SEPTEMBAR 2023

Chair's
Cases
Labor 20
Law
23
Digest of cases penned by
Associate Justice Ramon #HernanDoIt
Paul Hernando #Hernandonuts
 SEPTEMBAR 2023

BAR OPERATIONS: HERNANDO

SIBLINGS EDITION

A C KN O W L E D G M E N T
Special thanks to the following contributors:

CPALawyer2023 Wen Rayven

Macchiato Attysako Bonana
Lably Rommel Jr. Mikcroft
Kimu Celyn TinayTinapay
Liz0114 Quagmire4 Twistafate
Michie Hernalisa Narika
ML Atorniquet Yourhonor
Khateyyy Titaoframos AttyATW
Cattorney Subsilentio TheGreyQueen
Limecooler Chie El Filibusterismo
Justified Primrose Cara V
Reu Anne Garcia Regal_Nerd

"Always remember, chance favors the #HernanDoIt

prepared one." - J.Hernando #Hernandonuts
All the best to all Bar 2023 takers.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Topics Page

I.
Fundamental Principles and Concepts

B. State Policy Towards Labor

3. Social Justice

● ARIEL M. REYES VS. RURAL BANK OF SAN RAFAEL

(BULACAN) INC. G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022
1

II.
Pre-Employment

A. Recruitment and Placement of Local and Migrant Workers

● C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT VS. JIMMY G. JAICTEN G.R. No.

4
208981, February 01, 2021

3. Illegal Recruitment [Labor Code and the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Employment Act of 1995 (RA 8042), as amended by RA 10022]

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OLIVER IMPERIO y

ANTONIO G.R. No. 232623, October 05, 2020
6
c) Illegal Recruitment vs. Estafa

● PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. AVELINA

MANALANG G.R. No. 198015, January 20, 2021
8

III.
Employment Proper

B. Labor Standards

2. Wages
b. Principles
(4) Non-Diminution of Benefits

● COLEGIO SAN AGUSTIN-BACOLOD vs. MELINDA

M. MONTAÑO G.R. No. 212333, March 28, 2022
12

C. Social Welfare Legislation 15

3. Disability and Death Benefits

17
● EDGARDO M. PAGLINAWAN VS. DOHLE PHILMAN AGENCY
GR No. 230735, April 04, 2022
 ● EFRAIM DAUT DARROCA VS. CENTURY
MARITIME
AGENCIES, INC G.R. No. 234392, November 10, 2021

● DOLORES GALLEVO RODRIGUEZ VS.

PHILIPPINE
TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. G.R. No. 218311, October 11, 2021

● EDGARDO I. MABALOT VS. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING,

19
INC. G.R. No. 224344 September 13, 2021

● CHARLO P. IDUL VS. ALSTER INT'L SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. 23

G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021

● ARMANDO H. DE JESUS VS. INTER-ORIENT 25

MARITIME
ENTERPRISES, INC. G.R. No. 203478, June 23, 2021
28
● EMS CREW MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES VS. ERWIN C.
BAUZON G.R. No. 205385, April 26, 2021
30
● FLORENCIO B. DESTRIZA VS. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 203539, February 10, 2021
32
● V PEOPLE MANPOWER PHILS., INC. VS. DOMINADOR C.
BUQUID G.R. No. 222311, February 10, 2021
34
● C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT V. JIMMY G. JAICTEN G.R.
No. 208981, February 01, 2021
36

● GERARDO U. VILLE VS. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC.

G.R. No. 217879, February 01, 2021 40

● RONNIE L. SINGSON VS. ARKTIS MARITIME CORP. G.R. No.

214542, January 13, 2021 42

● PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. VS. ALMARIO C.

SAN JUAN G.R. No. 207511, October 5, 2020 44

IV. Post-Employment

A. Employer-Employee Relationship

1. Tests to Determine Employer-Employee Relationship

● GEROME B. GINTA-ASON vs. J.T.A. PACKAGING

CORPORATION, G.R. No. 244206, March 16, 2022

48
 50
● MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON VS. CYBERONE PH., INC. G.R.
No. 210741, October 14, 2020

2. Kinds of Employment

a) Regular

● ALLAN REGALA VS MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION 53

G.R. No. 204684, October 05, 2020

● PEDRITO R. PARAYDAY VS. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO. 55

INC. G.R. No. 204555, July 06, 2020

d) Project

● EDUARDO G. JOVERO VS. ROGELIO CERIO G.R. No. 58

202466, June 23, 2021

● ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF ASIA 59

VS. SEGUNDINO PALLE G.R. No. 201247, July 13,
2020

f) Fixed-Term

● ARLENE PALGAN VS. HOLY NAME UNIVERSITY G.R. 62

No. 219916, February 10, 2021

● ALLAN REGALA VS. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION 64

G.R. No. 204684, October 05, 2020

B. Termination of Employment by Employer

● EFREN SANTOS, JR. VS. KING CHEF G.R. No. 211073, November 25, 2020 68

1. Just Causes

● SYSTEMS AND PLAN INTEGRATOR AND DEVELOPMENT 70

CORPORATION VS. MICHELLE ELVI C. BALLESTEROS G.R. No.
217119, April 25, 2022

● COLEGIO SAN AGUSTIN-BACOLOD vs. MELINDA 73

M.
MONTAÑO G.R. No. 212333, March 28, 2022
76
● ARIEL M. REYES VS. RURAL BANK OF SAN
RAFAEL
(BULACAN) INC. G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022 78

● EVELINA E. BELARSO v. QUALITY HOUSE, INC G.R. No. 209983,

November 10, 2021 80

● PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. VS. VIOLETA NOCHE G.R.

No. 202392, October 04, 2021
● UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS VS. BENEDICTO F. 82
LACANARIA G.R. No. 223665, September 27, 2021

● INTER-ISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. VS. COURT OF 85

APPEALS G.R. No. 187323, June 23, 2021

● SALVACION A. LAMADRID VS. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS 86

LIMITED G.R. No. 200658, June 23, 2021

● SUSAN M. BANCE VS. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY G.R. No. 89

202724, February 03, 2021

● FERNANDO C. GOSOSO VS. LEYTE LUMBER YARD G.R. No. 91

205257, January 13, 2021

● JR HAULING SERVICES VS. GAVINO L. SOLAMO G.R. No. 93

214294, September 30, 2020

● SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. ROSARIO A. GOMEZ G.R. No. 95

200815, August 24, 2020

● LUFTHANSA TECHNIK PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. ROBERTO 98

CUIZON G.R. No. 184452, February 12, 2020

● 101
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. MANUEL C. BULATAO G.R.
No. 200972, December 11, 2019

2. Authorized Causes

● TELETECH CUSTOMER CARE MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, 103

INC. VS. MARIO GERONA, JR. G.R. No. 219166, November 10, 2021
●
OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT 105
CORPORATION VS. ROLANDO B. MESINA G.R. No. 217169,
November 04, 2020

3. Due Process

a) Twin Notice Requirement

● PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. VS. VIOLETA

NOCHE G.R. No. 202392, October 04, 2021 107

● UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS VS. BENEDICTO

109
F. LACANARIA G.R. No. 223665, September 27, 2021

● JOSE R. DELA TORRE VS. TWINSTAR PROFESSIONAL 112

PROTECTIVE SERVICES G.R. No. 222992, June 23, 2021

● PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. 114

SYLVIA DE LUNA G.R. No. 209437 March 17, 2021
 ● SUSAN M. BANCE VS. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY
G.R. No. 202724, February 03, 2021 116

● JR HAULING SERVICES VS. GAVINO L. SOLAMO G.R.

No. 214294, September 30, 2020 117

● PEDRITO R. PARAYDAY VS. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO.,

INC. G.R. No. 204555, July 6, 2020 120

● JOSE DEL PILAR VS. BATANGAS II ELECTRIC

COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELIC II) G.R. No. 160121, 122
February 19, 2020

C. Termination of Employment by Employee

1. Resignation vs. Constructive Dismissal

● JOSE EDWIN ESICO VS. ALPHALAND CORPORATION G.R. No.

216716, November 17, 2021 124

● RENATO C. TACIS VS.. SHIELDS SECURITY SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 234575, July 07, 2021 126

● JOSE R. DELA TORRE VS. TWINSTAR

PROFESSIONAL 129
PROTECTIVE SERVICES G.R. No. 222992, June 23, 2021

131
● FERNANDO C. GOSOSO VS. LEYTE LUMBER YARD G.R. No.
205257, January 13, 2021
133
● ALLAN REGALA VS. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION G.R. No.
204684, October 05, 2020
135
● ITALKARAT 18, INC. VS. JURALDINE N. GERASMIO G.R. No.
221411, September 28, 2020
138
● TELUS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HARVEY DE
GUZMAN G.R. No. 202676, December 04, 2019
141
● VILLOLA VS. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. (UPL) G.R. No.
230047, October 09, 2019

D. Preventive Suspension
143
● COLEGIO SAN AGUSTIN-BACOLOD vs. MELINDA M. MONTAÑO G.R.
No. 212333, March 28, 2022
145
● PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. SYLVIA DE LUNA
AND NENITA BUNDOC G.R. No. 209437, March 17, 2021

E. Reliefs from Illegal Dismissal

147
● FERNANDO C. GOSOSO VS. LEYTE LUMBER YARD G.R. No. 205257,
January 13, 2021

● PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. MANUEL C. BULATAO G.R. No. 148

200972, December 11, 2019

V. Jurisdiction and Remedies

 ● JOSE EDWIN ESICO VS. ALPHALAND CORPORATION G.R. No. 216716, November 150
17, 2021

A. Labor Arbiter

● SALVACION A. LAMADRID VS. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED 152

G.R. No. 200658, June 23, 2021

B. National Labor Relations Commission

● PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. VS. VIOLETA NOCHE G.R. No.
154
202392, October 04, 2021

● JOSE DEL PILAR, VS. BATANGAS II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. 156

(BATELIC II) G.R. No. 160121, February 19, 2020

C. Court of Appeals

● PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. SYLVIA DE LUNA

G.R. No. 209437, March 17, 2021 159

● ITALKARAT 18, INC. VS. JURALDINE N. GERASMIO G.R. No. 221411,

160
September 28, 2020

G. DOLE Regional Directors

● DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS CO. vs. RENANTE A. ARMENTA

G.R. No. 240144, February 3, 2021 163

I.B.3. Social Justice

ARIEL M. REYES vs. RURAL BANK OF SAN RAFAEL (BULACAN) INC.,

G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022
By: liz0114

DOCTRINES:

In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of
reason and fairplay. The liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two requirements:
1. a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and
2. a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.

The reason for these requirements is that the liberal application of the rules before quasijudicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate injustice
and hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard the rules of procedure. It must be
noted however, that protection to labor and resolution of doubts in favor of labor cannot be pursued to the point of deliberately committing a
miscarriage of justice. The right to obtain justice is enjoyed by all members of society, rich or poor, worker or manager, alien or citizen. Justice
belongs to everyone. It is not to be blinded or immobilized by the fact of one' s being economically underprivileged.

The measures embedded in our legal system which accord specific protection to labor stems from the reality that normally, the laborer stands on
unequal footing as opposed to an employer. As an additional aid therefore, a liberal interpretation of the technical rules of procedure may be
allowed if only to further bridge the gap between an employee and an employer.

FACTS:

Respondent Rural Bank of San Rafael (Bulacan) Inc. (RBSR) while respondents Veneracion et. al. are RBSR’s Board of Directors. Sometime in
2012, several stockholders of RBSR complained about the discrepancies in the amounts of the purchase price of stock subscriptions appearing in
the original receipts as against the duplicate copies issued by the bank. These involved several millions of pesos collected from stockholders.
Upon RBSR’s investigation, it was discovered that in the original receipts given to the stockholders, the stated price of shares ranged from
P250.00 to P275.00, but in the duplicate copies retained by RBSR, only Pl 00.00 was indicated. The original receipts contained signatures of
President Cruz while the duplicates were signed by either Treasury Head Bognot or Branch Manager Eusebio.

Thus, in compliance with the Manual of Regulations for Banks mandating the prompt report of anomalies to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP), RBSR's Board of Directors approved a Report on Crimes and Losses and directed Ariel Reyes (Petitioner) - as Compliance Officer - to
certify the same. However, Ariel refused to certify the report, reasoning that no independent investigation was conducted, and that he cannot
completely validate the same for lack of material data and evidence, and that he was being pressured to certify the report.

Afterwards, Ariel claimed that instead of furnishing him the hard copies of the reports and its original attachments to enable him to verify and
certify the same, RBSR issued him two show cause orders and put him on preventive suspension for neglect of duty. Meanwhile, RBSR
contended that several administrative hearings were scheduled to hear Ariel’s side, but all were ignored.

Ariel, together with Bognot and Eusebio (complainants) - who were principally accused of theft/misappropriation of funds in connection with the
anomaly - filed a Complaint against respondents for illegal suspension and money claims. An Amended Complaint was subsequently filed to
include illegal dismissal, in view of their eventual dismissal from work.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the NLRC Decision which reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter applying the principle of liberal
application of the procedural rules notwithstanding it was not made an issue in the proceedings before the LA

RULING:

The CA erred in affirming the NLRC Decision. Respondents were not denied due process. A liberal interpretation of the procedural rules was not
warranted.

Based on the Labor Arbiter’s undisputed findings, it appears that respondents have unjustifiably missed at least two settings: that on June 4,
2013, and that on June 19, 2013. The respondents failed to appear on June 4, but their counsel and representative appeared much earlier than the
scheduled date of hearing and secured a photocopy of the amended complaint.

To stress, respondents missed the hearing on June 19, 2013 despite having been directed prior by the arbiter to attend. Moreover, it must be noted
that respondents, at this point in time, have already obtained a copy of the amended complaint which would have enabled them to intelligently
respond.

Section 3 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure (2011 NLRC Rules) provides that “within two (2) days from receipt of a complaint or amended
complaint, the Labor Arbiter shall issue the required summons”.

While it may be true that the arbiter failed to issue summons, such circumstance cannot operate as a denial of respondents' right to due process
because the fact remains that respondents have already obtained a copy of the amended complaint, and have been duly notified of the June 19,
2013 hearing. Given the circumstances in the present case, the issuance of the summons would have been a mere superfluity since again,
respondents have already obtained a copy of the amended complaint and notified of the upcoming hearing date.

We take note of the fact that from the date the respondents obtained a copy of the amended complaint in early June 2013, up to the promulgation
of the arbiter's Decision on February 24, 2014, there was no initiative made by them to demand their day in court, so to speak. In the Court's
view, this cavalier attitude exhibited by respondents reeks of negligence and disrespect to duly instituted authorities and rules of procedures,
either of which this Court can ever tolerate.

Respondents in the present case are not entitled to be accorded a liberal interpretation of the rules; the same being primarily granted for the
employee's favor, and not the employer. In certain cases, of course, a liberal approach to the rules may be had even if it favors the employer.
Such allowance, however, must be measured against standards stricter than that imposed against the worker, and only in compelling and justified
cases where the employer will definitely suffer injustice should such liberal interpretation be disallowed. Unfortunately for respondents, this is
not the situation in the present case.

The findings of fact of both LA and NLRC reveal that first, respondents were able to earlier secue copy of the amended complaint; second,
respondents were absent during the June 4, 2013 and June 19, 2013 hearings; and third, respondents’ absences were unexplained. Respondents
failed to explain and justify their non-participation in the proceedings before the arbiter thus, the application of a more liberal policy is
unwarranted.

II.A. Recruitment and Placement of Local and Migrant Workers

C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT vs. JIMMY G. JAICTEN

G.R. No. 208981, February 1, 2021
By: michie
DOCTRINE:

Seafarers and overseas contract workers are not considered as regular employees, hence, the absence of obligation on the part of the employer or
the recruitment agency to rehire them after contract termination

FACTS:

Respondent Jaicten (Respondent) was employed on April 30, 2008 by Petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management (Sharp), for and in behalf of the
latter’s foreign principal, Petitioner James Fisher Tankship, Ltd. (JFTL), as a Bosun on board M/V Cumbrian Fisher for nine (9) months wherein
he was declared fit to work during his pre-employment medical examination.

However, after a few months of working, Respondent was diagnosed with non-ST myocardial infarction and underwent a series of operations
before being repatriated on October 30, 2008 and referred to Sachly International Health Partners Clinic (SIHPC). On January 7, 2009, the
companydesignated physician named Dr. Susannah Ong-Salvador (Dr. Ong-Salvador) certified Respondent fit to work. Respondent then sought
the medical opinion of his doctor of choice, Dr. Efren Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) of the Philippine Heart Center, who declared Respondent unfit to
resume sea duties. Thereafter, Respondent filed a complaint for payment of total and permanent disability benefits, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.

Petitioners argued that Respondent is not entitled to such benefits on the following grounds:
1. The company-designated physician, Dr. Ong-Salvador, already declared Respondent fit to resume sea duties and Respondent himself
even signed the Certificate of Fitness to Work and in fact, already lined up for re-employment; and
2. Respondent only filed the claim for disability benefits eight months from being cleared to resume to work.
LA: Dismissed Respondents’ Claim for benefits because Respondent himself agreed and confirmed his fitness to work when he signed the
Certificate for Fitness to Work which barred him from claiming disability benefits. The LA further sustained petitioners' claim that when Jaicten
reapplied for employment and underwent another pre-employment medical examination, he was found to be fit for sea duties and for which
reason he was already lined up for deployment.

NLRC: Reversed LA’s ruling and granted the claim ruling that the medical opinion of Dr. Vicaldo that Respondent is suffering from a
permanent disability due his elevated blood pressure must be given credence especially since such opinion is consistent with the findings of Dr.
Ong-Salvador that Respondent must continue to take his medications even after undergoing surgical intervention. NLRC further clarified that the
signing of the said certificate did not negate the non-deployment. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
current Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioners are under the obligation to rehire Respondent immediately after he was declared to fit to resume sea duties

RULING:

NO, Petitioners has no such obligation.

Under Article 280 of the Labor Code, seafarers and overseas contract workers are not covered by the term “regular employment”. Therefore,
petitioners are not under obligation to rehire respondent after the termination of his contract. Thus, the fact that he was not employed
immediately after he was declared fit to resume sea duties should not be taken against petitioners.

II.A.3. Illegal Recruitment

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OLIVER IMPERIO y ANTONIO

G.R. No. 232623, October 05, 2020
By: ML

DOCTRINE:

Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. The offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.

Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is liable for Illegal Recruitment when the following elements concur:
(1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; and
 (2) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042).

In the case of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, a third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and
placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

Moreover, to prove Illegal Recruitment, it must be shown that the accused gave the complainants the distinct impression that he or she had the
power or ability to deploy the complainants abroad in such a manner that they were convinced to part with their money for that end.

FACTS:

Sometime between June 2011 and July 2011, Oliver Imperio y Antonio (appellant) informed Llave that his aunt, who was based in California,
United States of America (USA), was hiring a data encoder with a salary of US$3,000.00. Due to appellant's representations, Llave forwarded
her resume to appellant, and paid him the amount of P7,000.00 as processing fee for her visa application with the United States Embassy, for
which no receipt was issued. Upon appellant's request for other referrals, Llave recommended other applicants. In consideration for their
employment abroad, appellant collected from these applicants certain amounts of money.

Despite the applicants' repeated inquiries, and the lapse of a considerable length of time, appellant failed to secure overseas employment for them
as promised. The foregoing notwithstanding, he demanded an additional amount of P 1,500.00 from each of the applicants as notarization fee for
their papers submitted to the United States Embassy.

These circumstances prompted Llave, Concrenio, Barabas, De Leon, and Sta. Maria, together with the other private complainants, to file their
respective complaints against appellant before the NBI. Upon further investigation by NBI Agent Agus, it was revealed that appellant has no
license or authority to recruit applicants for overseas employment as certified by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).

On January 11, 2012, appellant was arrested via an entrapment operation conducted by the NBI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

RULING:

YES, appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

In this case, the prosecution sufficiently proved that appellant had indeed engaged in Large Scale Illegal Recruitment.

First, appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Second, three (3) private complainants all positively identified appellant as the
person who promised them overseas employment in Canada or the USA in various capacities, which gave them the distinct impression that
appellant had the ability to facilitate their applications and, eventually, deploy them for employment abroad. The appellant failed to secure
overseas employment for them as promised. Lastly, it was established that there were at least three (3) victims in this case, who all testified
before the RTC in support of their respective complaints.

There is no doubt that appellant is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, which constitutes economic sabotage under Section 6 of RA
8042.

The penalty imposed: Considering that the crime charged was committed on January 11, 2012, which is almost two (2) years after the
amendment took effect on May 7, 2010, the penalty imposing life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00)
nor more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as amended by RA 10022 should be,
perforce, applied. Moreover, Section 7 of the latter statute provides that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if committed by a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority.

Hence, the proper penalty to be imposed upon appellant is life imprisonment and a fine of P5,000,000.00.

II.A.3.c. Illegal Recruitment vs. Estafa

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AVELINA MANALANG

G.R. No. 198015, January 20, 2021
By: khateyyy

DOCTRINES:

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Jurisprudence is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042 (or the Labor Code),
and Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. In estafa, damage is essential, but not in the crime of illegal recruitment. As to the latter, it is the
lack of the necessary license or authority, but not the fact of payment that renders the recruitment activity as unlawful.

FACTS:

Manalang was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in violation of Section 6(1) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042),
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995. In addition, eight (8) other Informations charged Manalang with
Estafa under Article 315(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The cases were thereafter consolidated and upon arraignment, Manalang pleaded
not guilty to all charges. Trial ensued.

As per the POEA, Manalang, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized by this POEA to recruit workers for overseas
employment. Any recruitment activity undertaken by the above-named person is deemed illegal.

The prosecution presented the private complainants Lolita V. Tura, Ma. Teresa P. Marañon, and Edgardo R. Cawas as witnesses. On August 16,
2000, Tura went to Trade Center Building, Padre Faura St., Ermita, Manila, where a certain "Maria" introduced her to Manalang who deploys
workers to Australia. During their meeting, Manalang promised to deploy Tura to Australia as a chambermaid. Convinced, Tura agreed to travel
as a tourist and paid Manalang P80,000.00 as placement fee, inclusive of processing charges for her withholding income tax, bank statement and
visa. Manalang issued corresponding receipts for the first two partial payments or a total of P32,000.00. Tura was not issued a receipt
corresponding to her last payment of P 24,000.00. In both instances, Manalang signed the receipts as "Tess Robles" in Tura's presence. Tura
waited for her deployment, which Manalang promised would be in January 2001. By March 2001, she was still not deployed.
Hence, Tura demanded the reimbursement of P56,000.00 but Manalang failed to return said amount. Thus, Tura filed a complaint before the
CIDG which successfully arrested Manalang in an entrapment operation on May 28,2001.

In November 2000, Marañon was looking for a job at Trade Center Building along Padre Faura Street when a certain Mercy Casa approached
her and informed her of the ongoing recruitment for employment in Australia. She then went upstairs at Room 221, Honte Travel Tours, and was
introduced to Manalang. Manalang informed Marañon that she can work as a chambermaid in Australia provided she pays a placement fee of
P160,000.00 and submits her passport and NBI clearance. They both agreed that Marañon will give a down payment of P90,000.00 and the
balance will be deducted from her salary. Marañon gave Manalang a total of P80,000.00. Marañon witnessed the accused sign both receipts as
"Tess Robles”. Manalang assured Marañon that she will be deployed for employment in Australia by January 2001. However, this did not
materialize. In view of Manalang's failed promises, Marañon went to the POEA to verify whether Manalang is a licensed recruiter. To her
surprise, she was informed that Manalang was not authorized to recruit workers abroad. Thus, Marañon demanded Manalang to return her
passport and partial payments, however the latter only returned her passport. Subsequently, Manalang again asked Marañon for an additional
P10,000.00 to complete her down payment of P90,000.00. Due to this, Marañon sought the help of the C1DG. On May 28, 2001, Manalang was
arrested in an entrapment operation.

In February 2001, Cawas applied for employment abroad at Honte Travel and Tours, Room 221 of the Trade Center Building, where he met the
accused who instructed him to fill out an application form and a BIR form. She then promised to deploy Cawas as a waiter in Australia upon
payment of P65,000.00 placement fee and submission of his passport. Cawas paid the P65,000.00 placement fee by installment. Cawas saw
Manalang sign the receipts and voucher as "Tess Robles". The accused promised to deploy Cawas on or before May 2001 but failed to do so.
Thereafter, Cawas made inquiries with the POEA which confirmed that Manalang was not licensed to recruit workers abroad. Thus, he
demanded the return of his money. However, only his passport was returned. He sought assistance from the CIDG, which successfully arrested
Manalang on May 28, 2001.

The accused vehemently denied the accusations against her. She claimed that her real name is Avelina Balala Manalang. She denied knowing
"Tess Robles" or using said name in any of her transactions.

The RTC found Manalang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, and three (3) counts of Estafa under Art. 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. Out of the 8 Informations filed, 3 were dismissed for lack of evidence, while the provisional dismissal of 2 Criminal
Cases was made permanent for failure of the complainants to revive the same.

Aggrieved, Manalang filed an appeal with the CA. However, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Manalang for the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under RA 8042 and
three (3) counts of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC

RULING:

YES, the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Manalang for the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under RA 8042 and three (3)
counts of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.

The essential elements of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale are:

(1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any
prohibited activities listed under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code;
(2) that he/she had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of DOLE with respect to the requirement to secure a license
or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and
 (3) that he/she committed the unlawful acts against three or more persons.

RA 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment for overseas employment and increased the penalties. Thus, while Article 38 of the Labor
Code limits illegal recruitment to recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, Part II of RA 8042 defines and
penalizes illegal recruitment for employment abroad, regardless of whether it was undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority or by
a licensee or holder of authority. It includes the following acts, among others, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee,
nonholder, licensee or holder of authority, to wit:

(1) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment;
(2) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

In this case, the Supreme Court finds that the elements for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale were sufficiently established in the
instant case.

Firstly, there is no doubt that the accused-appellant engaged in acts of recruitment. and placement of workers. She promised to deploy the private
complaints for work abroad upon payment of their placement fee. Secondly, it was duly established that Manalang was neither licensed nor
authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment, as evidenced by the POEA Certification. Thirdly, the illegal recruitment
was committed in large scale because the accused-appellant defrauded at least three persons, namely, Tura, Marañon and Cawas, who are the
private complainants in the instant case.

In sum, the appellate court correctly affirmed Manalang's conviction for the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.

The Supreme Court likewise affirms Manalang's conviction for three (3) counts of Estafa, penalized under Art. 315, par 2(a) of the RPC. The
elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment, are the following:

(a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;

(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud;
(c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his
money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and
(d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

In the instant case, the elements of deceit and damage are present. The accused-appellant, without any license or authority to do so, promised
private complainants overseas employment, then required them to undergo training and collected fees or payments from them, while continually
assuring them that they would be deployed abroad, but failed to do so. Persuaded by these assurances given by Manalang, the private
complainants paid their placement fees, albeit partially. Thus, her representation induced the victims to part with their money, resulting in
damage. When private complainants paid their placement fees, Manalang issued receipts using the fictitious name of "Tess Robles". In view of
the foregoing deceitful and illegal acts of Manalang, the private complainants undoubtedly suffered damage.

III.B.2.b.4. Non-Diminution of Benefits

COLEGIO SAN AGUSTIN-BACOLOD vs. MELINDA M. MONTAÑO

G.R. No. 212333, March 28, 2022
By: Cara V
DOCTRINE:

There is diminution of benefits when the following are present:

1. the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time;
2. the practice is consistent and deliberate;
3. the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and
4. the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.

In addition to policy or company practice, the grant or benefit may also be founded on a written contract. Consistent with the constitutional
mandate of protecting the rights of workers in promoting their welfare, benefits enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced, diminished,
discontinued or eliminated.

FACTS:

CSA-Bacolod is an educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. CSA-Bacolod first employed
respondent as a chemistry instructor in 1973. In 2003, she was appointed school registrar; her appointment was renewed several times.
Respondent alleged that in her reappointment letter for the 2009-2011 term, there was a diminution of her salary; her basic salary was reduced
from P33,319.00 to P26,658.20. She thus wrote to the Human Resource Director to seek an explanation. It was the school president who
responded, and he stated that her total gross pay did not change as the school merely opted to break down the amount to show the amount of
honorarium. Respondent claimed that this was the time when the president started to show his bias against her. Thereafter, respondent was
suspended, and her employment was eventually terminated due to complaints from two faculty members alleging that she allowed some students
to attend the graduation ceremony despite not meeting the requirements. These events led to her filing of the complaint. Respondent admitted
that she allowed certain students to join the March 2009 graduation ceremony in CSA-Bacolod even if they did not pass some of their subjects.
She claimed that she merely continued the practice of previous registrars; she even imposed more stringent rules in determining when ineligible
students may join the rites. She added that she allowed these students to participate due to humanitarian reasons. Respondent claimed that
management did not consider her explanation and she was instead served with a notice of charges. She responded to the notice. She asserted that
the basis of the notice was not really the letter complaints but mere letters seeking for clarification of the school's policy regarding graduation.
She also questioned the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Committee created by the president. CSABacolod, for its defense, posited that
respondent's suspension and eventual dismissal was due to gross misconduct resulting to loss of trust and confidence. A notice of charges was
issued to respondent for gross misconduct, tampering of school records, and willful breach of trust and confidence or gross negligence. The Ad
Hoc Committee deliberated and thereafter recommended the termination of respondent's employment for gross misconduct and willful breach of
trust and confidence. The president issued a notice of termination.

The LA ruled in favor of respondent, finding her suspension and dismissal illegal. This resulted to the award of backwages, separation pay,
damages, and attorney's fees. It also awarded salary differentials due to diminution of benefits. In ruling that respondent's preventive suspension
was illegal, the LA found that her continued presence in the school during the investigation would not have posed a serious and imminent threat
to the life or property of the school and its employees. As to respondent's dismissal, the LA found that her act cannot be construed as gross or
serious misconduct. Respondent had basis in allowing the ineligible students to attend the graduation rites: a long-standing practice as also
observed by the previous registrars. Also, the students concerned made written requests that were endorsed by their respective deans and
consented to by their respective parents. Further, there can be no loss of trust and confidence in her as respondent's act did not place the school in
an uncompromising situation. Indeed, there was a school directive that students who failed to comply with the requirements should not be
allowed to march; this directive, however, as held by the LA, was not implemented up until this instance. Respondent merely followed the
accepted practice. The LA concluded that respondent's offense is just simple misconduct for which the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate.
In addition to backwages, the LA awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstating respondent because of the strained relations. As to the claim of
diminution of benefits, the LA found that the lower salary on her latest appointment as compared with the previous salary violated Article 100 of
the Labor Code. As respondent was already enjoying the higher salary for more or less six years, it is just and equitable that she continues
receiving the same amount, therefore entitling her to differentials. The LA awarded moral damages as the school supposedly acted in bad faith in
unjustly dismissing respondent, and exemplary damages so that similar acts may be suppressed and discouraged. Attorney's fees were also
awarded.

NLRC reversed the LA and ruled that respondent was validly dismissed. It also ruled that she is not entitled to salary differentials. Respondent
indeed committed serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence reposed by the school in her. Despite being firm in reminding the deans
and other officials about the policy on graduation, she herself allowed ineligible students to participate in the ceremony. This act was in total
violation of the school's policy. With the finding of just cause, there is no basis to award backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. As to the issue of preventive suspension, the NLRC found that its imposition was valid. Respondent's continued
presence posed a serious and imminent threat to the school's property. Being the school registrar, she had access to student records; there is a
possibility that the records may be "stage-managed." With regard to the salary differentials, the NLRC ruled that respondent continued to receive
the same gross pay of P33,319.00.

CA reversed the NLRC Decision and reinstated the LA Decision with modification on the award of money claims. The CA ruled that
respondent's act was indeed an act of misconduct; however, it was not serious enough to warrant the penalty of dismissal. There was no wrongful
intent. The CA did not award moral damages as the finding of illegal dismissal does not automatically warrant moral damages — bad faith on
the part of the employer was not proven.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to the salary differential as a result of diminution of benefits.

RULING:

Yes, respondent is entitled to the salary differential as a result of diminution of benefits.

In this case, respondent's renumeration as school registrar is founded on policy or contract. Respondent's appointment and reappointments
indicated the monthly compensation for the position. The amounts received by her were duly established. The total monthly pay she received for
her latest appointment remained as her previous monthly pays. The issue, however, was on the amount of her basic pay. Respondent claims that
there has been a reduction of basic pay. CSABacolod on the other hand explains that the school just opted to separate the reporting of the basic
pay from the honorarium in the computation slip.

In the Court's view, there was indeed a diminution of benefit. The explanation of the school that the amount was merely broken down fails to
convince. It must be emphasized that there was no showing in these proceedings that respondent received honorarium prior to her 2009
reappointment as school registrar. Her prior appointments stated that she was to receive compensation equivalent to a certain number of load or
units pertaining to her academic rank; there was no mention of payment of honorarium then. Thus, it is fair and just to conclude that the entire
P33,319.00 that respondent had received prior to her 2009 reappointment is considered as her monthly basic pay. As it was established that
respondent continued to receive the same amount of P33,319.00 despite the addition of honorarium for the 2009 reappointment, it can be
concluded then that the basic pay indeed was reduced. This resulted to diminution of benefit that is expressly prohibited by the Labor Code.

III.C.3. Disability and Death Benefits

EDGARDO M. PAGLINAWAN vs. DOHLE PHILMAN AGENCY

GR No. 230735, April 04, 2022
By: cattorney

DOCTRINES:

POEA-Standard Employment Contract for seafarers is deemed incorporated to petitioner’s employment contract, and governs the petitioner’s
claim for permanent disability benefits.

Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC provides that for an illness to be compensable, two elements must concur:

(a) the injury or illness must be work-related; and,

(b) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. The POEA-SEC defines a
work-related illness as “any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of POEA-SEC and the conditions
set therein satisfied”.

Section 32-A provides for the conditions of compensability for listed occupational diseases:
1. the seafarer’s work must involve risks described therein;
2. the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
3. the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

There must be a reasonable causal connection between his illness and the work for which he has been contracted.

Illnesses not listed in the SEC may still be compensable as they are treated disputably presumed to be work-related, provided that the seafarer
proves the correlation of his illness to the nature of his work and the conditions for compensability should be satisfied (it is not automatic
compensation).

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed by Dohle as engine and deck fitter for and in behalf of foreign principal Dohle-IOM (Limited) on board the vessel M/V
Tamina. He signed the employment contract on March 19, 2013. In the course of his employment, he was constantly exposed to dust and
chemicals. He also performed strenuous task from time to time and his daily work extended up to the late hours of the night, causing tremendous
strain and fatigue.
Sometime in July 2013, petitioner suffered LBM and bloody stool. On August 2013, he was brought and admitted to Hospital Velmar in Mexico
City. He underwent laboratory examinations and CT scan. Later, he was discharged and was subsequently medically repatriated.

He was then referred to Metropolitan Medical Center for treatment under the care of the companydesignated physician. He was examined and
diagnosed with lower gastor intestinal bleeding secondary to ulcerative colitis; iron deficiency anemia; cholelithiasisl s/p laparoscopic
cholecystectomy – all of which are not work-related. Subsequently, he was again admitted for laparoscopic cholecystectomy and was declared
unfit for work for 3 months. The medical certificate was issued by the company-designated physician, dated Sept 27, 2013, and it stated that
petitioner’s ulcerative colitis and the secondary illness are not work-related.

Petitioner maintained that he was not restored to his prior health status despite treatment, and thus sought medical opinions of an Internist-
Cardiologist, who opined that petitioner was unfit to work as a seafarer. Petitioner sought payment of disability benefits from Dohle, but to no
avail, resulting to the filing of the instant complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgardo Paglinawan (petitioner) is entitled to permanent disability benefits

RULING:

NO, petitioner is not entitled to permanent disability benefits.

The Supreme Court in this case ruled that petitioner’s illness, ulcerative colitis, is not listed as an occupational disease in the 2010 POEA-SEC.
Thus, there is a disputable presumption that it is work-related. Petitioner, however, still bears the burden and must still prove by substantial
evidence the reasonable causal connection between his ulcerative colitis and the nature of his work as engine and deck fitter. In this regard, he
failed to prove by substantial evidence the workrelatedness of his illness. Records do not show, and there was absence of evidence, how his work
in the vessel caused the development of his illness. The same analysis applies to the allegation that his illness was work-related.

The company designated physician issued a medical report dated Sept 27, 2013, which clearly stated that petitioner’s illness is not work-related.
The report of the physician is binding when not refuted by the seafarer’s physician of his own choice and a third doctor. Petitioner failed to
present a contrary medical opinion. His availment of a second physician was belated – he consulted a second physician only after he filed a
claim for disability benefits. Also, based on the findings of the NLRC and CA, petitioner’s physician did not personally examined him, thus, his
certification is not reflective of petitioner’s actual condition.

Lastly, petitioner’s claim is premature. Other jurisprudence decided by the Supreme Court held that a claim for total and permanent disability
may be considered prematurely filed if there is no contrary opinion from the seafarer’s physician of own choice, and a third doctor as required.
Thus, it is proper only to deny the petition.

EFRAIM DAUT DARROCA vs. CENTURY MARITIME AGENCIES, INC

G.R. No. 234392, November 10, 2021
By: Anne Garcia

DOCTRINE:

For disability to be compensable under the above POEA- SEC, two elements must concur:
1. the injury or illness must be work-related; and
2. the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.

It is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that
there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.

The POEA-SEC defines work-related illness as "any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract
with the conditions set therein satisfied." For illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption in favor
of the seafarer that these illnesses are work-related

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

Thus, for both listed occupational diseases under Section 32 and non-listed illnesses, the seafarer must sufficiently show by substantial evidence
compliance with the conditions for compensability.

FACTS:

Beginning May 10, 1998, Darroca was continuously hired as a seafarer by respondent, Century Maritime Agencies,Inc. Darroca was rehired by
the same company and in behalf of its foreign principal, Damina Shipping Corporation for a period of seven months.
Prior to Darroca’s embarkation, he underwent rigid physical and medical examination where he was declared fit for sea duty.

Darroca boarded the vessel MT “Dynasty.” Darroca started to experience difficulty in sleeping and extreme exhaustion. He also began to see
unusual visions and hear voices. By October 2012, he experienced dizziness due to the smell of the fumes of chemicals, loss of appetite, and
weakness.

On October 15, 2012, while Daarroca was in the port of Houston, USA, he consulted with Dr. Darell Griffin. He was diagnosed with major
depression and psychomotor retardation and was declared unfit for sea duty. Hence, he was repatriated back to the Philippines for further
treatment.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, Darroca was referred to the company physician who examined him and found that his illness is not work-related
or work aggravated since there were no elicited conflicts in his associations with his work environment. The company physician continued to
attend his medical care until Darroca abandoned his medical treatment sometime in November 2012.

On June 19, 2013, Darroca submitted himself once again for evaluation by the companydesignated physician. He informed the physician that he
had consultations with his own personal specialist in the province, but had not gone through counseling.

Due to his continued incapacity to work, Darroca consulted Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag and he was diagnosed with major depression with
psychotic features and was recommended to undergo continuous psychological and psychiatric intervention. Darroca then filed a complaint for
the payment of his permanent and total disability ber.efits, sickness allowance, medical expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees against the respondents.

RULING OF LA: Dismissed the case. The LA stated that. Darroca’s illness is not work related because there was no causal connection between
his illness and his work.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Darroca’s psychological disorder is work-related and compensable

RULING:

No, Darroca’s psychological disorder is not work-related and not compensable.

It is undisputed that before repatriation, he was diagnosed to be suffering from major depression and psychomotor retardation. Upon consultation
with his physician of choice back in the Philippines, Darroca was also diagnosed to be suffering from major depression with psychotic features.
To prove his illness as work-related, it is necessary for evidence to show his actual duties, the nature of his illness, and other factors that may
lead to the conclusion that his work conditions brought about or at the very least, increased the risk of contracting his complained illness.
However, aside from his bare statement that he worked as an able seaman on board MT “Dynasty," records are bereft of any showing what his
specific duties were. Moreover, his general assertion of experiencing "dizziness when he smells the fumes of chemicals he was working on" is
insufficient to conclude that his work brought about or increased the risk of his depression.

It bears noting that the June 20, 2013 affidavit of Darroca stated that he was employed under fair working conditions and without any
maltreatment by the officers or crew of the ship. Additionally, he declared that he did not suffer any injury or any traumatic experiences onboard
causing his inability to sleep. Absent any mention of Darroca's duties and the risks involved in his work, it cannot be reasonably concluded that
it caused or aggravated his depression.

The CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding that Danoca's illness is not work-related. In the absence of
substantial evidence, working conditions cannot be considered to have caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the mental illness or in
this case, major depression with psychotic features. After all, the onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits
and substantially prove that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting his illness.

DOLORES GALLEVO RODRIGUEZ vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS

G.R. NO. 218311, October 11, 2021
By: Limecooler

DOCTRINE:

If the complaint for maritime disability compensation was filed prior to October 6, 2008, the 120-day rule enunciated in Crystal Shipping
applies.

If such complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards x x x the 240-day rule x x x as clarified in the case of Vergara applies.

Thus, for complaints filed from October 6, 2008 and onwards, the general rule is that the company-designated physician, must issue a final and
definitive medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him.

However, the mere lapse of 120 days without the company-designated physician's declaration of the seafarer's fitness to work does not
automatically entitle the latter to his permanent total disability benefits because the foregoing general rule is subject to the following guidelines:

• Within 120-day period o Yes, if the company-designated physician issued a final and definitive medical assessment on the seafarer’s
permanent and total disability.

• More than 120 days but less than 240 days o Yes, in any of the following circumstances:
 No justification from the company-designated physician during the 120-days to extend period of treatment; or
 The company designated physician declared that the seafarer is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day
period, as the case may be but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20 B (3) of the POEA -
SEC are of a contrary opinion
o No, in any of the following instances
 The lapse of the 120-days was caused by the seafarer’s fault (i.e. indifference to treatment / uncooperative
seafarer / medical abandonment)
 The company designated physician gave an assessment within the 120day period that the seafarer required further
medical treatment
• More than 240 days o Yes, thus if after the lapse of 240 days, and the company-designated physician has not made any assessment, the
finding of permanent and total disability becomes conclusive.
The referral to a third doctor is mandatory when:
1. there is a valid and timely assessment by the company designated physician and
2. the appointed doctor of the seafarer refuted such assessment.

FACTS:

Edgar Rodriguez was employed as an ordinary seaman by respondent Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC). Upon reaching a convenient
port in Taiwan in 2012, he underwent a medical examination and was initially diagnosed with Hepatomegaly; L5 Spondylosis with Lumbar
Spondylosis. He was repatriated on October 2, 2012. Two days later, he reported to PTC and was immediately referred to the Metropolitan
Medical Center under the care of the companydesignated physician, Dr. Robert D. Lim. Rodriguez was subsequently diagnosed with Antral
Gastritis; H Pylori Infection; Non-Specific Hepatic Nodule; L2-S1 Disc Protrusion and incidental finding of Specific Colitis Cholecystitis.

Dr. Lim issued a medical report indicating Rodriguez’s final disability assessment as equivalent to Grade 8. Rodriguez subsequently consulted
his personal orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Cesar H. Garcia (Dr. Garcia) who found him to be afflicted with multiple disc profusion. In his Medical
Certificate, Dr. Garcia assessed the seafarer to be permanently unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity with a corresponding Grade 1 disability or
a permanent total disability. In view of Dr. Garcia's assessment, Rodriguez claimed from PTC permanent total disability benefits.

However, PTC insisted that as per Dr. Lim's findings, Rodriguez was only suffering from a Grade 8 disability, and thus, he was only entitled to
partial and permanent disability benefits.

Thus, Rodriguez filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits, sickness allowance, medical reimbursement, damages and attorney's
fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rodriguez is entitled to permanent and total disability

RULING:

NO, Rodriguez is not entitled to permanent and total disability.

The Court dismissed the petition.

It is undisputed that the illness of Rodriguez, osteoarthritis, is an occupational disease, and thus, compensable under Section 32-A(21) of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Standard Employment Contract, series of 2010 (20 l O POEA-SEC). Disability claims of
seafarers are governed by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and by contract such as the 2010 POEASEC, which governed Rodriguez's
period of employment. Article 192(c)(l) of the Labor Code defines permanent and total disability of laborers, to wit:

ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability..

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules;

The rule referred to in the foregoing provision, i.e., Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which implemented
Book IV of the Labor Code (IRR), states:

Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. -(a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by
an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires
medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary
total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of
continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental
functions as determined by the System. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing provisions should be read together with Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC:
xxxx
2. xxx However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he
shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been
established by the company-designated physician.

3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive
sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until
 he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the companydesignated physician. The period
within which the seafarer shall be entitled to bis sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness
allowanc;e shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month..

Prior to October 6, 2008, the prevailing rule then, as enunciated in Crystal Shipping, Jnc. v. Natividad (Crystal Shipping), was that "permanent
and total disability consists mainly in the inability of the seafarer to perform his customary work for more than 120 days." However, Vergara v.
Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Vergara) was promulgated which modified the ruling in Crystal Shipping such that the doctrine laid down in
the latter cannot be simply applied as a general rule for all cases in all contexts.

In Vergara, the Court harmonized the abovementioned provisions. The Court clarified that even though the 120-day period for medical
evaluation was exceeded, the seafarers may not automatically claim permanent and total disability because it was possible to extend the
evaluation or treatment period until 240 days.

Therefore, the prevailing rule is that, "if the complaint for maritime disability compensation was filed prior to October 6, 2008, the 120-day rule
enunciated in Crystal Shipping applies. However, if such complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule as clarified in the
case of Vergara applies.

A claim for permanent and total disability benefits may prosper after the lapse of the 120-day period, but less than 240 days, from the time the
seafarer reported for medical treatment if the company-designated physician failed to declare within the 120-day period that the seafarer requires
further medical attention.

The court found Dr. Lim’s assessment as sufficient justification to extend the seafarer's medical treatment beyond the 120-day period, since the
latter still had to undergo further treatment and evaluation in view of his persistent back problems. Since Dr. Lim’s final medical assessment was
justifiably issued beyond the 120-day period but within 240 days from the time Rodriguez first reported to him, the Court found Rodriguez not
entitled to his claim for permanent and total disability benefits.

Moreover, since Dr. Lim and Dr. Garcia had conflicting medical assessments, Rodriguez failed to refer the matter to a third doctor, jointly
agreed upon the parities, as mandated by Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC and the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)

EDGARDO I. MABALOT vs. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC.

G.R. No. 224344 September 13, 2021
By: justified

DOCTRINE:

The Court summarized the rules governing the seafarer's claim for disability benefits, as follows:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120
days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician, fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the
seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g.,
seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be
extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to
extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's
disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

The Court went further in enumerating the instances when the seafarer may already pursue a case for full disability benefits, viz.:
1. the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse
of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence,
justify an extension of the period to 240 days;
2. 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician;
3. the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his
physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;
4. the company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his
own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well;
5. the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability
grading;

6. the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but
his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to
work;
 7. the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the
corresponding benefits; and
8. the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he
remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said periods.

A final, conclusive, and definite medical assessment must clearly state the seafarer's fitness to work or his exact disability rating, or whether such
illness is work-related, and without any further condition or treatment. It should no longer require any further action on the part of the company-
designated physician and it is issued by the company-designated physician after he or she has exhausted all possible treatment options within the
periods allowed by law.

FACTS:

Mabalot was deployed as Able Seaman by Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. to its foreign principal A.P. Moller A/S. The results of his pre-
employment medical examination showed that Mabalot was fit for sea duty.

In July 2011, he complained to the ship master that he was experiencing pain on his left shoulder. He was medically repatriated and was advised
to consult Dr. Alegre. Dr. Alegre issued a Grade 11 interim disability assessment on Mabalot. Mabalot informed Dr. Alegre that he wished to
seek a second opinion from a doctor of his choice and asked to postpone his treatment. Mabalot consulted Dr. Jacinto who issued a Medical
Certificate declaring him to be suffering from permanent total disability and unfit to go back to work.

Mabalot filed his Complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for payment of permanent total disability compensation, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. He averred that he was entitled to permanent total disability compensation because despite the
continuous medical treatment provided for by the company-designated physician for more than 120 days, he was still unfit to work as a seafarer
as he could no longer raise his left arm and shoulder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to total disability benefits

RULING:

NO, Mabalot is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

Records disclose that the Grade 11 disability rating given by Dr. Alegre 110 days from Mabalot's repatriation was merely an interim diagnosis.
The Medical Report clearly states so, thus, it cannot be considered as a definite and final assessment.

This is supported by the fact that Dr. Alegre still advised Mabalot to continue with his physical therapy, seek consultation with a Rehabilitation
Medicine Specialist and report back for a followup check-up. The failure of Dr. Alegre to issue a complete and definite medical assessment
within the 120-day period did not automatically render

Mabalot's disability as total and permanent. Mabalot remained in need of medical attention, a sufficient justification for the extension of the 120-
day period to the maximum period of 240 days in order for the company-designated physician to make a complete assessment of his injury and
recommend the appropriate disability rating, if any. 142 days after his medical repatriation but within 240 days therefrom, Mabalot filed the
Complaint for recovery of permanent total disability benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Clearly, Mabalot's Complaint was prematurely filed as his cause of action had yet to accrue. The company-designated doctor still had a
remaining period within which to give his definitive assessment on his medical condition or fitness to return to work. In addition, Mabalot
cannot rely on the medical certificate issued by his physician of choice, Dr. Jacinto. The rule is that while a seafarer has the right to seek the
opinion of other doctors, such right may be availed of on the presumption that the company-designated doctor had already issued a definite
declaration on the medical condition of the seafarer, and the seafarer finds it disagreeable. Given the lack of certification from the company-
designated doctor, Mabalot cannot rely on the assessment made by his own doctor.

CHARLO P. IDUL vs. ALSTER INT'L SHIPPING SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021
By: reu

DOCTRINES:

A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when:

1. the company-designated physician declares it to be so within the 240-day period; or
2. when after the lapse of the 240-day period, the company-designated physician fails to make such declaration.

The seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable
to work.
He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA [SEC] and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial
period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability
period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial
or total disability already exists

FACTS:

Petitioner Idul was employed by Alster Shipping on behalf of its principal, Johann for a period of 12 months. He boarded the vessel to
commence his services as a bosun. Idul figured in an accident while working when the lashing wires broke and hit his left leg resulting to a
fracture. He disembarked the vessel and underwent surgery in a hospital in France. Thereafter, he was repatriated back to the Philippines for
further medical attention. He was referred by the company to Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) under the care of Dr. Lim, and orthopedic
surgeon, Dr. William. He was given medication and instructed to undergo rehabilitation therapy. He was also asked to come back for follow-up
check-ups. The company-designated physician (Dr. William) issued medical report dated July 6, 2009 and declared Idul a Grade 10 disability
rating due to "immobility of ankle joint in abnormal position." Prior to this, or on March 16, 2009, Idul sought the opinion of his own doctor of
choice, Dr. Garduce. After a single consultation, Dr. Garduce assessed Idul to be totally and permanently disabled.

Thereafter, Alster Shipping offered to pay Idul the amount of $10,750.00 as disability benefit in accordance with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC). However, Idul rejected the offer and insisted that he was entitled to
full disability benefits. On June 3, 2009, Idul filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits with damages before the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).

LA ruled in favor of the respondents. NLRC reversed the findings of the LA, it ruled that Idul's inability to perform his job for more than 120
days from the time he was examined by Dr. Chuasuan entitled him to permanent disability benefits. Despite Alster Shipping establishing Idul's
disability grading within the extended 240-day temporary total disability period, the fact remains that he was still unable to return to work
beyond the 120-day period. CA upheld the ruling of the LA. It held that Idul's condition cannot be considered a permanent total disability that
would entitle him to the maximum disability benefit of $60,000.00. It stressed that a temporary total disability becomes permanent only when the
company-designated physician declares it to be so within the
240-day period, or when after the lapse of said period, the physician fails to make such declaration.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed
Decision and Resolution, which gave credence to the company-designated physician and found petitioner not entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits
RULING:

The CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Decision of the NLRC, and
reinstating the Labor Arbiter's Decision.

The CA correctly concluded that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when 1) the company-designated physician declares it to
be so within the 240-day period; or 2) when after the lapse of the 240-day period, the company-designated physician fails to make such
declaration.

[T]he seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis
and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally
unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA [SEC] and by applicable Philippine laws. If the
120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary
total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a
permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified
by his medical condition.

In this case, the medical reports issued by Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan reveal that Idul was examined, treated, and rehabilitated for about seven (7)
months. Thereafter, Dr. Chuasuan's assessment of Idul's disability grading was issued on July 6, 2009 or on the 207th day from December 11,
2008, and therefore, well within the 240-day period. Clearly, Idul's condition did not become a permanent total disability just by the mere lapse
of the 120-day period, especially since the extension was necessary for his rehabilitation.

As to the conflicting findings of Dr. Chuasuan on one hand and Dr. Garduce on the other, the medical findings of Dr. Chuasuan must prevail.
Under Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

At this point, it bears stressing that the employee seeking disability benefits carries the responsibility to secure the opinion of a third doctor. In
fact, the employee must actively or expressly request for it. The referral to a third doctor has been recognized by this Court to be a mandatory
procedure. Failure to comply therewith is considered a breach of the POEA-SEC, and renders the assessment by the company-designated
physician binding on the parties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

 ARMANDO H. DE JESUS, vs. INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC.,
G.R. NO. 203478, June 23, 2021
By: wen

DOCTRINES:

For a disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA SEC, it must be the result of a work-related injury or a work-related
or work-aggravated illness. The POEA SEC defines a work-related injury as "injuries resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the
course of employment.' On the other hand, a work-related illness has been defined as "any sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of
an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."

FACTS:

De Jesus worked as a seafarer of Inter-Orient Maritme Enterprises, Inc. (Inter-Orient) for 20 years. On July 4, 2005, De Jesus executed another
employment contract with Inter-Orient for nine months. On his seventh month on board the vessel, he felt severe chest pains and had difficulty
breathing. He was admitted at a hospital in Egypt and was diagnosed with Acute Extensive Myocardial Infraction.

He went back to the Philippines and was declared unfit for physical work. He underwent examination and it was confirmed that he had
myocardial infarction and that he must undergo rehabilitation and continuous medication. He went to the office of Inter-Orient and inquired
about his unpaid salaries and was told that he needed to sign a quitclaim before his salaries could be released. Due to exhaustion and desperation
brought about by his medical condition, he signed the quitclaim. De Jesus received US$5,749.00 upon signing documents for the processing and
release of his bonuses and allowances. Among said documents were complaint form for non-payment of wages, overtime pay, and sick leave and
a pro-forma motion to dismiss.

De Jesu then, filed a complaint before the NLRC for disability benefits and sickness allowance under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) and for moral and exemplary damages.

Inter-Orient filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata in view of the previous dismissal of the similar complaint earlier filed by De
Jesus against Inter-Orient. In addition, InterOrient pointed out that De Jesus had already executed a quitclaim and release in the prior complaint.

The Labor Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss by Inter-Orient on the ground that De Jesus signed the release and quitclaim without the aid of a
counsel and the consideration contained therein was unconscionable. Further, he found as irregular the filing on the same day of the complaint
and motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that De Jesus’ illness was not work-related.

De Jesus, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before CA, but it was dismissed outright based purely on procedural and technical grounds.

ISSUES:

Whether or not De Jesus’ illness was work-related hence compensable

RULING:

NO, the illness of De Jesus is not work-related, hence it is not compensable.

The employment of seafarers is governed by the terms and conditions of their employment contract, the law, and the relevant regulations of the
POEA SEC, which are deemed integrated into every employment contract, which employers are bound to observe as the minimum requirements
for the employment of Filipino seafarers.

Under the same rule, petitioner is obliged to submit himself to a post- employment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency
within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure to comply with this mandatory reporting requirement shall result in forfeiture of the
right to claim disability benefits. It is likewise provided that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor
may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

In this case, De Jesus submitted himself to a medical examination by the company-designated doctor where it was confirmed that he had
Myocardial Infarction and that he must undergo rehabilitation and continuous medication. Evidently, the Medical Report issued by Dr. Urlanda
of YGEIA Medical Clinic declared De Jesus’ illness as not work-related which he never questioned. Thus, at that point, he clearly forfeited his
right to claim any disability benefit.

De Jesus only questioned the company doctor’s findings when he filed the complaint against respondents before the Arbiter roughly 10 months
after his examination. While he allegedly consulted his personal doctors since April 26, 2006, the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Lim, his own
doctor, stating that his illness was work-related, was only issued on December 5, 2008, or about 30 months after his examination by the
company-designated physician.

The Court has consistently held that it is the company- designated physician who should determine the degree of disability of the seafarer or his
fitness to work. In the event the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, he ought to consult his doctor of
choice. Here, instead of consulting his own physician, De Jesus executed a release and quitclaim in favor of respondents.
In executing this document, he thus impliedly admitted the correctness of the assessment of the company-designated physician and
acknowledged that he could no longer claim for disability benefits.

EMS CREW MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES vs. ERWIN C. BAUZON

G.R. No. 205385, April 26, 2021
By: Attysako

DOCTRINE:

The Supreme Court ruled that it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to
entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the
development of the disease and in bringing about his death.

FACTS:

EMS Crew Management Philippines (EMS Phils.) is a Philippine manning agency for its foreign principal, EMS Ship Management (Singapore)
Pte., Ltd. (EMS Singapore). It is represented by Robert Bandivas, crewing manager of EMS Phils. (collectively, petitioners).

On September 24, 2009, EMS Phils. hired Bauzon as an Able Seaman on board the vessel M/T D. Elephant. His contract was duly approved by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Integrated
Transport Workers and Federation ITF/Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) and the ship owners.

Prior to embarkation, Bauzon underwent the requisite Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was declared "fit for sea duty." Thus,
on October 20, 2009, he commenced his employment.

While on board M/T D. Elephant, Bauzon experienced difficulty in swallowing due to severe pain in his throat. He reported his health problem
to the vessel's master, but he was advised to finish his contract which was about to expire. However, since the pain in his throat persisted, he
requested for medical repatriation. On August 2, 2010, he was repatriated to the Philippines and arrived in Manila on August 3, 2010.

He underwent regular consultation with the Seaman’s Hospital and later on he engaged the services of his private physician, Dr. Manuel C.
Jacinto, Jr. (Dr. Jacinto), at Sta. Teresita General Hospital. Dr. Jacinto diagnosed Bauzon with Papillary Cancer, declared him physically unfit to
go back to work and his disability to be total and permanent.
Thus, Bauzon filed a complaint for payment of disability/medical benefits, sickness allowance for 130 days, reimbursement of medical expenses,
damages, and attorney's fees against petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bauzon's ailment, papillary cancer, is compensable for being work-related as to entitle him to permanent and total disability
benefits?

RULING:

YES, Bauzon's ailment is work-related and compensable, he is thus entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

The Supreme Court ruled that it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to
entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the
development of the disease and in bringing about his death.

Neither is it necessary in order to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he
contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the
health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's
death for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had therefor
independent of any pre- existing disease.

In view of Bauzon's duties and responsibilities as an Able Seaman, coupled with the constricted diet among seafarers, We find that his
employment contributed to the aggravation and development of his ailment. In the more recent case of De Leon v. Maunlad Trans, Inc. wherein
this Court granted the petitioner seafarer his disability benefits, We reiterated our earlier holding that:

It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the
benefits provided therefor.
It is enough that the employment had contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of the disease x x x.

FLORENCIO B. DESTRIZA VS. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 203539, February 10, 2021
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:

Similarly, for an illness to be compensable, "it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness
suffered by the seafarer." It is enough that there is "a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a
rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition
he might have had."

The disputable presumption implies "that the non-inclusion in the list of compensable diseases/illnesses does not translate to an absolute
exclusion from disability benefits." Similarly, "the disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits
claim." There is still a need for the claimant to establish, through substantial evidence, that his illness is work-related.

If an illness is not included in the list under Section 32-A of Memorandum Circular No. 9, it is disputably presumed as work-related. Despite the
disputable presumption, case law such as Madridejos provides that to be compensable, the seafarer still has the burden to establish, by substantial
evidence, that his illness is work-related. As stated, the disputable presumption does not amount to an automatic grant of compensation.

In case of disagreements between the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, resort to a third-doctor
opinion is mandatory. The third-doctor opinion is final and binding between the parties. The opinion of the company-designated physician
prevails over that of the seafarer's personal doctor in case there is no third-doctor opinion.

FACTS:

FSC is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. Baseline is a foreign juridical entity engaged in the business of
shipping. FSC is Baseline's local manning agent in the Philippines while Cachapero is the President of FSC. Destriza is a seafarer formerly
employed by FSC for its foreign principal Baseline. He was first deployed by FSC in 2001 as a cook aboard M/V Pacific Venus. He was again
deployed in 2002 in the same capacity aboard M/V Tocho-Maru. Destriza filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits, sickness
allowance, medical reimbursement, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Destriza claims that the CA erred in ruling that he is not entitled to the US$20,000.00 award. He argues that his exposure to extreme
environment and high fat intake while on board Boseline's vessels for the duration of his three contracts were factors that caused the
development of gallstones and gall inflammation. Further, he alleges that his illness was work-related because the diet on board the vessel
consisted mainly of meat products. Lastly, his inability to work for more than 120 days (i.e., eight months) meant that he was suffering from a
permanent disability; therefore, he is entitled to disability benefits. Detriza prays for this Court to declare his illness a permanent disability or a
compensable illness.

In their Comment, respondents argue that the POEA Standard Employment Contract does not grant any monetary benefits to a seafarer by the
mere fact that he got ill while onboard the vessel. The respondents also contend that other than his general allegations, Destriza failed to prove
by substantial evidence that his illness was indeed work-related to be entitled to disability benefits.

On Destriza's position that he was thrice hired as a cook, the respondents point out that his employment as a seafarer is contractual in nature and
has a fixed period; therefore, his employment contracts were independent of each other and may not be integrated for the purpose of computing
tenure. On the application of the 120-day period for entitlement to permanent disability benefits, the respondents advance the following
arguments: (1) that the 120-day period is not iron-clad, and may be extended to 240 days if further medical attendance is required beyond the
original period; (2) temporary total disability becomes permanent only if the 240-day period expires without a declaration of either fitness to
work or the existence of a permanent disability; and (3) the mere counting of 120 days is insufficient for entitlement to permanent disability.

ISSUE:

Whether Destriza is entitled to disability benefits as previously awarded by the PVA

RULING:

NO, Destriza is not entitled to the award.

It is undisputed that Destriza was suffering from Chronic Calculus Cholecystitis due to development of gallstones. This is a gallbladder
inflammation that may result to gallstones blocking the opening of the gallbladder into the cystic duct or the cystic duct itself. Since Chronic
Calculus Cholecystitis and even contracting of gallstones are not included in Section 32-A of Memorandum Circular No. 9, Destriza had the
burden of establishing, by substantial evidence, that his illness was work-related or was at least aggravated by work. In short, he had the burden
of showing that he contracted gallstones because of his work as cook in M/V Cygnus.

In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that Destriza failed to establish work-relatedness relative to his illness. The records do not show that
the cause of the development of his gallstones resulting to Chronic Calculus Cholecystitis was his work as cook aboard the vessel. He merely
presented general averments and allegations that the hot temperature and constant meat or high fat diet aboard the vessel caused or aggravated
the development of his gallstones.
His claims on work-relatedness were not corroborated by other evidence. There is nothing in the records to substantiate the claims that would
have justified the award. Therefore, Destriza is not entitled to illness benefit for failure to establish work-relatedness by substantial evidence.

In addition, Destriza's failure to resort to a third-doctor opinion proved fatal to his cause. The opinion of the company-designated physician
prevails over that of the seafarer's personal doctor in case there is no third-doctor opinion. Thus, Dr. Cruz's declaration that Destriza is fit to
resume sea duties prevails over the medical opinion issued by Dr. Donato-Tan.

V PEOPLE MANPOWER PHILS., INC. VS. DOMINADOR C. BUQUID

G.R. No. 222311, February 10, 2021
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:

The law defines a "seafarer" based not only on the employee's kind of work, but also on the kind of marine vessel or offshore unit the employee
was aboard during his employment. Stated otherwise, an overseas employee, in order to be considered as a "seafarer," must not only perform
tasks concerning manning marine vessels or marine navigation, but they must also perform such functions onboard a vessel engaged in maritime
navigation or a mobile offshore rig or drilling unit in the high seas.

All the definitions mentioned would all point to the fact that in order to be considered a seaman or seafarer, one would have to be, at the very
least, employed in a vessel engaged in maritime navigation. Thus, it is clear that those employed in non-mobile vessels or fixed structures, even
if the said vessels/structures are located offshore or in the middle of the sea, cannot be considered as seafarers under the law.

FACTS:

In 2012, petitioner V People Manpower Phils., Inc. (V Manpower) hired Dominador, for and in behalf of its principal, Cape Papua New Guinea
Ltd. (hereafter, Cape PNG) as a Deck Crew/Rigger for an estimated period of six (6) months, from January 17, 2012 to July 17, 2012, or up to
the completion of a phase of a project or upon completion of the KUMUL Marine Terminal Rejuvenation Works (KUMUL Project), the site of
which is located in Papua, New Guinea.

Before his deployment, Dominador underwent and passed the routine Pre-employment Medical Examination (PEME). He commenced his work
at the KUMUL Project site after he was declared as "fit to work" by the company-designated physician.

On March 26, 2012, Dominador felt persistent stomach pains. The next day, March 27, 2012, he was brought to a hospital where he underwent
an appendectomy. During the surgery, the surgical team also found a mass in his colon and hence, a colostomy was also performed. Dominador
was discharged and repatriated to the Philippines on April 8, 2012.

After several check-ups and series of laboratory procedures, Dominador was diagnosed on May 9, 2012 with Stage 3 Colon Cancer. Despite
undergoing surgery and treatment, Dominador's condition did not improve, prompting him to consult Dr. Jhade Lotus P. Peneyra (Dr. Peneyra),
an oncologist, for a second opinion. Dr. Peneyra issued several medical abstracts18 which stated that Dominador's illness was occupation
related/aggravated and that he was permanently unfit for sea duties as a seaman in any capacity.

Considering these medical findings, Dominador initiated a claim for disability benefits with petitioners, pursuant to the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA¬SEC). However, his claim was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dominador is a sea-farer entitled to his claim for disability benefits.

RULING:

NO, Dominador is not a sea-farer and he is not entitled to the benefits.

Article 13(g) of the Labor Code defines a "seaman" as any person employed in a vessel engaged in maritime navigation. 2003 POEA Seafarer
Rules defines "seafarer" by expressly including fishermen, cruise ship personnel and those serving on foreign maritime mobile offshore and
drilling units. This definition was reinstated under the 2010 Omnibus Rules, but the phrase "in the high seas" was added to qualify the "mobile
offshore and drilling units" aforementioned. All the definitions mentioned would all point to the fact that in order to be considered a seaman or
seafarer, one would have to be, at the very least, employed in a vessel engaged in maritime navigation. Thus, it is clear that those employed in
non-mobile vessels or fixed structures, even if the said vessels/structures are located offshore or in the middle of the sea, cannot be considered as
seafarers under the law.

Despite allegedly being a seafarer for 22 years, was not engaged as a seafarer but as a land-based worker in his latest employment contract with
petitioners. Even if we consider the definition under the 2010 POEA Seafarer Rules, which was the prevailing set of rules during Dominador's
employment period with petitioners, he never presented any evidence that he was aboard any vessel engaged in maritime navigation, or a mobile
offshore rig or drilling unit in the high seas. Contrary to the allegations of Dominador, "M/V KML Platform" which he alleges as his vessel, does
not exist and has no basis in the body of evidence presented before us. There is no mention of such a marine vessel in the employment contract
between him and petitioners, nor was there any proof presented to show that a marine vessel was registered under the said name. The
employment contract simply mentioned that he will be hired as a project employee for the KUMUL Project and that the work site is located in
Papua, New Guinea. We take notice of petitioners' allegations that the KUMUL Marine Terminal Platform is a fixed offshore structure, anchored
to the bottom of the seabed. Dominador never disputed this. In fact, Dominador himself has alleged in his pleadings that the KUMUL Marine
Terminal Platform: "maybe stationary and does not move from to place to place;" and "is actually a port in the Gulf of Papua New Guinea."

Medical abstracts of Dr. Peneyra cannot be taken at face value, especially since the same were issued without personal knowledge of the working
conditions experienced by Dominador during his employment with petitioners, nor was there any showing that the said medical abstracts were
based on medical tests and procedures conducted by Dr. Peneyra on Dominador. In Coastal Safeway Marine Services Inc. v. Esguerra, we have
held that while mere probability and not ultimate certainty is the litmus test in compensation proceedings, awards of compensation cannot be
based on speculations or presumptions.

Dominador has admitted himself that he was a seafarer for 22 years in a container vessel, and during those 22 years, he was exposed to various
carcinogens as mentioned in Dr. Peneyra's medical reports. Even assuming for the sake of argument that he was subjected to similar elements
and stressful situations during his employment with petitioners, we cannot conclude that his medical condition developed or was aggravated to
such an extent during his relatively short stint as petitioners' employee. The time period of about two (2) months pales in comparison with the 22
years he previously spent as a seafarer in a container vessel. To stress this point, 22 years is equivalent 264 months, and hence, assuming that
Dominador has worked as a seafarer for all those years, he has only spent roughly 0.0075% (2/266) of his 266-month career (counting his 2-
month stint) working for petitioners.

While it can also be admitted that diet is a factor in the development of colon cancer, it is unreasonable to conclude that two (2) months of
alleged bad diet would lead to the aggravation of Dominador's medical condition, without any evidence of his diet and lifestyle prior to his
employment with petitioners. Even if he appeared to be healthy when he passed the PEME and was certified as "fit to work," we take notice of
the fact that cancer, in general, is difficult to detect, especially in its earlier stages. In fact, records would show that he was initially diagnosed as
only having appendicitis when he complained of stomach pain on March 26, 2012; the colon cancer was only diagnosed later on after a series of
follow-up check-ups and laboratory procedures.

C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT vs. JIMMY G. JAICTEN

G.R. No. 208981, February 1, 2021
By: michie

DOCTRINE:

The act of signing of the worker of a Certificate of Fitness to Work effectively releases the local recruitment agency and the foreign employer
from liability arising from his repatriation due to medical reasons.
The company-designated physician is tasked with assessing the seafarer’s disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during
the term of the latter’s employment, BUT, such assessment is not automatically final, binding, or conclusive on the claimant, labor tribunals, or
the courts as the claim’s inherent merits would still be weighed and duly considered. Moreover, the seafarer has the right to dispute such
assessment by consulting his own doctor. In addition, in case of disagreement between the findings of the companydesignated physician and the
seafarer's doctor of choice, both parties may agree to jointly refer the matter to a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them.

FACTS:

Respondent Jaicten (Respondent) was employed on April 30, 2008 by Petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management (Sharp), for and in behalf of the
latter’s foreign principal, Petitioner James Fisher Tankship, Ltd. (JFTL), as a Bosun on board M/V Cumbrian Fisher for nine (9) months wherein
he was declared fit to work during his pre-employment medical examination.

However, after a few months of working, Respondent was diagnosed with non-ST myocardial infarction and underwent a series of operations
before being repatriated on October 30, 2008 and referred to Sachly International Health Partners Clinic (SIHPC). On January 7, 2009, the
companydesignated physician named Dr. Susannah Ong-Salvador (Dr. Ong-Salvador) certified Respondent fit to work. Respondent then sought
the medical opinion of his doctor of choice, Dr. Efren Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) of the Philippine Heart Center, who declared Respondent unfit to
resume sea duties. Thereafter, Respondent filed a complaint for payment of total and permanent disability benefits, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.

Petitioners argued that Respondent is not entitled to such benefits on the following grounds:
(1) The company-designated physician, Dr. Ong-Salvador, already declared Respondent fit to resume sea duties and Respondent himself
even signed the Certificate of Fitness to Work and in fact, already lined up for re-employment; and
(2) Respondent only filed the claim for disability benefits eight months from being cleared to resume to work.
LA: Dismissed Respondents’ Claim for benefits because Respondent himself agreed and confirmed his fitness to work when he signed the
Certificate for Fitness to Work which barred him from claiming disability benefits. The LA further sustained petitioners' claim that when Jaicten
reapplied for employment and underwent another pre-employment medical examination, he was found to be fit for sea duties and for which
reason he was already lined up for deployment.
NLRC: Reversed LA’s ruling and granted the claim ruling that the medical opinion of Dr. Vicaldo that Respondent is suffering from a
permanent disability due his elevated blood pressure must be given credence especially since such opinion is consistent with the findings of Dr.
Ong-Salvador that Respondent must continue to take his medications even after undergoing surgical intervention. NLRC further clarified that the
signing of the said certificate did not negate the non-deployment.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the current Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the signing of the Certificate of Fitness to Work has released the Petitioners from any liability arising from
Respondent’s repatriation due to medical reasons?

RULING:

YES, the fact that Respondent signed the Certificate of Fitness to Work has effectively released Petitioners from any liability arising from his
repatriation due to medical reasons.

The Supreme Court clarified that absent any showing or evidence that there has been any coercion or duping of the employer into signing the
said certificate, such shall be considered as binding and with full effect. The allegation of Respondent that he signed the certificate due to a belief
that he would be re-deployed is not supported by evidence. Further, the fact that Respondent has admitted that he already underwent another pre-
employment medical examination to seek another employment with petitioners belied his claim of permanent and total disability clearly showing
that Respondent only filed the claim after he failed to gain another employment.

2. Whether or not the claim for the disability benefits should be granted?

NO, the claim for benefits shall not be granted.

Material to this case is Section 20 (B) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC) which reads:

Section 20 [B]. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness. —

xxx xxx xxx

2. x x x
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so
provided at cost to the employer until such time as he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by
the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage
until he is declared fit to work or the degree of his permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated
physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three
working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same
period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the
right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer.
The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

Based on this provision, the findings of the company-designated physician is not automatically binding and can be disputed by the worker by
consulting his own doctor. In fact, in cases of disagreement, the same provision provided for a remedy in case of disagreement between the
opinion of the company-designated physician and the chosen doctor of the worker, which is the referral of the matter to a third doctor whose
decision will be considered as final and binding.

In this case, not only did the procedure of referral was not complied with and that Dr. Vicaldo did not declare Respondent entitled to permanent
and total disability benefits or Grade I, but the Respondent also failed to provide sufficient evidence supporting his claims. Firstly, he merely
anchored his claim for the benefits on a medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo who (1) assessed his alleged disability as Impediment Grade
VII (41.80%) which does not even show any supporting diagnostic tests and/or procedure effectively and adequately refuting the assessments
made, and tests administered by Dr. Ong-Salvador. The fact that Respondent was required to continue his medications even after he was
declared fit to work did not discredit the findings of the companydesignated physician that respondent is fit to resume sea duties.

Moreover, it must be stressed that unlike Dr. Vicaldo who only saw Respondent on one occasion and did not even perform any medical test to
support his assessment, Dr. Ong-Salvador conducted extensive examination on Respondent over a period of more or less three months since the
latter’s repatriation through the conduct of 2D Echo with Doppler Result, CBC, Urinalysis, Physical Examinations, and Stress Test.
As ruled in the case of Philman Marine v. Cabanban, the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition, having
closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and actually treated the seafarer's illness, is more qualified to assess the seafarer's disability.

GERARDO U. VILLE vs. MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC.

G.R. No. 217879, February 01, 2021
By: rommel jr

DOCTRINES:
Even on the assumption that the illness is work-related and that the same was acquired onboard and during the term of his employment contract,
the suit for disability benefits must comply with the three-day reportorial requirement upon repatriation.

Section 19(H) of the 2010 POEA-SEC states: H. The seafarer shall report to the manning agency within 72 hours upon arrival at point of hire.

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, a seafarer-claimant is mandated a period of three working days within which he should submit himself
to a post-employment medical examination so that the company-designated physician can promptly arrive at a medical diagnosis. Due to the
express mandate on the reportorial requirement, the failure of the seafarer to comply shall result in the forfeiture of his right to claim the above
benefits.

Nevertheless, while the requirement to report within three working days from repatriation appears to be indispensable in character, there are
some established exceptions to this rule:
1. when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the employer upon his repatriation; and
2. when the employer inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician

FACTS:

In July 2011, respondent manning agency Maersk, hired Petitioner Ville as Chief Cook on board the ship Adrian Maersk for a period of six
months. Before his deployment, Ville underwent a PreEmployment Medical Examination (PEME) wherein he was declared as fit for work. On
August 11, 2011, he departed from the Philippines to join his vessel of assignment.

Upon the expiration of his contract on March 1, 2012, Ville disembarked from the vessel. Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he did not report
that he was experiencing any illness or injury while on board

On March 7, 2012, Ville underwent another PEME as a prerequisite for another deployment. In said PEME, he disclosed for the first time that he
has a history of high blood pressure or hypertension and has been taking medication. The results of the PEME indicated that Ville had Coronary
Artery Disease. Hence, he was declared "Unfit for Sea Duty."

Under the impression that he contracted the illness while on board Adrian Maersk, Ville filed a Complaint on May 3, 2012 against the
respondents for reimbursement of medical expenses and sickness allowance, payment of total and permanent disability benefits, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus legal interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover total and permanent disability benefits

RULING:

NO, petitioner is not entitled.

No, upon Ville's signing off from the vessel and repatriation on March 1, 2012 due to the completion of his contract, his employment
relationship with the respondents correspondingly ceased. Consequently, no liability should attach to the respondents for any illness or incident
that may have been acquired or transpire after signing off or expiration of his contract.

It has been established that Petitioner’s coronary artery disease was diagnosed only on August 28, 2012 or five months after his repatriation due
to completion of his contract. He was repatriated not because of any medical issue but due to the completion of his contract.

Furthermore, Petitioner failed to undergo post-employment medical examination within the prescribed period, Ville is deemed to have waived
his right to claim disability benefits.

Section 19(H) of the 2010 POEA-SEC states:

H. The seafarer shall report to the manning agency within 72 hours upon arrival at point of hire.

Based on the records, he disembarked on March 1, 2012. He had three working days or until March 6, 2012 to undergo a post-employment
medical examination. Yet, he submitted himself to a PEME the next day or on March 7, 2012 (or four working days after disembarkation). In
fine, the prescribed period to undergo post-employment medical examination had already lapsed.
There is no dispute that Ville never reported to his employer that he was suffering from an ailment while on board Adrian Maersk. Additionally,
even upon disembarkation, he did not inform his employer that he was experiencing any illness or that it was aggravated while on board the
vessel. Significantly, Ville did not submit himself for post-employment medical examination within three working days after disembarkation. It
is settled rule that non-compliance with the postemployment medical examination requirement is tantamount to a waiver or forfeiture of any
right to claim disability benefits.

Even assuming that Ville acquired an illness while on board, that he informed respondents, and then underwent a post-employment medical
examination within three days from repatriation, his claim for disability benefits would still fail because he did not secure the medical opinion of
the company-designated physician before consulting his own doctor in accordance with Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC. His failure
to do so bars him from claiming disability benefits.
Without these assessments, his suit for disability benefits was filed prematurely.

RONNIE L. SINGSON vs. ARKTIS MARITIME CORP.

G.R. No. 214542, January 13, 2021
By: Celyn

DOCTRINE:

When a certain sickness or injury causes a temporary and total disability which lasts continuously for more than 120 days, then such total
disability is considered to be permanent. However, as an exception to this rule, if the said sickness or injury that caused the temporary total
disability requires medical treatment beyond the 120-day period but not to exceed 240 days, then the employee is only entitled to temporary total
disability benefits until he is declared as either:
1. "fit to work," which stops his entitlement to disability benefits; or
2. "permanently and totally disabled," which then entitles him to permanent total disability benefits. In any event, if the 240 days had
lapsed without any certification issued by the company-designated doctor, then the employee may pursue an action for permanent total
disability benefits.

FACTS:

On January 13, 2010, respondent Fil-Pride Shipping Co. (Fil-Pride), for and in behalf of its foreign principal, respondent Prosper Marine Private
Ltd. (Prosper) hired Ronnie as "third engineer officer" on board the vessel "MIT Atlanta 2" for a period of 10 months. Ronnie boarded the vessel
on January 20, 2010 and commenced his employment. Concurrently, Fil-Pride was replaced by Arktis Maritime Corp. (Arktis) as the new
manning agent of Prosper.

On October 13, 2010, petitioner complained of severe stomach pains and was confined at the Citymed Hospital in Singapore. On October 14,
2010, Dr. Noel Yao, petitioner's attending physician, declared him to be fit to rejoin the vessel with rest on board for three more days. When his
condition did not improve, petitioner was recommended for repatriation.

He arrived in Manila on October 17, 2010. The following day, he was referred for a medical checkup at the company's accredited clinic,
Christian Medical Clinic, Inc.. The company physician, Dr. Lyn C. de Leon, diagnosed petitioner as suffering from "cholecystlithiasis and r/o
pancreatic pseudo cyst," with a recommendation for surgery.
About four months later, or exactly 134 days from petitioner's arrival in Manila, he again underwent an examination. This time, he was declared
by Dr. de Leon as "fit to work" in the Medical Report dated February 28, 2011.

On September 12, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents Arktis, Fil-Pride, and Prosper for the payment of his disability benefits,
sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses, as well as damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner alleged that after he was diagnosed with the
disease and recommended for surgery, Arktis took no action on the same. Consequently,he consulted Dr. Villanueva who recommended that he
undergo an operation. Due to Arktis' inaction, petitioner claimed that he was forced to undertake medication at his own expense without
receiving any assistance from the respondents. He further alleged that Arktis denied him his sickness and medical benefits and failed to give him
an assessment of his disability. Considering that he contracted the illness during the term of his employment contract, he maintained that his
illness was work-related.

Moreover, petitioner argued that for more than a year since his medical repatriation on October 17, 2010, he has been unable to resume work as
a seafarer and there has been no finding or declaration from the company-designated physician regarding his disability. Consequently, he prayed
for payment of permanent and total disability benefits, the refund of his medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits

RULING:

NO, the petitioner is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

There was no declaration as to Mr. Ronnie Singson’s (petitioner) fitness to work or as to the permanent and total status of his disability within
the 120-day period. However, since petitioner's sickness required medical treatment beyond the 120-day period, the temporary total disability
period was extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of his employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or
total disability already exists. In this connection, petitioner never presented any declaration to the effect that his disability is total and permanent.
The evidence revealed that the petitioner was declared as asymptomatic and fit to work on February 28, 2011 or one hundred thirty-four (134)
days after the onset of the disability, well within the 240-day period. Therefore, petitioner cannot claim permanent total disability benefits and is
only entitled to temporary total disability benefits until the time when he was declared to be fit to work.

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. vs. ALMARIO C. SAN JUAN

G.R. No. 207511. October 5, 2020.
By: kimu

DOCTRINES:

Settled is the rule that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be
determined by the companydesignated physician, and that "in case of conflicting medical assessments [between the company-designated
physician and the seafarer's own physician], referral to a third doctor is mandatory; and that in the absence of a third doctor's opinion, it is the
medical assessment of the company-designated physician that should prevail.

It was well established in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc that before a seafarer may claim permanent total disability benefits from
his employer, it must be first established that the latter's company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in
sea-duty or disability grading within the 120-day period or 240-day extension provided for by law. C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok
delineated the circumstances under which a seafarer may pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits.

They held that the 120-day period should be reckoned from the time the seafarer reported to the company-designated physician. If the company-
designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with sufficient justification, then the period of diagnosis and
treatment shall be extended to 240 days.

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period
exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

FACTS:

PTCI is engaged in the business of providing marine management services. It hired San Juan on several occasions as Chief Cook. He was
subsequently re-hired on August 26, 2009 in behalf of PTCI's principal, General Maritime Management LLC, to work as a Chief Cook aboard
the vessel MV Genmar George T for a period of eight (8) months. Prior to his embarkation, San Juan underwent a routine Pre-Employment
Medical Examination (PEME) where he declared that he suffered from "hypertension treated with medication." San Juan was eventually given
cardiac clearance and was certified as "fit to work" by PTCI's company-designated physicians.

San Juan claimed that performed hard manual labor and engaged in strenuous physical activities for twelve (12) hours a day. This worsened his
condition and he allegedly collapsed several times during the voyage due to lack of medications and medical attention. San Juan was brought to
a medical facility in India for a medical examination and treatment.
On January 23, 2010, San Juan signed off from the vessel and was medically repatriated to the Philippines on February 1, 2010. He was
immediately referred to the company-designated physicians at the Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) for medical examination and further
treatment. After treatment, the company-designated physicians declared him fit for duty.

San Juan averred that although he executed a Certificate of Fitness for Work on April 30, 2010, he was not, however, rehired by PTCI. He also
claimed that he applied for employment with other manning agencies, but was unsuccessful.

On May 26, 2010, San Juan filed the instant complaint against PTCI, General Maritime Management LLC, and Salinas seeking payment of his
permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance, among others. Meanwhile, on July 8, 2010, San Juan sought a second medical opinion
from Dr. Antonio C. Pascual, a cardiologist from the Philippine Heart Center, who, on the same day, certified that San Juan was "medically unfit
to work in any capacity as seaman."

ISSUES:

1. Whether the contrary findings of San Juan’s own physician should be upheld over the fitto-work certifications issued by PTCI’s company
designated physicians

RULING:

The findings of the company-designated physicians should prevail.

The prescribed procedure in contesting the findings of the company-designated physicians has been laid out by this court.
Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc. (Carcedo):

To definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled, upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the
company doctor's assessment based on the duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarer's own doctor, the
seafarer shall then signify his intention to resolve the conflict by the referral of the conflicting assessments to a third doctor
whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding on the parties. Upon notification, the company carries the
burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed between the parties.

Notably, it was only after the filing of the complaint, or on July 8, 2010, that San Juan sought the opinion of Dr. Pascual, his own physician. The
complaint was prematurely filed since at that time, San Juan was not yet armed with a medical certificate from his physician of choice. There is
no dispute that under the 2000 POEA-SEC, San Juan was not precluded from seeking a second opinion of his disability.

San Juan, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure above. It bears emphasis that it is only through this procedure
provided by the 2000 POEA-SEC that San Juan can question the fit-to-work certifications of PTCI's company-designated physicians and compel
PTCI to jointly seek an assessment from a third doctor.

However, instead of setting into motion the process of selecting a third doctor, he preempted the mandated procedure by filing the instant
complaint for permanent total disability benefits without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination. On this point,
nonreferral cannot be blamed on PTCI as the opinion of San Juan's own physician was only sought two months after the instant complaint for
disability benefits was filed by San Juan. Clearly, in the absence of any such request, PTCI cannot be expected to respond, more so refer the
conflicting findings to a third doctor.

In the absence of a third doctor resolution, the assessments of PTCI's company-designated physicians should stand. As held in Marlow, "[a]bsent
proper compliance, the final medical report and the certification of the company-designated physician declaring him fit to return to work must be
upheld. Ergo, he is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits."

2. Whether or not San Juan is entitled to Permanent Disability Benefits

NO, San Juan is not entitled to his claim for permanent and total disability benefits.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that San Juan reported to the company-designated physicians for examination and treatment immediately
upon repatriation on February 1, 2010. Nor is there dispute on the medical treatment received by San Juan from MMC, or that he was eventually
certified by two company-designated physicians as normal and fit to work for seaman duties.

Notably, the company-designated physicians issued San Juan's fit-to-work certifications 89 days after February 1, 2010, which is well within the
120-day period provided under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-Standard Employment Contract (SEC).

Significantly, this finding was not disputed nor controverted by the parties. As he was declared fit to resume sea duties, there was, therefore, no
basis for San Juan to claim total and permanent disability benefits from PTCI.

3. Whether or not San Juan is entitled to the balance of his sickness allowance

YES, San Juan is entitled to the balance of his sickness allowance.

Clearly, a seafarer's sickness allowance is computed from the time he signed-off from the vessel for medical treatment until he is declared
medically fit to work or his final medical disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. In this case, it is undisputed that
San Juan signed off from the vessel on January 23, 2010 and was declared fit to work on April 20, 2010 and April 30, 2010 by the company-
designated physicians, or after an interval of 97 days.

Considering that San Juan was paid his sickness allowance for only 89 days, then he is entitled to receive additional sickness allowance of eight
more days. Moreover, the additional sickness allowance shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.

IV.A.1. Tests to Determine Employer-Employee Relationship

GEROME B. GINTA-ASON vs. J.T.A. PACKAGING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 244206, March 16, 2022
By: Cara V

DOCTRINE:

The "four-fold test" in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship has the following requisites:
1. the selection and engagement of the employee;
2. the payment of wages;
3. the power of dismissal; and
 4. the power to control the employee's conduct.

FACTS:

Gerome Ginta-Ason filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary/wages, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation
pay and ECOLA, with claims for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against respondents J.T.A. Packaging Corporation (JTA)
and Jon Tan Arquilla. Petitioner alleged that he was hired by JTA as an all-around driver until his constructive dismissal. Petitioner claimed that
he was constructively dismissed because Arquilla made his continued employment impossible, unbearable, and unlikely. JTA averred that
petitioner was not its employee. In support thereof, JTA submitted 1) copies of its alpha list of employees as filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) for the years 2014-2016; 2) payroll monthly reports and 13th month pay it paid for the years 2015-2016; 3) reports on Social
Security System (SSS) contributions of its employees remitted for the years 2015-2016; 4) PhilHealth remittance reports on contributions of its
employees in 2016; and 5) Pag-IBIG fund membership and registration/remittance forms indicating the names of its employees and their
contributions for the period of 2015-2016. All of the foregoing documents did not include petitioner's name. Further, JTA claimed that Arquilla
was not the owner of JTA as evidenced by its articles of incorporation which showed that Arquilla was neither a stockholder nor connected in
any capacity with the company.

LA rendered a Decision declaring petitioner to have been constructively dismissed. The LA ruled that the evidence presented by the parties
sufficiently established that an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and JTA. Petitioner was constructively dismissed
because his continued employment with JTA was rendered impossible due to fear after the incident of maltreatment and detention. Finally, the
LA gave full faith and credit to the sworn statement of JTA's former employee who stated that Arquilla was introduced to him as the owner and
manager of JTA.

On appeal, the foregoing LA Decision was reversed and set aside by the NLRC. The NLRC did not give evidentiary weight to the pay slips
submitted by petitioner not only because there was no indication as to who issued the same but also due to the apparent discrepancy in the dates
they were issued. The NLRC noted that the pay slips date back as early as March 2014 contrary to petitioner's claim that he was hired only on
December 26, 2014. The NLRC, on the other hand, gave credence to the documentary evidence submitted by JTA which showed that petitioner
was not among its employees. It also considered the articles of incorporation presented by JTA as sufficient proof that Arquilla is not the owner
of JTA, or that he is in anyway connected with JTA. The NLRC dismissed the complaint for lack of employer-employee relationship between
the parties. The CA held that petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he is an employee of JTA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and JTA at the time of petitioner's dismissal.

No, employer-employee relationship did not exist between petitioner and JTA.

He presented no document setting forth the terms of his employment. In particular, no contract of employment or written agreement was
introduced by petitioner to establish the true nature of his relationship with JTA. Evident also is the lack of a company identification card to
prove petitioner's employment with JTA. The Court has held that in a business establishment, an identification card is usually provided not only
as a security measure but mainly to identify the holder thereof as a bona fide employee of the firm that issues it.

To prove the element of payment of wages, petitioner submitted pay slips allegedly issued by JTA. Significantly, the pay slips presented by
petitioner bore no indication whatsoever as to their source. Absent any clear indication that the amount petitioner was allegedly receiving came
from JTA, it cannot concretely establish payment of wages. In Valencia v. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation , the Court rejected the pay
slips submitted by the petitioner employee because they did not bear the name of the respondent company. Thus, the Court cannot sustain
petitioner's argument that the failure to indicate who issued the pay slips should not be taken against him. Moreover, a perusal of the pay slips
submitted by petitioner would show that he had been receiving compensation as early as February 2014. This clearly belies petitioner's allegation
in his complaint that he was hired by JTA only on December 26, 2014. The wide gap between February 2014 and December 2014 cannot be
dismissed as a trivial inconsistency.

Additionally, there were no deductions from petitioner's supposed salary such as withholding tax, SSS, PhilHealth or Pag-IBIG Fund
contributions which are the usual deductions from employees' salaries. Thus, the alleged pay slips may not be treated as competent evidence of
petitioner's claim that he is JTA's employee. To reiterate, not even a single document showed petitioner's name on it.

As to the power of control, the driver's itineraries failed to give details on who specifically dispatched petitioner. The address appearing on the
driver's itineraries is different from the actual office address of respondent JTA as reflected in petitioner's own complaint before the LA. The
determination of the identity of the authorized personnel of JTA who actually dispatched petitioner gains more importance in light of the
unexplained discrepancies in the company name and address appearing on the driver's itineraries. Absent this, it cannot be ascertained who
actually exercised control over petitioner. The driver's itineraries did not adequately establish the element of control.

In sum, petitioner failed to sufficiently discharge the burden of showing with legal certainty that employee-employer relationship existed
between him and JTA. On the other hand, it was clearly shown by JTA that petitioner was not among its employees. Consequently, the
allegation that he was illegally dismissed by JTA must necessarily fail.

MARIA LEA JANE I. GESOLGON vs. CYBERONE PH., INC.

 G.R. No. 210741, October 14, 2020
By: quagmire4

DOCTRINE:

The four-fold test used in determining the existence of employer- employee relationship involves an inquiry into:
1. the selection and engagement of the employee;
2. the payment of wages;
3. the power of dismissal; and
4. the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and method by which the work is to be accomplished.

FACTS:

Gesolgon and Santos alleged that they were hired on March 3, 2008 and April 5, 2008, respectively, by Mikrut as part-time home-based remote
Customer Service Representatives of CyberOne Pty. Ltd. (CyberOne AU), an Australian company.7 Thereafter, they became full time and
permanent employees of CyberOne AU and were eventually promoted as Supervisors.

Sometime in October 2009, Mikrut, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of both CyberOne AU and CyberOne PH, asked petitioners, together
with Juson, to become dummy directors and/or incorporators of CyberOne PH to which petitioners agreed. As a result, petitioners were
promoted as Managers and were given increases in their salaries. The salary increases were made to appear as paid for by CyberOne PH.

However, in the payroll for November 16 to 30, 2010, Mikrut reduced petitioners' salaries from P50,000.00 to P36,000.00, of which P26,000.00
was paid by CyberOne AU while the remaining P10,000.00 was paid by CyberOne PH. Aside from the decrease in their salaries, petitioners
were only given P20,000.00 each as 13th month pay for the year 2010.

Sometime in March 2011, Mikrut made petitioners choose one from three options: (a) to take an indefinite furlough and be placed in a manpower
pool to be recalled in case there is an available position; (b) to stay with CyberOne AU but with an entry level position as home-based Customer
Service Representative; or (c) to tender their irrevocable resignation. Petitioners alleged that they were constrained to pick the first option in
order to save their jobs. In April 2011, petitioners received P13,000.00 each as their last salary.

Hence, petitioners filed a case against respondents and CyberOne AU for illegal dismissal. They likewise claimed for non-payment or
underpayment of their salaries and 13th month pay; moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees.

On the other hand, CyberOne PH, Mikrut and Juson denied that any employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and CyberOne
PH. They insisted that petitioners were incorporators or directors and not regular employees of CyberOne PH. They claimed that petitioners were
employees of CyberOne AU and that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over CyberOne AU because it is a foreign corporation not doing business in
the Philippines.
ISSUE:

Whether or not employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners, on one hand, and respondent CyberOne PH, on the other hand

RULING:

NO, existed no employer- employee relationship between petitioners and CyberOne PH. Hence, there is no dismissal to speak of, much more
illegal dismissal.

Based on record, petitioners were requested by respondent Mikrut to become stockholders and directors of CyberOne PH with each one of them
subscribing to one share of stock. Other than the payslips mentioned, there are no employment contracts, or at least a job offer presented by the
private respondents to bolster their claim. True, there is no requirement under the law that the contract of employment of the kind entered into by
an employer and an employee should be in any particular form. Nevertheless, the court emphasized the fact that the private respondents initially
presented as evidence a copy of the Job Offer dated March 3, 2008, which showed that respondent Gesolgon was hired as Remote Customer
Service Representative of CyberOne AU, and not CyberOne PH., Inc.

As to the power of dismissal, the records reveal that petitioners submitted letters of resignation as directors of CyberOne PH and not as
employees thereof. This fact negates their contention that they were dismissed by CyberOne PH as its employees. Lastly, the power of control of
CyberOne PH over petitioners is not supported by evidence on record. To reiterate, petitioners failed to prove the manner by which CyberOne
PH alledgedly supervised and controlled their work. In fact, petitioners failed to mention their functions and duties as employees of CyberOne
PH. They merely relied on their allegations that they were hired and paid by CyberOne PH without specifying the terms of their employment as
well as the degree of control CyberOne PH had over the means and method by which their work would be accomplished. As it is established that
petitioners are not employees of CyberOne PH, there is no need for this Court to delve into the issues of petitioners' illegal dismissal.

IV.A.2.a. Regular Employees

 ALLAN REGALA vs. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 204684, Oct. 5, 2020
By: Hernalisa

DOCTRINE:

Article 295 of the Labor Code "provides for two types of regular employees, namely:
1. those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer
(first category); and
2. those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are
employed (second category).

FACTS:

Regala was hired by Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) in February 2000 as one of its waiters assigned to the Food and Beverage Department. He
was later assigned as cook helper at MHC's Chocolate Room/Cookies Kitchen during the period from October 18, 2004 to June 26, 2006. In the
course of his employment as waiter/cook helper, Regala worked for six (6) days every week, and was paid a daily salary of P382.00 until
sometime in December 2009. MHC also remitted contributions in Regala's behalf to the Social Security System (SSS) and Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Phill-Health).

As waiter, Regala's duties and responsibilities included preparing the mise en place, taking of orders, and serving food and beverages to hotel
guests at tables and inside 11HC's dining establishments. In the course of his engagement with MHC, Regala was directed to report to a Captain
Waiter, and assigned to work for its Cowrie Grill, Pool Bar, Mini Bar, Kitchen Ginza, Tap Room, Champagne Room, Room Service, Mabuhay
Palace, Banquet Services, and Pastry and House Keeping. From October 2008 to May 2009, Regala was made to attend and participate in hotel
trainings for Basic Food Safety Strategies, Food Safety Awareness,14 and Customer Service Awareness.

Regala alleged that he was not recognized as a regular rank-and-file employee despite having rendered services to MHC for several years.
Regala also claimed that MHC constructively dismissed him from employment when it allegedly reduced his regular work days to two (2) days
from the normal five (5)-day work week starting December 2, 2009, which resulted in the diminution of his take home salary.

On its part, MHC denied outright that Regala is its regular employee, and claimed that he is a mere freelance or "extra waiter" engaged by MHC
on a short-term basis. It explained that it employs extra waiters at fixed and/or determinable periods particularly when there are temporary spikes
in the volume of its business.
It is during these specific periods when management is forced to supplement the hotel's regular staff of waiters with temporary fixed term
employees, such as Regala, in order to meet increases in business activities in its food and beverage functions, special events and banquets. In
engaging extra or temporary waiters, Ml-IC relies on loose referrals from its employees and on a list of waiters who have expressed interest in
part-time or temporary engagements. It further explained that its system of hiring freelance waiters on an informal and temporary basis is a
common practice in the hotel and restaurant industry and that it is through this industry practice that these extra waiters, including Regala, are
able to offer their services to other hotels, restaurants, and food catering companies despite their existing engagement with MHC.

MHC then presented a sample fixed-term service contract, and copies of Regala's Department Outlet Services Contracts for Extra
Waiters/Cocktail Attendants (Service Agreements) covering the periods of his supposed temporary engagement with MHC, or from March 1,
2010 to March 3, 2010. MHC contended that prior to engaging the services of extra waiters, applicant waiters, such as Regala, and MHC execute
fixed-term service contracts and agree on a specific duration of engagement depending on the requirement of the hotel in a given period. On this
premise, MHC argued that there can be no illegal dismissal to speak of since the expiration of the period under Regala's Service Agreements
simply caused the natural cessation of his fixed-term employment with MHC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Regala is a regular employee

RULING:

YES, Regala is a regular employee

First, Regala is performing activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the business or trade of MHC. This connection can be
determined by considering the nature of the work performed by Regala and its relation to the nature of the particular business or trade of MHC in
its entirety. Being part of the hotel and food industry, MHC, as a service-oriented business enterprise, depends largely on its manpower
complement to carry out or perform services relating to food and beverage operations, event planning and hospitality. As such, it is essential, if
at all necessary, that it retains in its employ waiting staff, such as Regala, specifically tasked to attend to its guests at its various dining
establishments.

Notably, the desirability of his functions is bolstered by the fact that MHC retains in its employ regular staff of waiters charged with like duties
or functions as those of Regala's.

Second, the fact alone that Regala was allowed to work for MHC on several occasions for several years under various Service Agreements is
indicative of the regularity and necessity of his functions to its business. Moreover, it bears to emphasize that MHC has admitted, albeit
implicitly, that it renewed Regala's Service Agreements on various occasions, i.e., during temporary spikes in the volume of its business since
February 2000.
Thus, the continuing need for his services for the past several years is also sufficient evidence of the indispensability of his duties as waiter to
MHC's business. Additionally, Regala has already been working with the hotel for many years when he was supposedly constructively dismissed
from employment on December 2, 2009.

PEDRITO R. PARAYDAY vs. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO., INC.,

G.R. No. 204555. July 6, 2020
By: kimu

DOCTRINE:

Article 295 of the Labor Code "provides for two (2) types of regular employees, namely:
1. those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer
(first category); and
2. those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are
employed (second category).

However, it is to be noted that regular employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should
be.

FACTS:

Petitioners Parayday and Reboso alleged that they were employed as fitters/welders by Shogun Shipping Co. (formerly Oceanview),
corporations engaged in the business of ship building. As fitters/welders, petitioners' duties and responsibilities included, among others,
assembling, welding, fitting, and installing materials or components using electrical welding equipment, and/or repairing and securing parts and
assemblies of the barges. Petitioners further alleged that Shogun Ships failed to pay them their overtime pay, holiday pay, and premium pay
despite having rendered work during holidays, Sundays, and rest days. Shogun Ships likewise did not pay petitioners their SIL and 13th month
pay.

Sometime in May 2006, an explosion occurred during one of their welding assignments which caused petitioners to sustain third degree burns on
certain parts of their bodies. Petitioners were then hospitalized from May 11, 2006 until June 6, 2006. Although medical expenses were borne by
Shogun Ships, petitioners were not paid their salaries while on hospital confinement. After they were discharged from the hospital, Shogun Ships
discontinued providing petitioners financial assistance for payment of their medical expenses. Petitioners alleged that subsequently the
management of Shogun Ships verbally dismissed them from service effective May 1, 2008 due to lack of work as fitters/welders.
On its part, respondent denied outright that petitioners were engaged by Shogun Ships as regular employees. In support of its claim that no
employer-employee relationship existed between Shogun Ships and petitioners, respondent pointed out that Shogun Ships, which is a
corporation engaged in the business of domestic cargo shipping, was only incorporated sometime in November 2002, 13 several years after
petitioners were engaged by Oceanview as its fitters/welders in 1996/1997.

Anent petitioners' allegation of change of corporate name of Oceanview to Shogun Ships, respondent maintained that there was no such change
of corporate name and that Oceanview was a separate and distinct entity from Shogun Ships.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Petitioners, ordering respondent Shogun Ships Co. to reinstate complainants to their former position. The
Labor Arbiter held that petitioners were regular employees of Shogun Ships considering that they: (1) performed tasks necessary and desirable to
its business; and (2) rendered more than one year of service at the time of their dismissal from employment. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners and held that respondent failed to prove that petitioners were dismissed for just or authorized cause
and that they were afforded procedural due process. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
Aggrieved, they filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. They held that petitioners failed to prove that Oceanview were one and the same entity as Shogun Ships.

ISSUE:

Whether or not herein Petitioners were regular employees of Shogun Ships

RULING:

YES, Petitioners were regular employees of Shogun Ships.

While respondent was of the belief that rendering occasional work for Shogun Ships prevented the parties from creating an employment
relationship, much more for petitioners from attaining regular employment status, provision of law, however, dictates that they were regular
employees of Shogun Ships.

First, the records of the case are bereft of evidence that petitioners were duly informed of the nature and status of their engagement with Shogun
Ships. Notably, in the absence of a clear agreement or contract, whether written or otherwise, which would clearly show that petitioners were
properly informed of their employment status with Shogun Ships, petitioners enjoy the presumption of regular employment in their favor.
Second, petitioners were performing activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the business or trade of Shogun Ships. This connection
can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed by petitioners and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or
trade of Shogun Ships in its entirety.65 As Shogun Ships is engaged in the business of domestic cargo shipping, it is essential, if at all necessary,
that Shogun Ships must continuously conduct vital repairs for the proper maintenance of its barges. The desirability of petitioners functions is
bolstered by the fact that Shogun Ships itself precisely retained in its employ regular employees whose duties and responsibilities included,
among others, performing necessary repair and maintenance work on the barges.

Third, irrespective of whether petitioners' duties or functions are usually necessary and desirable in the usual trade or business of Shogun Ships,
the fact alone that petitioners were allowed to work for it for a period of more than one (1) year, albeit intermittently since May 2006 until they
were dismissed from employment on May 1, 2008, was indicative of the regularity and necessity of welding activities to its business. As such,
their employment is deemed to be regular with respect to such activities and while such activities exist.

IV.A.2.d. Project Employees

EDUARDO G. JOVERO vs. ROGELIO CERIO

GR No. 202466, June 23, 2021
By: atorniquet

DOCTRINE:

The principal test in determining whether an employee is a project employee is whether he/she is assigned to carry out a "specific project or
undertaking," the duration and scope of which are specified at the time the employee is engaged in the project, or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. A true project employee should be assigned to a project
which begins and ends at determined or determinable times, and be informed thereof at the time of hiring.

FACTS:

Respondents were hired as cement cutters on various dates by Sigma Construction and Supply, an independent contractor owned by petitioner.
However, PGI preterminated one of its contracts with Sigma on April 1, 1993, which was initially supposed to end on October 31, 1993. Due to
such termination, the project manager of Sigma issued a notice to all cement cutters, informing them that the contract with PGI will be effective
only until April 1, 1993.

Sometime in August 1993, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and non-payment of labor standard
benefits against Sigma and PGI. Jovero alleged that Sigma is an independent contractor that hired respondents as project employees to work on
the former’s projects with PGI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents were project employees

RULING:

NO, respondents are not project employees.

In the instant case, the record is bereft of any proof that the respondent’s engagement as project employees has been predetermined as required
by law. There was no substantial evidence offered to prove that respondents were informed at the time of their hiring, that they were project
employees. Moreover, petitioner’s failure to file termination reports at the end of each project was an indication that respondents were regular
employees.

ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF ASIA vs. SEGUNDINO

PALLE
G.R. No. 201247, July 13, 2020
By: Titaoframos

DOCTRINES:

An employment is generally deemed regular where:

1. the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, subject to exceptions, such as when one is a fixed, project or seasonal employee; or
2. the employee has been engaged for at least a year, with respect to the activity he or she is hired, and the employment of such employee
remains while such activity exists.

In the instant case, in order to ascertain whether respondents were project employees, as claimed by ECCA, it is essential to determine whether
notice was given to them that they were being engaged just for a specific project, which notice must be made at the time of hiring
The employer must establish that
1. the employee was assigned to carry out a particular project or undertaking; and, 2. the duration and scope of which was specified at the
time of engagement."

FACTS:

Petitioner ECCA, now known as First Balfour, Incorporated, is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business. In 2003, it merged
with First Philippine Balfour Beatty, Incorporated, with the latter being absorbed by the former. Subsequently, it was renamed First Balfour,
Incorporated.

Respondents Palle, Velosa, Pampanga, Galabo, Galapin and Felicitas (collectively, respondents) were hired by ECCA on various dates to work
in its construction business.

Respondents mainly argued that they were not project employees but were regular employees of ECCA. They claimed that ECCA hired them on
different dates to perform tasks which were necessary and desirable in its construction business. However, ECCA informed them that the cause
of their termination was "project completion.

Respondents further claimed that ECCA continuously employed them for different construction projects of the company. However, they did not
enjoy the benefits given by the company to its regular employees, such as, Christmas bonuses, hospitalization benefits, sick leaves, vacation
leaves and service incentive leaves, among others.

Respondents further pointed out that they were regular employees, and not project employees, since they performed tasks which were vital,
necessary and indispensable to ECCA's construction business, thus there was a reasonable connection between their nature of work and ECCA's
business.

Moreover, respondents asserted that although they may have signed employment contracts for some of ECCA's projects, they were asked to
work in new projects or transferred to other existing projects without the benefit of corresponding employment contracts.

Furthermore, respondents claim that ECCA's failure to report the termination of their employment to the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) every time that the company completed a project proved that respondents were not project employees but its regular employees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents are Regular or Project Employees

RULINGS:

Respondents are regular employees.

An employment is generally deemed regular where: (i) the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, subject to exceptions, such as when one is a fixed, project or seasonal employee; or (ii)
the employee has been engaged for at least a year, with respect to the activity he or she is hired, and the employment of such employee remains
while such activity exists.

On the other hand, a project employee "is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee." Thus, the "services of project-based employees are
co-terminous with the project and may be terminated upon the end or completion of the project or a phase thereof for which they were hired."

Generally, length of service is a measure to determine whether or not an employee who was initially hired on a temporary basis has attained the
status of a regular employee who is entitled to security of tenure. However, such measure may not necessarily be applicable in a construction
industry since construction firms cannot guarantee continuous employment of their workers after the completion stage of a project. In addition,
a project employee's work may or may not be usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Thus, the fact that a
project employee's work is usually necessary and desirable in the business operation of his/her employer does not necessarily impair the validity
of the project employment contract which specifically stipulates a fixed duration of employment.

In Lopez v. Irvine Construction Corp., it was held that "the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly
characterized as 'project employees[,]' as distinguished from 'regular employees,' is whether or not the 'project employees' were assigned to carry
out a 'specific project or undertaking,' the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project."

In the instant case, in order to ascertain whether respondents were project employees, as claimed by ECCA, it is essential to determine whether
notice was given to them that they were being engaged just for a specific project, which notice must be made at the time of hiring.

We find that ECCA failed to present substantial evidence to show that it informed respondents of the duration and scope of their work at the time
of their hiring. Upon careful review of the company's respective contracts of employment with respondents, this Court holds that the
employment contracts were lacking in details to prove that respondents had been duly informed of the duration and scope of their work, and of
their status as project employees at the time of their hiring. The respective contracts of respondents may have been dated at the time of their
issuance, but nowhere did said contracts show as to when respondents supposedly signed or received the same or were informed of the contents
thereof. This gives rise to the distinct possibility that respondents were not informed of their status as project employees, as well as the scope and
duration of the projects that were assigned to them at the time of their engagement. Thus, ECCA failed to refute respondents' claim that they
worked in new projects or they were transferred to other existing projects without the benefit of their corresponding employment contracts.
Therefore, ECCA failed to persuasively show that respondents herein were informed at the time of their engagement that their work was only for
the duration of the project.

Moreover, ECCA failed to present other evidence or other written contracts to show that it informed respondents of the duration and scope of
their work. Settled is the rule that "although the absence of a written contract does not by itself grant regular status to the employees, it is
evidence that they were informed of the duration and scope of their work and their status as project employees at the start of their engagement.
When no other evidence is offered, the absence of employment contracts raises a serious question of whether the employees were sufficiently
apprised at the start of their employment of their status as project employees."

It is necessary to note that an employer has the burden to prove that the employee is indeed a project employee. Thus, "the employer must
establish that (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a particular project or undertaking; and, (b) the duration and scope of which was
specified at the time of engagement."

However, this Court finds that ECCA failed to prove that it informed respondents, at the time of engagement, that they were hired as project
employees. Hence, respondents were without prior notice of the duration and scope of their work. Indeed, "[w]hile the lack of a written contract
does not necessarily make one a regular employee, a written contract serves as proof that employees were informed of the duration and scope of
their work and their status as project employee at the commencement of their engagement. Therefore, without such proof, it is presumed that
respondents are regular employees

IV.A.2.f. Fixed-term Employees

ARLENE PALGAN vs. HOLY NAME UNIVERSITY

G.R. No. 219916, February 10, 2021
By: Hernalisa

DOCTRINE:

Only when one has served as a full-time teacher can he acquire permanent regular status.

We have laid down in Lacuesta the following requisites before a private school teacher acquires permanent status, namely:
1. The teacher serves full-time;
2. he/she must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and 3. such service must have been satisfactory

The fixed-term contracts must be presumed to be knowingly and voluntarily entered into. One who alleges defect or lack of valid consent to a
contract by reason of fraud or undue influence must establish by full, clear and convincing evidence such specific acts that vitiated a party’s
consent, otherwise, the latter’s presumed consent to the contract prevails.

FACTS:

Arlene filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against HNU. She alleged that even though she was a regular employee, HNU did not renew her
contract of employment without due process. She sought moral and exemplary damages in her complaint. Petitioner (Arlene) started working as
a Casual or Assistant Clinical Instructor for two semesters for school year (S.Y.) 1992-1993 in HNU's College of Nursing.

In the second semester of S.Y. 1994-1995, she was hired as a full-time Clinical Instructor until S.Y. 1998-1999, and was assigned at the Medical
Ward. She was elected as Municipal Councilor of Carmen, Bohol. Upon her reelection as Municipal Councilor for the 2001-2004 term, she took
a leave of absence from HNU. Sometime in the year 2004, petitioner rejoined HNU and was given a full-time load for the S.Y. 2004-2005. For
S.Y. 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, petitioner signed contracts for term/semestral employment. However, in a notice dated February 28, 2007, HNU
informed Arlene that her contract of employment, which would have expired on March 31, 2007, will no longer be renewed. Arlene argued that
since she taught at HNU for more than six consecutive regular semesters, she already attained the status of a regular employee pursuant to the
Manual of Regulations for Private School Teachers. Petitioner claimed that her employment was illegally terminated.

On the other hand, respondents contended that in S.Y. 2004-2005, 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, Arlene remained a probationary employee. The
completion of her probationary period did not automatically make her a permanent employee since she failed to comply with all the conditions
of her probationary employment satisfactorily. Respondents insisted that petitioner was not dismissed; rather, her contract of employment merely
expired on March 31, 2007.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is a permanent employee

RULING:
NO, petitioner is not a permanent employee. Her fixed-term contract merely expired.

While petitioner has rendered three consecutive years of satisfactory service, she was, however, not a full-time teacher at the College of Nursing
of HNU.

The petitioner was a part-time lecturer before she was appointed as a full-time instructor on probation. As a part-time lecturer, her employment
as such had ended when her contract expired. Thus, the three semesters she served as part-time lecturer could not be credited to her in computing
the number of years she has served to qualify her for permanent status.

Thus, given that petitioner was not a full-time teaching personnel, she could not have acquired permanent status no matter the length of her
satisfactory service. Petitioner was never qualified to be a full-time faculty due to the apparent lack of the required clinical experience under the
governing law and its relevant regulations.

Under Section 45 of the 1992 Manual; Section 1, Article IV of CHED Memorandum Order No. 30 Series of 2001 (CMO 30-01); CHED issued
Memorandum No. 14, Series of 2009; and Section 27 of the 1991 Nursing Act, it is clear that the three-year or one-year clinical practice
experience is a minimum academic requirement to qualify as a faculty member in a college of nursing, and is therefore, required for one to be
considered as a full-time faculty of such.

Petitioner failed to meet the required minimum clinical practice experience under the law and the relevant regulations. Petitioner's experience as
clinical instructor cannot be considered as "clinical practice experience" as there is no substantial evidence on record that would prove that
petitioner actually engaged in activities that may be considered as clinical practice within the ambit of the law.

Since the petitioner never alleged to be performing clinical duties such as treating actual patients or assisting doctors in such treatment, nor did
she present any substantial evidence to prove such, we cannot assume that she indeed performed clinical duties during her stint as a clinical
instructor.

Thus, since petitioner failed to provide substantial evidence, much less clearly describe what kind of work she rendered as a clinical instructor,
we cannot consider such work experience as "clinical practice." Being unqualified as a nursing faculty from the start, petitioner cannot possibly
be considered a full-time faculty and thus, could not, even after rendering satisfactory service for three years, be entitled to permanency.

As applied in this case, the fixed-term contracts presented as evidence would reveal that the parties intended that their employee-employer
relationship would last only for a specific period. Considering petitioner's part-time status, even if no written fixed-term contract was presented,
judicial notice can be made upon the fact that teachers' employment contracts are for a specific semester or term.

ALLAN REGALA vs. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 204684, Oct. 5, 2020
By: Hernalisa

DOCTRINE:

A fixed-term employment, while not expressly mentioned in the Labor Code, has been recognized by this Court as a type of employment
"embodied in a contract specifying that the services of the employee shall be engaged only for a definite period, the termination of which occurs
upon the expiration of said period irrespective of the existence of just cause and regardless of the activity the employee is called upon to
perform." Along the same lines, it has been held that "[t]he fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the period agreed upon
between the employer and the employee."

Accordingly, "the decisive determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day
certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. Specification of the date of
termination is significant because an employee's employment shall cease upon termination date without need of notice.

In other words, a fixed-term employment contract which otherwise fails to specify the date of effectivity and the date of expiration of an
employee's engagement cannot, by virtue of jurisprudential pronouncement, be regarded as such despite its nomenclature or classification given
by the patties. The employment contract may provide for or describe some other classification or type of employment depending on the
circumstances, but it is not, properly speaking, a fixed-term employment contract. "

Parameters or criteria under which a "term employment" cannot be said to be in circumvention of the law on security of tenure, namely:

1. The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
2. It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral
dominance exercised by the former or the latter.
FACTS:

Regala was hired by Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) in February 2000 as one of its waiters assigned to the Food and Beverage Department. He
was later assigned as cook helper at MHC's Chocolate Room/Cookies Kitchen during the period from October 18, 2004 to June 26, 2006.

In the course of his employment as waiter/cook helper, Regala worked for six (6) days every week, and was paid a daily salary of P382.00 until
sometime in December 2009. MHC also remitted contributions in Regala's behalf to the Social Security System (SSS) and Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Phill-Health).

As waiter, Regala's duties and responsibilities included preparing the mise en place, taking of orders, and serving food and beverages to hotel
guests at tables and inside 11HC's dining establishments. In the course of his engagement with MHC, Regala was directed to report to a Captain
Waiter, and assigned to work for its Cowrie Grill, Pool Bar, Mini Bar, Kitchen Ginza, Tap Room, Champagne Room, Room Service, Mabuhay
Palace, Banquet Services, and Pastry and House Keeping. From October 2008 to May 2009, Regala was made to attend and participate in hotel
trainings for Basic Food Safety Strategies, Food Safety Awareness,14 and Customer Service Awareness.

Regala alleged that he was not recognized as a regular rank-and-file employee despite having rendered services to MHC for several years.
Regala also claimed that MHC constructively dismissed him from employment when it allegedly reduced his regular work days to two (2) days
from the normal five (5)-day work week starting December 2, 2009, which resulted in the diminution of his take home salary.

On its part, MHC denied outright that Regala is its regular employee, and claimed that he is a mere freelance or "extra waiter" engaged by MHC
on a short-term basis. It explained that it employs extra waiters at fixed and/or determinable periods particularly when there are temporary spikes
in the volume of its business. It is during these specific periods when management is forced to supplement the hotel's regular staff of waiters
with temporary fixed term employees, such as Regala, in order to meet increases in business activities in its food and beverage functions, special
events and banquets. In engaging extra or temporary waiters, Ml-IC relies on loose referrals from its employees and on a list of waiters who have
expressed interest in part-time or temporary engagements. It further explained that its system of hiring freelance waiters on an informal and
temporary basis is a common practice in the hotel and restaurant industry and that it is through this industry practice that these extra waiters,
including Regala, are able to offer their services to other hotels, restaurants, and food catering companies despite their existing engagement with
MHC.

MHC then presented a sample fixed-term service contract, and copies of Regala's Department Outlet Services Contracts for Extra
Waiters/Cocktail Attendants (Service Agreements) covering the periods of his supposed temporary engagement with MHC, or from March 1,
2010 to March 3, 2010. MHC contended that prior to engaging the services of extra waiters, applicant waiters, such as Regala, and MHC execute
fixed-term service contracts and agree on a specific duration of engagement depending on the requirement of the hotel in a given period. On this
premise, MHC argued that there can be no illegal dismissal to speak of since the expiration of the period under Regala's Service Agreements
simply caused the natural cessation of his fixed-term employment with MHC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Regala is a fixed-term employee.

RULING:

Regala is not a fixed term employee.

The three Service Agreements presented by MHC cannot be regarded as true fixed-term employment contracts. A perusal thereof shows that the
term of Regala's engagement with the hotel merely indicate the dates March 1, 2010, March 2, 2010, and March 3, 2010 - all of which pertain
only to specified effectivity dates of Regala's engagement as waiter of MHC. The Service Agreements do not, however, unequivocally specify
the periods of their expiration.

Notably, even the very terms of the Service Agreements purportedly proving Regala's fixed-term employment status are uncertain, if not
altogether evasive of Regala's actual period of employment with MHC, which, in this case, commenced as early as February 2000. It bears
noting that the Service Agreements furnished by MHC do not even account for Regala's employment for the previous years, especially at the
time of Regala's hiring in February 2000. On this point, it is incredulous, to say the least, that the hotel merely hired Regala under a fixed-term
agreement since February 2000.

All things considered, the Service Agreements presented by MHC deserves scant consideration from this Court. Mere presentation thereof does
not prove that Regala had been a mere fixed-term employee. The Court cannot simply rely on the vague provisions of the Service Agreements as
proof of his fixed-term employment status. To do so would erroneously warrant their enforcement despite their apparent failure to express the
term/s of Regala's engagement as waiter since February 2000.

The Service Agreements and/or fixed-term service contracts do not meet the criteria for valid contracts of employment with a fixed period.

As to the first guideline, the Service Agreements signed by Regalado not even prove that he knowingly agreed to be hired by MHC for a fixed-
term way back in February 2000. At best, they only account for Regala's supposed fixed-term status from March 1 to 3, 2009.
At any rate, the sample fixed-term service contract presented by MHC, including the Service Agreements of Regala, readily show that they were
entirely prepared by its Personnel Department. On this premise, it appears that the Service Agreements and/or the fixed-term service contracts
are contracts of adhesion whose terms must be strictly construed against its unilateral crafter, MHC.
As to the second guideline, this Court is inclined to believe that Regala can hardly be on equal terms with MHC insofar as negotiating the terms
and conditions of his employment is concerned. To be clear, a fixed-term employment agreement should result from bona fide negotiations
between the employer and the employee. As such, they must have dealt with each other on an arm's length basis where neither of the parties have
undue ascendancy and influence over the other. As a waiter, a rank-and-file employee, Regala can hardly stand on equal terms with MHC.
Moreover, no particulars in the Service Agreements or the fixed-term service contract regarding the terms and conditions of employment
indicate that Regala and MHC were on equal footing in negotiating them

V.B Termination of Employment by Employer

EFREN SANTOS, JR. vs. KING CHEF

G.R. No. 211073, November 25, 2020
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:

In cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. But before the
employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, it is well-settled that the employees must first establish by substantial
evidence that indeed they were dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.

FACTS:

Petitioners Efren Santos, Jr. (Santos) and Jeramil Salmasan's (Salmasan; collectively petitioners) filed for illegal dismissal against respondents
King Chef, Marites Ang (Ang), and Joey Delos Santos (Delos Santos, collectively, respondents).

King Chef is a Chinese restaurant owned by Ang, with Delos Santos as its General Manager. It employed Santos on February 19, 2011 and
Salmasan on July 29, 2010, both as cooks. On December 25, 2011, Santos rendered only a half day work without prior authorization. Salmasan,
on the other hand, did not report at all. Petitioners claimed that in view thereof, they were dismissed from employment. They averred that when
they tried to report for work, their chief cook told them that they were already terminated.

Accordingly, petitioners filed their complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, nonpayment of salaries and thirteenth month pay,
damages, and attorney's fees.

Respondents denied that petitioners were dismissed from work. They argued that petitioners violated the December 22, 2011 memorandum
informing the employees of King Chef that no absences would be allowed on December 25, 26, 31 and January 1 unless justified. After
petitioners failed to report for work on December 25, 2011, and returned the following day merely to get their share in the accrued tips, they
allegedly went on absence without leave (AWOL) for the rest of the Christmas season. Respondents believed petitioners went on AWOL after
they got wind of respondents' decision to impose disciplinary action against them for their unauthorized absence on December 25, 2011.
Respondents claimed that even before they could impose disciplinary action on petitioners, the latter already filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against them on January 2, 2012.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed

RULING:

NO, petitioners are not illegally dismissed.

No substantial evidence to establish that petitioners were in fact dismissed from employment. Petitioners merely alleged that they were
terminated by their chief cook and were barred from entering the restaurant, without offering any evidence to prove the same. They failed to
provide any document, notice of termination or even any letter or correspondence regarding their termination. Aside from their bare allegations,
they did not present any proof which would at least indicate that they were in fact dismissed.

On the contrary, the evidence on record points to the fact that after petitioners failed to report on December 25, 2011, and after they went back to
their workplace merely to get their share in the tips the following day, they refused to return to work and continued to be on AWOL thereafter.
First, it is undisputed that petitioners went on AWOL on December 25, 2011 (half day for Salmasan). Second, they in fact returned the following
day to claim and receive their share in the tips as shown from the uncontroverted sign-up sheet they signed, which belies their assertion that they
were banned from entering the premises after being absent on December 25, 2011. Third, petitioners themselves admitted that they continued to
be on AWOL during "the Christmas season of 2011". This was likewise reflected on their time cards.

Even worse, petitioners made untruthful allegations in their pleadings. They claimed that they filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on January
20, 2012, but the NLRC found that it was filed earlier that is on January 2, 2012. This gives credence to the claim of Respondents that then they
had no time yet to discipline Complainants, when the latter filed this case. As noted above, "the Christmas season" during which complainants
incurred their "only infraction" of having been "absented themselves" x x x started from December 24, 2011 and ended on January 1, 2012.
Without substantial evidence that petitioners were indeed dismissed, it is futile to determine the legality or illegality of their supposed dismissal."
We are thus constrained to uphold the NLRC's ruling, as affirmed by the CA, that there was no illegal dismissal in this case.

IV.B.1. Just Causes

SYSTEMS AND PLAN INTEGRATOR AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

MICHELLE ELVI C. BALLESTEROS
G.R. No. 217119 April 25, 2022
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:

CA. Robustan, Inc. v. Court of Appeals provides the standard for establishing gross neglect of duty as a just cause for terminating employment:

Thus, under the Labor Code, to be a valid ground for dismissal, the negligence must be gross and habitual. Gross negligence has been defined as
the want or absence of even slight care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of the person or property. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Put differently, gross negligence is characterized by want of
even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

Habitual tardiness alone is a just cause for termination. Punctuality is a reasonable standard imposed on every employee, whereas habitual
tardiness is a serious offense that may very well constitute gross or habitual neglect of duty. It manifests lack of initiative, diligence, and
discipline that are inimical to the employer’s general productivity and business interest.

For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, these two elements must concur:
1. conduct must have been willful or intentional and willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and
2. order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to duties which he had been engaged
to discharge.

Loss of trust and confidence may be a just case for termination of employment only upon proof that:
1. the dismissed employee occupied a position of trust and confidence; and
2. the dismissed employee committed "an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence

FACTS:

On June 15, 2005, Ballesteros started working for SPID Corp as a Customer’s Service Representative and was later promoted to administrative
staff with basic salary of P9,900.00 Emergency Cost of Living Allowance of P2,200 and transportation allowance of P1,000 totaling to P14,300.
During the first week of February 2011, Kristine Castro, Personnel Officer of SPIDC told Ballesteros that Cunanan, President and CEO of
SPIDC was asking for her resignation because she was pregnant, and was going to have two children to take care of. Castro even told Ballesteros
that she was going to be terminated anyway so resignation would be a proper option. Disturbed, Ballesteros talked to Ronniel Cunanan, SPIDC’s
Administration and Finance Officer, who confirmed that the company is indeed asking Ballesteros to tender her resignation reiterating the same
reasons Castro told her.

March 25, 2011, Ballesteros gave birth and availed of the maternity leave. In April 2011, she went back to the office and reiterated that she did
not want to resign. When Ballesteros asked again the reason for her termination, Castro replied that she received a memoranda from the
company, one each during 2008, 2009, and 2010, which Ballesteros protested to as her superiors always told her that she did not have a bad
record during the five and a half years she was employed. On May 31, 2011, while still on maternity leave, Ballesteros discovered that her salary
for May 15-31, 2011 was not deposited to her account even if her maternity leave was until June 21, 2011. She contacted Castro and found that
the company withheld her salary and would be released if Ballesteros would process her SSS maternity benefits and tender her resignation letter.
Still, Ballesteros refused to resign. June 5, 2011, Ballesteros received a letter for her termination from service.

On the other hand, the company alleged that Ballesteros’ termination was grounded on her incompetence and inefficiency in the performance of
duties. On July 7, 2008, Ballesteros was issued a memorandum for habitual absences and for neglect of duty which adversely affected her work
and for which she was sternly reminded. On February 11, 2009, she was again admonished for not following company procedure in the
preparation of deposit slips. Her continued neglect of duty as Customer Service Representative constrained the company to re-assign her to the
Accounting Department. On September 24, 2010, she was reprimanded for incurring cash shortage due to her admitted lapses. On February 21,
2011, she was given a memorandum to explain why she should not be terminated.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Ballesteros was validly terminated based on gross and habitual neglect of duty

RULING:

NO, Ballesteros was invalidly terminated based on gross and habitual neglect of duty
The presentation of the certified true copies of Ballesteros’ leave ledger does not sufficiently establish the required habituality of neglect that
would merit her dismissal. For one, all leaves she incurred were deducted from earned leave credits, meaning, credits she was entitled to over the
course of her work. This Court has held that only habitual absenteeism without leave constitutes gross negligence. Secondly, such leaves were so
few to be characterized as a reckless disregard for the safety of the company.
It could not be said that she repeatedly neglected her duty for she was only absent for a total of 12.5 days over the period of six months and a
week (January 2008 to July 7, 2008).

As for habitual tardiness and undertime for the years 2010 and 2011, CA found that the company only charged Ballesteros in her notice of
termination with habitual leaves of absence from January 2008 to July 7, 2008, not for the years 2010 and 2011.

Although habitual tardiness is a just cause for termination, the company failed to substantiate Ballesteros’ habitual tardiness and undertime as the
generated print-outs presented to the NLRC were mere photocopies and unauthenticated hence unreliable and should be rejected as evidence
without any probative value.

Similarly, absent reliable and reasonable proof that Ballesteros was indeed habitually tardy, and habitually incurred undertime for more than IO
days in a month for six months, the Court cannot conclude that she is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty.

2. Whether or not Ballesteros was validly terminated based on open and willful disobedience

NO, Ballesteros was invalidly terminated based on open and willful disobedience

There is also no substantial evidence to show that Ballesteros willfully violated verbal instructions. There is lack of showing that the company
gave clear verbal instructions regarding the preparation of deposit slips. Neither did the company present proof that Ballesteros’ transgression
was coupled with a wrongful intent. Even if company presented proof of instruction and violation of instruction, Ballesteros’ failure “to text the
[concerned] employee regarding their deposit slips while waiting for the scanner to be fixed” cannot be said to be a product of a wrongful and
perverse attitude. It was merely a momentary lapse of judgment, rather than some design to circumvent the company's policy regarding deposit
slips. The requirement of willfulness or wrongful intent in the appreciation of the aforementioned just causes, in turn, underscores the intent of
the law to reserve only to the gravest infractions the ultimate penalty of dismissal. It is essential that the infraction committed by an employee is
serious, not merely trivial, and be reflective of a certain degree of depravity or ineptitude on the employee's part, in order for the same to be a
valid basis for the termination of his employment

3. Whether or not Ballesteros was validly terminated based on loss of trust and confidence

NO, Ballesteros was invalidly terminated based on loss of trust and confidence

The first element was met because Ballesteros, an administrative officer at the time of her termination, held a position of trust and confidence.
Her tasks included "answering/endorsement of telephone calls, preparation of deposit slips, handling of petty cash fund, front-lining duties, and
other related tasks.”

However, the second element, pertaining to the act that breached the company's trust and confidence, was never established in the NLRC and CA
proceedings. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, it must be substantial, and not arbitrary, whimsical, capricious,
and concocted. It demands that a degree of severity attends the employee's breach oftrust

The Court agrees with the CA that Ballesteros' monetary shortage in the amount of Pl,100.00 cannot be considered substantial and severe, as to
justify the company's loss of trust and confidence in her. Furthermore, not only did Ballesteros admit that she was negligent in not counting the
money before returning the same, the amount was even deducted from her salary and returned to the company. To dismiss Ballesteros over such
an insignificant amount which she duly returned would amount to a clear injustice.

COLEGIO SAN AGUSTIN-BACOLOD vs. MELINDA M. MONTAÑO

G.R. No. 212333, March 28, 2022
By: Cara V
DOCTRINE:

Misconduct is an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for dismissal under the Labor
Code, the employee’s conduct must be serious - of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. The misconduct
must be related to the performance of the employee’s duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the employer. Further, the act or
conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent.

There is loss of trust and confidence when an employee fraudulently and willfully committed acts or omission in breach of the trust reposed by
the employer. Two requisites must be complied with to justify this ground for termination.
1. First, the employee must be holding a position of trust; and
2. second, the employer shall sufficiently establish the employee's act that would justify loss of trust and confidence.
The act must be characterized as real wherein the facts that brought about the act were clearly established, and that the employee committed the
same without any justifiable reason.

FACTS:

CSA-Bacolod is an educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. CSA-Bacolod first employed
respondent as a chemistry instructor in 1973. In 2003, she was appointed school registrar; her appointment was renewed several times.
Respondent alleged that in her reappointment letter for the 2009-2011 term, there was a diminution of her salary; her basic salary was reduced
from P33,319.00 to P26,658.20. She thus wrote to the Human Resource Director to seek an explanation. It was the school president who
responded, and he stated that her total gross pay did not change as the school merely opted to break down the amount to show the amount of
honorarium. Respondent claimed that this was the time when the president started to show his bias against her. Thereafter, respondent was
suspended, and her employment was eventually terminated due to complaints from two faculty members alleging that she allowed some students
to attend the graduation ceremony despite not meeting the requirements. These events led to her filing of the complaint. Respondent admitted
that she allowed certain students to join the March 2009 graduation ceremony in CSA-Bacolod even if they did not pass some of their subjects.
She claimed that she merely continued the practice of previous registrars; she even imposed more stringent rules in determining when ineligible
students may join the rites. She added that she allowed these students to participate due to humanitarian reasons. Respondent claimed that
management did not consider her explanation and she was instead served with a notice of charges. She responded to the notice. She asserted that
the basis of the notice was not really the letter complaints but mere letters seeking for clarification of the school's policy regarding graduation.
She also questioned the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Committee created by the president. CSA-Bacolod, for its defense, posited that
respondent's suspension and eventual dismissal was due to gross misconduct resulting to loss of trust and confidence. A notice of charges was
issued to respondent for gross misconduct, tampering of school records, and willful breach of trust and confidence or gross negligence. The Ad
Hoc Committee deliberated and thereafter recommended the termination of respondent's employment for gross misconduct and willful breach of
trust and confidence. The president issued a notice of termination.

The LA ruled in favor of respondent, finding her suspension and dismissal illegal. This resulted to the award of backwages, separation pay,
damages, and attorney's fees. It also awarded salary differentials due to diminution of benefits. In ruling that respondent's preventive suspension
was illegal, the LA found that her continued presence in the school during the investigation would not have posed a serious and imminent threat
to the life or property of the school and its employees. As to respondent's dismissal, the LA found that her act cannot be construed as gross or
serious misconduct. Respondent had basis in allowing the ineligible students to attend the graduation rites: a long-standing practice as also
observed by the previous registrars. Also, the students concerned made written requests that were endorsed by their respective deans and
consented to by their respective parents. Further, there can be no loss of trust and confidence in her as respondent's act did not place the school in
an uncompromising situation. Indeed, there was a school directive that students who failed to comply with the requirements should not be
allowed to march; this directive, however, as held by the LA, was not implemented up until this instance. Respondent merely followed the
accepted practice. The LA concluded that respondent's offense is just simple misconduct for which the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate.
In addition to backwages, the LA awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstating respondent because of the strained relations. As to the claim of
diminution of benefits, the LA found that the lower salary on her latest appointment as compared with the previous salary violated Article 100 of
the Labor Code. As respondent was already enjoying the higher salary for more or less six years, it is just and equitable that she continues
receiving the same amount, therefore entitling her to differentials.
The LA awarded moral damages as the school supposedly acted in bad faith in unjustly dismissing respondent, and exemplary damages so that
similar acts may be suppressed and discouraged. Attorney's fees were also awarded.

NLRC reversed the LA and ruled that respondent was validly dismissed. It also ruled that she is not entitled to salary differentials. Respondent
indeed committed serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence reposed by the school in her. Despite being firm in reminding the deans
and other officials about the policy on graduation, she herself allowed ineligible students to participate in the ceremony. This act was in total
violation of the school's policy. With the finding of just cause, there is no basis to award backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. As to the issue of preventive suspension, the NLRC found that its imposition was valid. Respondent's continued
presence posed a serious and imminent threat to the school's property. Being the school registrar, she had access to student records; there is a
possibility that the records may be "stage-managed." With regard to the salary differentials, the NLRC ruled that respondent continued to receive
the same gross pay of P33,319.00.

CA reversed the NLRC Decision and reinstated the LA Decision with modification on the award of money claims. The CA ruled that
respondent's act was indeed an act of misconduct; however, it was not serious enough to warrant the penalty of dismissal. There was no wrongful
intent. The CA did not award moral damages as the finding of illegal dismissal does not automatically warrant moral damages — bad faith on
the part of the employer was not proven.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the dismissal based on serious misconduct is proper

RULING:

YES, the dismissal based on serious misconduct is proper.

The Court agrees with the NLRC that respondent committed serious misconduct in allowing ineligible students to march. She violated an
established school policy as espoused in a memorandum issued by the university. The memorandum states that “no student will be allowed to
march for graduation unless he/she has fully complied with all the academic requirements of his/her course”.

Circumstances show that respondent's act is clearly a conscious and willful transgression of the university's established rule regarding graduation
rites. Respondent was consistent in reiterating this rule; she even reminded the deans to observe the policy. Yet, she herself made a conscious
decision or choice to violate the established rule that she insisted to be followed in allowing the ineligible students to march. This surely renders
her unfit to continue working as a school registrar because her act relates to her duties as such.

Considering these, the Court holds that respondent committed serious misconduct that constitutes just cause for valid dismissal from
employment.
2. Whether or not the dismissal based on serious misconduct is proper

YES, the dismissal based on serious misconduct is proper

There is no dispute that respondent as school registrar occupied a position of trust. She is in possession and custody of student records, which are
vital for any educational institution. As to the second requisite, the Court holds that respondent's act justifies loss of trust and confidence.
Respondent's conscious decision of allowing the ineligible students to march shows her willfulness to transgress the established rule. This willful
transgression of a rule indeed results to the loss of trust and confidence CSA-Bacolod has reposed on her.

In this regard, the Court adds that the length of time (30 years) respondent was employed with CSA-Bacolod cannot outweigh the seriousness of
the violation she has committed, even if this is the first time she transgressed a rule. This is because once trust and confidence are betrayed, it
will be difficult to restore the smooth relationship that had once been existing.

ARIEL M. REYES vs. RURAL BANK OF SAN RAFAEL (BULACAN) INC.,

G.R. No. 230597, March 23, 2022
By: liz0114

DOCTRINES:

In Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc. this Court held: For willful disobedience to be a ground, it is required that:
1. the conduct of the employee must be willful or intentional and
2. the order the employee violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties that
he had been engaged to discharge.

Willfulness must be attended by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination. In
any case, the conduct of the employee that is a valid ground for dismissal under the Labor Code constitutes harmful behavior against the
business interest or person of his employer. It is implied that in every act of willful disobedience, the erring employee obtains undue advantage
detrimental to the business interest of the employer.

FACTS:

Respondent Rural Bank of San Rafael (Bulacan) Inc. (RBSR) while respondents Veneracion et. al. are RBSR’s Board of Directors. Sometime in
2012, several stockholders of RBSR complained about the discrepancies in the amounts of the purchase price of stock subscriptions appearing in
the original receipts as against the duplicate copies issued by the bank. These involved several millions of pesos collected from stockholders.

Upon RBSR’s investigation, it was discovered that in the original receipts given to the stockholders, the stated price of shares ranged from
P250.00 to P275.00, but in the duplicate copies retained by RBSR, only Pl00.00 was indicated.

The original receipts contained signatures of President Cruz while the duplicates were signed by either Treasury Head Bognot or Branch
Manager Eusebio.

Thus, in compliance with the Manual of Regulations for Banks mandating the prompt report of anomalies to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP), RBSR's Board of Directors approved a Report on Crimes and Losses and directed Ariel Reyes (Petitioner) - as Compliance Officer - to
certify the same. However, Ariel refused to certify the report, reasoning that no independent investigation was conducted, and that he cannot
completely validate the same for lack of material data and evidence, and that he was being pressured to certify the report.

Afterwards, Ariel claimed that instead of furnishing him the hard copies of the reports and its original attachments to enable him to verify and
certify the same, RBSR issued him two show cause orders and put him on preventive suspension for neglect of duty. Meanwhile, RBSR
contended that several administrative hearings were scheduled to hear Ariel’s side, but all were ignored.

Ariel, together with Bognot and Eusebio (complainants) - who were principally accused of theft/misappropriation of funds in connection with the
anomaly - filed a Complaint against respondents for illegal suspension and money claims. An Amended Complaint was subsequently filed to
include illegal dismissal, in view of their eventual dismissal from work.

ISSUE:

Whether Reyes was illegally dismissed

RULING:

YES, Reyes was illegally dismissed.

Here is no question that Reyes' refusal to certify the Report on Crimes and Losses was intentional. This is clearly disobedience. However, we
find that the same is not attended by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude which warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal. A review of the
findings below will reveal that Reyes refused to certify said report based on his honest assessment that the report cannot be completely validated
for lack of material data and evidence.

Surely, no employer would find pleasure in a disobedient employee. Be that as it may, imposing the ultimate penalty of dismissal for such action
- which, as already mentioned, obtains justification - and for such single instance, is simply too harsh and downright unlawful. Besides, what is
the penalty for the late submission of the report? A miniscule monetary fine of P150.00 to P450.00 per day of delay.

EVELINA E. BELARSO vs. QUALITY HOUSE, INC

G.R. No. 209983, November 10, 2021
By:Regal_Nerd

DOCTRINE:

1. Breach of trust and confidence must be premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence,
where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The essence of the
offense for which an employee is penalized is the betrayal of such trust.

In the case of Wesleyan University Phils. v. Reyes, employees vested with trust and confidence were divided into two classes:
a. the managerial employees; and
b. the fiduciary rank-and-file employees.

As explained by the Court:

a. To the first class belong the managerial employees or those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management
policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend
such managerial actions.
b. The second class includes those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle significant
amounts of money or property. Cashiers, auditors, and property custodians are some of the employees in the second class.

2. There must be some basis for the loss of trust and confidence. The employer must present clear and convincing proof of an actual
breach of duty committed by the employee by establishing the facts and incidents upon which the loss of confidence in the employee
may fairly be made to rest. This means that "the employer must establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and
confidence." Otherwise, employees will be left at the mercy of their employers.

FACTS:

Private respondent Quality House, Inc. (QHI) is a manufacturer and distributor of leather products. It hired petitioner Evelina E. Belarso. She
was initially assigned at the belt department of QHI. Belarso was then promoted as supervisor of the Raw Materials Warehouse.

Before leaving the warehouse, Belarso submitted herself to the routinary outgoing inspection and body frisking of employees at the QHI gate.
When Belarso's bag was inspected, a lady guard found a belt buckle inside the bag.
She called Belarso's attention but the latter had no gate pass or authorization to bring out the said item from the warehouse. Thereafter, an
incident report was immediately filed by the guard.

Belarso submitted her written explanation denying all the accusations against her. At the conference, no plausible explanation was given by
Belarso other than that she was framed-up by her co-employees by putting the belt buckle inside her bag without her knowledge.

The result of the conference was summarized by Ms. Go in the January 6, 2011 "Rule Violation Memo" addressed to Belarso. In the said memo,
QHI expressed that it found Belarso's explanation to be unsatisfactory. It also informed Belarso that her employment was being terminated for
stealing company property and for loss of trust and confidence.

However, before the result of the investigation was even released, a complaint for illegal dismissal against QHI was already filed by Belarso. In
her complaint, Belarso indicated that she was illegally dismissed by QHI.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter (LA):

The LA ruled that Belarso had been illegally dismissed by QHI. He found that it was unbelievable for Belarso to attempt to steal the belt buckle
knowing that the employees of QHI were regularly frisked upon exit. Aggrieved, QHI appealed to the NLRC.

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission:

The NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA after finding that QHI, through its evidence, was able to establish that Belarso's dismissal was for a just
cause, i.e., loss of trust and confidence. Unsatisfied, Belarso filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit. Thus, her
appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA sustained the NLRC's findings and agreed that the evidence on record supports QHI's position. It rejected Belarso's defense of a frame-
up as she did not submit any proof to corroborate the same. Belarso's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in the assailed
Resolution.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is a ground to dismiss Belarso based loss or breach of trust and confidence

RULING:

YES, there is a ground to dismiss Belarso based loss or breach of trust and confidence

First, Belarso never denied in her Petition that she held a position of trust and confidence. Her appointment letter showed that she assumed the
position of Raw Materials Supervisor in 1987.

As a supervisor, she was responsible for the custody, handling, safekeeping, and releasing of QHI's raw materials. This brings her within the
scope of employees vested with trust and confidence, i.e., those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property.

Second, QHI was able to establish the basis of its loss of trust on Belarso: her violation of the company rule prohibiting the stealing or attempting
to steal company property.

While Belarso insists that the charge imputed against her defies logic and common experience, the records show that she had a propensity to
violate company rules and regulations. As shown by the various rule violation memoranda issued against her, Belarso had committed a total of
19 infractions from 1986 to 2005. Indeed, even her allegation that she placed her bag under her table making it possible for anyone to put
anything in it, constitutes a violation of company rules.

2. Whether or not the penalty of dismissal is proper and warranted by the circumstance.

Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer.

Belarso finally argues that the penalty is too harsh considering her 34 years of service in the company. Under the present circumstances, length
of service only aggravates Belarso's offense. First, she held a position of trust and confidence, overseeing the custody of the raw materials she
tried to steal. As a supervisor, greater trust was placed on her by QHI. Second, her infraction affected the very essence of loyalty and honesty
which all employees owe to their employers. It was serious, grave, and reflected adversely on her character.

PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. vs. VIOLETA NOCHE

G.R. No. 202392, October 04, 2021
By: Hernalisa

DOCTRINE:

Two requisites must concur for a valid termination of employment due to loss of trust and confidence

[T]he first requisite is that the employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and confidence, thus, one who is either:
1. a managerial employee; or
2. a fiduciary rank-and-file employee, who, in the normal exercise of his or her functions, regularly handles significant amounts of money
or property of the employer.

The second requisite is that the loss of confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
FACTS:

Petitioner Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. (PRBFI) is a business entity engaged in the manufacturing, processing, and distribution of coconut
products for export. PRBFI employed respondents as coconut parers.

Respondents filed a complaint for non-regularization with the DOLE. Allegedly acting on product quality complaints and claims for
reimbursement and damages from some of its clients, PRBFI sent letters to respondents suspending them for 15 days due to issues of product
contamination.

In their joint answer to PRBFI's letters, some of the respondents denied involvement in the product contamination incident. PRBFI dismissed
respondents from work. Respondents filed a complaint against PRBFI for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, regularization, damages, and
reinstatement before the NLRC.

In their Position Paper, respondents averred that they were dismissed from work without a prior investigation or an opportunity to air their side.
Respondents also raised the lack of basis of their dismissal due to loss of trust and confidence, as this ground refers to managerial and
confidential employees and respondents were only rank-and-file workers of PRBFI.
PRBFI maintained that respondents were properly and correctly dismissed from employment. Per PRBFI, thirteen (13) coconut parers, including
the eleven (11) respondents herein, were thus subjected to an administrative investigation on the product contamination incident.

The Labor Arbiter ruled for the respondents. The Labor Arbiter declared respondents entitled to reinstatement to their former positions in PRBFI,
payment of full backwages and other benefits, and enjoyment of seniority rights and privileges. The Labor Arbiter further found respondents to
be regular employees of PRBFI.

PRBFI appealed to the NLRC. It also filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Reduce Bond (Motion to Reduce Bond) and tendered a cash bond in
the amount of P100,000.00.

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA. They imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. The CA granted respondents' Petition for Certiorari.
CA likewise denied PRBFI's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, PRBFI's Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PRBFI’s ground to dismiss the employee based on trust and confidence is proper RULING:

NO, PRBFI’s ground to dismiss the employee based on trust and confidence is improper.

Respondents' positions as coconut parers are essential in PRBFI's business of coconut products, but in no case do they fit the job description of
managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file employees. Manual work such as paring coconuts for commercial production is a task that
does not entail being routinely entrusted with the care and custody of money and property belonging to the company like fiduciary rank-and-file
employees. Much less can coconut parers be considered to be directly involved in the management and policy-making of their employer as
managerial employees.

Indeed, trust is fundamental in every employer-employee relationship. Not all employees, however, are dismissible on the basis of loss of trust
and confidence. Only managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file employees may be terminated from work on such ground. If PRBFI's
theory would be sustained, then all employees shall be inequitably deemed as holding positions of fiduciary nature. Respondents having
occupied ordinary rank-and-file posts with petitioner, their dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is illegal.

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS, vs. BENEDICTO F. LACANARIA

G.R. No. 223665 September 27, 2021
By: kimu

DOCTRINES:

Misconduct involves the transgression of some established and definite rule or action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be
1. of grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant,
2. connected with the work of the employee such that the latter has become unfit to continue working for the employer, and
3. performed with wrongful intent.

The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty
to be imposed upon an erring employee. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted
out since an employee's past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in determining the proper imposable penalty.

FACTS:

Petitioner University of the Cordilleras employed respondent Lacanaria as an Instructor-Associate Professor at the College of Teacher Education
(CTE). One of his students, a certain Flores, filed a written complaint against him, following an incident where he dismissed Flores’ coughing fit
as “just acting” during a graded performance. While he was skeptical of the illness, Lacanaria allowed Flores to go to the clinic to get checked.
When Lacanaria saw Flores again, he uttered the phrase “tae mo” at Flores. It was later found that Flores had costochondritis and upper
respiratory tract infection.

The University issued to Lacanaria a Charge Sheet with Notice of Investigation (Charge Sheet) for serious misconduct and violation of the Code
of Ethics for Professional Teachers, indicating the corresponding penalties if found guilty. He was directed to file an answer within five days
from receipt thereof and that he will be informed of the date of investigation wherein he will have the right to be assisted by counsel, to confront
the witness against him, and to present his evidence. He was also asked to explain why he should not be administratively charged for uttering
“green jokes” in class, based on the student evaluations. In his answer, Lacanaria stated that he thought Flores was merely covering up his failure
to do his part in class, and that the student should not have attended class if he was really sick.
The Grievance Committee thereafter commenced its proceedings. The petitioners averred that they informed Lacanaria of the hearing through a
text message, but Lacanaria failed to appear. The Grievance Committee then informed Lacanaria of his next hearing through registered mail,
wherein his failure to attend would constitute as a waiver of his right to present his evidence. Supposedly, Lacanaria received the notice only on
the day itself. The Minutes of the meeting on indicated that Lacanaria again failed to appear, resulting in his waiver of his right to present his
evidence.

Eventually, the undated Report and Recommendation by the Grievance Committee recommended the dismissal of Lacanaria and noted that the
filing of his resignation after receipt of the Charge Sheet would not render the imposition of the penalty moot and academic. Lacanaria was then
dismissed, effective on May 15, 2010. Lacanaria allegedly received said notice on May 21, 2010.

Lacanaria filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the findings of the Grievance Committee. He denied receipt of any notice regarding the
hearing, and claimed that the charge sheet failed to state the place, time, and date of the investigation, contrary to Section 7 of the Faculty
Manual. However, the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution, which stated that since Lacanaria did not take advantage of his
opportunity to be heard, he can no longer question the ruling.

Lacanaria filed a Complaint against herein petitioners for illegal dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay for 2010 with prayer for
reinstatement, payment of all money claims, full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees before the Department of Labor
and Employment. Mandatory conciliation conferences yielded no positive results.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is substantial evidence to Dismiss [respondent] on the ground of serious Misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an
Academician, as established by [respondent's] own Admission of his infractions and supported by the Uncontroverted documentary and
testimonial Evidence presented in the proceedings a quo

RULING:

YES, there were valid grounds to dismiss respondent on the ground of serious misconduct.

In this case, it is evident that Lacanaria’s misconduct was grave and not merely trivia, considering his position as a professor. The real issue in
the case was not the seriousness of Flores’ cough or his alleged pretension of being severely ill, but the utterance of remarks unbecoming of an
educator. It was not proper to speak to a student in such a manner, especially in a classroom setting or even within the school grounds where it is
clear that Lacanaria was acting in his capacity as a professor. In all angles, no matter how one looks at it, Lacanaria's statements could not be
said as having been uttered "without malice" or "without wrongful intent."

Even if the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers would not apply because Lacanaria taught in the tertiary level, the fact remains that his
actions were inappropriate. The University's Faculty Manual states that the teachers are required to "treat students with respect and with due
regard to their dignity," and that they should "recognize that, to assure itself of a continuing adequate enrolment, [the University] must deliver
quality, courteous, and dedicated service to its students."

Due to his shameful behavior, the ELA and the NLRC additionally considered the principle of "totality of infractions" in ruling that Lacanaria
was validly dismissed. Considering that Lacanaria committed a serious misconduct, there is no impediment which bars the Court from taking
into account his previous offenses. It is undisputed that Lacanaria has been warned in the past, verbally and in writing, as regards his delivery of
"green jokes" in class. Unsurprisingly, this past infraction is related to his inappropriate statements, or that which involved his conversations
with his students. Even if uttering "green jokes" is not listed in the Faculty Manual as punishable by reprimand or any penalty, the University is
not precluded from considering this past transgression given the nature of the profession (education of the youth). Simply put, the totality of his
offenses revealed that Lacanaria has a penchant for impertinent behavior which renders him unsuitable for employment in the University which
is responsible for the education and rearing of the youth.

INTER-ISLAND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 187323, June 23, 2021
By: subsilentio

FACTS:

Cham Ibay (respondent) was hired by Inter-Island (petitioner) as a technical support in its Network Operations Center. Into seven (7) months of
his employment, he was informed by Scott Lam through a memorandum of his inclusion in a scheduled training. However, in a subsequent
memorandum, he was already delisted as one of the trainees. When Ibay discussed his exclusion with the NOC Technical Head, it was explained
that he was delisted from the said training due to expiration of his contract and would further be explained to him by the HR Department.
Lam talked to Ibay over the phone urging him to submit his resignation letter. Lam further said that in exchange for his submission of resignation
letter, Inter-Island would issue a Certificate of Employment which he could use as reference for his application in other companies. Lam also
threatened to block his applications with other companies should he refuse to resign.

It was alleged that Jesse Tan Ting (Ting) summoned respondent to his office and told him to submit his resignation letter. Respondent refused.
Respondent thereafter was prevented from entering Inter-Island premises, hence he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Petitioner claims that
the during the respondent’s tenure in the company, he incurred several infractions. Further, respondent’s work continued to deteriorate until he
abandoned his work. Respondent was not terminated and was, in fact, ordered to return to work.

The LA rendered a decision reinstating Ibay to his former position with full payment of his backwages. The fact that there was a scheduled
training which included respondent was fully substantiated. However, petitioner failed to justify why respondent was delisted from joining the
training. Moreover, although petitioner claimed that it ordered respondent to return to work, the company had not seen fit to notify respondent of
its return-to-work order. Hence, the LA ruled in favor of respondent and ordered his reinstatement with full backwages. On appeal, the NLRC
dismissed the company’s appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the LA’s decision. The NLRC ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Ibay was illegally dismissed

RULING:

YES, Ibay was illegally dismissed.

Even granting that petitioner availed of the correct remedy and that the same was filed within the reglementary period, the petition still warrants
its dismissal. Although the appellate court’s x x x Resolutions did not delve on the issue of Ibay’s illegal dismissal, we deem it necessary to
completely resolve and settle this issue considering the duty of the Court to consider and give due regard to everything on record relevant and
material to the resolution of the issues presented. As can be gleaned from the records, Ibay did not abandon his work in Inter-Island as in fact he
immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which only proves that Ibay had no intention to sever his employer-employee relationship
with Inter-Island.

The contention that Ibay had applied to work abroad is not supported by evidence on record. Even if the same is true, Ibay’s intent to earn a
living during the pendency of the labor case should not be taken against him. Besides, even if he indeed applied for a new job abroad in
November 2003, the petitioner’s illegal dismissal of respondent Ibay and the latter’s subsequent filing of a complaint were fait accompli, having
already been accomplished in October 2003 or way before respondent Ibay’s alleged application for work abroad. This cannot erase the fact that
the company illegally dismissed its employee without just and authorized cause and prevented the latter from entering the company premises.

Further, petitioner's contention that it issued several return-to-work orders is without any factual basis. Petitioner's allegation that it ordered its
worker to return to work during the mandatory conference on January 12, 2004, as reiterated in its position paper dated February 5, 2004 and in
its Rejoinder dated May 12, 2004, were substantially refuted by Ibay who claimed non-receipt of petitioner's written notice to return to work.

SALVACION A. LAMADRID vs. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED

GR No. 200658, June 23, 2021
By: chie

DOCTRINE:

Employees can be terminated only for just or authorized cause. Article 297 [282] of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for dismissal, to
wit:

ARTICLE 297. [282] Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
There is loss of trust and confidence when an employee fraudulently and willfully committed acts or omission in breach of the trust reposed in
her/him by the employer. Two requisites must be complied with to justify this ground for termination.
1. the employee must be holding a position of trust, and
2. second, the employer shall sufficiently establish the employee's act that would justify loss of trust and confidence.

The act must be characterized as real wherein the facts that brought about such act were clearly established, and that the employee committed the
same without any justifiable reason

FACTS:

In 1990, Cathay hired Salvacion A. Lamadrid (Lamadrid) as a cabin crew member. Cathay's Conditions of Service stipulated that all its cabin
crew shall be based in Hong Kong. Prior to her termination in 2007, Lamadrid had rendered about 17 years of service in Cathay, and held the
position of Senior Purser.

On May 19, 2007, Donald Lal (Lal), Airport Services Officer of Cathay in Sydney Airport, received a report from Customer Officer Mary Greiss
(Mary) that some crew members of Cathay flight CX 139, including Lamadrid, were caught in possession of goods after alighting from the
aircraft.

Mary handed to Lal a plastic bag containing a 1.5-liter Evian water bottle and a pile of magazines confiscated from Lamadrid as well as the
photocopy of the latter's passport. The confiscated items were turned over to Cindy Lowe (Lowe), the Airport Services Supervisor, who then
finally surrendered the items to Brian Davis (Davis), Cathay's Airport Services Manager in Sydney Airport, after Lowe recorded the confiscated
items on Lamadrid's passport. On May 21, 2007, Lamadrid and a certain Yvette Tsang (Tsang) met with Davis and pleaded him not to report the
incident to their Hong Kong office. They also mentioned their 17 years of service with Cathay. Davis, however, responded that a report was
already relayed and the confiscated items had already been sent to Hongkong via flight CX 100.

In a letter dated May 22, 2007, Cathay requested Lamadrid to submit a written explanation regarding the May 19, 2007 incident aboard flight CX
139 and to show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed against her since removal of company property without authorization is
considered a serious misconduct.

On July 10, 2007, Cathay informed Lamadrid of the termination of her services effective immediately for committing serious misconduct by
removing company property without authorization. According to Cathay, it could no longer repose its trust and confidence on petitioner
considering the seriousness of her violation.

Hence, Lamadrid instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against Cathay and Lo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lamadrid has been illegally dismissed

RULING:

YES, Lamadrid was illegally dismissed.

Cathay has complied with the two aforementioned requisites for loss of trust and confidence. We have already settled that Lamadrid's position
was imbued with trust and confidence. Likewise, the airline clearly demonstrated that she committed an infraction of company policy that
breached its trust and confidence on her.

Pilferage of company property is an act characterized by fraud or dishonesty which may be meted with summary dismissal as specifically
provided in Cathay's Disciplinary & Grievance Policy.

Cathay attached a confirmation from Danone Imported Water Asia that the batch number of the Evian water confiscated from Lamadrid
belonged to the batch of Evian water that was exclusively shipped to Cathay. This certainly established that the bottle of water confiscated from
her was Cathay's property. Admittedly, Lamadrid transgressed Cathay's Disciplinary and Grievance Policy by taking out the bottle of water
without authorization.

Lamadrid's infraction was clearly a case of misconduct considering that it is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." It evidently eroded
Cathay's trust and confidence in her.

Simply put, all surrounding circumstances must be considered and the penalty must be commensurate to the violation committed by an
employee. Termination of the services of an employee should be the employer's last resort especially when other disciplinary actions may be
imposed, considering the employee's long years of service in the company, devoting time, effort and invaluable service in line with the
employer's goals and mission, as in Lamadrid's case. Thus, We emphasize the principle of totality of infractions, viz.:
x x x . It is here that totality of infractions may be considered to determine the imposable sanction for her current infraction. In Merin v. National
Labor Relations Commission, the Court explained the principle of "totality of infractions" in this wise:
The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty
to be imposed upon an erring employee. x x x.

During Lamadrid's span of employment, she did not commit any infraction or was ever sanctioned except in the incident subject of the present
controversy. To impose a penalty as grave as dismissal for a first offense and considering the value of the property allegedly taken would be too
harsh under the circumstances. Therefore, Lamadrid was illegally dismissed from service.

In the recent case of Foodbev International v. Ferrer, We held that:

x x x A less severe penalty of suspension should have been imposed considering that the respondents have been in the service for several years.
The Court also observes that this is the first time in the long years of service that respondents failed to follow the cleaning procedure. Thus, a
more compassionate penalty of suspension is deemed appropriate.

SUSAN M. BANCE vs. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY

G.R. No. 202724, February 03, 2021
By: cpalawyer2023

DOCTRINES:

To constitute willful breach of trust, the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence, and there must be an act, that is
willful, that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. Fraud and dishonesty can only be used to justify termination from employment when
the employee concerned commits a dishonest act that reflects a disposition to deceive, defraud and betray the employer

A supervisory position is considered a position of trust because of the high degree of honesty and responsibility required and expected of the
employee as compared with ordinary rank and file employees.

FACTS:

Petitioners Susan M. Bance (Bance), Arlene C. Dimaiwat (Dimaiwat), Jean O. Velasco (Velasco), Nancy M. Aguirre (Aguirre), and Hazel A.
Lobetania (Lobetania; collectively, petitioners) filed complaints for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondents University and Atty.
Santiago D. Ortega, Jr. (Atty. Ortega; collectively, respondents).

For Bance, Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre: The University found that Bance, Dimaiwat, Velasco, Aguirre took advantage of their positions in
the Accounting Office by enrolling their children and relatives under the group’s enrollment incentive program despite knowing that they were
unqualified which they admitted in a conference dated December 2007. Atty. Ortega thus verbally informed them that their employment will be
terminated.
On December 22, 2007, Atty. Ortega issued Office Memo No. 007-026, informing them that their employment will be terminated effective
January 1, 2008 on grounds of dishonesty amounting to malversation of school funds. The office memo was allegedly not preceded by any
written notice to petitioners except for the two conferences and a verbal announcement during the second conference.

Dimaiwat, Velasco, Aguirre tendered their resignation on December 22, 2007 and these were approved by Atty. Ortega on December 26, 2007.
Bance did not tender her resignation.

For Lobetania: The University discovered a cash shortage after examination of the several irregular and anomalous transactions noted in the
Accounting Office. Lobetania has custody of the cash vault where the cash should have been kept but it is missing. Lobetania eventually
admitted that she failed to deposit it on the University’s bank account. Further, additional anomalous transactions in the prior years surfaced
where the tellers accommodated the encashment of checks not in the name of the University.

Lobetania tendered her resignation on July 27, 2007 (to take effect on August 1, 2007), and was approved by Atty. Ortega on August 9, 2007.
All of them filed complaints for illegal dismissal with money claims against the respondents on the ground that their dismissal was illegal for
lack of just or authorized causes and non-observance of the requirements of procedural due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lobetania, Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre were dismissed for Just causes

RULING:

YES, Lobetania, Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre were dismissed for Just causes

Lobetania's failure to remit and deposit the University's funds to its bank account amounted to a willful breach of trust. She is holding a position
of trust because her duties as Credit and Collection Officer included safeguarding of the cash vault and depositing cash to the University's bank
account, among others. The audit report proved that there were undeposited amounts that should have been inside the cash vault under
Lobetania's custody but were unaccounted for.
As to Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre, their collective act of taking undue advantage of the University's group enrollment incentive program
despite knowledge that their children and relatives were unqualified amounted to fraud and dishonesty. Petitioners even admitted during a
conference with Atty. Ortega that their children and relatives indeed benefitted from the unauthorized discounts.

FERNANDO C. GOSOSO vs. LEYTE LUMBER YARD

G.R. No. 205257, January 13, 2021
By: primrose

DOCTRINE:

Abandonment requires the concurrence of the following:

1. the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and
2. there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts.

Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from equivocal acts. Absence must be accompanied by overt acts pointing
definitely to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. The burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to
go back to work rests on the employer.

FACTS:

Leyte Lumber, a construction supply and hardware store, hired Gososo as a sales representative. Gososo allegedly overstepped the boundaries of
Leyte Lumber's company policies. Gosoco failed to course the orders through authorized checkers before the items are released and left his work
area without the supervisor’s consent.

When he returned to work on October 11, 2008, Yu allegedly told Gososo to sign a prepared document. Gososo declined since the document
contained admissions of offenses that he did not commit. Irked by Gososo's refusal, Yu informed him of his termination from work. Yu allegedly
even threw a pair of scissors at Gososo but missed. Respondents confirmed that Gososo was reprimanded on October 10, 2008 for violating
standard operating procedures and established company policies. On even date, respondents claimed that Gososo filed a leave of absence for
October 11, 2008 purportedly to attend his son's graduation, in disregard of the rule that leaves of absence must be filed and approved days
before the actual date of leave.

According to respondents, Gososo did go on an unapproved leave on October 11, 2008 and even allegedly extended his absence. These prompted
respondents to issue Gososo another Memorandum on October 13, 2008 wherein they requested him to report back to work, otherwise he will be
considered to have abandoned his work. Gososo, however, did not report back to work Aggrieved, Gososo filed on October 13, 2008 a
Complaint for illegal constructive dismissal against respondents, non-payment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day
allowance, vacation and sick leave pay, separation pay, moral damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner Gososo abandoned his work and was legally dismissed by respondents Leyte Lumber and Yu

RULING:

NO, Gososo was not legally dismissed.

Respondents did not discharge this burden of proof of abandonment. They just surmised that petitioner had no intent to return to work when he
allegedly went on an unapproved leave of absence on October 11, 2008, of which respondents were also the approving authority. No attendance
sheet of any sort was submitted to substantiate this claim by respondents. Neither was it shown that respondents actually denied the application
for leave and made the disapproval known to petitioner.

There was also no evidence or mention of the exact number of required days before respondents' employees could properly file their applications
for leave of absence. Nor was it established in the records whether this policy had actually ripened into company practice. To merely state that
employees must file their applications "days before" their intended dates of absence is too selfserving to be given credit. Records also fail to
show with any clarity whether petitioner had truly violated this rule of prior notice when he filed his application for leave, especially when the
said application for leave was not even dated.

It is more curious, misleading even, for respondents to impress upon Us that petitioner had absented himself for a prolonged period of time. It
was on October 11, 2008, a Saturday, that petitioner supposedly absented himself, and it was just on October 13, 2008, the immediately
succeeding Monday, that respondents declared his post to be in danger of being considered abandoned.

Moreover, while respondents issued the October 13, 2008 Memorandum requiring petitioner to return to work, records do not disclose whether
petitioner was actually furnished copies of this Memorandum. To claim that petitioner blatantly disregarded respondents' return-to-work order in
their October 13, 2008 Memorandum, when petitioner was never shown to have received a copy of the same, speaks volumes of petitioner's
vague intent to abandon his work and respondents' attempt to tweak facts in their favor.

The mere absence or simple failure to report for work is not abandonment, more so if the employee was able to lodge his complaint before the
labor tribunals with haste. An immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement, is
inconsistent with a charge of abandonment. Indeed, employees like petitioner herein who take steps to protest their alleged dismissal cannot be
said to have abandoned their work.

JR HAULING SERVICES VS. GAVINO L. SOLAMO

G.R. No. 214294, September 30, 2020
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:

We have defined misconduct as "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For serious misconduct to justify dismissal under the law,
1. it must be serious,
2. must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and
3. must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.

Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal of employees covers employees occupying a position of trust who are proven to have
breached the trust and confidence reposed on them. Moreover, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be
work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In addition, loss of confidence as a just cause
for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence or that
the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the property
and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. In this regard, it is not the
job title but the nature of the work that the employee is duty-bound to perform which is material in determining whether he holds a position
where greater trust is placed by the employer and from whom greater fidelity to duty is concomitantly expected.

FACTS:

JR Hauling is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of hauling and delivery of broiler chickens to its clients such as Magnolia
Corporation and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Respondents are former drivers/helpers of JR Hauling.

As drivers/helpers of JR Hauling, respondents were tasked to transport live chickens from broiler farms or contract growers to the processing
plant of JR Hauling's clients. In the course of transporting broiler chickens, JR Hauling issues to respondents "receiving slips" or job orders
containing the details of the deliveries, which include the number of live chickens to be loaded into the trucks for transport, and the delivery
route from broiler farms located either in Pangasinan, Tarlac, Batangas, Bulacan, Zambales, or La Union, to the processing plant of its clients in
Hermosa, Bataan.

From JR Hauling's place of business in Bulacan, respondents proceed to the designated broiler farm indicated in their respective job orders.
Since a number of broilers usually die in the course of their delivery, respondents secure from the farms additional broilers to serve as
replacements for the dead broilers in order to ensure that the same quantity or number of broilers under the job order will be delivered to the
processing plant.

Respondents were required to make two trips per day and were thus paid Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) per trip or a total of Six Hundred Pesos
(P600.00) per day. Respondents averred, however, that considering that the broiler farms are located in remote and distant areas, they could only
accomplish, on the average, one trip per day, and would thus earn only P300.00 per day. Respondents further alleged that from the time they
were engaged by JR Hauling, they were not paid their respective 13th month pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and SIL.
They claimed that on April 3, 2011, JR Hauling dismissed them from employment without notice and hearing and/or investigation, and without
any valid reason when the management allegedly displayed their pictures at the gate and barred them from entering the company premises.

By way of defense, petitioners countered that respondents, in the course of their employment with JR Hauling, incurred shortages in their
deliveries of broilers amounting to 371 pieces and 377 pieces in February 2011 and March 2011, respectively. In support thereof, petitioners
presented a copy of a summary of short broilers delivery supposedly issued by SMFI for February 2011 and March 2011.

Upon further investigation, petitioners discovered that respondents, without the knowledge or consent of JR Hauling, were committing
anomalous transactions involving the sale of excess broilers and crates somewhere in Concepcion, Tarlac. In support thereof, petitioners
presented the affidavits of Mapue, Pedro, a helper of Mapue, and respondents' co-employees, namely, Acoba, Leo Enriquez (Enriquez) and
Marville Moratin (Moratin), Hector Fuentes (Fuentes), Orlando Espares (Espares), and Roberto Sanico (Sanico).

The affidavits of Mapue, Pedro, Fuentes, and Espares also revealed that JR Hauling incurred shortages in the number of broiler crates totalling
232 pieces. The same were purportedly sold by the respondents together with the excess broilers at Concepcion, Tarlac. Considering the
foregoing circumstances, petitioners insisted that respondents' transgressions amounted to serious misconduct, and constituted fraud or willful
breach of trust and confidence, which justified their dismissal from employment.

Petitioners also averred that respondents were field employees and/or workers who are paid by the results, and therefore, were not entitled to
their monetary claims for underpayment of salaries, 13th month pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and SIL.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not complainants were validly dismissed based on serious misconduct.
RULING:

YES, complainants are validly dismissed based on serious misconduct.

In this regard, we opine that respondents' acts constitute Serious Misconduct which would warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal. Notably, the
facts of the case reasonably establish with certainty: (1) that excess broilers and crates were being illegally sold in Tarlac; and (2) that
respondents were involved in the anomalous transaction.

2. Whether or not complainants were validly dismissed based on breach of trust and confidence

YES, complainants are validly dismissed based on breach of trust and confidence

The unauthorized sale of excess broiler and broiler crates constitutes an act of dishonesty, a breach of trust and confidence reposed by JR
Hauling upon them.

Petitioners, as drivers/helpers, were entrusted with the custody, delivery and transportation of the broilers and broiler crates, including their
proper handling and protection, in accordance with the directives of JR Hauling and instructions of its clients. To stress, respondents are
performing the core business of JR Hauling. Thus, even on the premise that respondents were not occupying managerial or supervisory
positions, they were, undoubtedly, holding positions of responsibility. As to respondents' transgressions i.e., the unauthorized sale of broilers and
broiler crates, the same are clearly work-related as they would not have been able to perpetrate the same were it not for their positions as
drivers/helpers of JR Hauling.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. ROSARIO A. GOMEZ

G.R. No. 200815, August 24, 2020
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:

[T]he language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states that the loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust
reposed in the employee by his employer. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse,
as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it must be based on substantial evidence and
not on the employer's whims or caprices or suspicions other wise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Loss of
confidence must not be indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee was arbitrary. And, in
order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned is unfit to
continue working for the employer.
In addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for termination or employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a
position of responsibility, trust and confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such
as the handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which
an employee is penalized.

Thus, the requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: 1) the employee concerned must be holding a
position of trust and confidence; 2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence; and 3) such loss of
trust relates to the employee's performance of duties.

Loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations
where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property.
1) To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies
and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial
actions;
2) and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.

FACTS:

SMC is a corporation organized under Philippine laws which is engaged in the business of manufacturing fermented beverages, particularly beer,
among others. It employed Gomez on September 16, 1986 as a researcher in the Security Department and concurrently as Executive Secretary to
the Head of the Security Department. Sometime in October 1994, Gomez was assigned as coordinator in the Mailing Department of SMC. On
December 20, 2002, SMC terminated her services on the ground of fraud or willful breach of trust.3

The circumstances which led to the termination of Gomez's employment involved SMC's arrangement with C2K Express, Inc. (C2K). C2K is a
corporation engaged in courier and delivery services, which entered into business with SMC sometime in January 2001 as the latter's courier. For
the first three months, the relationship between C2K and SMC went smoothly until C2K encountered difficulty in collecting its service fee from
SMC. Eventually, it was found out that C2K's former manager, Daniel Tamayo (Tamayo), formed another courier services group, Starnec, which
had been using fake C2K receipts and collecting the fees pertaining to C2K. C2K claimed that it was through Gomez's intervention that
Tamayo's group was able to transact business with SMC.

C2K brought the matter to the attention of SMC, which conducted an investigation. In line with this, SMC requested C2K's President, Edwin
Figuracion (Figuracion), to execute an affidavit naiTating their claim. In the said affidavit, Figuracion mentioned that Gomez had been collecting
25% commission from the total payment received by C2K.
An audit was conducted where it was discovered that Gomez was allegedly involved in anomalies which caused tremendous losses to SMC.

SMC conducted an administrative investigation and hearing where Gomez was able to present her evidence and witnesses to disprove the
charges against her. After the investigation, Gomez was found guilty of committing fraud against SMC and of receiving bribes through
commissions in connection with the performance of her function. On December 20, 2002, SMC issued a Notice of Termination of Services to
Gomez prompting her to file a case for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gomez’s termination was valid

RULING:

YES, Gomez was validly terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

SMC claims that Gomez is a mailing coordinator at the Mailing Department tasked with weighing and determining the volume of documents and
other shipments of the corporation, including the Kaunlaran Magazines.

The Mailing Department is headed by a manager, in this case Ms. Rosanna Mallari (Gomez's boss), who takes care of the voluminous mailing as
well as courier services of SMCThe Court finds that Gomez indeed occupied a position of trust and confidence, as defined by law and
jurisprudence, since she was entrusted with SMC's property, in particular its mail matter which included weighing and determining volumes of
documents to be shipped. Thus, she was routinely charged with custody of SMC's mail matter.

The Court finds that Gomez indeed occupied a position of trust and confidence, as defined by law and jurisprudence, since she was entrusted
with SMC's property, in particular its mail matter which included weighing and determining volumes of documents to be shipped. Thus, she was
routinely charged with custody of SMC's mail matter.

SMC likewise substantially proved the second requisite (i.e. there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. In this case,
We find that Gomez willfully, intentionally, knowingly, purposely, and without justifiable excuse disregarded SMC's rules and regulations in the
workplace. It was through Gomez's intervention that Starnec (Tamayo's group) was able to transact business with SMC, wherein Starnec used
fake receipts and collected the fees pertaining to C2K.43 Gomez, as the used factor in SMC's Mailing Department, should have known or
noticed said fake receipts since she had previously transacted with C2K. We give credence to the claim of C2K's President, Figuration, in his
affidavit that Gomez had been collecting 25% commission from the total payment received by C2K. This was corroborated by SMC's audit
findings where it was discovered that Gomez's anomalies caused and tremendous losses to SMC.

Furthermore, SMC conducted its investigation which resulted in Gomez being found guilty of committing fraud against SMC and of receiving
bribes through commissions in connection with the performance of her function.

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that Gomez was validly terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

LUFTHANSA TECHNIK PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. ROBERTO CUIZON

G.R. No. 184452, February 12, 2020
By: rayven

DOCTRINE:

The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are:
1. the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence;
2. there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence; and 3. such loss of trust relates to the employee's
performance of duties

With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of involvement in the alleged
events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient.

But as regards a managerial employee, the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer
would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient
that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is
responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
of his position.
Neglect of duty, as a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual.

Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's
duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.

FACTS:

Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc. (LTP) is a corporation duly organized under Philippine law, and is engaged in the business of aircraft
maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO). Cuizon had initially worked with the Maintenance and Engineering Department of Philippine Airlines
(PAL) for 32 years. Eventually, LTP absorbed said department and its employees, including Cuizon.
He held the position of MA2 Duty Manager in LTP's Cebu Station from 2000 until his dismissal in 2005.

LTP claimed that they validly terminated Cuizon’s employment for loss of trust and confidence in his ability to perform his duties as MA2
Deputy Manager. The company alleged Cuizon’s numerous violations and blatant disregard of the LTP Standards in the Workplace on two
separate incidents specifically: (1) his willful concealment of the accidental light-up of an aircraft and (2) his failure to observe safety guidelines
and precautions of LTP with respect to aircraft towing which caused damage.

In his defense, Cuizon argued that he was being singled-out due to events prior to the accidental light-up and towing incidents. Prior to the
incidents, an anonymous letter circulated criticizing Division Manager Loquellano’s (one of the petitioners) handling of the company in Cebu
and his other alleged culpabilities which are inimical to LTP’s interest. In the same letter, Cuizon was being praised for his work ethic and
named to be better suited to hold the position of Loquellano. He further points out that he was the only one terminated despite the involvement
and admissions of other personnel. He claims that LTP, et. al. railroaded his efforts to procure documents necessary to defend himself, such as
transcripts of the investigation.

With regard to the accidental light-up incident, Cuizon claims that he immediately informed Loquellano through a phone call about his findings.
He also submitted a copy of his incident report on time. As for the towing incident, Cuizon claims that he did not abandon the towing crew but
only proceeded to do other tasks to support the leak check that was meant to be conducted on the aircraft’s engine. After conducting a hearing on
the matter, LTP issued a Memorandum finding Cuizon to have violated LTP’s safety rules and guidelines, negligence on the job, false
information, and was dismissed from the service.

Both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed Cuizon’s complaint for illegal dismissal. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the LA and NLRC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Cuizon was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence

RULING:

No, Cuizon was not validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence

In the instant case, we find that petitioners failed to substantially prove the second requisite (i.e., there must be an act that would justify the loss
of trust and confidence). In Cadavas, we have emphasized] that "[l]oss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on
a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently."
However, in this case, we are of the firm view that petitioners failed to prove that Cuizon willfully, intentionally, knowingly, purposely and
without justifiable excuse disregarded LTP's rules and regulations in the workplace. On the contrary, this Court finds that Cuizon has
substantially refuted petitioners' claim on the alleged concealment of the accidental light-up and the towing incident.

The CA found, and this Court agrees, that Cuizon could not be held guilty of deliberately giving false, inaccurate, misleading, incomplete or
delayed information to LTP regarding the accidental aircraft engine light-up incident. We note the following circumstances: (i) Cuizon had
indeed immediately called Loquellano to inform him about the accidental light-up and likewise timely submitted/furnished him a copy of his
incident report; (ii) the report submitted by Cuizon was based on his personal findings and appreciation of facts of the accidental aircraft engine
light-up incident. The facts that he transmitted were the most precise information that he could gather at that time. We give credence to his
justification that he could not immediately conclude that there was an accidental light-up because the same had to be eventually confirmed using
a boroscope; and (iii) Cuizon's claim had been substantially corroborated and confirmed by the reports of his fellow employees involved in the
incident.

The foregoing efforts of Cuizon showed that he followed the rules of procedure of LTP and that there was no act of deliberately giving false,
inaccurate, and misleading information to petitioners.

Similarly, we are of the firm view that Cuizon did not willfully, purposely, and without justifiable excuse disregard the towing precautions
during the towing incident. As aptly held by the CA, towing is a shared responsibility of the towing crew. Thus, the entire towing crew was
supposed to observe the safety precautions, such as not leaving their posts during the towing operation. Indeed, Cuizon could not be faulted if
unknown to him, some members of the towing crew, specifically the tail and wing guides, decided to leave their posts without permission or
authority to do so. As properly held by the CA, petitioners failed to prove that Cuizon consciously allowed some members of the towing crew to
leave their posts. Furthermore, we find that the CA aptly gave credence to Cuizon's claim that he did not abandon the towing crew but that he
only proceeded to do other tasks to support the leak check that was meant to be conducted on the aircraft's engine
 2. Whether or not Cuizon was validly dismissed on the ground of gross negligence

NO, Cuizon was not validly dismissed on the ground of gross negligence.

Firstly, petitioners miserably failed to show that Cuizon did not exercise even a slight care or diligence which caused the grounding of and
damage to the aircraft during the towing operation. Moreover, petitioners failed to prove that it as Cuizon’s act that directly or solely caused the
grounding of and damage to the aircraft during the towing incident.

Secondly, we find that petitioners failed to prove that Cuizon was negligent in his job when he allegedly concealed the accidental light-up
incident or allegedly provided false information thereon.
On the contrary, we find that he performed his task in accordance with the rules and procedures of LTP. We note that Cuizon immediately
informed his supervisor, Loquellano, through a phone call, about his findings. In addition, we note the fact that Cuizon had indeed timely
submitted/furnished a copy of his incident report to Loquellano. Moreover, Cuizon did not rely on hearsay information on what happened with
the aircraft but he acted based on his personal findings and appreciation of facts of the accidental aircraft engine light-up incident.

Considering Cuizon's untainted 32 years of service, this Court finds that it is incongruous for him to deliberately act recklessly on his job,
especially since his employer's line of business involves the lives and safety of airline passengers.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. MANUEL C. BULATAO

G.R. No. 200972, December 11, 2019
By: Bonana

DOCTRINE:

To establish abandonment, the employer must prove that:

1. the employee failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and
2. there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some
overt act.

FACTS:

Respondent Bulatao was formerly the Senior Vice-President (SVP) of the Information Technology Group of the Petitioner PNB. The respondent
alleged that on October 1, 1999, PNB’s President Mr. Benjamin Palma and Mr. Samit Roy, an Indian national, hosted a dinner for PNB’s IT
staff. In the dinner, the conclusion of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between PNB and Mr. Roy was announced.

Additionally, it was announced that not all of the IT staff would be retained because they would be required to undergo an International
Competitive Test as a precondition for absorption. Meanwhile, those who would not be absorbed would be offered retirement packages.

The respondent objected to the JVA. He maintained that it was merely a ploy to force the IP personnel who were not supportive of the project to
leave the bank. In a letter dated November 10, 1999, the respondent manifested his intent to retire. Pertinent in the letter was his objection to the
JVA and his manifestation that the working environment brought about by the recent decisions of the management made it difficult for him to
stay at the employ of the petitioner. Moreover, in the said letter, he stated that he was going to be on an official leave of absence,

Meanwhile, the JVA did not materialize. The respondent had a meeting with Mr. Lucio Tan, a member of the Board of the Petitioner. He was
asked to reconsider his decision to retire and instead, to join Mr. Tan’s management Team. Subsequently, the respondent went back to work on
January 1, 2000. During this time, his previous letter was not yet acted upon, causing the respondent to withdraw the same.

However, on January 29, 2000, the respondent was informed that the Board had already accepted his decision and informed him not to report to
work. As a consequence, the respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bulatao was illegally dismissed

RULING:

YES, Bulatao was illegally dismissed. PNB failed to prove by convincing evidence that the termination was legal.

It was clear in Bulatao’s letter that he was taking an official leave of absence following his statement that he was taking the bank’s offer to retire.
Thus, there was a reason for Bulatao’s absence at the time, which we already noted to be accepted and approved due to PNB’s undeniable
inaction. Moreover, while Bulatao intended to take up the offer to retire which would have led to the severance of the employer-employee
relationship, it should be considered that the circumstances surrounding such decision was influenced by the JVA with the “Indian” group which
Bulatao did not agree with. Such instance did not stem from Bulatao’s desire to willingly and unconditionally cut ties with PNB but because of
the JVA which he believed to be disadvantageous to the bank.
In addition, Bulatao categorically withdrew his application to retire as mentioned in his memorandum which he submitted before the Board
“approved” his application to “resign”. Indeed, there must be a positive and overt act signifying an employee’s deliberate intent to sever his/her
employment, which is wanting in this case.

PNB Failed to show that Bulatao had a clear and deliberate intent to sever his employment without any intention of returning, as it was not able
to rebut with sufficient evidence Bulatao’s withdrawal of his application for retirement. Additionally, PNB did not convincingly disprove
Bulatao’s claim that the real reason behind his filing of early retirement was his dissatisfaction with the agreement with the “Indian” group, even
if the said agreement did not materialize.

In light of these observations and findings, PNB failed to prove by convincing evidence that there was just or authorized cause for terminating
Bulatao from employment.

IV.B.2. Authorized Causes

TELETECH CUSTOMER CARE MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. MARIO GERONA, JR.
G.R. No. 219166. November 10, 2021
By: mikcroft

DOCTRINE:

Redundancy exists when an employee's services are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the business. To
successfully invoke a valid dismissal due to redundancy, there must be:
(1) a written notice served on both the employees and the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of termination of
employment;
(2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service;
(3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and
(4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished.

Moreover, the company must provide substantial proof that the services of the employees are in excess of what is required of the company.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business process outsourcing (BPO). Petitioner answers queries and concerns in behalf of
their clients, such as Accenture and Telstra.

On July 21, 2008, respondent Gerona was hired as one of Teletech's technical support representatives and was assigned to the Accenture account.
By January 17, 2009, Gerona became a regular employee. Respondent was informed by Teletech’s human resource that he would be transferred
to the Telstra account upon successfully passing the training, assessment and examination. He was informed that refusal to take the examinations
would result in the termination of his services on the ground of redundancy. Believing that he was entitled to security of tenure, respondent
Gerona refused to undergo the training and take examinations.

On November 17, 2009, Gerona received a notice dated November 16, 2009 informing him of his dismissal due to redundancy effective
December 16, 2009. Through his counsel, he sent a demand letter to Teletech asserting that there was no redundancy in the company considering
that they were even continuously hiring other technical support representatives. Moreover, as a regular employee, he should no longer be
required to take another examination to prove his qualifications.

On January 7, 2010, Gerona filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Petitioner argued that the decrease in volume of calls for
the Accenture account resulted in an excess in the number of technical support representatives assigned to their account.

The LA dismissed Gerona’s complaint ruling that the termination based on redundancy is a valid exercise of the petitioner’s management
prerogative. It anchoring its decision on the basis only of Teletech's allegation as the former failed to submit his position paper.

The NLRC upheld the decision of the LA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Gerona was illegally dismissed as
petitioner failed to show that Gerona's position was redundant, not just with respect to the Accenture account, but in relation to the whole
business organization of Teletech. Moreover, the offer of transfer to the Telstra account is prejudicial since Gerona's continued employment
depended on passing the assessment and examinations. By imposing such condition, his right to security of tenure as a regular employee was
infringed.

ISSUE:

Whether Gerona was validly dismissed on the ground of redundancy

RULING:
NO, Gerona was illegally dismissed.

In the case at hand, the Court finds that the evidence presented by Teletech fails to convincingly show the alleged decline in Accenture's business
and that the expected volume of calls for its Accenture account would not materialize. Other than the bare assertion of human capital delivery
site manager Joel Go, no other evidence was offered to prove the alleged low volume of calls or how the officers of Accenture and Teletech
came to a conclusion that its business was slowing down.

Teletech should have presented any document proving the decline in Accenture's volume of calls for the past months, or affidavits of the
Accenture and Teletech officers who determined that business was slowing down and their basis thereof.

Unfortunately, Teletech only relied heavily on the self-serving affidavit of its human capital delivery site manager. While Teletech submitted
other documents, such pieces of evidence hardly proved the fact of redundancy.

Teletech also claims that the offer to transfer Gerona to the Telstra account serves as a badge of good faith. However, the Court cannot subscribe
to such assertion when the transfer is actually prejudicial to the Gerona. Gerona was a regular employee, hence, he was entitled to security of
tenure. By requiring him to pass additional trainings and examination as a condition to retain his employment under the pain of dismissal,
Teletech disregarded his right to security of tenure.

OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

ROLANDO B. MESINA
G.R. No. 217169. November 4, 2020
By: TinayTinapay

DOCTRINE:

For a dismissal on the ground of disease to be considered valid, two requisites must concur:
1. the employee suffers from a disease which cannot be cured within six months and his/her continued employment is prohibited by law or
prejudicial to his/her health or to the health of his/her co-employees, and
2. a certification to that effect must be issued by a competent public health authority.
FACTS:

Omanfil International Manpower Development Corporation (Omanfil) hired Mesina for overseas work as an Expediter in Dammam, Saudi
Arabia. On May 4, 2005, Mesina left for Saudi Arabia and commenced working with AKJO on May 7, 2005. After nine months since he started
working, Mesina experienced chest pains. He was confined at a local hospital on February 11, 2006; diagnosed as a heart disease but he was
discharged as his health was regarded "in good condition." He was again admitted, his condition improved but the doctor advised him to
immediately undergo an Angiogram Test in a better equipped hospital; he got discharged.

Petitioners (Omanfil): Mesina opted to come home to the Philippines since he felt he could be treated better in his home country for his
congenital heart ailment with his family around. They likewise claimed that they gave Mesina an entry-reentry visa so that he could return to
them for work after his recovery.

Respondent (Mesina): Mesina claimed that against his will, the following day, or on February 20, 2006, MAZTPC requested AKJO to
immediately repatriate him due to his serious medical condition. On February 22, 2006, Mesina was repatriated. Mesina reported to Omanfil and
sought reimbursement for his medical expenses and for further expenses for the operation and treatment of his illness.

Petitioners did not accede to his demands since pursuant to the employment contract, the free medical treatment may only be availed of by
Mesina during the period of his employment; his heart ailment could not have been work- related or acquired during his short-term employment
of nine months, thus he is not entitled to free extensive medical treatment, as contemplated in Item 8 of his employment contract.

Respondent believed that termination of his employment without any legal justification; Mesina proceeded to file a case for illegal dismissal,
refund of hospitalization and medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees against petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Mesina was illegally dismissed because of the absence of a medical certificate as required under
Sec. 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines

RULING:

NO, the CA properly held that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions.

In the instant case, petitioners did not comply with the foregoing requirements to justify Mesina's termination on the ground of a disease. We
note that MAZCO repatriated Mesina to the Philippines without any showing that he had a prolonged and permanent disease. Furthermore,
Mesina's Medical Reports established that he was first confined on February 11, 2006 due to acute retrostemal chest pain and upon his discharge
on February 14, 2006, he was "in good general condition with an advice to [undergo] a percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) for further
evaluation and management". Similarly, during his second confinement on February 18, 2006 due to left sided precordial pain on his left
shoulder and forearm, his February 20, 2006 Medical Report indicated that "[t]he patient was admitted in the hospital under observation with
follow up ECG & cardiac enzymes. ECG showed no new changes. The cardiac enzymes were within normal range. He was given a strong
analgesic & the specific treatment & was discharged on 19.02.06 with an advice for urgent PCI for more evaluation. . . ,"

Thus, when Mesina was repatriated on February 21, 2006, none of his medical records showed that his ailment was permanent or that he suffered
from a disease which could not be cured within six months and that his continued employment was prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health
or to the health of his co-employees. This is validated by the absence of the required Certification from a competent public authority certifying to
such a health condition on his part.

CA properly held that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Mesina's Employment Agreement/Contract, and with the provisions of
Article 284 of the Labor Code and Section 8, Rule I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Had they done so, Mesina's Ischaemic
Heart Disease could have been considered as an authorized cause for his dismissal.

This Court finds that the very nature of petitioner's work as an Expediter had contributed to the aggravation of his illness — if indeed it was pre-
existing at the time of his employment. In De Leon v. Maunlad Trans., Inc., We have held that "it is not required that the employment be the sole
factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the
employment had contributed, even to a small degree, to the development of the disease."
IV.B.3.a. Twin Notice Requirement

PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. VS. VIOLETA NOCHE

G.R. No. 202392, October 04, 2021
By: Hernalisa

DOCTRINE:

[T]he following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

1. The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a
directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them
to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice
to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence,
and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint.

Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed
narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the
charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among
the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

2. After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given
the opportunity to:
a. explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them;
b. present evidence in support of their defenses; and
c. rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given
the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this
conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

3. After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination
indicating that:
a. all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and
b. grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment

FACTS:

Petitioner Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. (PRBFI) is a business entity engaged in the manufacturing, processing, and distribution of coconut
products for export. PRBFI employed respondents as coconut parers.

Respondents filed a complaint for non-regularization with the DOLE. Allegedly acting on product quality complaints and claims for
reimbursement and damages from some of its clients, PRBFI sent letters to respondents suspending them for 15 days due to issues of product
contamination.

In their joint answer to PRBFI's letters, some of the respondents denied involvement in the product contamination incident. PRBFI dismissed
respondents from work. Respondents filed a complaint against PRBFI for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, regularization, damages, and
reinstatement before the NLRC.
In their Position Paper, respondents averred that they were dismissed from work without a prior investigation or an opportunity to air their side.
Respondents also raised the lack of basis of their dismissal due to loss of trust and confidence, as this ground refers to managerial and
confidential employees and respondents were only rank-and-file workers of PRBFI.

PRBFI maintained that respondents were properly and correctly dismissed from employment. Per PRBFI, thirteen (13) coconut parers, including
the eleven (11) respondents herein, were thus subjected to an administrative investigation on the product contamination incident.

The Labor Arbiter ruled for the respondents. The Labor Arbiter declared respondents entitled to reinstatement to their former positions in PRBFI,
payment of full backwages and other benefits, and enjoyment of seniority rights and privileges. The Labor Arbiter further found respondents to
be regular employees of PRBFI.

PRBFI appealed to the NLRC. It also filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Reduce Bond (Motion to Reduce Bond) and tendered a cash bond in
the amount of P100,000.00.

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA. They imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. The CA granted respondents' Petition for Certiorari.
CA likewise denied PRBFI's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, PRBFI's Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PRBFI’s complied with the procedural due process of employment termination

RULING:

No, PRBFI did not comply with the procedural due process of employment termination While the wordings of the termination letters appear to
be in acceptable compliance with the third requisite, two out of the above three requirements have not been complied with. In PRBFI's first
series of letters for respondents, the latter were informed that they were the suspected perpetrators of the supposed product contamination. This,
however, is a statement too thin and sweeping to be considered as "a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for
the charge against the employees" demanded by law and jurisprudence. Also again, PRBFI failed to prove with substantial evidence that
hearings and interviews of respondents were actually conducted. The records only confirm the fact that PRBFI trampled on respondents' rights to
procedural due process.

UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS vs. BENEDICTO F. LACANARIA

G.R. No. 223665 September 27, 2021
By: kimu

DOCTRINES:

To comply with procedural due process and validly dismiss an employee, the employer is required to follow the two-notice rule. In general,
"[f]irst, an initial notice must be given to the employee, stating the specific grounds or causes for the dismissal. It must direct the submission of a
written explanation answering the charges. Second, after considering the employee's answer, an employer must give another notice providing the
findings and reason for termination.

It is settled that "actual hearing or conference is not a condition sine qua non for procedural due process in labor cases because the provisions of
the Labor Code prevail over its implementing rules." Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor
Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall be observed 'substantially,' not strictly. This is a recognition
that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.

A formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a
company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.

Although there was a just cause in terminating Lacanaria's employment, the University did not follow the requirements of procedural due
process. Where there is a valid cause for dismissal, but the requirements of procedural due process were not observed, the award of nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is in order.

FACTS:

Petitioner University of the Cordilleras employed respondent Lacanaria as an Instructor-Associate Professor at the College of Teacher Education
(CTE). One of his students, a certain Flores, filed a written complaint against him, following an incident where he dismissed Flores’ coughing fit
as “just acting” during a graded performance. While he was skeptical of the illness, Lacanaria allowed Flores to go to the clinic to get checked.
When Lacanaria saw Flores again, he uttered the phrase “tae mo” at Flores. It was later found that Flores had costochondritis and upper
respiratory tract infection.
The University issued to Lacanaria a Charge Sheet with Notice of Investigation (Charge Sheet) for serious misconduct and violation of the Code
of Ethics for Professional Teachers, indicating the corresponding penalties if found guilty. He was directed to file an answer within five days
from receipt thereof and that he will be informed of the date of investigation wherein he will have the right to be assisted by counsel, to confront
the witness against him, and to present his evidence. He was also asked to explain why he should not be administratively charged for uttering
“green jokes” in class, based on the student evaluations. In his answer, Lacanaria stated that he thought Flores was merely covering up his failure
to do his part in class, and that the student should not have attended class if he was really sick.

The Grievance Committee thereafter commenced its proceedings. The petitioners averred that they informed Lacanaria of the hearing through a
text message, but Lacanaria failed to appear. The Grievance Committee then informed Lacanaria of his next hearing through registered mail,
wherein his failure to attend would constitute as a waiver of his right to present his evidence. Supposedly, Lacanaria received the notice only on
the day itself. The Minutes of the meeting on indicated that Lacanaria again failed to appear, resulting in his waiver of his right to present his
evidence.

Eventually, the undated Report and Recommendation by the Grievance Committee recommended the dismissal of Lacanaria and noted that the
filing of his resignation after receipt of the Charge Sheet would not render the imposition of the penalty moot and academic. Lacanaria was then
dismissed, effective on May 15, 2010. Lacanaria allegedly received said notice on May 21, 2010. Lacanaria filed a Motion for Reconsideration
questioning the findings of the Grievance Committee. He denied receipt of any notice regarding the hearing, and claimed that the charge sheet
failed to state the place, time, and date of the investigation, contrary to Section 7 of the Faculty Manual. However, the motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Resolution, which stated that since Lacanaria did not take advantage of his opportunity to be heard, he can no longer question
the ruling.

Lacanaria filed a Complaint against herein petitioners for illegal dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay for 2010 with prayer for
reinstatement, payment of all money claims, full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees before the Department of Labor
and Employment. Mandatory conciliation conferences yielded no positive results.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the dismissal is tainted with procedural defect when [respondent] failed to strictly adhere to its faculty manual,
specifically Pertaining to the date, place and time of investigation

RULING:

YES, there were procedural due process lapses. Lacanaria must be compensated for the same, notwithstanding the finding of a just cause for his
dismissal.

The Charge Sheet with Notice of Investigation charged Lacanaria with serious misconduct and a violation of the Code of Ethics for Professional
Teachers then enumerated the imposable penalties without however specifying which provisions were violated. Nonetheless, he was purportedly
provided with a copy of Flores' Complaint and other documents which supplemented the details and reason for the charges. Relevantly, the
Charge Sheet did not inform Lacanaria of the date, time and place of the hearing, even if the grievance procedure of the University requires it.

Lacanaria did not receive any formal written notice for the March 30, 2010 hearing; thus, he did not attend the said session. Although the
University alleged that a text message was sent to Lacanaria to notify him of the scheduled hearing, it did not present substantial proof that he
received it. All the same, Lacanaria denied receipt of the text message. As for the April 7, 2010 hearing, Lacanaria was again not able to attend
since he allegedly received the notice on the same day it was scheduled. Although the University sent the notice by registered mail on March 31,
2010, there was no guarantee that it would reach Lacanaria before the hearing, considering the recognized delay in the delivery of registered
mails.

In the case at bench, it may be said that Lacanaria was given the opportunity to be heard since he was able to file his Answer to Flores'
Complaint as well as a Motion for Reconsideration on the decision terminating him from employment. However, it should be emphasized that
after receipt of the Notice of Decision (or Termination), Lacanaria filed a Motion for Reconsideration to ask for a reinvestigation (which is
equivalent to a request for a hearing) so that he can present his side. This is considering that he was not able to attend the previous hearings as he
was not duly informed of the schedule. While the April 7, 2010 hearing was meant for him to present his side, Lacanaria unfortunately belatedly
received the notice and was not able to prepare or attend at all. Furthermore, the University's own grievance procedure provides that an
investigation should be conducted anyway.

2. Whether or not respondent is entitled to reinstatement, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees

YES, Lacanaria is entitled to compensation.

Based on the discussion, although there was a just cause in terminating Lacanaria's employment, the University did not follow the requirements
of procedural due process. Ergo, "[c]onsidering that a valid cause for [Lacanaria's] dismissal exists but the requirements of procedural due
process were not observed, the award of nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is in order."

However, the declaration of reinstatement, as well as the award of damages and attorney's fees in favor of Lacanaria, should be set aside given
that his termination was attended with a just cause. In any case, a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the
monetary award from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
 JOSE R. DELA TORRE v. TWINSTAR PROFESSIONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES
G.R. No. 222992, June 23, 2021
By: twistafate

DOCTRINES:

In the case of termination of employment for offenses and misdeeds by employees, i.e., for just causes under Article 297 (formerly 282) of the
Labor Code, employers are required to adhere to the so-called "two-notice rule."

King of Kings Transport v. Mamac (King of Kings Transport) outlined what should be considered in terminating the services of the employees,
to wit:

1. The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a
directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them
to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice
to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence,
and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for
the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention
which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
2. After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given
the opportunity to:
a. explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them;
b. present evidence in support of their defenses; and
c. rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given
the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this
conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
3. After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination
indicating that:
a. all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and
b. grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment

FACTS:

In October 1988, petitioner Jose Dela Torre was employed as a security guard by respondent Twinstar Professional Protective Services, Inc.
(Twinstar), where he was paid a daily wage of PhP240 and was assigned in Tarlac. In January 2011, Jose sought assistance from the program of
a certain Tulfo to complain about the underpayment of his salaries. Thereafter, he was directed to report to Twinstar's office in Quezon City.
Upon reporting to the office, Jose was informed by Twinstar's administrative officer that he was being placed on floating status.

Petitioner alleged that he was on floating status for more than six (6) months which prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and
underpayment/non-payment of certain salaries and benefits on August 23, 2011 against Twinstar. Despite receipt of summons for mandatory
conferences on various dates, Twinstar failed to appear and thus, the Labor Arbiter (LA) required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the mandatory conference scheduled December 5, 2011. However, since Twinstar still failed to attend the said mandatory conference
and considering that petitioner was not ready to submit his position paper on said date, the submission of position papers was reset to January 11,
2012, and later to January 30, 2012 because of the same reasons. On January 30, 2012, only petitioner appeared and submitted his position
paper.

The LA held that Jose was constructively dismissed, and thus entitled to backwages. Twinstar then filed an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Twinstar admitted that it hired Jose as a security guard and that his latest assignment was in Las Haciendas
Luisitas in Tarlac City during which he went on absence without leave (AWOL) on or about January 21, 2011. Twinstar alleged in its defense
that it had sent several notices to petitioner for him to report for duty, specifically: 1) Order to Report for Duty dated June 3, 2011; 2) 2nd Notice
to Report for Work dated June 9, 2011; and 3) Last & Final Order to Report for Duty dated June 22, 2011. Moreover, Twinstar claimed that
aside from these notices, a duty officer of the company sent text messages and tried to call Jose but to no avail. In fact, Jose has also refused to
receive a company letter on June 8, 2011, and manifested his unwillingness to go on duty anymore to a company officer who was tasked to
deliver such letter.

Thus, since petitioner did not report back to Twinstar for reassignment despite all the opportunities given to him, the latter terminated the
former's employment on July 19, 2011.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Jose’s right to procedural due process was violated

RULING:

YES, Jose’s right to procedural due process was violated since Twinstar failed to follow the two-notice rule

As applied in this case, Twinstar found the petitioner guilty of insubordination or willful disobedience, which is just cause under Article 297 of
the Labor Code, for his refusal to report to work and accept reassignment despite receipt of the notices to return to work. However, there is
nothing in the records that would show that Twinstar gave petitioner ample chance to explain and be heard on the allegations against him, which
is the purpose of the first notice in the "two-notice rule." Twinstar merely terminated the employment of petitioner on July 19, 2011, without
complying with the rules laid down in King of Kings Transport and thus, in violation of the "twonotice rule."

PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. SYLVIA DE LUNA

G.R. No. 209437 March 17, 2021
By: Narika

DOCTRINE:

The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected:
1. the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and
2. the second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.

The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was
conducted

FACTS:

PHAI is an organization of the homeowners of Philam Homes, Quezon City. De Luna worked as PHAI’s Office Supervisor and was in charge of
accepting payments from clients for reservations of rental facilities. Bundoc, as cashier, received membership dues and other incomes, made
daily deposits of collections, prepared checks and was in charge of petty cash fund. During an audit of PHAI’s books of accounts in September
of 2008, irregularities were discovered, such as issuance of unauthorized official receipts, unrecorded and undeposited collections and
encashment of personal checks.
The investigating committee found that De Luna and Bundoc were involved in said fraudulent activities. Both De Luna and Bundoc participated
before the investigating committee and were later required to appear before the investigating committee to explain said irregularities and to
account for the amount misappropriated. PHAI later demanded payment of P757,315.00 from De Luna and informed her of her dismissal from
service by reason of dishonesty, misappropriation and malversation of funds. Bundoc was also dismissed from service a few months ahead of De
Luna, after Bundoc took a leave of absence for 30 days.

Both De Luna and Bundoc filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, underpayment and non-payment of wages.

Both the LA and the NLRC ruled that the termination of De Luna and Bundoc was legal since it was based on just cause. The CA affirmed their
decision but modified the same as to the monetary award as PHAI failed to comply with the procedural due process requirement as regards
Bundoc. It also found that De Luna’s preventive suspension was in excess of 10 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bundoc’s dismissal was in accordance with the procedural due process requirement?

RULING:

NO, PHAI failed to observe due process in terminating Bundoc’s employment.

The appellate court found that PHAI failed to prove that Bundoc was notified and given the chance to explain and to refute the accusations
against her. Bundoc was not notified of the charges leveled against her or of her termination. This clearly amounted to a violation of Bundoc's
right to procedural due process.

For PHAI's failure to accord due process in terminating her employment, Bundoc is entitled to nominal damages. The CA correctly awarded
P30,000.00 in favor of Bundoc in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. When the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the
Labor Code, such as loss of trust and confidence, but the termination was procedurally infirm, the sanction against the employer for such a
violation is tempered; hence, the award of P30,000.00 instead of P50,000.00 as nominal damages.57 This is because the dismissal was initiated
by an act imputable to the employee compared to when the dismissal was initiated by the employer through the enumerated authorized causes
under the Labor Code, where the sanction is stiffer and the amount of nominal damages is higher.

SUSAN M. BANCE vs. UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANTHONY

G.R. No. 202724, February 03, 2021
By: cpalawyer2023
DOCTRINES:

For a dismissal from employment to be valid, both the substantial and procedural due process requirements must be satisfactorily complied with.
Substantial due process pertains to the "employee's right not to be dismissed without just or authorized cause, as provided by law." Procedural
due process pertains to the employer's compliance with the procedure in effecting a dismissal as provided in the Labor Code and implementing
rules.

To comply with the requirements of procedural due process, two notices must be served to the employee. The conduct of a hearing or conference
though is, as held in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, mandatory only "when requested by the employee in writing or
substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it." Failure to comply with
procedural due process (although the dismissal is based on just or authorized causes) will entitle the employee to nominal damages: if the
dismissal is based on just cause, the employee is entitled to P30,000.00; if the dismissal is based on authorized cause, the employee is entitled to
P50,000.00.

FACTS:

Petitioners Susan M. Bance (Bance), Arlene C. Dimaiwat (Dimaiwat), Jean O. Velasco (Velasco), Nancy M. Aguirre (Aguirre), and Hazel A.
Lobetania (Lobetania; collectively, petitioners) filed complaints for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondents University and Atty.
Santiago D. Ortega, Jr. (Atty. Ortega; collectively, respondents).

For Bance, Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre: The University found that Bance, Dimaiwat, Velasco, Aguirre took advantage of their positions in
the Accounting Office by enrolling their children and relatives under the group’s enrollment incentive program despite knowing that they were
unqualified which they admitted in a conference dated December 2007. Atty. Ortega thus verbally informed them that their employment will be
terminated. On December 22, 2007, Atty. Ortega issued Office Memo No. 007-026, informing them that their employment will be terminated
effective January 1, 2008 on grounds of dishonesty amounting to malversation of school funds. The office memo was allegedly not preceded by
any written notice to petitioners except for the two conferences and a verbal announcement during the second conference.

Dimaiwat, Velasco, Aguirre tendered their resignation on December 22, 2007 and these were approved by Atty. Ortega on December 26, 2007.
Bance did not tender her resignation.

For Lobetania: The University discovered a cash shortage after examination of the several irregular and anomalous transactions noted in the
Accounting Office. Lobetania has custody of the cash vault where the cash should have been kept but it is missing. Lobetania eventually
admitted that she failed to deposit it on the University’s bank account. Further, additional anomalous transactions in the prior years surfaced
where the tellers accommodated the encashment of checks not in the name of the University.

Lobetania tendered her resignation on July 27, 2007 (to take effect on August 1, 2007), and was approved by Atty. Ortega on August 9, 2007.
All of them filed complaints for illegal dismissal with money claims against the respondents on the ground that their dismissal was illegal for
lack of just or authorized causes and non-observance of the requirements of procedural due process.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the dismissal of Bance complied with the procedural due process for termination of employment

RULING:

NO, the procedural due process was not observed.

Records show that during the events leading to Bance's dismissal, two conferences were held, after which, Office Memo No. 007-026 was issued
to inform her (and Dimaiwat, Velasco, and Aguirre) of the termination of her employment effective January 1, 2008. Clearly, these are not
compliant with the requirements established by law. Only the second written notice or Office Memo No. 007026, was served on Bance. The
records show that no first written notice was given to Bance. Conferences and verbal announcements do not suffice as substitute for the requisite
first written notice.

Applying Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, Bance is therefore entitled to nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00

JR HAULING SERVICES VS. GAVINO L. SOLAMO

G.R. No. 214294, September 30, 2020
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:
The Implementing Rules in relation to Article 297 of the Labor Code provides for the procedure that must be observed in order to comply with
the required procedural due process in dismissal cases, to wit:
1. A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side.
 2. A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

FACTS:

JR Hauling is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of hauling and delivery of broiler chickens to its clients such as Magnolia
Corporation and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Respondents are former drivers/helpers of JR Hauling.

As drivers/helpers of JR Hauling, respondents were tasked to transport live chickens from broiler farms or contract growers to the processing
plant of JR Hauling's clients. In the course of transporting broiler chickens, JR Hauling issues to respondents "receiving slips" or job orders
containing the details of the deliveries, which include the number of live chickens to be loaded into the trucks for transport, and the delivery
route from broiler farms located either in Pangasinan, Tarlac, Batangas, Bulacan, Zambales, or La Union, to the processing plant of its clients in
Hermosa, Bataan.

From JR Hauling's place of business in Bulacan, respondents proceed to the designated broiler farm indicated in their respective job orders.
Since a number of broilers usually die in the course of their delivery, respondents secure from the farms additional broilers to serve as
replacements for the dead broilers in order to ensure that the same quantity or number of broilers under the job order will be delivered to the
processing plant.

Respondents were required to make two trips per day and were thus paid Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) per trip or a total of Six Hundred Pesos
(P600.00) per day. Respondents averred, however, that considering that the broiler farms are located in remote and distant areas, they could only
accomplish, on the average, one trip per day, and would thus earn only P300.00 per day. Respondents further alleged that from the time they
were engaged by JR Hauling, they were not paid their respective 13th month pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and SIL.
They claimed that on April 3, 2011, JR Hauling dismissed them from employment without notice and hearing and/or investigation, and without
any valid reason when the management allegedly displayed their pictures at the gate and barred them from entering the company premises.

By way of defense, petitioners countered that respondents, in the course of their employment with JR Hauling, incurred shortages in their
deliveries of broilers amounting to 371 pieces and 377 pieces in February 2011 and March 2011, respectively. In support thereof, petitioners
presented a copy of a summary of short broilers delivery supposedly issued by SMFI for February 2011 and March 2011.

Upon further investigation, petitioners discovered that respondents, without the knowledge or consent of JR Hauling, were committing
anomalous transactions involving the sale of excess broilers and crates somewhere in Concepcion, Tarlac.
In support thereof, petitioners presented the affidavits of Mapue, Pedro, a helper of Mapue, and respondents' co-employees, namely, Acoba, Leo
Enriquez (Enriquez) and Marville Moratin (Moratin), Hector Fuentes (Fuentes), Orlando Espares (Espares), and Roberto Sanico (Sanico).

The affidavits of Mapue, Pedro, Fuentes, and Espares also revealed that JR Hauling incurred shortages in the number of broiler crates totalling
232 pieces. The same were purportedly sold by the respondents together with the excess broilers at Concepcion, Tarlac. Considering the
foregoing circumstances, petitioners insisted that respondents' transgressions amounted to serious misconduct, and constituted fraud or willful
breach of trust and confidence, which justified their dismissal from employment.

Petitioners also averred that respondents were field employees and/or workers who are paid by the results, and therefore, were not entitled to
their monetary claims for underpayment of salaries, 13th month pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and SIL.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner complied with the procedural due process for the dismissal of complainant’s employment

RULING:

NO, petitioner did not comply with the procedural due process for the dismissal of complainant’s employment

Petitioners admit that no written notice to explain and written notice of termination were served upon respondents. Their defense, however, is
premised on their assertion that it was respondents themselves which prevented JR Hauling from serving upon them the written notices when
they failed to report for work after they were confronted by management of their alleged transgressions. We are not persuaded.

At the outset, respondents were adamant in their pleadings before the LA and the NLRC that JR Hauling dismissed them from employment
without notice and hearing and/or investigation when management allegedly displayed their pictures at the gate and barred them from entering
the company premises. Interestingly, petitioners failed to categorically deny these allegations. It is worth noting that Section 11, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, which supplements the NLRC Rules of Procedure, provides that allegations which are not specifically denied are deemed
admitted.

Even on the premise that it was the respondents who refused to report for work, the same does not exculpate petitioners from observing the basic
principles of due process before respondents can be dismissed from employment.
To be clear, if petitioners were adamant to give respondents the opportunity to explain their side and refute the accusations made against them,
petitioners should have served the notices personally to respondents, or where their whereabouts are unknown, such as in this case, by courier or
registered mail at their last known addresses indicated in their employee file maintained or in the possession of JR Hauling. This, however,
petitioners failed to do.
In light of the above premises, there being just cause for the dismissal but considering petitioners' non-compliance with the procedural requisites
in terminating respondents' employment, the latter are entitled to nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 each in line with existing
jurisprudence

PEDRITO R. PARAYDAY vs. SHOGUN SHIPPING CO., INC.

G.R. No. 204555. July 6, 2020
By: kimu

DOCTRINE:

It is an established principle that the dismissal of an employee is justified where there was a just cause and the employee was afforded due
process prior to dismissal. The burden of proof to establish these twin requirements is on the employer, who must present clear, accurate,
consistent, and convincing evidence to that effect.

FACTS:

Petitioners Parayday and Reboso alleged that they were employed as fitters/welders by Shogun Shipping Co. (formerly Oceanview),
corporations engaged in the business of ship building. As fitters/welders, petitioners' duties and responsibilities included, among others,
assembling, welding, fitting, and installing materials or components using electrical welding equipment, and/or repairing and securing parts and
assemblies of the barges. Petitioners further alleged that Shogun Ships failed to pay them their overtime pay, holiday pay, and premium pay
despite having rendered work during holidays, Sundays, and rest days. Shogun Ships likewise did not pay petitioners their SIL and 13th month
pay.

Sometime in May 2006, an explosion occurred during one of their welding assignments which caused petitioners to sustain third degree burns on
certain parts of their bodies. Petitioners were then hospitalized from May 11, 2006 until June 6, 2006. Although medical expenses were borne by
Shogun Ships, petitioners were not paid their salaries while on hospital confinement. After they were discharged from the hospital, Shogun Ships
discontinued providing petitioners financial assistance for payment of their medical expenses. Petitioners alleged that subsequently the
management of Shogun Ships verbally dismissed them from service effective May 1, 2008 due to lack of work as fitters/welders.
On its part, respondent denied outright that petitioners were engaged by Shogun Ships as regular employees. In support of its claim that no
employer-employee relationship existed between Shogun Ships and petitioners, respondent pointed out that Shogun Ships, which is a
corporation engaged in the business of domestic cargo shipping, was only incorporated sometime in November 2002, 13 several years after
petitioners were engaged by Oceanview as its fitters/welders in 1996/1997. Anent petitioners' allegation of change of corporate name of
Oceanview to Shogun Ships, respondent maintained that there was no such change of corporate name and that Oceanview was a separate and
distinct entity from Shogun Ships.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Petitioners, ordering respondent Shogun Ships Co. to reinstate complainants to their former position. The
Labor Arbiter held that petitioners were regular employees of Shogun Ships considering that they: (1) performed tasks necessary and desirable to
its business; and (2) rendered more than one year of service at the time of their dismissal from employment. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners and held that respondent failed to prove that petitioners were dismissed for just or authorized cause
and that they were afforded procedural due process. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
Aggrieved, they filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. They held that petitioners failed to prove that
Oceanview were one and the same entity as Shogun Ships.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were validly dismissed from employment

RULING:

NO, petitioners were not validly dismissed from employment.

Here, respondent was unable to discharge the burden of proof required to establish petitioners' dismissal from employment was legal and valid.
The records also failed to show that respondent afforded petitioners due process prior to their dismissal, as in fact, they were merely verbally
dismissed, and were thus not served notices informing them of the grounds for which their dismissal was sought. Clearly, petitioners' dismissal
was not carried out in accordance with law and was, therefore, illegal.

JOSE DEL PILAR vs. BATANGAS II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELIC II)
G.R. No. 160121, February 19, 2020
By: yourhonor
DOCTRINE:

Art. 283 of the Labor Code requires the employer to serve a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) at least one (1) month before the intended date of retrenchment. In case of retrenchment, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one
(1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service which is higher.

The purpose of a written notice under Article 283 of the Labor Code is to give employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs as
well as to give the DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause of termination

FACTS:

Complainants were employees of BATELEC II occupying various positions. They held rallies to denounce the alleged corrupt, anomalous, and
irregular activities of some BATELEC II Officials. As a result, these employees were dismissed for participating in an illegal strike, which
prompted the nine (9) complainants and eight (8) other employees to file a case of illegal dismissal against BATELEC II. On October 15, 1993,
the Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos, ruled in favor of the complainants. Thereby ordering BATELEC II to immediately reinstate the complainants
to their former positions and to jointly and severally pay complainants full backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Later on, March 31 1995, BATELEC II filed a manifestation with motion before the Labor Arbiter arguing that reinstatement has become
impossible because of a major reorganization and streamlining that it had undergone, which resulted in the abolition of some positions pertaining
to the complainants.

Thus, on September 29, 1995, the Labor Arbiter rendered declaring impossibility in the physical reinstatement of all complainants and in lieu
they are awarded the payment of separation pay. Hence, the complainants filed an appeal before the NLRC but the same was denied and it found
out that they were arbitrarily dismissed for an authorized cause which warranted the payment of indemnity and it also ruled that in computing for
backwages, the base pa is the basic pay plus allowances. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed because
five (5) of the complainants entered into an amicable settlement with BATELEC II. The resolution of the NLRC was then affirmed.
BATELEC II then elevated the case before the Supreme Court to challenge the award of full backwages and the very award of backwages
because the amount is only awarded to illegally dismissed employees and not to those whose former positions had already been abolished and
reinstatement is not possible. The complainants also add that instead. Of an appeal to the CA, BATELEC II should have filed a petition for
injunction with the NLRC questioning the computation of the award pursuant to Rule XI, Sec. 1 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not BATELEC II was able to comply to the required notices for the authorized dismissal

RULING:

BATELEC II was not able to comply to the required notices for the authorized dismissal.

In the case at bar, the retrenchment of complainants was found to be bona fide, but the required notices were lacking.

In this case, there was no actual notice of termination. BATELEC II merely assumed that complainants knew about the retrenchment when they
actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter who tackled the validity of the reorganization. The offer to pay separation pay
is not sufficient to replace the formal requirement of written notice. At the time the reorganization took place, complainants were reinstated on
payroll so they were deemed employees of BATELEC II. Thus, there was no reason why BATELEC II could not have served them notice of
retrenchment before actually dismissing them.

In this case, the Jaka ruling was applied retroactively, the dismissals under the authorized causes will also be regarded as valid while the
employer shall likewise be required to pay an indemnity to the employee, the amount of indemnity payable by the employer in cases where the
dismissals are based on authorized causes but have been effected without observance of the notice requirements. It fixed the amount of
indemnity in the mentioned scenario to P50,000

IV.C.1. Resignation vs. Constructive Dismissal

JOSE EDWIN ESICO vs. ALPHALAND CORPORATION

G.R. No. 216716 November 17, 2021
By: attyATW

DOCTRINE:

It is essential that there is a lack of voluntariness in the employee's separation from employment.

Constructive dismissal exists when continued employment has become so unbearable because of acts of clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by the employer, that the employee has no choice but to resign.

The test of constructive dismiss, is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his position
under the circumstances.
FACTS:

Jose Edwin Esico, a former pilot of Philippine Airforce, was employed by Philweb Corporation, Alphaland’s group of companies, as Risk and
Security Management Officer (RSMO) on March 19, 2010. Among other benefits, Esico had a monthly basic pay of Php90,000 pursuant to their
letter proposal which was signed by Esico on October 28, 2010.

On April 19, 2010, Esico was concurrently engaged by Alphaland as a rotary wing pilot assigned to fly its Chairperson, Ongpin, to his various
engagements within and outside the country. It was agreed that his compensation will be paid by Philweb Corporation. In addition, the
employment contract provided that the company will send Esico on the ground and flight course training and in return Esico will render service
to the Company for a minimum period of five years beginning on April 19, 2010. Should Esico fail to complete the minimum of five years of
service he shall reimburse the company for the expenses spent on his trainings subject to proportionate reduction equivalent to 5% per completed
quarter of actual service.

Pursuant to the above agreement, Esico sent an email to to Alphaland’s head of security asking for recommendation on what salary figure to
quote respondents for his employment as Pilot.

Philweb adjusted Esico’s compensation package from Php90,000 to Php115,000.00 with an additional Php25,000 monthly representative
allowance. Esico signed the job offer sheet believing that it was the compensation package that he had asked for separately from his work as
RSMO for Philweb.

On December 23, 2011, Esico found out that he had been transferred from Phil web Alphaland because he could not access his payroll with Phil
web.

On July 13, 2012, after more than two years, Esico tendered his resignation letter, citing the following reasons: (a)serious embarrassments and
insults had been committed against his person, honor and reputation on several occasions by a company officer; (b) serious flight safety
concerns; (c) absence of employment contract with Alphaland Corporation; (d) absence of helicopter recurrent training; ( e) unresolved issues on
services already rendered in favor of Alphaland Corporation as wing pilot from May 2, 2011 to June 2012; and (f) other related matters.

Pursuant to Esico’s resignation letter, Alphaland’s counsel sent a demand letter to Esico asking for reimbursement in the amount of
Php977,720.00 representing the portion of his flight training expenses.

Esico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC and sent a reply letter to respondent’s counsel
refuting the allegations in the demand letter. On August 2, 2012, Alphaland filed a complaint against Esico for alleged wrongful resignation and
damages with the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is constructive dismissal

RULING:

NO, Esico was not constructively dismissed for failure to meet the requirement of substantial evidence to establish constructive dismissal.

“When a complaint for illegal dismissal is filed, the complainant has the duty to prove that he or she was dismissed and that the dismissal is not
legal because there is no valid cause or no compliance with due process. In a case such as the one before us, where the question presented is
whether Esico was constructively dismissed, Esico must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. It was
incumbent upon Esico to prove that his resignation was not voluntary, and was actually a dismissal. It is essential that there is a lack of
voluntariness in the employee's separation from employment.

Apart from the employment contract which is the pith of the issue between the parties, Esico did not muster the standard of substantial evidence
to prove that respondents Alphaland intended his dismissal. What is fairly apparent is that Esico resigned because he was dissatisfied and
unhappy with respondents Alphaland for the cited reasons in his resignation letter:

“The undersigned would like to respectfully express his sincerest gratitude and appreciation to Alphaland Corp. and Phil Web Corp. for the job
opportunity given for the past 2 years and 3 months as Corporate Pilot and Risk and Security Management Officer respectively.
Same gratitude and appreciation are also given to Company executives, superiors and co-workers on both Companies the undersigned had the
chance to work with most especially to alt hardworking Company pilots and aircrew.”

In illegal dismissal cases while the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee
must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. In this case, however, respondents Alphaland should not be
impelled to prove a valid dismissal as they did not terminate the employment of Esico. The dissatisfaction of Esico and his claim of constructive
dismissal may be related but these are two different and separate matters. The first can be proven simply by a plain reading of his resignation
letter, the second one is carved by law and must be proven by substantial evidence. Regrettably, Esico was not able to prove his allegations.

RENATO C. TACIS vs. SHIELDS SECURITY SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No.\ 234575, July 07, 2021
By: el filibusterismo
DOCTRINE:

Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; or
when there is a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay. It exists when there is a clear act of discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer, which makes it unbearable for the employee to continue his/her employment. In cases of constructive dismissal, the impossibility,
unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment leaves an employee with no other viable recourse but to terminate his or her
employment. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up
his position under the circumstance.

The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his position
under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not.

On the other hand, resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office. It is the voluntary act of an employee who
is in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has then no other
choice but to disassociate himself from employment. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts of
the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his
employment. In illegal dismissal cases, it is a fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the defense of resignation, on him necessarily
rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, with claims for payment of full back wages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and salary
differentials against respondent Shields Security Services, Inc.- a domestic corporation engaged in security services.

Petitioners Tacis and Lamis alleged that they were hired as security guards on April 4, 2007 and May 1, 2012, respectively. They were assigned
at Texas Instruments, Inc. located in Baguio City. Sometime in November 2013, the Company deployed more or less 15 new security guards at
Texas Instruments and instructed petitioners to train the new recruits for three days. However, on November 29, 2013, Morante, the General
Manager, informed petitioners that the old security guards of Texas, including herein petitioners, were relieved and terminated from service and
that the 15 new hirees will replace them as per the client's (Texas Instruments) request. Morante then gave petitioners checks representing their
"retirement pay" and advised them that the other benefits due them such as 13th month pay and last salary shall be given upon their return to
Manila.

The petitioners objected that there was no valid ground for their dismissal as they did not commit any infraction during their employment with
the Company. Morante made a commitment to transfer them to Soliman Security Services (Soliman Security), a sister company of Shields
Security and even made petitioners fill out application forms for their eventual transfer to Soliman Security.

Convinced that they would be absorbed by Soliman Security, petitioners submitted their respective resignation letters and quitclaims as pre-
requisites for their receipt of cash benefits, e.g., separation pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, cash bond, uniform allowance and
last salary. However, in January 2014, Morante informed that there was no vacancy at Soliman Security. This prompted petitioners to file the
instant complaint.

Respondents belied petitioners' claim of illegal dismissal. They averred that petitioners voluntarily resigned from their employment as evidenced
by their individual handwritten resignation letters which were duly accepted by the Company. In fact, they were given the option to go to Manila
for their next assignment, but they opted to resign. Further, petitioners were already paid their separation benefits and in return, they have
executed a Quitclaim, Release and Waiver therefor and processed the documents required of resigning employees such as their exit interview,
company clearance and information sheets. Petitioners also signed a Statement of Understanding and Participation in the said program,
authorizing automatic deduction from their salary of death contribution during paydays.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding that petitioners were constructively dismissed. He concluded that the act of the Company in
replacing petitioners who were then already its regular employees, without just or authorized cause, was a clear act of illegal dismissal.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA Decision finding that petitioners' resignation was voluntary as shown by their expression of gratitude and
appreciation to the Company for the opportunity given to them.
Further, the quitclaim and waiver executed by petitioners confirmed their resignation from the company. There was no showing that petitioners
were compelled to sign the same or that they did not fully understand the consequences of signing a quitclaim.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA ascribing upon the NLRC grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it held that no illegal dismissal took place and that petitioners voluntarily resigned from the Company. Petitioners
lamented that they were deceived by respondents into resigning in exchange for their monetary benefits and upon the false representation that
they would be transferred to Soliman Security.

CA rendered a decision denying the Petition for Certiorari. The CA concluded that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of vitiated
consent. Other than their respective affidavits, no controverting evidence was adduced by petitioners to refute the fact that they voluntarily filed
their respective resignation letters with the Company and that the same were accepted by respondents. Hence, petitioners' resignation and
quitclaim as valid and binding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner’s employment was constructively dismissed

RULING:

NO, Petitioner’s employment was not constructively dismissed

Here, the Company was able to show petitioners' voluntary resignation. The acts of petitioners before and after the resignation do not show that
undue force was exerted upon them.

First, petitioners relinquished their positions when they submitted their individual letters of resignation, which to reiterate, were in their own
handwriting. Petitioners admitted having submitted the said letters, albeit, due to an alleged deceitful machination, but which they utterly failed
to substantiate for lack of substantial documentary or testimonial evidence.

More importantly, there was no indication in their respective resignation letters that they were unduly influenced or coerced to resign. In fact, the
said letters contained words of gratitude which can hardly come from an employee forced to resign.

Second, petitioners accepted the retirement pay and monetary benefits given them by the Company and executed a Quitclaim, Release and
Waiver therefor, as settlement and waiver of any cause of action against respondents. The Court has consistently ruled that "a waiver or
quitclaim is a valid and binding agreement between the parties, provided that it constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement, and that the one
accomplishing it has done so voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import. There was no showing that the quitclaims were procured by
respondents through fraud or deceit. Neither was there proof that respondents employed force or duress to compel petitioners to sign the same.
Third, the Court finds petitioners' imputation of bad faith or deceit against respondents untenable. Petitioners insist that respondents misled them
into signing their resignation letters upon the Company's false promise that they would be transferred to Soliman Security. No agreement to this
effect was presented by petitioners. Not even a single witness was introduced to corroborate this claim.

Finally, it makes no sense for an employee to file a resignation letter solely based on an alleged promise that said employee would be later
reinstated by the company. petitioners' voluntary resignation coupled by their execution of quitclaims and the processing of the documents
required from resigning employees such as the exit interview, company clearance and information sheets indubitably show their intent to
relinquish voluntarily their employment with the Company

In conclusion, the petitioners failed to prove that their resignation letters were tainted with deceit and bad faith, hence, no constructive dismissal
took place in the instant case.

JOSE R. DELA TORRE v. TWINSTAR PROFESSIONAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES

G.R. No. 222992, June 23, 2021
By: twistafate

DOCTRINE:

There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the
employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment. It exists where there is involuntary resignation
because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. We have held that the standard for constructive dismissal is
"whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his employment under the circumstances.

However, it must be emphasized that "not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a
finding of constructive dismissal." What is vital is the weighing of the evidence presented and a consideration of whether, given the totality of
circumstances, the employer acted fairly in exercising a prerogative.

FACTS:

In October 1988, petitioner Jose Dela Torre was employed as a security guard by respondent Twinstar Professional Protective Services, Inc.
(Twinstar), where he was paid a daily wage of PhP240 and was assigned in Tarlac.

In January 2011, Jose sought assistance from the program of a certain Tulfo to complain about the underpayment of his salaries.
Thereafter, he was directed to report to Twinstar's office in Quezon City. Upon reporting to the office, Jose was informed by Twinstar's
administrative officer that he was being placed on floating status.

Petitioner alleged that he was on floating status for more than six (6) months which prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and
underpayment/non-payment of certain salaries and benefits on August 23, 2011 against Twinstar.

Despite receipt of summons for mandatory conferences on various dates, Twinstar failed to appear and thus, the Labor Arbiter (LA) required the
parties to submit their respective position papers on the mandatory conference scheduled December 5, 2011. However, since Twinstar still failed
to attend the said mandatory conference and considering that petitioner was not ready to submit his position paper on said date, the submission of
position papers was reset to January 11, 2012, and later to January 30, 2012 because of the same reasons. On January 30, 2012, only petitioner
appeared and submitted his position paper.
The LA held that Jose was constructively dismissed, and thus entitled to backwages. Twinstar then filed an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Twinstar admitted that it hired Jose as a security guard and that his latest assignment was in Las Haciendas
Luisitas in Tarlac City during which he went on absence without leave (AWOL) on or about January 21, 2011. Twinstar alleged in its defense
that it had sent several notices to petitioner for him to report for duty, specifically: 1) Order to Report for Duty dated June 3, 2011; 2) 2nd Notice
to Report for Work dated June 9, 2011; and 3) Last & Final Order to Report for Duty dated June 22, 2011. Moreover, Twinstar claimed that
aside from these notices, a duty officer of the company sent text messages and tried to call Jose but to no avail. In fact, Jose has also refused to
receive a company letter on June 8, 2011, and manifested his unwillingness to go on duty anymore to a company officer who was tasked to
deliver such letter.

Thus, since petitioner did not report back to Twinstar for reassignment despite all the opportunities given to him, the latter terminated the
former's employment on July 19, 2011. Subsequently, petitioner filed his second complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims, but notably,
during the October 18, 2011 hearing, he declined Twinstar's offer of reassignment and opted to be paid separation pay instead. Regarding its
failure to submit its position paper and documentary evidence before the LA, Twinstar blamed the negligence of its previous counsels.
Relevantly, Twinstar alleged that petitioner had already filed an earlier labor complaint with the DOLE-NCR and executed a Deed of Quitclaim
and Release on March 3, 2012, but the same was not established with the LA due to the aforementioned negligence of its previous counsels.

The NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and held that no constructive dismissal took place. It also liberality and allowed the presentation of
Twinstar’s evidence for the first time on appeal. However, it held that Twinstar failed to observe due process in terminating Jose. However, the
NLRC did not impose nominal damages on account of the valid Quitclaim and Release executed on March 3, 2012. On appeal to the CA, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jose was constructively dismissed by Twinstar

RULING:

NO, Jose was not constructively dismissed by Twinstar.

Petitioner utterly failed to prove that he was constructively dismissed. He never presented any evidence, aside from his self-serving allegations,
that he was forced to be on floating status for more than six (6) months without being given new assignment by Twinstar.

In comparison, Twinstar was able to establish that Jose went on absence without leave on or about January 21, 2011 and that it had subsequently
sent several notices to Jose, including the Order to Report for Duty dated June 3, 2011, 2nd Notice to Report for Work dated June 9, 2011, and
Last & Final Order to Report for Duty dated June 22, 2011. Aside from the said notices, a duty officer of Twinstar vainly tried to contact
petitioner by calling him and sending text messages, and a field inspector of Twinstar attempted to deliver a company letter on June 8, 2011 but
petitioner refused to receive the same.

Further, Jose himself admitted declining the assignment offered to him by the Twinstar within six (6) months from the time he was placed on
floating status in the hearing dated October 18, 2011 before the LA. Jose cannot claim that he did not understand the question of the LA and the
Minutes of the said hearing, as both were in the English language. He had all the opportunity to request the LA to translate the question and the
Minutes to a language he understood, but he chose not to. Clearly, the totality of circumstances would lead us to conclude that no constructive
dismissal happened in this case. Instead, the circumstances would show the stubborn unwillingness of petitioner to return to work despite being
required by Twinstar to report to work multiple times within six (6) months from January 21, 2011, even assuming arguendo that he was indeed
placed on floating status.

FERNANDO C. GOSOSO vs. LEYTE LUMBER YARD

G.R. No. 205257, January 13, 2021
By: primrose

DOCTRINE:

Constructive dismissal has often been defined as a "dismissal in disguise" or "an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not."
It exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving
a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.

In some cases, while no demotion in rank or diminution in pay may be attendant, constructive dismissal may still exist when continued
employment has become so unbearable because of acts of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by the employer, that the employee has no
choice but to resign. Under these two definitions, what is essentially lacking is the voluntariness in the employee's separation from employment

FACTS:

Leyte Lumber, a construction supply and hardware store, hired Gososo as a sales representative. Gososo allegedly overstepped the boundaries of
Leyte Lumber's company policies. Gosoco failed to course the orders through authorized checkers before the items are released and left his work
area without the supervisor’s consent.
When he returned to work on October 11, 2008, Yu allegedly told Gososo to sign a prepared document. Gososo declined since the document
contained admissions of offenses that he did not commit. Irked by Gososo's refusal, Yu informed him of his termination from work. Yu allegedly
even threw a pair of scissors at Gososo but missed. Respondents confirmed that Gososo was reprimanded on October 10, 2008 for violating
standard operating procedures and established company policies. On even date, respondents claimed that Gososo filed a leave of absence for
October 11, 2008 purportedly to attend his son's graduation, in disregard of the rule that leaves of absence must be filed and approved days
before the actual date of leave.

According to respondents, Gososo did go on an unapproved leave on October 11, 2008 and even allegedly extended his absence. These prompted
respondents to issue Gososo another Memorandum on October 13, 2008 wherein they requested him to report back to work, otherwise he will be
considered to have abandoned his work.

Gososo, however, did not report back to work Aggrieved, Gososo filed on October 13, 2008 a Complaint for illegal constructive dismissal
against respondents, non-payment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day allowance, vacation and sick leave pay,
separation pay, moral damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment

RULING:

No, petitioner was constructively dismissed from employment

Petitioner insists that he was forced to sign a prepared incriminatory letter and then fired when he refused to do so. This statement does not fit the
above legal definition provided in Doctor. No proof other than petitioner's bare allegations supported this claim. It is settled that bare allegations
deserve no legal credit for being self-serving.
Even if these accusations were adequately corroborated, respondent Yu's rebuke of petitioner, while overbearing and intimidating, was
reasonably incited by the latter's violations of respondent Leyte Lumber's company practices. It cannot be considered as tantamount to
unequivocal acts of discrimination, insensibility, or disdain as to render petitioner's continued employment as unbearable.

In fine, the Court finds no working basis to declare that petitioner had been dismissed, whether legally, illegally, or constructively.

ALLAN REGALA vs. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 204684, Oct. 5, 2020
By: Hernalisa

DOCTRINE:

There is constructive dismissal where "there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to
forego his continued employment."

Constructive dismissal occurs not when the employee ceases to report for work, but when the unwarranted acts of the employer are committed to
the end that the employee's continued employment shall become so intolerable.

In these difficult times, an employee may be left with no choice but to continue with his employment despite abuses committed against him by
the employer, and even during the pendency of a labor dispute between them.

FACTS:

Regala was hired by Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) in February 2000 as one of its waiters assigned to the Food and Beverage Department. He
was later assigned as cook helper at MHC's Chocolate Room/Cookies Kitchen during the period from October 18, 2004 to June 26, 2006. In the
course of his employment as waiter/cook helper, Regala worked for six (6) days every week, and was paid a daily salary of P382.00 until
sometime in December 2009. MHC also remitted contributions in Regala's behalf to the Social Security System (SSS) and Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Phill-Health).

As waiter, Regala's duties and responsibilities included preparing the mise en place, taking of orders, and serving food and beverages to hotel
guests at tables and inside 11HC's dining establishments. In the course of his engagement with MHC, Regala was directed to report to a Captain
Waiter, and assigned to work for its Cowrie Grill, Pool Bar, Mini Bar, Kitchen Ginza, Tap Room, Champagne Room, Room Service, Mabuhay
Palace, Banquet Services, and Pastry and House Keeping. From October 2008 to May 2009, Regala was made to attend and participate in hotel
trainings for Basic Food Safety Strategies, Food Safety Awareness,14 and Customer Service Awareness.
Regala alleged that he was not recognized as a regular rank-and-file employee despite having rendered services to MHC for several years.
Regala also claimed that MHC constructively dismissed him from employment when it allegedly reduced his regular work days to two (2) days
from the normal five (5)-day work week starting December 2, 2009, which resulted in the diminution of his take home salary.

On its part, MHC denied outright that Regala is its regular employee, and claimed that he is a mere freelance or "extra waiter" engaged by MHC
on a short-term basis. It explained that it employs extra waiters at fixed and/or determinable periods particularly when there are temporary spikes
in the volume of its business. It is during these specific periods when management is forced to supplement the hotel's regular staff of waiters
with temporary fixed term employees, such as Regala, in order to meet increases in business activities in its food and beverage functions, special
events and banquets. In engaging extra or temporary waiters, Ml-IC relies on loose referrals from its employees and on a list of waiters who have
expressed interest in part-time or temporary engagements. It further explained that its system of hiring freelance waiters on an informal and
temporary basis is a common practice in the hotel and restaurant industry and that it is through this industry practice that these extra waiters,
including Regala, are able to offer their services to other hotels, restaurants, and food catering companies despite their existing engagement with
MHC.

MHC then presented a sample fixed-term service contract, and copies of Regala's Department Outlet Services Contracts for Extra
Waiters/Cocktail Attendants (Service Agreements) covering the periods of his supposed temporary engagement with MHC, or from March 1,
2010 to March 3, 2010. MHC contended that prior to engaging the services of extra waiters, applicant waiters, such as Regala, and MHC execute
fixed-term service contracts and agree on a specific duration of engagement depending on the requirement of the hotel in a given period. On this
premise, MHC argued that there can be no illegal dismissal to speak of since the expiration of the period under Regala's Service Agreements
simply caused the natural cessation of his fixed-term employment with MHC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Regala was constructively dismissed

RULING:

YES, Regala was constructively dismissed.

Patently, the reduction of Regala's regular work days from five (5) days to two (2) days resulted to a diminution in pay. Regala's change in his
work schedule resulting to the diminution of his take home salary is, therefore, tantamount to constructive dismissal.

The fact that Rega1a may have continued reporting for work does not rule out constructive dismissal, nor does it operate as a waiver. the fact of
constructive dismisal should be reckoned on December 2, 2009, or from the time Regala was made to accept the changes of his work schedule
which thereby resulted in the diminution of his take home pay.

ITALKARAT 18, INC. VS. JURALDINE N. GERASMIO

G.R. No. 221411, September 28, 2020
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:

1. It is true that in constructive dismissal cases, the employer is charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action or the
transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity. However, it is likewise true that in
constructive dismissal cases, the employee has the burden to prove first the fact of dismissal by substantial evidence. Only then when
the dismissal is established that the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the dismissal was for just and/or authorized cause. The
logic is simple — if there is no dismissal, there can be no question as to its legality or illegality

If the fact of dismissal is disputed, it is the complainant who should substantiate his claim for dismissal and the one burdened with the
responsibility of proving that he was dismissed from employment, whether actually or constructively. Unless the fact of dismissal is
proven, the validity or legality thereof cannot even be an issue.

An act, to be considered as amounting to constructive dismissal, must be a display of utter discrimination or insensibility on the part of
the employer so intense that it becomes unbearable for the employee to continue with his employment.

2. As a general rule, the law does not require employers to pay employees that have resigned any separation pay, unless there is a
contract that provides otherwise or there exists a company practice of giving separation pay to resignees.

FACTS:
Juraldine alleged that the Company hired him on June 1, 1990. In 1993, he was designated as the Maintenance Head and Tool and Die Maker
until his dismissal on November 20, 2008 on the ground of serious business losses. He claimed that during and prior to the last quarter of 2008,
the Company had repeatedly informed its employees of its proposed retrenchment program because it was suffering from serious business losses.
In particular, Juraldine claimed that Noel San Pedro (San Pedro), the then OIC/Manager of the Company, informed him sometime in November
2008 that the Company was planning to retrench a substantial number of workers in the Maintenance and Tool and Die Section; and that if he
opts to retire early, he will be given a sum of P170,000.00. San Pedro then allegedly cautioned Juraldine that if he will not accept the offer to
retire early, the Company would eventually retrench or terminate him from his employment, in which case, he might not even receive anything.

In light of the foregoing, Juraldine executed and signed a resignation letter and quitclaim on November 20, 2008. He was then informed to return
on November 25, 2008 to get his check worth P170,000.00. However, to his dismay, Juraldine was later informed by San Pedro that he would be
receiving only the amount of P26,901.34. Thus, Juraldine, through his lawyer, sent a letter dated November 25, 2008, essentially demanding the
amount of P170,000.00 he was allegedly promised earlier. Since the Company did not respond, Juraldine filed the instant complaint for illegal
dismissal.

On the other hand, the Company essentially alleged that Juraldine voluntarily resigned from his job, thus, his claims are baseless. The Company
admitted that it hired Juraldine as maintenance personnel on December 1, 1989. It further alleged that during the last year of his employment,
Juraldine took leaves of absence in order to process his papers for a possible seaman's job. Moreover, the Company stated that on October 20,
2008, Juraldine tendered his resignation and demanded from the Company the payment of his separation pay on account of his long years of
service. On November 6, 2008 and on November 20, 2008 respectively, he executed and signed a waiver and quitclaim which shows, inter alia,
the computation of his receivables. He then signed the voucher for this purpose and thereafter received the check issued to him representing his
last pay.

Surprisingly, he sent a demand letter, through his lawyer, on November 28, 2008, for the payment of P170,000.00 in addition to the amount
already received by him. The Company refused to pay him the additional amount for lack of basis in law and in fact.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Juraldine’s employment was unlawfully dismissed.

RULING:

NO, he was not illegally dismissed. Juraldine failed to prove that his resignation was involuntary and that he was constructively dismissed.
Juraldine clearly has the burden of proving that he was dismissed by the Company, in light of the Company's allegation that he resigned
voluntarily and was not dismissed. Hence, Juraldine must first prove that he was actually dismissed by the Company before the legality of such
dismissal can even be raised as an issue.

Records would show that Juraldine failed to prove the fact of dismissal. He relied primarily on his allegations that he was misled by the
Company into resigning and that he was actually retrenched. These uncorroborated and self-serving allegations, especially considering the
existence of a resignation letter and a quitclaim (both bearing Juraldine's signature), fall short of the evidence required under the law to discharge
Juraldine's burden to prove that he was dismissed by the Company.

In the instant case, the records are bereft of substantial evidence that will unmistakably establish a case of constructive dismissal. Here, the
circumstances relayed by Gemina were not clear-cut indications of bad faith or some malicious design on the part of Bankwise to make his
working environment insufferable.

Records show that Juraldine had already intended to resign in 2008, even earlier than October. The evidence presented by the Company would
show that Juraldine in fact requested for multiple leaves on various occassions, usually for processing of his papers for work abroad. Juraldine's
allegation that the Company was already considering retrenching its employees during the last quarter of 2008 or earlier, which Juraldine would
want to impress upon this Court to be the catalyst that prompted San Pedro to make the alleged offer of resignation to Juraldine, would not have
made any difference in view of the fact that Juraldine was already in the process of applying for a job overseas or at the very least, intending to
go abroad. The fact of the matter is that it was Juraldine himself who resigned from his work, as shown by the resignation letter he submitted and
the quitclaim that he acknowledged, and thus, he was never dismissed by the Company.

2. Whether or not Juraldine is entitled to separation pay.

Juraldine is not entitled to separation pay.

The general rule is that employers are not required to pay employees who resigned separation pay unless there is a contract or company practice.
Juraldine failed to prove that a contract exists between him and the Company. He likewise did not prove that there exists a Company practice
wherein resignees were given separation pay. Considering that there was no dismissal involved in this case as Juraldine voluntarily resigned
from work, his claims arising from his complaint for illegal dismissal must be denied. This includes his claim for separation pay as he failed to
prove his entitlement thereto, either via contract or company practice.
 TELUS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HARVEY DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 202676, December 04, 2019
By: khateyyy

DOCTRINE:

Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because 'continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely,
as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to
dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or
disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his
continued employment.

The burden is on the employer to prove that the transfer or demotion of an employee was a valid exercise of management prerogative and was
not a mere subterfuge to get rid of an employee; failing in which, the employer will be found liable for constructive dismissal. For a transfer not
to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial
to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.

FACTS:

Harvey De Guzman was an employee of Telus International. He was a Senior Quality Analyst for DELL After Point of Sale.

On August 2, 2008, Telus received an escalation complaint from Jeanelyn Flores, Team Captain of DELL APoS, charging De Guzman of
disrespect and ridicule towards a person. Acting on the complaint of Flores, Telus, issued a Due Process form to De Guzman on charges of
"insulting or showing discourtesy, disrespect, or arrogance towards superiors or co-team members abusive behavior language which is outside
the bounds of morality" in violation of Telus' Code of Conduct. At the same time, De Guzman was placed in preventive suspension and was
directed to submit a written explanation to answer the charges. De Guzman complied and submitted his written explanation.

On August 11, 2008, Telus conducted an administrative hearing on the matter. Upon termination of the investigation, Telus found De Guzman
not liable for the offenses charged and did not impose any disciplinary sanction against him. Accordingly, De Guzman's preventive suspension
was lifted and he was fully compensated during the period. Telus, however, decided to remove De Guzman from his current designation and
transfer him to another practice. He was transferred to a different account and was informed to report the next day in Market Market, BGC
Branch.

Thinking that everything was in order, he eagerly reported to their night shift schedule in Market Market. However, at around one o'clock in the
morning, he received a text message asking him to report to the Ortigas office instead. Thereat, he was told that Sy made a mistake in instructing
him to report for work and that Sy would still need to find an account for him. Hence, he did not have any work yet despite the lifting of his
suspension.

De Guzman was then forced to apply for a vacation leave, while Sy was still looking for an account for them. In his desire to keep his job and to
receive his salary, he exhausted his earned vacation leaves and used up 26 days from August 22 to September 26, 2008. On September 28, 2008,
after all his vacation leaves were spent and a month after his preventive suspension, De Guzman inquired from Sy when he can report for work.
He was told that he would still report to him but since there was no endorsement yet for another program, he was not yet required to return to
work. As it is, he was considered as a "floater" and he will not get paid unless his floating status has been lifted.

De Guzman was also made to undergo a profiling interview in order for him to get the position. De Guzman asked Sy why he needed to undergo
such interview considering that he was not a new hire or a job applicant. Sy responded that passing the interview is a must as he was already
considered a "floater."

The foregoing series of events led to De Guzman's filing of a complaint before the NLRC for constructive dismissal, money claims and damages
against petitioners.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not De Guzman was constructively dismissed

RULING:

YES, De Guzman was constructively dismissed.

In this case, the series of actions done by Telus manifests that De Guzman was terminated in disguise and such actions amount to constructive
dismissal. It can easily be discerned that the series of harsh and unfair acts of the private respondents have made the employment condition of
petitioner uncongenial, averse, and intolerable.

First, after finding petitioner not liable for the offense charged, respondents did not immediately reinstate petitioner to his former position.
Second, private respondents informed petitioner that he was being transferred to a new account and directed to report to the Telus' branch office
at Market Market, Global City, Taguig City. However, after a few hours, respondents asked petitioner to just go home and wait since they
needed time to search for his account. While waiting for the promised new account, petitioner was compelled to utilize his leave credits.
Third, after his leave credits were consumed, private respondents placed petitioner on a floating status. It bears stressing that after more than one
(1) month from his exoneration and the lifting of the suspension, private respondents have not assigned petitioner a new account.

Finally, respondents required petitioner to undergo a profile interview supposedly to determine which account would he would best fit in. Such
profile interview was not a pre-qualification requirement for employment.

The conclusion is all too clear that Telus fostered a working environment that was hostile, discriminatory, unreasonable, and inequitable that
naturally compelled De Guzman to give up his employment thereat to avoid the difficulties he had to face just to keep his employment.

2. Whether or not placing an employee on “floating status” is valid in the absence of any valid justification or proof that there was a deficit
of account that bars the immediate transfer of employee or that the company was sustaining losses

NO, placing an employee on “floating status” is not valid in the absence of any valid justification or proof that there was a deficit of account that
bars the immediate transfer of employee or that the company was sustaining losses.

In the instant case, Telus did not provide any valid justification or presented proof that there was indeed a deficit of account that bars the
immediate transfer of De Guzman or that the company was sustaining losses that would justify placing De Guzman on floating status.

While it may be argued that the nature of the call center business is such that it is subject to seasonal peaks and troughs because of client
pullouts, changes in clients' requirements and demands, and a myriad other factors, still, the necessity to transfer De Guzman to another
practice/account does not depend on Telus' third party-client/contracts. When the controversy arose, Telus had several clients in its roster to
which it can easily assign De Guzman as Quality Analyst without any hindrance. Moreover, after the lifting of the preventive suspension of De
Guzman by Telus, the company had several job vacancy postings for the position of Quality Analysts, the very position previously occupied by
De Guzman.

Hence, the unwarranted acts of Telus evidently constitute proof of the constructive dismissal of De Guzman.

VILLOLA vs. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. (UPL)

G.R. No. 230047, October 9, 2019
By: TheGreyQueen

DOCTRINE:

Resignation is defined as a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by
the act of relinquishment.

As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation
must be considered in determining whether in fact, he or she intended to sever from his or her employment. The fact of resignation is therefore
supported by the concurrence of the following:
(a) the intent to relinquish one's office; and
(b) the overt act of relinquishment. In illegal dismissal cases, fundamental is the rule that when an employer interposes the defense of
resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.

FACTS:

On April 1, 2010, Villola was employed by UPL as its Information Technology (IT) Officer. Almost a year after his hiring, Villola was assigned
as IT and Communications Manager. His duties and responsibilities included, among others, help desk administration, systems administration
and implementation of the CORE program (CORE), a repository of all information gathered from applicants, crew and former crew of UPL.
UPL initially outsourced the implementation of the CORE to HelpDesk, an IT consultant. The administration and implementation of the CORE
was later transferred to Villola. During the first quarter of 2013, UPL observed that Villola was unable to implement the CORE despite budget
allotment therefore for two years. In this respect, UPL had to engage the services of HelpDesk. UPL found that HelpDesk was otherwise able to
perform Villola’s key functions as IT and Communications Manager.

Meanwhile, aside from rendering work for UPL, Villola was also engaged as trainer for a UPL affiliate for the latter's Anti-Piracy Awareness
Program. UPL tolerated Villola's engagement as trainer, although training classes detracted him from his core duties and responsibilities as IT
and Communications Manager of UPL.
On May 31, 2013, Villola received an e-mail message from Mr. Joey G. Consunji (Consunji), General Manager of UPL, instructing Villola to
submit to management a written resignation letter indicating therein the effectivity date of his resignation, i.e., June 1, 2013.

Villola stopped reporting for work starting June 2013 and from then on, no longer receiving salaries from UPL. Villola, however, continued to
render part-time work during the period from June to July 2013 as trainer in the Anti-Piracy Awareness Program of a UPL affiliate, which were
conducted at the company premises of UPL.
On June 27, 2013, Villola, under the name of "DRD Technology Solutions," submitted to Consunji his proposal for the scanning project. The
scanning project, however, did not materialize.

On September 30, 2014, Villola filed against UPL a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other money claims as well as claims for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:

Whether Villola is considered voluntarily resigned or dismissed from employment

RULING:

Villola is considered voluntarily resigned from his employment. He was not dismissed by UPL.

At the outset, while Villola's resignation letter serves as proof of the latter's formal relinquishment of his employment with UPL, the absence
thereof is not enough to rule out the conclusion that no resignation ever took place.

On the other hand, the contemporaneous and immediate subsequent acts of Villola after his supposed resignation from UPL should be considered
in determining if there is truth to the contention that he indeed resigned from UPL.

The acts of Villola, particularly when he: (1) failed to question Consunji's request to submit a written resignation letter; (2) stopped reporting for
work, at his own initiative, after May 31, 2013; and (3) submitted on June 27, 2013 the agreed proposal to UPL under "DRD Solutions," which
appears to be co-written by a third party in the name of Mr. Dulay, impels this Court to arrive at the logical conclusion that there existed a prior
agreement between UPL and Villola – that instead of terminating Villola's employment with UPL on the ground of redundancy, he agreed that
he will simply voluntarily cease his employment with UPL effective June 1, 2013, and thereafter render his services to UPL for its scanning
project as an independent consultant. Moreover, the fact that Villola submitted his proposal under a name of another corporate entity is a clear
indication that he was no longer connected as an employee of UPL after May 31, 2013.

The concurrence of Villola's resignation, coupled with his actions thereafter, ultimately support the finding that he resigned from UPL.

IV.D. Preventive Suspension

COLEGIO SAN AGUSTIN-BACOLOD vs. MELINDA M. MONTAÑO

G.R. No. 212333, March 28, 2022
By: Cara V

DOCTRINE:

The implementing rules of the Labor Code allows an employer to preventively suspend an employee if continued employment poses a serious
and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or co-workers. In preventive suspension, the employer safeguards itself from further
harm or loss that may further be caused by the erring employee.

FACTS:

CSA-Bacolod is an educational institution duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. CSA-Bacolod first employed
respondent as a chemistry instructor in 1973. In 2003, she was appointed school registrar; her appointment was renewed several times.
Respondent alleged that in her reappointment letter for the 2009-2011 term, there was a diminution of her salary; her basic salary was reduced
from P33,319.00 to P26,658.20. She thus wrote to the Human Resource Director to seek an explanation. It was the school president who
responded, and he stated that her total gross pay did not change as the school merely opted to break down the amount to show the amount of
honorarium. Respondent claimed that this was the time when the president started to show his bias against her. Thereafter, respondent was
suspended, and her employment was eventually terminated due to complaints from two faculty members alleging that she allowed some students
to attend the graduation ceremony despite not meeting the requirements. These events led to her filing of the complaint. Respondent admitted
that she allowed certain students to join the March 2009 graduation ceremony in CSA-Bacolod even if they did not pass some of their subjects.
She claimed that she merely continued the practice of previous registrars; she even imposed more stringent rules in determining when ineligible
students may join the rites. She added that she allowed these students to participate due to humanitarian reasons. Respondent claimed that
management did not consider her explanation and she was instead served with a notice of charges. She responded to the notice. She asserted that
the basis of the notice was not really the letter complaints but mere letters seeking for clarification of the school's policy regarding graduation.
She also questioned the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Committee created by the president. CSA-Bacolod, for its defense, posited that
respondent's suspension and eventual dismissal was due to gross misconduct resulting to loss of trust and confidence. A notice of charges was
issued to respondent for gross misconduct, tampering of school records, and willful breach of trust and confidence or gross negligence. The Ad
Hoc Committee deliberated and thereafter recommended the termination of respondent's employment for gross misconduct and willful breach of
trust and confidence. The president issued a notice of termination.

The LA ruled in favor of respondent, finding her suspension and dismissal illegal. This resulted to the award of backwages, separation pay,
damages, and attorney's fees. It also awarded salary differentials due to diminution of benefits. In ruling that respondent's preventive suspension
was illegal, the LA found that her continued presence in the school during the investigation would not have posed a serious and imminent threat
to the life or property of the school and its employees. As to respondent's dismissal, the LA found that her act cannot be construed as gross or
serious misconduct. Respondent had basis in allowing the ineligible students to attend the graduation rites: a long-standing practice as also
observed by the previous registrars. Also, the students concerned made written requests that were endorsed by their respective deans and
consented to by their respective parents. Further, there can be no loss of trust and confidence in her as respondent's act did not place the school in
an uncompromising situation. Indeed, there was a school directive that students who failed to comply with the requirements should not be
allowed to march; this directive, however, as held by the LA, was not implemented up until this instance. Respondent merely followed the
accepted practice. The LA concluded that respondent's offense is just simple misconduct for which the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate.
In addition to backwages, the LA awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstating respondent because of the strained relations. As to the claim of
diminution of benefits, the LA found that the lower salary on her latest appointment as compared with the previous salary violated Article 100 of
the Labor Code. As respondent was already enjoying the higher salary for more or less six years, it is just and equitable that she continues
receiving the same amount, therefore entitling her to differentials. The LA awarded moral damages as the school supposedly acted in bad faith in
unjustly dismissing respondent, and exemplary damages so that similar acts may be suppressed and discouraged. Attorney's fees were also
awarded.

NLRC reversed the LA and ruled that respondent was validly dismissed. It also ruled that she is not entitled to salary differentials. Respondent
indeed committed serious misconduct and breach of trust and confidence reposed by the school in her. Despite being firm in reminding the deans
and other officials about the policy on graduation, she herself allowed ineligible students to participate in the ceremony. This act was in total
violation of the school's policy. With the finding of just cause, there is no basis to award backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. As to the issue of preventive suspension, the NLRC found that its imposition was valid. Respondent's continued
presence posed a serious and imminent threat to the school's property. Being the school registrar, she had access to student records; there is a
possibility that the records may be "stage-managed." With regard to the salary differentials, the NLRC ruled that respondent continued to receive
the same gross pay of P33,319.00.

CA reversed the NLRC Decision and reinstated the LA Decision with modification on the award of money claims. The CA ruled that
respondent's act was indeed an act of misconduct; however, it was not serious enough to warrant the penalty of dismissal. There was no wrongful
intent. The CA did not award moral damages as the finding of illegal dismissal does not automatically warrant moral damages — bad faith on
the part of the employer was not proven.

ISSUE:

Whether or not preventive suspension is proper

RULING:

YES, preventive suspension is proper

CSA-Bacolod acted well within its right in doing so. The threat raised by the school was not unfounded as respondent was school registrar,
whose functions include evaluation of subjects and credits earned by students and enforcement of graduation requirements. Respondent’s
violations was indeed related to her functions as school registrar. With her continued presence during the investigation, it is not impossible that
the school records under her custody may be tampered; it is also not impossible that the investigation may be influenced given the nature and
ascendancy of her position.

PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. SYLVIA DE LUNA

G.R. No. 209437 March 17, 2021
By: Narika

DOCTRINE:

While an employee may be preventively suspended while undergoing investigation for an alleged violation, the period for such suspension shall
not exceed 30 days. When this period expires, the employer has the obligation to reinstate the employee by actual or payroll reinstatement.

FACTS:

PHAI is an organization of the homeowners of Philam Homes, Quezon City. De Luna worked as PHAI’s Office Supervisor and was in charge of
accepting payments from clients for reservations of rental facilities. Bundoc, as cashier, received membership dues and other incomes, made
daily deposits of collections, prepared checks and was in charge of petty cash fund. During an audit of PHAI’s books of accounts in September
of 2008, irregularities were discovered, such as issuance of unauthorized official receipts, unrecorded and undeposited collections and
encashment of personal checks.

The investigating committee found that De Luna and Bundoc were involved in said fraudulent activities. Both De Luna and Bundoc participated
before the investigating committee and were later required to appear before the investigating committee to explain said irregularities and to
account for the amount misappropriated. PHAI later demanded payment of P757,315.00 from De Luna and informed her of her dismissal from
service by reason of dishonesty, misappropriation and malversation of funds. Bundoc was also dismissed from service a few months ahead of De
Luna, after Bundoc took a leave of absence for 30 days. Both De Luna and Bundoc filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, underpayment and non-payment of wages.
ISSUE:

Whether or not De Luna’s preventive suspension was in excess of 10 days?

RULING:

YES, De Luna’s preventive suspension exceeded the period of 30 days allowed by law.

Since De Luna’s preventive suspension lasted for 40 days, even though her dismissal was valid, PHAI should have paid De Luna her salary for
the 10 days in excess of the 30-day suspension period.

IV.E. Reliefs from Illegal Dismissal

FERNANDO C. GOSOSO vs. LEYTE LUMBER YARD

G.R. No. 205257, January 13, 2021
By: primrose

DOCTRINE:

If reinstatement of the dismissed employee is rendered impossible, an award of separation pay is proper in lieu of reinstatement. The separation
pay is equivalent to one (1)-month salary per year of service up to the time the employee stopped working

FACTS:

Leyte Lumber, a construction supply and hardware store, hired Gososo as a sales representative. Gososo allegedly overstepped the boundaries of
Leyte Lumber's company policies. Gosoco failed to course the orders through authorized checkers before the items are released and left his work
area without the supervisor’s consent.

When he returned to work on October 11, 2008, Yu allegedly told Gososo to sign a prepared document. Gososo declined since the document
contained admissions of offenses that he did not commit. Irked by Gososo's refusal, Yu informed him of his termination from work. Yu allegedly
even threw a pair of scissors at Gososo but missed. Respondents confirmed that Gososo was reprimanded on October 10, 2008 for violating
standard operating procedures and established company policies. On even date, respondents claimed that Gososo filed a leave of absence for
October 11, 2008 purportedly to attend his son's graduation, in disregard of the rule that leaves of absence must be filed and approved days
before the actual date of leave.

According to respondents, Gososo did go on an unapproved leave on October 11, 2008 and even allegedly extended his absence. These prompted
respondents to issue Gososo another Memorandum on October 13, 2008 wherein they requested him to report back to work, otherwise he will be
considered to have abandoned his work. Gososo, however, did not report back to work Aggrieved, Gososo filed on October 13, 2008 a
Complaint for illegal constructive dismissal against respondents, non-payment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day
allowance, vacation and sick leave pay, separation pay, moral damages, and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is entitled to separation pay and his other money claims
RULING:

YES, the petitioner is entitled to separation pay and other money claims.

Where the employee fails to prove the fact of his or her illegal dismissal, and the employer has also not demonstrated that the employee
abandoned his or her work, the case usually ends with the employee's reinstatement without the payment of backwages. Should reinstatement be
rendered impossible by strained relations of the parties, become unreasonable with the passage of time since the legal controversy, or otherwise
attained impossibility or impracticability due to the present prevailing circumstances, equity impels the Court to award the petitioner separation
pay equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service, computed up to the time he stopped working for respondents.

Upon a correlative finding of lack of abandonment of work, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without payment of
backwages. As reinstatement is already rendered impossible under the present circumstances, respondents are ordered to pay petitioner
separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, computed at one (1)-month salary for every year of service until petitioner stopped working for
respondents.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. MANUEL C. BULATAO

 G.R. No. 200972, December 11, 2019
By: Bonana

DOCTRINE:

Although reinstatement is a matter of right, the award of separation pay is an exception to such rule, as it is awarded in lieu of reinstatement in
the following circumstances:
1. when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the realities of the situation;
2. reinstatement is inimical to the employer's interest;
3. reinstatement is no longer feasible;
4. reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved;
5. the employer is prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 6. facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened;
or
7. strained relations between the employer and employee.

FACTS:

Respondent Bulatao was formerly the Senior Vice-President (SVP) of the Information Technology Group of the Petitioner PNB. The respondent
alleged that on October 1, 1999, PNB’s President Mr. Benjamin Palma and Mr. Samit Roy, an Indian national, hosted a dinner for PNB’s IT
staff. In the dinner, the conclusion of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between PNB and Mr. Roy was announced.
Additionally, it was announced that not all of the IT staff would be retained because they would be required to undergo an International
Competitive Test as a precondition for absorption. Meanwhile, those who would not be absorbed would be offered retirement packages.

The respondent objected to the JVA. He maintained that it was merely a ploy to force the IP personnel who were not supportive of the project to
leave the bank. In a letter dated November 10, 1999, the respondent manifested his intent to retire. Pertinent in the letter was his objection to the
JVA and his manifestation that the working environment brought about by the recent decisions of the management made it difficult for him to
stay at the employ of the petitioner. Moreover, in the said letter, he stated that he was going to be on an official leave of absence.

Meanwhile, the JVA did not materialize. The respondent had a meeting with Mr. Lucio Tan, a member of the Board of the Petitioner. He was
asked to reconsider his decision to retire and instead, to join Mr. Tan’s management Team. Subsequently, the respondent went back to work on
January 1, 2000. During this time, his previous letter was not yet acted upon, causing the respondent to withdraw the same.

However, on January 29, 2000, the respondent was informed that the Board had already accepted his decision and informed him not to report to
work. As a consequence, the respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA’s order for reinstatement was proper

RULING:

NO, the order of reinstatement was not proper.

Taking into account the lapse of time as well as the age and capacity to work of Bulatao, reinstatement is no longer feasible. In fact, Bulatao
revealed that he has suffered and is still suffering from various medical ailments such as stroke, arthritis, gout, cervical spondylosis, and even
had to undergo cancer treatments and heart surgery during the pendency of this case. Thus, the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
more appropriate under the circumstances.

V. Jurisdiction and Remedies

JOSE EDWIN ESICO vs. ALPHALAND CORPORATION

G.R. No. 216716 November 17, 2021
By: attyATW DOCTRINE:

Labor tribunals do not have jurisdiction to settle various issues necessitating application of our civil law on obligations and contracts.

FACTS:

Jose Edwin Esico, a former pilot of Philippine Airforce, was employed by Philweb Corporation, Alphaland’s group of companies, as Risk and
Security Management Officer (RSMO) on March 19, 2010. Among other benefits, Esico had a monthly basic pay of Php90,000 pursuant to their
letter proposal which was signed by Esico on October 28, 2010.
On April 19, 2010, Esico was concurrently engaged by Alphaland as a rotary wing pilot assigned to fly its Chairperson, Ongpin, to his various
engagements within and outside the country. It was agreed that his compensation will be paid by Philweb Corporation. In addition, the
employment contract provided that the company will send Esico on the ground and flight course training and in return Esico will render service
to the Company for a minimum period of five years beginning on April 19, 2010. Should Esico fail to complete the minimum of five years of
service he shall reimburse the company for the expenses spent on his trainings subject to proportionate reduction equivalent to 5% per completed
quarter of actual service.

Pursuant to the above agreement, Esico sent an email to to Alphaland’s head of security asking for recommendation on what salary figure to
quote respondents for his employment as Pilot.
Philweb adjusted Esico’s compensation package from Php90,000 to Php115,000.00 with an additional Php25,000 monthly representative
allowance. Esico signed the job offer sheet believing that it was the compensation package that he had asked for separately from his work as
RSMO for Philweb.

On December 23, 2011, Esico found out that he had been transferred from Phil web Alphaland because he could not access his payroll with Phil
web.

On July 13, 2012, after more than two years, Esico tendered his resignation letter, citing the following reasons: (a)serious embarrassments and
insults had been committed against his person, honor and reputation on several occasions by a company officer; (b) serious flight safety
concerns; (c) absence of employment contract with Alphaland Corporation; (d) absence of helicopter recurrent training; ( e) unresolved issues on
services already rendered in favor of Alphaland Corporation as wing pilot from May 2, 2011 to June 2012; and (f) other related matters.

Pursuant to Esico’s resignation letter, Alphaland’s counsel sent a demand letter to Esico asking for reimbursement in the amount of
Php977,720.00 representing the portion of his flight training expenses.

Esico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC and sent a reply letter to respondent’s counsel
refuting the allegations in the demand letter.

On August 2, 2012, Alphaland filed a complaint against Esico for alleged wrongful resignation and damages with the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether the labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the complaint for wrongful resignation and damages pursuant to the employment contract?

RULING:

Labor tribunals do not have jurisdiction to settle issues necessitating application of the civil law.

“In this case, the bone of contention between the parties lies in the interpretation of the employment contract, specifically the clause on the
minimum service requirement in consideration of expenses (advances) for flight trainings. Unarguably, respondents Alphaland claim payment of
actual damages equivalent to the amount they advanced for Esico's flight training who reneged on his contractual obligation by his premature
resignation. Respondents Alphaland's cause of action, the supposed violation of the right-duty correlative between the parties, hinges on the
enforceability of the contentious clause in the employment contract. Clearly, respondents' recourse against Esico is based on our law on
contracts.”

Jurisdiction being set by law and not by the parties, the LA and the NLRC cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents Alphaland's complaint
just by the mere expedient of the designation thereof as one for "wrongful resignation with claims of damages" and the employer-employee
relationship between the parties.

Alphaland’s contention that Esico’s failure to serve written notice of his resignation at least a month prior violated article 300 of the Labor Code
which makes him liable to pay damages is untenable. The claim for damages, as ruled by the Supreme Court, arose form the Esico’s supposed
breach of employment contract.

V.A. Labor Arbiter

SALVACION A. LAMADRID vs. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED

GR No. 200658, June 23, 2021
By: chie

DOCTRINE:

Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide termination
disputes involving all workers. "Overseas Filipino worker" refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a citizen or on board a vessel navigating the foreign seas other than a government ship
used for military or noncommercial purposes or on an installation located offshore or on the high seas; to be used interchangeably with migrant
worker.

FACTS:
In 1990, Cathay hired Salvacion A. Lamadrid (Lamadrid) as a cabin crew member. Cathay's Conditions of Service stipulated that all its cabin
crew shall be based in Hong Kong. Prior to her termination in 2007, Lamadrid had rendered about 17 years of service in Cathay, and held the
position of Senior Purser.

On May 19, 2007, Donald Lal (Lal), Airport Services Officer of Cathay in Sydney Airport, received a report from Customer Officer Mary Greiss
(Mary) that some crew members of Cathay flight CX 139, including Lamadrid, were caught in possession of goods after alighting from the
aircraft.

Mary handed to Lal a plastic bag containing a 1.5 liter Evian water bottle and a pile of magazines confiscated from Lamadrid as well as the
photocopy of the latter's passport. The confiscated items were turned over to Cindy Lowe (Lowe), the Airport Services Supervisor, who then
finally surrendered the items to Brian Davis (Davis), Cathay's Airport Services Manager in Sydney Airport, after Lowe recorded the confiscated
items on Lamadrid's passport. On May 21, 2007, Lamadrid and a certain Yvette Tsang (Tsang) met with Davis and pleaded him not to report the
incident to their Hong Kong office. They also mentioned their 17 years of service with Cathay. Davis, however, responded that a report was
already relayed and the confiscated items had already been sent to Hongkong via flight CX 100.

In a letter dated May 22, 2007, Cathay requested Lamadrid to submit a written explanation regarding the May 19, 2007 incident aboard flight CX
139 and to show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed against her since removal of company property without authorization is
considered a serious misconduct.

On July 10, 2007, Cathay informed Lamadrid of the termination of her services effective immediately for committing serious misconduct by
removing company property without authorization. According to Cathay, it could no longer repose its trust and confidence on petitioner
considering the seriousness of her violation.

Hence, Lamadrid instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against Cathay and Lo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission have jurisdiction over the case

RULING:

YES, LA and NLRC have jurisdiction over the case.

Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide termination
disputes involving all workers. This provision must be read together with Section 10 of RA 8042 as amended by RA 10022,50 as well as Section
3 of RA 10022.

SECTION 2. Section 3, paragraph (a) of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

(a) "Overseas Filipino worker" refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated
activity in a state of which he or she is not a citizen or on board a vessel navigating the foreign seas other than a government
ship used for military or non-commercial purposes or on an installation located offshore or on the high seas; to be used
interchangeably with migrant worker.

Under the foregoing definition, Lamadrid is considered an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW). She had been engaged in a remunerated activity in
a state where she is not a citizen. Cathay's cabin crew are all based in Hong Kong, and in fact Lamadrid resided and leased an apartment in Hong
Kong during her stint with Cathay. As an OFW faced with a termination dispute, Lamadrid's case may be heard and decided by the Arbiter under
Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code in relation to RA 8042 as amended by RA 10022.

V.B. National Labor Relations Commission

PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC FOODS, INC. vs. VIOLETA NOCHE

G.R. No. 202392, October 04, 2021
By: Hernalisa

DOCTRINE:

The general rule is that appeals by an employer before the NLRC of decisions by a labor arbiter that involve monetary awards to an employee
must be secured by a cash or surety bond in the full amount of the monetary award.

By way of exception, the payment of this full amount may be excused if the appealing employer files a motion to reduce bond showing
meritorious grounds, and upon posting of a bond in a reasonable amount.

Mcburnie requires the concurrence of the following conditions before an aggrieved employer appealing before the NLRC may be allowed to post
a bond in a reduced amount:
 1. The employer-appellant files a motion to reduce bond;
2. The motion to reduce bond shall be based on meritorious grounds;
3. The employer-appellant posts the provisional percentage of at least 10% of the monetary award, excluding therefrom the award of
damages and attorney's fees;
4. The provisional bond must be posted within the reglementary period for appeal; and
5. If the NLRC eventually determines that a greater or the full amount of the bond shall be posted, the employer-appellant shall comply
accordingly within ten (10) days from notice of the NLRC order directing the such posting of the increased or full amount of the bond.

Once these are complied with, the aggrieved employer's appeal of the labor arbiter's decision before the NLRC shall be deemed perfected.
Notably, the requisites laid out by Mcburnie also presupposes a sixth requirement: the NLRC issues an express ruling on the appellant's motion
to reduce bond.

FACTS:

Petitioner Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. (PRBFI) is a business entity engaged in the manufacturing, processing, and distribution of coconut
products for export. PRBFI employed respondents as coconut parers.

Respondents filed a complaint for non-regularization with the DOLE. Allegedly acting on product quality complaints and claims for
reimbursement and damages from some of its clients, PRBFI sent letters to respondents suspending them for 15 days due to issues of product
contamination.
In their joint answer to PRBFI's letters, some of the respondents denied involvement in the product contamination incident. PRBFI dismissed
respondents from work. Respondents filed a complaint against PRBFI for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, regularization, damages, and
reinstatement before the NLRC.

In their Position Paper, respondents averred that they were dismissed from work without a prior investigation or an opportunity to air their side.
Respondents also raised the lack of basis of their dismissal due to loss of trust and confidence, as this ground refers to managerial and
confidential employees and respondents were only rank-and-file workers of PRBFI.

PRBFI maintained that respondents were properly and correctly dismissed from employment. Per PRBFI, thirteen (13) coconut parers, including
the eleven (11) respondents herein, were thus subjected to an administrative investigation on the product contamination incident.

The Labor Arbiter ruled for the respondents. The Labor Arbiter declared respondents entitled to reinstatement to their former positions in PRBFI,
payment of full backwages and other benefits, and enjoyment of seniority rights and privileges. The Labor Arbiter further found respondents to
be regular employees of PRBFI.

PRBFI appealed to the NLRC. It also filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Reduce Bond (Motion to Reduce Bond) and tendered a cash bond in
the amount of P100,000.00.

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also denied respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. They imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. The CA granted
respondents' Petition for Certiorari. CA likewise denied PRBFI's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, PRBFI's Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA was correct in considering PRBFI’s appeal of the Labor Arbiter's Decision before the NLRC as not perfected for its failure to
file a bond?

RULING:

YES, CA was correct in considering PRBFI’s appeal of the Labor Arbiter's Decision before the NLRC as not perfected for its failure to file a
bond.
Appeals of decisions rendered by a labor arbiter that grant a monetary award in favor of an employee require the aggrieved employer to file a
bond. Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended (2011 NLRC Rules), provides the general rule that appeals by an
employer before the NLRC of decisions by a labor arbiter that involve monetary awards to an employee must be secured by a cash or surety
bond in the full amount of the monetary award. By way of exception, the payment of this full amount may be excused if the appealing employer
files a motion to reduce bond showing meritorious grounds, and upon posting of a bond in a reasonable amount.

Mcburnie v. Ganzon (Mcburnie) has already set the "reasonable amount" of the provisional reduced bond at a percentage of 10% of the monetary
award, excluding the amount of damages and attorney's fees, if any.

Records, however, show that PRBFI's Motion to Reduce Bond was never acted upon by the NLRC. Still, the NLRC resolved petitioner's appeal
of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on the merits and issued its own resolutions thereon.
Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules provides that there should be no implied approval of a jurisdictional requirement that has not been
complied with. Otherwise, the ground of lack of jurisdiction becomes a waivable defect in procedure. Whether the NLRC accepts or rejects the
appellant's motion to reduce bond, the ruling must be unequivocal, and such ruling must be issued before or at the time the NLRC resolves the
appeal by final judgment. Failure to do so shall render the NLRC liable for grave abuse of discretion for having ruled on an appeal without
acquiring jurisdiction over the same, and the judgment it had issued shall be vacated as null and void.

JOSE DEL PILAR vs. BATANGAS II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELIC II)
G.R. No. 160121, February 19, 2020
By: yourhonor

DOCTRINE:

An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective means of
settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and compromise,
mediation and arbitration

FACTS:

Complainants were employees of BATELEC II occupying various positions. They held rallies to denounce the alleged corrupt, anomalous, and
irregular activities of some BATELEC II Officials.
As a result, these employees were dismissed for participating in an illegal strike, which prompted the nine (9) complainants and eight (8) other
employees to file a case of illegal dismissal against BATELEC II. On October 15, 1993, the Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos, ruled in favor of the
complainants. Thereby ordering BATELEC II to immediately reinstate the complainants to their former positions and to jointly and severally
pay complainants full backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Later on March 31 1995, BATELEC II filed a manifestation with motion before the Labor Arbiter arguing that reinstatement has become
impossible because of a major reorganization and streamlining that it had undergone, which resulted in the abolition of some positions pertaining
to the complainants. Thus, on September 29, 1995, the Labor Arbiter rendered declaring impossibility in the physical reinstatement of all
complainants and in lieu they are awarded the payment of separation pay. Hence, the complainants filed an appeal beforethe NLRC but the same
was denied and it found out that they were arbitrarily dismissed for an authorized cause which warranted the payment of indemnity and it also
ruled that in computing for backwages, the base pa is the basic pay plus allowances.

The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed because five (5) of the complainants entered into an amicable
settlement with BATELEC II. The resolution of the NLRC was then affirmed.

BATELEC II then elevated the case before the Supreme Court to challenge the award of full backwages and the very award of backwages
because the amount is only awarded to illegally dismissed employees and not to those whose former positions had already been abolished and
reinstatement is not possible. The complainants also add that instead. Of an appeal to the CA, BATELEC II should have filed a petition for
injunction with the NLRC questioning the computation of the award pursuant to Rule XI, Sec. 1 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NLRC can issue writs of injunction as applied in this case

RULING:

NLRC can issue writs of injunction but it did not do so in this case due to lack of urgency and irreparable injury.

Article 225(e) of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC "[t]o enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party," while Sec. 1, Rule X of the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure, as amended, pertinently provides as follows:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute. - A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the
Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 [now 225 of the Labor Code, as
amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, involving or
arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.

In Philippine Airlines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court expounded on the NLRC's power to issue an injunction, viz.:

Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of
action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under· any standard of compensation. The application
of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly
heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which
appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending parties,
 the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is also a
special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.

On the other hand, Article 223 provides that decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
NLRC. The NLRC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code.
From the finding of illegal dismissal up to the execution of the monetary award, the jurisdiction of the NLRC is appellate in nature. "Article
218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that
Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes."

Moreover, there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the complainants might suffer. They are already assured of adequate
compensation. "[A]n injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it generally has not proved to be an
effective means of settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use the non-judicial process of
negotiation and compromise, mediation and arbitration."

V.C. Court of Appeals

PHILAM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. SYLVIA DE LUNA

G.R. No. 209437 March 17, 2021
By: Narika

DOCTRINE:

In labor cases, the proper recourse from the adverse decision or final order of the NLRC is via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to the appellate court on the ground that the labor tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction.

From the CA, the labor suit is elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on pure
questions of law; questions of fact may be entertained and reviewed only in exceptional circumstances.

When a labor case is brought to this Court for final review, We are confronted with a question of law, that is: has the CA correctly determined
whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the determination and resolution of the NLRC?

Gabriel v. Petron Corporation instructs:

Specifically, we are limited to:

1. Ascertaining the correctness of the CA's decision in finding the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion. This is done by
examining, on the basis of the parties' presentations, whether the CA correctly determined that at the NLRC level, all the adduced
pieces of evidence were considered; no evidence which should not have been considered was considered; and the evidence presented
supports the NLRC's findings; and
2. Deciding other jurisdictional error that attended the CA's interpretation or application of the law.
FACTS:

PHAI is an organization of the homeowners of Philam Homes, Quezon City. De Luna worked as PHAI’s Office Supervisor and was in charge of
accepting payments from clients for reservations of rental facilities. Bundoc, as cashier, received membership dues and other incomes, made
daily deposits of collections, prepared checks and was in charge of petty cash fund. During an audit of PHAI’s books of accounts in September
of 2008, irregularities were discovered, such as issuance of unauthorized official receipts, unrecorded and undeposited collections and
encashment of personal checks.

The investigating committee found that De Luna and Bundoc were involved in said fraudulent activities. Both De Luna and Bundoc participated
before the investigating committee and were later required to appear before the investigating committee to explain said irregularities and to
account for the amount misappropriated. PHAI later demanded payment of P757,315.00 from De Luna and informed her of her dismissal from
service by reason of dishonesty, misappropriation and malversation of funds. Bundoc was also dismissed from service a few months ahead of De
Luna, after Bundoc took a leave of absence for 30 days. Both De Luna and Bundoc filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, underpayment and non-payment of wages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA can review the factual matters of the case

RULING:

Yes, the CA can review factual matters.

The CA, pursuant to rule 65 of the Rules of Court, has the power to examine records and evaluate evidence to confirm their significance and to
disregard the labor tribunal’s factual findings if its conclusions were not supported by evidence. Here, the CA, in order to arrive at a just decision
of the case, modified NLRC’s award of nominal damages in favor of Bundoc and ordered payment of De Luna’s 10-day salary.

ITALKARAT 18, INC. VS. JURALDINE N. GERASMIO

G.R. No. 221411, September 28, 2020
By: macchiato

DOCTRINE:

It is precisely this final and executory nature of NLRC decisions that makes a special civil action of certiorari applicable to such decisions,
considering that appeals from the NLRC to this Court were eliminated.

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, we have explained that; Ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction
between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the
concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate
Bill No. 1495.

In sum, while under the sixth paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC becomes final and executory after the lapse
of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, the adverse party is not precluded from assailing it via Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 before the Court of Appeals and then to this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45

It must be noted that under Article 229 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, a decision of the NLRC already becomes final after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties; on the other hand, the reglementary period with respect to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is sixty (60) days.

FACTS:

Juraldine alleged that the Company hired him on June 1, 1990. In 1993, he was designated as the Maintenance Head and Tool and Die Maker
until his dismissal on November 20, 2008 on the ground of serious business losses. He claimed that during and prior to the last quarter of 2008,
the Company had repeatedly informed its employees of its proposed retrenchment program because it was suffering from serious business losses.
In particular, Juraldine claimed that Noel San Pedro (San Pedro), the then OIC/Manager of the Company, informed him sometime in November
2008 that the Company was planning to retrench a substantial number of workers in the Maintenance and Tool and Die Section; and that if he
opts to retire early, he will be given a sum of P170,000.00. San Pedro then allegedly cautioned Juraldine that if he will not accept the offer to
retire early, the Company would eventually retrench or terminate him from his employment, in which case, he might not even receive anything.

In light of the foregoing, Juraldine executed and signed a resignation letter and quitclaim on November 20, 2008. He was then informed to return
on November 25, 2008 to get his check worth P170,000.00. However, to his dismay, Juraldine was later informed by San Pedro that he would be
receiving only the amount of P26,901.34. Thus, Juraldine, through his lawyer, sent a letter dated November 25, 2008, essentially demanding the
amount of P170,000.00 he was allegedly promised earlier. Since the Company did not respond, Juraldine filed the instant complaint for illegal
dismissal.

On the other hand, the Company essentially alleged that Juraldine voluntarily resigned from his job, thus, his claims are baseless. The Company
admitted that it hired Juraldine as maintenance personnel on December 1, 1989. It further alleged that during the last year of his employment,
Juraldine took leaves of absence in order to process his papers for a possible seaman's job. Moreover, the Company stated that on October 20,
2008, Juraldine tendered his resignation and demanded from the Company the payment of his separation pay on account of his long years of
service. On November 6, 2008 and on November 20, 2008 respectively, he executed and signed a waiver and quitclaim which shows, inter alia,
the computation of his receivables. He then signed the voucher for this purpose and thereafter received the check issued to him representing his
last pay. Surprisingly, he sent a demand letter, through his lawyer, on November 28, 2008, for the payment of P170,000.00 in addition to the
amount already received by him. The Company refused to pay him the additional amount for lack of basis in law and in fact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition was proper despite having been filed after the NLRC Decision had become final and executory

RULING:

YES, petition was proper. Final and executory NLRC decisions may be subject of a petition for certiorari.

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, we have explained that; Ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by
certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction
between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the
concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate
Bill No. 1495.

Certainly, given that the special civil action for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period, the CA committed no error and was acting in
accordance with the law when it took cognizance of Juraldine's petition.

V.G. DOLE Regional Directors

DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS CO. vs. RENANTE A. ARMENTA

G.R. No. 240144, February 3, 2021
By: Cara V
DOCTRINE:

The rules governing jurisdiction on labor standards claims, as set in People's Broadcasting Service may be summed up as follows:
1. If the claim involves labor standards benefits mandated by the Labor Code or other labor legislation regardless of the amount prayed
for and provided that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, jurisdiction is with the DOLE regardless of whether the
action was brought about by the filing of a complaint or not.
2. If the claim involves labor standards benefits mandated by the Labor Code or other labor legislation regardless of the amount prayed
for and there is no existing employer-employee relationship or the claim is coupled with a prayer for reinstatement, jurisdiction is with
the LA/NLRC.

FACTS:

To ensure the protection and welfare of drivers and conductors in the public utility bus industry, the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), in the exercise of its rule-making power, issued Department Order No. 118-12 (DO 118-12) on January 13, 2012 providing for a fixed
and performance compensation scheme in the computation of public utility bus driver's or conductor's wage. The goal of the issuance was to
insure public road transport safety by improving the working conditions, compensation and competence of bus drivers and conductors thereby
eliminating their risktaking behavior. The DOLE, through its Regional Director, issued Labor Standards Compliance Certificates (LSCC) as Bus
Transportation to Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (DMMWI) for having complied with DO 118-12, other labor laws, rules and regulations. The
certificates of compliance were valid for one (1) year from issuance unless earlier revoked or cancelled.

On July 28, 2014, a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive
leave, 13th month pay, and attorney's fees was filed by the respondents against Del Monte Land Transport Bus, Co., Inc. (DLTB). DLTB is a
domestic corporation established on March 16, 2010 with principal office address at 650 EDSA, Malibay, Pasay City, Metro Manila. It is
engaged in the transportation business and duly registered to operate as a common carrier plying the route of Metro Manila to Batangas, Laguna,
Bicol, and Visayas and vice versa.

Respondents, on the other hand, are drivers and conductors who were hired by DLTB on various dates from 2010-2013.
They averred that since the start of their employment, they have yet to receive their 13th month pay, holiday pay, five (5)-day service incentive
leave pay, rest day pay, overtime pay, and ECOLA. They further claimed that their daily salaries were at P337.00, below the prevailing daily
minimum wage of P466.00.

For its part, DLTB alleged that prior to the implementation of DO 118-12 mandating the "fixed wage plus commission" scheme, respondents
were paid on a purely commission basis. When DO 118-12 took effect, petitioner asserted that respondents were being paid their salaries based
on the number of hours they actually worked plus commission which is at least 1% of the gross revenue for passengers and 2.5% of the gross
revenue for baggage's transported by them. DLTB claimed that respondents are not entitled to receive the statutory minimum wage rates for the
National Capital Region (NCR) because they are all assigned in various operations centers of DLTB located in the South Luzon and Visayas
regions at the time of the institution of the complaint. Moreover, the prevailing minimum wage in the NCR cannot be invoked by respondents
since DLTB's office in Manila is a mere transit point. Petitioner DLTB thus raised the issue of jurisdiction. It claimed that the LA does not have
jurisdiction to render judgment or award on the alleged underpayment of wages claimed by the respondents since it is the DOLE which has
jurisdiction over their money claims pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code.

The LA states that respondents are entitled to their monetary claims. The LA held that DLTB is domiciled in the NCR with its principal office
address at 650 EDSA, Malibay, Pasay City, NCR. Its business starts and ends in its Head Office in Pasay City thereby negating petitioner's claim
that Manila is merely a transit point. Such being the case and based on the Rules, DLTB should be covered by the wage order issued by the
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) of the NCR entitling respondents to salary differentials. For failure to prove
payment, the LA further held DLTB liable for respondents' 13th month pay, regular holidays, and 5-day service incentive leave citing Section 2,
Rule II of DO 118-12.

NLRC found the LA to have committed grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC held that the LA
disregarded the provisions of DO 118-12 which categorically provided that compliance with minimum wages, wage related benefits, hours of
work and occupational safety and health standards of public utility bus drivers and conductors shall be enforced by the appropriate Regional
Office of the DOLE (DOLE-RO) having jurisdiction over the principal office of the owner/operator. The labor tribunal pointed out that based on
the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article 128 of the Labor Code, the Regional Director has
the authority to ensure compliance with the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code and other labor legislation and its Rules. Since the LA
did not have jurisdiction over the complaint from the start, he should have dismissed it and referred the respondents to the DOLE-NCR for the
proper dispensation of their claims.

CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the LA correctly took cognizance of the present case. The CA noted that the primary cause of
action of respondents involved underpayment of wages and non-payment of other employee benefits, hence within the jurisdiction of the LA and
NLRC pursuant to Article 224 of the Labor Code, as amended.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations made in the complaint regardless of whether the complainant is
entitled to his claim which is a matter resolved only after a trial. The matter of jurisdiction is not dependent upon the defenses put up by
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DOLE – Regional Office has jurisdiction over the controversy.

RULING:

DOLE – Regional Office has jurisdiction over the controversy.

The letter of DO 118-12 could not be any clearer. Section 1 thereof categorically provides that issues concerning compliance with the minimum
wages and wage-related benefits of public utility bus drivers and conductors is conferred with DOLE-Regional Officer having jurisdiction over
the principal office of the bus owner/operator.

In the present case, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR issued several Labor Standard Compliance Certificates dated February 12, 2014,
certifying petitioner's compliance with the labor standards requirements of the law. Five months after or on July 28, 2014, respondents filed the
instant case before the LA for underpayment of wages and non-payment of other benefits alleging violation of the requirements of DO 118-12 in
their Affidavit-Position Paper.

This fact should have prompted the LA to refer the case to the DOLE as it was evident that the respondents' money claims are beyond his
jurisdiction. In addition, respondents' categorical statement that they would not have filed the instant case for money claims had there been real
compliance of the mandate of DO 118-12 shows that the claims were the offshoot of the DOLE Regional Officer's issuance of the certificates of
compliance. This constituted a challenge by the respondents on the certificates of compliance issued by the DOLE Regional Officer relative to
the labor standard requirements under DO 118-12 which should have been lodged before the DOLE.

Undeniably, the issues surrounding the money claims of respondents public utility bus drivers and conductors, as well as questions pertaining to
the Labor Standard Compliance Certificates dated February 12, 2014 raised in the instant case, are within the purview of the jurisdiction of the
DOLE pursuant to Article 128 and the provisions of DO 118-12.