Electoral Volatility in Latin America: Causes and Consequences

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Electoral Volatility in Latin America Electoral Volatility in Latin America

Electoral Volatility in Latin America
Chapter · August 2019

DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1684
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Subject: Governance/Political Change, Political Behavior, Political Institutions
Online Publication Date: Aug 2019 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1684
Summary and Keywords
Latin American political systems experience significant levels of institutional uncertainty

and unpredictability. One of the main dimensions of this institutional and political instabil
ity is the high level of electoral volatility in the region. In the last 30 years, traditional
parties that had competed successfully for several decades abruptly collapsed or weak
ened considerably in a number of Latin American countries. New parties (or electoral
movements) and political outsiders have attracted considerable electoral support in sev
eral national and subnational elections in the region. Even when the main partisan actors
remain the same from one election to the next, it is not uncommon to observe large vote
swings from one established party to another.
While some scholars and observers expected that the instability in electoral outcomes
would decline as democracies aged and consolidated, electoral volatility has remained
high in recent decades in many Latin American countries. However, in other Third Wave
Latin American democracies (e.g., Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Uruguay), the pat
terns of interparty competition have been much more stable, which suggests we should
avoid blanked generalizations about the level of party system institutionalization and
volatility in the region. Cross-national variation in the stability of electoral outcomes has
also motivated interesting scholarly work analyzing the causes and the consequences of
high volatility in Latin American democracies.
One of the major findings of this literature is that different forms of institutional disconti
nuity, such as the adoption of a new constitution, a significant enfranchisement, electoral
system reforms, and irregular changes in the legislative branch (e.g., a dissolution of
Congress) or in the executive branch (e.g., a presidential interruption), can result in high
er volatility. Another major determinant of instability in electoral outcomes is the crisis of
democratic representation experienced by several Latin American countries. When citi
zens are disenchanted with the poor performance and moral failures (e.g., corruption) of
established political parties, they are more likely to support new parties or populist out
siders.
Weak party system institutionalization and high electoral volatility have serious conse
quences for democratic governability. Institutionalized party systems with low electoral
volatility promote consensus-building and more moderate policies because political par
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ties are concerned about their long-term reputation and constrain the decisions of politi
cal leaders. In contrast, party systems with high volatility can lead to the rise of outsider
presidents that have more radical policy preferences and are not constrained by strongly
organized parties. Electoral volatility also undermines democratic representation. First,
the fluidity of the party system complicates the task of voters when they want to hold the
members of the incumbent party accountable for bad performance. Second, high instabili
ty in the patterns of interparty competition hinders citizens’ ability to navigate program
matic politics. Finally, electoral volatility augments the cognitive load required to vote
and foments voter frustration, which can lead to higher rates of invalid voting.
Keywords: electoral volatility, party system institutionalization, outsiders, institutional uncertainty, democratic
representation, democratic governability, Latin American politics
Introduction
Democratic elections in Latin America are often unpredictable processes. In the last 30
years, traditional parties that had competed successfully for several decades abruptly col
lapsed or weakened considerably in a number of Latin American countries (Mainwaring,
Bejarano, & Leongómez, 2006; Morgan, 2011; Seawright, 2012). New parties (or electoral
movements) and political outsiders have attracted considerable electoral support in sev
eral national and subnational elections in the region (Carreras, 2012B; Corrales, 2008).
Even when the main partisan actors remain the same from one election to the next, it is
not uncommon to observe large vote swings from one established party to another (Car
reras, Morgenstern, & Su, 2015). In sum, electoral outcomes in Latin America are highly
volatile. The instability in the patterns of interparty competition has attracted consider
able scholarly attention.
This article will present the main findings of the growing body of research on the causes
and consequences of electoral volatility in Latin America. The first section focuses on the
definition and operationalization of electoral volatility. Then we present descriptive infor
mation about electoral volatility in Latin America, showing that Latin America has much
higher levels of electoral volatility than Western Europe or the United States, but is con
siderably less volatile than Eastern Europe. There is also considerable variation in the
stability of electoral outcomes within Latin America. The following section reviews the lit
erature on the determinants of electoral volatility in Latin America, namely institutional
factors, historical legacies, and political developments in Third Wave democracies; eco
nomic factors; and societal cleavages. The penultimate section presents research on the
consequences of electoral volatility. Specifically, it points to literature that relates elec
toral volatility to party system fragmentation, the lack of moderation in policymaking, and
failures in democratic representation. The article concludes by highlighting some possi
ble avenues for future research.
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Definition and Operationalization

What Is Volatility?
Electoral volatility can be defined as the “change in vote shares obtained by individual po
litical parties in a given political system across consecutive elections” (Roberts &
Wibbels, 1999, p. 576). This indicator is also very closely associated with the concept of
party system institutionalization, another widely debated topic in the political science lit
erature specializing in Latin America. Mainwaring, Bizzarro, and Petrova (2018, p. 19) de
fine an institutionalized party system as “one in which a stable set of parties interacts
regularly in stable ways. Actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise
that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition will prevail into the foresee
able future.” In other words, party system institutionalization can be understood as stasis
in the patterns of partisan competition (i.e., low electoral volatility).
While Mainwaring (2018A) considers electoral volatility as only one among several indica
tors of party system institutionalization,1 a number of studies use electoral volatility as a
proxy for party system institutionalization (i.e., as an indicator that stands for the latent
concept that cannot be measured directly). While this is a reasonable empirical choice if
scholars do not have access to better summary indicators of the concept, it is important
to keep in mind that stability in electoral competition (i.e., low volatility) does not neces
sarily mean that political parties are strongly organized, have deep roots in society, or are
perceived as legitimate by citizens (Luna, 2014). There is ample evidence in the literature
that political parties in Latin America can be “uprooted but stable” (Luna & Altman,
2011). In countries such as Brazil before 2018 and Chile, relatively low volatility has gone
hand in hand with a decline in mass partisanship and weak party organizations (Bargsted
& Maldonado, 2018; Lucas & Samuels, 2010; Samuels & Zucco, 2015).2 In sum, volatility
measures the stability of electoral support for different parties in a political system, but
scholars should be careful not to confuse low volatility with strong parties. The links be
tween strongly organized parties, mass partisanship, and patterns of electoral competi
tion remain to be fully investigated (Mainwaring et al., 2018).
Different Types of Volatility
The study of electoral volatility in Latin America (and beyond) is dominated by analyses of
the aggregate level of volatility in electoral outcomes in national elections (Bartolini &
Mair, 1990; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; Remmer, 1991; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Tavits,
2008). Most of the works reviewed here focus on aggregate electoral volatility at the na
tional level, either as an independent variable or as a dependent variable.
There are, however, alternative ways to think about volatility in the Latin American con
text. First, some scholars have analyzed dynamics of electoral volatility at the subnational
level (Arquer, 2018; Borges & Lloyd, 2016; Epstein, 2009; Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015;
Peres, Ricci, & Rennó, 2011). The aggregate measures of volatility at the national level
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might hide important differences in volatility at the local or regional level that warrant
scholarly attention (Morgenstern, Swindle, & Castagnola, 2009; Mustillo & Jung, 2016).
A second way to capture electoral volatility in Latin America is to focus on campaign

volatility. If voters are not strongly identified with political parties, they may shift their
vote intentions during the campaign that precedes an election. Several studies have fo
cused on the factors that lead volatile or “floating” voters to change their minds during
an electoral campaign (Ames, García-Sánchez, & Smith, 2012; Baker, Ames, & Renno,
2006; Jennings & Wlezien, 2016).
Another approach to conceptualizing and measuring volatility is to focus on party-level

volatility (rather than country-level volatility). Similar exogenous shocks might not affect
the electoral fortunes of all political parties in a political system equally, which raises im
portant research questions. In several Latin American countries, some established parties
have collapsed (or declined) over the past three decades, while others have retained sta
ble political support (Carreras, 2012A; Carreras et al., 2015; Lupu, 2016). It is therefore
critical to investigate the reasons why some parties have more stable bases of electoral
support than others (Lupu & Stokes, 2010; Su, 2014; Wills-Otero, 2016).
Finally, recent works argue that it is important to distinguish between vote shifts among
established parties and vote shifts associated with the success of new parties. Scholars
have used different terms to identify these two types of volatility: Type A versus Type B
(Powell & Tucker, 2014); extra-system versus within-system volatility (Mainwaring, Gerva
soni, & España-Najera, 2017); and “party replacement” versus “stable party” volatility
(Birch, 2003; Cohen, Salles Kobilanski, & Zechmeister, 2018). The point that all these
scholars make, however, is similar. Different factors might account for extra-system and
within-system volatility, and theoretical models should be able to shed light on these dif
ferent forms of volatility rather than focusing exclusively on total volatility.
In sum, while most of the empirical analyses of electoral volatility in Latin America focus
on total volatility at the national level, the works briefly discussed in this section suggest
that this aggregate measure might hide important variations at the subnational and party
levels. Moreover, extra-system and within-system volatility might be determined by differ
ent factors and might have different consequences for governability and democratic rep
resentation.
Measuring Electoral Volatility
The Pedersen index is a widely used measure of electoral volatility (Pedersen, 1983). It is
estimated by “taking the change of each party’s vote share from one election to the next
as an absolute value, summing these changes for all parties, and dividing by
two” (Mainwaring, 2018A, p. 44). The index yields a scale from 0 to 100, corresponding to
the net shift in voting percentages. A zero signifies that no parties lost or gained vote (or
seat) percentages, while 100 means that all the votes (or seats) went to a new set of par
ties.3 The Pedersen index remains the gold standard measure to capture stability in ag
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gregate patterns of interparty competition, and most of the works reviewed in this article
use this measure.
Descriptive Information About Electoral

Volatility in Latin America
How High Is Electoral Volatility in Latin America?
We start this descriptive discussion by comparing the level of electoral volatility in Latin
America, other regions, and the United States. The data presented in Figure 1 show the
average net volatility in all legislative (lower chamber) elections between 1980 and 2005.
We use the most comprehensive dataset on electoral volatility for different regions (Main
waring et al., 2017).4
As expected, we observe low levels of electoral volatility in highly institutionalized party

systems in the United States (3.2) and in Western Europe (10.2). By contrast, electoral
volatility is much higher in all the other regions where democracies are newer and party
systems less institutionalized. The average volatility score in Latin America is 25.5, which
shows significant instability in patterns of interparty competition during this period. In
fact, Latin America is the second most volatile region in the world behind Eastern Europe
(43.1).
Figure 1. Total electoral volatility, Latin America vs.

other regions (1980–2005).
(Source: Mainwaring et al., 2017).
Important Variations in Volatility Within Latin America
The literature on electoral volatility in Latin America cautions against using regional av
erages to summarize the situation of the region, pointing to significant differences within
Latin America (Carreras et al., 2015). There is considerable variation in the organization,
resources, and support for parties in the region, which in turn produces different levels of
electoral volatility.
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Figure 2 shows that there are significant differences in the stability of interparty competi
tion within the Latin American region, both in presidential and in parliamentary elections.
Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Argentina rank among the most electorally volatile coun
tries in Latin America. On the opposite pole, we find Honduras, Uruguay, Mexico, El Sal
vador, and Costa Rica. It is also noteworthy that presidential elections in Latin America
are on average more volatile than elections for Congress (see Duarte Recalde, 2012).
Figure 2. Differences in volatility within Latin Ameri

ca (1978–2016).
(Source: Cohen et al., 2018).
Figure 3 allows us to distinguish between “extra-systemic” (or “party replacement”)

volatility and “intra-systemic” (or “stable party”) volatility, by country. These descriptive
statistics show country averages for the period between 1978 and 2016. We observe that
most of the region’s electoral volatility comes from new party entry and dissolution of es
tablished political parties (“extra-systemic” volatility). The only exceptions are Honduras,
Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Brazil, and Costa Rica, where total volatility can
mostly be attributed to voters switching from one established party to another one.
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Figure 3. Volatility in Latin America, extra-systemic

vs. intra-systemic (1978–2016).
Evolution in Electoral Volatility in Third Wave Democracies
Several studies have shown that electoral volatility has declined over time in Africa and
Eastern Europe since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization (Powell & Tuck
er, 2014; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014). As voters gain democratic and electoral experi
ence, they gradually become more attached to political parties, which leads to the stabi
lization of interparty competition. Some scholars suggest that the passage of time should
lead to a similar decrease in electoral volatility in Latin America (Lupu & Stokes, 2010).
The descriptive statistics presented in Figure 4, however, do not show a stabilization in

electoral outcomes over time in the region. The figure shows the average volatility scores
for the whole Latin American region by 5-year periods starting in 1980. We observe a
steady rise in electoral volatility from 1980 to 2004. Since then, volatility has remained
stable, but it is still much higher than it was in the 1980s when most Latin American
countries transitioned to multiparty democratic systems.5
Figure 4. Evolution in volatility in Latin America

(1980–2014).
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This section has shown that Latin America has one of the highest levels of electoral
volatility in the world, which suggests that party systems are weakly institutionalized
(Mainwaring, 2018B). However, it has also shown that there is significant variation in the
patterns of interparty competition within Latin America (Carreras, 2012A; Carreras et al.,
2015). The cross-national differences in electoral volatility within the region have led
scholars to investigate the contextual or structural determinants of volatility. Cross-na
tional variation in the stability of electoral outcomes has also motivated interesting work
analyzing the consequences of high volatility for governability and democratic represen
tation. The next two sections review the main findings of this literature.
The Search for Explanatory Factors

One of the major lines of inquiry for scholars interested in electoral volatility and weak
party institutionalization in Latin America is the analysis of the factors that explain this
phenomenon either at the national or at the subnational level. While any attempt to clas
sify a large body of research is necessarily schematic, we have identified four main fac
tors that can shape electoral volatility: institutional factors, historical legacies and politi
cal developments in Third Wave democracies, economic factors, and social cleavages.
Institutional Factors
One of the defining characteristics of political systems in Latin America is their institu
tional uncertainty. In Latin American democracies, there is a higher level of unpredictabil
ity in the rules of the political game than in older and more consolidated democracies
(Lupu & Riedl, 2013). Constitutional changes, electoral system reforms, and fundamental
transformations of the party system occur relatively frequently in the region.
Several studies have shown a positive association between institutional uncertainty and
electoral volatility. In one of the first efforts to empirically assess the determinants of
electoral volatility in Latin America, Coppedge (1995) showed that proscriptions, boycotts
of prominent parties, and the splintering of parties led to more volatile electoral results
throughout the 20th century because they denied voters the opportunity to vote for their
preferred party or candidate.
Although proscriptions and boycotts are rare in Third Wave Latin American democracies,
other forms of institutional uncertainty are still very prevalent, and they have a similar
impact on electoral volatility. A number of scholars have shown that different forms of in
stitutional discontinuity such as the adoption of a new constitution, a significant enfran
chisement, and irregular changes in the legislative branch (e.g., a dissolution of Con
gress) or in the executive branch (e.g., a presidential interruption) can lead to important
shifts in electoral dynamics (Madrid, 2005A; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Su, 2014). In a
similar vein, in an analysis of electoral reforms in Latin American between 1978 and
2002, Remmer (2008) shows that electoral reforms both reflect and foster electoral
volatility. Although electoral reforms are often adopted by dominant parties to curtail the
rise of new parties and independent candidates, these reforms have often yielded “in
Page 8 of 28

creased party system volatility, highlighting the potential perils of institutional

engineering” (Remmer, 2008, p. 25). For instance, Centellas (2009) demonstrates that the
move from a list-proportional to a mixed-member proportional electoral system in Bolivia
in 1995 increased party system instability. While the reform was introduced with the goal
of stabilizing the party system by better connecting parties to voters, the result was an in
crease in electoral volatility, especially in the Andean regions of Bolivia.
An institutional trait that distinguishes Latin American democracies from Western Euro
pean countries where party system volatility has been relatively low (Bartolini & Mair,
1990) is that Latin American countries have presidential systems. Samuels and Shugart
(2010) demonstrate that the separation of executive and legislative powers under presi
dentialism leads to weak, undisciplined, and personalistic parties. Moreover, Linz (1994)
argues and Carreras (2017) demonstrates that the rise of outsider candidates is more
common in presidential than in parliamentary systems. All these factors might also con
tribute to the high level of electoral volatility we observe in Latin America. Some of the
most comprehensive analyses of electoral volatility in the Latin American region (Cohen
et al., 2018; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Su, 2014) only include Latin American cases in
their samples so they cannot assess whether presidentialism (an institutional trait that all
countries have in common) is indeed a risk factor. As shown in Figure 2, the data show
that presidential elections are more volatile than legislative elections in Latin America, fa
cilitating the rise to power of populist outsiders (Carreras, 2012B; Corrales, 2008). In a
similar vein, Jennings and Wlezien (2016) show that early polls are less indicative of elec
tion results in presidential elections than in parliamentary systems. This again suggests
that there is more volatility in vote intentions under presidentialism. However, two large
cross-national analyses of electoral volatility have rejected the hypothesis that elections
are more volatile in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems once other insti
tutional and structural factors are controlled for (Mainwaring et al., 2017; Mainwaring &
Zoco, 2007). More research is necessary to make sense of these puzzling findings.
Historical Legacies and Political Developments in Third Wave Democ

racies
Beyond purely institutional explanations, several recent works have focused on how his
torical legacies (in particular from the recent authoritarian past) and more recent politi
cal developments shape the level of electoral volatility observed in different Latin Ameri
can countries.
Some authors focus on long-term historical explanations of party system stability in Latin
American democracies. Frantz and Geddes (2016) show that the choices of authoritarian
regimes on how to deal with established political parties had an impact on electoral
volatility in different countries in the region after democratization. The main argument is
that “dictators who allied with traditional parties or repressed existing ones have con
tributed to very stable party systems” (Frantz & Geddes, 2016, p. 3). Repressed parties
can operate underground and re-emerge with force after a democratic transition. By con
trast, political parties created by the regime during an authoritarian period tend to have
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weak organizations and low ideological coherence and often attract opportunists rather
than career politicians. These parties tend to disintegrate after democratic transitions, re
sulting in high levels of electoral volatility.
The timing of democratic transitions in Latin America is also critical to explain electoral
volatility in the region. In a large cross-regional analysis of electoral volatility, Mainwar
ing and Zoco (2007, p. 155) demonstrate that “competitive regimes inaugurated in earlier
periods have much lower electoral volatility than regimes inaugurated more recently.”
They argue that in earlier cases of democratization, political parties were the main vehi
cles used to incorporate citizens into the political systems. These parties were able to se
cure a base of loyal followers, which led to more stable patterns of interparty competi
tion. In democracies created in recent decades, executive candidates had less incentive to
engage in party building because they could reach voters directly through the mass me
dia. This has led to a higher level of electoral volatility in countries that democratized
during the Third Wave, which is the case in most Latin American countries.
Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (2016) also trace the success and electoral stability of
new parties in Latin American over the past few decades to the context in which these
parties originated. They argue that parties that emerged during violent times (e.g., a civil
war) are more successful because they inherit important resources from the violent con
text in which they originated. First, political parties that emerge during a violent period
tend to have solid party brands because people strongly adhered to one side of the con
flict, and they maintain those attachments after the civil war is over. Second, insurgent
political parties can benefit from a strong territorial organization built during the conflict
after countries put an end to the civil war and transition to democracy. The Farabundo
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador is a good example of a guerrilla
movement that became a political party after the democratic transition (and pacification)
of the country and was able to maintain stable electoral support since then. According to
Holland (2016, p. 303), “the success of the FMLN was overdetermined by its expansive
network of fighters, deep popular roots, chance to counterbalance an identifiable conser
vative party and subnational electoral investments.” All these factors contribute to ex
plaining the relatively low level of volatility in El Salvador when compared to other Latin
American countries (see Figures 2 and 3).
Although authoritarian periods can sometimes create the conditions for robust and con
sistent electoral support for specific parties, Lupu and Stokes (2010) call attention to the
fact that regime instability in Latin America overall had the opposite effect of increasing
electoral volatility. They argue that democratic processes “encourage the spread of parti
sanship and hence the stabilization of electoral outcomes over time in new
democracies” (Lupu & Stokes, 2010, p. 91). But this dynamic is interrupted when democ
ratic regimes break down. A long history of regime instability and military coups (e.g., Ar
gentina during the 20th century) interrupts normal democratic practices and can in
crease the level of electoral volatility over the long term (even after countries democra
tize). Lupu and Stokes (2010) show strong support for this argument by studying the dy
namics of electoral support for individual parties over a long period in Argentina (1912–
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2003). This study implies that the passage of time should increase the stability of elec
toral outcomes in Third Wave Latin American democracies. As convincing as the empiri
cal analysis conducted by Lupu and Stokes is for the case of Argentina, this implication
does not mirror the empirical reality, as electoral volatility has not declined in the past
four decades as Latin American democracies consolidated (see Figure 4).
Other works help us make sense of this puzzle. In a significant contribution, Roberts
(2015) argues that the programmatic structuration of party systems during the neoliberal
era shaped long-term party system institutionalization.6 Party systems that had a clear
programmatic differentiation during the neoliberal period have had more stable patterns
of electoral competition (i.e., lower electoral volatility) since then. In countries where
conservative forces adopted structural adjustment programs and leftist parties consis
tently opposed them (e.g., Chile, El Salvador, and Uruguay), the party system stabilized
around those sharp programmatic differences. By contrast, party systems were destabi
lized, and electoral volatility increased in countries where leftist parties implemented ne
oliberal programs, leaving many leftist voters unrepresented. This political vacuum was
quickly occupied by new parties and outsider candidates in countries such as Costa Rica,
Ecuador, and Venezuela, thereby leading to an increase in volatility. These arguments are
consistent with Lupu’s (2014, 2016) theoretical proposition that brand dilution and pro
grammatic convergence during the neoliberal period weakened party identities and
destabilized party systems. The increase in electoral volatility at the systemic level is an
indirect outcome of the electoral decline (or collapse) of established parties that results
from brand dilution.
Ideological convergence and lack of programmatic structuration is just one of the factors
that contributed to the legitimacy crisis in Third Wave democracies in Latin America. Citi
zens’ satisfaction with (and attachment to) political parties has declined in Latin Ameri
can countries since the democratic transitions. This is a relatively new political reality.
Until the 1990s the electorates of many Latin American countries were reasonably
aligned with established parties (Dix, 1987; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2007; Lupu, 2016). However,
in the past three decades, many Latin American countries have gone through a process of
partisan and electoral dealignment (Hagopian, 1998; Klesner, 2005; Levitsky & Cameron,
2003; Morgan, 2007). One of the main reasons for citizens’ disenchantment with political
parties and democratic institutions in the region is the gap between citizens’ expectations
and government performance in Third Wave democracies in Latin America. In the
decades following democratization, many Latin American governments failed to provide
economic security and public security to their citizens (Hagopian, 2005; Mainwaring et
al., 2006). But this is not the whole story. Citizens’ disenchantment with political parties
also results from a feeling of moral failure associated with the perception of widespread
corruption in government institutions. In the words of Hawkins (2010, p. 94), “legitimacy
is ultimately a normative attribute of the regime, and only significant moral failures can
weaken this legitimacy enough for it to become a true crisis.” This argument is corrobo
rated by empirical studies that demonstrate that the perception of corruption is negative
Page 11 of 28

ly associated with trust in democratic institutions (Morris & Klesner, 2010; Seligson,
2002).
The policy and moral failures of Latin American governments have led to what some
scholars describe as a “crisis of democratic representation” (Mainwaring, 2006; Mainwar
ing et al., 2006). The literature has consistently shown that this legitimacy crisis is relat
ed to the breakdown of established parties and the rise of new parties or political out
siders, thereby increasing the level of extra-systemic (or “party-replacement”) volatility.
Anti-party sentiments are often exploited by outsiders who campaign with a clear anti-es
tablishment rhetoric, promising to put an end to the reign of inefficient and corrupt par
ties—often referred as partidocracia (Cameron, 1997; Hawkins, 2010; Kenney, 2004;
Philip & Panizza, 2011). In a recent study of party system collapse in Peru and Venezuela,
Seawright (2012) shows that corruption scandals increase voters’ level of anger, which in
turn increases voters’ degree of risk acceptance and leads to a greater likelihood of suc
cess for anti-systemic outsiders. In a similar vein, Doyle (2011) finds that political distrust
(i.e., lack of trust in democratic institutions) is positively associated with support for pop
ulist outsider candidates in Latin American presidential elections.
Economic Factors
Many scholars have analyzed the link between economic downturns and electoral volatili
ty. The findings of these studies are mixed, but they suggest that economic factors are not
the main reason for the high level of volatility in Latin America.
One of the most robust conclusions of the literature on electoral behavior and vote choice
is that economic problems hurt the electoral chances of the incumbent in a variety of con
texts (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Stegmaier & Lewis-Beck,
2013). In a similar vein, a recent study analyzing a sample of 119 elections in 18 Latin
American democracies between 1978 and 2014 finds that low growth and high inflation
lead to a decline in electoral support for the incumbent (Murillo & Visconti, 2017). How
ever, in institutionalized party systems, the anti-incumbent swing generated by an eco
nomic downturn may only lead to a small increase in intra-systemic volatility. The U.S.
case is a good illustration of this pattern (Nadeau & Lewis-Beck, 2001). In Latin America,
economic crises tend to have more severe consequences than in the United States and
party systems are less institutionalized. Can economic hardships lead to a sharp increase
in electoral volatility in those contexts?
In an early study of electoral volatility in Latin America, Remmer (1991) analyzed 21 na
tional elections between 1982 and 1990 and found that crisis conditions (i.e., high infla
tion and low GDP growth) resulted in sizable anti-incumbent vote shifts and provoked
high levels of electoral volatility. While this is a significant contribution, these results
were probably overdetermined by the fact that these elections took place in new democ
racies with high institutional uncertainty and weakly institutionalized party systems.
Moreover, the economic crises during the 1980s were very severe with long periods of
negative growth and hyperinflation in many Latin American countries.
Page 12 of 28

Roberts and Wibbels (1999) also find that economic performance influences electoral
volatility in Latin America but that this effect is contingent upon the type of election and
not particularly robust to different model specifications. The authors of this study con
clude that institutional factors trump economic conditions in models of electoral volatility
in Latin America. Coppedge (1995) also finds that electoral volatility cannot be explained
by economic factors. In a recent contribution, Cohen et al. (2018) revisited this question
with a larger sample of elections conducted in Latin America between 1978 and 2016. In
terestingly, this study re-affirms the classic finding regarding the link between economic
conditions (inflation and change in GDP) and electoral volatility during the 1980s, but it
also shows that this link is ephemeral. Economic factors have not been good predictors of
electoral volatility in recent decades.
While the evidence regarding the lack of association between economic conditions and
electoral volatility in recent decades is strong, economic factors might still influence the
stability of electoral outcomes in ways that are context-dependent. For instance, Remmer
(2012) argues that good economic times can lead to an increase in electoral volatility by
creating incentives for voters to abandon conservative parties in favor of leftist alterna
tives (either within or outside of the party system). In fact, favorable economic conditions
signal to voters that it is possible to afford welfare protections and social programs. Eco
nomic downturns, in contrast, can lead voters to switch in favor of more right-wing and
fiscally responsible parties. In another important paper, Singer (2013) emphasizes how
contextual factors affect voters’ calculations. During inflationary periods, governments
that are not able to deal with rising prices can be harshly sanctioned by voters, leading to
an increase in electoral volatility. When prices stabilize, electoral volatility might be
shaped by other economic factors as Latin American voters pay more attention to growth
and unemployment.
Social Cleavages
In a seminal analysis of European party systems, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that
patterns of partisan competition in Western Europe were “frozen” because political par
ties were the political expression of deep-rooted social cleavages (i.e., religious, ethnic, or
class cleavages) present in different European countries. This argument was corroborat
ed in a rigorous empirical analysis of the evolution of party systems in the European con
tinent (Bartolini & Mair, 1990). Have social cleavages played a similar role in the Latin
American context? Do stronger social cleavages stabilize electoral competition in Latin
America?
These questions have received less attention from scholars interested in electoral volatili
ty in Latin America. However, the few studies that exist cast doubt on the stabilizing ef
fect of social cleavages. Roberts and Wibbels (1999) assess the link between class cleav
ages and electoral volatility in Latin America. While measuring class cleavages is notori
ously difficult, the variable used by the authors as a proxy (union density) is not signifi
cantly associated with electoral volatility in any of the empirical models they considered.
The authors attribute this null finding to two different factors. First, class cleavages have
Page 13 of 28

been less central to party system structuration in Latin America than in Europe as work
ing classes in Latin America have historically been mobilized by catch-all oligarchic par
ties or by multiclass populist parties. Second, the ties between labor movements and po
litical parties eroded during the neoliberal period in Latin America, which has diminished
the capacity of unions to deliver encapsulated bloc votes, thereby generating more elec
toral volatility.
Another social cleavage that can lead to a stabilization of electoral outcomes is ethnic
fragmentation. Many Latin American countries (e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Pe
ru) have large indigenous populations. Research conducted in other regions of the world
strongly suggest that ethnic cleavages can help freeze the party system and create stable
patterns of electoral competition because voters consistently support the party that rep
resents their ethnic group (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Birnir, 2007). However, ethnic cleav
ages appear to have the opposite effect of reducing the stability of electoral outcomes in
Latin America. Some studies have demonstrated that electoral volatility is higher in coun
tries with larger indigenous populations (Birnir & Van Cott, 2007; Madrid, 2005A). In a
similar vein, Carreras (2012B) shows that the rise of outsiders in presidential elections is
more likely in ethnically heterogeneous societies. Moreover, electoral volatility in coun
tries such as Bolivia and Ecuador tends to be significantly higher in provinces or munici
palities where indigenous people represent a large proportion of the population (Madrid,
2005B). There are several reasons why ethnic diversity has not had the expected stabiliz
ing effect on electoral outcomes in the Latin American context (Madrid, 2005A, 2005B,
2005C). First, ethnic identities in the region are characterized by a higher degree of fluid
ity than ethnic identities in other regions. In many Latin American countries, people of
mixed European and indigenous descent (i.e., mestizos) constitute a large group that can
blur the boundaries between ethnic communities. Second, Latin American party systems
have traditionally not divided along ethnic lines (even in countries with large indigenous
populations). Latin American catch-all parties often do not specifically target indigenous
groups, which might lead indigenous voters to feel unrepresented. Third, and relatedly,
Latin American parties have not responded adequately to the needs and demands of in
digenous populations in recent decades. In fact, indigenous populations have lagged be
hind the rest of the population according to different indicators of socioeconomic status,
such as income, education, and life expectancy. Therefore, indigenous voters may “switch
their votes particularly frequently since they have little reason to establish enduring ties
to political parties that fail to cater to their needs” (Madrid, 2005A, p. 3). The election to
the presidency of an indigenous leader (Evo Morales) and the creation of an ethno-pop
ulist party (MAS) in Bolivia might have helped stabilize patterns of electoral competition
in that country (Madrid, 2008), but the characterization is still valid for most Latin Ameri
can countries with large indigenous populations.
Page 14 of 28

The Consequences of Electoral Volatility

Early studies of electoral volatility in Latin America developed theoretical frameworks to
explain the causes of this phenomenon (Coppedge, 1995; Remmer, 1991; Roberts &
Wibbels, 1999), which led to a large and impressive body of research, as discussed earli
er. More recently, several scholars have shifted their attention to the consequences of low
party system institutionalization and high electoral volatility. While it is not possible to
present all these works here, in this section we will summarize the main findings of re
search looking at the impact of electoral volatility on party system fragmentation, policy
making, and democratic representation.
Party System Fragmentation
One of the most robust findings in the literature on party system institutionalization is
that electoral volatility is associated with an increase in the number of political parties,
i.e., party system fragmentation. In an analysis of electoral patterns in 33 democracies
between 1945 and 2011, Laroze (2017) demonstrates that high volatility (i.e., the collapse
of one of the parties) in a national election leads to the success of new political parties in
the next election. In a similar vein, Gerring (2005) analyzes electoral results in 237 elec
tions in 37 countries and finds that electoral volatility fosters minor party success in plu
rality electoral systems.
In the Latin American context, Weyland (1999, p. 384) similarly argues that “party weak
ness, indicated by organizational fluidity and high electoral volatility, allows populist out
siders to emerge.” Carreras (2017) indeed demonstrates that (lagged) electoral volatility
is a significant predictor of the rise of political newcomers in national executive elections.
In a comprehensive analysis of incumbent vote share in 92 presidential elections in 18
Latin American countries, Valdini and Lewis-Beck (2018) show that a history of electoral
instability significantly reduces support for the incumbent candidate, which can allow
new parties or outsider candidates to emerge, leading to increased party system fragmen
tation.
The causal mechanisms explaining the link between electoral volatility and party system
fragmentation are rather straightforward. Electoral volatility signals to political leaders
(or political entrepreneurs) that established parties do not have stable support among the
electorate. The lack of stability in electoral outcomes also shows that running outside of
the party system can pay off in a context of deep disenchantment with the political estab
lishment. In particular, once an outsider candidate gets elected to an important executive
position (e.g., Fujimori elected president of Peru in 1990) or after a new party is able to
defeat an established party in a national election, other minor parties or electoral move
ments can be created at the national and at the subnational level to try to replicate that
success (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003).
Page 15 of 28

Policymaking
Beyond its impact on the number of parties in the political system, electoral volatility can
have consequences for policymaking and democratic governability. Several scholars ar
gue that institutionalized party systems with low electoral volatility promote consensus-
building and more moderate policies (Flores-Macías, 2010; Hankla, 2006; Robbins,
2010).7 Institutionalized parties are concerned about their long-term reputation and con
strain the decisions of political leaders who try to implement radical policies. Moreover,
party system stability facilitates compromise because the policy and programmatic posi
tions of different parties are well known and change slowly. On the contrary, party sys
tems with high volatility can lead to the rise of outsider presidents who have more radical
policy preferences and are not constrained by strongly organized parties.
These different studies show an indirect association between electoral volatility and the
adoption of radical policies. High electoral volatility facilitates the electoral success of
outsider and radical leaders. Once in office, these leaders are much more likely to adopt
more extreme policies. For instance, Flores-Macías (2010, 2012) analyzes how party sys
tem institutionalization influenced the types of economic policies (statist vs. pro-market)
adopted by leftist governments in Latin America during the recent commodity booms.
With both cross-national evidence and in-depth case studies of Brazil, Chile, and
Venezuela, Flores-Macías convincingly demonstrates that leftist governments in less insti
tutionalized (i.e., more volatile) party systems tended to implement the most extreme sta
tist (anti-neoliberal) policies during the “pink tide” in Latin America. Political outsiders in
very volatile party systems quickly radicalized their programmatic positions and were not
able (or chose not to) reach policy compromises with other parties. The collapse of the
party system in countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela made the radical agendas of
Morales and Chávez possible. By contrast, Hunter (2007) argues that radicalism was im
peded in Brazil by the increased stability and institutionalization of the Brazilian party
system.
Robbins (2010) analyzes the link between electoral volatility and government spending
with a database of 60 democracies in Africa, Asia, the Organisation for Economic Co-op
eration and Development (OECD), Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The argument de
veloped by Robbins is that more institutionalized and less volatile party systems create in
centives for parties with longer time horizons to focus on delivering public goods to a
larger proportion of the population. By contrast, parties or political leaders in more
volatile party systems “will rely on particularistic spending to provide immediate rewards
to their smaller, more fluid support bases” (Robbins, 2010, p. 234). In a similar vein, Han
kla (2006) shows that parties’ calculations regarding trade policies vary depending on
how volatile party systems are. In particular, he argues that parties with volatile electoral
linkages adopt trade protection policies as a way to shore up their electoral support in
the next election. On the contrary, stable party systems lead parties with longer time hori
zons to adopt freer trade policies with the goal of generating long-term economic pros
perity. These studies suggest that weakly institutionalized and volatile party systems lead
Page 16 of 28

to more extreme and fiscally irresponsible economic policies, which can lead to lower
growth rates and hurt long-term economic development (Bizzarro et al., 2018).
Democratic Representation
Electoral instability also matters because it undermines democratic representation. First,

high electoral volatility makes it harder for voters to hold governments and politicians ac
countable for their performance in office. High volatility (especially “extra-systemic”
volatility) is often associated with party collapse, party splits, and the emergence of new
political forces from one election to the next. These changes in the party system compli
cate the task of voters when they want to sanction the incumbent for bad performance.
Schleiter and Voznaya (2018) analyze how party system institutionalization shapes ac
countability for government corruption. They argue that underinstitutionalized and
volatile party systems impede accountability because “they compromise the capacity of
voters to attribute responsibility and undermine electoral co-ordination to punish incum
bents for corruption” (Schleiter & Voznaya, 2018, p. 315). Moreover, the fluidity of party
systems in Latin America might facilitate party switching among legislators and mayors
(Desposato, 2006; Levitsky & Zavaleta, 2016), which might help them to escape the vot
ers’ wrath.8
In addition to the difficulty associated with holding governments accountable in highly

volatile contexts, the instability of partisan competition also affects other aspects of de
mocratic representation. For instance, using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer sur
vey, Zechmeister and Corral (2013) show that electoral volatility hinders citizens’ ability
to place themselves coherently in the left-right scale. In other words, when electoral com
petition is unstable citizens have a hard time navigating programmatic politics (see also
Carlin, Singer, & Zechmeister, 2015). Floating voters in highly volatile contexts can vote
“incorrectly” (i.e., vote for parties that do not represent their preferences), as a recent
study has shown in the U.S. context (Stiers & Dassonneville, 2018). Another aspect of
these failures in democratic representation is the higher prevalence of invalid voting (i.e.,
blank and null votes) in volatile contexts. In fact, Cohen (2016) demonstrates that invalid
voting increases in contexts with high extra-systemic (or “party replacement”) volatility.
This is due to the fact that volatility augments the cognitive load required to vote and fo
ments voter frustration, which then leads to invalid voting.
The low quality of democratic representation in weakly institutionalized, and volatile par
ty systems often means that parties are disconnected from society and cannot aggregate
citizens’ demands. Some voters react to this volatile context by supporting anti-establish
ment outsiders or by spoiling their ballots. However, highly volatile party systems can al
so generate “unconventional” political engagement when citizens perceive that political
parties do not respond to their demands. In particular, Arce (2010) uses cross-sectional
time-series data from 17 Latin American countries during the neoliberal era to assess the
link between the stability of partisan competition and street protests. The empirical
Page 17 of 28

analysis demonstrates that countries with volatile and weakly institutionalized party sys
tems experience higher levels of protest activity.
It is important to emphasize, however, that high electoral stability (i.e., very low electoral
volatility) can also create problems for democratic representation. When low volatility is a
reflection of hegemonic party dominance (as in Venezuela or Bolivia), the lack of competi
tiveness often results from competitive authoritarian practices by the incumbent, such as
the tight control of the state media, the illegal use of state funds for campaign purposes,
the lack of transparency during elections, and the disregard for term limits.
On the other hand, a moderately high electoral volatility can signal that democratic insti
tutions are working well as voters hold ineffective or corrupt governments accountable
for their failures. In a statistical analysis of electoral volatility at the subnational level in
Uruguay, Luján and Schmidt (2018) show that volatility often reflects an anti-incumbent
vote when governments are not responding to citizens’ demands. The challenges to demo
cratic representation discussed in this section often result from electoral volatility that is
both very high and consistent over time (irrespective of the performance of the govern
ment).
Concluding Remarks and Avenues for Further

Research
Latin American political systems experience significant levels of institutional uncertainty
and unpredictability. One of the main dimensions of this institutional and political instabil
ity is the high level of electoral volatility in the region. Many Latin American countries
face significant instability in the patterns of interparty competition. While some scholars
and observers expected that the instability in electoral outcomes would decline as democ
racies aged and consolidated, electoral volatility has remained high in recent decades in
many Latin American countries. Most of that volatility is due to party replacement (i.e.,
death of old parties and creation of new parties). It is also noteworthy that there is signifi
cant variation in the level of volatility within Latin America. The literature on Latin Ameri
can politics has devoted significant attention to the causes and the consequences of
weakly institutionalized and volatile party systems.
We conclude by suggesting three avenues for further research. First, it would be interest
ing to investigate the link between highly charismatic political leaders and the stability of
partisan competition in Latin American countries. While the conventional wisdom holds
that personalistic parties are more likely to generate high electoral volatility than strong
ly organized parties, it appears that some of the most electorally stable political forces in
Latin America (e.g., Peronismo, Fujimorismo, Chavismo, Uribismo) originated as personal
istic movements and owe part of their continued success to the charismatic attachment
between voters and a personalistic leader (or the memory of that leader). However, we
still know very little about the psychological and political underpinnings of this phenome
non. Second, more research is necessary to better understand the impact of electoral
Page 18 of 28

volatility on accountability in Latin America. The accepted wisdom is that volatile elec
toral environments hurt accountability because voters are not always able to sanction in
cumbents when there is high instability in the patterns of partisan competition. An alter
native hypothesis that has received much less attention is that electoral volatility might
lead to an exaggerated sanction for incumbent presidents, especially when mass partisan
attachments are very weak. Since presidents cannot rely on a core group of partisan sup
porters, they might rapidly lose popular approval. This could lead to a scenario of
“hyperaccountability” (Roberts, 2008) in which presidents are sanctioned even when they
are able to deliver good policy results. For instance, all Peruvian presidents since Fuji
mori have finished their terms with extremely low approval ratings despite good macro
economic results. Finally, future research should continue to investigate the link between
economic factors and electoral volatility. A recent study suggests that economic factors,
such as GDP growth and unemployment, have not been significant determinants of elec
toral volatility since the 1980s (Cohen et al., 2018). While this is an important finding, it is
not clear why economic factors are no longer important predictors of the stability of in
terparty competition in Latin America. One possibility is that electoral volatility (especial
ly extra-systemic) is determined by long-term economic hardships rather than by short-
term economic fluctuations. Voters might turn to new parties or outsider candidates when
they live in countries (or in subnational units) that are suffering a long-term economic de
cline.
Further Reading
Carreras, Miguel, Morgenstern, Scott, & Su, Yen-Pin. (2015). Refining the theory of parti
san alignments: Evidence from Latin America. Party Politics, 21(5), 671–685.
Cohen, Mollie J., Salles Kobilanski, Facundo E., & Zechmeister, Elizabeth J. (2018). Elec
toral volatility in Latin America. Journal of Politics, 80(3), 1017–1022.
Flores-Macías, Gustavo A. (2012). After neoliberalism? The left and economic reforms in
Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press.
Levitsky, Steven, James Loxton, Brandon Van Dyck, & Jorge I. Dominguez (Eds.). (2016).
Challenges of party-building in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lupu, Noam. (2016). Party brands in crisis: Partisanship, brand dilution, and the break
down of political parties in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott. (Ed.). (2018). Party systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, de
cay, and collapse. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott, Gervasoni, Carlos, & España-Najera, Annabella. (2017). Extra- and
within-system electoral volatility. Party Politics, 23(6), 623–635.
Remmer, Karen L. (1991). The political impact of economic crisis in Latin America in the
1980s. American Political Science Review, 85(3), 777–800.
Page 19 of 28

Roberts, Kenneth M. (2015). Changing course in Latin America: Party systems in the ne
oliberal era. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Roberts, Kenneth M., & Wibbels, Erik. (1999). Party systems and electoral volatility in
Latin America: A test of economic, institutional, and structural explanations. American Po
litical Science Review, 93(3), 575–590.
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Notes:
(1.) Other indicators include the vote share of new parties, the stability in the main con
tenders, and changes in parties’ ideological positions.
Page 27 of 28

(2.) The PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) in Brazil is a notable exception as it has a

stronger party organization and has managed to cultivate widespread partisanship in the
past three decades (Hunter, 2010; Samuels & Zucco, 2018).
(3.) Pedersen’s formula is relatively uncomplicated, but two difficult decisions regarding
measurement and classification are necessary. First, scholars employing this tool need to
establish sound coding rules for splits, mergers, and party name changes. Second, it is
challenging and time-consuming to obtain data for small parties (often regrouped in an
“other” category in national electoral statistics), so it is necessary to adopt a transparent
threshold for inclusion (Casal Bértoa, Deegan-Krause, & Haughton, 2017; Mustillo &
Springer, 2015).
(4.) We thank Scott Mainwaring for sharing this dataset with us.
(5.) Of course, this does not mean that all Latin American countries have become more
volatile during this period. In some countries, such as Chile, the patterns of interparty
competition have remained quite stable. Other countries (e.g., Argentina) have experi
enced a moderate increase in volatility as a result of the electoral decline of one of the es
tablished parties. Finally, countries such as Peru and Colombia have experienced party
system collapse and a significant increase in extra-systemic volatility with the rise of sev
eral outsiders and independent candidates in each presidential election. See Carreras et
al. (2015) for a more detailed discussion of these cross-national differences.
(6.) Party system institutionalization (PSI) is closely linked with electoral volatility, and
Roberts in this work uses volatility as one of the main indicators of PSI. Low PSI entails
that the vote share of new parties is high and that there is no stability in the main elec
toral contenders (2018a), which naturally leads to an increase in electoral volatility.
(7.) All the works reviewed in this section analyze the link between party system institu
tionalization and policymaking. However, the empirical models use electoral volatility as
the main proxy for PSI. The results therefore precisely capture the relation between
volatility in partisan competition and policy moderation.
(8.) While we are not aware of any study looking at the link between party switching and
accountability in the Latin American context, an analysis of accountability in Poland
demonstrates that legislators can take advantage of party system fluidity to switch par
ties and escape accountability (Zielinski, Slomczynski, & Shabad, 2005).
Miguel Carreras
Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside
Igor Acácio
Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside
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Electoral Volatility in Latin America

Summary and Keywords

Latin American political systems experience significant levels of institutional uncertainty

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Definition and Operationalization

Different Types of Volatility

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A second way to capture electoral volatility in Latin America is to focus on campaign

Another approach to conceptualizing and measuring volatility is to focus on party-level

Measuring Electoral Volatility

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Descriptive Information About Electoral

As expected, we observe low levels of electoral volatility in highly institutionalized party

Figure 1. Total electoral volatility, Latin America vs.

(Source: Mainwaring et al., 2017).

Important Variations in Volatility Within Latin America

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Figure 2. Differences in volatility within Latin Ameri­

(Source: Cohen et al., 2018).

Figure 3 allows us to distinguish between “extra-systemic” (or “party replacement”)

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Figure 3. Volatility in Latin America, extra-systemic

(Source: Cohen et al., 2018).

Evolution in Electoral Volatility in Third Wave Democracies

The descriptive statistics presented in Figure 4, however, do not show a stabilization in

Figure 4. Evolution in volatility in Latin America

(Source: Cohen et al., 2018).

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The Search for Explanatory Factors

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creased party system volatility, highlighting the potential perils of institutional

Historical Legacies and Political Developments in Third Wave Democ­

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The Consequences of Electoral Volatility

Party System Fragmentation

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Electoral instability also matters because it undermines democratic representation. First,

In addition to the difficulty associated with holding governments accountable in highly

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Concluding Remarks and Avenues for Further

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Birch, Sarah. (2003). Electoral systems and political transformation in post-communist

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Coppedge, Michael. (1995). Freezing in the tropics: Explaining party-system volatility in

Corrales, Javier. (2008). Latin America’s Neocaudillismo: Ex-presidents and newcomers

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Dix, Robert H. (1987). The politics of Colombia. New York: Praeger.

Doyle, David. (2011). The legitimacy of political institutions: Explaining contemporary

Duarte Recalde, Liliana. (2012). Variaciones en el Comportamiento Electoral en Paraguay.

Figure 2. Differences in volatility within Latin Ameri

Historical Legacies and Political Developments in Third Wave Democ

Epstein, Daniel J. (2009). Clientelism versus ideology: Problems of party develop

Hagopian, Frances. (2005). Conclusions: Government performance, political representa

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2002). The impact of corruption on regime legitimacy: A compara