Article 14

 
Right to Equality is the first fundamental right assured to the people of India. Article 14-18
of the Constitution guarantees this right to every citizen of India. Equality is one of the
magnificent corner-stones of the Indian democracy. “ This right was considered to be a
negative right of an individual not to be discriminated in access to public offices or places or
in public matters generally.
They were of the opinion that only Article 14 would not be sufficient enough to deal with
these inequalities so they introduced Articles 15-18 in the Constitution along with Article 14
which deals specifically in and expressly abolished and prohibited some of the existing
inequalities. “Thus, the right to equality in the Constitution of India is not merely a
negative right not to be discriminated against but also a positive right to be treated as
an equal. Under the later aspect of the right, which is the essence and core of the right to
equality, the State is under the obligation to take necessary steps so that every
individual is given equal respect and concern which he is entitled to as a human being.” 
Article 14 embodies the idea of equality expressed in the preamble. It lays down the general
principles of equality before the law and prohibits unreasonable discrimination between the
persons. The Succeeding Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 lays down specific applications of the
general rules laid down in Article 14. Article 14 is the equality clause because of its wide
ambit and applicability. It applies to all persons while Article 15 and others cover only
citizens. Article 15 relates to prohibition of discrimination on grounds of Religion, race,
caste, sex or place of birth. Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public
employment. Article 17 abolishes untouchability and Article 18 abolishes title.

ARTICLE 14: EQUALITY BEFORE LAW

“The state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India.”  (Art. 14)
Article 14 guarantees to every person the right to equality before the law or the equal
protection of laws. The first expression ‘equality before the Law’ which is taken from
English Common Law, is somewhat a negative concept. It is a declaration of equality of
all persons within the territory of India, implying thereby the absence of any special privilege
in favour of any individual. Every person, whatever be his rank or position, is subject to the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. It means no man is above law and that every person, high
or low, is subject to the ordinary law of the land. Prof. Dicey in explaining the concept of
legal equality, as operating in England, said: “With us, every official, from the Prime
Minister down to a constable or collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every
Act done without any legal justification as any other citizen.” 
The second expression, “equal protection of laws”, which is rather a corollary
(Something that results from something else flows from the other) of the first
expression, and is based on the last clause of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the American Constitution, directs that equal protection shall be secured to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the Union in the enjoyment of their rights and
privileges without favouritism or discrimination. It is a more positive concept (as it expects
a positive action from the state) implying equality of treatment in the equal circumstances. In
other words, all persons who are in the same circumstances will be governed by the same set
of rules. It is a guarantee of equal treatment. An equal law should be applied with an equal
hand to all persons who are the equals. The rule is that the like should be treated alike and not
that unlike should be treated alike. The same or uniform treatment of unequal is as bad as
unequal treatment of equals. It has been said that the equal protection of the law is a pledge of
protection or guarantee of equal laws.
EQUALITY BEFORE LAW
According to Dr. Jennings, “Equality before the law means that among equals the law should
be equal and should be equally administered, that the like should be treated alike. The right to
sue and be sued, to prosecute and to be prosecuted for the same kind of action should be same
for all citizens of full age and understanding without distinctions of race, religion, wealth,
social status or political influence. 

Rule of law- the guarantee of equality before the law is an aspect of what Dicey calls the rule
of Law in England. Rule of law requires that no person shall be subjected to harsh,
uncivilized or discriminatory treatment even when the object is the securing of the paramount
exigencies of law and order. 
Prof. Dicey, (UK) gave three meanings to Rule of Law, they are –

1. The absence of Arbitrary Power or Supremacy of Law 

2. Equality before the Law 
3. The Constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land/ Absence of individual
liberty 

Rule of Law In India

 Supremacy of Law
 Equality before Law
 Individual Liberty ()

The first and second aspects apply to the Indian system but the third aspect of the Dicey’s
rule of law does not apply to Indian system as the source of rights of individuals is the
Constitution of India. The Constitution is the supreme Law of the land and all laws passed by
the legislature must be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution

EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF EQUALITY 

Under Art. 359, when the proclamation of emergency is in operation, the enforcement of Art.
14 may be suspended during that period. Art. 361 provides that president and governors shall
not be answerable to any Court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of
the office. They also enjoy immunity from criminal and civil proceedings until certain
conditions are fulfilled. A certain class of people being subject to some special rules are not
prevented by the rule of law.
Special rules in the professions govern those specific members of society. These people are
treated differently from other citizens.
Members of Parliament and of State Legislature are not liable in respect of anything done or
said within the House (Arts. 105 and 194). Foreign Diplomats are immune from the
jurisdiction of Courts. Art. 31 C forms an exception by excluding some laws [for
implementing any of the directive principles specified in Art. 39(b) or (c)- Not concentration
of wealth but its distribution for common good] from the purview of Art. 14.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

It is a guarantee of equal treatment. An equal law should be applied with an equal hand to all
persons who are the equals. The rule is that the like should be treated alike and not that unlike
should be treated alike. The same or uniform treatment of unequal is as bad as unequal
treatment of equals. It has been said that the equal protection of the law is a pledge of
protection or guarantee of equal laws. The phrase “equal protection of laws” means that
people in similar circumstances should be treated equally. Which also means, those who are
not equal circumstances should not be treated equally.

 The Rule of Law embodied in Article 14 is the ‘basic feature’ of the Indian Constitution and
hence it cannot be destroyed even by an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 of
the Constitution, (Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299)

ARTICLE 14 PERMITS REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION BUT PROHIBITS

CLASS LEGISLATION
Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be general in character or that the same laws
should apply to all persons or that every law must have universal application, for, all persons
are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, in the same positions. The State can treat
different persons differently if circumstances justify such treatment. In fact, identical
treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. The legislature must possess
the power to group persons, objects and transactions with a view to attaining specific aims.
So, a reasonable classification is not permitted but necessary if society is to progress.
By the process of classification, the State had the power of determining who should be
regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular
subject. Classification meant segregation in classes which had a systematic relation, usually
found in common properties and characteristics. It postulated a rational basis and did not
mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. (Re Special Courts Bill,
1978 AIR 1979 SC 478)
 The legislature can treat two sets of persons differently if their classification is made on a
reasonable basis. A reasonable classification must be founded on intelligible differentia.
Which means that persons or things that are grouped together make a well-defined, distinct
class and can be distinguished from those that are left out of the group. Further, this basis of
classification should have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the
legislation in question.
For example, the maternity benefit law applies to working women on the way to maternity,
not others. Because the object of the maternity benefit law is to give certain privileges only to
women who become mothers at the time of their need. Hence, the classification of women
and men is based on an intelligible differentia.
Another illustration is of tax laws. Classifications may be made for the purpose of taxing or
not taxing certain classes of property. Charities, libraries are exempted from certain tax
whereas other properties are not.
The class legislation is that which makes an improper discrimination by conferring
particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected. And no reasonable
distinction can be found justifying the inclusion of one and exclusion of other from such
privilege. While Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it permits reasonable classifications of
persons, objects, and transactions by the legislature for the purpose of achieving specific
ends. In other words, what Art. 14 prohibits is class legislation and not a classification for the
purpose of the legislation. 
 
Article 14 Permits Reasonable Classification
All persons are not equal by their nature, attainment or circumstances. The varying needs of
different classes of persons often require separate treatment. As a consequence the legislature
must have power to make laws distinguishing, selecting and classifying persons and things
upon which its laws are to operate.
 
TEST OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION
Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons,
objects, and transactions by the Legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends.
Classification to be reasonable should fulfil the following two tests: (F.N. Balsara v State of
Bombay, 1951)

1. It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based on an intelligible

differentia, some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons or
things grouped together in the class from another left out of it.
2.  The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or
reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
 
 
The true meaning and scope of Article 14 have been explained in a number of cases by the
supreme court. In view of this the propositions laid down in R.K.Dalmia v Justice
S.R.Tendolkar (AIR 1958 SC 538) case still hold good governing a valid classification and
are as follows. [[Appointment of Commission of Inquiry under the Commission of inquiry
Act, 1952, with Justice S.R. Tendolkar as its Chairman, against one of the Dalmia concerns,
on the ground of mismanagement in the said concern, apprehending considerable loss to the
investing public. Contended that the Commission of inquiry Act, 1952 gave wide and
unregulated discretion to the Government which could result in the denial of equality.
The Court upheld the action taken against the petitioner and laid down that while Article 14
forbids class legislation, it did not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of
legislation.]]
1.A law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if on account of
some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that
single individual may be treated as a class by itself
2. There is always presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the burden is
upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of constitutional
principles.
3.The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the fact of the statue,
there is no classification and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not
applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or
class
4. It must be assumed that Legislature correctly understand and appreciates the need of its
own people that its law are directed to problem made manifest by experience and that its
discrimination are based on adequate grounds
5. In order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into
consideration maters of common knowledge, matters of report, the history of the times and
may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of the
legislation.
6. Thus the legislation is free to recognize degrees of harm and may confine its restriction to
those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest.
7. While good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are
to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances
brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonable be regarded as
based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to extent always that there must
be some undisclosed and unknown  reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporation to
be hostile or discriminating legislation
8.The classification may be made on different bases e.g. geographical or according to object
or occupation or the like.
9. The classification made by the legislature need not be scientifically perfect or logically
complete. Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required.
Equality before the law does not require mathematical equality of all persons in all
circumstances. Equal treatment does not mean identical treatment. Similarly, not identity of
treatment is enough.
10. There can be discrimination both in the substantive as well as the procedural law. Article
14 applies to both.
If the classification satisfies the test laid down in the above propositions, the law will be
declared constitutional. The question whether a classification is reasonable and proper and
not must however, be judged more on common sense than on legal subtitles.
 
 
In State of West Bengal V. Anwar Ali Sarkar [AIR 1952 SC 75], was involved a Bengal
law permitting setting up of special courts for the ‘speedier trial’ of such ‘offence’, or ‘classes
of offences’ or ‘cases’, or ‘classes of cases’, as the State Government might direct by a
general or special order. These courts were to follow a procedure less advantageous to the
accused in defending himself than the procedure followed by the ordinary criminal courts.
The Act was held invalid as it made no reasonable classification, laid down “no yardstick or
measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of offenses” so as to distinguish
them from others outside the purviews of the Act. The government had the power to pick out
a case of a person and hand it over to the special tribunal while leaving the case of another
person similarly situated to be tried by the ordinary criminal courts. It gave ‘uncontrolled
authority’ to the executive ‘to discriminate’. The necessity of ‘speedier trial’ was held to be
too vague, uncertain and indefinite criterion to form the basis of a valid and reasonable
classification.
 
CASES ON ARBITRARINESS

IN E. P. ROYAPPA V STATE OF TAMIL NADU, 1973. It was held that an authority,
however, has to act properly for the purpose for which the power is conferred. He must take a
decision in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the statutes. He must not be guided
by extraneous or irrelevant consideration. He must not act illegally, irrationally or arbitrarily.
Any such illegal, irrational or arbitrary action or decision, whether in the nature of legislative,
administrative or quasi-judicial exercise of power is liable to be quashed being violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution. It was observed that equality is a dynamic concept with many
aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed cabined and confined” within traditional
and doctrinaire limits.
In Maneka Gandhi v Union of India, 1975, it was observed that Article 14 strikes at
arbitrariness in state action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment.
In Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs International Airport Authority Of India And Others (1979
AIR(SC) 1628) . It was observed that the expression “arbitrarily” means: in an unreasonable
manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle,
not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or
judgment, depending on the will alone.
A common tendency in modern democracies is to confer a discretionary power on the
government or administrative officers. In order to ensure that discretion is properly exercised,
it is necessary that the statute in question lays down some norms or principles according to
which the administrator has to exercise the discretion. Many a time the statutes do not do this
and leave the administrator free to exercise his power according to his judgment. This creates
the danger of official arbitrariness which is subversive of the doctrine of equality. To mitigate
this danger, the courts have invoked Art. 14. In course of time, Art. 14 has evolved into a
very meaningful guarantee against any action of the Administration which may be arbitrary,
discriminatory or unequal.

In Air India V. Nargesh Meerza [AIR 1981 SC 1829] , a regulation made by Air India
International, a statutory corporation, providing for termination of service of an air hostess on
her first pregnancy has been held to be arbitrary and abhorrent to the notions of a civilized
society. The regulation also fixed the normal age of retirement of air hostess at 35 years but
authorized the managing directors to extend the same to 45 years at his option subject to other
conditions being satisfied. The regulation was held bad as it armed the managing director
with uncanalized and unguided discretion to extend the age of retirement of an air hostess. No
guidelines, principles or norms were laid down subject to which the power was to be
exercised. Nor were there any procedural safeguards available to an air hostess who was
denied the extension.

Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination:

Article 15(1): Article 15(1) prohibits the state from discriminating any citizen on the basis of
these following 5 categories:
  Religion– No person can be discriminated on the basis of religion in order to access
any public place etc…
 Race – Any person’s origin shouldn’t be a basis of discrimination.
 Caste – Mainly discrimination on the basis of caste is prohibited. This prevents the
crimes committed against lower caste.
 Sex – Gender of any particular individual can’t be a basis in order to discriminate.
 Place of Birth – Any person place of birth can’t be taken into consideration and
discriminate them.
 Any of the above.

In the case “DP Joshi v/s Sate of Madhya Bharat”, there was a medical college which was
established in Indore and it was under the control of Madhya Pradesh Government. The govt,
had made a rule which stated that all the Domicile students residing in Madhya Bharat
wouldn’t be required to pay any “capitation fees”, but all the non-domicile students had to
pay a nominal fees of Rs. 1300-1500 as capitation fees. This rule was challenged by filing a
writ in Supreme Court under Article 32 claiming that it had violated the Fundamental rights
guaranteed under Art 14 and Art 15(1). The court had passed a judgement stating that, this
rule doesn’t violate article 15(1) since “Place of birth” and Place of Residence” are two
distinct terms. The term “Place of Residence” is mentioned under Article 16(2) which would
be discussed further.

Article 15(2): Article 15(2) lays down that no individual shall be subjected to any disability,
restriction, or any other form of discrimination with regard to:

In access of shops, parks, restaurants, hotels or any other public place. Each and every
individual have the right to use wells, tanks, bathing Ghats, roads, visit public resorts and any
other place which are maintained by government authority for general public.

Article 15(2) applies to every individual which includes private actions while Article 15(1)
alludes to all the obligations done by the State only.  

Article 15(2) was invoked in the case “Nainsukhdas v/s State of Uttar Pradesh”. In this
case the, the state had set up different electoral boards, for different religions. The Supreme
Court had declared such differentiation on electoral boards based on religion as
unconstitutional as per Art 15(2). The court had laid down the judgement that, the state shall
not discriminate any individual.

Article 15(3), 15(4), 15(5) and 15(6) discusses about the provisions made by the government
to empower certain classes in the society.

Article 15(3): Nothing in this section can stop the state from making any special laws for
women and children. Under this article, the state has been empowered to make special
provisions for Women and Children.  Under this article, the court had upheld the validity of
legislation or executive orders discriminating in favour of women.
This Article states that, even though the state wouldn’t discriminate anyone on the basis
mentioned in Art 15(1), yet they have the whole authority to make special provisions in order
to protect the interests of Women and Children.

In Case “Yusuf Abdul Aziz v/s State of Bombay” the judgement was passed by the court
which stated under Sec 497 of IPC only men can commit the crime of adultery and be
punished for the same. The court had also stated that a women shall not be punished as an
abettor, as this would offend Art 14 and 15(3). The court had stated that since art 15(3) is a
special provisions made for women by the state therefore the woman was saved under this
article. However, recently in “Joseph Shine v/s Union of India” . Adultery was
decriminalized since it was violating Art 14, 15 and 21 of Indian Constitution. Hence it is no
longer treated as a crime, rather it can only act as a reason for divorce.

Article 15(4): This article was added by the first amendment of Constitution. This article was
added by the constituent assembly itself who have drafted our Indian Constitution. This
article permits the state to make special provisions for the advancement of :

  Socially and Educationally backward classes of citizens

 Schedule class
 Schedule tribes

In case, “State of Madras v/s C.Dorairajan” is a landmark judgement which lead to the

insertion of Article 15(4) in indian constitution. This is the first major judgement which dealt
with reservations in India. The Madras high court have passed the judgement which reserved
seats in Government jobs and college institutions based upon caste system.

In another case “MR Balaji v/s State of Mysore”, the Mysore state have reserved seats for
all the communities except for Brahmin community. Mysore state have treated all the
communities as “socially and educationally” backward class except for Brahmin community.
68% of the seats were reserved in engineering and medical colleges. The state also divided
the reserved seats for More backward and Backward classes along with SC and ST. The
petitioners had filed a case under article 32 in supreme court which stated that, 68% of
reservation had no reasonable cause and it is a clear violation of Article 15(4).

The SC passed a judgement stating that reservation under article 15(4) was solely based on
“Caste”. Also it stated that article 15(4) neither have reservation based on “Backward” and
“More backward classes”, nor this article don’t provide any classification based on the same
above terms mentioned. Verdict given by the court stated that, classifying communities into
backward and more backward classes and then reserving the seats isn’t valid and it acts as
volition for Art 15(4).

To conclude article 15(4) empowers the state to make provisions which provides reservation
for the individuals who fall under the category of both “Socially and Educationally Backward
class”, “Scheduled casts” and “Scheduled Tribes”.

Article 15(5): Under this article, the state is empowered to make provisions which helps in
uplift-met of socially and educationally backward classes or Scheduled castes and Scheduled
tribes. Under this article the state is empowered to make provisions which includes
educational institutes whether aided or not aided by the State, irrespective of the minority
educational institutes which are referred in art 30(1). 

Article 15(5) was introduced under 93rd amendment act which merely acts as an “Enabling
section”. This was held in the case “Ashoka Kumar Thakur v/s Union of India”. Also in
the case “T.M.A. Pai Foundation”9, the court held that article 15(5) was introduced which
enables a right to establish and administer any of the private educational institutions under
Art 19(1)(g) of Indian Constitution. Hence it was clearly laid down by the court that art 15(5)
doesn’t violate art 19(1)(g).

Article 340: This article empowers the President to appoint a commission inorder to
investigate the conditions related to backward classes. Under the same article, “Mandal
Commission and Sanatham Commission” was appointed.

Mandal Case: In this the concept of “Creamy layer” was adopted. The concept of Creamy
Layer was laid down in the case “Indira Sawheny v/s Union of India” . The Supreme Court
had given the verdict that 27% of Government jobs would be reserved for OBCs’. Also it was
stated in this case, that the reservation would be provided only for the “initial stages of
appointments” and not for further promotion process. In total the reservation shall not exceed
50%. ( since already 22.5% is reserved for SCs’ and STs’.) After this Indira Sawheny case,
many of the state governments and other governing bodies have upvooted for Mandal Report
and deemed it to be valid. This case was invoked under Art 16(4)

In the year 2006, in the case “M.Nagraj v/s Union of India”, the Supreme court have
ordered the Parliament to enable the reservations even in “promotions” I.e. revservation for
SCs’ and STs’ in further promotion process as well. However the court did lay down some
grounded principles which made it difficult for both Centre and State government, to grant
such reservations. This case was decided as per the 77th amendment [insertion of art 16(4a)]
and 81st amendment [insertion of art 16(4b)].

Article 15(6): This article which empowers the state to make special provisions for the
advancement of “economically weaker sections” of the society, which would even include
the reservations in educational institutes. This article was added as 103 rd amendment in 2019.
This article further states that 10% of the reservation has to be provided for EWS. This 10%
of reservations is independent of ceilings upon the already existing reservations.

More than 20 petitions have been received by the Supreme Courts challenging this
amendment. It was argued that, this article violates article 14 of indian constitution. The main
argument which was put forth was that the amendment which was introduced exceeds 50%
ceiling limit which was laid down in Indra Sawhney case. The court after looking into all
the contentions made, stated that the state have an authority to make laws which promoted
“social equality” and protect the welfare of weaker sections of society under Art 46 of Indian
constitution.
Article 16: Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment
1. There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the State.
 2. No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth,
residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any
employment or office under the State.64%
3. Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in
regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the
Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any
requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such
employment or appointment.
4. Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the
reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens
which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under
the State.

(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for
reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority to any class or classes
of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the
services under the State.

(4B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled
vacancies of a year(carry forward rule) which are reserved for being filled up in that
year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause
(4A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and
such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in
which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent reservation on
total number of vacancies of that year.
5. Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the
incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or
denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a
person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.
6. Article 16(6): Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any economically
weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clause (4), in addition
to the existing reservation and subject to a maximum of ten per cent of the posts in
each category.
(((Articla 340: Appointment of a Commission to investigate the conditions of backward
classes
(1) The President may by order appoint a Commission consisting of such persons as he thinks
fit to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within the
territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour and to make recommendations
as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or any State to remove such difficulties and
to improve their condition
Article 335: The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of
administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union or of a State.
The Constitution (Eighty-second Amendment) Act, 2000 i.e. Amendment of Article 335: In
Article 335 of the Constitution, the following proviso shall be inserted at the end,
"Provided that nothing in this article shall prevent in making of any provision in favour of the
members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes for relaxation in qualifying
marks in any examination or lowering the standards of evaluation, for reservation in matters
of promotion to any class or classes of services or posts in connection with the affairs of the
Union or of a State".
 State of M.P. v. Kumari Nivedita Jain, 1981: The Executive Order dated 9th Sept.,
1980 passed by the State Government completely relaxing the conditions relating to
the minimum qualifying marks in Pre-Medical Examination for selection of students
to Medical Colleges of the State in respect of candidates belonging to Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes categories is not liable to be struck down as being
violative of Regulation II or Art. 15 of the Constitution. 
 In Preeti Srivastava, Dr. v. State of M.P.1999 the court  held  Fixing of lower
qualifying marks for SC, ST in Post graduate Medical course - Medical Council to
decide - Disparity between marks fixed for reserved and general candidates should not
be big.

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (Art 16)In 1979 Morarji Desai govt formed Mandal
commission to look into the job opportunities for backward classes. On this basis, 27%
reservation was allocated to OBC communities. This decision of the government was
challenged in SC in the case Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, also known as Mandal
Commission Case. in this case, the Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court enumerated the
following essential points:
 The SC held the government decided to allocate 27% reservation to backward classes
valid.
 SC also fixed a ceiling on the maximum reservation at 50%.
 Reservation to socially and educational Backward people will subject creamy layer
criteria.
 SC also held that reservations for poor among forwarding castes on the basis of
economic conditions is invalid.
 It also observed that reservation under Article 16(4) — which allows the state to make
provisions for “reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class
of citizens”, did not apply to promotions.
 In the process of identification of backward class of citizens and under Article 16(4)
among Hindus, caste is a primary criterion or a dominant factor though it is not the
sole criterion.
 Any provision under Article 16(4) is not necessarily to be made by the Parliament or
Legislature. Such a provision could also be made by an Executive order.
 The power conferred on the State under Article 16(4) is one coupled with a duty and,
therefore, the State has to exercise that power for the benefit of all those, namely,
backward class for whom it is intended.
In order to nullify the effects of Indra Sawney judgment, Parliament enacted Constitution
(77th Amendment) Act, 1995.
Amendment inserted clause (4A) after clause 4 of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 
Clause (4A) provides for giving the benefit of promotion in service to the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes.
 Constitutional 81st amendment act inserted Article 16(4B) in the constitution. (carry
forward rule)
Article 16(4B) provides that reserved promotion posts for SCs and STs that remain unfilled
can be carried forward to the subsequent year. It ensured that the ceiling on the reservation
quota – capped at 50% by Indra Sawhney – for these carried forward unfilled posts, does not
apply to subsequent years.
 Constitution 82nd amendment act  article 335 was amended and Proviso was added
"Provided that nothing in this article shall prevent in making of any provision in favour of the
members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes for relaxation in qualifying
marks in any examination or lowering the standards of evaluation, for reservation in matters
of promotion to any class or classes of services or posts in connection with the affairs of the
Union or of a State".
 The constitutional 85th amendment  changed the words ”in matters of promotion to
any class” to the words ”in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any
class”.
 Bir Singh Vs. Delhi Jal Board & Ors (2014): (Art 16) Bench by a majority held
that the Scheduled Castes or Tribes can avail benefit of reservation in government
jobs only in their home states and they cannot access quotas in other states where they
might have migrated. It was also held by a five-Judge Bench that a person from the
SC or ST category should not claim benefits in another state or Union Territory.
Upholding the "son of the soil" principle, the Bench said if a person's status migrates
with him it will amount to depriving the rights of SCs or STs of the host state. It also
held that the beneficiary lists cannot be changed by states and alterations of the
presidential orders can only be done by Parliament. "Unhesitatingly, therefore, it can
be said that a person belonging to a scheduled caste in one state cannot be deemed to
be a scheduled caste person in relation to any other state to which he migrates for the
purpose of employment or education" the court said. The Bench said the expression
'in relation to that state or Union Territory' and 'for the purpose of this Constitution'
used in Articles 341 and 342 means benefits of reservation would be within the
geographical territories of a state or UT in respect of which lists of SCs and STs have
been notified by presidential orders, Court ruled that scheduled caste and tribe citizens
moving from one State to another cannot claim reservation benefits, whether or not
their caste is notified in the state where they migrate to, since the exercise of notifying
scheduled castes or tribes is region (state) specific, i.e " in relation" to the state of
their origin.

IR Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu, 2007(Art 16): All amendments to the Constitution made
on or after 24th April, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various
laws therein shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the
Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19 and the principles
underlying them. To put it differently even though an Act is put in the Ninth Schedule by a
constitutional amendment, its provisions would be open to attack on the ground that they
destroy or damage the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or
abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic structure.

The 103rd constitutional amendment act

 It provides for the reservation to economically weaker sections from the upper castes
over and above the existing reservation subject to a maximum limit of 10%.
 It provides for reservation of jobs in central government jobs as well as government
educational institutions.
 It is also applicable on admissions to private higher educational institutions.
 Article 15 (6) is added to provide reservations to economically weaker sections for
admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions,
whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions
referred to in clause (1) of Article 30.
 Article 16 (6) is added to provide reservations to people from economically weaker
sections in government posts.
In the case of Jarnail Singh vs Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018) (Art 16) allowed Union
government to go ahead with reservation in promotion for employees belonging to the SC
and ST category in "accordance with law". The bench approved Nagaraj’s insistence on
 proof for the inadequate representation of classes for whom promotional posts are
reserved, and
 Submission of additional proof that efficiency would not be impacted by such
reservation
In this case, the bench also held( as held in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India) that creamy layer
principle is an essential aspect of the equality code, and therefore, exclusion of creamy layer
while applying the principle of the reservation is justified, even in the case of SCs and STs. 
((B K Pavitra v. Union of India 2019 SC decision - SC upholds Karnataka law giving
reservation in promotions.)) (Art 16)

Reservation, particularly in promotions, has always been controversial. Article 16, which
provides for “Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment” originally did not
contain any explicit provision regarding promotion. However, Indra Sawhney, which came in
the wake of the Mandal Commission in 1992, held reservation in promotion as
unconstitutional. To counter this judgment and others like Virpal Singh and Ajit Singh,
parliament passed the 77th, 81st and 85th constitutional amendments in 1995, 2000 and 2001
respectively. These Amendments added the current Article 16(4A) and Article 16(4B) that
explicitly allowed reservations in promotions for SCs and STs. The constitutional validity of
these provisions was challenged in Nagaraj.
The court in Jarnail Singh read the concept of creamy layer as part of the equality principle
encapsulated in Article 14, 15 and 16. Borrowing from Indra Sawhney, a case that did not
concern itself with SC/ST reservation, the court made the following broad observations. First,
that for a class to be truly backward and for them to constitute a class, the ‘misfits’ among
them i.e. the advanced individuals among them should be excluded. Second, excluding the
creamy layer is necessary to make sure that the backward within the class have access to
reservations and the better off within the group do not corner all the benefits of affirmative
action. Third, not excluding the creamy layer violates the equality principle in as much as it
amounts to treating equals i.e. forward castes and creamy layer of backward classes
unequally, and unequals i.e. creamy layer of backward classes and the rest of the backward
class as equals. It is worth noting that in applying this principle to SC/STs, neither Jarnail
Singh nor Nagaraj engage in any discussion regarding the difference between OBCs and
SC/STs or the appropriateness and risks of importing the concept and measurement of
creamy layer to SC/STs. These are aspects that a constitutional court ought not to have
ignored. The judgment consequently construes equality in ways that delivers inequitable
results.
Creamy layer is an economic criterion. The assumption is that economic progress reflects
social advancement and therefore, the person is liberated from his/her backwardness at
attaining a certain economic standard i.e. when he/she becomes a part of the ‘creamy layer’.
While the correctness of applying this standard even to OBCs may be debated, its application
to SC/STs is fraught with grave risks….

ARTICLE 17,18

Untouchability has been abolished by the Indian Constitution through Article 17. The Article
states that the practice of untouchability is prohibited in all forms. Article 17 of the
Constitution abolishes the practice of untouchability. The practice of untouchability is an
offense under the Untouchability Offences Act of 1955 (renamed to Protection of Civil
Rights Act in 1976) and anyone doing so is punishable by law. This Act states that whatever
is open to the general public should be open to all the citizens of India.
This article enacts two declarations:
i. Firstly, it announces that ‘untouchability’ is abolished and its practice in any form is
forbidden, and

ii. Secondly, it declares that the enforcement of any disability arising out of
‘untouchability’ shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. Most part of
this article is been covered under Art.15. Thus, on the grounds of untouchability no
person can be denied access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public
entertainment or the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public
resort, maintained wholly or partly out of State funds.
These are the major instances of the form in which untouchability is practised in this country.
All these practices are now forbidden by the Constitution. For the effective enforcement of
the declaration contained in this article, the Constitution contemplates penal laws specifying
various acts which are to be prohibited and penalised and under Article 35 the parliament
alone can make laws prescribing punishments for the acts forbidden under Article 17.
In 1955 Parliament, enacted Untouchability (Offences) Act, and it prescribed punishments for
various practices which are forbidden. However, it was found that the punishments are
inadequate and in 1965, a committee on Untouchability, Economic and Educational
Development of the Scheduled Castes was set upped. On the recommendations made by this
committee, a bill was passed in 1976 and renamed as ‘Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955’. 
Significant changes were made, and offences are now punishable up to three months. 
In People’s Union for Democratic Rights v UOI, 1982, the Supreme Court held that
whenever a fundamental right contained in Arts. 17, 23 or 24 was being violated by a private
individual, it would be the constitutional obligation of the State to take necessary steps to
interdict such violation and ensure that such person should respect the right. Merely because
the aggrieved person could himself protect or enforce his invaded fundamental rights, did not
absolve the State from its constitutional obligations.
To prevent the commission of offences or atrocities against the members of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Parliament also enacted the ‘Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.’ The Act provides for special
courts for the trial of offences under the Act and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims
of such offences. Atrocities committed against a Hindu SC or ST, who had converted to
another religion, can be prosecuted under the Act, if the victim is still suffering from social
disability.  Though the Preamble of Constitution states that India is a Secularistic state,
Article 17 of the Constitution abolishes ‘Untouchability’ and also forbids it and is punishable
under law. Thus social angularity of this evil of Untouchability is tried to be abolished by the
Constitution by providing  express provision under it.
ARTICLE 18. ABOLITION OF TITLES: Art.18 Clause (1) prohibits the conferment of
titles, Military and academic distinctions are exempted from the prohibition. Clause (2)
prohibits a citizen of India from accepting any title from a foreign State. Clause (3) provides
that a non-citizen who holds any office of office of profit or trust under the State shall not
accept, without the consent of the President, any title from any foreign State. Clause (4)
provides that no person citizen or non citizen holding any office of profit or trust, shall,
without consent of the President, accept any present or emolument or office of any kind from
or under any foreign State.
Titles such as Rai Bahadur, Sawai, Rai Sahab, Zamindar, taluqdar etc were prevalent in
medieval and British India. All these titles were abolished by article 18 of the constitution.
In 1954 the Government of India introduced four awards namely, Bharat Ratna, Padma
Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri for exceptional and distinguished service in any
field including public service. Their validity was challenged in Balaji Raghavan v. Union of
India (AIR 1996)[ 5 judges bench held that the National awards do not amount to titles
within meaning of Article 18(1)] on the ground of their inconsistency with that article. It was
argued in the court that the National Awardees very often misuse the title which is given to
them by the Government. The Supreme Court held that National Awards are not  titles as per
Article 18 and receiving a National Award was not a violation of equality under the
Constitution. Article 51(A)(f) of the Constitution speaks about the necessary recognition and
appreciation of excellence in the performance of a person’s duty. ((Court observed that it
does not conflict with Article 18 and Court also noted indiscriminate conferment of these
awards without any clear guidelines and it advised that a committee under the Prime Minister
consisting among others i.e., Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Chief Justice of India or his
nominee and the leader of the opposition in consultation with the President of India should
nominate persons for these awards.))
 Article18 does not, like Article 17 provide breach of any obligation will be an offence
punishable in accordance with law.