TRUTH, LIES, AND THE NARRATIVE SELF

Author(s): Steve Matthews and Jeanette Kennett

Source: American Philosophical Quarterly , OCTOBER 2012, Vol. 49, No. 4 (OCTOBER
2012), pp. 301-315
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American
Philosophical Publications

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American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 49, Number 4, October 2012

TRUTH, LIES,
AND THE NARRATIVE SELF

Steve Matthews and Jeanette Kennett

Uh! What a tangled web we weave

When first we practise to deceive!
Walter Scott

I. Introduction the consequences can be devastating. Social

S ocial
persons' shared
persons routinely narrative
tell themselves self-conception
we think, should be founded on what is tru
and others richly elaborated autobiographical because the failure to provide others, par
stories filled with details about deeds, plans, larly close others, with true accounts of
roles, motivations, values, and character. we are, blocks the possibility of accessing th
Saul, let us imagine, is someone who once goods we derive from intimate relationship
sailed the world as a young adventurer, going One of the marks of intimacy is the shari
from port to port and living a gypsy exis- our self-narratives. Jess and Saul's friend
tence. In telling his new acquaintance, Jess, itself may take a particular narrative pat
of his former exotic life, he shines a light on cause it is predicated on aspects of the st
his present character and this may guide to they exchange and the beliefs they hold
some extent their interaction here and now. each other on the basis of these exchang
Perhaps Jess also spent time at one of these There is an important sense in which sha
port locations; perhaps their paths might narratives cannot be true if (at least) one of
even have crossed. They might be drawn into parties systematically lies about themse
recounting some common events that indeed Our account begins with two strang
do establish a common link. Did they visit a striking cases of people who have concoct
certain famous landmark? Did they meet up elaborate, false accounts of who they are
at the same bars? And so on. When we open thesis is that lying of this magnitude ab
up to friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and oneself interferes with the value of intim
close others through the stories we tell them, one finds in close relationships such as f
we do so by revealing bits of ourselves. ship or marriage. In the cases we discuss
What effects might there be on such po- individuals lie extensively about themselv
tentially intimate exchanges if the stories a and so they must remain vigilant from o
person told about herself were not true? There telling of their story to another to ensur
are real cases of people who systematically sistency and to guard against being caught
lie about themselves and their pasts; when For this reason the self-story of the system
found out, as the cases we discuss show, liar comes to have a rigid quality; he w

©2012 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

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302 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

tend to be protective of it and less open to its tourist brochures. He stayed afloat financially
becoming the subject of interpretation, revi- by selling an apartment and by borrowing
sion, or even correction. Since friendship, and money from relatives and then falsely promis
close relationships more generally, are partly ing to invest it. In 1993 Romand believed he
constituted by this interpretive process, those would be discovered. Facing such a prospect,
who systematically lie to close others fail to he killed his parents, his wife, and their two
engage in the process that supports intimacy. children. He then tried to burn down his house
In addition to lost intimacy, we think a set and took pills apparently to make it look like
of secondary effects is brought about through suicide. This failed and Romand was later
falsification of one's self-narrative. We will tried, at which point the true nature of what
argue for an analytic connection between had occurred came out. He was convicted and
truth in narrative selfhood and the values of received life imprisonment.2
forgiveness, atonement, and redemption. Our Rex Crane is an elderly Australian man
claim there is a rather simple one: a value like who, in 2009, was exposed as a fake. During
forgiveness is unavailable to the person who the 1980s Crane began telling his family,
systematically lies about herself. We cannot friends, and the Australian federal govern
be forgiven for that which we have not done; ment that he had fought in World War II. He
and we must reveal to others the extent and claimed that his parents had been in Malaya
nature of our deceptions in order to be for- from 1938 but then, in the face of the Japanese
given for them. Finally, we emphasize that invasion, had abandoned him and his brother
our thesis is not that there should be an ex- Raymond. He was fifteen years old. He then
ceptionless demand for truth in self-narrative. apparently joined a British behind-enemy -
That claim is surely too strong, and we will lines guerilla unit but was captured and sent
later consider some exceptions to our general to Singapore's infamous Outram Road Jail
claim. Our view is that being truthful about and then the Burma-Thai railway. During this
ourselves places a constraint on narrative time he said he was tortured, and that among
self-construction to the extent that the norms other horrors he had been crucified, stomped
and values we discuss are affected. on, beaten with a baseball bat, and had the
soles of his feet hammered.
2. Cases Every word of Crane's story is false. The
Jean-Claude Romand was in the second truth is that in 1941 he attended Adelaide
year of his medical degree when he lied High School and then went on to take u
about passing a test for which he had failed apprenticeship as a boilermaker not far
to show up. This deception was the trigger his home in the suburb of Prospect.
event for a cascading series of greater and 1988 Crane received Commonwealth
greater lies, through "completing his degree," pension payments totaling over $4
to "becoming a doctor," and to "having a and free health care. He became well-k
career in medical research and working at within the ex-servicemen's commun
the World Health Organization [WHO]." eventually becoming president of t
Romand spent nearly twenty years of his prisoner of War Association of Aus
life living this fraudulent existence. He spent Crane himself claims that the roots of
his days wandering, sometimes going to the living a lie went as far back as his failed
WHO building to consult its free services. He tempts to join the navy when he was fif
would claim he was going on a business trip "Half a dozen of us, we rode our bikes d
to Switzerland but would in fact stay at the to the navy depot and we were turned a
airport studying medical journals and Swiss and they said 'get back to work, and [the

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 TRUTH, LIES, AND THE NARRATIVE SELF / 303

kicked our arses and [they said] don't be That there is some decisive moment that
stupid' . . . that was the start of it."4 explains the living of a lie of such magnitude
Simon Caterson (2009b) says Crane and may stretch things a bit, but it nevertheless
others like him are tempted into faking their seems likely that the cement of a false self
past because convincing others of your war- presentation all too swiftly sets in the public
time involvement is a relatively easy thing mind. And so the temptation to continue with
to pull off—for example, army regalia can and build on the initial fabrication is hard to
be acquired quite openly. Pretending to be resist; the social costs of admitting the lies
a war hero of the type Crane chose makes become too great. A momentum builds, and the
exposure unlikely. He claimed to be part of liar is almost irreversibly caught up in a public
a unit acting in secret behind enemy lines, narrative with him or her self at the center. In
thus providing a good explanation for the another case of a war impostor, Geoff McGib
nonexistence of documentary proof of his bon claimed he was a Vietnam veteran. He later
claims. Possible witnesses to the fraud, such admitted the lie, explaining that "many years
as Crane ' s brother Raymond, who had moved ago I did the wrong thing and it was a problem,
to Canada, were out of the picture; Crane had I was having a bad time with my marriage
claimed he was dead. When those investigat- and I was on the grog and I got involved and
ing the story finally spoke with Raymond, it got all out of proportion."6 It is 'the getting
they had proof of at least one significant lie. out of proportion' that is of interest. The story
So in Crane's case a range of external condi- quickly snowballs, and at a certain point the
tions do help to explain what motivated him: false narrative becomes socially embedded,
the attractiveness of war hero status, perhaps generating its own momentum,
some compensation for earlier rejection from
the navy, the material benefits, and his belief 3- Narrative Theory of Selves
that exposure was unlikely. But presumably An important aspect of the surge of interest
others have been similarly tempted and not in narrative selves has been a focus on the role
gone down Crane's path, and so it is plausible narrativity plays in thinking about normative
to think some other factors are at work. This agency.7 Catriona Mackenzie (2008) writes,
is particularly so given a case like Romand's, "The central claim of narrative approaches to
where the risk of exposure was high. identity or agency is that the lives of persons
A suggestion for why some individuals end cannot be thought of as a series of discrete,
up living a lie is the existence of a trigger disconnected experiences or events. Rather,
event, or set of events, setting them, almost to be a person is to exercise narrative ca
inevitably, on the slippery path to construct- pacities for self-interpretation that unify our
ing their fantasy narrative. This seems very lives over time" (p. 11). As David Velleman
plausible in Romand's case. It answers the (1985) has suggested, such narrative capaci
'why' question partly with reference to an ac- ties enable a person to make sense of what
count that explains how it came about. When she is doing by fitting it together with a wider
asked about his case, Crane first pointed to the story extending up or downstream of her cur
early times he had tried to get into the military rently acting self (p. 33). When we invoke our
and was rejected; but it seems a significant agency in this way, planning and reflection
turning point came later. He says, "When this work together so that choices are weighed
all started, I went along to a POW Singapore and decisions made; this process brings to
day that was advertised . . . and they invited light our desires, goals, or commitments, all
me in for afternoon tea, which I did. I suppose of which may be currently in tension, so that
I thought this would be quite good."5 we can then choose the best path forward. A

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304 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

good story for me will be one in which these understand what goes wrong in our cases,
tensions are smoothed over and I can resolve But we do not intend here to show what goes
what is pulling me in this or that direction. wrong in those cases with direct reference to
On this normative understanding of narrative these roles, though they do provide important
agency, divergent aspects of the self can be background. We think an extra dimension to
reconciled, thereby facilitating effective uni- narrativity is brought into view by the cases
fied agency. In this deliberative process, one of Crane and Romand, which is the impor
will settle on a course of action one regards tance, and limits, of having a true narrative,
as the best, given the narrative circumstances and in particular a true narrative that is, in
of one's life to that point. This is an idealized part, shared by those in one's social environ
account of practical deliberation to be sure, ment. Now in a sense this is just obvious—it
and we recognize that it is a commonplace is clearly at the center of what is morally
for actual human lives to fall short of nar- problematic in our cases. The philosophical
rative unity. From ordinary indecisiveness, challenge is to explain the importance of truth
confusion, forgetfulness, or loss of interest, in narrative selves, to show why it is generally
to weakness of will, or reckless short-term a good thing, and to explain why the failure
gain, all the way to pathological biases or to meet a condition of truth in cases like this
impairments, our attempts at unity all too of- fails a relevant justificatory demand,
ten fall short. In addition, a range of external It will be useful in answering these ques
impediments—socially oppressive regimes, tions to posit a hypothetical contrast case
for instance—disrupt our efforts to establish of a narrative self in which the condition
narrative coherence. of truthfulness is largely fulfilled. Consider
Nevertheless, there is a compelling norma- then the unremarkable case of Jones. Jo
tive sense of agency in which we conceive of grew up in the city, attending school, an
ourselves as extended over a period of time then university, where he earned a degree
and organize ourselves so as to create and engineering. He landed a job with a cons
impose narrative coherence on the events in tion company, and though he shifted fir
which we take part. We consider the ways couple of times, he stayed in construction
in which certain diachronic connections in remained in the same city. Jones was marr
a life confer value that would otherwise be in his early twenties and together wit
unregistered were we to consider the mere ag- wife raised three children. He was stable
gregation of the synchronic values within that able, honest, a typical, conventional subu
life.8 We recognize that certain narrative ca- individual with predictable routines and
dences within life confer an additional value ordinary lifestyle. Though he did not thi
(or disvalue) besides its moment-by-moment of his own life in very philosophical term
experiences. The ideas of, for example, re- Jones had an appreciation of the importanc
demption, atonement, forgiveness, or promise of staying true to himself and those arou
fulfillment are premised on this diachronic him. He did not put it this way, but his sen
understanding of the self. A life is better, his own narrative was well synchronized w
ceteris paribus, if in contrast to a possible the public record and the narratives of tho
alternative, the person within it overcomes around him. They formed a unit, more or le
adversity, sticks with some task and finally and to the extent divergences crept in, th
succeeds, keeps a lifelong promise, makes up were local divergences, differences of vie
for past losses, or rights a great wrong.9 and emphasis about specific events and m
These roles for narrative are familiar and likely explained away by faulty memories
well understood, and they will help us to innocent enough misrepresentations.

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 TRUTH, LIES, AND THE NARRATIVE SELF / 305

Let us say that Jones's private narrative is clear. Once we know both stories we must
largely a true account of what he has done view them sitting side by side, two narrative
and is a narrative that is shared, or able to streams containing radically different content
be shared, by his family, friends, and com- that cannot be mixed up and made sense of
munity. Jones's private narrative and the as one.
knowledge others have of him may not al- We should be more precise about this,
ways fit together neatly—the revelation, say, When we say that Romand's and Crane's
that the apparently staid family man Jones private and public narratives cannot be rec
occasionally smokes marijuana is a surprise, onciled into a single coherent story, we have
but it does not violently contradict what we in mind a contrast between two narratives,
know about him. These, and other, previously the content of which is somewhat artifi
unknown narrative details about Jones may daily obtained. Imagine a science-fiction
continue to be assigned with relative coher- scenario in which someone recorded all of
enee to the public understanding of who he the public claims Crane and Romand made
is. Is Jones a convincing case? It could be over the period relating to their deceptions,
objected that Jones lacks the complexity we and that these claims had been fashioned,
find in ordinary lives and that the consistency storylike, into an account of their lives,
we find in his narrative is unrealistically And now imagine, again quite artificially,
flawless.10 Certainly, Jones is something of that someone extracted private information
an idealization, lacking as he does in a little Crane and Romand possess about what they
of the messiness we find in many other cases in fact did during this same period. Imagine,
in which there are narrative loose ends and in relation to the former, that we now have
contradictory qualities and traits. Neverthe- two books in our possession: "Rex Crane:
less, many of us—ourselves included—do The Private Account" and "Rex Crane: The
indeed know people like Jones. In any case, Public Account." It is these books that can
we introduce Jones—not as an example of not both be true, and that is what gives rise
the norms we focus on—but as a point of to the normative point that lies behind our
contrast. In Jones's case there are no barri- claim that there exist two narrative streams
ers to intimacy, and the other values we will that cannot be made to cohere. The public
focus on, such as forgiveness, are not made narrative is irretrievably damaged once the
unavailable to him in the ways that plague private narrative comes to light.
Romand and, albeit to a lesser extent, Crane. It is of some explanatory significance,
Contrast Jones, then, with our cases from course, that both Crane and Romand them
above. Romand's real activities and his public selves were able to view these two narrativ
story about himself cannot both be assigned streams with intelligibility. Both of these in
te a single stable practical view of the world. viduals were quite adept at making the sep
His private (true) narrative and the false story ration between what they claimed public
of himself he presents to the world sit side by and what they knew privately; and, indee
side without any hope of reconciliation into a the longevity of their deceptions depende
single coherent story. It is not possible to fit quite crucially on the existence of a third
Romand's public and private stories of him- narrative, the narrative of someone who is
self into a single account while preserving the trying to keep track of his private knowled
truth of a significant portion of both of them, and his public lies in order to avoid detecti
whereas in Jones's case this is eminently pos- and maintain social standing,
sible. In Rex Crane's case too, the failure to Now Crane's and Romand's cases are of
align his public and private narratives is quite course different in one sense, because Ro

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306 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

mand's false story was ongoing—for each and to himself, ought to fit the facts of that
day new lies had to be invented.11 Crane's past as accurately as possible—it (his story)
lies picked out an era from the past that was should be truth-tracking. Second, his future,
carefully circumscribed, and so the task of as will be witnessed by those around him
remaining unexposed was in this way easier and as brought about by himself, ought to
because he had less of which to keep track. correspond as much as possible with the
He thought himself quite invulnerable to dis- story Jones presents to himself and to those
covery, and that fearlessness led him to form around him now—it (his future) should be
apparently close relationships with veterans truth-making. Third, given the requirements
and family members based partly on his false of the truth-tracking and truth-making fea
identity. But, as we will argue, this was a tures, Jones's narrative may be—normatively
counterfeit intimacy: like fake currency, its speaking—shared with others because of
discovery revealed its true worthlessness. others' true understandings of that narrative;
Romand's and Crane's relationships, to the it will be truth-shareable. Narrative connec
extent they were both based on deception, tions thus exhibit three directions of fit: when
were equally morally indefensible. They truth-tracking, narrative content should fit
differed to the extent that Crane, given he facts about the self and world; when truth
thought he had more control over his infor- making, the world should come to fit narrative
mation, was able to engage with those close content; when truth-sharing, narrative content
to him in ways unavailable to Romand, who should fit others' true understandings of that
by all accounts was a private and secretive narrative. (Notice the distinction between
person. There are two implications, then, aris- [mere] narrative shareability and narrative
ing from systematic lying, depending on the truth-shareability. Crane and Romand were
confidence one has in controlling the infor- obviously able to share their false narratives
mation others have about you. In Romand's for a long time without challenge. We are
case, with the constant threat of discovery, the making the purely normative point that those
loss of intimacy was direct and quite global: narratives could not be truthfully shared.)
he simply saw himself as unable to enter into It has been put to us that we should say
close relationships that had the potential to something concerning our use of 'truth'
reveal the truth about him. In Crane's case, in expressions like 'truth-tracking.' What
he was more comfortable forming apparently we said above—using expressions like 'fit
intimate connections with others based on his the facts'—suggests we have some kind of
false story, yet the false basis of these con- correspondence story in mind. A narrative
nections ultimately destroyed them just as statement, on such a view, is truth-tracking
effectively as Romand's, albeit less violently. just in case it corresponds with some fact or
These differences will help us to examine the state of affairs. We make two points about
relation between truth and narrative selves. this. The first is that narrative content in
cludes material that arguably goes beyond
4. Truth-Tracking, Truth-Making, wjjat a correspondence account could supp
and Truth Shareability such as our normative self-understanding
Consider three purely normative claims e.g., value-laden beliefs about the kinds
about the role of truth in narrative. (We persons we are. So that approach would s
present these as fairly rigid constructions; in to be incomplete. But a quite different k
the next section we present some qualifica- of point is that this is simply not the foru
tions to them.) Consider Jones. The story of to discuss or defend our metaphysical com
his past, as presented to those around him mitments pertaining to a definition of trut

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 TRUTH, LIES, AND THE NARRATIVE SELF / 307

So we will remain silent on the definition another way, not all narrative content is purely
while continuing to use the word. descriptive; some is ineliminably normative.
We do think, however, that a condition A person might reflect in the following way:
needs to be in place for determining whether Am I a good philosopher? Am I a bad father?
there is agreement between what a person Am I a hard worker? Though I might think I
claims and the object of such a claim. Liars could give roughly correct answers here, the
represent their claims as true and so, by im- matter is complex, contestable, and perhaps
plication, as falsifiable. The truthfulness of essentially interpretive. Take the last example
these claims is plausibly settled on the basis of a hard worker. The claim that Jones is a
that there exists an actual (though perhaps hard worker relies on evidence from many
sometimes only potential) reliable witness to sources—his co-workers, his supervisor,
what has been claimed. Rex Crane claimed to his family, community standards, and so
have been sent to the Outram Road Jail during on. Judgments about this evidence, and the
the war. Many people saw him in Adelaide yardstick for those judgments, would seem
during this period, and so actual witnesses inevitably to be intersubjective at their base,
presumably are available to falsify his claim.
That the veracity of one's shared narrative 5- Some Exceptions to Our Claim
requires (potential) independent reliable tes- We do not wish to argue that the normative
timony implies resistance to a further claim demand for truthful narrative self-formation
that our thesis could be made out merely on is exceptionless, and in this section we con
tile basis of shared narrative coherence, and sider a variety of cases in which it is absent,
that talking about the truth of our narratives These cases help to clarify the status of our
is beside the point. Could not our points be claim that truth is best thought of as a con
made simply by identifying a correct account straint on narrative self-conception. Consider,
of shared narrative coherence?12 We doubt then, some legitimate exceptions to the gen
this. It is not just that Romand's private un- eral demand for truth,
derstanding of what he is doing and what he
says to his family does not cohere. Someone Cases of Permissible
delusional and someone caring for such a Nontruthjul Identities
person will suffer failures of coherence. It There are cases in which a significant
is critical to the moral psychology of the dissonance between one s public and pri
situation that the failures of coherence are vate narratives may be justified think,
explained by the deception, and the decep- ^or example, °f an espionage agent or an
tion in these cases is in relation to claims undercover police operative. Their split nar
about something that did or did not happen. ratives can be explained and justified against
In both Romand's and Crane's cases, shared an overarching story that situates the falsely
narrative coherence ceased when third parties presented narrative within a socially or mor
discovered witnesses who disconfirmed what a"y legitimate purpose in these cases the
they had claimed purpose is to fulfill a professional role. When
That there exists (potential) independent suc^ ro'es are socially sanctioned, the deceit
confirmation of my claims is not sufficient involved is justified by the grounds for the
to characterize all the normative demands of ro'e itself. Note, however, that the argument
a truthful narrative. That is because settling for having agents such as undercover police
whether I performed or experienced all or is an argument from necessity: clearly, it is
most of what I said does not exhaust all of an undesirable state for the persons who oc
what can be said to be true about me. To put it cuPy these roles. The losses to value that we

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308 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

outline in our two cases are, in some sense, ognize the oppression but be unable to resist
present in these cases as well. For example, it it by adopting a double life, and this leads to
may be that the undercover operative must, at a rather miserable single life. In a third kind
times, develop apparently close, or seemingly of case, oppressive conditions give rise to
intimate, relationships in order to glean infor- identities shaped by preferences that adapt
mation. This mimicry of genuine intimacy to what is available. Adaptive preferences
provides a barrier to the development of close are formed in response to what are seen as
friendships. We elaborate on the reasons for the only feasible options.14 The double life
this in a later section. cases are a risky response to the same kinds
of conditions. We see them as prima facie
Cases of Oppression permissible because they are a produ
It is a pervasive feature of all societies we society beset by too narrow a concep
know that certain identities are unavailable a range 0f legitimate values and r
and certain identities are socially imposed. this necessitates practices ensuring
So, for instance, homosexuals in the immedi- jty. To put it another way, the failur
ate postwar period in Western societies were the double life under conditions of
forced underground; housewife identities in sion_^speCially the case in which on
the 1950s and early 1960s were molded under one's preferences in accordance wit
the same political-economic conditions, and expectations—might constitute anoth
women in highly socially conservative the- of deception, a kind of self-deception
ocracies were and are excluded from social oppression appears to cause the opp
life. No doubt many other examples exist. practice deceit whichever way they
The effect of these social conditions is that

certain narratives are forced upon oppressed Cases of Confabulation

individuals that cannot be made true so long There is both anecdotal and experimen
as the oppressed continue to conceal aspects evidence of confabulation by people w
of who they are or their commitments. In such construct fictive 'bridge sections' to pl
circumstances, the oppressed are forced to memory gaps that form breaks in narrative
live a lie. In the case of homosexuals, double continuity.15 The fictions of confabulation
lives are forced upon those who practice in providing pragmatic sense-making plu
their homosexuality in secret.13 In the case in faulty narratives, seem to show that the
of housewives, the effect is suppression of normative demand for global truthfuln
aspects of their narrative identity they are in narrative self-construction is simply too
unable to publicly express. In the case of the strong. Again, we do not deny this point—
religiously persecuted, the effect is again the rigorous insistence that there be truthfuln
practice of engaging in secret activities, such in narrative self-conception that ruled ou
as unapproved study groups, while main- relatively harmless confabulation would s
taining public conformity. Again, we have to be morally pathological. Our point can
cases of justifiable deceptions that provide made without that level of demand,
an exception to the demand for truthfulness,
particularly truth shareability. 6. Degrees of Truth
We focus here on double lives within op- and Truth Sensitive Content
pressive environments because we are inter- Surely, then, my narrative self-conception
ested in permissible deceptions. There are two need not be an absolutely true account of my
other salient kinds of response to oppression. fife. Often it is morally permissible that an
In the second kind of case, a person may ree- account of oneself be 'true enough.' What

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 TRUTH, LIES, AND THE NARRATIVE SELF / 309

does this mean? In telling my friend stories and share their stories?16 Let us suppose our
about my holiday, it seems permissible for me drifters spend a week or so a few times a
to get some of the peripheral details wrong year in a remote beachside town, fishing and
or even to exaggerate certain features—the meeting up at the local hotel to drink and tell
wave I caught was seven feet high (when it stories of their exploits since they last met.
was probably only four feet high); the sunset They strongly suspect that the yarns they tell
was about the most spectacular I had ever each other are full of exaggeration, lapses
seen (when, come to think of it, I had seen of accuracy, and even some outright fiction,
better), I had come back refreshed (when in but they do not care. They allow a degree
fact I was not too keen to get back to work), of latitude here that significantly discounts
and so on. However, it seems impermis- the demand for truthfulness compared to the
sible to tell outright falsehoods about what cases we might have had in mind. Cannot
happened—that, for example, I went deep sea our drifters enjoy intimate companionship,
fishing and hooked a marlin (when I did no and if so, does our account not fail to have
such thing and was in fact drinking in the bar the general application we thought it did?
at the time), or that I had met and had a brief We make two main points in response,
romance with a handsome stranger (when First, it is likely that the kind of friendship
in fact a handsome stranger had completely the drifters have is what Aristotle called a
ignored my suggestion to join me), and so on. pleasure friendship. It is structured around a
In the exaggeration cases, the substance of specific pleasant activity—drinking and tell
the story is true—I did go surfing and catch ing tall tales—which is recognized as such,
a wave—and the false details seem irrelevant. and so while there is a kind of easy intimacy
We should make two qualifications to this. generated by the interaction, it falls short of
First, sometimes the details do matter. An the closeness we see in relationships that are
honest estimation of the height of the wave open-ended in the way they dispose their
might well matter to someone who surfs. participants. It is plausible to suppose that
This suggests that certain narrative content lesser friendships of pleasure and utility are
is highly truth-sensitive. And second, were I less subject to the constraint of truth share
to be in the habit of getting the details wrong ability than the kinds of relationships we
as a matter of course, the danger is that I have in mind. Second, we think our drifters
come to have a picture of my life that is also would indeed care that there be some core of
in general distorted. But those qualifications truth attaching to their self-narratives. To see
aside, it is important that we allow for the that this is plausible, consider the following
spinning of our yarns that are largely true variation on our example. Let us imagine
(with occasional forgivable lapses of detail), that one of our drifters bumps into the other
lest we end up with a pathological demand for in another context. He discovers that the
accuracy and a skewed focus on getting the other person is in fact no drifter at all, but on
peripheral details of our self-stories exactly the contrary a high flyer from the city. Our
right at the expense of keeping true the core high flyer has a penchant for acting out the
of our stories. persona of the drifter and delights in playing
At this point someone might object that this role whenever he can get a
the cases we have in mind do not exhaust the his banking activities in the city
possibilities. Are we extrapolating too nar- drifter might well now view their
rowly from cases of people "like ourselves"? exchanges with hostility and resen
Can we not imagine, for instance, a case of although some looseness with the t
two drifters who from time to time meet up tacitly informed their conversatio

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310/ AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

assumed reasonably that his companion was when he told us stories of the suffering he
someone like him: transient and down on his endured during the war." She says she now
luck. He feels used. What this shows is that feels "embarrassed and insulted." "I thought
even for pleasure friendships a core of truth him a hero because of his positive disposi
is required, which is to say that even here tion and his drive to help the other POWs
some self-narrative content is highly truth make peace with their hurt. [But] he had us
sensitive. Perhaps the peripheral detail of the all fooled and we are mortified." She says
self-narratives of drifters does not matter in a also that "my family is absolutely horrified
context where telling tall tales about oneself by Rex's revelations. My poor grandmother
is accepted practice, but we think that even is devastated."17
here the failure to honestly disclose the true The point of these observations around the
core of our self stories threatens the loss of extent and depth of the effect such false sto
intimacy and of the friendship. ries have is that false narratives of this degree
We will not attempt to account for the dif- contaminate the narratives of others. Consider
ference between 'the true core of our stories' simple everyday interactions between the
and the 'peripheral detail.' Such an account purveyor of the lie and a close other. Think,
seems hardly even possible. Rather, what we for example, of Romand's wife as she packs
need to focus on are the normative features for his trips, or of what she tells her children
of narrative identity. These features emerge their father does. Her efforts at truth-tracking,
in consideration of truth shareability and of truth-making, and truth-sharing are thereby
the relation between this shareability and caused to misfire. Of course, she is not deceiv
intimacy. Not just any shareable narrative ing her children about what their father does,
details are normatively special; we claim the but her evidence grounding claims about his
ones contributing to intimate relations are. activities is contaminated by his false testi
The account below deals with this apparent mony. In this way she, too, comes to "live a
circularity. We will then connect this claim lie" in the sense that her narrative agency in
with the idea of personal development and packing and so on cannot be truth-making,
growth. The idea is that, in having to "pro- She becomes a used and nonconsenting par
ted" their false stories, people like Crane and ticipant in Romand's false narrative as she
particularly Romand cannot share them with comes to structure her activities and her own
intimate others in familiar ways, a process story around his nonexistent WHO project,
that normally contributes to the appropriate She also participates, again without consent,
development of selves within that story- in a real project—Romand's false portrayal
sharing environment. of himself as a medical researcher. The case
shows quite starkly that a person's narrativ
7. Truth, Shareability, js not a single-authored work. My na
Intimacy, Growth docs not belong to me alone, and th
Let us remind ourselves of the extent of the important source of the normati
deceit Rex Crane foisted upon his family and for truth.
community. For thirty years he was a hero to The normativity of shareability e
them, someone who had apparently survived also from the fact that certain value
unspeakable wartime horrors. Crane was not possible only under conditions o
backward in making his stories form part of ness. Recall in this connection
his relationship with his immediate family. suggestion that there are moral
His step-granddaughter, Caroline Smalley, depend for their satisfaction on
remarked, "As a child I would cry with him features of true narratives. Some ex

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 TRUTH, LIES, AND THE NARRATIVE SELF / 311

we gave included redemption, atonement, quite obviously, no shared memories are

and forgiveness. A question arises here even possible in such cases since there was
whether such concepts might apply to the no past shared event for my friend to have
likes of Rex Crane. Can he not be forgiven? experienced. However, the interest is in the
Can he not atone? The answer is 'yes, and case where the fraudsters attempt to describe
no—it depends on how we apply these their past experience and in that way share
concepts.' Within, and in terms of the false their memory. The trouble is that a person
narrative content—no redemption or atone- like Crane or Romand simply cannot engage
ment is even possible. Can Crane atone for openly and freely with the person to whom
any of the 'deeds' he performed during the they are telling the story of their past. Their
war? No, there were no deeds. Suppose his false stories are fixed and unrevisable, and
daughter were to say to him, "Dad, don't you they are on their guard to ensure compatibility
feel bad about having abandoned your POW between one telling and another. Their core
mates when you left?" What can Crane say narrative claims are not open in the right way
here? He can mimic shame, but can he re- to correction or elaboration or to an emotional
ally be ashamed? Not under the description analysis. Genuine experience lays down a
'abandoning my POW mates.' However, "multimodal" recording of sights, sounds,
presumably the thought here is not to ap- feelings, and so on; it is thick with content
ply the concepts of redemption, atonement, that must be manufactured imaginatively in
forgiveness, etc., within the false narrative, the false story. The vividness of real experi
but rather in terms of Crane's ongoing act of enee cues memory recall in ways that differ
making it all up. So can he, for example, be from carefully imagined autobiographical
the subject of forgiveness for making up his fantasies.
false wartime narrative? Yes he can, but we Consider in this connection a recent study
should notice that this forgiveness may come in which participants were asked to produce
about only when, and precisely because, the both deceptive and nondeceptive oral versions
truth of the matter comes out publicly. These of narrative autobiography.19 Linguistic anal
values depend for their instantiation on co- ysis revealed significant divergence across
knowledge of what is to be forgiven and on seven variables. The deceptive performances,
what it is that atonement relates to. relative to the nondeceptive ones, tended to
Turning now to the relational goods, we contain (1) lower word-to-sentence and syl
think shared memories and narratives are lable-to-word ratios, (2) fewer sentences per
especially important to truth-tracking and to narrative, (3) sentences that were syntactical
intimacy. In the case of memories, our stories ly more similar and less complex in structure,
are often co-authored by our close friends (4) more explicit action verbs, (5) less use
who shared in earlier experiences. I might of relatively rare words, (6) less referential
have some of the details of such an experi- cohesion between sentences, and (7) fewer
enee wrong or incomplete and in relying on pronouns. The authors speculate, plausibly,
a friend to correct me, or to supply the miss- that making up a deceptive autobiography
ing details, I come to recall the experience is more like describing the actions of other
with more accuracy. Close others thereby people, and that when we do this, we focus
act as a kind of scaffold in the construction more on describing behavior, compared to the
of our narrative selves—they contribute to internal states, such as reasons, that motivate
truth-tracking and coherence.18 In contrast, that behavior. We thus see more narrative
can cases in which I am living a lie give distance between narrator and narration in
rise to a similar effect? We think not. First, deceptive self-story telling. This explains the

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312/ AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

relatively heavy use of explicit action verbs. others think of us, and we take seriously the
We would add that since lying is psychologi- idea that others should think very well of us.
cally uncomfortable, the deceiver would tend We also regard it as important that they think
to minimize the discomfort, and a way to do well of us because of the things we in fact
this is to avoid focusing on the mental life did and of who we really are. The feature of
accompanying one's alleged past actions. interpretation is integral to close friendship in
There is, in addition, less to keep track of the sense that it is partly constitutive of the in
when narrative distance is involved. Crane's timacy there.20 But for this intimacy to obtain,
and Romand's lying no doubt required sig- close others must provide an interpretation
nificant cognitive resources to ensure some of us based on enough of the truth of who
semblance of event order and consistency, we really are. In the case of Crane, no such
and the authors of the study suggest that the interpretation may take place with respect to
devotion of such resources to maintaining a that part of his identity he has falsely claimed,
lie would explain the diminished complexity He, and those close others he shares his life
of the narrative language as seen in almost all with, are thereby prevented from engaging
of measures listed above. in this process. Their attempts at intimacy, in
Like false smiles that use different facial which the structural basis is a false narrativ
muscles compared with genuine smiles, the are doomed from the start,
study reveals something similar in the way of There are implications in this for person
measurable indicators for those who lie about growth and the development of one's cha
themselves. Were these indicators present in ter. For often these aspects of moral life tak
the cases we have discussed? Of course, we place against the backdrop of reflection abou
will never know for sure, but it seems likely the past, and especially shared reflect
that they were, at least at first. In the case of about the past. Crane and Romand are larg
Crane, with less to keep track of, it may be paralyzed in this respect. They can imi
that he became better practiced at telling his such reflection but they cannot genuinely
story, more immersed in the detail, and more bring the present to bear on the story of th
comfortable at playing his role. Romand, by past. They are constrained by the false sto
all accounts, simply failed to disclose much far more than we are in general constrained
about his day-to-day activities. In both cases, by the truth because their socially embed
given how much was at stake, some degree of and accepted story depends on it. The soc
narrative distance was surely present, and the cost of having to repudiate aspects of a p
motivation clearly was to protect, so to speak, one has represented with honesty is in gene
the seeming truth of their false narratives. lower than the cost of repudiating a pivota
Since, given the fact of narrative distance, falsehood. They are stuck with their f
they could not get close to their own false nar- stories and so can make neither their past
rative, they could not allow their nearest and their future stories come true,
dearest to get close either. The falsity of their
narratives was intensely private and secret, 8. Conclusion
yet the narratives themselves were shared for In this essay we have attempted to under
other effects—to make them someone in the stand why it is important for the narrati
eyes of society. self-conceptions of social persons to be true.
When living a lie, one's self-narrative is Knowingly and persistently tellin
less open to interpretation and revision by ries about ourselves rules out the po
intimate others than it is in the usual cases. that others will understand wh
We are typically very interested in what are, and this prevents intimacy a

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 TRUTH, LIES, AND THE NARRATIVE SELF / 313

velopment of genuine closeness with others. behind their strange behavior and to contrast
We have not explored in detail the different such cases with those we discussed under
causes and motivations leading to signifi- permissible cases,
cant deceit, the kind exhibited by Crane and
Romand, for example. An important project Australian Catholic University
would be to explore the moral psychology Macquarie University

NOTES

We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful feedback, as well as audiences at Australia
University, Macquarie University, the University of Waikato, Australian Catholic University, an
Sturt University. This research was partly supported by an Australian Research Council Gr
"Addiction, Moral Identity, and Moral Agency: Integrating Theoretical and Empirical Appro

1. This is not the only reason, but we focus on it here because of its centrality in the so
struction of narrative selves. Another reason, as Seumas Miller pointed out to us, is that li
undermines normative agency itself. Sometimes we make public the otherwise internalized
commentaries about what we do, and in so doing, this reinforces the determination to do i
nouncing to a group of friends that you are leaving the party and then stay right where y
social discomfort this might engender is a strong indicator that sharing the parts of our st
ing our intentions adds considerable weight to carrying them out. Frequent lying about wh
and who we are is disruptive of agency itself. This emerges very strongly in the case of J
Romand, which we discuss below.

2. The case of Romand is recounted by Emmanuel Carrere in his L'Adversaire (2000). L'Ad
was also made into a film directed by Nicole Garcia.

3. We will alternate freely between talk of 'living a lie' and talk of 'false narrative.' We ack
the logically possible case of someone who systematically lies about a past when it turns out
they have said is true. We also acknowledge the possible case of globally deluded individuals
who honestly represents themselves when much of what they say is false. So, conversely, in th
context we would only fuss over the distinction between 'true narrative' and 'honestly e
narrative,' where some additional factor, such as a delusion, was present. We will ignore the
involving someone globally deluded, but the first possibility of someone whose lies turn out
of some conceptual relevance. In the film The Truman Show (1998), Truman Burbank believ
ordinary man when in fact his entire life is at the center of a television program. If we chang
and suppose that Truman lied to those around him, claiming to be the subject of a reality
program, it would then be a case in which the phrases 'living a lie' and 'false narrative' cou
substituted. Should this bother us? Someone might argue that this strange case is useful
what is at the core of the normative issue. If what we say about Crane applies equally to Bu
this altered Truman Show case, then perhaps it is the lying—i.e., the deceitful misrepresenta
blocks intimacy, and that is all. We doubt this. Suppose it turned out that Crane really did t
he lied about (suppose he had false memories of being at Adelaide High School and so on).
would then be like the altered Truman Show case, and yet it surely generates moral intuitions a
to the original Crane case. Just how we should interpret these cases is very puzzling. We su
contain elements that contaminate our intuitive responses; for example, it is morally relev
changed case that we must suppose Crane to be deluded. His family dismay over his lying
overshadowed, even assuaged, by the knowledge of his global delusion.

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314 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

4. Sydney Morning Herald, October 3, 2009. See http://www.smh.com.au/national/pow-chief-a

-prisoner-of-his-own-lies-20091002-ggid.html?skin=text-only
5. Ibid.

6. Caterson (2009b).

7. We do acknowledge the literature in response to Dennett (1992), particularly a respo

man (2005), but the focus there is largely tangential to the issues raised here.

8. Velleman (1991) argued for this.

9. Cf. Kennett and Matthews (2008).

10. An anonymous referee raised this point.

11. We thank an anonymous referee for prompting us to clarify our position in the light of
between the two cases.

12. This objection was raised by an anonymous referee.

13. Cf. Matthews (2010), esp. pp. 357-358.

14. See Khader (2011).

15. See, for example, Johansson, Hall, and Sikstròm (2008).

16. An anonymous referee raised a question about whether intimacy could be supported by shared
narrative alone (setting aside a dependence on truth) and suggested to us the case of a (solo) drifter
who, "moving constantly, doesn't share significant narrative episodes . . . and, consequently, fails to
develop significant intimacy, despite the fact that there is nothing false in the drifter's self-narrative." We
agree there might be cases like this, but our thesis is unaffected here, because intimacy requires other
conditions besides being truthful with close others. Sharing certain kinds of personal information in an
ongoing way with others represents a baseline requirement in order just to be a candidate for intimate
relations; the referee's solo drifter does not meet this baseline. The case of the two drifters whom we
discuss in the main text tests the idea that intimacy might arise in a relationship without the need for
largely truthful exchanges; in other words, it tests the converse possibility from that raised by the case
of the solo drifter.

17. The quotes in this paragraph are from the Sydney Morning Herald, October 6, 2009. See http://
www.smh.com.au/national/grandpas-war-stories-had-them-fooled—now-theyre-mortified-20091005
-gjf6.html

18. This claim requires careful qualification because its truth depends on a range of favorable
contingencies. Empirical work in the area of shared memory suggests that collaborative remembering
may in fact bring about inhibition as well as facilitation in accurate recall and the performance of
remembering tasks. However, facilitation is more likely when groups (e.g., couples) have a shared
history, shared domain knowledge, and a communication strategy. Of course our point is that a faked
past prevents engagement with another in an act of sharing the past, thereby preventing the goods of
intimacy this act might generate. (For a thorough discussion of work in this area and a study of twelve
couples interviewed in relation to three memory tasks, see Harris, Keil, Sutton, Barnier et al. [2011].)

19. See Bedwell, Gallagher, Whitten, and Fiore (2011).

20. See Cocking and Kennett (1998).

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 TRUTH, LIES, AND THE NARRATIVE SELF / 315

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