.
In this case, it was significantly proven by evidence that accused Eulalio had carnal knowledge
of AAA, an 11-year old victim, by using threats and intimidation.

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOLI VILLEGAS, JR. Y LACRETE

G.R. No. 218210, October 9, 2019
By: Mileyy
DOCTRINE:
The elements of the special complex crime of rape with homicide are as follows: "
1. the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman;
2. carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and
3. by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or
intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.
FACTS:
Accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for the rape and death of AAA.
Various circumstantial evidence and two witnesses were presented by the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused.
The accused denied the commission of the crime and posited alibi as part of his defense despite
his house being only 10 to 15 minutes away from the place where the crime was committed. He
further argued that when the circumstances shown to exist yield at least two inferences - one of
which consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other with a finding of guilt - the
Court must acquit the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide
RULING:
YES, accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide
In this case, the post-mortem examination of AAA's body revealed that she had lacerations on
her private parts and that she recently lost her virginity, which more likely meant that the
assailant had carnal knowledge of her. Moreover, the contusions, abrasions, and injuries on her
body, and more importantly the head injury, signify that such carnal knowledge was achieved by
means of force and intimidation which eventually led to AAA's death. The testimonies of the
medico-legal as well as those of the other prosecution witnesses, when considered together,
inevitably lead to the conclusion that Villegas committed the felony.

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO WAD-AS

GR. No. 221428, February 13,2019
By: tinee
DOCTRINE:
Review of rape cases - principles:

1. an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2. in view of the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and,
3. the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
FACTS:
In the evening of April 16, 2002, after an altercation with her father CCC, 12-year-old AAA left
home and went to the barangay hall of Barangay II, San Mateo, Isabela. After 10 minutes, AAA
proceeded to the park, sat beside the fountain, and cried for about 30 minutes. Accused-appellant
approached AAA and introduced himself as "Jun-jun." When AAA refused his invitation for
them to go to the plaza, he then invited her to the market place but, again, the latter refused.
Accused-appellant then forcibly pulled AAA towards the market place. AAA tried to free herself
from the accused-appellant's grasp but she was unable to escape. At that time, there were about
12 people nearby but AAA did not cry out for help because the accused-appellant threatened to
kill her.
Accused-appellant managed to pull AAA towards a parlor in the market place. The parlor was
already closed and had no lights on. Accused-appellant removed his clothes, laid AAA on the
ground, and started removing her shorts and shirt. AAA tried to resist but the accused-appellant
threatened to kill her with a knife that was protruding from his bag. After removing AAA's
clothes, accused-appellant went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to
push accused-appellant away but was unsuccessful.
At the time of the incident, witness Borja was driving his tricycle, with a passenger on-board,
witness Garlitos, when they saw accused-appellant pulling AAA towards the market place. They
immediately reported the incident to the victim's parents and also accompanied AAA's father,
CCC, to the place where they last saw AAA. The trio saw AAA and accused-appellant sitting on
a wooden bench outside Naty's Restaurant (N's Restaurant). They confronted accused-appellant
and brought him to the police station. AAA was crying and her hair was rumpled; she also
appeared to be in a state of confusion.
When AAA's mother, BBB, arrived at the police station, she asked AAA what happened but she
did not respond. Only when a lady police officer arrived did AAA disclose that she was raped by
accused-appellant.

Case Digests
On the other hand, the defense presented the accused-appellant himself, accused-appellant's
live-in partner, Realyn Acosta (Acosta), and Teddy Santos (Santos) as witnesses.
According to the evidence for the defense, accused-appellant was on his way home from work on
April 16, 2002 when he saw AAA crying beside a fountain at the public park. Accused-appellant
asked AAA to come with him to N's Restaurant, which was just across the fountain. She agreed
and went with him. She then asked him to buy bread because she was hungry. However, after a
few minutes, AAA's father and his two companions arrived and suddenly boxed
accused-appellant. Thereafter, accused-appellant was brought to the municipal police station.
Acosta and Santos both testified that many people go to the park at night since there are several
mini-stores and eateries in the area.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Accused-Appelant is guilty of the crime of Rape
RULING:
YES, Accused-Appelant is guilty of the crime of Rape
The records of this case clearly bear out that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA
through the use of force, threat, and intimidation. AAA categorically narrated that the
accused-appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina against her will.
The RTC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that AAA's testimony was straightforward,
convincing, and consistent. Indeed, AAA described vividly how accused-appellant deflowered
her and we cannot imagine how a child, as young in years as AAA, could directly and
consistently recount in open court such an ordeal, unless she, in fact, had experienced the same.
Between accused-appellant's plain denial and AAA's categorical testimony, we give weight to the
latter, especially because accused-appellant admitted that he was actually found together with
AAA in front of N's Restaurant by AAA's father and prosecution witnesses Borja and Garlitos.
AAA could not have been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of
her virtue. There was no showing that she was moved by anger or any ill motive against
accused-appellant or that she was unduly pressured or influenced by anyone to charge
accused-appellant with the serious crime of rape. Where there is no evidence that the principal
witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he/she was
not so actuated and his/her testimony is entitled to full credence
In an attempt to raise doubts as to the credibility of AAA's testimony, accused-appellant points

out that (a) AAA did not shout for help during the time of the incident; and (b) she failed to
immediately inform her parents that she was raped. We have always held that there is no standard
behavior expected of rape victims. Depending on the circumstances and their personal and
emotional situation, victims react differently.

Case Digests
In this case, AAA explained that she was confused at the time of the incident and afraid that if
she shouted for help, accused-appellant would kill her. Also, it is not rare for young girls to hide
for some time the violation of their honor because of the threats on their lives.
Since accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, we affirm the
imposition by the R TC and the Court of Appeals of the penalty of reclusion perpetua under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. However, in line with recent jurisprudence, 18 we
increase the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to
PhP75,000.00 each. In addition, we impose interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on
all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Case Digests
II.H.1. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA 9208, as amended by RA

11862)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. XXX

GR No. 248815, March 23, 2022
By: Atorniquet
DOCTRINE:
Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines Trafficking in Persons as "the recruitment, transportation,

transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the
purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude
or the removal or sale of organs." It further states that " [t]he recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring or receipt of child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be
considered as ' trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth
in the preceding paragraph.
Meanwhile, Section 4 of the same law enumerates the acts that constitute Trafficking in
Persons which includes maintaining or hiring a person to engage in prostitution or
pornography.
Prostitution is specifically defined in the law as "any act, transaction, scheme or design
involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in
exchange for money, profit or any other consideration.
The elements of Trafficking in Persons, as follows:

1. The act of"recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders;"
2. The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another;" and
3. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs

Case Digests
Furthermore, under Section 6(a), the crime of Trafficking in Persons becomes qualified
when the trafficked person is a child, which refers to a person below the age of 18 years old
or above 18 years old but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself or herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition
FACTS:
AAA, who was then only 14 years old, went with BBB, 13 years old, to meet BBB’s “text
mates”. BBB introduced AAA to the accused. AAA was brought by the accused to another room
where she was inquired if she was still a virgin. She answered in the affirmative. Accused then
turned-off the lights and approached AAA. He then tightly held her upper right arm and kissed
her on the lips, taking off her clothes, AAA fearfully pleaded and tried to escape but the accused
grabbed her by the arm and pulled her back, laid her on the bed, kissed her vagina and proceeded
to insert his penis in her vagina.
AAA saw the accused a few more times because BBB would persuade her to go back to the
hotel. Accused would instruct BBB to bring more girls that he would match with his male
friends. Subsequently, accused provided AAA with her own male customer, whom she had to
have sex with. For the sexual service rendered by AAA she will get ₱1,000 then accused and
BBB would get ₱500 each. This set-up continued for several occasions until AAA and the
accused had a misunderstanding and they never saw each other again.
Thereafter, AAA proceeded to tell her mother CCC of her ordeal which caused her to be
medically examined where she was found out to have multiple healed and healing lacerations in
her vagina and had contracted an STD. This eventually led to the filing of the criminal case.
Accused put up the defense of denial and alibi. He alleged that he was not the one who recruited
AAA and was only a customer. Accused further argued that the presence of force, threat, or
intimidation is lacking. He confirmed that he met AAA thru BBB who asked him if he wanted to
pay for the sexual services of AAA since she is in dire need for money. Besides, the fact that
AAA met with the accused and had sexual intercourse with him more than once ... is indicative
that she did so willingly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking
in Persons.
RULING:
Yes, accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified trafficking in persons.
Here it was sufficiently proved that all the elements of the crime are present.

Case Digests
Here there is no dispute that AAA was a minor. Accused-appellant’s bare denial that he did not
recruit AAA must fail in light of the latter’s clear, consistent and credible testimony.. Through
the straightforward and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly AAA's, it
was established that: 1) accused recruited or hired AAA by instructing her and BBB to bring
other minor females at the hotel and introducing them to different customers on separate
occasions; (2) accused took advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor child and as someone
who was in need of money; and (3) the purpose of such acts was for AAA and the other minor
females to engage in sexual intercourse or to render sexual services to several men in exchange
for money.
Additionally, it is an undisputed fact that AAA was only 14 years old during the time when the
incident occurred.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. XXX AND YYY

G.R. No. 225288, June 28, 2021
By: sandysundae
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence has listed the elements of the offense derived from the definition under
Section 3 (a) of RA 9208:
1. The act of " recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders
2. The means used which include " threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another"; and
3. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes exploitation or the
Section 3(a) of RA 9208 clearly provides that the recruitment and receipt of a child for
purposes of exploitation, even if it does not involve the means listed in the same provision,
will be considered "Trafficking in Persons.
FACTS:
In a conducted rescue and entrapment operation by the PNP, several sex workers who were
minors were rescued and the proprietors thereof arrested.

Case Digests
It was noted during the entrapment operation that in the bar, the officers saw young girls dancing
naked on stage and they were offered for a provision of girls for sex in their VIP rooms for a fee
of P1,500.00. They were even informed that customers could opt to bring girls back to their hotel
and just pay the bar fine of P5,000.
Among those who were rescued was AAA, a minor. She executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein she recounted the nature and terms of her employment at the club such as how she was
initially employed, payment of wages and commission and hours of work. She also listed the
menu of sexual services for a fee performed by her and other girls for customers of the bar. She
also confirmed that the fact of her minority was known to the proprietors of the club whore
herein respondent XXX and YYY.
Accused on the other hand denied that they committed human trafficking of the girls and pointed
to their co-accused “Mommy Angel” (at-large) as the sole culprit who hires girls to work in the
bar. They denied having knowledge of AAA’s minority claiming that she told him she was
already of legal age and that they did not offer any of the girls for prostitution or sold for sex
under an arrangement to pay a bar fine.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused are guilty of the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES, the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Anti-Trafficking in
Person law.
The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants XXX and YYY
committed acts of Trafficking in Persons under RA 9208 which were qualified by the minority of
one of the victims and the status of XXX as a police officer
In this case, the charge against and conviction of accused XXX and YYY fall under Section 4 ( a
and e) in relation to Section 6 ( a and f) of RA 9208:
Jurisprudence has listed the elements of the offense derived from the definition under Section 3
(a) of RA 9208
Section 3 (a) further states that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of
a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph."
The foregoing elements were proven by the prosecution in this case.

Case Digests
First, AAA was recruited by YYY and hired by XXX to work for the purpose of prostitution.
AAA and other young girls danced on stage and performed other sexually exploitative acts to
lure customers to go to the VIP rooms. The girls were offered to customers and patrons of the bar
to perform sexual services in exchange for a fee.
Second, at the time AAA was hired until her rescue during the entrapment operation, she was a
child, below 18 years of age. Her minority was never refuted by the accused.
Third, XXX was a police officer, a fact that was stipulated on~ Pre-Trial before the RTC. XXX
was likewise the owner-proprietor of the bar where he and YYY offered the sexual services of
AAA and other girls working to customers.
Fourth, YYY and XXX similarly offered the sexual services of AAA and other girls working at a
place to customers. BBB and PO3 Ong both testified that YYY, on separate occasions, offered
BBB and PO3 Ong, who were posing as customers, the use of the VIP rooms for all kinds of
sexual entertainment and pleasure with girls whom they fancied.
Plainly, the elements of the offense of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 (a and e)
in relation to Section 6 (a, c and f) of RA 9208 were established by the prosecution.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BELINA BAWALAN y MOLINA

BBB and CCC
G.R. No. 232358, May 12, 2021
By: ml
DOCTRINE:
This Court enumerated the elements of Trafficking in Persons:

1. The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders.
2. The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and
3. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the
Under Section 6 of RA 9208, trafficking is considered qualified when the offender is an

ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority over the trafficked
person.

Case Digests
FACTS:
AAA, the victim, was residing with her mother, BBB, and the latter's live-in partner, CCC.
The victim narrated that BBB and CCC would pimp her every time their family had nothing to
eat. On the night of the subject incident, she was at the park in front of the store of Bawalan
when a man suddenly arrived and approached the latter. AAA saw the man handing money to
Bawalan. Upon receipt of the money, Bawalan instructed AAA to go with the client. Meanwhile,
BBB, CCC and Samud were also in the area, about six meters away from AAA and Bawalan.
The victim further testified that prior to the subject incident, there had been more than five
instances in the past when she was pimped by accused. In some of those instances, she was taken
to a motel to engage in sexual intercourse with customers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons.
RULING:
YES, accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under
RA 9208.
The elements of the offense of trafficking in persons were sufficiently established by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The elements of the offense of trafficking in persons were sufficiently established by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. First, AAA categorically stated that Bawalan instructed
her to go with PO1 Intoy, who was then acting as a poseur-customer, after Bawalan received
money from the latter. This fact was corroborated by Officer Pabion, who saw PO1 Intoy hand
the marked money to Bawalan. AAA further stated it was not the first time she was sexually
exploited by accused-appellants. According to her, it would happen often, whenever their family
had nothing to eat
AAA also stated that in the previous incidents, she would be taken to the cemetery and motel,
was videotaped naked, and had sexual intercourse with her customers. Evidently,
accused-appellants took advantage of her vulnerability when she was made to engage in sexual
activities with customers in exchange for money.
The fact that the poseur customer, PO1 Intoy, was not presented as a witness is of no moment.
Contrary to accused-appellants' claim, the victim of the crime is in the best position to state that
the accused had recruited and used her by giving her payment in exchange for her sexual
exploitation

Case Digests
With respect to the circumstances which qualify the offense, we affirm the pronouncements of
the courts below. It is undisputed that BBB is the mother of AAA, and CCC is her fatherly figure
whom she calls "Papa CCC." Taking into consideration the circumstances on how AAA was
sexually exploited, all three accused-appellants conspired and acted together in perpetrating the
crime.
While the prosecution failed to prove the victim's minority due to the absence of her birth
certificate, it however established that the crime was committed by a group of three persons, and
by an ascendant and a person exercising authority over the victim. Consequently, the crime still
falls under Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Sections 6(c) and (d) of RA 9208.
😊
*Note: This case was decided on May 12, 2021, while RA 11862 was approved on June 23, 2022
by PRRD.

Case Digests
II.H.2.b. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children [Sec. 5]
XXX vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 221370, June 28, 2021
By: Macchiato
DOCTRINE:
Economic abuse is one of the acts of violence punished by RA 9262:
"Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
Specifically, Sec. 5, par. (e)(2) of RA 9262 penalizes the deprivation of financial support
legally due the woman or child, which is a continuing offense
FACTS:
Information was filed against petitioner for violation of Section 5 paragraph (e)(2) of RA 9262
accusing him of deliberately depriving complainant AAA, whom he has a child BBB, a five (5)
year old minor, of sufficient financial support legally due them.
AAA and XXX knew each other in high school and began their relationship in college. They
begot a child so they got married on March 08, 2005 and lived together in the house of XXX’s
family. While living with petitioner’s family, latter was unable to provide medical care. During
the last stage of her pregnancy, AAA had an argument with XXX who refused to bring her to the
doctor. When petitioner hurt her, she decided to leave the family home. Thus, after only two
months of being married, AAA went back to live with her parents. Eventually, AAA gave birth
to their son BBB who was later diagnosed to be suffering from Congenital Torch Syndrome,
resulting in delayed development and hearing impairment. BBB’s hearing aid costs P35,000 each
ear. AAA asked XXX for financial help but XXX informed her that he was not capable of giving
anything since his salary could only cover his own expenses. AAA was a call center agent while
XXX was a sales agent.

Case Digests
Sometime in 2010, AAA tried to contact petitioner to ask for financial help since she could no
longer BBB’s special needs. She sent a message on a social networking site but the latter told her
to leave him alone and that he was already happy with his new family. AAA also tried to contact
XXX’s new partner CCC, as well as his parents, but to no avail. It was also proposed that BBB
will be enrolled to a school for the hearing impaired. AAA shouldered the tuition fee of P20,000
alone. It was possible to cure BBB’s condition, but the procedure costs P1,000,000.00 for each
ear. She reached out to XXX, but he would always tell her that he did not have enough money.
For his part, XXX denied the charges and claimed he was a victim of physical and emotional
abuse committed by AAA. AAA pressured him to stop going to school and work full time. When
he was accepted as a sales agent, AAA belittled his job and never got any moral or emotional
support from her. AAA made him sleep on the floor and that it was AAA who initiated the fight
before the latter left their house. During that incident, AAA kicked him and kept on hurting him
as he tried to restrain her. He also asserted he paid for all the hospital bills when AAA gave birth,
amounting to about P25,000.00. The last time he saw his son was in Christmas 2005 when he
brought him milk and stuffed toy. He was forced to sign a kasunduan that stated he and AAA
would be living separately and that he would no longer bother them anymore. He also alleged
that it was only in 2008 when he learned of BBB’s medical condition and he did not hesitate to
give support. Between August 2008 to December 2008, he gave money to his son ranging from
P1,500 to P2,000. He also explained that he only told AAA that he had a new family so that she
would stop bothering him again. In truth, he got hurt because AAA prevented him from taking
pictures of his son when they met in December 2008 after years of not seeing each other.
Although admitting that he failed to give support from December 2005 to August 2008, he said it
was because AAA prevented him from complying with his obligation. AAA asked him for a
large amount of money, which he was incapable of giving at the time. In fact, he has been giving
support as evidenced by receipts, cash deposit slips, and cash load slips between 2010 and 2013.
When the instant case was filed in court and XXX was about to post bail, he thought of going to
AAA’s house first. Instead of spending money on bail, he offered P6,0000 for B’s support.
However, AAA asked him, ‘yan lang ba ang kaya mong i-offer para sa bata?”. He also admitted
that BBB’s operation pushed through owing to the efforts of AAA, who looked for different
charity institutions to seek help. His family also helped raised funds by helping AAA sell tickets.
More or less, he and his family were able to contribute P100,000. At trial, XXX said he receive
about P16,000 as monthly salary, P5,000 of which would be given as monthly support to BBB.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not XXX is guilty of the offense charged.
RULING:
Yes, RTC, CA, and SC found him guilty of the offense charged and is sentenced to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prission correccional and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and moral
damages of P10,000. He is also directed to undergo mandatory psychological counseling
and to report compliance to the trial court.

Case Digests
In this case, courts a quo correctly found all the elements for violation of Section 5(e)(2) of RA
9262, as it was established that: (a) XXX and AAA are married after being pregnant with BBB;
(b) XXX acknowledged BBB as his child; (c) he failed to provide sufficient support for BBB; (d)
he withheld financial support for BBB due to the ire he felt towards his wife; (e) he only
provided financial support after the complaint against him in the Prosecutor’s Office was filed.
Article 195(4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his child, comprising of
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education, and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The amount of support shall
be in proportion to the necessity of recipient and the means of the person obliged to give support.
Here, XXX deliberately deprived his son BBB of financial support. From the moment the child
was born until the case was filed, petitioner was only able to give a total of about P10,000 in a
span of five years. This does not meet the necessity of BBB’s expenses considering the child is
suffering from Congenital Torch Syndrome. This especially holds true since petitioner is capable
of giving support based on his Income Tax Return for the year 2009, when his gross
compensation was P234,565.79.
His claim that he complied with his obligation to give support as evidenced by receipts from
2010 to 2013 only bolsters AAA’s claim that he only started to provide support after filing of the
instant case against him. As admitted by petitioner himself, he failed to provide support from
2005 to 2008 after he got angry at AAA for the latter’s failure to bring BBB to him on Christmas
day. However, it should be BBB’s best interest that should prevail over spouse’s conflict with
each other. There is no justification for him to terminate giving support to their child on the basis
of his anger towards his spouse.
2. Whether or not absence of malice should warrant petitioner’s acquittal.
This contention lacks merit. In crimes mala prohibita, malice or intent is immaterial.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects to society as to call for almost unanimous
condemnation of its members. These pertains to felonies defined and penalized by the RPC.
Crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more
orderly regulation of the affairs of society. It refers to acts made criminal by special laws and
malice or intent is immaterial.
Since RA 9262 is a special law, the act of deprivation of financial support is considered malum
prohibitum. The only inquiry to be made is whether or not XXX committed the act. Here, it has
already been sufficiently established that petitioner indeed deprived financial support to his son.

Case Digests
II.I. Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security (Arts. 267-292)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAE AL-SAAD Y BAGKAT

G.R. No. 242414, March 15, 2021
By: OraEtLabora
DOCTRINE:
Arson is present when:

1. there is intentional burning; and
2. what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
FACTS:
In an Information dated September 20, 2010, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of
Arson, as follows: “That on or about the 14th day of September 2010, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
motivated by spite or hatred towards the occupants of the property burned, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to an inhabited house situated at Blk 37, Lot 18
Lennox Anne Black St., BF Resort Village, Talon 2, Las Piñas City, and by reason of or on the
occasion of the arson, death results to Ameerah Nabil Al-Saad, 14 years old and Ibrahim Nabil
Al-Saad, 12 years old, and serious physical injuries to Sarah Nabil Al-Saad, 16 years old who are
all her stepchildren with Nabil Al-Saad, and causes damage to properties in the amount of Php
1,500,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof.”
Upon her arraignment on October 21, 2010, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial ensued. The prosecution presented 12 witnesses. On the other hand, the defense
presented accused-appellant as the lone witness.
In a Decision dated April 29, 2015, the RTC, Branch 199 of Las Piñas City found the
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson. In its Decision dated
May 4, 2018, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's Decision with modification as to the
award of damages and interest.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court gravely erred in convicting the accused of Arson with Homicide
even though her guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Case Digests
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirms the accused-appellant's conviction but with modification as to
the amount of damages awarded. Her guilt for the crime of Arson with Homicide was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found that the prosecution
positively proved that the accused-appellant deliberately set fire to their house which resulted in
the deaths of its two inhabitants. The case records clearly showed that the accused-appellant's
acts before, during, and after the fire established beyond reasonable doubt her guilt of
committing the acts alleged in the Information. The prosecution sufficiently established an
unbroken chain of events which led to the fair and reasonable conclusion that she intentionally
set the house on fire.
We agree with the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the following
combination of circumstances pointed to the logical conclusion that accused-appellant
commenced and caused the fire as to support a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt
against her:
● [F]irst, at 12:00 in the morning of 14 September 2010, Mae went home from SM Mall of
Asia;
● second, Mae arrived at their house in Lennox Anne Black Street, BF Village, Talon Dos,
Las Piñas City at 1:20 in the morning;
● third, Mae instructed Grace to get her child, Leila, from the room of Ameerah and Sarah;
● fourth, Mae bought four (4) liters of gasoline from Optimus Shell Gasoline Station, Talon
Dos Branch at around 2:59 in the morning of 14 September 2010:
● fifth Mae and her child rode a tricycle driven by Tudio going home to Lennox Street and
picked up something at Optimus Shell Gasoline Station, Talon Dos Branch;
● sixth when Mae alighted from the tricycle Tudio noticed a liquid substance on the floor of
his tricycle and when he wiped it, it smelled of gas;
● seventh at around 3:20 in the morning of 14 September 2010, Morallos saw Mae come
back to B.F. Las Piñas and she handed to him a Zesto tetra pack and five (5) sticks of
Marlboro cigarettes;
● eighth at the time Mae gave Morallos the Zesto tetra pack and five (5) sticks of Marlboro
cigarettes, he noticed Mae was hiding something;
● ninth, Mae instructed Grace to buy pandesal at 3:00 in the morning;
● tenth, Mae was admittedly at the guard house when the fire was ongoing, on the pretext
that she was looking for Grace, who had taken long in coming back, but since it was
drizzling, she supposedly took shelter in the guard house;
● eleventh, Miciano retrieved the CCTV of the gas station and it showed Mae together with
Leila purchasing gasoline, cigarettes and chocolates in the early morning of 14
September 2010

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO BUEZA Y RANAY

G.R. No. 242513, March 4, 2021
By: oikooiko
DOCTRINE:
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats, "any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person, honor, or property of the latter or of his family
of any wrong amounting to a crime[.]" The crime is consummated as soon as the threats
come to the knowledge of the person threatened.
It was inconsequential that the threat was made in the presence of a number of people since
the offense does not require that it be committed in private.
FACTS:
On or about August 31, 2013, Bueza robbed AAA, who was then 17 years old at the time of the
incident, with two mobile phones and cash amounting to P4,000. And while on occasion of the
robbery, Bueza pointed a knife at AAA and brought her to a public restroom. Despite attempts to
escape and begging, and while still at knifepoint, Bueza removed her clothes and inserted his
penis into the victim’s vagina. AAA, accompanied by her landlord, went to the police station to
report the robbery but not the accompanying rape. On September 4, 2013, Bueza approached
AAA and told her that he would kill her the next time he sees her. Thereafter, she went to the
police station and reported that Bueza threatened, robbed, and raped her. AAA was subjected to a
physical and genital examination but there was no evident signs of injuries and no laceration on
the victim’s hymen. However, the examiner did not preclude the possibility of sexual abuse.
The RTC ruled that Bueza is guilty of Robbery with Rape and Grave Threats. The CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bueza is guilty of Grave Threats
RULING:
YES, Bueza is guilty of Grave Threats
The Court agrees with the appellate court that the crime was consummated as soon as the victim
heard Bueza utter his threatening remarks.
In this case, it is clear that accused-appellant's threat to kill the private complainant is a wrong on
the person amounting to, at the very least, homicide under the RPC. The felony of Grave Threats
was consummated the moment she heard Bueza utter his threatening remarks.

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HECTOR CORNISTA y REOTUTAR

G.R. No. 218915, February 19, 2020
By: Pong
DOCTRINE:
The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, are as
follows.
1. intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty;
2. actual deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and
3. motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.
In the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the person is killed
in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought.
FACTS:
On May 3, 2005 at around 2:30 AM when spouses Carmelita and Arturo Picones were about to
leave their restaurant in Binangonan, Rizal and board their car, four armed men approached
them. Arturo was taken while Carmelita was left behind. At 10:30 AM of the same day,
Carmelita received a call from a man informing her that they have custody of Arturo and
demanded P5,000,000 as precondition for the release of Arturo. Carmelita was only able to raise
P470,000. The said amount was received by the abductors on May 6, 2005. Arturo was never
released and his dead body was later found after a month in Angono, Rizal.
Accused-turned-state witness, Rogelio Mendoza Samson (Mendoza) impleaded several persons

including the accused-appellants Hector Reotutar (Hector) and Alvin Cornista (Alvin), and
accused Ricardo Banaay (Banaay) as members of the Waray Waray Kidnap for Ransom Group.
Hector and Alvin Averred that it is physically impossible for them to commit the crime since
they have been working as administrators of Hacienda Ragaza in Jaro, Leyte since 2000 and
2001, respectively. On August 27, 2005, they went to Manila only to buy parts for Hector’s
Jeepney. RTC and CA found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide.
RULING:
The appellants are guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide
In the instant case, all elements were present.

Case Digests
Firstly, appellants' intent to deprive Arturo of his liberty was evident from the moment his
freedom of movement was forcibly curtailed on May 3, 2005 at 2:30 in the morning, wherein
appellants poked a gun at him and his wife Carmelita while they were both about to board their
car, and made Arturo take the back seat of the car. Thereafter, Arturo was taken against his will
to Angono, Rizal.
Secondly, the prosecution was able to prove the actual deprivation of his liberty. Prosecution
witness Mendoza testified that on May 3, 2005, appellants brought Arturo to a small house in
Angono, Rizal. He further witnessed that Arturo's hands were tied at the back with a chain. In
addition, he testified that he, together with some of the accused, guarded Arturo for several days
until he was shot by accused Bitangol on May 6, 2005.
Thirdly, the prosecution was able to prove that ransom money was demanded for the release of
Arturo. Carmelita testified that on May 3, 2005, at 10:30 in the morning, she received a call
informing her that Arturo was held captive and will only be released upon payment of
P5,000,000.00. Several negotiations were had between the kidnappers and Carmelita during the
period of May 3 to May 5, 2005. Eventually, the kidnappers agreed to the amount of
P470,000.00 which Carmelita was able to raise. Thereafter, she was instructed to wrap the
money in two separate batches – Pl50,000.00 in one newspaper and the remaining P320,000.00
in another newspaper, and to place them in a blue plastic bag. On May 6, 2005, Carmelita and
her son-in-law, John, received several instructions from the kidnappers as to where to proceed
with the money, which they followed. Finally, she was ordered to go to Purok 6, Manggahan, to
deliver the money. In turn, she requested John to go to said place.
In addition, John testified in relation to the ransom money. According to him, he rode a
motorcycle and went to Purok 6, Manggahan as per instruction of the kidnappers. On his way to
the said place, the kidnappers made several calls and instructions. Upon his arrival at the meeting
place, the kidnappers called again and instructed him to give the ransom money to the person
who will eventually approach him. When said person arrived, John handed him the ransom
money; He later identified the man as accused Bathan. However, Arturo was not released by his·
kidnappers despite the delivery and receipt of the ransom money.
Finally, Arturo was killed in the course of the detention. About a month after the delivery and
receipt of the ransom money, Carmelita and John were informed by a police officer from the
Angono Police Station that a dead body had been found in Brgy. San Isidro, Angono, Rizal. On
May 28, 2005, Carmelita and John went to the Angono Police Station and pleaded for the police
to dig up the corpse of Arturo. Together with the police, Carmelita and John went to the Angono
Municipal Cemetery. After the body was exhumed, Carmelita and John confirmed that it was
Arturo

Case Digests
II.J. Crimes Against Property (Articles 293-332)
ERIC WU vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 207220-21, March 16, 2022
DOCTRINE:
Under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of estafa are:
1. the offender receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to deliver, or return, the same;
2. the offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or denies
receiving such money or property;
3. the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. the offended party demands that the offender return the money or property.
FACTS:
The spouses Wu are Taiwan nationals residing in the Philippines under a Special Resident
Retiree's Visa (SRRV) upon their investment and deposit of $90,000.00 with the Philippine
Retirement Authority (PRA) of the Board of Investments (BOI).
In 2002, at the solicitation of respondent HTI, the spouses Wu sought to transfer their dollar time
deposit investment plus accrued interests with the PRA, and invest the money with HTI,
representing their capital contribution, in exchange for the issuance of 47,440 shares of stock of
HTI. On August 21, 2002, pending approval by the PRA of the spouses Wu's dollar time
deposit, HTI issued a board resolution certified by its corporate secretary, Sandra G. Dy, listing
petitioners as two of four persons authorized to deposit and withdraw from HTI's Globalbank
deposit account.
Upon approval of the conversion of the spouses Wu's dollar time deposit, the PRA, on September
9, 2002, deposited the peso equivalent thereof i.e., P4,622,508.00, to HTI's deposit account with
Metrobank. However, HTI failed to issue the promised shares of stock in Eric and Chen's names.
Immediately thereafter, the relationship between HTI and the spouses Wu turned sour. On
separate occasions, Eric and Chen issued checks to various payees, for different amounts, drawn
from HTI' s corporate bank deposit accounts leading to the litigation between the parties.
Two of those checks are the subject matter of Criminal Case Nos. 06-1263- CFM (Estafa 1, for
short) and 07-0254-CFM f(Estafa 2, for short) for Estafa against the Wu couple. Previous
thereto, HTI filed seven criminal complaints against the Wus before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, involving the same checks, including those with payable amounts of P291,000.00
and Pl7,524.00, which were ultimately dismissed on the ground of duplicity of offenses charged.

Case Digests
The dismissal was brought up to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the CA and Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 196066 which affirmed the City Prosecutor's Office's dismissal of the complaints with
finality. Insisting on the defect in the Informations, the spouses Wu filed separate motions to
quash before the RTC Branches 112 and 114.
In separate Orders, the RTC Branches 112 and 114, quashed the Informations for Estafa against
the Wus on the same ground of duplicity of offenses charged. Significantly, the RTC branches
orders pertained to the prior prosecution of the spouses Wu for the same charges of
misappropriation of the same amounts in Criminal Case No. 03-1293 before RTC, Branch 195,
which was eventually dismissed with finality.
With the respective denials of its motions for reconsideration, HTI filed separate appeals to the
CA. As adverted to, the CA granted HTI's appeal and reversed and set aside the Orders of the
RTC Branches 112 and 114, respectively. The CA ruled that there was no duplicity of offenses
because both Informations separately charged a single offense of Estafa by conversion and
misappropriation for each amount. The CA held that double jeopardy, or res judicata in prison
grey, did not attach since the Wus were not arraigned in criminal case which was eventually
dismissed by the RTC Branch 195.
As for the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the CA disagreed with the
RTC Branch l 14's succinct ruling that the allegations contained in the Information differed from
the findings of the City Prosecutor's Office. The CA found that the facts charged in the
Information sufficiently averred the elements of the offense of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph l(b) of the RPC.
According to the CA, the Wu’s may still be held liable for Estafa should they be found to have
expended corporate funds for their personal use, notwithstanding their money investment
deposited with HTI's corporate account. Wu’s filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the
offense as defined in the law and be ultimately considered as a ground for a motion to quash.
RULING:
YES, the facts charged constitute the offense of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the RPC.
In the case at bar, the reading of the two Informations will disclose that the essential elements of
the offense charged are sufficiently alleged.

Case Digests
In CA-G.R. CR No. 31063, the Information charged that [petitioners], while being authorized
signatories of HTI's corporate checking account only for authorized expenditures, "misapplied,
misappropriated and converted" to their own use and benefit the amount of P291,000.00 from the
said bank account to the detriment of the said corporation.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 31921, the Information similarly charged that appellees, while being
authorized signatories of HTI's corporate checking account only tor authorized expenditures,
drew against the said bank account to pay for the tuition fee of their son to the detriment of the
corporation. These facts, as alleged in tl1e two Information indubitably constitute the elements of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the RPC.
The fact that appellees' investment was deposited into HTI's corporate account does not mean
that they could not be held liable for estafa, if they did in fact misappropriate the corporate fund
for tl1eir personal use. The crime of estafa is committed when a person shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. This is true whether or
not such person is an officer of the corporation defrauded, as in these consolidated cases.
ELIZABETH HORCA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 224316, November 10, 2021
DOCTRINE:
Under Article 308 of the RPC, the crime of theft is committed when the following elements
concur:
1. that there be taking of personal property;
2. that said property belongs to another;
3. that the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. the taking be accomplished without the use of violence, intimidation, or force upon
persons or things.
Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender and can be presumed from the unlawful taking.
FACTS:
On January 21, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft. The information alleges that
petitioner received from the Sisters of Providence, represented by Sister Linda Jo Reynolds the
total amount of P1,005,626.50 under the express obligation of delivering 19 Swiss Air plane
tickets for Rome to the complainant, she failed to do so and did not return the same to the
complainant.

Case Digests
The prosecution's witness Sister Linda Jo Reynolds testified that she procured the services of
petitioner to be the group's travel agent for a trip to Rome, Italy scheduled in October 2001. A
couple of months before the trip, Sister Reynolds ordered from petitioner 19 airline tickets and
issued two BPI checks amounting to P502,813.25 each, or in the total amount of P1,005,626.50,
as payment therefor. Sister Reynolds only received four and was informed that the other 15
tickets were stolen. Further, the four tickets could not be used and had to be returned to petitioner
because the flight covered by the said tickets was cancelled. Upon demand, petitioner was only
able to return P90,000.00, thus, prompting the nun to file the complaint before the RTC.
Petitioner confirmed that she received two checks from Sister Reynolds with the total amount of
P1,005,626.50 under the agreement that she was to book 19 Swiss Air plane tickets for them.
Despite giving the receipt, however, she was not able to deliver all of the tickets to the Sisters of
Providence because the airline company which issued them filed for bankruptcy and the flight
was eventually cancelled. Swiss Air refunded the value of the checks to Expert Travel but she
was unable to get the money from the agency. Wanting to save face and thinking that the travel
agency would reimburse her, petitioner voluntarily refunded Sister Reynolds the amount of
P90,000.00. Expert Travel did not reimburse petitioner because it was already going to close and
stop operations.Consequently, she could not pay Sister Reynolds the whole amount.
The RTC rendered its Decision holding that all the elements of the crime of Theft were present
and sentenced her to suffer the maximum penalty of twenty (20) years imprisonment applying
Art. 309 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and to reimburse the private complainant the amount of
P915,626.50 plus interest.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC and found that the prosecution successfully
proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner insisted that the crime charged is not supported by
the evidence on record and that her liability is merely civil in nature. Further, petitioner raised a
new argument and claimed that the crime charged should have been estafa and not theft. In
denying the motion, the CA reiterated its ruling that the elements of theft had been sufficiently
established by the prosecution. Anent petitioner's estafa argument, the appellate court noted that
it was raised for the first time on appeal and thus did not give it any due consideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
RULING:
No, petitioner is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Case Digests
Here, Horca was properly charged with the crime of Theft because she was merely entrusted
with the material or physical possession of the sum of money which she was supposed to use for
the purchase of the 19 airline tickets. Juridical possession, which means a possession that gives
the transferee a right over the thing transferred and that which he may set up even against the
owner, was never shown to have been transferred to petitioner.
The prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the crucial element of taking with intent to gain or
animus lucrandi, as it failed to adduce any concrete evidence which would show that Horca had
taken the cash for her own personal gain.
On the contrary, the records show that Horca actually used the money covered by the checks for
its intended purpose, i.e., to purchase the airline tickets, albeit only four were initially delivered
to Sister Reynolds. Moreover, it is also not established from the records if Horca took or received
the money after Swiss Air reimbursed the amount to the travel agency. Per petitioner's account,
when the flight was cancelled, Swiss Air refunded the money to Expert Travel and not to
petitioner. There was no clear evidence presented to prove that the money reimbursed by Swiss
Air landed in the hands of Horca. It was not established that Horca was also given the authority
by the agency to take possession of the reimbursed amount. Apart from Horca's assertions, the
records are bereft of any showing as to whom the money was refunded to or whether Horca was
able to get a hold of the money when Swiss Air returned the same to Expert Travel after the
flight was cancelled.
Hence, petitioner should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SPOUSES ISIDRO DULAY III AND ELENA DULAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021
By: khateyyy
DOCTRINE:
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit as defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC:
1. that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
2. that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
3. that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
4. that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Estafa by deceit was consummated when petitioners received payments for the subject
property knowing that they were not the registered owners who could validly transfer title
thereto.

Case Digests
Time and again we have ruled that the one induced, who must be ignorant of the falsity of
the representations, must have relied on the truth thereof and, as a consequence, sustained
injury.
The doctrine of pro reo and the correlative rule on lenity is applied when there is doubt as
to the applicability of various penalties under different amended or repealed laws.
FACTS:
Claiming to be the actual owners of a 450-square meter lot in Baguio City, petitioners sold it to
private complainants, the spouses Isabelo and Hilaria Dulos; hence, petitioners were charged
with Estafa under Article 315 2(a) of the RPC.
Marilou, the daughter-in-law of the spouses Dulos, met petitioner Elena who proposed to sell the
subject property to either Marilou or her in-laws. During a meeting at the Dulos' house,
petitioners presented a photocopy of TCT registered in the names of Isidro and Virginia Dulay
covering the subject property. When complainants inquired, why a different name was indicated
in the title, i.e., Virginia Dulay instead of Elena, the latter explained that she and Virginia are one
and the same person. Consequently, the spouses Dulos confirmed their interest to purchase the
subject property, subject to inspection prior to finalizing the sale.
Subsequently, the parties agreed on the terms of sale. The parties further agreed that the spouses
Dulay will hand over title to the subject property once the spouses Dulos' monthly payments
have reached half the amount of the purchase price . When the spouses Dulos' monthly payments
reached more than half of the purchased price without receiving the promised title or a copy
thereof from petitioners, they made further inquiries on the subject property and learned that: (1)
the registered owners indicated in TCT i.e., Isidro and Virginia Dulay, are different persons from
petitioners; (2) the Isidro Dulay named in the TCT is petitioner Isidro's uncle and namesake; and
(3) the long deceased spouses Isidro and Virginia Dulay has a daughter, Carmencita. Forthwith,
the spouses Dulos stopped paying the monthly installments.
Petitioners maintained that at the time of sale, they owned the subject property (via donation or
succession) and were awaiting the facilitation of the transfer of title to their names which was
made known to the complainants. Petitioners insisted that the spouses Dulos, including Marilou,
knew of the difficulty they were encountering in registering the property in their own names and
transferring title in the names of the spouses Dulos. In all, petitioners completely denied deceit in
their sale of the subject property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of estafa when private complainants
were aware that the subject property was not in their names at the time of the transaction.

Case Digests
RULING:
Yes, Spouses Dulay are guilty of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.
Here, all the elements are present.
Petitioners employed a scheme of dissembling against the spouses Dulos by withholding from
the latter the true registered owners of the subject property under TCT No. T-2135. Petitioners
took advantage of the demise of the real registered owners, the spouses Isidro and Virginia Dulay
and more importantly, the similarity in the names of the two Isidros who are related and share the
exact same name, i.e., Isidro Dulay. Petitioners' deceit is illustrated by their inconsistent and
conflicting claims (a) that title to the subject property is simply being reconstituted to reflect
their names, (b)that they are the same persons as Isidro and Virginia Dulay, and (c) that petitioner
Isidro is a putative heir of Maria, the purported registered owner of the subject property prior to
the registered owners reflected in TCT No. T-2135.
Reconstitution of title is the issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. It presupposes that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject
property. On this score alone, it is apparent that petitioners falsely misrepresented their
ownership of the subject property to complainants.
Petitioners' false pretense of ownership which could transfer valid title to the subject property,
was committed prior to and simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. Private
complainants' reliance on this false pretense induced and impelled them to purchase the subject
property from sham owners who do not hold any color of title and pay them the total amount of
P707,000.00.
Plainly, petitioners deceived private complainants and misrepresented to them that: (a) TCT No.
T-2135 covering the subject property is registered in their names; (b) the Virginia indicated in
TCT No. T-2135 is the same person as petitioner Elena; and (c) they are simply reconstituting
their lost title, TCT No. T-2135.
Estafa by deceit was consummated when petitioners received payments for the subject property
knowing that they were not the registered owners who could validly transfer title thereto. Time
and again we have ruled that the one induced, who must be ignorant of the falsity of the
representations, must have relied on the truth thereof and, as a consequence, sustained injury.
2. Assuming that they employed deceits, whether or not the petitioners were correctly
convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a), instead of estafa under Article
316 (1) of the RPC.
Yes, Spouses Dulay are correctly convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a).

Case Digests
In this case, however, there is no doubt as to the applicability of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC:
the constitutive offense of estafa by deceit under Article 315(2)(a) was specifically charged in
the Information, established and proven beyond reasonable doubt, and affirmed on appeal by the
appellate court. Therefore, there is no need to apply lenity and the doctrine of pro reo.
Moreover, the following essential elements of Article 316 of the RPC must be established: (1)
that the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a building; (2) that the offender who is
not the owner of said property should represent that he is the owner thereof; (3) that the offender
should have executed an act of ownership, e.g., selling, leasing, encumbering, or mortgaging the
property; and (4) that the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.
Here, petitioners did not exercise acts of dominion or ownership over the property other than
their false pretense and claim that they owned it. Petitioners proffered a nominal claim of
ownership by showing a copy of TCT No. T-2135 and pretending to be the same persons
indicated therein as registered, owners of the subject property. The fraudulent acts of petitioners
in pretending to own the real property and selling it is not equivalent to an exercise of an act of
dominion or ownership which damaged and prejudiced the real owner of the thing, Carmencita,
the daughter of Isidro and Virginia Dulay.
ROSELLA BARLIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 207418, June 23, 2021
By: quagmire4
DOCTRINE:
The elements of estafa under Article 315 paragraph (1)(b) of the RPC are:
1. that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
2. that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or a denial of the receipt thereof;
3. that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
FACTS:
Ruth S. Gacayan and petitioner, Rosella Barlin were both dealers of Triumph products in San
Juan, Metro Manila. After the petitioner's store was gutted by a fire, Gacayan agreed to place
orders of Triumph products on petitioner's behalf as covered by Trust Receipt Agreements
(TRAs).

Case Digests
From March 6, 1999 until December 16, 1999, petitioner religiously returned the unsold items to
Gacayan. However, Gacayan claimed that the petitioner failed to pay on time for the other items
with a total value of P74,955.00. Petitioner thus issued checks to pay her obligations to Gacayan
but the checks bounced for having been drawn against a closed account. Hence, Gacayan filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against petitioner. During the trial, Gacayan claimed that the
petitioner owed her P78,055.00.
Out of the 22 TRAs presented by the prosecution, only two were signed by the petitioner herself
while the others were signed by her salespersons. Petitioner insisted that she had already returned
all unsold products to Gacayan with a total value of P43,000.00. Thus, she no longer had any
liability to Gacayan.
Finally, the petitioner admitted that a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(BP 22) was filed by Gacayan against her in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 57 of
San Juan, Metro Manila. Petitioner presented a Compromise Agreement on the civil liability they
entered into on October 16, 2002 on the BP 22 case. She claimed that she was in the process of
paying off the compromise amount of P50,000.00.
The RTC convicted petitioner of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
of the RPC. The RTC found that petitioner received items from Gacayan as per the TRAs
presented by the prosecution. Her failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the products or to
return the unsold items constitutes the crime of estafa. Moreover, her partial cash payments and
the offsetting with the products procured by Gacayan will not exculpate her from criminal
liability for the crime of estafa. Neither did the alleged compromise agreement she entered into
with Gacayan before the MeTC of San Juan be used as a defense for prosecution for estafa.
The CA found that the petitioner is guilty as charged when she disposed of the goods covered
thereby without delivering the proceeds to Gacayan. Nonetheless, the appellate court noted that
the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the exact amount of the petitioner's obligation since
Gacayan submitted inconsistent computations. The total amount owed by the petitioner to
Gacayan was reduced to P24,975.00. Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties before the MeTC of San Juan with respect to the criminal
case filed by Gacayan against petitioner for the latter's violation of BP 22 did not novate the
TRAs to a contract of loan or relieve Badin of her criminal liability and convert it to one merely
civil in nature
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in convicting Barlin of Estafa
RULING:
YES. All the essential elements of Estafa are present in this case.

Case Digests
First, there is no dispute that petitioner received merchandise from Gacayan as evidenced by
TRAs 0081 and 0083 signed and executed by petitioner herself.
As to TRAs 0081 and 0083, the documents clearly stated that petitioner received in trust the
merchandise from Gacayan to: (a) hold the goods in trust; (b) dispose or sell them for cash and to
receive the proceeds in trust; (c) turnover and remit the proceeds of the sale of goods on or
before the due date less petitioner's commission; and (d) return the goods in the event of non-sale
within period specified or upon demand. Upon default or failure of petitioner to comply with any
of the terms and conditions, Gacayan may cancel the trust receipt and take possession of the
goods subject of the trust or the proceeds realized therefrom.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, she entered into a trust receipt agreement with Gacayan and
not a barter or exchange.The terms of TRAs 0081 and 0083 were clear that she received the
products listed therein in trust for Gacayan. She obligated herself to dispose the goods and
receive the proceeds of sale in trust for Gacayan. In case the goods were not sold, she must return
them to Gacayan.
Second, petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the products she procured from
Gacayan under TRAs 0081 and 0083 upon the latter's demand. Petitioner even admitted that a
similar case with respect to the same transactions were the subject matter of a criminal case for
violation of BP 22 before the MeTC of San Juan for an amount of P50,000.00. She apparently
attempted to pay Gacayan post-dated checks worth P50,000.00 which eventually bounced for
having been drawn against a closed account. This fact alone proves petitioner's culpability that
she misappropriated or converted the proceeds of the sale of the items she held in trust for
Gacayan.
Third, petitioner's misappropriation or conversion of the proceeds of the sale of Gacayan's

products caused damage to the latter in the total amount of P8,275.00.[38] Gacayan is deemed to
have suffered damage when she parted with her goods and did not receive the proceeds of the
sale thereof or the unsold items were not returned despite demand.
Lastly, Gacayan demanded payment from petitioner under TRAs 0081 and 0083 which went
unheeded.
Lastly, Gacayan demanded payment from petitioner under TRAs 0081 and 0083 which went
unheeded.
Petitioner's contention that she was not informed of the cause of accusation against her in the
Information fails to convince. The Information clearly and categorically charged her with Estafa
under Article 315 paragraph (1)(b) for violating the trust receipt agreements she had entered into
with Gacayan. It must be stressed that a violation of trust receipt agreements would make the
accused criminally liable for estafa under paragraph (1)(b) of Article 315 of the RPC as
expressly provided in Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law.

Case Digests
The prosecution had proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa.
The element of damage was sufficiently established when Gacayan parted with her goods and
failed to recover the proceeds of the sale thereof or the unsold items despite repeated demands.
Petitioner herself admitted that she tried to turn over the proceeds of the sale under the TRAs
through the issuance of post-dated checks which were however dishonored.
Petitioner even admitted before the trial court that the post-dated checks were issued with respect
to the same transactions in this case. She also presented a Compromise Agreement with respect
to the dishonored post-dated checks executed by the parties before the MeTC of San Juan.
RAMON H. DEBUQUE vs. MATT C. NILSON

G.R. No. 191718, May 10, 2021
By: Cara V
DOCTRINE:
The elements of Syndicated Estafa are as follows:
1. Estafa or Other Forms of Swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC,
is committed;
2. the Estafa or Swindling is committed by a syndicate of five [5] or more persons; and,
3. defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon[s]," or
farmers' association, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.
The case of Remo v. Devanadera clarifies the standards on what constitutes a syndicate
under PD 1689, to wit:
1. [The group] must be at least five (5) in number.

2. [The group] must have formed or managed a rural bank, cooperative, "samahang
nayon," farmer's association or any other corporation or association that solicits
funds from the general public.
3. [The group] formed or managed such association with the intention of carrying out
an unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme i.e., they used the very
association that they formed or managed as the means to defraud its own
stockholders, members and depositors
FACTS:
Nilson alleged that in the early 1990s, while he was the Managing Director of Tongsat, he met
Atty. Debuque, who was then the Chairman of Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc. (DOMSAT).

Case Digests
Atty. Debuque borrowed sizable funds from Nilson numerous times. Atty. Debuque, who was
also acting on behalf of the other accused, invited Nilson to join them in a business venture,
which the former alleged would yield large profits. He promised Nilson shares of stock in
Investa Land Corporation (ILC), a corporation then to be formed, equivalent to the value of the
numerous personal loans extended to him by Nilson. Atty. Debuque also induced Nilson to
purchase various commercial lots in partnership with him, stating that the value of the lands will
rise exponentially, and that these will be transferred in the name of ILC. Consequently, on two
occasions, Nilson paid Atty. Debuque sums of money as his share in the purchase price of
commercial lots. Nilson, however, thereafter claimed that the lots were not commercial lands and
were represented as such to induce him to pay a higher price. Atty. Debuque then pledged TCT
No. 203836 in exchange for the release of the P3 million. The Land Registration Authority,
however, reported that the said title was questionable. Also, Nilson's wife, Racquel, lent Atty.
Debuque sums of money in exchange for ILC shares of stock, secured by TCT No. 291035.
Nilson further contributed P8 million as initial operational funds of ILC. In turn, Atty. Debuque
promised to give Nilson ILC shares of stock in the total amount of P76 million.
Hence the filing of a Complaint-Affidavit for Syndicated Estafa against Atty. Debuque, Ramon,
and the other accused. Nilson alleged that they neither gave him the promised ILC shares of
stock nor returned the funds that he contributed to the venture. In response, Atty. Debuque and
the other accused filed countercharges for Falsification and Perjury against Nilson. In their Joint
Counter-Affidavit in the Syndicated Estafa charge, Atty. Debuque and the other accused denied
the charges against them and alleged the following: (a) PD 1689 is not applicable because ILC is
a closed corporation; (b) they filed a complaint for declaratory relief against Nilson and the issue
raised therein presents a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case; (c) the mere act of
disbursing the corporate funds by Atty. Debuque does not ipso facto mean that these were
mishandled; (d) the charge is in the nature of an intra-corporate dispute; and (e) ILC is not
bankrupt as it has numerous properties assigned to it.
Assistant City Prosecutor Florante R. Ramolete found probable cause to charge Atty. Debuque
and the other accused with Syndicated Estafa in relation to PD 1689. He also dismissed the
counter-charges of Falsification and Perjury against Nilson. DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez
reversed and set aside the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. He ordered the
withdrawal of the Information for Syndicated Estafa and directed the filing of a new one for
Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC but only against Atty. Debuque. The Secretary of
Justice ruled that all the elements of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC were present,
namely: (a) Atty. Debuque made false pretenses regarding the issuance of certificates of shares
of stock in exchange for the loans extended by Nilson; (b) the false pretenses were made prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of fraud; (c) Nilson relied on Atty. Debuque's false
pretenses and was induced to part with his money or property; and, (d) Nilson suffered damage
when Atty. Debuque failed to issue the promised shares of stock despite repeated demands.
Further, the DOJ Secretary did not find any evidence implicating the other accused for
Syndicated Estafa. There was no evidence showing that Atty. Debuque was authorized by the
other shareholders of the corporation to transact with Nilson. The other accused were in fact
strangers to the agreements between Atty. Debuque and Nilson.

Case Digests
Likewise, conspiracy among Atty. Debuque and the other accused in the perpetuation of fraud
was not proved. The DOJ Secretary found that the other accused are likewise liable for the
following reasons: (a) they joined Atty. Debuque in incorporating ILC; (b) they were the
controlling stockholders and officers of ILC, therefore privy to the matters relating to it,
including Atty. Debuque's scheme; (c) despite being aware that the amounts Nilson paid (as his
share for the purchase of properties and as his contribution for ILC's operational funds) were
made in exchange for ILC shares of stock, they refused to issue the same; and, (d) they actively
participated in delaying the resolution of Nilson's criminal complaint against Atty. Debuque by
filing a complaint for declaratory relief.
The CA treated Nilson's petition as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 considering that there
was an allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary in issuing his
August 23, 2007 Resolution.
The appellate court reversed the last Resolution of the DOJ Secretary and reinstated the Joint
Resolution of the City Prosecutor finding probable cause for Syndicated Estafa against all
accused. The CA ruled that conspiracy may be implied from the fact that Ramon and the other
accused were all relatives of Atty. Debuque, and were incorporators, officers, and stockholders of
ILC. According to the CA, these circumstances make them privy to Atty. Debuque's activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was probable cause to indict Ramon for the crime of Syndicated Estafa
under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC, as amended, in relation to PD 1689.
RULING:
No, there was no probable cause to indict Ramon for the crime of Syndicated Estafa under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC, as amended, in relation to PD 1689.
Applying the foregoing, the Court finds no existing syndicate in which Ramon and the other
accused had any participation. As found by the DOJ Secretary, Atty. Debuque acted on his own,
without the participation or involvement of Ramon or the other accused. Atty. Debuque was
never authorized by the ILC shareholders, i.e., Ramon and the other accused, to transact with
Nilson. The third standard provided in Remo, therefore, is not satisfied. There is simply no proof
that all of the accused, including Ramon, acted through ILC in defrauding Nilson.
There was also no showing that Ramon acted on his own and defrauded Nilson. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that Nilson parted with his money solely because of Atty. Debuque's
misrepresentations and false pretenses.

Case Digests
Moreover, there was no conspiracy, express or implied, among Ramon, Atty. Debuque, and the
other accused. Implied conspiracy, as correctly ruled by the CA, must be proved "through the
mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of [the] crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert
of action and a community of interest."
Here, it was not shown that Ramon performed any overt act in consonance with Atty. Debuque's
intent to defraud Nilson. That Ramon and the other accused were relatives of Atty. Debuque and
incorporators and officers of ILC, standing alone, would not suffice to warrant the finding of
implied conspiracy absent the commission of an act in furtherance of a joint purpose or
community of interest with Atty. Debuque. Being incorporators and officers of a corporation
does not automatically connote conspiracy.
Therefore, there being no syndicate in the first place, only Atty. Debuque is to be held personally
liable. The DOJ Secretary, in his August 23, 2007 Resolution, correctly found probable cause for
Estafa only against him. However, as stated, this criminal case for Estafa may not be initiated
anymore due to his death.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AVELINA MANALANG

G.R. No. 198015, January 20, 2021
By: khateyyy
DOCTRINE:
Jurisprudence is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for
Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code), and Estafa under Article
315(2)(a)of the RPC. In estafa, damage is essential, but not in the crime of illegal
recruitment. As to the latter, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, but not the
fact of payment that renders the recruitment activity as unlawful.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or

concealment, are the following:
1. there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
2. such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
3. the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
4. as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Case Digests
FACTS:
On separate occasions, while Tura, Marañon, and Cawas were looking for jobs abroad, they met
Manalang who informed them that they can work in Australia provided they pay the placement
fee. They paid the said fee and Manalang issued receipts with respect thereto. Manalang signed
the receipts in their presence under the name “Tess Robles”. However, they were not deployed
on the dates Manalang promised. They demanded reimbursement but Manalang failed to return
said amount.
In view of Manalang's failed promises, they went to POEA to verify whether Manalang is a
licensed recruiter. To their surprise, they were informed that Manalang was not authorized to
recruit workers abroad.
The accused vehemently denied the accusations against her. She claimed that her real name is
Avelina Balala Manalang. She denied knowing "Tess Robles" or using said name in any of her
transactions.
ISSUE:
Whether Manalang was guilty of three (3) counts of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.
RULING:
Yes, Manalang is guilty for three (3) counts of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.
In the instant case, the elements of deceit and damage are present. The accused without any
license or authority to do so, promised private complainants overseas employment, then required
them to undergo training and collected fees or payments from them, while continually assuring
them that they would be deployed abroad, but failed to do so. Persuaded by these assurances
given by Manalang, the private complainants paid their placement fees, albeit partially. Thus, her
representation induced the victims to part with their money, resulting in damage. When private
complainants paid their placement fees, Manalang issued receipts using the fictitious name of
"Tess Robles". In view of the foregoing deceitful and illegal acts of Manalang, the private
complainants undoubtedly suffered damage.
FERNANDO PANTE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 218969, January 18, 2021
By: wom
DOCTRINE:
Theft is also committed by one's failure to deliver lost property to its owner or local
authorities. In this kind of Theft, it is essential to prove:
1. the finding of lost property;

Case Digests
2. the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities or its owner.
In fine, a "finder" under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual
finder of the lost property since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and
misappropriation of the property found
FACTS:
Mr. Dawson Word dropped by the People’s Mart with his housekeeper Angie to buy fish. He was
carrying US$4,550.00 and PhP27,000.00 bundled together in a rubber band placed on his lap.
Word gave Angie PhP1,000.00 to buy fish and arranged his remaining money while waiting
insdie his car. When Angie returned, Word placed the bundle of money between his lap and
drove back to his apartment. He parked his car in front of his residence and forgot the money
that he placed on his lap. Apparently, upon alighting from the car, the bundled money fell on the
road near his vehicle.
A bakery worker noticed a bundle of money lying on the ground near Word's car. Meanwhile,
one of Pante's co-accused, who was riding his bike outside, also noticed the bundle of money and
picked it up before going inside his house. he found 30 pieces of US$100 bills near Word's car,
but no Philippine currency. He kept the money in his pocket and proceeded to deliver bread.
Afterwards, he went to his co-accused cousin to ask him what to do with the money. While they
were talking, Pante overheard their conversation. Being the only adult among them, Pante told
them to get the money and proceed to the tree house. On their way to the tree house, Pante
grabbed the money and counted it. Thereafter, he got 17 pieces of US$100dollar bills for
himself. His co-accused cousin received US$500.00 while he kept US$2,350.00. Pante went
home with his share and never returned.
Word realized that the money that he had placed on his lap was missing. He began searching
for it in his car but could no longer find it. With the help of his landlord, Word learned that
Pante's minor co-accused picked up the bundled money near his car.
On the same day, the police went to the house of the other accused-minor, who admitted
getting US$500.00 but could no longer return the same because he already spent it. Thereafter,
the police proceeded to the house of Pante, who also admitted that he received US$1,700.00.
He was able to return US$300.00, P4,660.00, one unit of JVC component, and a gas stove with
a tank. Pante also gave a receipt from Monton Hardware, where he bought construction
materials. Seeing that some of the materials were already used, the police did not retrieve them
anymore. Thereafter, all the money and items recovered from the three accused were returned
to Word.
Pante and his co-accused minors were charged of Theft. the RTC found all three accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence submitted by the prosecution proved that Word lost his
money and that the accused-minor was the finder thereof, and who shared the cash he found
with his co-accused cousin and Pante, the latter both knowing where the money came from.

Case Digests
In his appeal, Pante claimed that the prosecution did not present any proof of ownership over
the money that Word had allegedly lost. Pante posited that there was no unlawful taking of the
money on his part because the finder of the lost money was his co-accused and not himself.
Not knowing where it came from, he averred that he did not have any intent to take money
belonging to another. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the lower court’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused were guilty of Theft.
RULING:
Yes, the accused were guilty of Theft. Under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that the prosecution
witnesses were able to prove that Word lost his bundled money after alighting from his car in
front of his residence and forgetting that he had placed them in between his legs. Such fact was
corroborated by the prosecution witness who testified that he positively saw the accused-minor
pick up the bundle of money under Word's car.
In the same vein, all three accused admitted that it was the accused-minor who found the
bundle of money in front of the bakery, which they later divided among themselves in the
following manner: US$1,700.00 for Pante; and US$500.00 and US$2,350.00 for each of the
two accused-minor. Despite knowing that the money did not rightfully belong to them, Pante
encouraged the two minor accused to keep the money for themselves. He also appropriated the
money for himself by buying various items such as a JVC component, gas tank, and
construction materials. He only returned the remainder of the money to Word when police
authorities showed up in his house.
2. Whether the “finder” under Art. 308(1) of the RPC is limited the actual finder of the
lost property
No, the "finder" under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual
finder of the lost property since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and
misappropriation of the property found.
Though not the actual finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his two
co-accused minor did not own the subject money. He knew for a fact that his co-accused minor
merely found the money along the road while the latter was delivering bread. Instead of
returning the money, Pante convinced his co-accused minors not to return the money and to
divide it among themselves. At that moment, Pante placed himself precisely in the situation as
if he was the actual finder.

Case Digests
Otherwise stated, petitioner was a "finder in law," if not in fact; and his act in appropriating the
money was of precisely of the same character as if it had been originally found by him. His
criminal intent to commandeer the money found was altogether clear at that point.
LUIS T. ARRIOLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020
By: lewi
DOCTRINE:
As laid down by the jurisprudence, the elements of Estafa by means of deceit under Art.
315, Par. 2 (a) of the RPC are as follows:
1. That there must be false pretense or fraudulent representation as to the offender’s

power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions;
2. That such false pretense or fraudulent act, or fraudulent representation was made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
3. That the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and was induced to part with his money or property
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Case law instructs that the ‘gravamen of the crime of Estafa is the employment of fraud or
deceit to the damage or prejudice of another’.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including
all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of
truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which
another is cheated.
On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words
or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it
to his legal injury.
Being malum in se, and depending on the proven circumstances, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are indeed available defenses against a prosecution for Estafa.

Case Digests
The return by the accused of money belonging to the private complainant will not reverse a
consummated act of Estafa.
FACTS:
Del Rosario met Arriola, a real estate broker of real properties located in Tagaytay City. Arriola
informed Del Rosario that the lot adjacent to the land he previously bought was also for sale.
Arriola showed Del Rosario a letter purportedly from the subject lot owner, Candelaria,
authorizing him to sell it in her stead.
Arriola presented himself as authorized to sell the property of Candelaria and to receive
payments in behalf of the latter. Hence, Del Rosario paid and delivered the amount of P437,000
representing full payment of the land.
When Arriola could not give to Del Rosario a copy of the TCT after repeated requests, she asked
the former to return the money. Arriola promised to return the amount with interest but he
reneged on his promise. After earnest efforts to contact Candelaria, Del Rosario later learned that
the former was not selling the subject property, nor had she authorized Arriola to sell it.
Arriola maintained that there was no deceit and his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. He also asserted that there was no damage, since the money had already returned to Del
Rosario.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the accused is guilty for Estafa by means of deceit.
RULING:
Yes, the totality of circumstantial evidence sufficiently established Arriola’s guilt for Estafa
by means of deceit.
The deceit and false pretenses committed by the accused prior to the transfer of money is laid out
as follows:
1. Arriola held himself out to Del Rosario as a duly authorized person to sell Candelaria’s
lot and showed her a letter apparently signed by Candelaria to the effect.
The Authorization contained no such authority in favor of Arriola to sell Candelaria's lot.
Assuming that the Authorization was genuine, its wordings gave Arriola nothing more
than an authority to receive the payment for the supposed sale of Candelaria's lot. There
was no explicit mention of any sale to be facilitated by Arriola. Despite such a patently
defective Authorization, Arriola still volunteered information to Del Rosario that he was
also the broker of Candelaria's lot and could negotiate the sale of the property.

Case Digests
An authority to receive the payment cannot be impliedly construed as an authority to sell

a piece of real property. Here, the Authorization was not in any way the special power of
attorney contemplated and required by law. Being a real estate broker by profession,
Arriola should be well-equipped with the basic knowledge on the technicalities in
conveyances of real property for another person. This pretense can only be perceived as
misleading, false, and fraudulent, as Arriola acted before Del Rosario as though there was
an express grant of authority to sell Candelaria's lot in his name, when in fact there was
none.
2. Arriola also presented to Del Rosario a fax transmission allegedly from Candelaria
addressed to him simultaneously to the full payment of the supposed purchase price. The
fax transmission was likewise bereft of any indication that Arriola, or anyone else, had
been particularly entrusted with the sale of Candelaria's property, other than the
processing of its alleged documentation and the pertinent government transactions.
3. Arriola presented to Del Rosario a ready-made Deed of Absoltue Sale with Candelaria’s
signature already affixed thereto. Nothing else attested to the genuineness of this
document aside from the compelling . assurances by Arriola to Del Rosario. These
assurances having successfully blocked any doubt on the Deed of Absolute Sale, Del
Rosario signed it on June 28, 2001 and Arriola had it notarized on August 2, 2001. It is
curious, however, that while it is established that Candelaria resided in Australia, there
was no indication or testimony that Candelaria was actually present in the Philippines to
sign the Authorization or appear before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed
of Absolute Sale.
Thus, the totality of these precedents lumped together with the ensuing phone calls, only
solidifies the veracity of the respective but similar conversations that Arriola indeed had not been
authorized to sell Candelaria’s land.
2. Will the return of the amount owed to Del Rosario cancel Arriola’s criminal liability for
Estafa?
No, the return of the amount owed to Del Rosario will not cancel Arriola’s criminal liability
for Estafa, it will not reverse a consummated act of Estafa. Such action may even uphold a
conviction.
The return by the accused of money belonging to the private complainant will not reverse a
consummated act of Estafa. Quite the contrary, such action may even uphold a conviction.
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that in criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

Case Digests
In this case, Arriola's initial attempts to reimburse Del Rosario through checks, coupled with the
actual return of the latter's money after the RTC issued its judgment of conviction, may all be
considered as unequivocal gestures to compromise and which can be measured against Arriola as
his implied admission of guilt.
Moreover, Salazar v. People, which exonerated accused therein upon reconsideration and
contemplated Estafa by misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, finds no
application here, as the present case involves Estafa by false pretenses under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the same law.
Even if so similarly situated, Salazar v. People declared that the transaction between the parties
therein was simply that of sale, and a delay in the performance by a party to the contract entailed
only a civil obligation to return the advance payment made by the other. No such sale of a piece
of land transpired in this case due to Arriola's lack of authority to sell. There was no contract in
the first place. Also, unlike in Salazar v. People, evidence of false pretenses and the resultant
damage to Del Rosario clearly obtains against Arriola. This creates not just a civil obligation on
Arriola to return Del Rosario's money, but also a correlative criminal liability for the perpetration
of fraud on Del Rosario.
3. Is good faith a defense in Estafa?
No, good faith is not a defense in Estafa.
Good faith is "an elusive idea, taking on different meanings and emphases as we move from one
context to another."It is, in general, a state of mind consisting in honesty in belief or purpose,
faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in a given trade or business, absence of intent to defraud or seek unconscionable
advantage, or a belief in one's legal title or right. Being malum in se, and depending on the
proven circumstances, good faith and lack of criminal intent are indeed available defenses
against a prosecution for Estafa.
However, all-encompassing this definition is, good faith still cannot be appreciated in favor of
Arriola. As earlier expounded, Arriola, a real estate broker, presented to Del Rosario an
Authorization and a fax transmission clearly conveying mere permission from Candelaria to
receive payment from Del Rosario. Despite knowledge of such information, and even going so
far as to disclose the same to Del Rosario, Arriola continued to wield his ultra vires power to sell
Candelaria's lot. This smacks of overt thoughtlessness, gross negligence, and fraudulent
intentions in his professional dealings, imperiling the welfare of both his principal and the latter's
client and culminating in the actual damage to Del Rosario. To attribute good faith to Arriola
under these facts is to uphold injustice.

Case Digests
TEDDY AND TEOFILO GRANA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 202111, November 25, 2019
DOCTRINE:
The elements of malicious mischief under article 327 of the RPC:
1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
2. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;
3. That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of
damaging it.
FACTS:
Complainant Bolbes and the five accused (Teddy, Gil, Ricky, Olive, and Teofilo) were neighbors
Bolbes claimed to have purchased the property subject of this controversy evidenced by a
Contract to Sell. Bolbes declared that Teddy and accused Gil and Ricky, upon the order of
Teofilo and Olive and without Bolbes's consent, entered the subject property by destroying the
iron fence, removing the cement foundation and made diggings until it reached a portion of the
foundation of his apartment, thus, exposing his apartment to danger of being destroyed in case of
heavy rains.
The defendants argued that Teofilo is the owner of the subject property, having purchased it as
evidenced by a contract of lease with option to purchase. He declared that he is the owner of the
said parcel of land and that he made some diggings and destroyed the fence because Bolbes built
them without his consent.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are guilty of the crime of malicious mischief.
RULING:
Yes, they are guilty of Malicious Mischief.
In this case, all the elements of malicious mischief were duly proven by the prosecution, viz:
1. Petitioners admitted in their "kontra salaysay" that Teofilo deliberately destroyed the
fence and its cement foundation, and made diggings in the subject property;
2. The destruction did not constitute arson or other crime involving destruction; and
3. The act of damaging another's property was committed merely for the sake of damaging
it.
Under the third element, assuming that petitioner Teofilo owned the property in controversy, he
and his co-accused were not justified in summarily destroying the improvements built thereon by
Bolbes. They unlawfully took the law into their own hands when they surreptitiously entered
Bolbes's enclosed lot and destroyed its fence and foundation.

Case Digests
II.K. Crimes Against Chastity (Arts. 333-334, 336-346)

G.R. No. 214882, October 16, 2019
By: melptjdatty
DOCTRINE:
Acts of lasciviousness; the offense proved, is included in rape, the offense charged."
FACTS:
ISSUES:
Whether or not Eulalio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to the second incident although the crime
charged is rape.
RULING:
Yes, Eulalio is guilty of acts of lasciviousness because all elements of the crime were present.
Conviction under Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the prosecution establish
the following elements:
(a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of
either sex; and
(b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either:
(i) by using force or intimidation; or
(ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or
(iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age.
The second incident would show that the accused committed lewd acts upon AAA, who was
only 11 years of age at the time, by kissing her using threats and intimidation.

Case Digests
II.K.2.a.(i) Compare Prosecution for Acts of Lasciviousness Under Art. 336,

RPC, and RA 7610, as amended

G.R. No. 214882, October 16, 2019
By: melptjdatty
DOCTRINE:
Under Article 336 of the RPC requires that the prosecution establish the following
elements:
1. the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of
either sex; and
2. the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either
a. by using force or intimidation; or
b. when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or
c. when the offended party is under 12 years of age.
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements:
1. the accused commits an act of sexua1 intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
3. the child is below 18 years old.
As regards the second additional element, it is settled that the child is deemed subjected to
other sexual abuse when the child engages in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that
some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will
of the offended party. The law does not require physical violence on the person of the
victim; moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient.
FACTS:

Case Digests
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eulalio could be convicted of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of
RA 7610.
RULING:
Yes, Eulalio could still be convicted of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 given the facts provided in the Information and those which were proven during
the trial of the case.
Eulalio committed lewd acts upon AAA, who was only 11 years old at the time, by kissing her
using threats and intimidation. Eulalio can only be held guilty of acts of lasciviousness although
charged with rape "following the variance doctrine enunciated under Section 42 in relation to
Section 52 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Acts of lasciviousness; the offense
proved, is included in rape, the offense charged
Withal, there is basis to rule that there was sexual abuse in the instant case, given that Eulalio
kissed AAA, who was only 11 years old at the time, by employing threats to force her into
submission.
In relation to this, it is important to emphasize that although Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
was not expressly mentioned in the Information, "this omission is not fatal so as to violate his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Indeed, what controls is
not the title of the information or the designation of the offense, but the actual facts recited in the
information constituting the crime charged.
In the case at bench, the Information alleged sufficiently all the elements constituting the crime
of acts of lasciviousness. Eulalio forced AAA, who was 11 years old at the time, to engage in
lascivious acts which is within the ambit of other sexual abuse in relation to Section 5(b). Thus,
even if Section 5(b) was not expressly mentioned or specified in the Information, Eulalio could
still be convicted of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610 given the facts
provided in the Information and those which were proven during the trial of the case.

Case Digests
II.L. Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons (Arts. 347-352)
LUISITO G. PULIDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021
By: Abonjoc
DOCTRINE:
For one to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution must prove the following:
1. that the offender has been legally married;
2. that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. that the second or subsequent marriage has all die essential requisites for validity.
It is vital in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage
When both the prior and subsequent marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, a void ab initio marriage can be raised as a defense in a bigamy case even
without a judicial declaration of its nullity. Nonetheless, the Court recognized that an
action for nullity of the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
In a criminal prosecution for bigamy, the parties may still raise the defense of a void ab
initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity if the first
marriage was celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code.
A judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and
subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for
bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.
Article 349 of the RPC penalizes parties who contracted a valid or voidable second
marriage when the first marriage, which may be valid or voidable, is still subsisting. In
contrast, Article 350 of the RPC penalizes those who without being included in Article 349,
contract a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with
or in disregard of a legal impediment.

Case Digests
FACTS:
Petitioner, then 16-yr.old Luisito G. Pulido, married his teacher then 22, Nora S. Arcon on
September 5, 1983 in a civil ceremony solemnized by the Mayor. The couple lived together until
2007 when Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. When confronted by Arcon,
Pulido admitted to his affair with Baleda. Arcon likewise learned that Pulido and Baleda entered
into marriage on July 31, 1995 solemnized by Rev. Conrado P. Ramos. Their Marriage
Certificate indicated Pulido’s civil status as single.
Arcon charged Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy on Dec. 4, 2007. In his defense, Pulido insisted
that he could not be held criminally liable for bigamy because both his marriages were null and
void. He claimed that his marriage with Arcon in 1983 was null and void for lack of a valid
marriage license while his marriage with Baleda is null and void for lack of a marriage
ceremony.
Baleda, on the other hand, claimed that she only knew of Pulido’s prior marriage with Arcon
sometime in April 2007. She alleged that even prior to the filing of the bigamy case, she already
filed a Petition to Annul her marriage with Pulido before the RTC. RTC declared her marriage
with Pulido as null and void for being bigamous in nature. This ruling attained finality, there
being no appeal filed thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pulido is guilty of bigamy
RULING:
NO, Pulido is not guilty of bigamy.
It is undisputed that Pulido married Arcon on September 5, 1983. Thereafter, he contracted a

second marriage with Baleda on July 31, 1995 without having his first marriage with Arcon
legally dissolved. Pulido and Baleda's marriage has all the essential requisites for validity had it
not for the existing first marriage.
Thereafter, Pulido's first marriage with Arcon and second marriage with Baleda were judicially
declared void for lack of a valid marriage license and for being bigamous, respectively
In this case, Pulido's marriage with Arcon was celebrated when the Civil Code was in effect
while his subsequent marriage with Baleda was contracted during the effectivity of the Family
Code. Hence, Pulido is required to obtain a judicial decree of absolute nullity of his prior void ab
initio marriage but only for purposes of remarriage. As regards the bigamy case, however, Pulido
may raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity.

Case Digests
When the accused contracts a second marriage without having the first marriage dissolved or
annulled, the crime of bigamy is consummated as the valid or voidable first marriage still
subsists without a decree of annulment by a competent court, In contrast, when the first marriage
is void ab initio, the accused cannot be held liable for bigamy as the judicial declaration of its
nullity is not tantamount to annulment nor dissolution but merely a declaration of a status or
condition that no such marriage exists.
In the same manner, when the accused contracts a second or subsequent marriage that is void ab
initio, other than it being bigamous, he/she cannot be held liable for bigamy as the effect of a
void marriage signifies that the accused has not entered into a second or subsequent marriage,
being inexistent from the beginning. Thus, the element, "that he or she contracts a second or
subsequent marriage" is lacking. A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the second
marriage merely confirms its inexistence and shall not render the accused liable for bigamy for
entering such void marriage while the first marriage still subsists. Consequently, the accused in
bigamy may validly raise a void ab initio second or subsequent marriage even without a judicial
declaration of nullity.
Applying the foregoing, Pulido may validly raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage in the
bigamy charge against him.
During the pendency of this case, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of Pulido's marriage
with Arcon due to the absence of a valid marriage license was issued and attained finality on
May 11, 2016. On June 29, 2016, the RTC issued a Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage
which effectively retroacts to the date of the celebration of Pulido and Arcon's marriage, i.e. on
September 5, 1983, This connotes that Pulido and Arcon were never married under the eyes of
the law.
Lacking an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., a prior valid marriage, as per
Certification dated December 8, 2008 and the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of Pulido
and Arcon's marriage, the prosecution failed to prove that the crime of bigamy is committed.
Therefore, the acquittal of Pulido from the bigamy charge is warranted.

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SEPTEMBAR 2023

BAR OPERATIONS: HERNANDO

"Always remember, chance favors the #HernanDoIt

2. Circumstances affecting Criminal Liability

● EDWIN TALABIS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 1

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDDIE MANANSALA 3

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GERALD MORENO Y 5

D. Execution and Service of Sentence

● GIL MIGUEL VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF 7

2. Probation Law (PD 968, as amended)

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENATO WAD-AS GR. No.

4. An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and

● TEDDY AND TEOFILO GRANA VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENE MONDEJAR G.R. Nos. 13

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MA. CONSUELO TOROBA PALMA 16

E. Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs

3. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 [RA 9165, as

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DONATO C. HERNANDEZ 20

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. KEVIN CASTILLO Y 23

● EMILY ESTORES Y PECARDAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE 25

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEX BALUYOT Y 27

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOHNNY ARELLAGA Y 30

G. Crimes Committed by Public Officers (Arts. 203-245)

1. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as

b) Corrupt Practices of Public Officers [Sec. 3]

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENE MONDEJAR 33

● PEOPLES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RICHARD R ENOJO 35

● DOMINADOR G. MARZAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE 38

● GIL MIGUEL VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS 41

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIO PANIS, FLORES, SANTIAGO, 44

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y RANAY G.R. 46

1. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA 9208, as

2. Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAE AL-SAAD Y BAGKAT G.R. No. 71

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y RANAY G.R. 73

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HECTOR CORNISTA y REOTUTAR 74

J. Crimes Against Property (Articles 293-332)

● ERIC WU VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 207220-21, March 76

● ELIZABETH HORCA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 224316, 78

● ROSELLA BARLIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 207418, 83

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AVELINA MANALANG G.R. No. 89

● FERNANDO PANTE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 218969, 90

● LUIS T. ARRIOLA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 199975, 93

● TEDDY AND TEOFILO GRANA VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 97

K. Crimes Against Chastity (Arts. 333-334, 336-346)

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNABE EULALIO y ALEJO G.R. 98

2. Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,

(1) Compare Prosecution for Acts of

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BERNABE 99

L. Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons (Arts. 347-352)

I.B.2.C. Mitigating Circumstances

EDWIN TALABIS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following

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Undeterred, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

Petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

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I.B.2.D. Aggravating Circumstances

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDDIE MANANSALA

Jurisprudence dictates that the elements of murder are as follows:

The elements of evident premeditation are:

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1. Whether or not treachery is present