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Cleavage Structures and Party Systems
in Latin America
Robert H. Dix
In a seminal article in 1967 Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan posed a series of
central questions for the comparative study of party systems. The first set of questions
concernedthe genesis of the system of cleavages within the nationalcommunity, including
the timing of their appearanceand their relative salience and durability.A second group of
questions focused on the translationof cleavages into stable party systems, including the
question of why conflicting interestsand ideologies in some cases favored the emergence of
broadaggregativecoalitions, and in others fragmentation.The final set of questionsbore on
the behavior of voters within the various party systems. What were the characteristicsof
those voters mobilized by the several parties, and how did economic and social change
translateinto changes in the strengthsand strategiesof the parties?The authorsstressedthat
all these and related questions were to be addressed diachronically, that is, in historical
perspective.'
While Lipset and Rokkan, as well as most of the many others who have asked similar
comparativequestions, have focused almost exclusively on the competitive partysystems of
Europe and the Anglo-Saxon diaspora (the United States, Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand), it seems high time thatquestionslike those raised for industrializedcountriesnow
also be posed for Latin America, particularlysince Latin Americaconstitutesthe area of the
world that most closely approximatesthe developed West in culture, levels of economic and
social development,2 and experience with competitive party systems. Only by examining
such questions outside the regions of the ancestral homes of political parties and party
systems can we expand our generalizationsabout the historical development of political
partiesbeyond the evidence of a particulartime and place. It is also at least highly plausible
that Latin America's experience with the construction of systems of competitive party
politics will prove more relevantto the futuretrajectoryof such politics in other partsof the
so-called Third World than will that of the developed West.
This article is an attemptto begin the systematicanalysis of that experience.3Among the
questions we pose will be the following. Has the development of western party systems
proven to be the prototypefor the evolution of competitive partysystems in Latin America?
What are the kinds of partiesand the patternsof competitionamong partiesin LatinAmerica,
and how have they emerged over time? Have the West's past experiences with the onset of
mass politics and the politics of industrialization been more or less replicated in
contemporaryLatin America?How might one account for any differences?What follows is
thereforemeant essentially as an exploratoryexercise in delineating some broad patternsof
similarity and difference between the party systems of Latin America and the developed
West.
At the same time, our enterprise will be a good deal more modest in scale and in
23
ComparativePolitics October 1989
24
RobertH. Dix
25
ComparativePolitics October 1989
-or factions and splinters thereof--still predominate,as they have since the last century,
and while thirdpartiesof some significance have from time to time emerged, they have so
far scarcely shaken the party alignments inherited from history. Not least, party
identificationtends to be intense and to have deep roots in the distantpast. Thus Paul Lewis
portrays a Paraguay where "party identification is practically universal," where
"membershipin one of them is almost always a lifetime commitment,"and where to switch
party allegiances connotes virtualtreasonto one's friends and family.10
The trajectoryof party system developmentin Latin America has thereforediffered from
that of the developed West in partbecause the formerhas largely lacked the cultural,ethnic,
and interreligiouscleavages that have characterizedthe latter, but most of all because the
vagaries of political history have in the Latin Americancase all but eradicatedthose parties
that took form prior to the onset of mass politics (or, in several other cases, paradoxically
forestalled the emergence of new parties altogetherby freezing in place the historic party
pattern).Only in a handfulof instances, notablyChile and, less clearly, Argentina,has party
developmenteven roughly followed the western model.
If both the natureand significanceof the patternsof cleavage thatprevailedpriorto the onset
of mass politics mark the developmentof Latin America's party systems as different from
those of the industrializedwestern countries, the coming of industrializationand universal
suffrage likewise had quite divergent impacts.
In the western case (albeit with the notable exceptions of the United States and Canada)
the admission of the middle and working classes to effective political participationin the
second half of the nineteenthand early decades of the twentieth century saw the attendant
formationof parties that have been variously termed "partiesof integration," "class-mass
parties," or "socialist working-classparties." Socialist and Communistpartieswere typical
of the new style of party.11Ideologically such class-mass partiestended to be Marxist, or at
least to adhereto programsthat spelled out quite explicitly the desirabilityof a futurewhere
the state owned the means of production. The focus was on the class struggle, and the
appeals of such parties were primarilyto the organized industrialworking class.
The coming of universal suffrage and high levels of political mobilization in Latin
America, on the otherhand, some decades laterthan in the Europeancase, did not eventuate
in the kind of class-mass partiesfamiliarfrom the industrializingperiod in the West, but in
something it seems fair to call a Latin American version (or ratherseveral versions) of the
"catch-all" party. Indeed, such catch-all parties, broadly conceived, have continued to be
the predominanttype of party in the Latin America of the 1980s. In most contemporary
Latin American party systems, single class parties (whether working class or bourgeois)
have tended to be relatively peripheral, or mere adjuncts to party systems that instead
revolve aroundan axis of one or more multiclass parties.
The catch-all party is one that eschews dogmatic ideology in the interestsof pragmatism
and rhetoricalappeals to "the people," "the nation," "progress," "development," or the
like, that electorally seeks (and receives) the supportof a broad spectrum of voters that
extends the party'sreach well beyond thatof one social class or religious denomination,and
26
RobertH. Dix
that develops ties to a variety of interest groups instead of exclusively relying on the
organizationaland mobilizationalassets of one (such as labor unions).
In short, whereas the catch-allpartycame into prominencein Europein the postindustrial
era of developmentand in the wake of a politics substantiallystructuredby partieswith their
principalroots in, and appealsto, one or anothersocial class (or religious denomination),the
Latin Americancatch-all partyhas surged to the front as the preeminentparty form during
the industrializingstage of development and in lieu of (prior to?) the emergence of class
partiesof the Europeanstripe.'2
Apart from broad characteristicsthat together mark them as catch-all,'3 there are, to be
sure, distinctions among Latin American catch-all parties as well. Some are essentially
personalistic instrumentsof caudillos, often but not necessarily military in background.
Examples include Argentina's Peronists, Peru's National Odrifsta Union (UNO), the
political vehicle of formermilitarydictatorGeneralManuel Odria, and Ecuador'sNational
Velasquista Federation(FNV), the party that served as the political instrumentof the late
Jose MariaVelasco Ibarra.Still others tend to be more structuredand enduring,with a more
consistent democratic vocation. The programs and ideologies of such parties, while
sometimes couched initially in dogmatic terms, very quickly become highly pragmaticin an
effort to attractbroad, multiclass supportand confront the real problems of governing.14
Examples are numerous, but include Peru's APRA, Venezuela's DemocraticAction (AD),
Costa Rica's Party of National Liberation(PLN), and the Dominican RevolutionaryParty
(PRD). Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and Bolivia's National
RevolutionaryMovement (MNR) (at any rate prior to its fragmentation)would also fit this
category of catch-all party. Yet a third type of Latin American catch-all party tends to be
squarelybased on the middle class and to be led by uppermiddle class professionals. In fact,
it may begin as a "bourgeois" party. But when such parties successfully reach out to
peasants, workers, or slum dwellers, as Chile's ChristianDemocratsdid in the 1960s, or to
a broaderelectorate, as Argentina'sRadicalshave in the 1980s underthe leadershipof Raul
Alfonsin or as Peru's PopularAction Party (AP) once did underformerpresidentFernando
Belatinde Terry, they go beyond a single-class constituency to become genuine catch-all
parties.
Notwithstandingthe differences among them, all merit the designation catch-all in that
they are pragmaticor eclectic in program and ideology, multiclass in their support, and
oriented to broad-basedelectoral appeals that go beyond the mobilization of a committed
constituency. In contradistinctionto the pattern of western party development, catch-all
parties, ratherthan the class-mass party, have generally been the immediate successors to
traditionalelite-centeredparties and politics in Latin America.
The Evidence
27
ComparativePolitics October 1989
not account for the voting intentionsof the Venezuelan electorate. If one were to select at
randomone hundredHerrera(COPEI)supportersand place them in a room, and then repeat
this procedurewith Pinerua (AD) supporters,the two groups would look very similar."5
Polls in two states (one carried by AD, the other by COPEI) prior to the 1978 election
showed each party to be favored by a significant proportionof each economic stratum:no
less than 25 percentand no more than45 percentfor either partyin every one of four social
categories (upper, middle, working, and poor).'6 Clearly, both qualify as catch-all parties.
Similarly, a 1976 survey in Costa Rica found that voting for the NationalLiberationParty
(PLN), that country's dominant party, was only slightly related to such variables as
rural-urbanresidence, housing conditions (a surrogate for social class), and age. Party
identificationtied to events of the brief 1948 civil war appearedto be a far better predictor
of the PLN vote.•7
Even such parties as Argentina's Peronists (today formally known as the Justicialist
Party), while perhapsappealingdisproportionatelyto the workingclass, are, when looked at
more closely, in reality quite heterogeneousand genuinely multiclass. Thus between 26 and
49 percentof the lower middle class (in the federal capital) voted for Peronistcandidatesin
the five elections between 1960 and 1973. In fact, the proportionof the upper middle class,
as well as of the upperclass, voting for Peronrangedas high as 31 and 30 percentrespectively
in September 1973. The Radicals, too, though getting somewhat more support from the
middle class (both lower and upper) than elsewhere, ranged ratherevenly across the social
spectrum,with 22 percentof the working class vote and 28 percentof the upper class vote
in the September 1973 election.'8
The leadershipof catch-all partiesconfirms their socially eclectic nature. Some, such as
Argentina's Peronists, Colombia's ANAPO, Peru's National Odrifsta Union, and the
short-livedmovement that adheredto the political bannerof formerChilean dictatorCarlos
Ibdifiezdel Campo in the 1950s, were not only led by formermilitaryofficers but, at least in
their formativestages, had a numberof active or retiredmilitaryofficers in other prominent
leadershippositions.19
Landownersand businessmen have also made up significant proportionsof the national
leadershipof many catch-allparties. For the Peronists, 12 percentof theirlegislatorsin 1946
and 20 percent in 1963 were landowners,20while industrialistswere among the prominent
confidants and advisers of Peron's first regime, despite its allegedly working-class base.21
While Venezuela's AD drew disproportionateelectoral strengthfrom ruralareas as well as
from organized labor, especially during the 1960s, its founders and top leadershipcadres
have largely been comprised of lawyers, educators, medical doctors, and professional
politicians.22Bolivia's MNR in its heyday showed a similar pattern.23
Some scholars, like Gliucio Ary Dillon Soares, have argued that the politics of
developmentare the politics of class and ideology and that Brazil duringthe years 1946-64,
priorto a militarycoup that restructuredthe party system, was a case in point. Thus in the
election of 1960 there was a clear and consistent tendency for voter preferences for the
National Democratic Union (UDN) to decline and for the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) to
increaseas one "descended"the occupationalscale from persons with professionaland high
level administrativejobs to unskilled manualworkers. At the same time, it should be noted
that neitherthe PTB nor the UND found majorityfavor in any social groupingin what was
then a genuinely multiparty system and that the support of each was in reality quite
28
RobertH. Dix
There are of course a numberof non-catch-allparties in Latin America in the 1980s. They
include the Communistparties of the hemisphere, as well as a myriad of Marxist variants
and splintergroupsthatretaina highly ideological content and directtheirappealsespecially
to workers, although sometimes to peasants or nonproletarianslum dwellers as well. The
Communists are the single party in Cuba and, prior to the 1973 coup that brought the
militaryto power, were an importantpresencein Chile, regularlywinningbetween 11 and 16
percentof the vote in congressionalelections in the years between 1961 and 1973.27 Some
might also wish to classify Nicaragua'sSandinistasas a Marxistpartydominantin its system,
although its membershipand appeals are broaderthan those of most class-mass parties.
Elsewhere, although Communistparties exist--legally or not--in every country, they are
generally marginalto electoral politics.
There is also a scatteringof "bourgeois"partiesthat appeal largely to business or middle
class constituencies, some strictly regional or provincial parties (Argentina has had a
29
ComparativePolitics October 1989
30
RobertH. Dix
Some Explanations
31
ComparativePolitics October 1989
32
RobertH. Dix
Conclusion
33
ComparativePolitics October /989
34
Robert H. Dix
in Third World countries."43The point is even more critical for politics than for scholarly
understandingof political institutions in developing countries, at least if Ozbudun is also
correctin arguingthat "the success of democraticpolitics in developing societies is strongly
associated with the presence of broadly-based,heterogeneous,catch-all parties,"44a point
with which we would agree but which we have not directly sought to develop here. Even
more than it is the politics of class and ideology, the politics of development is the politics
of cross-class coalitions and programmaticpragmatism.
NOTES
I wish to thank my colleague John Ambler as well as two anonymousreadersfor their perceptive substantiveand
editorial suggestions on the draft of this article.
1. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An
Introduction,"in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and VoterAlignments(New York: The
Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.'
2. Cf. WorldBank, WorldDevelopmentReport1987 (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1987), pp. 202-3. Latin
America in the context of this article encompasses the nineteen independentcountriesof the western hemispherewith
an Iberianheritageand colonial background.
3. Of course, this is not literally the beginning of all cross-national study of party systems in Latin America.
However, seldom have such studies sought explicitly and systematicallyto addressthe questionsraised here, and none
of which I am aware has endeavored, except perhaps in passing, to analyze the evolution of Latin American party
systems in juxtapositionto the experience of the West. Among the previous comparativestudies of Latin American
party systems is Ronald McDonald, Party Systems and Elections in Latin America (Chicago: Markham, 1971),
currently being revised and updated for a new edition. A comprehensive and very useful compilation of
country-by-country,party-by-partydescriptions is Robert J. Alexander, ed., Political Parties in the Americas:
Canada, Latin America and the WestIndies, 2 vols. (Westport:Greenwood Press, 1982).
4. The classic statementof the tentativenessof Latin Americanpolitical systems is Charles Anderson, Politics and
Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton:Van Nostrand, 1967), chap. 4.
5. See Lipset and Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures."
6. Of course liberals and conservatives were not always consistent in what they advocated. Liberals, for example,
once in power, often became staunchpromotersof central authority,in practiceat least, if not in doctrine. Moreover,
there were indeed conservative merchantsand liberal landowners. In fact, the very designations conservative and
liberal at times appearedto be mere labels, adopted by one or another caudillo in order to enhance his image or
legitimacy.
7. Conservativesand Liberals (with their various factions and permutations)were by 1857 supplementedby the
Radicals (much in the French traditionof that designation), then by the Democrats, a small "petit bourgeois" party
(1887), the Communists(1921), the Socialists (1933), and much later, in part as a breakawayof the Conservatives'
youth wing, the Christian Democrats, not to mention a myriad of other, mostly ephemeral, parties of varying
ideological hues. The Conservativesand Liberals merged to help form the National Party in 1966.
8. In a case like Brazil, such traumatic interruptionhas occurred several times, first when the Liberals and
Conservativesof the empire disappearedwith the adventof the republicin 1889, then when the dictatorshipof Getulio
Vargas put an end to the Old Republic in the 1930s, and again when the authorsof a militarycoup broughtan end to
the party system of the Second Republic in 1964 and effectively decreed a two-party system comprised of a
governmentparty and an opposition. In an effort to divide its opposition the militarysubsequently(1979) opened the
system to a variety of parties that have competed undercivilian rule since 1985.
9. See RiordanRoett, Brazil: Politics in a PatrimonialSociety, rev. ed. (New York:Praeger, 1978), pp. 65 and 69.
Despite the name, the PSD was not a social democraticparty in the Europeansense.
10. Paul H. Lewis, Paraguay underStroessner(ChapelHill: Universityof NorthCarolinaPress, 1980), pp. 145-50.
For a comparablediscussion concerning Colombia and its "hereditaryhatreds"that led to some 200,000 deaths in
interpartisanviolence as late as 1946-1966, see RobertH. Dix, The Politics of Colombia (New York: Praeger, 1987),
pp. 92-94. For Uruguay see Juan Rial, "The UruguayanElections of 1984: A Triumphof the Center," in Paul W.
35
ComparativePolitics October 1989
Drake and EduardoSilva, eds., Elections and Democratizationin Latin America, 1980-1985 (San Diego: Center for
Iberianand Latin American Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1986), pp. 262--64.
11. For these terms see, respectively, SigmundNeumann,ModernPolitical Parties (Chicago:Universityof Chicago
Press, 1956); Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformationof the Western European Party Systems," in Joseph
LaPalombaraand Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1966), pp. 177-200; and Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New Brunswick:
Transaction, 1980). Analogous in some respects were parties like Germany's Catholic Zentrum, where religion
replaced social class as an integratingforce.
12. The classic depiction of the catch-all party is found in Kirchheimer.I do not mean to imply that there were no
importantpartieswith a multiclass following in prewarEurope(for example, Great Britain's Conservatives), nor that
all of Europe'sputativeclass partiesappealedalmost exclusively to the industrialworkingclass (France'sSocialists did
not, for example). Rather, tendencies and contrasts are at issue, the central question being why Latin America has
failed to develop sizable Communistparties or such ideological, working-class-orientedparties as the prewar Social
Democratsof Sweden or Germanyand the Laborparties of Great Britain and Norway.
13. The use of the term catch-all is not critical here, as long as the point is carriedthat Latin America's mass parties
tend to be cross-class and nonideologicalin nature.Some Latin Americanistsmight preferthe term populist to refer to
many (althoughperhapsnot all) such parties.
14. For an excellent example of this process with regardto Peru's APRA, see FrederickB. Pike, TheModernHistory
of Peru (New York: Praeger, 1967), and GrantHilliker, The Politics of Reformin Peru: The Aprista and Other Mass
Parties (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
15. Robert E. O'Connor, "The Electorate," in Howard Penniman,ed., Venezuelaat the Polls (Washington, D.C.:
AmericanEnterpriseInstitute, 1980), pp. 86-87.
16. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
17. Mitchell A. Seligson, "Costa Rica and Jamaica," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Competitive
Elections in Developing Countries(Washington,D.C.: AmericanEnterpriseInstitute, 1987), p. 171.
18. Peter G. Snow, Political Forces in Argentina, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 36-39.
19. See Robert H. Dix, "Populism:Authoritarianand Democratic," Latin American Research Review, 20 (1985),
33.
20. Snow, p. 32.
21. Jose Luis de Imaz, Los Que Mandan (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1970), p. 17.
22. John W. Martz, Accidn Democrdtica (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1966), pp. 195ff.
23. ChristopherMitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 17-19 and 26-28.
24. Glducio Ary Dillon Soares, "The Politics of Uneven Development," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., p. 187.
25. Roett, Brazil, p. 67.
26. Most of the PT's leaders are blue collar workers, a rare occurrencein Latin America; see MargaretE. Keck,
"Great Expectations:The Worker's Party in Brazil (1979-1985)," paper preparedfor the ThirteenthInternational
Congress of the Latin AmericanStudies Association, Boston, October 1986.
27. Arturo Valenzuela, Origins and Characteristicsof the Chilean Party System: A Proposal for a Parliamentary
Form of Government, Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Latin American Program, 1985),
Table 1.
28. Thus O'Connorfound in a two-provincestudy of the 1978 Venezuelanelection that, while 8 percenteach of the
upper and middle strata supportedthe left, only 6 percent of the working class and 3 percent of the poor did so
(O'Connor, p. 81). CharlesG. Gillespie found a similar patternfor Uruguay;see his "Activists and Floating Voters:
The Unheeded Lessons of Uruguay's 1982 Primaries,"in Drake and Silva, eds., p. 234.
29. See Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52 (Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1978). In
1952, for example, the majoritywing of the divided Socialists, togetherwith an eclectic arrayof parties and political
"movements," backed the presidentialcandidacy of former militarydictator(1927-31) Carlos Ibfilez del Campo.
30. A conspicuous, if short-lived, exception to this generalizationflourishedin Colombia in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The National PopularAlliance (ANAPO), essentially the political vehicle of former dictatorGeneralGustavo
Rojas Pinilla, won 39 percent of the vote, and nearly the presidency, in 1970 in a multicandidateelection with a
populistic appeal and strong supportfrom the urbanmasses, plus the supportof a numberof ruralareas, all of them
disaffected from the then-reigningpower-sharingagreementbetween the Conservativeand Liberal parties called the
National Front. Significantly, and attesting to the strengthof traditionalparty loyalties in Colombia, ANAPO at its
peak functioned not as a formally separateparty (though it became one in 1971), but as a combinationof dissident
36
Robert H. Dix
factions of the two major parties. When in 1970 Rojas Pinilla himself ran for president, he did so under the
Conservativelabel; see Robert H. Dix, "Political Oppositionsunder the National Front," in R. Albert Berry, Ronald
G. Hellman, and Mauricio Solatin, eds., Politics of Compromise(New Brunswick:TransactionBooks, 1980), pp.
140-64. ANAPO has since virtually faded from sight.
31. The cross-national variance is considerable in this respect. Pre-1973 Chile was at one extreme: there were
typically three or four presidentialcandidatesbut many more congressionalslates, with many minor partiesexplicitly
or tacitly backingone of the majorpartycandidacies. In Peruin 1980, on the otherhand, therewere fifteen presidential
candidaciesand fifteen congressionalslates; cf. SandraL. Woy-Hazelton, "The Returnof PartisanPolitics in Peru,"
in Stephen M. Gorman, ed., Post-RevolutionaryPeru (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 55. More typical than
either of these cases are Costa Rica and Venezuela, where the two leading candidatesas a rule garner8-10 percent
more of the vote than do their respective congressionalslates and there are usually two or three more parties seeking
representationin congress than there are presidentialcandidates.
32. Cf. Epstein, Political Parties, chap. 6.
33. World Bank, WorldDevelopmentReport 1987, p. 267.
34. Ibid., p. 265.
35. Ibid.
36. AlejandroPortes, "Urbanizationand Politics in Latin America," Social Science Quarterly,52 (December 1971),
697-720; see also Joan M. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations (Cambridge,
Mass.: HarvardCenter for InternationalAffairs, 1969).
37. JuanM. Villareal, "Changesin ArgentineSociety: The Heritageof Dictatorship,"in Monica PeraltaRamos and
Carlos H. Waisman, eds., From MilitaryRule to Liberal Democracy in Argentina(Boulder:Westview Press, 1987),
p. 95.
38. Cf. Epstein, concerningthe relevance of this factor in the case of the United States.
39. AlbertO. Hirschman,"Underdevelopment,Obstacles to the Perceptionof Change, and Leadership,"Daedalus,
97 (Summer 1968), 925-37.
40. Epstein, p. 132.
41. That the decline of class politics in Europemay have been exaggeratedis suggested in ibid., pp. 368-74; see also
Steven Wolinetz, "The Transformationof Western EuropeanParty Systems Revisited," West European Politics, 2
(January1979), 4-28.
42. France's Charlesde Gaulle was in a sense such a leader. However, he consideredhimself above, or apartfrom,
political parties, even those that adheredto his cause or invoked his name; he personally spent little time building or
leading his own party.
43. Ergun Ozbudun, "InstitutionalizingCompetitive Elections in Developing Societies," in Myron Weiner and
ErgunOzbudun, eds., p. 405.
44. Ibid.
37