Rosenblatt 2018

Uruguay
Party Vibrancy and Democracy in Latin America

Fernando Rosenblatt
Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780190870041
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2018
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190870041.001.0001
Uruguay
Fernando Rosenblatt
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190870041.003.0006
Abstract and Keywords

This chapter, focusing on Uruguay, reviews the trajectory of the oldest parties in
the study, PC and PN. This analysis presents the clearest example of the
theorized evolution of the causal factors: the waning effect of Trauma, the
difficulty of sustaining Purpose, the importance of formal and informal Channels
of Ambition, and the consolidation of moderate Exit Barriers as a combination of
institutional and organizational formal and informal rules. The chapter also
discusses the case of the FA, a vibrant party that faces the challenge of
consolidating Channels of Ambition. Finally, the Uruguayan case illustrates the
trade-off between Trauma and Channels of Ambition and is the only one of the
three countries in this study where all the major parties, at the time of fieldwork,
could be considered vibrant.
Keywords: FA, PC, PN, vibrant parties, Purpose, Trauma, Channels of Ambition, moderate Exit
Barriers
Introduction
Uruguay’s PC and PN1 have existed for more than 180 years. For more than a
century, Uruguay had a stable two-party system (Caetano and Rilla 1984,
Caetano, Rilla, and Pérez 1987, Pérez Antón 1984, 1988, Buquet 2003). Until
1971, the two traditional parties together obtained more than 90 percent of the
votes in every election.2 They predate even the consolidation of Uruguayan
national identity and are the two oldest parties in the region. Parties remain
essential components of Uruguayan politics (Caetano and Rilla 1984, Caetano,
Rilla, and Pérez 1987). In fact, despite differences in their respective historical
evolution, both foundational parties have remained locally rooted and vibrant.
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Uruguay
The examination of Uruguay’s parties and party system therefore brings to the
study a longer-term perspective on the evolution of parties’ vibrancy.
Since the 1970s, the FA has also become a historically established actor (see
Yaffé 2003). The FA has thus transformed the traditional two-party system by
opposing the PC and PN, giving rise to a moderate multi-party system. This
stability also translated to the regime level. With the exception of the
authoritarian Terra regime of 1934–1942, Uruguay was a democratic country
from 1919 until 1973.
(p.161) Trauma marked the origin of both the PN’s and PC’s first, formative
years. This Trauma resulted from the intense fight between them. Nineteenth-
century Uruguay was anarchic for a long period (see Pivel Devoto 1942,
Monestier 2017). Different factions, comprising heterogeneous sectors of the
small society, formed each proto-party. In the early twentieth century, intense
but incoherent Purpose also developed. Uruguay’s electoral system set in motion
a virtuous cycle that eventually yielded a perfect equilibrium between incentives
reducing Exit and channels satisfying Ambition (Buquet and Piñeiro 2014).
Uruguay’s stable electoral rules, initially forged by the PC and PN, have also
exerted an ongoing, systemic influence on the country’s parties, including the
more recent FA. These rules have favored party stability. They include, since
1910, the double simultaneous vote (DSV),3 proportional representation (PR,
since 1918), closed lists, and concurrent executive and legislative elections
(since 1934). The relevance of the Uruguayan set of rules in determining the
presence of Channels of Ambition and moderate Barriers to Exit is undisputed
among scholars and was also unanimously agreed upon in my interviews.
González (1995) incisively explains these rules and their effects as follows:
The DSV means that voters vote at the same time for a party and for a
specific set of candidates within the party, though they have to select lists
—which cannot be modified—from among those presented by the rival
factions within each party. Once they choose the party, they have as many
options as there are lists presented by the party. An obvious consequence
of voting for a party is that split tickets are not allowed. The party that
obtains a plurality of votes is the winner; the winner of a plurality within
that party becomes president. Since 1934, finally, all elections occur at the
same time. This simultaneity obviously reinforces the effects of the ban on
split tickets. (González 1995, 146–147)
Uruguayan parties are distinctive in that each has presented an immense

number of electoral lists.4 Some scholars have argued that, given the
pervasiveness of party factions, their political relevance, and the apparent
nonexistence of organization at the party level, Uruguay historically had a multi-
party system with a two-party façade (Lindahl 1962, Sartori 1976). However,
Page 2 of 39
Uruguay
most Uruguayan (p.162) scholars have provided more compelling evidence to

the contrary (see, e.g., González 1995, Mieres 1992, Buquet and Chasquetti
2004b).5 Since 1934, each party has had institutionalized factions. Through the
analysis of the effective number of Senate lists,6 Buquet et al. (1998) show that
the effective number of factions has traditionally been between two and three
(44).7 In this sense, although DSV and PR generate incentives for the
proliferation of lists at the representative level, because executive and
legislative elections are concurrent and fused, the vertical integration from the
presidential and senate level reduces the effective number of factions.8 In terms
of Cox and McCubbins’s (2001) distinction between strong and feeble electoral
systems, the Uruguayan electoral system is not feeble but strong: it fosters
“incentives toward party and vote concentration” (44). The quote in Box 6.1 from
a PC leader reflects the important role of the specific institutional design in
explaining the trajectory of partisan stability in Uruguay.
Box 6.1 Uruguay 3
First, the PC and the PN, called “foundational” parties, I believe are the
oldest in Latin America, among those that still exist. They are parties that,
because of their origins, cut through the whole society and all ideologies. . . .
Parties in Uruguay . . . [exist] within one solid and closed system of lema, to
use the constitutional term, [a] very closed [system] that vindicates and
strengthens parties, something observable in Chile, [and with] the Unión
Cívica Radical in Argentina, where one can see parties that try to structure
themselves as such, beyond their best and worst moments.
But, in your view, what would explain the fact that this history still remains
alive, that it is able to reproduce itself, beyond its historical roots?
There are sociological [reasons], but there are mainly reasons attributable to
the electoral and partisan structure. The constitutional and legal scheme
does not make dismembering [parties] easy. They do not facilitate occasional
coalitions, something that before the reform in Italy was a marvelous thing
[said ironically].
In terms of Channels of Ambition, PR and the DSV at different levels allow

internal differences to be resolved within the party. If a political leader has
problems with a senior leader, he can opt to open his own list without leaving
the party. As González highlights, the DSV regulates internal competition and
solves internal disputes (see also Buquet 2003). Along these lines, Lanzaro
(1998) emphasizes the existence of “an ingenious electoral regime . . . that
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Uruguay
served for decades to ensure broad representation and to air the competition
among the elites” (200).9 Party leaders perceived that Ambition was satisfied.10
Parties have their methods and, thus, operate as “accelerants or brakes on the
general tendencies exerted by the institutional framework” (Moraes 2008, 167).
As Moraes (2008) and Buquet (2005) show, Channels of Ambition has thus been
controlled by party elites, above all leaders of senate lists, factions operating at
the national level. The last constitutional reform, in 1997, introduced mandatory
(p.163) and simultaneous primary elections.11 This change in rules
institutionalized intra-party competition and moved it to an early stage in the
electoral process. The existence of primaries, first enacted in 1999, has in some
cases introduced a clear criterion for settling competition between prospective
candidates for the House of Representatives. The PC and PN were using votes
received by different local-level lists in the primaries to order the list for the
national election. Nonetheless, national faction leaders competing for the Senate
still have tremendous nomination power for the Senate list (Uruguay 23,
Uruguay 38).
In terms of economic development, Uruguayan parties were affected in their

early history by the early capitalist economic collapse of the 1890s—one of the
first modern capitalist depressions. The country then benefited from the World
Wars. From the sidelines, it consolidated an important role as a provider of food
in times of scarcity. In the twentieth century, Uruguay suffered the same
economic crises and the same junctures associated with them as did Chile and
Costa Rica. Like those countries, in the 1930s Uruguay implemented a series of
reforms that led to the long consolidation of strong state intervention and all (p.
164) the traits that characterized the ISI model throughout the region and that
subsequently led to exhaustion (Bulmer-Thomas 2013). Starting in 1955, the
country entered a long period of stagnation. This stagnation went beyond bad
economic indicators. It deeply penetrated the country’s cultural and intellectual
life, and tested political parties’ vibrancy. As a direct consequence of the
economic stagnation and the context of the Cold War, polarization ensued during
the 1960s, and the 1973 coup then put a definitive end to the country’s
successful early-twentieth-century political and economic development. Unlike
Pinochet in Chile, Uruguay’s authoritarian regime was unsuccessful in
establishing a new economic model. Though formally proscribed, the country’s
political parties were key players in defeating that attempt. Since democracy’s
restoration in 1985, parties have shown their rootedness. The so-called debt
crisis of the 1980s that afflicted the region, however, imposed a new test on
parties’ vibrancy.
As in other Latin American countries, the most decisive period of structural and
market reforms ensued in Uruguay after the resolution of the debt crisis of the
1980s. However, direct-democracy mechanisms and strong political
organizations (FA, factions of traditional parties and unions) halted most of the
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Uruguay
market reform attempts. For example, in the 1992 referendum on a law

promoting privatization of state-owned utility companies, 79.2 percent voted to
repeal it (Altman 2010).
Finally, at the turn of the twenty-first century, Uruguay experienced its harshest
economic crisis ever. The portion of the population living below the poverty line
in 2003 reached 39.4 percent—almost twice the pre-crisis level of 1999 (20.6%).
Levels of unemployment in 2003 reached 16.9 percent.12 The country also saw
an estimated net emigration of 104,000 people from 2000 to 2005, quadruple
the number during the preceding five years. Overcoming this juncture tested
party organizations’ vibrancy, and in 2004, the most significant government
turnover in the nation’s history occurred: the FA, for the first time ever, won the
election.
Analysis of Each Party

United by Birth: Lasting Traits of the Foundational (Traditional) Parties
The PC and PN have been among the world’s most enduring political party
organizations. These parties are thus excellent cases through which to examine
how parties in developing countries can achieve vibrancy and sustain it over (p.
165) time.13 Moreover, I analyze part of their respective historical trajectories
together because both were born at the same time, and their respective
evolutionary trajectories have been closely intertwined (Pérez Antón 1988). The
stories of these two parties’ early stages are thus inseparably linked.
It was diplomacy, a dispute between empires, that created Uruguay as an

independent state. What was historically singular about Uruguay was that
durable partisan identities quickly emerged immediately after independence,
consolidated over time, and continue today to capture a significant portion of the
votes cast in every election. These parties were closely associated with the
founding of the country’s national identity, each representing various
perspectives that permeated society in different arenas.14 The origins of both
the PN and PC can be traced back to the 1836 “Batalla de Carpintería,” (the
Battle of Carpintería) in which the two camps used distinctive emblems (white
and purple) to differentiate themselves from one another.15 Costa Rica and Chile
also developed nineteenth-century party identities, but they did not survive the
incorporation period (Collier and Collier 1991, Roberts 2013, 2014).
The early identity of each party first developed over the course of a series of
violent conflicts that involved: the personal ambitions of caudillos that led the
drive for independence; the debate concerning the viability of an independent
Uruguay and its relations with Argentina and Brazil; and, finally, debates over
land property titles (Pivel Devoto 1942, Barrán 1990). Each party had its
martyrs, and gradually an epic narrative imbued each side. Thus, traumatic
events marked the evolution of each partisan identity.
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Uruguay
After a period of major instability due to a regional conflict—the Guerra Grande

(Great War) that ruined the country and involved Argentina, Brazil, Britain, and
France—different presidents tried to appease passions and transcend partisan
divisions (Barrán 1990). In 1855, army leaders from each side (Venancio Flores
and Manuel Oribe) signed the Pacto de la Unión (Union Pact), in which each
renounced seeking the presidency of the Republic. At the time, there were
different attempts by some members of the elite to transcend partisan divisions.
In this regard, Buquet and Chasquetti summarize those attempts (p.166) and,
more significant, how they were frustrated by the pervasiveness of partisan
identities. They state:
The idea that old parties made no sense because they did not channel
ideological differences or political projects became the central argument of
the illustrious intellectuals of the time. Ideas of “parties’ fusing” around
the common good of society were only supported by the cultivated
elements—the doctores—of the collectives and were unable to sustain their
preponderance for long. Confronting them, the caudillos—natural chiefs of
the popular sectors—made the party’s sentiments prevail. . . . The strength
and permanence of traditional parties, which overcame the projects of
fusionistas and principistas, highlighted the need to establish rules for
their peaceful coexistence. (2004a, 224–225)16
Conflicts between the two proto parties continued, illustrating the relevance of
each camp’s identity. However, an emerging capitalist elite demanded peace.
The ending of the Revolución de las Lanzas (Lance Revolution, 1870–1872)17
with the Paz de Abril (Peace of April) was crucial. For the first time, it generated
a mutual recognition of both sides. The agreement included a geographical
power distribution between PN and PC known as the coparticipación (power-
sharing mechanism; see, e.g., Pérez Antón 1988), that the PN ardently sought,
together with a demand for fair elections. However, Uruguay did not resolve the
issue of territorial power distribution nor that of fair elections, and the country
did not achieve peace and order. The PC, who had greater control of the state,
imbued the PN with Trauma by excluding them. PN kept fighting for inclusion,
with two more major conflicts in 1897 and 1904, the year of the last
insurrection. Both conflicts were led by the PN caudillo Aparicio Saravia.
Peace was finally achieved through the consolidation of state institutions around
a series of institutional arrangements, mainly the consolidation of the
coparticipación that gradually transcended the mere geographical distribution of
power, and these two parties eventually recognized each other. Their shared
evolution, though conflictual, thus gradually evolved into a tradition of “partisan
pacts and cooperation agreements between both camps” (Luna 2006, 130).
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Uruguay
These parties endured through the noncompetitive nineteenth century and then
led the modern transition to competitive elections and full (p.167)
participation.18 The party system achieved consolidation when they developed
an agreement on electoral rules that ensured free and fair elections, which were
finally guaranteed through the 1918 Constitution (Buquet and Castellano 1995).
These guarantees developed into the Laws of 1924, 1925, 1938, and 1939 (see
Buquet 2003). Very early in the country’s history, the electoral agreement almost
automatically ensured moderate Exit Barriers and facilitated the existence of
Channels of Ambition. Mutual recognition and acceptance, agreements, and
competitive rules thus together enabled stable, modern parties to develop in
Uruguay (Pérez Antón 1984, Caetano, Rilla, and Pérez 1987). Over the course of
this period, each camp gradually became more institutionalized. Above all, they
developed very strong social roots.19
In terms of Purpose, for the noncompetitive, pre-democratic nineteenth century,

González (1995) says that the PC evolved as the party of the city and was closer
to a typical liberal party of the time. The PN was meanwhile more rural and
closer to being a conservative party. However, even this characterization seems
problematic given that, from the very beginning, each camp comprised a
complex coalition, with personalistic rather than ideological loyalties uniting
each group (Rial 1984, Luna 2006). The existence of institutionalized factions
did have an impact on the coherence of each party’s Purpose.
By the early twentieth century, different ideological perspectives had begun to

coexist within each party, though loyalty toward a specific leader—personalistic
attachment—within the party also remained relevant.20 This later consolidated,
with the enactment of the DSV and other contemporary rules of the electoral
system. It therefore seems clear that having institutionalized factions limited the
Purpose of Uruguay’s two traditional parties.21 Each party came to be composed
of a very complex array of programmatic preferences.22
(p.168) Although neither party has ever been deeply coherent, they had
moments of intensity when one of their constitutive factions dominated the party
with a definite project. The Batllismo project in the early twentieth century is the
clearest example.23 Other examples can be found throughout history. In the PN,
the popularly known Herrerismo faction, led by Luis Alberto de Herrera, could
be regarded as an example of intense Purpose. The Herreristas’ electoral
preeminence facilitated coherence and thus an eventual presence of Purpose
within the PN.
In terms of vibrancy, Rial (1984) claims that Uruguay’s traditional parties were
merely electoral machines. He bases his argument on the fact that parties
increasingly relied on distributing particularistic goods through the state
apparatus to keep voters’ loyalty. Rama (1971) describes the increasingly
clientelistic nature of the Club Político, local-level partisan organizations, and
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Uruguay
claims that the quality of their role degenerated over time. Nevertheless, I
concur with the description of the traditional parties espoused by Pérez Antón
(1984) and Caetano, Rilla, and Pérez (1987). These authors argue that the
clientelistic nature of parties’ main linkage to voters coexisted with pervasive
partisan organization and considerable party activism.24
Thus, the eventual absence of a coherent Purpose did not prevent vibrant
organizations from developing. In fact, the organizations, though clientelistic
(Rama 1971), also maintained established instances of activist participation. The
impact of Trauma, which forged partisan identities based on retrospective
loyalty, together with moderate Exit Barriers and Channels of Ambition also help
to explain the nonexistence of inter-party alliances for most of the twentieth
century.25 It also helps to explain why, until 1971, only one faction ever switched
sides. In the absence of coherent Purpose, Trauma, Exit Barriers, and Channels
of Ambition sufficed to generate party vibrancy.
Starting in 1955, repeated economic crises began to take a toll on the economic
health of the country. These crises made delivery of private goods (p.169)
prohibitively expensive, undermining the two parties’ ability to ensure activists’
attachment by promising them particularistic goods (Piñeiro 2014). In the 1960s,
more left-of-center factions within the PN gained strength, as did more right-
wing groupings within the PC. Already lacking a coherent Purpose, the two
parties leapfrogged ideologically. Thus, Purpose declined significantly, and
Trauma had by then largely waned. The organizational consequence was that,
since no source of loyalty remained, both traditional parties started to show
signs of decay. They were still vibrant, but significantly less so. This sequence
provides preliminary evidence concerning the fragility of relying on moderate
Exit Barriers and Channels of Ambition alone (without Trauma or Purpose) to
reproduce vibrant party organization. It seems that this combination suffices for
vibrancy but leaves a party less resilient to shocks than when Trauma or
Purpose are also present. However, there is no disputing the permanent
reproduction of both organizations’ vibrancy. Their respective organizations
were continuously alive and active throughout the country.
During the authoritarian period (1973–1985), some groups within both parties
supported the regime. However, in contrast to Chile, the major factions were in
the opposition and campaigned against the constitutional reform proposed by
the Junta for establishing the foundations of a new regime. The proposal was
subjected to a plebiscite in 1980, and the Junta lost (Rial 1984, Caetano and Rilla
1987). Moreover, the factions opposing the regime obtained clear majorities in
the internal elections of 1982. In terms of Trauma, although they were in the
opposition and fought for the restoration of democracy, leaders of Uruguay’s
traditional parties were not as pervasively persecuted or as widely forced into
exile as Uruguayan militants and leaders of the left. In my interviews, leaders
from the PN and PC referred to the 1980s as a period of political involvement
Page 8 of 39
Uruguay
and reorganization of political parties (e.g., Uruguay 22, Uruguay 36).26 Almost
no references emerged that could lead one to consider Trauma as having been
present.
The post-authoritarian period was marked by some similar trends. In terms of

Purpose, both the PC and PN lost their defining identities.27 The emergence and
growth of the FA forced traditional parties to place themselves more clearly on
the center-right of the ideological spectrum. This could have generated more
coherence within both the PN and PC.28 Nevertheless, most of the interviewees
mentioned that their parties had significant problems with coherence, a crucial
(p.170) component of Purpose. Nor did any widely shared project emerge to
inspire intensity (e.g., Uruguay 3, Uruguay 5, Uruguay 24, Uruguay 32).
Moreover, the establishment of different governmental coalitions from 1990—
and more clearly from 1995—to 200229 led the two parties to neglect their
individual programmatic identities. Instead, the logic of the party system
became one of bipolar competition between two blocs: the traditional parties
versus the FA (Lanzaro 2000a, Moreira 2004, Chasquetti and Garcé 2005).
Further consolidating this change, for the first time in history, the two
foundational parties presented a unified Lema,30 running together for the 2015
departmental and municipal elections in Montevideo.
Thus, both parties have been, and still are, mainly characterized by the
configuration ptAE.
In sum, we have two foundational parties with Trauma similarly present at their
origin, with intermittent but decaying Purpose, and presence of Barriers to Exit
and Channels of Ambition. Nonetheless, they emphasized that the parties had a
meaningful history, with legends, symbols, heroes, and builders of the national
identity (Batlle y Ordóñez and Herrera in the twentieth century). Moreover, they
agreed that, even today, these traditional parties capture the affection of people
who relate to, militate in, and cooperate through them, even in adverse contexts.
While leaders of both described their parties as having problems, there were
differences between the two parties in terms of their vibrancy; the PC has been
in serious trouble since 2004.
Partido Nacional (National Party, PN)

The PN has traditionally been considered more uniformly conservative than the
PC. This has been so since the turn of the twentieth century. However, the party
has had leftist groups and an “insurrectionary spirit” that some leaders identify
as still present within the party (Uruguay 26, Uruguay 28). Thus, there was no
Purpose for portions of its history. However, it is worth highlighting that the PN
had a period of near hegemony of one faction, as did the PC, under the
leadership of Luis Alberto de Herrera. This period began in 1920 when he first
headed the party and lasted until his death in 1959. Herrera tried to bridge the
previous differences, rooted in the nineteenth century, between caudillos and
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doctores (see Caetano and Rilla 2003). He developed a series of ideological

definitions promoted with intensity, an ideological tendency that persisted within
the party for the rest of the century. Its preeminence gave coherence to the
party for much (p.171) of the time Herrera led it. Caetano and Rilla summarize
these ideas as having included:
. . . an anti-statist proposal, with a clear defense of the primordial role of

the market and private initiative; a visceral mistrust of taxes (more than
once the caudillo called for a “strike of the closed pockets”) and state
growth; a radical and popular ruralismo; a political activism of democratic
and liberal support (with the shadow of his sympathy for fascism and
Franco) based on a popular vision of how to do politics and a staunch anti-
doctrinarism; an affirmation of the primacy of society and its agents; a
mistrust of immigration . . . and [a mistrust] of universalistic educational
and social policies. (Caetano and Rilla 2003, 43–44)31
As typically happened in Uruguay’s traditional parties, the pervasiveness of

Herrerismo32 generated an internal opposition. However, unlike those in the PC,
the differences and tensions within the PN led to a split. The Partido Nacional
Independiente (Independent National Party) was formed and competed as a
separate party from 1944 until 1958, facilitating coherence of Purpose. After
unification, the PN won two successive elections (1958 and 1962), though with
different and divergent factions,33 bringing the party back to power after nine
decades. The death of Herrera in 1959 generated a more balanced dispute
between the Herreristas and those opposed to them.
The party underwent other programmatic transformations associated with the

emergence of a new faction, Por la Patria (For the Motherland) of Wilson
Ferreira Aldunate, who led the party from the end of the 1960s until his death in
1988. Ferreira Aldunate gave the party a centrist perspective in years of
polarization and was influenced by desarrollismo (developmentalism), the
economic perspective in vogue at the ECLAC. He later became a fervent
opponent of the authoritarian regime, denouncing it in international forums.
Some leaders characterized this juncture as an epic one (Uruguay 26, Uruguay
28).
(p.172) The period of transition began in November 1982 with the internal
elections of authorized parties (PC, PN, and Civic Union). Within each party, lists
opposing the authoritarian regime won.34 Interviewees, of all parties, who had
been young activists at the time agreed that those years of mobilization and
political openness after ten years of political proscription were particularly
intense. However, the PN had been less pervasively persecuted than had leftist
leaders. In the PN’s case, repression had been more focused on individual
leaders like Ferreira Aldunate. Interviewees close to him said it had been a time
of intense political activity (e.g., Uruguay 22), but did not recount any associated
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dangers: all the suffering was focused on Ferreira Aldunate. Moreover, the rest
of the party (the minority, at the time, of Herreristas as well as less prominent
leaders of the Wilsonismo) did not suffer under the authoritarian regime.
Democratic transition negotiations were unfavorable for the party. The PN

participated in the first democratic elections without its main leader, Wilson
Ferreira Aldunate. In June 1984 he returned from exile, but he was jailed and
prohibited from running in the first post-1971 democratic elections. The PN lost
the elections but showed no significant signs of organizational deterioration.
Ferreira’s alignment with Julio María Sanguinetti’s PC-led government against

the referendum campaign that sought to repeal the amnesty Law (Ley de
Caducidad) implied a clear rejection of the role of Trauma within his
organization. Ferreira died soon thereafter, in 1988, before having the chance to
run for president. For the next decade, only a few Por la Patria leaders retained
some degree of relevance (e.g., Luis Alberto Zumarán), but none ever emerged
as a real heir, and all were contested by other Wilsonistas. One interviewee, very
emphatically, illustrates the process in Box 6.2.
Box 6.2 Uruguay 26
Por la Patria had a vertiginous decomposition. At the end of the process,

Wilson had already died, and virtually nothing remained. . . . This was a
question that many asked at the time [why such decomposition actually took
place]. . . . [In those days] I had finished reading . . . Marco Polo where he
narrates that in I do not recall which Central Asian region, when an
outstanding boss died, who with his magnetism captivated the horde behind
him, they would kill his horse, break his sword, behead his generals, bury
them all together, and that was it. It was like saying that such a great thing
as this [leader] cannot have successors. One has to come from the end of the
steppe and appear on his own. Por la Patria movement wanted to have heirs,
but they were too fragile. . . . Wilson had the weakness of dying ahead of his
time . . . and a colossal political asset instantly vanished.
After Ferreira Aldunate’s death and the demise of Por la Patria, two major
groups alternated in controlling the party. One group, led by Luis Alberto Lacalle
(the grandson of Luis Alberto de Herrera), was more conservative and followed
Herrera’s ideas. Lacalle won the 1989 presidential election and governed from
1990 to 1995. With the other factions in dire straits since Aldunate’s death,
there was also more ideological coherence within the PN as a whole.35 However,
this changed as the non-Herreristas consolidated various political factions,
including a more centrist group controlled until 2014 by Jorge Larrañaga.
Although leaders (p.173) from these centrist factions claim to be heirs of
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Ferreira Aldunate, established leaders agree that, with his death, the centrist
Purpose he tried to forge within the party largely disappeared (Uruguay 22 and
Uruguay 26).
Like all Uruguayan parties, the PN’s vibrancy was severely tested during the
economic depression of 1999–2003. Its stance at that juncture was complicated
by its having formed governing coalitions with the PC. The PN, however, left the
coalition before the worst of the economic storm happened (Chasquetti 2011). In
any case, the organization reacted and was reinvigorated by its response to this
juncture and recovered electorally, becoming the strongest opposition party. The
PN thus proved itself resilient. The moderate Exit Barriers (arising from both
party history and electoral rules) and its provision of Channels of Ambition for
prospective leaders helped the party to survive and remain vibrant. Channels of
Ambition have always existed within the party and have played an important role
in maintaining its organizational vibrancy. A permanent trait of the PN that my
interviewees agreed upon almost unanimously was that it provided Channels of
Ambition.36 Young, established, and prospective leaders agreed that recognized
requirements and established (mostly informal) processes have always allowed
new politicians to rise within the party. First and foremost, top leaders never
hold undisputed power (Uruguay 28). Interviewees stressed the party’s anarchic
nature (Uruguay 26). (p.174) Second, interviewees said that a party member
had to be conscious that a political career takes time and requires building a
network based on mutual trust (Uruguay 28). They also said he needed to show
that he could gather votes for the party, normally proving his ability in this
respect through primary, or local (Uruguay 29), or internal elections. Finally,
they said he has to be able to deal with the party elite (e.g., Uruguay 5, Uruguay
10, Uruguay 22, Uruguay 23, Uruguay 31, Uruguay 36). According to
interviewees, some PN politicians’ careers are more successful than others’
because of their differential ability to meet these requirements. These factors—a
set of (mostly informal) rules and traditions that individuals can follow to pursue
their ambition through the party organization—were widely mentioned by
politicians from both of the traditional parties. These mechanisms for satisfying
ambitions are intertwined with reproducing the partisan organization, its
identity, and a sense of belonging. Box 6.3 presents an excerpt of a dialogue with
a young leader from the PN, who explains how Channels of Ambition operate
within the party.
Box 6.3 Uruguay 19
If you had to summarize what explains your personal trajectory within the
party, to which factors would you attribute it?
Page 12 of 39
Uruguay
Political work is not mysterious. Political work is something more

complicated and exhausting than commentators think. National and
departmental leaders need more local-level leaders to draw votes, and that
support takes a while to develop. It implies a relationship based on trust. It
implies a relationship where [they] take the temperature of the leader and
perceive him as someone suited for that task, for getting things, for whatever
[is needed according to] the assessment that local-level leaders make of
“why we are going to support this one.” And there are all the things that
factor into the complexity of the support from elderly people, [including the
candidates’] trajectories in parallel places. If you were a gremial leader in
the rural sector [a leader of the ranchers] and you have managed things well
according to some criteria, your jump to politics will be easier because you
are already known. . . . Thus, there are multiple channels for gaining
legitimacy. Now, what is clear is that nobody gives you anything as a gift . . .
and that you occupy a place because of your specific political activity.
Perhaps the door opens for you . . . for whatever reason, but that is a door
that gives you some visibility, where it can become easier to meet people.
[Getting] votes is all about the classic proselytism: door-to-door, work,
making the rounds, getting to know people, so that they test what you can
get and what you can really do.
What are the mechanisms that currently exist in your party for pursuing a
political career? In other words, if you were starting your political career
today, how would you imagine your first steps? What should you do to
advance your political career?
The elections. You run in an election, and if you do well you start to advance.
Then you have to confront other leaders who will want to kill you because
you did well.
Do you think the party favors competition between current leaders and
people with leadership potential and interest in participating but without
formal positions in the party? And does your faction favor competition
between leaders and those who would like to become leaders, or not?
The party very clearly has [favored such competition] through the party
youth elections. The youth in the party elections were the green wood that
turned into leaders who are twenty-something and today are departmental
councilors [ediles] in many departments, thanks to getting that earlier push.
In 2007, they forged their friendships and defined their stuff. Leaders were
discovered. They saw how things have to be done, and in 2010 there is no
department, I think, where the party won where there are not at least one or
two councilors of twenty-something [years old] who emerged through the
youth election.
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Uruguay
Leaders from this party claim that the almost anarchically uncoordinated
stances of PN leaders, while it facilitates the satisfaction of ambition, negatively
affects the party’s Purpose—and even its strategic-electoral decisions.37Boxes
6.4 and 6.5 summarize the party’s Purpose and the relationship between Purpose
and Channels of Ambition.
Box 6.4 Uruguay 22
I believe that one thing that works well is that this is a truly free party, and
open. Everyone expresses his or her opinion. Everyone says whatever he
wants. Everyone in practice does whatever she wants. Second, all roads are
open. If I want to become President of the Republic, in the PN I can run. If I
want to become a representative, I can run. And if I want to become an
Intendente, I can run. I mean, I do not have to ask for permission; I need to
get people to follow me, period, nothing else. Thus, I can have my list of
representatives, and if someone does not like it, too bad: he does not have to
vote for me. But if I am better than the next guy, I will beat him. I am going
to be the Representative and not him. And the same at the presidential level.
Anyone on the table today [as a candidate], or someone who we do not even
imagine could run, can take the stage and say, “I am a Blanco. I want to do
something different. I want people to follow me.” He puts his name on the
table, and there is no way to tell him “no,” and then the people decide. This
is a very free party, very open. That, of course, has it flip side, like all
coins. . . . It is hard for it to be disciplined. It is hard for it in terms of
coherence, because it is too open. But the fact [is] that there is internal
mobility and that there is a structure that facilitates renovation.
Box 6.5 Uruguay 10
The PN is a liberal party par excellence, because it is the party that, from its
inception, has historically defended the value of freedom. It is a party that
has stirred up revolutions for freedom. And except for the pact between
Herrera and Terra in 1933 justifying the coup, the party has always been
marked by the vindication and defense of the value of freedom as a value
fundamental for coexistence within society. That is an element that gives
strength to the party. . . . For the same reason . . . it has always been said
that the Blancos are a bit anarchic, because they always vindicate that value
of freedom and are authentic in doing it. That is why it was also the party of
revolution. Wilson Ferreira Aldunate said, when the FA was very
inexperienced, was still a very small force, “the only party that exists in
Uruguay is the PN, because PC is the name that in Uruguay is used for
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Uruguay
power.” Power has always been historically associated with the PC. I would
say the authenticity in that matter is one of the virtues of the party. Of the
defects, the flip side of that authenticity and that libertarian feeling, is many
times not to understand or adapt to a more organic conception, [one that is]
more disciplined, and more structured, that is required for the functioning of
a political party. This has historically been one of the greatest problems, and
it has caused more than one problem. And [in terms] of the internal problems
that the party had, even in times when it was its turn in government, it has
been a serious factor.
The quote in Box 6.6 not only discusses this peculiar relationship between
Purpose and Channels of Ambition, but also considers how being in opposition
affects the party’s vibrancy.
Box 6.6 Uruguay 29
The PN has a great capacity for confronting the adversity provoked by being
out of power for ninety-three years. It is a party that does not depend on
power for its existence. . . . I believe the PN is very strong at that and that it
is a party that has a great capacity to recover. . . . The survival of the PN has
been represented by that tremendous capacity to recover. And so it is a party
that has a defect that is also a virtue: namely, to have debates in its internal
life. It is a party that, because its chances of attaining power have been
distant, has sometimes cultivated internal divisions too much. There were
ferocious internal fights within the party, but that also is a great revitalizer
because there is a lot of competition, and caudillescos [i.e., more
personalistic] leaders have died. . . . Having different tendencies competing
makes the party very lively internally.
[. . .]
I believe [the PN] appeals to issues that are very central for the human being
and the national collective. This has been a thorough, not always
majoritarian, way of understanding Uruguay. And in that, in consonance with
the strange relationship we have with the PC, it is like we are tied
together. . . . The PN and the PC, since they operate concerning the same
reality, are sometimes alike. You even have the U.S. phenomenon; a given
wing [of one party] is [sometimes] closer to a wing of the other than to its
own fellows. That is why they are so like the U.S. ones. They do not uphold
detailed ideological definitions well. They do not have programs that deepen
into philosophical perspectives. They are interpretations of the same reality
with a difference.
Page 15 of 39
Uruguay
The role of each of the theorized factors examined has evolved over time as
follows. First, the party was born with Trauma. Helped by an electoral system
that combined moderate Exit Barriers with the satisfaction of ambition, the party
then stabilized. It remained a vibrant organization over time, helped by the
presence of those factors. Purpose also sometimes helped it. Like the PC, the PN
was present throughout the territory. It forged families’ political identities and
influenced all strands of society. Purpose did not last, and Trauma definitely
waned over time. The party nonetheless subsequently endured through several
challenging periods, proving itself resilient, largely fueled by Exit Barriers and
Channels of Ambition alone. Nonetheless, the party’s vibrancy has been less
robust than that of a party also strongly marked by Purpose, with or without
continued Trauma. Also, PN is an exception to the general observation that
Purpose, once lost, is hard to be recovered. The neoliberal imprint of the 1990s
show that Purpose can, in certain circumstances, be renewed. (p.175)
(p.176) The PN’s long-term trajectory shows that vibrancy is not simply a
function of its organizational structure. The PN’s decentralization of its power
structure and the lack of many well-structured organizational instances also
characterizes the PPD, for example. Two things differentiate the PN from a party
that, like the Chilean PPD, activates mostly during elections and operates as an
electoral machine. First, the origin is clearly different because the PN was born
out of Trauma. Second, activating the PN does not solely depend on the main
national leaders deciding to do so; top-down activism is combined with bottom-
up activism. Third, and more important, the PN remains active between
elections. Very interestingly, a young leader mentioned this aspect of the PN,
also illustrating its historical longevity, in his quote in Box 6.7.
(p.177)
Box 6.7 Uruguay 8
Leaders are [there] for me. . . . We question our leaders all the time, always.
That is classic at the PN, to question the Directorate. Every time one goes on
a tour (I have done a lot with the directorate), you are received with
critiques. I think that is an exercise the party always does, criticizing its own
leader.
Currently, the PN continues to operate as an organization within which Channels

of Ambition are present as a force furthering vibrant party survival. For
example, in 2012, the PN organized elections to elect new authorities drawn
from youth within the party and forty-seven thousand activists participated. The
party is still present throughout the nation, involves significant numbers of
activists, and has organizational units that operate between elections. Despite
Page 16 of 39
Uruguay
the PN’s lack of a rigid structure, almost all interviewees highlighted how
intense and demanding political activity is, in terms of the hours dedicated to
discussing, debating, and engaging with party activists. Though loosely
structured, the party is thus nonetheless vibrant.38 The Blancos (PN activists
and leaders) themselves call a fervent (p.178) (p.179) activist: “Blanco como
hueso de Bagual” (white as the bone of a wild horse), an expression that
captures the PN’s rebellious spirit. Since its birth, the party has stubbornly
endured in the face of electoral defeat. More than one established leader
described the party’s trajectory as “epic,” highlighting its reproduction of myths,
legends, and folk identity. This “disorganized organization” (Levitsky 2001) is
thus an organizational structure that can coexist with party vibrancy.
Partido Colorado (Colorado Party, PC)

From the early twentieth century to the democratic breakdown of 1973, the PC
historically had two main groups: Batllistas and Anti-Batllistas. José Batlle y
Ordóñez’s presidencies in 1903–1907 and 1911–1915 forged a strong Purpose
that marked both the party and the country.39 However, during Batlle’s years,
the party also had an internal Anti-Batllista opposition comprising conservative
groups and disaffected former Batllistas. This internal opposition consolidated
mainly in 1913, during Batlle’s second presidency in the context of discussions
of the colegiado (multi-member) executive (Barrán and Nahum 1979). Above all,
Anti-Batllistas opposed Batlle’s social and economic reforms. These conservative
groups later founded a faction called Partido Colorado General Rivera, and came
to be known as the Riveristas.40 In 1915, power changed hands within the party,
and Riverista Feliciano Viera was elected President. Viera put a stop to Batlle’s
social and economic reforms (Nahum 1986). After José Batlle y Ordóñez’s death
in 1929, the PC’s division between Batllistas and their opponents consolidated
(Caetano 1992).
The influence of Batlle and his reforms was pervasive within the party and gave
it a defined Purpose for decades, albeit not one coherent at the party level
(Barrán and Nahum 1979, Caetano 2011). As with the case of the PN, one
committed faction with a clear project was able to imbue the party with an
intense Purpose, though not with high levels of coherence. Electoral rules
facilitating institutionalized factions mainly explains this peculiarity of Uruguay.
Unlike what happened in the PN, however, the Batllistas’ Purpose predominated
and gave the PC an identity. In fact, leaders from different sectors, such as
Unión Colorada y Batllista (Colorada and Batllista Union), Propuesta Batllista
(Batllista (p.180) Proposal), Foro Batllista (Batllista Forum), Batllismo Lista 15
(Batllismo List 15), and Batllismo Unido (United Batllismo), claimed to be the
true heirs of Batlle’s ideals and named themselves accordingly.
Batlle’s nephew Luis Batlle Berres, who served as President of the Republic from
1947–1951 and President of the National Council of Government (the colegiado)
from 1955–1956, is considered the leader of a second Batllismo, known as
Page 17 of 39
Uruguay
Neobatllismo (Panizza 1990). He was an influential leader within the party until
his death in 1964. During this period, the party nonetheless once again had rival
factions, basically reproducing the disputes of the earlier Batllistas and
Colorados no Batllistas. Moreover, especially since 1950 in the context of an
economic crisis and the Cold War, two factions disputed the Batllismo tradition
and legacy, “the 15” and “the 14.”41 This rivalry would last for decades, forging
the main identities of the contemporary PC. In the years preceding the
authoritarian regime (1973–1985), the party was mainly captured by the more
rightist, more conservative sector led by Jorge Pacheco Areco (Panizza 1990).42
In short, significant disputes grew within the party, and rival factions ever more
strongly disputed the Batllista Purpose. As older politicians emphasized, since
the 1960s the party has increasingly lost Purpose. Batllismo has remained part
of the party’s symbolism but has lost much of its substantive meaning (Uruguay
16).
Evolution of the theoretical factors accounting for the party’s vibrancy can be
summarized as follows. Initially, it had Trauma; then moderate Exit Barriers in
conjunction with Channels of Ambition consolidated. Though it did not claim
high levels of coherence, the party also developed Purpose. Trauma has
meanwhile long since waned. The coherence component of Purpose was always
the weakest link. Intensity also then gradually dissipated. Exit Barriers at
moderate levels have remained. Defections occurred throughout the party’s
history, though until the end of the 2000s, less often than from the PN. The PC
has always offered Channels of Ambition. Essentially, like the PN, over time it
has come to increasingly rely on moderate Exit Barriers and Channels of
Ambition.
It must be acknowledged that the party’s long periods in government make it

difficult to assess its vibrancy. The organization was not severely strained during
the late nineteenth or during most of the twentieth century. It became heavily
reliant on the easy resources provided by its access to the state. If clientelism
was a cheap resource for both foundational parties, it was especially so for the
PC. Nevertheless, long periods in government seemingly did not act as (p.181)
an organizational sleeping pill. Despite the PC’s never being truly tested in
adversity from the start of the polyarchic era in 1919 until 1973, the
organization retained an internally lively organization independent from the
state throughout this period.
With the restoration of democracy in 1985, the PC also favored policies in line
with structural reform and liberalization of the economy, albeit not as intensely
as the PN government under Lacalle (Lanzaro 2000a)—see above.43 The populist
authoritarian turn and the increasingly liberal economic stances engendered a
gradual erosion of its left-of-center, Batllista factions. The PC differs from the PN
in that almost no interviewees mentioned its having Purpose. In fact, some
actually referred explicitly to its increasing problem of programmatic and
Page 18 of 39
Uruguay
ideological identity. The quote in Box 6.8 identifies the loss of Purpose within the
PC.
Box 6.8 Uruguay 3
It is beginning to lose the [batllista] profile. It is also the times. It was the
time of the Washington Consensus. We have reached the nineties. From a
sociological and political perspective, it started abandoning the public. A
portion of society began to emigrate, to [the party] that offered something,
although it has [offered] totally incompatible things. That [party] was the FA.
Since 2010, the PC has been almost entirely governed by one faction, located
more to the right of the ideological spectrum (Vamos Uruguay—Go Uruguay—led
by Pedro Bordaberry). Paradoxically enough, this faction, whose members
constitute the majority of the party, has not led to the presence of Purpose at the
level of the party as a whole. This apparent anomaly could be traced to the
existence of another group within the party: Propuesta Batllista (Batllista
Proposal, ProBa). While not as electorally successful as Vamos Uruguay, it
comprises more centrist Batllistas, who are self-proclaimed heirs of that
tradition. Interviewees not belonging to Vamos Uruguay therefore think that the
organization has lost its programmatic identity. But most critically, those
interviewed who were from Vamos Uruguay—with one exception—acknowledged
that the party has problems in terms of coherence and intensity and that their
faction has been unable to promote a defined Purpose for the party as a whole.
Interviewees from the PC agreed that it provided Channels of Ambition. Not only
have rules such as mandatory primaries promoted these channels, but the (p.
182) party’s decisions—for example, to adopt primaries as a formal mechanism
for ranking candidates on its national electoral list—have opened such channels
as well.44 The quote in Box 6.9 highlights the presence of Channels of Ambition.
The interviewee attributed their presence to the 1997 constitutional reform,
which established mandatory primary elections, explicitly emphasizing the
difference the reform had made in this regard. Like other leaders, he also
indicated that Channels of Ambition were essentially absent during the 1990s,
before the reform.
Box 6.9 Uruguay 24
I believe the relationship of the leaders with the base is essential. Essential.
Without that, there is no political career.
Page 19 of 39
Uruguay
Okay, but, what mechanisms [for promoting one’s career within the party]
exist? Perhaps you do that, but the party says “no.”
No, the thing is that the party will not tell me “no.” The party says yes to
everyone. The possibility exists. Before, what you had to do was to be a
friend of Jorge Batlle or Sanguinetti. You had to wear a kneepad. That was
the way to rise. That is the truth, because they made the list. . . . It was the
leader who identified you and said, “You, come! You go here. You go second
in the list. You third! You go fourth.” Because yes, if there was no way to
determine who was better, it was a matter of his instinct about who worked
better or was more useful to him or to the party. Now, for that [to rise], one
has to work within the structure [of the primaries], and there is no other way.
Because no one unknown will [get a leader to] make a statement and
campaign on TV in order to get everyone to know him and get public opinion
to say, “Hey! We have to vote for this awesome person!”
So, would you say that today competition between leaders and those who
want to be leaders is favored or not?
Yes, there is no doubt about it. In reality, Batllismo was always a party of
primaries. I believe that the internal [structure] creates opportunities, and if
I want to remain where I am, I will have to work.
The quote in Box 6.9 is also interesting for its analysis of how the party traversed
and emerged from the economic crisis. The 1999–2003 economic crisis tested
the party’s vibrancy more than anything had for quite some years.45 (p.183)
Unfortunately, the closeness of this event to the present time of writing does not
allow for adequate historical perspective. Still, more than ten years have
elapsed, and some tendencies can be delineated in terms of vibrancy.
It could well be argued that the heavy electoral cost paid after the economic
crisis was predictable, since Jorge Batlle, Uruguay’s president at the time, was a
Colorado. However, the PC did ultimately did not collapse. My fieldwork
suggests that it surmounted this challenge thanks to moderate Exit Barriers
(rules and history) and Channels of Ambition. The party continued organizing
multiple activities, including the election of young authorities. Though it was
certainly affected, it has remained a vibrant organization.
The party’s terrible drop in electoral support in 2004, just one year after
economic growth had resumed, helped new groups within the party to emerge.
The interview’s excerpt from a PC leader contained in Box 6.10, like other
leaders, presented this change in leadership as having marked a reopening of
Channels of Ambition.
Page 20 of 39
Uruguay
Box 6.10 Uruguay 16
Today there is an interesting possibility for someone starting as an activist

within the PC, because apparently the worst has already passed, and
apparently what awaits the PC is all increase [of votes]. We do not know
where [it is coming from?], but it is an increase. This, accompanied by [the
fact] that within the PC there is a favorable environment, there is an
environment that has somehow been freed of the poison of corporatism, of
clans in the sense of age groups and in the sense of people who have been
someplace a long time and somehow protect each other. It is as if there is a
lack of corporatism. If one enters the PC and wants to run roughshod over
everyone on his own merit, he has everything at his disposal to win.
However, lack of Purpose and the depletion of Trauma dry up important

wellsprings of loyalty, helping to explain the PC’s limited ability to keep activists
at different levels attached. Although the PC’s control of the executive during
the economic crisis could well explain its weakening, interviewees also
acknowledged that the party had begun decaying organizationally even before
the crisis (Uruguay 2, Uruguay 16). Interviewees perceived the PC as a party
that was alive and functioning with the same organizational structure as in the
past, albeit at lower levels. One young PC leader explicitly affirmed the need to
“reestablish strong communication with the party base” (Uruguay 32).
Moreover, the PC has purportedly been too reliant on the impetus of a few
national leaders, and the vibrancy noted after the 2004 national election
subsequently dipped. The (p.184) party’s meager result in the 2014
presidential election (12.8%) magnified the previous shock. Defection (exit) from
the party has since increased, making the news during the 2015 departmental
and municipal elections. In the case of the PC, the 2002–2015 period thus does
attest to the challenges of overcoming shocks, and, more important, to how
fragile vibrancy sustained only by Exit Barriers and Channels of Ambition can
be.
Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA)

Leftist parties, both Socialist and Communist, have existed in Uruguay since the
beginning of the twentieth century, though they never achieved electoral
relevance.46 In the 1960s, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party built
separate coalitions with other small parties,47 ventures that proved
unsuccessful. In 1971, however, the FA broke into the two-party system. It
emerged in a context of economic crisis, political polarization, violence, and
repression. The country was experiencing increasingly severe economic
conditions. The years of “happy Uruguay” as a prosperous Latin American
Page 21 of 39
Uruguay
country were long gone (Cancela and Melgar 1985, Astori 2001, Garcé and Yaffé
2005).48
The traditional parties (PC and PN) had lost their Purpose. The combination of
absence of Purpose and economic crisis was fatal for their clientelistic structure
(Piñeiro 2014). As in the rest of the region, society was increasingly polarized,
and analyses at the time show it was increasingly distant from the foundational
parties. In fact, though existing rules set high barriers to exit, defection
nonetheless occurred, and groups from traditional parties,49 in coalition with
leftist parties, formed the FA.
The FA originated mostly as an alliance of the Communist Party, the Socialist

Party, the Christian Democratic Party,50 and factions from the traditional parties.
Thus, the FA was a coalition of previously existing political organizations, which
(p.185) intended to mobilize Uruguayan society. The term coalition could
appear to mean that in 1971 the FA was not a party; even today some refer to
the FA as a coalition. However, participation in national elections under the
same lema and the complex structure created at the FA’s origin and consolidated
over time indicate that it has always operated as a party, albeit with the
institutionalized factions characteristic of Uruguayan political parties. Moreover,
in its Declaración Constitutiva (Constitutive Declaration), the newly created
organization committed to operating permanently. This commitment was then
manifested in the Reglamento de Organización (Organizational Regulations)
approved in March 1971. Like every party, it underwent a process of
institutionalization, through which the FA gained importance relative to each
component.51 Lanzaro summarizes the original organizational nature of the FA
as follows:
From the beginning, the composite was more than the mere addition of its
parts [different groups that coalesced to give birth to the FA], giving room
to a frenteamplista corpus, in terms of identity and in terms of
structure. . . . [A]t the margins of the groups that form it, the FA put
together a peculiar network of base organizations . . . that operated as
nuclei of integration and militancy, forging its activism in the electoral
campaign and through mass mobilizations. The FA apparatus reflects its
dual constitution. Its leadership is integrated by the representatives of its
party members. But, at the same time, it includes a quota of direct
representatives the frenteamplistas bases . . . with a rule of qualified
majorities for resolving some issues. (2004, 38–39)52
In terms of Purpose, despite the divergent origins of its components, the FA put
forth a leftist platform from the start, as illustrated by its Constitutive
Declaration of February 5, 1971:
Page 22 of 39
Uruguay
A program of democratic and anti-imperialist content that established the

control and planned and nationalized direction of the key points of the
economic system, to take the country out of stagnation, equitably
redistribute income, annihilate the predominance of the oligarchy of
intermediaries, bankers and owners of large estates and to enact an
effective policy of freedom and welfare, based upon the productive effort of
the Republic’s inhabitants. (FA, Constitutive Declaration)53
(p.186) How is it possible that the FA, composed of a greater number of

political factions than the PN and PC have been, has nonetheless been able to
develop Purpose? The harsh times that the country was suffering, leaders’
emphasis on consensus between the components of the FA to prevent any group
from overwhelming the rest, and other sources of polarizations resulted in an
agreement on a few major ideological and programmatic issues understood as
“basic agreements” (Garcé and Yaffé 2005 and Yaffé 2005).
As in the case of the PC and PN, after the FA’s establishment, rules fostered
partisan organization and satisfied ambition to a certain degree. The union of
different political organizations under the FA constituted a great challenge. The
satisfaction of different ambitions was thus something that leaders took care of.
Channels of Ambition were initially reflected in the FA’s foundational structure,
which granted a role to all its constituent units. Moreover, by using DSV, the FA
habilitated the existence of multiple lists. However, to preserve the unity of the
new organization, the FA decided to present one presidential candidate—
although the DSV made possible the existence of a plurality of presidential
candidates within the same lema. This trait was maintained until the 1999
electoral cycle in which Tabaré Vázquez defeated Danilo Astori in the
presidential primary by a wide margin—82 percent of the votes cast at the FA’s
primary went to Vázquez’s candidacy. In fact, in 2004, the FA had no presidential
contest, Vázquez was the only candidate.
The authoritarian regime (1973–1985) meant exile, prison, and torture for most
FA leaders.54 This process was epitomized by the imprisonment of the FA’s first
presidential candidate (and then leader until 1996), General Líber Seregni.55
Thus, the party emerged with a coherent and intense Purpose, and the
authoritarian regime inflicted a traumatic experience on its activists and
leaders. After the authoritarian regime, when the PC and PN tried to pursue
structural reforms and liberalization of the economy, the FA also became the
defender of the ISI model and the Uruguayan welfare state (Luna 2014).
The FA gradually moderated ideologically and programmatically. The end of the

1980s and early 1990s were years of realignment within the party and the
formation of new factions, some of which continue to exist today (e.g., Asamblea
Uruguay—Uruguay Assembly). Garcé and Yaffé (2005) and Yaffé (2005) indicate
that the FA gradually moderated starting in 1995. Their studies (p.187) show
Page 23 of 39
Uruguay
how the party gradually adopted more centrist perspectives compared to the
clearly leftist program of 1971. This process proceeded through lively debates in
party congresses and documents. This gradual and mostly deliberative process
indicates a true process of party adaptation (see Chapters 1 and 2). Yaffé
summarizes this process, which he analyzes thoroughly through party
documents, as follows: “. . . and that change should not be interpreted as a sheer
operation of electoral catch up, or a last minute opportunist turn, because it has
been the result of a long and complex process of programmatic and ideological
renovation” (2005, 97).56 However, it is crucial to emphasize that this process
did not involve abandoning the opposition to the neoliberal turn nor a clear
distancing from the party bases or the social movements—at least until 2015.
This case illustrates that, although the party’s Purpose changed, as was to be
expected given: (a) the changes in historical context and (b) its change of status
from its role as the main opposition party to govern three consecutive periods,
neither coherence nor intensity have been adversely affected (Lanzaro 2004,
Uruguay 15). From the 1994 national elections through those of 2004, the party
added the label Encuentro Progresista (Progressive Encounter) to the name
Frente Amplio.57 Through the coalition, the party accepted support outside the
formal structure of the party from small (generally more centrist) groups that
supported its presidential ticket as well as agreements regarding lists for the
Senate and other programmatic issues. The Progressive Encounter coalition
then sought to incorporate other groups outside the FA. The new brand
eventually disappeared, however, and the Frente Amplio label prevailed. As this
suggests, moderating did not end up transforming the party’s core ideas and
identity.
The FA shows how the persistence of Purpose over time does not imply
resistance to change. Also, the case of the FA illustrates that Purpose can coexist
with internal divergences. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, this
divergence is expressed in the existence of two identifiable blocks. One of the
blocks comprises the Communist Party, the Movimiento de Participación Popular
(Popular Participation Movement, MPP),58 and other minor factions. José Mujica
(former Tupamaro and President 2010–2015) has been one of the (p.188) most
important leaders of this sector. The other major sector has comprised various
moderate left-of-center factions, of which Danilo Astori (vice president from
2010 to 2015) has been the most important leader. What is important is how the
organization resolves internal disputes. Coherence does not necessarily mean
unanimity. It means agreeing on a project and intensely promoting some major
ideas concerning the role of the party and its goals.
The party has a Purpose (e.g., Uruguay 11, Uruguay 33). However, some
members of left-of-center factions did not refer to Purpose, thus reinforcing the
divide mentioned above. This fact did not lead me to conclude the absence of
Purpose for two reasons. First, a majority explicitly referred to the presence of
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Purpose. Second, the rest did not explicitly refer to problems related to
coherence and/or intensity. In fact, only four of the twenty interviewees explicitly
claimed that there were problems specifically related to coherence, and most of
those were not established leaders. Perhaps the role of Trauma or the fact that
the party has not yet lost control of government has helped the organization in
terms of coherence. A waning of Trauma or loss of power could perhaps
generate greater conflicts in the future. The excerpt in Box 6.11 illustrates that,
although important internal tensions and discussions have occurred within the
FA, the party has maintained an ideological and programmatic identity.
Box 6.11 Uruguay 34
I am going to tell you that the FA is not the Frente Grande [Great Front], and
that is not a semantic issue. I believe that the FA’s constitutional self-
definition holds it to a predetermined, obligatory political positioning. And
[just] because there is no “empire” in the old-fashioned sense of the 60s, 70s,
that does not mean that the first-world political, economic, and military
power does not still exercise a certain imperial attitude. So, in my own
judgment, definitions are still in force, and I think there are sectors that are
not defined that way to the same degree. Then, there are, and there have
been, other proposals, like for example the Great Front. I think that there is
a vaguer will that at some point [it] could have become the Nueva Mayoría
[New Majority]. There is a reason why, without any type of crisis, we
succeeded in remaining with the [name] FA. And [yet] there are people still
using the label Progressive Encounter, and some institutional registries say
“FA-EP-NM.” Or, well, you could tell me that it is the convenience of an
identity, of a brand, a stamp. That is not enough. It is also a framework of
definitions. That [dropping the EP-NM name] does not force you not to be
broad, but that it does draw a roadmap. And I say the kind of debate that is
currently occurring is not just because Uruguay is undergoing a juncture of
growth that [we] are suggesting, “Let’s talk about the redistribution of
wealth.” We could [instead] do it the Chilean way, concentrating on a given
type of resource [copper] and having a more efficient Social Development
Ministry that keeps doing various compensatory social policies. And
nonetheless, no, we are effectively discussing where we are. If we have
grown until now, and if we are going to keep growing for a non-negligible
period, let us keep watching whether along with poverty reduction,
reduction of indigence, we have improved indices of equality of
opportunities. But I believe this is being suggested from within a political
organization with a certain ideological definition.
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Uruguay
After being freed from jail, the Tupamaro leader Raúl Sendic advocated forming
a broad leftist coalition, the Great Front, comprising groups whose members
agreed on a minimal common program (Garcé 2006, Uruguay 27).
However, Sendic’s conception of a leftist coalition seems to have died with him
in 1989. Mujica then became the leader of the FA’s largest faction. He and other
emblematic Tupamaro leaders resuscitated Sendic’s vision, constructing a broad
group—Espacio 609—with only weak internal ties. All these new groups became
part of the FA. More critically, all the other labels (including the Progressive
Encounter) that sought to transcend the FA identity disappeared. As stated by
Pérez, Piñeiro, and Rosenblatt (2017) these failed attempts are straw in the wind
evidence of the FA’s resilience.
There were different references to Trauma, with different politicians referring to

the harsh experience under the authoritarian regime (Uruguay 27, Uruguay 39,
Uruguay 43). The authoritarian regime still deeply affects the FA’s leaders and
activists. For those who formed the backbone of the Movimiento de Liberación
Nacional-Tupamaros (National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros), the extended
periods in isolation suffering torture and the killing of many members is present
in their speeches and actions. Although at the foundation of the FA in 1971 the
Tupamaros were not formally members and some factions within the FA (from
the PDC to the Communist Party) even opposed their strategy and actions, they
eventually joined the FA and reassessed the importance of forging unity on the
left.
(p.189) The party fought for the failed 1986 Referendum to repeal the Ley De
Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado (Law on the Expiration of the
Punitive Claims of the State, Law #15.848), a law that extended amnesty from
possible prosecution to military and police officers. Although civil organizations
claimed that the FA was not fully committed to the second attempt to repeal the
Law in 2009, this effort does show the continued salience of that issue within the
party. Also, every 20th of May, the “march of silence” takes place in the streets
of downtown Montevideo. On May 20, 1976, Héctor Gutierrez Ruiz and Zelmar
(p.190) Michelini (a founder of the FA) were killed in Buenos Aires. As an
emblematic commemoration of those disappeared during the authoritarian
regime, civil society organizations led by the Madres y Familiares de Uruguayos
Detenidos Desaparecidos (Mothers and Relatives of Missing Detained
Uruguayans)59 repeat the march every year. Even though no partisan signs
accompany the march, FA activists and leaders attend the march and occupy a
prominent place in the procession. This is an example of how Trauma still
operates as a bonding factor within the Uruguayan left. Since the Tabaré
Vázquez government (2005–2010), the FA has also implemented policies that
seek to investigate those assassinations and disappearances. These deliberate
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actions of the FA government also show the relevance of this traumatic period
for the party.
As already mentioned, the FA has used Uruguay’s unique electoral system,

which facilitates the resolution of disputes over power positions.60 However, as
Moraes (2008) rightfully suggests, rules do not determine the end result in
terms of career trajectory; organizational mechanisms are also relevant. My
fieldwork confirms this perspective and reveals problems of elite promotion and
renovation. Yaffé (2005) describes a process of elite renovation in the 1990s,
manifested, for example, in the emergence of Tabaré Vázquez. However, in-depth
interviews with leaders showed that the process stopped in the first years of the
2000s. These conversations reveal significant disagreement about Channels of
Ambition, disagreement which cannot be explained in terms of interviewees’
generational or relative power positions. In fact, problems associated with elite
promotion and renovation have been sources of public discord and
preoccupation among party elites. Those who raised this concern also mentioned
that the party might have problems revitalizing its leadership in the near future.
The quote in Box 6.12 from a young prospective leader illustrates this point.
Box 6.12 Uruguay 33
Do you consider that the party favors competition between current leaders
and people with leadership potential and with interest in participating but
without any formal positions in the party? And your faction? Does it favor
competition?
No, generally not. There are very settled leaders. It’s natural. It is not the
healthiest [thing]. . . . There is such strong leadership, like that of Tabaré
[Vázquez], Pepe [Mujica], Danilo [Astori]. There are personal characteristics
that we cannot invent if we are to have good candidates who have legitimacy.
I would love there to be younger people. . . . I believe that the FA youth
should compete electorally. I think that the traditional parties did well. [The
youth] competed and grew. . . . What the youth has to do is compete and see
what happens.
As observed in the discussion of Chile, and as the quote in Box 6.13 illustrates,
most interviewees who attested to the presence of Trauma also claimed that the
party suffered from the absence of Channels of Ambition.
Box 6.13 Uruguay 34
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No, it does not favor [competition].
Is that because of the [party] structure or the weight of history?
It is the weight of history, unequivocally.
And the structure allows it?
Yes, the structure would allow you. It is not the structure that is barring it.
What is barring it are the white elephants. They sat down on history.
Future research could examine the relationship between Trauma and Channels
of Ambition in greater depth. At first sight, as shown in the case of the PSCh in
Chile, it seems that Trauma solves collective action problems but also hinders
elite renovation through the consolidation of a marked generational cleavage.
Leaders who suffered repression or persecution gain a heroic profile, becoming
figures in a very significant epic. It can be hard for younger leaders wanting to
advance their political careers to challenge such leaders. Again, as in Chile, this
problem was raised in several interviews in the context of discussions of (p.
191) the role of trauma. This relationship between Trauma and partisan
organization was also acknowledged by one young FA leader in Box 6.14. This
leader referred to how those harsh years had marked different generations.
Box 6.14 Uruguay 35
There is a generation of those who were in politics before the FA existed and
who were active at the birth of the FA. That is a significant age group,
generation. Another generation that came at the end of dictatorship. It was
formed during the dictatorship. It had to do with the clandestine spaces,
social spaces, a very limited debate, that [generation] spans from those years
until the 1990s. And then [there is] a generation that was formed under
democracy [and] with an international left that was losing track and losing
utopias, and that [generation] . . . [is] individualistic. That is the generation
that goes up until the FA wins. It did not experience defeat. It did not
experience torture. It did not ecstatically live the foundational moment. It did
not live the spring of ’85 [the democratic transition]. . . . And the question is,
“What the hell will this generation that lived during the nineties contribute?”
The FA’s complex rules for determining its internal structure could also help
explain the differing perceptions of the Channels of Ambition it offers. This
structure has dissociated factions’ electoral success from their representation
within the party (e.g., Uruguay 9, Uruguay 17, Yaffé 2005). Finally, for some
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interviewees, the desire to retain control of government has required the party
to rely on experienced and well-known leaders, preventing the emergence of
new ones. The FA introduces the clearest example of a tension between an
“epic” generation and new generations. Nonetheless, though imperfect, the
partisan structure does provide various known channels for the emergence of
new leaders, including open internal election.61 The excerpt in Box 6.15 presents
an (p.192) (p.193) interesting variant: there are known—though informal—
mechanisms to advance a political career. However, this leader feels that
younger generations are not fighting enough for their place.
Box 6.15 Uruguay 17
What are the mechanisms today existing in your party for pursuing a political
career? In other words, let us suppose that today you were to decide to start
your political career from scratch. How do you imagine your first steps?
There is no such thing as a mechanism. . . . The one thing that I would say
that is essential for you to find a place within the Uruguayan left is to be
from the house. [It is essential] that you are recognized. I was Seregni’s
[names a position that implies closeness to the leader]. . . . I am from the
house. I have always been “one of us.” That is essential. If you are a stranger,
it is very hard. I believe that the mechanism of promotion to the middle
levels downward and barely above is to be from the house. The upstart
doesn’t stand a chance. The newcomer is doomed before he starts running in
the Uruguayan left. He cannot take his first steps. He does not make it.
Do you consider that the FA promotes competition between current leaders

and people with leadership potential and interest in participating but with no
formal positions in the party?
That is not a problem in the FA. In fact, the problem is that the only
mechanism of generational turnover and openness to change is someone
fighting for change. Whenever you see something that has no mechanisms of
promotion, it is not the fault of those who block it but rather of those who do
not fight enough.
The electoral rules (DSV and PR, in particular) also provide a basic structure
through which to pursue a political career. Thus, compared to those of the PSCh,
DC, or PPD in Chile, the FA’s prospective leaders have better chances of defying
the established elite, but as Moraes (2008) argues, these rules do not
automatically engender the actual satisfaction of ambition. Nevertheless, during
the 2014–2015 national, departmental, and municipal elections after my first
and second waves of interviews had been conducted, the party did undergo a
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gradual process of elite renovation. Moreover, for his second government

cabinet, Tabaré Vázquez selected relatively young leaders as under-secretaries.
Younger candidates were also included on the party ticket, as alternates in the
2015 departmental election of mayor of Montevideo. Though not yet
consolidated, and not well captured in my interviews, a tendency to better
promote new leaders seems to have begun emerging since the FA took power for
the third time. In the second wave of interviews, conducted with young leaders,
they affirmed that there are Channels of Ambition within the party. Thus, as the
older generation retires from politics and the party remains successful in
government, new leaders might emerge. As for Exit Barriers, my fieldwork
revealed broad agreement on their presence. Some interviewees even
mentioned that, based on the meager results of groups that split off (moderate
Nuevo Espacio, then the Partido Independiente and the more radical party
Asamblea Popular) leaders have learned there is no future outside the FA
(Uruguay 9, Uruguay 27). Not only their assessment of the existing rules, but
also their appraisal of the history of the party and its future inform their views
regarding actual exit. This is in line with scholarly descriptions of the process of
tradicionalización of the FA, a process through which it became a traditional
party, with its own history, symbols, and myths (Queirolo 1999, Moreira 2004,
Lanzaro 2004, Yaffé 2005).62
The party gained access to government in 2005. For the first time in Uruguayan
history, the left won the presidency, with Tabaré Vázquez leading the first
government.63 In 2009, the FA again won the election, with José Mujica
becoming president for 2010–2015. Finally, the FA won the 2014 national
elections, and Tabaré Vázquez returned to the presidency for 2015–2020. In each
instance the party secured an absolute majority in both chambers of the
legislature (Banco de Datos Política y Relaciones Internacionales, Facultad de
Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Uruguay). The FA lost (p.194)
its absolute majority in the House in 2016 and recovered it in 2017. This
occurred because in 2016 one FA representative defected from the party and
then resigned his seat the following year. He was replaced by a new FA
representative, which enabled the FA to regain control of the 50th seat, and,
thus, an absolute majority in the House. In terms of how the causal factors
evolved, Purpose preceded Trauma and both remain present—though Trauma
seems to be waning as a bonding mechanism. The party, like all Uruguayan
parties, shows the presence of moderate Exit Barriers. The FA has also forged a
brand, based upon its already significant history. It also provided Channels of
Ambition, though not since entering government. This began to change in the
context of the last electoral campaign, during which the party emphasized the
role of young activists. However, the party does not seem to have continued
promoting young leaders as key decision makers, at least at the outset of the
third FA government. Yet, the party is ready to overcome the challenge of
generational turnover. Therein lies one of the most challenging tasks for the
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organization in the near future. The second wave of interviews paint a more
optimistic picture in terms of Channels of Ambitions. The configuration of causal
conditions for the FA is: PTaE.
As reviewed above, since its origins, the party has built a dense organizational
structure of permanent opportunities for activists’ participation and gradually
expanded its operations throughout the territory (Luna 2007, 2014). The
Comités de Base (Base Committees), which many said are not as strong as in the
past (Uruguay 1, Uruguay 9), are crucial for the party’s permanent mobilization
and organization (e.g., Uruguay 43) and each faction has its structures for
activists’ participation between elections.64 Thus, as highlighted by other
scholars (see Lanzaro 2004) and repeatedly raised in my interviews, there are
permanent opportunities to participate within the FA structure. In 2012, in the
middle of the Presidential term (i.e., distant from any electoral cycle), the party
held internal elections to elect the party President. More than 170,000 activists
voted. At the same time, this figure represents a loss of 50,000 in voter turnout,
in comparison to the 2006 election.65
The electoral campaign of 2014 proved an interesting test of vibrancy for a party
that had been in government for the last decade. When Vázquez decided to run,
analysts claimed that there was no possible way that the FA would lose, but polls
later began showing that in combination, the traditional parties had (p.195)
serious chances of winning.66 For four months, the FA was widely thought to be
in dire straits.
The organization reacted. It changed its campaign manager, and its activists
(i.e., from below) promoted a series of activities that mobilized hundreds of
thousands of people. The FA ultimately emerged clearly victorious: it won not
only the presidency, but also retained the absolute majority in both chambers of
the legislature. It is impossible to determine whether the polls were inaccurate
and the FA was never actually in dire straits to begin with. If they were
inaccurate, then the electoral campaign may not have influenced the result.
What is critical in terms of assessing the continued vibrancy of the FA here was
its ability to quickly mobilize a coherent message, in various forms and through
varied channels. For instance, the party organized conferences called “Uruguay
x+” (“Uruguay por más,” “Uruguay for more”), rallies, “caravans,” and other
varied activities mobilizing supporters. A group of young economists even
created the “E-Comité” to advertise the party’s achievements in government.
The E-Comité’s messages were not centrally coordinated by the electoral
campaign headquarters or the party structure. The same was true of the
activities organized by the Redes Frenteamplistas. In both cases, groups of
activists coordinated timely, complementary interventions in line with the
organization’s main messages and goals. This mobilization shows that activists
are so attached to the organization that they are willing and able to self-mobilize
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for the benefit of the party’s goal of winning office. Yet, again, this book cannot
predict; the argument and the research design are unsuited to predict the effect
of a given cause.
New tools were thus combined with conventional mobilization strategies and did
not depend solely on the agenda of the presidential ticket. Still, the campaign
was less active than the FA’s previous ones, suggesting that there has been some
loss of party vibrancy. What is contributing to its decline, beyond years in
government? The underlying mechanism is, first, some loss of Purpose due to
“administering” reality. Second, those in power naturally do not want to lose
their jobs, and this hinders turnover and narrows Channels of Ambition. Finally,
the FA is feeling the waning effect of Trauma. It is still vibrant precisely because
Trauma and Purpose are for now both still present, adding force to moderate
Exit Barriers—where the brand has also consolidated. Nevertheless, as
previously noted, the argument developed here emphasizes the process of
vibrancy reproduction. It will be interesting to see how the party may be
affected should it later lose control of government.
(p.196) Conclusion
Uruguay differs from Chile and Costa Rica in that its parties are all currently
vibrant. One observation of my fieldwork is that, compared to the other two
countries, Uruguay’s party leaders were more emotionally committed. They
passionately described their current involvement with their parties and
recognized themselves as part of something “bigger” with an identifiable
trajectory extending without major disruptions from the past. By contrast, DC
and PSCh leaders in Chile and PLN or PUSC in Costa Rica made much greater
reference to a more nostalgic “lost” past when party organizations were decisive
in their respective societies.
The system’s stability and perceived Exit Barriers go hand in hand. They have,
moreover, long been reinforced by parties’ history; a dense history reduces
intentions to defect. Their more than 180-year history and tradition gives strong
weight to party organizations: party reputation comes into play, the
organizational know-how, and machines, among other assets. When asked about
prospective and hypothetical situations, Uruguayan interviewees believe that
rules of the game foster party organization via Exit Barriers and that the history
of their parties also sets high costs for defecting. There are, however, interesting
differences between the Partido Colorado and Partido Nacional, on the one hand,
and the Frente Amplio, on the other.
Channels of Ambition together with moderate Exit Barriers have for now kept
both the PC and PN vibrant. Their leaders do not expect the constellation of
parties to change and almost unanimously agree that both their parties and the
system will survive a severe economic crisis. At the same time, they think their
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parties are viable channels for pursuing a political career, namely, Channels of
Ambition.
In terms of Purpose, both foundational parties have weathered several periods of

low-to-moderate levels of coherence or intensity of Purpose. The PC and the PN
also both illustrate the waning effect of Trauma as a bonding mechanism
activating retrospective loyalty. Finally, the PC’s contemporary situation
highlights how fragile vibrancy may be when it is solely based on Exit Barriers
and Channels of Ambition.
The case of the FA reinforces the discovery of a potential conflict between

Trauma and Channels of Ambition. As shown above, Trauma facilitates partisan
organization through the activation of retrospective loyalty but, as time elapses,
it can consolidate a strong generational cleavage. It also illustrates the inherent
challenges of remaining in government for long periods of time. The difference
between the FA and the PSCh or DC in Chile lies in that the FA has a more
developed structure with known channels and operates under more competitive
(p.197) rules, facilitating the emergence of new leaders. The configuration
observed in the FA, PTaE, is also sufficient for vibrant party survival. However,
though partial turnover of the party elite did occur at the end of the 1990s, to
reproduce its vibrancy and extend it beyond the “foundational” generation of
older leaders, the party will need to better promote such renovation and take
seriously the need to better satisfy individuals’ ambitions.
Notes:
(1) For this study, I use the terms Partido Nacional and Blanco interchangeably.
(2) For Sartori (1976), the PC was a predominant party from 1865 until 1959. In
the 1958 elections, the Blancos won the majority of the National Council
Government, a colegiado (collegiate) government established in the 1952
Constitution. González (1995) disputes the characterization of Uruguay as a
predominant party system from 1865 until 1959 for two reasons. First, it was not
until 1918 that the system was polyarchic, and the PC thus cannot be
characterized as predominant prior to that. Second, the PC did not control the
majority in the House for three successive elections, as Sartori’s (1976)
definition of a “predominant” party requires. He does acknowledge that the
system could be classified as having a predominant party, the PC, from 1942
until 1958 (142).
(3) The double simultaneous vote (DSV) allows intraparty preference. Piñeiro
(2007) and Buquet et al. (1998) summarize the logic and incentives generated by
this set of rules. Piñeiro (2007) also describes the change in incentives
introduced with the 1996 constitutional reform.
(4) For a thorough study of the increasing number of lists at the representative
level see Monestier (1999).
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(5) The exceptions are Solari (1991), who speaks of a “an apparent two party
system and a real multi-party system” (122) and Rial (1984), who sometimes
refers to each party as a “federation of parties” or “confederation of
factions.” (Translation from Spanish by the author).
(6) They analyze Senate, rather than House, lists because the former have
national circumscriptions, and politics in Uruguay are national. Moreover, the
Senate lists cut parties vertically (Buquet et al. 1998, 41).
(7) Moreover, given that presidential and legislative elections are fused and
concurrent, the former had an “ordering effect” on the number of Senate lists.
(8) The introduction of ballotage in the 1996 constitutional reform did, however,
introduce some variations.
(9) Translation by the author.
(10) See Chasquetti (2010) for a thorough study of legislative careers in

Uruguay. He shows that parties play a crucial role in satisfying individuals’
legislative career ambitions. Also, see Altman and Chasquetti (2005).
(11) For further details of the changes introduced by this reform, see Chasquetti
(2003) and Piñeiro (2007). The most important modifications were introducing
party selection of unique candidates through open, simultaneous, and mandatory
primaries, and the prohibition of vote accumulation by sub-lemas at the
representative level.
(12) Source: Encuesta Continua de Hogares (Continuous Household Survey,

ECH) of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute, INE).
(13) The cases of the Partido Liberal and Partido Conservador in Colombia would
have provided another possibility. Comparing the divergent trajectories of
parties in Colombia and Uruguay could be theoretically rewarding.
(14) For example, it is possible to identify two different historiographies. The

construction of the country’s national identity was built through these lively
debates.
(15) Though originating in the first half of the nineteenth century, it is also clear
that they would not become parties, in the strict sense of the term, until the
twentieth century. However, as Caetano and Rilla (e.g., 2003) suggest, though
they were not institutionalized parties, these parties’ identities started to
develop beginning in the first half of the nineteenth century. For a thorough
analysis of the origin and evolution of the Uruguayan traditional parties, see
Pivel Devoto (1942).
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(17) Barrán (1990) says that the Lance Revolution was the first “Uruguayan”
insurrection, because it was the first time the camps (Blancos and Colorados)
were not aligned with regional (and international) actors.
(18) Despite its conflictive nineteenth century, Uruguay became a polyarchic

regime long before such regimes developed in Costa Rica and Chile.
(19) For an analysis of the electoral evolution of the two parties, see Buquet,
Chasquetti, and Moraes (1998).
(20) For example, the most important and persistent cleavage within the PC was
that between Batllistas and Anti-Batllistas, or so-called Colorados no Batllistas
(Caetano and Rilla 2003). In this case, even though one faction rallied around a
major leader, José Batlle y Ordóñez, the cleavage also coincided with a kind of
ideological divide (see discussion below).
(21) Buquet, Chasquetti, and Moraes (1998) mention that most of the time this
did not undermine party discipline in the legislature.
(22) González claims that both have always been catch-all parties (1995, 143).
Luna provides some reasons for the lack of ideological mobilization: “The lack of
ethnic cleavages, the historical weakness of the Church and conservative forces
in the country, and the rapid suffrage expansion at the turn of the century
pushing dominant parties to rapidly incorporate the mass electorate through the
expansion of the state apparatus (given the small size of the internal market and
an economy based on low-labor intensive agriculture and commerce), the
enactment of social legislation, and the creation of powerful clientelistic
machines, all contribute to an explanation of the weakness of ideological
mobilization in the system” (2006, 114).
(23) In fact, this period of Uruguayan political history has been thoroughly
studied. For example, see Vanger (1963), Real de Azúa (1964), Barrán and
Nahum (1979), Panizza (1990), and Caetano (2011). The pervasiveness of
scholarly works on this period signals its significance for the country’s history
and, in turn, for the PC. For an analysis of the consequences and the
development of Uruguayan democracy, see Rama (1987), Real de Azúa (1971),
and Panizza (1990).
(24) Moreover, in terms of party-voter linkages, as Luna (2014) highlights,

clientelistic and programmatic linkages can coexist, and actually have done so.
For a contemporary assessment of the workings of partisan organization at the
local level, especially in relationship with voters, see Luna (2004 and 2014).
(25) Chasquetti (1998, 2008) analyzes the PN and PC coalitions that emerged in
the 1990s.
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Uruguay
(26) For a detailed analysis of the negotiated transition to democracy in

Uruguay, see Gillespie (1991).
(27) However, the faction of Luis Alberto Lacalle (PN, president from 1990 until
1995) forged something close to a defined Purpose for a brief period as it tried
to advance neoliberal reforms.
(28) In fact, the evidence introduced by Luna (2014) supports this claim.
(29) See Chasquetti (2008).
(30) Lema is the legal term for political party in Uruguay.
(32) Although Herrerismo and Batllismo signal the importance of leaders

(caudillos) in determining the identity of a party’s faction—and its opposition—
none of these groupings became the tool of a single leader. Their history and the
ever-present internal disputes may have prevented this total personalization of
party politics.
(33) Mostly between a more conservative faction, Herrerismo (which forged an

alliance for the 1958 elections with an outside group known as Ruralismo led by
Benito Nardone), and a more progressive one called Unión Blanca Democrática
(White Democratic Union, which resulted from the unification of Nacionalistas
Independientes—Nationalists Independents—and emerging, progressive leaders
like Daniel Fernández Crespo).
(34) As with Chile, there were many milestones in the gradual transition.
Another well-documented instance was the massive rally that took place on
November 27, 1983; hundreds of thousands of people attended the event that
centered on the Obelisco in downtown Montevideo and was announced under
the slogan “For a Democratic Uruguay without Exclusions” and leaders of all
parties were on the stage. A famous picture of the rally was entitled “Un Río de
Libertad” (A river of freedom) and the actor Alberto Candeau delivered a
profound speech at the event.
(35) It was under Lacalle’s government that the Uruguayan version of the
neoliberal turn took place, but the party as a whole was not strongly behind it.
(36) In fact, some emphasized this trait as a virtue and a structural problem of
the organization (Uruguay 29); I will return to this point in brief. One illustration
was what has been termed a fratricidal electoral competition in the primary
election in 1999 (Chasquetti and Garcé 2005).
Page 36 of 39
Uruguay
(37) It would be interesting to explore further the inherent tensions of parties,

which, on the one hand, have to promote individuals’ careers but, on the other,
must preserve and protect a collective identity.
(38) In contrast to the PC, however, nothing as severe as the economic crisis of
1999–2003 tested the party. Since the democratic transition, accusations of
corruption against members of Lacalle’s government and poor performance in
the 1999 national election are what have most tested the party’s endurance.
(39) Some of his own major ideas (e.g., rationalism and cosmopolitanism) were
already part of the party’s patrimony (Pérez Anton 1984). For a thorough review
of this significant period of Uruguayan politics, see Barrán and Nahum (1979).
(40) The terms refer to the attempt to rescue the traditional values of the
founding period of the proto-party, led by General Fructuoso Rivera (Caetano
1992, 2011).
(41) The numbers correspond to those of their Lists.
(42) From 1954 onward, the faction “14,” more conservative though Batllista,
started to ally with the Colorados no Batllistas, consolidating a new conservative
group within the party (Buquet 2003). In the 1966 presidential election, this
faction, which since 1962 had been called Unión Colorada y Batllista (Colorada
and Batillista Union), won the presidential election.
(43) In fact, the Batllistas factions promoted the repeal of the Public Utilities
Companies Law in the 1992 referendum.
(44) The FA, by contrast, does not hold primaries as a formal mechanism for
ranking candidates on its national electoral list, as discussed below.
(45) See Rosenblatt (2006) for an analysis of the political management of the
economic crisis. For a detailed description of the critical years of 2001 and 2002,
see Paolillo (2004).
(46) The Socialist Party was founded in 1910 and the Communist Party, which
split off from it, in 1921. For a review of the pre-FA leftist parties, see Lanzaro
(2004).
(47) In 1962, the PS formed the electorally disastrous Unión Popular (Popular
Union), and the Communist Party formed FIDEL.
(48) In fact, it was a time of profound intellectual production, with very critical
assessments of the socio-political situation of the country. The work of Rama
(1971) or the weekly Marcha are examples of this zeitgeist among intellectuals.
Page 37 of 39
Uruguay
(49) Among the founders of the FA were Francisco Rodríguez Camusso from the
PN and Zelmar Michelini from the PC.
(50) In fact, for the 1971 elections, the official name of the FA was Partido
Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, PDC). The PDC was a splinter
from the traditional, though electorally irrelevant, Unión Cívica (Civic Union)
that was founded in 1911 and that represented Catholic interests and values.
(51) For a detailed analysis of that process, see Yaffé (2005, 101–125). The
author also describes the complex internal structure (109–116).
Available at: http://www.frenteamplio.org.uy/sites/frenteamplio.org.uy/files/

DOCUMENTO%201.pdf.
(54) For historical reviews see Bermeo (2003) for the process leading to the
coup, and Caetano and Rilla (1987) for a basic review of the authoritarian
regime.
(55) Seregni resigned from the FA’s presidency as a consequence of disputes

over the proposed constitutional reform.
(56) Translation by the author. See also Lanzaro (2004).
(57) In fact, for 2004 it also added the label Nueva Mayoría (New Majority) to
the already long name (i.e., Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista-Nueva
Mayoría).
(58) In 1988, the political faction of former Tupamaros guerrillas (the MPP),
which also includes other leaders, was formally accepted in the FA. Several
scholars have analyzed this impressive adaptation. For a detailed history of the
Tupamaros, as well as its later evolution, see Labrousse and Klang (2009). For
an analysis of the ideological evolution of the Tupamaros and later MPP, see
Garcé (2006). For an analysis of its organizational strategies and party-voter
linkage strategies, see Luna (2014).
(59) http://www.desaparecidos.org.uy.
(60) In this sense, Piñeiro and Yaffé (2004) and Yaffé (2005) review the evolution
of the effective number of factions in the FA. See also Moraes (2008).
(61) The last internal election, which decided part of the internal structure, was
held in 2016 and gathered more than 80,000 voters. The first open internal
election was held in 1997.
Page 38 of 39
Uruguay
(62) The concept is also extended to its format (institutionalized factions).
(63) For thorough analyses of the electoral growth and eventual success of the
FA, see Buquet and De Armas (2005), Moreira (2004), Lanzaro (2004), Garcé and
Yaffé (2005), and Yaffé (2005).
(64) The Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the MPP are the most active.
(65) Also conducted between national elections.
(66) See, e.g., the compiled series of polls conducted by all major public opinion
firms at: http://cienciassociales.edu.uy/bancosdedatos/intencion-de-voto-a-
partidos-en-elecciones-nacionales.
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Uruguay

Party Vibrancy and Democracy in Latin America

Print publication date: 2018

Abstract and Keywords

Uruguayan parties are distinctive in that each has presented an immense

most Uruguayan (p.162) scholars have provided more compelling evidence to

Box 6.1 Uruguay 3

In terms of Channels of Ambition, PR and the DSV at different levels allow

In terms of economic development, Uruguayan parties were affected in their

market reform attempts. For example, in the 1992 referendum on a law

Analysis of Each Party

It was diplomacy, a dispute between empires, that created Uruguay as an

After a period of major instability due to a regional conflict—the Guerra Grande

In terms of Purpose, for the noncompetitive, pre-democratic nineteenth century,

By the early twentieth century, different ideological perspectives had begun to

The post-authoritarian period was marked by some similar trends. In terms of

Partido Nacional (National Party, PN)

doctores (see Caetano and Rilla 2003). He developed a series of ideological

. . . an anti-statist proposal, with a clear defense of the primordial role of

As typically happened in Uruguay’s traditional parties, the pervasiveness of

The party underwent other programmatic transformations associated with the

Democratic transition negotiations were unfavorable for the party. The PN

Ferreira’s alignment with Julio María Sanguinetti’s PC-led government against

Box 6.2 Uruguay 26

Por la Patria had a vertiginous decomposition. At the end of the process,

Box 6.3 Uruguay 19

Political work is not mysterious. Political work is something more

Box 6.4 Uruguay 22

Box 6.5 Uruguay 10

Box 6.6 Uruguay 29

Box 6.7 Uruguay 8

Currently, the PN continues to operate as an organization within which Channels

Partido Colorado (Colorado Party, PC)

It must be acknowledged that the party’s long periods in government make it

Box 6.8 Uruguay 3

Box 6.9 Uruguay 24

Box 6.10 Uruguay 16

Today there is an interesting possibility for someone starting as an activist

However, lack of Purpose and the depletion of Trauma dry up important

Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA)

The FA originated mostly as an alliance of the Communist Party, the Socialist

A program of democratic and anti-imperialist content that established the

(p.186) How is it possible that the FA, composed of a greater number of

The FA gradually moderated ideologically and programmatically. The end of the

Box 6.11 Uruguay 34

There were different references to Trauma, with different politicians referring to

As already mentioned, the FA has used Uruguay’s unique electoral system,

Box 6.12 Uruguay 33

Box 6.13 Uruguay 34

No, it does not favor [competition].

Is that because of the [party] structure or the weight of history?

It is the weight of history, unequivocally.

And the structure allows it?

Box 6.14 Uruguay 35

Box 6.15 Uruguay 17

Do you consider that the FA promotes competition between current leaders

gradual process of elite renovation. Moreover, for his second government

In terms of Purpose, both foundational parties have weathered several periods of

The case of the FA reinforces the discovery of a potential conflict between

(9) Translation by the author.

(10) See Chasquetti (2010) for a thorough study of legislative careers in

(12) Source: Encuesta Continua de Hogares (Continuous Household Survey,

(14) For example, it is possible to identify two different historiographies. The

(16) Translation by the author.