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MENT OF IND
DIA
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
D R GENERA AL OF CIVIL AVIATIO
ON
Opp.
O Safda
arjung Airp
port, New Delhi
D – 110 003
SS
SP Divis
sion Cirrcular No.1
N off 2012
File No.:AV-15011/ASC/3
3/2012-AS (2
2)
Date
ed 26.10.201
12
Subject: Hazard Log Template
CAR Section
S 1 Series C Part I requires s Air ope erators, Aerodrom
A me
operato
or, ATS/A
ANS Service provid der to develop, esta aintain and
ablish, ma
e to a Safety Mana
adhere agement System. Effective safety re eporting oof
hazards by operrational pe
ersonnel, their ana
alysis and documen ntation is a
corners
stone for managem
m ment of safety.
Distribu
ution: All Aircrafft Operattors /Aerodrome Operato
ors/Airportts
Authoriity of India
a
.
DGCA Template for Hazard Log
This excel spreadsheet is a template for the The aim is to identify the high level risks the organisation Detailed hazard logs will not be approved
production of a hazard log ‐ also known as a risk faces, to assess them, identify mitigations, and put in place by the DGCA, and remain the responsibility
register. actions to assure the risk control is implemented. of the individual operator.
Scroll down What does this spreadsheet do?
The template laid out in this Excel file is intended to assist organisations in preparing a hazard log. It contains guidance on the areas to be completed, along with a suggested hazard tolerability
scheme. The hazard log is a critical part of the "safety library" of an organisation.
What is a hazard log?
Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3
"Unawareness and unwillingness can be overcome only through knowledge. The “The continually updated record of the Hazards, "Organisations should wherever possible maintain a
formal documentation of hazards is therefore an essential requirement for hazard incident sequences and incident / accidents associated centralised log of all identified hazards. The nature and
identification as well as a trait of mature safety management. Safety information with a system. It includes information documenting format of such a log may vary from a simple list of
(i.e. analysed raw data) and safety intelligence (i.e. safety information that has risk management for each Hazard and accident hazards to a more sophisticated relational database
been corroborated and further analysed by adding context) combine to generate (incident). These Hazards, incident sequences and linking hazards to mitigations, responsibilities and
safety knowledge that must formally reside in the organization, not in the heads of accident / incidents are those which could conceivably actions (as part of an integrated safety risk
individual members of the organization." happen, and not only the ones which have already management process)."
been experienced.”
Source: EASA European Strategic Safety Initiative ‐
Source: ICAO Doc 9859 section 4.6.3 Source: Def Stan 00‐56 Issue 4
Guidance on Hazards Identification
What does the DGCA template contain and why?
ID Unique Hazard ID number assigned by organisations ‐ this allows traceability of the hazard (particularly if discovered via multiple sources)
Originator Name of organisation (as used by DGCA)
Method from which hazard was identified. Examples could include accident/incident investigations, safety audits, proactive methods etc. See sheet 4 of
Source
this file
Location If applicable, the location of the hazard (identified by its ICAO designator if relevant)
Functional area The area (or function) of the operation within which the hazard resides
Hazard description A short description of the hazard. For guidance on hazard types, see sheet 5 of this file which gives a non‐comprehensive list
A short description of the worst credible effect of the hazard (what risk could the hazard potentially lead to?) and the reasons for the hazard leading to this
Worst credible effect and reason
risk
Existing controls Identification of the existing mitigations (or controls) which prevent the hazard leading to the end effect
Outcome pre‐mitigation An analysis of the risk, in terms of probability, severity and ultimately tolerability (or acceptability) ‐ guidance on this process is shown in sheet 3
Additional risk controls If the risk is found to not be acceptable (or acceptable with additional mitigations), additional controls will be shown here
Outcome post‐mitigation Following the implementation of additional controls, the new outcome (risk) is analysed for acceptability
Action Specific actions are identified to implement any new risk controls
Owner Specific action owners are identified for each action ‐ the responsibility for implementation of the risk control lies with them
Deadline A deadline for the action should be fixed. It is not enough to identify risk controls and leave them to be implemented in five years' time
A review period should be specified, upon which the effectiveness of the new controls should be assessed. Are they effective, or are new risk controls
Review period
necessary?
Worst
Location
Date added credible Additional risk controls (risk Status and
ID Originator Source (ICAO Functional area Hazard description Existing controls (defences) Outcome Pre‐mitigation Outcome post‐mitigation Action Owner Deadline Review period
to hazlog effect and mitigation strategy) completion date
designator)
reason
Severity Likelihood Risk tolerable? Severity Likelihood Risk tolerable?
HazID Liaise with base airlines and vehicle
Procedural mitigations promulgated Procedural mitigations promulgated to Mr A.N.Other,
workshop ‐ owners to develop and
Example 1 AAI n/a 15‐03‐12 ANS ‐ TWR service Loss of comms Accident internally to TWR ATCOs (exact ref to be 1 4 N flight crews and vehicle drivers (exact 1 5 Y safety manager, 01 January 2013 Open 01 January 2014
March communicate procedures in case of
given) refs to be given) TWR services
2012 (ref) loss of comms
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Hazard tolerability (or acceptability)
In assessing the tolerability of various hazards, you must examine the worst credible effect (risk) associated with the hazard. Guidance on this can be found in ICAO Doc 9859 (Safety Management
Manual). The characterisation of the worst credible effect is carried out using the variables of severity and probability (likelihood).
From ICAO Doc 9859: "The process of bringing the safety risks of the consequences of hazards under organizational control starts by assessing the probability that the consequences of hazards
Scroll down materialize during operations aimed at delivery of services. This is known as assessing the safety risk probability. Safety risk probability is defined as the likelihood that an unsafe event or condition
might occur.
The second step in the process of bringing the safety risks of the consequences of hazards under organizational control is the assessment of the severity of the consequences of the hazard if its
damaging potential materializes during operations aimed at delivery of services. This is known as assessing the safety risk severity.
Once the safety risk of the consequences of an unsafe event or condition has been assessed in terms of probability and severity, the third step in the process of bringing the safety risks of the
consequences of the unsafe event or condition under organizational control is the assessment of the tolerability of the consequences of the hazard if its damaging potential materializes during
operations aimed at delivery of services.
This is achieved by combining the safety risk probability and safety risk severity tables into a safety risk assessment matrix."
The safety risk matrix, and specific scales used, can be individual to each organisation . However, in the interest of providing guidance to Indian stakeholders and maintaining a consistent approach,
the DGCA is providing these two matrices below as a basis for stakeholders' hazard analyses. All stakeholders other than small NSOPs( operating 1‐2 aircraft) should use Matrix 1.
Severity Severity
margins
s injury
impactt, or no
Catasttrophic
reducttion in
ent or
Hazarrdous
Negliigible
ance
ds to
Seriious
pact
ajor
nor
safety m
Nuisa
accide
Min
Lead
serious
Ma
imp
Probability
Frequent 5 Several times per year, or more 5
Probability
Accident / incident investigations
Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) ‐ also known as Flight Data Monitoring (FDM)
Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR)
Internal safety audits
Flight reports (flight crew, cabin crew) ‐ including operational reports, hazard reports, incident reports etc
Maintenance reports
Hazard workshops (proactive brainstorming)
DGCA regulatory audits and surveillance activities
Mandatory Occurrence Reports
Voluntary reporting systems (anonymous)
Safety surveys
Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA)
Change risk assessments (for operational changes)
Other organisations' hazard logs
Quality audits
Manufacturers reports
Safety Information Exchange programmes
CAR‐145 audits (if applicable)
Example hazards ‐ by type and per organisation
This spreadsheet gives some initial examples of hazards. It is in no way exhaustive.
• Non stabilised approach • Failures of components
• Fatigue • Malfunction of systems Aircraft Operators (SOP and NSOP) ANSPs
• Defect control • Adequate facilities and • Fatigue • Incorrect clearance given
• Runway incursion systems
• Inappropriately applied • Loss of communications • Wrong call‐sign
• Standard Operating
Procedures not followed tools and techniques • Expired aeronautical information • Adverse weather conditions
Operational Technical
By type By organisation