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Representational of Conditional Probabilities

Author(s): Bas C. van Fraassen


Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Aug., 1976), pp. 417-430
Published by: Springer
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BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

REPRESENTATIONAL OF CONDITIONAL

PROBABILITIES*

Under certain conditions, the conditional probability of event A given


event B can be construed in terms of absolute probabilities. This is as far as
the standard theory, initiated by Kolmogorov, goes.
I shall first list the reasons for exploring a wider concept of conditional
probability. Then I shall, in Sections 2-4, present and relate the standard,
Renyi, and Popper approaches to this subject. The remainder of this paper
will develop representation theorems for Popper's conditional probabilities.
My conclusion is that the concept of conditional probability cannot be
reduced to that of absolute probability; but all conditional probabilities can
be represented in terms of absolute probabilities.

1. LIMITS OF ABSOLUTE PROBABILITY

Following Kolmogorov [6], we call a function P a probability measure if it


is defined on a Borel field (now commonly called a-field) of subsets
of a given set K, and P is a real-valued function with the properties

1. O<P(A) < = P(K)


2. P(UG) = ({P(A): A e G} when G is a countable disjoint
subfamily of the domain ofP.

I shall refer to 1 and 2 as Kolmogorov's axioms.


In addition, because various authors think that countable additivity
(axiom 2) is too strong a requirement on probability, I shall call a function
P a probability function it it is defined on a field of subsets of a given set K,
and satisfies 1 and

3. P(A U B) = P(A) + P(B) when A and B are disjoint.


I shall call 3 the axiom of finite additivity.
The conditional probability of A given B is usually defined by

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418 BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

4. P(A/B) = P(A B)/P(B),


for those cases in which P(B) # 0, and left undefined otherwise.
There are four reasons for wishing a wider concept of conditional prob-
ability -- that is, for wishing P(A /B) to exist in at least some cases in which
P(B)= 0.
The first is very familiar: there are intuitive cases in which such a con-
ditional probability makes sense. Emil Borel already set the following prob-
lem: what is the conditional probability distribution of latitude 0 for a given
longitude 4/? In the context, the probability of being in a certain region of
the earth's surface is assumed proportional to the area of the region; so the
antecedent (having exact longitude 0) here has probability zero.'
The second reason concerns relative frequencies. While these do not
form a good model for probability theory,2 they have always been one of
the main inspirations for the development of the theory of probability. Now
the relative frequency of powers of 93 in the natural numbers equals zero
(their proportion in the first n numbers decreases toward zero as n increases
indefinitely). But the relative frequency of even powers of 93 among the
powers of 93, equals one-half. And this should correspond to a conditional
probability.
The third reason is that finite proportions are certainly a simple para-
digm guiding our intuitions of probability. But if we stay with Kolmogorov's
account, we must admit a systematic ambiguity in judgments of probability
based on proportions in finite classes. Consider

5. Probability ({1,..., n}/{1,.. ., q}) = n/q for n < q.


There is no single probability function on the natural numbers which can
satisfy 5 for all numbers n and q. The reason is that each single number
would have to be given a positive probability; and they would also all have
to be given the same number, because each is allocated the same proportion
of each finite class. But then the sum of the absolute probabilities of the
first r numbers would exceed 1, for some number r. The only reaction, if we
stick with the narrow eoncept of conditional probability, is to say that
different probability functions express or represent the probabilities
appropriate to different finite reference classes.
The fourth reason is that on the narrow concept, there cannot be
uncountably many mutually incompatible events, which can be antecedents
of conditional probabilities - again, unless we admit a systematic ambiguity.

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REPRESENTATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES 419

In quantum mechanics, there are uncountably many amximal observables,


no two of which can be jointly measured. To explicate

The probability that the outcome is in E, if observable m be


measured, equals r,

we must accordingly either give up the narrow concept of conditional prob-


ability, or else admit that there is no single interpretation of probability that
satisfies all such statements at once. For ifP is a probability measure, there
cannot be uncountably many disjoint events to which P gives a non-zero
value.3
These four difficulties seem to me sufficient reasons to explore wider
concepts of conditional probability, in which the antecedent event may
have absolute probability zero.

2. POPPER'S THEORY

Karl Popper defined his conditional probabilities as finitely additive binary


maps into [0, 1], subject to certain conditions.4 These conditions imply
that the domain of the map is a Boolean algebra, hence representable as a
field of sets.

Following the discussions by Stalnaker [9] and Harper [3], we can


present Popper's notions in modern, simplified form.

A Popper probability function P is a map of F x F into [0,1],


where F is a field of subsets of a given set K, such that

Al. 0 <P(A/B) <P(B/B)= 1,


A2. If P(BIB) * 1, then P(-/B) is a probability function,
A3. P(A n B/C) = P(A/C)P(B/A n C),
A4. If P(A/B) = P(B/A) = 1 then P(C/A) = P(C/B).
When F is a Borel field, and the following also holds

A2'. If P(B/B) * 1 then P(-/B) is a probability measure,

then I shall call P a Popper probability measure.


This is a fairly simple formulation, but is obscured by the extra baggage
of 'don't cares': cases P(B/B) = 1. It is easily deduced that this is the case if
and only if P(X/B) = 1 for all X. Let us call X normal if P(X/X) # 1 and

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420 BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

abnormal otherwise. In that case we also deduce easily that X is abnormal


iff P(X/A)= 0 for all normal A. Furthermore, the Popper condition A4,
which at first looks such a stringent identification, is in fact dispensable
for normal sets.
For if A and B are normal, then so is A U B; and indeed, P(AB/A U B)=
1. Axiom A3 then quickly yields the conclusion that P(X/A) = P(X/B) for
all X in F.

We obtain significantly greater simplicity therefore, if we ignore the


abnormal sets, for which the Popper probabilities are easily calculable any-
way. This leads to the following alternative formulation of Popper's theory.

A Popper (probability) space is a quadruple (K, F, G, P)


where K is not empty, F a field on K, G a subset ofF, and
P a map ofF x G into [0, 1] such that the following hold
whenever the equations are defined:

I. P(B/B)= 1;
II. For constant B, P(X/B) is a probability function;
III. P(AB/C) = P(A/C)P(B/AC);
IV. IfP(AIB) * 0 for some B in G, then A is in G.

When F is a Borel field, and P(X/B) is a probability measure for any set B
in G, I shall call (K, F, G, P) a Popper o-space.
Condition I implies the converse of IV, so Popper spaces are in natural
one-one correspondence with Popper probabilities. The distinctive condition
III, which connects different antecedent conditions, is equivalent to

P(XA B)
If A B and P(A/B) # 0 then P(X/A) = P(AB)'
P (A /B)
and implies (given I and II) that

P(X/A) = P(XA /A),

that is, only subsets of the antecedent 'really' figure as consequents. (The
condition of the antecedent is 'assumed' as given or necessary.)

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REPRESENTATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES 421

3. RENYI'S THEORY

Renyi's theory, in [8] of conditional probability is formulable by means of


the definition of a conditional probability space; and this is just the defi-
nition of a Popper a-space with condition IV omitted. Renyi calls one of his
spaces additive if the family G of conditions is an additive family; that is, if
G is closed under finite unions. Thus Popper a-spaces are a special case of
Renyi's additive conditional probability spaces.
Renyi envisaged the construction of conditional probabilities as
quotients in the usual way, but by measures which need not be probability
measures, not even bounded. He gave the following example. Let G1, ...,
Gn ,. .. be a series of subfamilies of F which are mutually disjoint, and
/-1, .. ,.n, .. a series of measures defined on F which may take any value
up to + oo inclusive. Let G be the union of the series G1, , . G ... and
define:

P(x/B)= Lm(XB)ILm(B),
for the unique number m such that B is in Gm. Provided Jim(B) is positive
and finite when B is in Gm, the quadruple (K, F, G, P) is a conditional
probability space.
Csaszar proved quite easily that all conditional probability spaces can be
so constructed. We use a separate measure for each B in G defined as:

IB (X) = P(XIB) if X c B, and + oo otherwise.

But Renyi had suggested a condition that would make the representation
interesting: that the measures be dimensionally ordered: if m < n and
pm(X) is finite, then pn=(X)= 0. (The indices m and n are linearly ordered,
and the family of measures need not be countable.)
Here we may note the origin of the terminology. Figures on a line are
also figures on a plane, which in turn are figures in space. Length, area, and
volume are the appropriate measures; and line figures have zero area, while
plane figures have zero volume. If we further stipulate that two- and three-
dimensional figures have infinite length, and the latter infinite area, then we
have here a dimensionally ordered series of measures.
Renyi then proved a result, which was reported and generalized by
Csaszar in [2] namely that every additive conditional probability space can
be generated by a series of measures which are dimensionally ordered.
Thus all Popper a-spaces can be so generated.

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422 BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

4. A COMPARISON

To have a concrete example where Popper and Renyi may be compared, let
us look at finite frequencies. Let N be the set of natural numbers, F its
family of subsets, and G its family of non-empty finite subsets. We would
like
cardinality (A n B)
P(A/B) =cardn B in G.
cardinality (B)

In Renyi's case this is easy: let p(A) = cardinality (A) for all A in F. In that
case, p is not bounded, but takes value oo atN. Note also that this is an
additive space.
In Popper's case, we must tread more carefully. Since N is in F, and
P(N/B) = 1 whenever B is in G, we would need to have N in G. This goes for
all non-empty subsets of N. But we cannot make G that large, without intro-
ducing a further criterion for the probabilities conditional on infinite sets.
I shall leave that until I have shown how Popper probabilities can be repre-
sented.

For now we may point out that if we let F' be the family of finite sub-
sets (G and also A) then (N, F', G,P) is a Popper space. This is not a Popper
a-space, of course, since F' is not a Borel field.

5. REPRESENTATION OF POPPER SPACES

I have three objectives in this section. First, I want to describe a construction


that generates all and only the Popper spaces. Second, I want all construc-
tions used to be in terms of (Kolmogorov) probability measures or functions,
and no others. Thirdly, I wish to state the conditions under which an order-
ing like Renyi's ('according to dimension') is possible in these constructions.
Let K be a non-empty set. I call a set {a,: at < X} an ordinal family of
probability functions (on K) if:

(1) each a,, is a probability function defined on a field F, on a


subset of K;

(2) the union F of these fields Fa is a field on K;

(3) ifA e F and B is in Fa then AB is in Fa;

(4) if A e F and p,,(AB) is positive, then 1p3(A) is defined and


positive for some 3.

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REPRESENTATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES 423

Given such an ordinal family we can define the set G of sets B in F such
that Cr,(B) > 0 for some a, and the function

P(X/B) = ja(XB)/Ia(B) where a is the first ordinal such that


iat(B) > 0 (and hence defined)
for each B in G. In that case, call (K, F, G, P) the space genemted by I.
(Note that since I determines F, it determines K.)

THEOREM. If I is an ordinal family of probability functions (measures),


then the space it generates is a Popper space (a-space).

The only condition that is not immediately obvious is III:

P(AB/C) = P(A IC)P(BIA C),

where C and AC are both in G. Let a and ( be first numbers such that

ji,(C) 0 0 / Op(AC). Since pp(C)> -jp(AC), it follows that either a = P or


else a <13 while pa(AC) = 0.
In the first case, both sides of the equation are derived from a single
probability measure, so the equation holds. In the second case, P(ABIC) =
gA(ABC)/1a(C), but pa(ABC) < pa(AC) = 0, so that equals zero; and
P(A/C) = a.(AC)/Im(C), but pa(AC) = 0, so both sides of the equation
equal zero.
Note that condition (3) was used to insure that P(A/B) is defined, if at
all, for all A in F; and since I is a well-ordered set, P(A/B) is defined for all
B in G.

THEOREM. Every Popper space (a-space) can be generated by an ordinal


family of probability functions (measures).

Let (K, F, G, P) be such a space, and define for each set A in G:

FA = {A nB: BeF},
pA = IA(B) = P(B/A) for B in FA.
Finally, let the set G be well-ordered in any way at all.
That we have here an ordinal family of functions (measures) is clear.
Also, the union of the sets FA is F; and B is in G iff for some A in G,
P(B/A) # 0, iff for some function VA , A(B) O0. Now suppose uA(B) # 0;

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424 BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

without loss of generality, let it be the first such function (in the well-

ordering chosen). Then B c A, because pA(B) is defined, and P(B/A) # 0,


and so
P(X/B) = P(XB/A)/P(B/A) by the equivalent of III
= IA(XB)/I.A(B)
as required.
This kind of representation uses a great many probability functions. It is

clearly redundant, for whenever B _ A and P(BIA) A 0, the function gA can


be omitted from the family without changing the space generated. What we
would like to know is: for which Popper spaces is there a minimal generating
family? This is similar to the 'dimensional order' question broached by
Renyi. A preliminary result will relate the questions.

DEFINITION. For ordinal families I and I' of probability functions


(measures), I <I' iff they generate the same space and all functions in I are
in I'; call I minimal iff I' I implies I' = I.

THEOREM. An ordinal family I is minimal if and only if for each set B in


G in the generated space (K, F, G, P), there is exactly one member A for
which g(B) is defined and positive.

I shall prove this for the case of an ordinal family of measures. If the family
I satisfies the stated condition, then it must be minimal. For in that case, if
we deleted one of its measures, say pa,, then at least the universal set Ka of
ua would receive no positive value from any remaining measure, and so dis-
appear from the family G - an operation the generated space cannot survive
intact.

Let us suppose conversely that the family I does not satisfy the stated
condition. This can only mean that for some set B, there are two measures
p and 1' in I which give a positive value to B. Let K and K' be the universal
sets of those measures: respectively they give value 1 to K and K' and are
defined only on subsets thereof. Now B is part of each, and hence of their
intersection, so we get: P(B/K) > 0 and B c K', so P(K'IK U K') > 0; and
likewise P(K/K U K')> 0, both by the following

LEMMA. If P(X/C) = 0 and X c Y then P(Y/C U Y) # 0 for all Popper


probabilities P and sets in their domain.

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REPRESENTATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES 425

(For proof see below.)


Now K U K' is in G because K is, and P(X/K) = P(XK/K U K')/P(K/K
U K') and similarly with K replaced by K'. It follows therefore that at least
one of the measures u and /' is totally dispensable, for their job is done by
whatever measure i" is such that g"(K U K') > 0.
It follows then that I was not minimal. This ends the proof except for
the lemma. It suffices to consider the case (C U Y) in G; and to prove that
then P(XIC U Y) > 0 ifP(X/C) > 0 and X c Y. Now ifP(C/C U Y) > 0
then P(X/C U Y) > P(XC/C U Y) = P(C/C U Y)P(XIC) > 0. If on the other
other hand P(C/C U Y) = 0 then we have immediately that P(Y/C U Y) = 1
because P(C U Y/C U Y) = 1. This proves the lemma.
We can now take another look at the finite frequency example. Recall
that (N, F', G, P) has F' as the family of finite subsets of F' and G as the
family of non-empty members of F'. We can think of this space as generated
by the probability functions

PA(B) = card (B)/card (A), defined only for subsets B of A

for A in G. We can now enlarge F' and G systematically by adding infinite


sets X simultaneously to F' and G and to the generating family

I I(B)
Px(B) = limit v

where I(B) is the characteristic function of B, provided we restrict the values


of B to a certain field of subsets of X - this is not automatic. Not all infinite
sets can be so added, just because the whole domain of PN so defined is not
a field. And we certainly cannot make this a Popper a-space, because PN
will have to be defined on both N and all its finite subsets, in which case it
cannot be countably additive. (See [10] for details.) Finally, no such space
with P reflecting at least the finite proportions can be generated by a mini-
mal ordinal family, as I shall show in the next section. I do not believe
these difficulties concern Popper spaces so much as relative frequencies.

6. DIMENSIONAL POPPER SPACES

In the preceding section it is shown that all and only the Popper spaces are
generated by ordinal families of probability functions (and Popper a-spaces
by such families of probability measures). I shall now investigate under what

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426 BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

conditions a Popper space can be generated by a minimal family, and what


such a space looks like.
To begin, we may note that there is a natural compatibility relation
among the measurable sets in a Popper space.

DEFINITION. If (K, F, G, P) is a Popper space, and A, B are in G, then:

A is compatible with B iff for some X in G, A U B L X, while


P(AIX) and P(B/X) are both positive.

It is easily proved by means of the stated equivalent of condition III that A


and B are compatible if and only if P(A/A U B) and P(B/A U B) are both
positive.
Compatibility is an equivalence relation on G. It is necessary only to
prove transitivity. So suppose:

AUBcY BUCc Y
P(A/X) > O P(B/Y) > O
P(B/X) > O P(C/Y) > O

We note that B _ X n Y. So P(XY/Y) # 0 and XY S Y, so P(XY/X U Y) /


0 by our Lemma, in the preceding section. Therefore P(X/X U Y) and
P(Y/X U Y) are positive. So P(A/X U Y) > P(AX/X U Y) = P(X/X U Y)
P(A/X) > 0 and similarly P(C/X U Y) > O0. Thus A and C are compatible.
Let us call a Popper space dimensional if for each condition there is a
maximal condition from which it derives; precisely:

(K, F, G, P) is dimensional iff for each set A in G, the union


of the sets compatible with A belongs to G, and is com-
patible with A.

THEOREM. A Popper space can be generated by a minimal ordinal


family if and only if it is dimensional.

First, let the space (K, F, G, P) be dimensional, and let R be the family
{U [A] : A E G} where [A] is the family of sets in F compatible with A.
For each set X in R, define the function

lLx(B) = P(B/X)

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REPRESENTATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES 427

on just those subsets of X which are in F. Since compatibility is an equival-


ence relation, the families [A ] are disjoint. So if pix(B) is defined and posi-
tive, then B and X are compatible, and so X belongs to [B] and to no other
such equivalence class. Therefore X = U [B]. This shows that iLx(B) can be
defined and positive for at most one X in R. These functions can now be
well-ordered arbitrarily, and will then form a minimal ordinal family gener-
ating the space.
Second, let the space be generated by a minimal ordinal family I. For
given B, let pa be the unique function in I such that ~a(B) is defined and
positive. Then the universal set K, of pa is compatible with B. If in addition,
A is compatible with B, then A U B is compatible with both. Let ~p be the

function which gives a positive value to A U B. Then ap must give positive


values to A and B because their compatibility implies that P(A/A U B) and

P(B/A U B) are positive. Since aa alone gives a positive value to B, ta = a#.


We conclude that all sets compatible with B are included in K". But K. is
one of these; so it is their union.
To get a picture of a dimensional space, imagine it divided into a series of
non-empty sets

KD...
such that (a) later sets in the series have probability zero relative to earlier
sets; (b) each setB in G is compatible with a unique member of the series,
whence derives the conditional probability P(-/B). This is shown by the
following.

THEOREM. LetI be an ordinal family of probability functions with K,


the universal set of pa in I. Then I is minimal iff: K, = Kp implies a = P,
Ka D Kp implies lp(Ka) = 0, and {Ka} is linearly ordered by set inclusion.

Let us first suppose that I is minimal. Then Ka = Kp implies that some set,
namely that one, receives value 1 from pa and pp, so they are identical.
Define now for any sets A and B in G in the generated space (K, F, G, P):

A is superior to B iffP(B/A U B) = 0.

Then the following hold, and entail the required conclusion:

(a) Ka is superior to Kp iffKa D Kp.

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428 BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

(b) Either Ka is superior to Kp or Kp to Ka; or they are identical.

(c) If Ka is superior to K1 then P(KpI/Ka) = 0.


To prove these, we note that if A is superior to B then P(A/A U B) = 1; and
of course P(A U B/A) = 1; so the A and A UB are compatible. Since Ka is
the union of all sets compatible with it in a dimensional space, this shows
the 'only if' part of (a). Suppose now that Ka D K1; each is the union of all
sets compatible with it; therefore they are incompatible. Now P(Ka,IKa)= 1;
so then P(Kp/Ka) = 0. This establishes at once the 'if' part of (a) and also
(c). Finally, if neither K, nor K1 were superior to the other, they would be
compatible, for then P(Ka/Ka U Kp) * 0 P(Kp/Ka U Ku). But in that
case, each would include the other, since each includes all sets compatible
with it.

Conversely, let us suppose that the family {Ka} is a chain of the supposed
sort. Let us suppose that B E Ka n Kp = Ka and that pa(B) > 0. Then
pa (K>) > ga(B) > 0, which is impossible, unless Ka = K1, in which case
pa = g-. So B can receive a positive value from at most one of the
measures.

THEOREM. If a Popper space (K, F, G, P) contains any countable series of

sets X1 c X2 C -. . in G such that P(XI/X,) is positive for all n, but con-


verges to zero as n is increased indefinitely, then this space is not dimen-
sional.

If a space is thus, all the sets X, are compatible with each other, for
X, U X, = X,, where m < n; moreover, P(X,,,IX,) >P(X1/Xn) > 0 for
such m.

But the union of such a series is either not in G or not compatible


with the members of the series. For if X is that union and in G, then we can
apply the following corollary to condition III in the definition of Popper
space
if A cB C then P(A/C) < P(A/B)
which shows that P(X1/X) would have to be smaller than all the members
P(X/1Xn), and hence zero.
This theorem shows at once that our example of a finite frequency
Popper space (N, F', G, P) is not, and cannot be extended to, a dimensional
space..To apply the theorem, simply let X, = {(1,.. ., n}.

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REPRESENTATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES 429

COROLLARY. Not all Popper spaces are dimensional.

University of Toronto

NOTES

* The research for this paper was supported by Canada Council grant S74-0590.
a This problem is discussed by Kolmogorov in [61, Chapter V, Section 2. It is pointed
out there, and in many texts, that the theory of absolute probability allows the exist-
ence of a function Px such that

P(A nX1-(E)) =E Px(A)dPx(x)


where X is a random variable, E a Borel set on the real line, and PX the measure on the
real line determined by P and X, namely Px(D) = P(X-' (D)). It is reasonable to think
of Px(A) as the probability of A given that X takes value x. However, if E is not a point
set, and P(X-'(E)) = 0, this does not allow us to isolate a value for P(AWX-' (E)). The
account is generalized to allow a functionP(--/G), where G is a Borel subfield of the
domain of P, and

P(C n B) =f P(B/G) dP for each C in G.

This can be done in such a way that P(-/G)(a) is a probability measure almost every-
where. Note that if P(C) = 0, or more generally if all the sets in G are given zero by P,
the equation is easy to satisfy trivially. For details on this general treatment, see for
example [1], Chapter 6.
2 See my [10], which defends an amended frequency interpretation.
3 I assume here that in this case we must restrict ourselves in interpretation to count-
ably additive measures. This subject is treated in detail in [5].
* See[7], Appendices * iv and v (pp. 326-358), and the bibliography pp. 318-319.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] Ash, R. B., Real Analysis and Probability, Academic Press, New York, 1972.
[2] Csaszar, A., 'Sur la Structure des Espaces de Probabilitd Conditionnelle', Acta
Mathematica Hungarica 6 (1955), 337-361.
[3] Harper, W., Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester, 1975.
[4] Harper, W. and Hooker, C. A., (eds.), Foundations of Probability Theory, Statisti-
cal Theory, and Statistical Theories of Science, Volume III. Reidel, Dordrecht
1975.
[5] Hooker, C. A. and van Fraassen, B. C., 'A Semantic Analysis of Niels Bohr's
Philosophy of Quantum Theory', in [4].
[6] Kolmogorov, A. N., Foundations of the Theory of Probability, Chelsea, New
York, 1950.
[7] Popper, K. R., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Revised Edition, Hutchinson,
London, 1968.

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430 BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN

[8] Renyi, A., 'On a New Axiomatic Theory of Probability', Acta Mathematica
Hungarica 6 (1955), 285-333.
[9] Stalnaker, R., 'Probability and Conditionality', Philosophy of Science 37 (1970),
64-80.

[10] van Fraassen, B. C., 'Relative Frequencies', forthcoming in Synthese, 1976.

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