PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. vs.

THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND

SPORTS
G.R. No. 78385, August 31, 1987.

FACTS: On Feb 21, 1987, the DECS created a Task Force

on Private Higher Education which submitted a Report and
Recommendation regarding the policy on tuition and other
school fees. In its report, it set a ceiling of 15% to 20%
increase of total school fees.

The DECS took note of the same Report and issued a

Department Order which authorized the said increase.
Herein petitioner, sought reconsideration of the same DO,
on the ground that the increase was too high. Thus, the
DECS issued another Order which reduced the increase to
a range of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the
increase and sought the suspension of its implementation,
sending a telegram to the President’s Office but receiving
no response.

The petitioner argued that the DO was issued without

any legal basis and that it violated the due process clause
of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the Department Order is

unconstitutional?

HELD: No, the DO is not unconstitutional. Petitioner

argues that the power to regulate school fees “does not
always include the power to increase” such fees. However,
Sec. 57 (3) of the BP Blg. 232, vests the DECS with the
power to regulate the educational system in the country.
Sec. 70 of the same also granted the DECS the power to
issue rules necessary in the discharge of its functions and
duties under the law.

In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this

power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No
other government agency has been vested with the
authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should
be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and
effectively discharge its functions and duties under the
law.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the due

process clause requires that prior notice and hearing are
indispensable for the Department Order to be validly
issued. The Court disagrees.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative

agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of
prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates
prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial function or when it applies exclusively to
a particular party, prior notice and hearing are essential to
the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid
down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to
all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country,
they may partake of a legislative character.

The DO in question set the maximum school fees for

all private schools in the country. As such, prior notice
and hearing are not essential to the validity of its
issuance.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant

Petition for prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.