Conflicts – 2nd Outline 1

Congress of the Philippines Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
Twelfth Congress citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
Third Regular Session aforesaid oath.

Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
three. illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines.
Republic Act No. 9225             August 29, 2003
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
Philippines and the following conditions:
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress
9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
Assembled:
other existing laws;
Section 1. Short Title –  this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
acquisition Act of 2003."
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
authorized to administer an oath;
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion." (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country
of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 2

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned

officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause  -  If any section or provision of this Act is held

unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations

inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause –  This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in theOfficial Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general
circulation.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160869             May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN
CALILUNG, Petitioner,  "I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. 1 Petitioner
prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic
Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63,
As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states,
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003,
reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003."
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 3
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a

personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in
the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held
unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No.
9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers
that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 4
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without
losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law
allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. 2 The
Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national
interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a
state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the
oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former
Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The
fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of
the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to
the Republic.3
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is
necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law.
During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual
allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - -
the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this
case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He
pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He
thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of
foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a
violation of the Constitution…
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional
injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law
aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However,
he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the
taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from
the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the
former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the

case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have
no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual
allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the
bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this
oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country concerned, he explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his
foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at
the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now
a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a
matter that he wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign
parliament but a Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to
national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance
problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill
which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is
recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and
in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country
of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this
stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an
oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 5
problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other
foreign country.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it
does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3,
Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed
any law on the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be
justification why this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is
true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the Supreme Court, through
Mercado v. Manzano,6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual
allegiance from dual citizenship.7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual
allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to
entertain issues regarding dual allegiance. 8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is
not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned
with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 9 Congress was given
a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes
dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since
the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance.
Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 6

dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed
laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint
and act with caution and forbearance. 12 The doctrine of separation of powers demands
no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual
allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining
what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 7

EN BANC citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his
family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria,
[ G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015 ] California, and finally in Canada.

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner
AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., RESPONDENTS. made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of
Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election. The decretal
DECISION portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

PERALTA, J.:
RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of Candidacy of respondent
Caballero is hereby CANCELLED.[7]
Before us is a petition for certiorari  with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order seeking to set aside the Resolution[1] dated November 6, 2013 of the Commission
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised by
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed in toto the Resolution[2] dated May 3,
petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also in consonance with the
2013 of the COMELEC First Division canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
Commission's constitutional duty of determining the qualifications of petitioner to run for
petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
elective office. It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No.
9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly
Petitioner[3] and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.[4] were both
renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements
candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes
provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons who
in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed a Petition [5] to deny due course to
renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency
or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false
requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner's
representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of
naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin
Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof.
in Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon
him to prove that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that
to run for elective office in said locality which he failed to do.
he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and the petition was served by
registered mail not in his address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however,
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns showed that
received a copy of the petition during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer
petitioner won over private respondent.[8] Private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-
but filed a Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in his
parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.[9]
petition.
On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En
Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian
Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the COMELEC's First Division
citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
canceling his COC.
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian
citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes
On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation. [10]
on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. [6] He claimed that he
did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian

On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari  with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution [11] of the May 3, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En Banc and prayed for
the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the appropriate correction of the certificate of
canvas to reflect that all votes in favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity
of petitioner's proclamation and proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of
Execution.[12] Private respondent took his Oath of Office[13] on December 20, 2013.
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAR
IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN SEVERAL
FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE
DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION OF HIS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON RESIDENCY.[14]
Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due course or
to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a
copy thereof was not personally served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy
of the petition to him by registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason
on why registered mail as a mode of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that
private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs (1) [15]and (4),[16] Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 8
his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy should have
been denied outright.
We are not convinced.
While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements, the
settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules
as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy
disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion
thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations
without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do
justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a
full day in court is not substantially impaired. [17]
In Hayudini v. COMELEC,[18] we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of
respondent's petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC despite its failure to
comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by Resolution No. 9523, i.e., pertaining to the period to file petition and to
provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served personally on
petitioner, respectively, and held that:
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in
order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by
mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an
indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative
that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the
sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of
procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle was
reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and De Castro v.
Commission on Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and
jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC
must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes."
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its
rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all

matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of its objectives - ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds
the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to
ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful
leader.[19]
Here, we find that the issue raised,  i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he
represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office,
therefore imbued with public interest, which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its
own rules. We adopt the COMELEC's s ratiocination in accepting the petition, to wit:
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with the procedure
for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy set forth in
Section 4, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, which requires service of a copy of the petition to respondent prior
to its filing. But then, we should also consider the efforts exerted by petitioner in serving
a copy of his petition to respondent after being made aware that such service is
necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for petitioner to personally
serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he was in Canada at the time of its filing
as shown in respondent's travel records.
The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford the latter an
opportunity to answer the allegations contained in the petition even prior to the service of
summons by the Commission to him. In this case, respondent was given a copy of the
petition during the conference held on 10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded
the occasion to rebut all the allegations against him. He even filed a Memorandum
containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all intents and purposes,
therefore, respondent was never deprived of due process which is the very essence of
this Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow to
substantive considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding, x x x
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 9
xxxx
When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules
is in order, x x x.
Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which warrants the
relaxation of the application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure, consistent with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in several cases.[20]
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he
was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple
of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter
and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also
contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from
work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement
of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public office is
not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on
the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common
welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election
is a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-
acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. [21] The law
does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. [22]
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.[23] This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-
born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he
may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is
also a citizen.[24]However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an
elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA
No. 9225 provides:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of
1991,  provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective local official. Section
39 thereof states:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of
the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the
election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the
ground that the latter made material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he
is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceeding the day of
elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, [25] that is, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi)."[26] A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is
usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.[27]
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 10
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes.
Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However,
he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC[28] we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as
permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian
citizenship.[29] Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines
and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes
during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC,[30] wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose
residency in the said place was put in issue, we had the occasion to state, thus:
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still
retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option
to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence
therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall
not retroact to the time of his birth.[31]
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove
that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished
Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he
made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that
he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year
immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after
reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that
petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if
such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to
reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12,

2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of
administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final
unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. [32] Clearly,
where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in
the questioned Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor
substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.[33]
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as
required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to
the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial compliance with the law, is not
persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on Elections,[34] we held:
x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican
government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their
representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government
positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running
for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or
plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. [35]
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he is a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately proceeding the day of
the election, thus, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and
grant or denial of due course to COCs, to wit:
SEC. 74.  Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks
to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 11
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in
the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for
the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate
- the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. [36] We
concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to
qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any
other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the
Local Government Code.[37] Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the
misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.[38] We, therefore, find no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for
material misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May 3,
2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the
COMELEC En Banc and are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 12

THIRD DIVISION Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-
March 18, 2015 10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11,
2007.
G.R. No. 199113
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner,  intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO
vs. officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled
land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact
DECISION led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s
family.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order 1 dated October
RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which
challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of
denied the petition for certiorari filed by Renato(petitioner)M. David. Petitioner assailed
Justice (DOJ).
the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental
Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that
petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in
The factual antecedents:
his MLA which was void ab initio.8

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines.
by the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of
Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong,
public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the
Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the
absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing
year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land
the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document
and part of the salvage zone.
was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued
against the petitioner.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application 3 (MLA) over the
subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said
filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause 10 in the MTC.
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the
motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal
enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 63 11 (CA 63). Since the
complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the

MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC
ordered:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of
merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him
relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely
legal. He argued that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action
by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the
applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he
applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration. 14
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition 15 for certiorari
under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted
that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-
determination of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest;
and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-
born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his
citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost
on account of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition, 16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification
was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect
his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said
oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for
certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without
any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where he can make use of his
claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in
case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 13
Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court
has disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by
legal fiction "deemed not to have lost" it at the time of his naturalization in
Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed
Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and
to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for his alleged false
claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of
petitioner through his wife and counsel to question the validity of the said
warrant of arrest against him before the same is implemented, which is
tantamount to a denial of due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the
retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit.1âwphi1 It is contended that this Court’s rulings
in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections 19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections 20 on
the retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his
application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not
work for petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less
proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he
made the declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is
stressed that in falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain
or intent to injure a third person be present. As to petitioner’s defense of good faith, such
remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full- blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General
opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion
for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his
person to the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the
RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the
parties’ arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted
before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for
falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite

his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225;
and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable
cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of
2003," was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003.
Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of
another country shall be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," such is
qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 14
the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the
second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of
Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally
employed the terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of
the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under
which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away
with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual
citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining
Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225
took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A.
9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the
accused is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of
innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult
question of law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a non-
lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-
reply dated January 31, 2011 22 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating
that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August
18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of Representative
Exequiel Javier:
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate
version, "Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of

the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain
their Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by
reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are deemed to have
reacquired…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born
citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this act are considered to
have retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship
before the effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the
distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say,
American citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship
before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens because they have
just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention
and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63.Upon the effectivity -- assuming that
we can agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending
Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have
reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future
instances. So that’s the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making
distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very important for certain
government positions, ‘no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a
specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 15
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the
provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation, Congressman Javier, that is
our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino
citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the
future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity
of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it
is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of
such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having
already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2
declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s
effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference
to Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise
misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the accused following the
time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 24 in relation to Article 17125 of
the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who
did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial
documents. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of
the RPC are:
(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who
did not take advantage of his official position;

(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of
the RPC; and
(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause
for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as
ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re- determination of probable cause, as the
motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. 27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which
involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of
bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 16
the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by
the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished
either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of
the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when
a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become
obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
xxxx
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we
clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
xxxx
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person.Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of
the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-
determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked
jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC's
order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11
(Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 18

EN BANC people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr.,
the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a
G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004 natural-born Filipino or is he not?

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,  The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
vs. roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents. Filipino.

x-----------------------------x Antecedent Case Settings

G.R. No. 161634             March 3, 2004 On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,  of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
vs. Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent. representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
x-----------------------------x place of birth to be Manila.

G. R. No. 161824             March 3, 2004 Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, 
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
vs.
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
DECISION
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
VITUG, J.: could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
or by those who dispute it. respondent.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish

by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage
against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a
certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by
the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that
there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided
or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge
of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available
information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate
of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between
Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during
the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February
2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 19
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny
due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
--- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false" –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition
to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or

resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required
by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a
gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a
proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government
post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke
the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in
urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before
it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, 4 as
"not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of
the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 20
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the
members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of
the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A
petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. 5 In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number
of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,

questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on
the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office. 6Aristotle saw its significance if
only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be
governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other. 8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in
public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest
of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the
rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship,
which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. 10 The 20th
century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. 11 The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in
Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship. 12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects
of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." 13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios',
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 21
denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship
became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to
point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however,
were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by
Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; 15 however,
three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines -
the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, 16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, 17 and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. 18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because
of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the
Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws. 19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants
of any town of the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws
then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by
its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights
of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as
are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty,
a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which
declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." 22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress
on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects.
Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be
"aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 22
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December
tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight." 23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of
the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a
native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899
to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines.
Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the
common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality,
operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to
the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other
insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had
for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first
Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed
at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such

others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 23
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of
the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except
for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship
- naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28 – had been in vogue. Only two,
i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of
the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29 (1912), did not last long.
With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married
to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had
not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed
that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05
July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date
of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to
be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 24
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino,
twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old
and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September,
1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years
old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley,
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence
for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan
F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on
11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified
true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x           x x x           x x x
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie
proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement
made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes
more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. 31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954,
at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that
Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a
colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San
Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound
to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of
his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the
Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 25
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to
the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took
effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment
was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment
was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In
the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the
name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
being an authoritative document of recognition. 33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled
-
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is
merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient
proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our
judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents,
there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents
as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it
was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the
civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature
of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also
be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case,
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 26

there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the
child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In
Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of
voluntary acknowledgment:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those "(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and
those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public "Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his
document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
may be made belongs to the first class." minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate death of either or both of the parties.
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in "x x x           x x x           x x x.
any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which
would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
lifetime of the presumed parent.
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing,"
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a
reads:
genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument
(one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his. "Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws."
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article
175 provide:
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, 36 the Court has ruled:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of
that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take
place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of
this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of
the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely
govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that
the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political
rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on
"citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those
which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."37
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife,
their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the
classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter,
the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and
divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are
governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15
of the Civil Code, stating that -
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 27
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in
different parts of the Civil Code, 39 such as on successional rights and family
relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of
his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such
legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law 41 and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the
rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the
distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and
the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became
the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the
domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should
thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for
civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or
paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal
and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable
by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons
is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree’
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when

and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must
be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x           x x x           x x x
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 28
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation
of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x           x x x           x x x
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of
Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise
in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has
now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.
According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,
1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent
marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no
less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a
Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or
on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his
mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court
in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them.
If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare
decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson
followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there.
The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son
of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become
Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to
Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 29
mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about
invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about
the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan
claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof
that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore
concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was
his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but
was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple,
simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x           x x x           x x x
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it
would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino
father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago
by People vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate
children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real
differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify
distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political
rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an

important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There
is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal
protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails
the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed
for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has
committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions
in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this
Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and
vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 30
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the
elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship
of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years
old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place
of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio,
Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R.
No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 31

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.

Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-
003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 32

EN BANC on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6
March 8, 2016 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and
G.R. No. 221697 Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar." 1
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, 
vs. When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the
x-----------------------x trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
G.R. No. 221698-700
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the petitioner's adoptive mother
discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, 
petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
vs.
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
VALDEZ Respondents.
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live
Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4
DECISION
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter
PEREZ, J.: with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received
her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan,
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of Metro Manila.5
the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte  issuance of
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993
(COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured
Banc,  in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616. 7
First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc,  in
SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the
issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
University of the Philippines 8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for
of jurisdiction.
the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston
College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree
The Facts in Political Studies.9

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose

Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in
the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29
July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16
April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika)
were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained
U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to
support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this
time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with
her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3
February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in
the settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the
first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
for the next semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; 21 and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog
into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. 23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3)
children immediately followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to
complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there. 26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her
husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005. 27 The corresponding
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 33
Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private
schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. 29 She travelled back to
the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. 31 The family home was
eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S.
in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major
Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home 34 and to this day, is where the
couple and their children have been residing. 35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering
said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. 37 As can be
gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and
declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her
children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. 38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3)
children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay  Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the
No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). 43 Before
assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the

United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary
public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, 44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted
the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport. 48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." 49 On
that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein
she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with
the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. 50 In the same
questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically
in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months"
to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." 53 Petitioner
obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. 57 The petitioner attached to
her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing
of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated
cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari  in G.R. No. 221697
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 34
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001
(DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition. 60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that
petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections. 61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. 62 Elamparo claimed
that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo  that petitioner was a natural-
born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized
American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous
from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound
by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated
that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May
2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo  that petitioner is
qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the
ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be
counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under
the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile
in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was
actually a petition for quo warranto  which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins
in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in
her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation
that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that
foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born
of citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior
to the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and
that the same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or
recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess
natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-
born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for
Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of
the Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should
she serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding
that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 35
the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material
representations which are false. The fallo  of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9,
2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner
which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying
the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner
before the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the
requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born
status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to
exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-
born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support
her claim that foundlings have a nationality. 76 According to Tatad, international
conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary
in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. 77 He also
stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born
status to foundlings.78

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option
to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former
natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling. 79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with
the ten (10) year residency requirement. 80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her
domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship
which was sometime in 2010 or 2011. 81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack
of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed
thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed
as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did
not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen. 83 He advanced the view that
former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. 84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had
only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior
to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim
that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not
meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue.
He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground
that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy
and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of
the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. 86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. 87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition
of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as
such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws. 88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 36
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action.
His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. 89 Instead, Tatad completely
relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not
among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective
office.90
Second,  the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they
focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. 91 A petition for quo
warranto  falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a
natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality
and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found. 94 Consequently,
the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated
under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status. 96 Moreover, the
official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the
issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her
appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth,  she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started
reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's
resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan
City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills. 99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied with. 100She reasoned out that there
was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the
acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101

Eighth,  she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for
Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division
ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10)
year residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her
COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a
period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May
2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present
petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte  temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the
COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation
of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter,
oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to
ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in
the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 37
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-
139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding
the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding
the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated
are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner
is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be
denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the
certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in
the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet
undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the
same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in
Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including determination of the number and location
of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations,
or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall
likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to
political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their
registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may
be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in
court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize
election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 38
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary
action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive,
order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report
on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or
recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc,  shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the
President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc  decision in Fermin v.
COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in
Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action
which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making
power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the
right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence  and citizenship  of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in
their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as
already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office.
In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or
during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office  and
the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to  remove the incumbent
from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not
imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate
for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization
Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does
not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the
respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of
provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 39
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election  the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual
should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g.,  vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification
is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are
established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his
favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g.,  his citizenship
or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the
beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case
(G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8,
1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers.  The law is satisfied if candidates state
in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to
fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only
in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations
made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections
for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives.
(R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications  of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez  pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin,  led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25
September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which
states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any

act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds.  - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by
final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate,
or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election  the qualifications of candidate.
Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by
a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided
by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are
flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow,  are not authorizations, are not vestment
of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts
of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by
statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is
not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of
the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-
evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such
are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 40
foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments,
when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that
herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain
that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the
burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown
nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole
chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce
that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is
not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters
shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines
was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo
Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970,
the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented
were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were
210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299

Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were
245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not
dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in
Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that
she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She
also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond
shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a
person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would
be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents
are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the
Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not
face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50%
chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our
questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average,
there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to
1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the
ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that
the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while
the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 41
ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I
am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at
all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than
99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not
imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those
infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a
foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because
there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings
might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty -
99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision
denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle
of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.
It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered
by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is
inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by
the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The
gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider
them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown
parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption
is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the
Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be
Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for
amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the
children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 42
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child,
is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a
Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not
unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does
not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from
Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that
the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children
or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized,
and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively. 116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who
said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment
to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a
mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to
apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that

illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16
February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was
the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the
way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola
and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings
as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct.
Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are
imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What
matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos
because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency
and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a
class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive
policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a
famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is
not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just
and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to
impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the
grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the
Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express
intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to
use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really
intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 43
provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,"
Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section
3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws
is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties,
status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court
will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a
child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem,  which no court
may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and
over the parties, but also over the res,  which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well
as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality.
Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules
to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes"
(otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to
the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 44

a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this
instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or
the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother
under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. 122 The Decree of
Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa
Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status
as a foundling.123
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and
or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
be cared for by his or her parents.
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 125 International
customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a
and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to nationality:"
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 126 "General principles of Article 24
law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of
reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of
and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social the State.
and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the 2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our
present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to
wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of
birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the
rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory
of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing
the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the
1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 45
effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. 132 In Razon v. Tagitis,  133 this Court noted that the
Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis  is likewise notable
for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force
and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as
petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and regional
state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United
States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada,  134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to" 135 the 1966
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out
that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the
Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition
of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and
yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread
practice.
Our approach in Razon  and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that
"generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international
custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the
phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness,
equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying
the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally," 136 support the notion
that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments,
were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under
the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South
America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-
two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis  regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three
(33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not
signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings
are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis  countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to

presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's
Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are
among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the
DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99%
and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of
nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class
which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to
their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those
treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that
the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if
this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect
and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship.
The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is
reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 46
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET,  140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC 141  where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also
included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit, 142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144  is categorical
that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he
will ... recover his natural-born  citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit
to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It
is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to
mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or
perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are
only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and
naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,
ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of
a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and

the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed
all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should
be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior
to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be
respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed
a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to
presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data
required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the
effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee." 149 Under R.A.
No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact
that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any
notation that it is an amended issue." 150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books,
and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of
Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential." 151 The law therefore allows
petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what
would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was
an adoptee.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 47
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in
the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before
and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections,  is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held
on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May
2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence
in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months"
which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25
May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is
the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or
bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide  intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi  coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned
their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include
petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to
the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in
March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of

their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June
2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding
tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the
Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family;
March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address;
final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S.
Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May
2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May
2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was
purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly
decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only
to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur
Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence
and animus manendi,  but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The
COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the
basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in
the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was
approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC.  157 During the oral
arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158  Respondents
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be
counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since
petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be
counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 48
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count
residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing
that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's
acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC,  161 the
candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his
frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an
American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship
issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial
officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is
not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by
the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted
only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together
leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from
the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address
in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from
U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is
clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan.  A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended,
otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is
no overriding intent to treat balikbayans  as temporary visitors who must leave after one
year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and
"comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan  program
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to
become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country"164in line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms
that the balikbayan  must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted
him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before
he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is
exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and
buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in
domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court.
Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that
comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to
have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue
of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner,
the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years
and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for
Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only
in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the
statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required
in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in
2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period
when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from
25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the
COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC
which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016."
The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first
version was vague.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 49
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her
U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had
returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the
school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding
and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her,
yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's
mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence.  In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven
(7) months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one
year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to
have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she
was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would
have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both  correctly stated
the pertinent  period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually
and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because
COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact
that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently,
on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As
already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as
early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement
of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an
established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012
COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by
Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco
discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and
were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition
for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted
that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6)
months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer
period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when
petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be
said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for
Senator  which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to
hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner,
moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily
constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to,
and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for
public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good
number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines
and animus non revertedi  to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of
coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which
the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her
residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that
"based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 50
is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for
purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as
President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency
have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less
in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner. 169 It ignores, above
all else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the
SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration
in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six
(6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the
residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared
years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the
time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to
vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by
petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential
candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There
are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator.
Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat
include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however
stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
[Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection
in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson
Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former
lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name
and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner]
returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 51

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of
the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills,
where they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the
case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date
than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December
2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11
December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc,  upholding the 11 December
2015 Resolution of the First Division.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in
Division and En Banc  are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion
from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for
President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA
No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent,  stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,  respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30241          December 29, 1928
GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant,  Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said
vs.
NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL., respondents.  therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative Code.
NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.
Mabanag and Primicias, Gibbs and McDonough, and Mariano Alisangco for appellant.
Sison and Siguion and Franciscco Ortega for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of La Union, upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing
the quo warranto proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval against Norbeto
Guray and others, with costs against the petitioner.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assign the following alleged errors as committed
by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered upon Gregorio
Nuval's petition for the cancellation of Norbeto Guray's name on the election list
of Luna is conclude and constitutes res judiata in the present case.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that Norbeto Guray at the time of his
election, was ineligible for the office of the residence in said municipality.
3. The lower court erred in not finding in its judgment that the petitioner is
entitled to hold the office in question.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 52
In regard to the first assignment of error, the evidence adduced during the trial of the
case shows:
That on May 11, 1928, and within the period fixed by section 437 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, Gregorio Nuval filed, in civil case No. 1442 of the
Court of First Instance of La Union, in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and
registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered
candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality, a petition against
municipality, not being a qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not resided
Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance with sections 437 and 438 of the
same Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered
judgment dismissing it because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident
of the municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable,
Norberto Guray's name remained in the election list of the municipality of Luna.
The general election having been held on June 5, 1928, Norbeto Guray was elected to
the office of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of votes, Gregorio Nuval obtaining
second place. On June 7, 1928, the municipal council of Luna, acting as the municipal,
Norberto Guray, elected to the office of municipal president of the said municipality of
Luna for the next triennium.
On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto as provided
in section 408 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, asking that
Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to the
election as required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be
eligible to an elective municipal office.
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the
judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name
from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and
prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Act. No. 3387 is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not
appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital

or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with
whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for execution was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as qualified
voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of the
president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the
election list of said municipality. The present proceedings of quo warranto was
intreposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the
office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate
for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is
not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of
capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate
of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165.)
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious
matter was the conclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the
municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter in his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he
has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray
had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter
thereof, while in the present proceedings of quo warranto, the case of this action is that
Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for the eligibility to the
office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of
causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b)
identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850).
And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in the present quo
warranto proceeding, as there is no identity either of parties, or of things or litigious
matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.1awphi1.net
For the above considerations, the trial court erred in holding that the judgment rendered
in the case on the petition of Gregorio Nuval asking for the cancellation of Norberto
Guray's name in the election list of Luna is conclusive and constitutes  res judicata in the
present case.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 53
With respect to the second assignment of error, the evidence establishes the following
facts:
Up to June 27, 1922, Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his
birthplace, where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. On that
date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, Province of La Union. The rules
of the provincial treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray was subject as such
municipal treasurer, require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the
municipality where they perform they official duties, in order to be able to give an
account of their acts as such treasurers at any time. In order to qualify and be in a
position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925, Norberto Guray
asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, where he had voted
in the general elections of 1922, alleging as a ground therefore the following: "On the
ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day of June, 1922. My
correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in order to be registered
in the subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors of precinct
No. 1 of Balaoan, by virtue of which he was registered as an elector of the said precinct,
having made use of the right of suffrage in said municipality in the general elections of
1925. In his cedula certificates issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from
the year 1923 to 1928, included, he made it appear that his residence was the
residential district of Balaoan. In the year 1926, his wife and children who, up to that
time, had lived in the municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the town of Luna in the
house of his wife's parents, due to the high cost of living in that municipality. Norberto
Guray used to go home to Luna in the afternoons after office hours, and there he passed
the nights with his family. His children studied in the public school of Luna. In January,
1927, he commenced the construction of a house of strong materials in Luna, which has
not yet been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1,
1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and
on the 16th of the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph, which was accepted
on the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with
a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring
him resident of said town, he obtained another cedula from the municipality of Luna on
February 20, 1928, which was dated January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that he
resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna, Province of La Union. On February
23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in the
election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he applied for
registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for
thirty years. For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate antedated.

In view of the facts just related, the question arises whether or not Norberto Guray had
the legal residence of one year immediately prior to the general elections of June 5,
1928, in order to be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of La
Union.
There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed the office of
municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union, he transferred his residence from the
municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.
The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more established his
residence in the municipality of Luna.
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and
acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence
until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28).
"The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of
Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time
prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so,
but his personal presence in said municipality.
By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of the rules of
the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction was such municipality,
Norberto Guray had to reside and in fact resided in said municipality until the 6th of
February, 1928 when he filed his resignation from his office, which was accepted on the
same date. The fact that his family moved to the municipality of Luna in the year 1926 in
order to live there in view of the high cost of living in balaoan; the fact that his children
studied in the public shool of said town; the fact that on afternoons after hours he went
home to the municipality of Luna and there passed the night with his family, are not in
themselves alone sufficient to show that from said year he had transfered his residence
to said municipality, since his wife and children lived with his father-in-law, in the latter's
house that only in the month of January, 1927, did he begin the construction of a house
of strong materials, which is not yet completed, nor occupied by himself or his family, His
aftrenoon tips to Luna, according to his own explanation given to the provincial
treasurer, were made for purpose of visiting his sick father. His own act in recording in
his cedula certificates for the years 1927 and 1928 issued by himself in his favor as
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 54
municipal treasurer of Balaoan, that his place of residene was that municipality, and in
taking out a new cedula in the municipality of Luna of February 20, 1928, and having the
date of its issuance surreptitiuosly put back to January 15 1928, show that until the date
of his resignation he did not consider himself as a resident of the municipality of Luna.
The fact that his wife and children lived in Luna not in his own house but in that of his
wife's father since the year 1926, cannot be looked upon as a change of residence,
since a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the
former (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time.
The present case is different from that of Doctor Apacible cited by the appellee in his
brief. Doctor Apacible never had abandoned his legal residence in the Province of
Batangas, nothwithstanding that he had been living with his family in the City of Manila,
taking out his cedula certificates here, but he never exercised the right of suffrage here.
Norberto Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of Luna, transferring
it to the municipality of Balaoan by reason and an account of the requirements of the
rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction is said
municipality, exercising his right of suffrage in the latter.1awphi1.net
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law
Norberto Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and
began to acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he
filed his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been
holding, and which resignation was accepted; and on being elected municipal president
of Luna in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal
residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of
municipal president of Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and, in
consequence, he has no right to take possession of said office, petitioner Gregorio
Nuval being the one legally elected to said office with a right to take possession thereof,
having secured second place in the election. With costs against the respondent. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur. 
Villamor, J., dissents.
RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
VILLA-REAL, J.:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 55

This is a motion praying for the reasons given that the judgment rendered in this case on So ordered.
December 29, 1928 be reconsidered, and another rendered affirming the judgment
appealed from. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
In regard to the grounds of the motion with reference to the defence of res judicata, as Manila
the movant does not adduce any new argument in support thereof, and inasmuch as this
court has already discussed question at length, we find no sufficient reason to grant the EN BANC
motion on said grounds.
G.R. No. L-43314         December 19, 1935
As to the other grounds touching this court's holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who
has been legally elected to the office of municipal president of Luna, La Union, and A.L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, plaintiff
entitled to take possession thereof, having received second place, we consider them -appellant, 
meritorious, for the reason that 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in case a vs.
person not eligible should be elected to a provincial or municipal office, does not JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.
authorize that it be declared who has been legally elected, thus differing from section
479 of the law, which contains such an authorization, and for the reason, furthermore, Ohnick and Opisso for appellant.
that section 477 of the said law provides that only those who have obtained a plurality of Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
votes, and have presented their certificates of candidacy may be certified as elected to
municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature different from the appointive offices. The
occupation of the first depends on the will of the elector, while that of the second
depends on the will of the authority providing for it. In quo warranto proceedings
referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the
candidate elect, while in quo warrantoproceedings referring to offices filled by BUTTE, J.:
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when
the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instant of manila in an action to
the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only recover from the defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of P77,018.39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against the
votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.
determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled
to occupy the office. The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as follows:

In view of the foregoing, we are of opinion that the judgment rendered in this case on
December 29, 1928, should be, and is hereby, amended, eliminating from the dispositive
part thereof, the holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has been legally elected, so
as to read as follows:
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the
office of Municipal president of Luna, is hereby declared unlawful and quashed
and, consequently, that he has no right to take possession of said office, with
costs against said respondent.
I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.
II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, certified
copy of which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached and made a part hereof, by
virtue of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M.
Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New
York, United States of America.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 56

III. That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator
of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell
Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same being designated
as case No. 39113 of said court. Copy of said petition marked Exhibit BB is
hereto attached and made a part hereof.
IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition will of the deceased Arthur
Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in
a decree dated May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the decree marked
Exhibits CC and DD, respectively, are hereto attached and made parts hereof.
V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only
heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by
the court in said case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE is hereto
attached and made a part hereof; and that during the hearing for the declaration
of heirs, Ida M. Palmer presented as evidence a letter dated February 28, 1925,
and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon Moody, copy of which marked Exhibit
FF hereto attached and made part hereof.
VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally
of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more
fully shown in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator
with the court in said case No. 39113, certified copy of which inventory marked
Exhibit GG is hereto attached and made a part hereof. This stipulation does not,
however, cover the respective values of said properties for the purpose of the
inheritance tax.
VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the
estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return, certified copy
of which marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part, hereof.
IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed
with the court its report, certified copy of which marked Exhibit KK is hereto
attached and made a part hereof.
X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to
the attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter, copy of which marked
Exhibit LL is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the
letter of the Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in the preceding
paragraph. Said answer marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a part
hereof.
XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney
for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto
attached and made a part hereof.
XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in
a letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the
sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019.75 on January
19, 1932, making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41
covers the assessment for income tax against said estate.
XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the
protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the
hearing of the present case.

VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period Manila, August 15, 1933.
from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy of which marked Exhibit
11 is hereto attached and made a part hereof, was also prepared by the Bureau
In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and
of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon
documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen,
Moody.1awphil.net
came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in
these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He
had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting

principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property valued by
the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of
Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property
at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far
as this record shows, he left no property of any kind located anywhere else. In his will,
Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of the
Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer, he
stated:
I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the
Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and
Testament . . ..
The substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint
as follows:
That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed
or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal
properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and
collection by defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the value of said
stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted
and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without due process of
law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of the Philippine Islands.
Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:
SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. — Every transmission by virtue of
inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of
inheritance. devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands
and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the
Philippine Islands, of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any
corporation or sociedad anonima  organized or constituted in the Philippine
Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership,
business or any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be
subject to the following tax:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 57
It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a "non-
resident of the Philippine Islands". The answer, besides the general denial, sets up as a
special defense "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date of his death,
a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was engaged actively in
business." Issue was thus joined on the question: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur
G. Moody at the time of his death?
The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any evidence
that Moody's domicile was elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his death based on
the proposition that as no such objection was made before the Collector of Internal
Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax, this
objection cannot be considered in a suit against the Collector to recover the taxes paid
under protest. He relies upon the decision in the case of W.C. Tucker vs. A.C.
Alexander, Collector (15 Fed. [21, 356). We call attention, however, to the fact that this
decision was reversed in 275 U.S., 232; 72 Law. ed., 256, and the case remanded for
trial on the merits on the ground that the requirement that the action shall be based upon
the same grounds, and only such, as were presented in the protest had been waived by
the collector. In the case before us no copy of the taxpayer's protest is included in the
record and we have no means of knowing its contents. We think, therefore, the
preliminary objection made on behalf of the appellee does not lie.
We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to whether
Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his death.
Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in the
Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a
fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for
many years and was living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of February,
1928, under the following circumstances: He was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced
stage and been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the Philippine
authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law. Distressed
at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise to Dr. Wade that
he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of
February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax
clearance certificate. The record does not show where Moody was during the remainder
of the year 1928. He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and
April of the year 1929 where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur
Institute. The record does not show where Moody was in the interval between April,
1929, and November 26, 1930, on which latter date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry
Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him mis interest in the Camera Supply Company, a
Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter,

among other things, he states: "Certainly I'll never return there to live or enter business
again." In this same letter he says:
I wish to know as soon as now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided
either to sell or put in a line of school or office supplies ... before I go to the necessary
investments placing any side lines, I concluded to get your definite reply to this ... I have
given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be executed until March and
this will give you plenty of time ... anything that kills a business is to have it peddled
around as being for sale and this is what I wish to avoid. He wrote letters dated
December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the same line to Wendt. As Moody died
of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written, there can be no doubt
that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he
returned to the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from
confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine
Islands.
There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new
domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for some
months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not claim that
Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and
cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live
there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal
domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no writing whatever of Moody
from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he
intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any property
in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account there. There is no
evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there.
The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does
not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three months in
Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose
of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates
clearly that Moody's continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was
due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious
departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Cullion Leper Colony for he doubtless
knew that on his return he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became
graver to us while he was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous departure and
he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do
in foreign parts.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 58
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their
usual residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual
residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and
"outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a
century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the
date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must
be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in
the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and
permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the
record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
The contention under the appellant's third assignment of error that the defendant
collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is, in
our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the Collector of
Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of
P59,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of surplus by
the Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the evidence. The appellant
contends that this assessment in taxation: First, because the corporation paid income
tax on the same amount during the years it was accumulated as surplus; second, that an
inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed against the estate, and third, the
same amount is assessed as income of the estate. As to the first, it appears from the
collector's assessment, Exhibit 11, to the collector allowed the estate a deduction of the
normal income tax on said amount because it had already been paid at the source by
the Camera Supply Company. The only income tax assessed against the estate was the
additional tax or surtax that had not been paid by the Camera Supply Company for
which the estate, having actually received the income, is clearly liable. As to the second
alleged double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional income tax
in question are entirely distinct. They are assessed under different statutes and we are
not convinced by the appellant's argument that the estate which received these
dividends should not be held liable for the payment of the income tax thereon because
the operation was simply the conversion of the surplus of the corporation into the
property of the individual stockholders. (Cf. U.S.  vs.  Phellis, 257 U.S., 171, and
Taft vs.  Bowers, 278 U.S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is relied
on by the appellant, plainly provides that the income from exempt property shall be
included as income subject to tax.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at
the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and,
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 59

second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine
Islands. Costs against the appellant.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22041             May 19, 1966
MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, petitioner and appellant,  either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present in this
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
Tagayuna, Arce and Tabaino for petitioner and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor F. C. Zaballero and
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for oppositor and appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is
married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal
age. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a
residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. He
returned to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a
temporary stay. He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in
Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension of
$115.00 from the Social Security Administration of the United States of America. He has
no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the
U.S.A.1äwphï1.ñët
After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that
petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his
petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the
qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 60
resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization'
[Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This 'residence' requirement in cases of
naturalization, has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive
permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he lives
and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no
matter how long, is his domicile. In other words domicile is characterized by animus
manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor,
country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his
stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is
accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is presently a citizen of the United
States of America, was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has
maintained at the time of the filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship and which continues up to the present. Such being the case, he has not
complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before
filing his present petition."
We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a
correct interpretation [Section 3 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63] which requires that
before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization." The word
"residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic,
L-18885, January 31,1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that term cannot
refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been admitted only on the
strength of a permit for temporary residence. In other words, the term residence used in
said Act should have the same connotation as that used in Commonwealth Act No. 473,
the Revised Naturalization Law, even if in approving the law permitting the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by foregoing the
qualifications and special disqualifications prescribed therein. The only way by which
petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a quota for
permanent residence so that he may come within the purview of the residence
requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner,  United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,  After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private
respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to
which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is
a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of
Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13,
1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito
Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C.
Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 61
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the
decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the
position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on
account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him
by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the
may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that
he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent
has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao
as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said
municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of
citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic)
as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is
no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
(p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a
foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card
holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This
respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel,
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon.
Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The
Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further
proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case
questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the
Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the
very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to
elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for
the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code
are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that
the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent
Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior
to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure  shall be dealt with by
law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in
the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 62
foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the
Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State)
which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in
Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question
No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's
answer was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent
Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back
of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States." (Annex A
pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application
of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to
reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in
it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose
of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes
sometimes give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS
674.)

As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S.,
the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to
him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain,
are in general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their
rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted
to remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard
to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution
that no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection
of the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to
earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an
alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth
Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito
Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
which provides:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.'
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 63
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as
a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
"disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as
municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence
in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at
the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate
for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government
Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident
of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not
one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for
mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy
of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who
possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens
who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of
evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are
incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with
one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under
the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as
permanent residents thereof.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 64

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in
the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he
wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other
words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S.
under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but
kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself
to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best
of both worlds so to speak.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered
his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in
the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run
for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC
Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby
set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,  petitioner that:
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced
verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger
or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on
March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________
Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a
"Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 65
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his
petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one
year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and
in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner)
disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the
filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on
or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred
that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result
of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's
motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending
to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended
registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said
city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month
actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC
to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with

other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative
district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve
his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed
on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First
District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean
elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by
a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her
original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity
of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the
printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she
thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in
Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, to which she always intended to return
whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in
her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became
a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts
that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of
the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in
Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However,
this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 66
not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware
of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is
curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her
actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because
there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item
no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in
the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be
made, she cited the case of Alialy v.  COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The
reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case
only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to
secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in
that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in
the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of
years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected
is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer.
To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the
integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of
her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood"
is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission.
The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent

indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry
in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995
which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6
months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said
accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat
so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her
residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited
period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March
8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it
was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is
clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon
vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226
SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines
in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan,
Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila
and not Tacloban.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 67
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the
First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It
cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent
in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In
1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a
registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on
served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of
the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a
letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for
the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that
she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including
Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and
on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila.
Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to
have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in
other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs.  RTC (226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice.
There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old
domicile. In other words there must basically be animus
manendi  with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay
in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there
by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a
resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban

City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must
likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's
statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is
not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not
presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the
election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was
evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a
resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of
the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a
resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner
correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered
as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her
residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a
resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of
the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution
declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely
stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition
for disqualification. 18
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 68
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in
the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental
Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal
issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the
First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said
Code.
b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election
law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for
the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence,
a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it
were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has
a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic  20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements
of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken
up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal
for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is
used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 69
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.
A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily
so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves  26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies
or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in
our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the
mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is
it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district

for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation
given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to
reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile
and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term
residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 70
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period
of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district,
which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are
amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a
different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would
be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of
Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in
her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible
source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by
the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven  Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in
Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down
her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item
7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile —
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be
disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of
residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing
than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of
April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked
for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The
Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's
domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her
husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a
voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not
been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion
lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears
repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence
in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile
for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his
own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without
having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived
either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence
in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an
elector in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time
that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs.  Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures,"
as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes
study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in
business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 71
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to
cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other
reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the
qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi  to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not
forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return
to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of
one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for
another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional
commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's
assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She
studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949
when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies
in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the
Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to
Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez
in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-
President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of
Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was
elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,

when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as
a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she
came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable
is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a
minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban,
reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of
the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of
the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by
appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to
her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos
power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions,
or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew:
the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers
that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many
years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing
her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 72
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her
own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of
the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific
area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place;
but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which
states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa
eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a
ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of
the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act
of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened
by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which
means, "when the husband shall transfer  his residence," referring to another positive act
of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article
obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one
place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his
family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of
the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the
wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the
sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of
actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately
preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together,
thus:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 73
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and
support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences
(as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live
together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the
domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
(various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with
reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a
question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made
from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile
can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place,
there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is
also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the
question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain
situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that
the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or,
for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed
to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal  43 this Court held that "[a] married woman
may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the

existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce."  44 Note that
the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in
such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live
separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile
of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo  45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not
within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But
we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic)
by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the
purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be
effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts
of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in
England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife;
and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a
mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even
by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon
v.  Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President
in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was
not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights
in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be
enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884)
abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order
for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 74
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so
far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory
order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was
in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband,
who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision
of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil
Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has
not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears
to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid
requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative,
upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain
money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had
brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not
appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile
was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would
be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property;
and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time,
Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his
family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the
conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did
not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have
been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the
Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between
the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has
been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly

different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes
revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by
making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is
that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation
of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate
(our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for
the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house,
an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the
PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was
in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and
"residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our
discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would
be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the
death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist
within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different
from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court
up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily
in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 75
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering
that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before
the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover,
petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is
untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them
does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such
result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held
by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs.  Cruz  held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of
the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the
aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential
act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed
merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it
lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would
then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a
decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section
78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction
to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 76

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of

jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us
to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground
here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for
the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred
ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established
principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law.
Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 77

Republic of the Philippines After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court
SUPREME COURT entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26
Manila April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered,
upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been
EN BANC satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined
because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the
G.R. No. L-12790             August 31, 1960 Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a
physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,  reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to
vs. collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.  that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical examination.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On
13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
appellant. The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee. strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife
was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent during the
hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.
PADILLA, J.:

Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the
state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is
Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court
the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of
of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to
a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition
incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically
of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist;
enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to
and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had
annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony
complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks.
provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see
established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17
decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined
December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a
or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit
certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional
to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court
five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that
may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She
her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate
is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the
herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 78

presumption is in favor of potency." 2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913
CONSTANZA YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant,  Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to
vs.
GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant.
O'Brien & DeWitt for plaintiff.
Chicote & Miranda for defendant.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yañez were joined in a
Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel
Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal property.
Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yañez came to Manila, where her husband was
residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On
the 4th day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a public document, by
which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and
by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in
such place as the said lady pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the same document, the
husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support,
payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of the said year 1899. The husband
complied with this obligation until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make
further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the husband
had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the same year. On the
11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her husband,
alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in or about the year 1899 with
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 79
a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and
cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a
decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and
the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be
therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been determined,
that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension
owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the
sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to
P12,959.90.
The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila, as
they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that both of them were
natives and subjects of Spain. He admitted that he was married to Constanza Yañez; he
also admitted having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in which he had
undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his wife in Madrid, but he denied the
other paragraphs of the complaint. As a special defense with regard to the allowance, he
alleged: "That in or about the month of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff,
instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her husband and being
maintained by him in his own house; that the communication was ignored by the plaintiff,
who against the will of the defendant, continued to live separately from him that from the
year 1901, the defendant did not know her address; that since 1900, the plaintiff has
lived in comfort and has known where her husband resided; that the plaintiff, during all of
the time referred to, in addition to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her
husband, possessed and still possesses property of her own, acquired by her, in greater
amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any case the action has prescribed
by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the divorce, he admits that he had by
the plaintiff two children that have died. He expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5
of the complaint, relating to the charge of adultery and also those of paragraphs 6, 7,
and 8, concerning the possession of real and personal property of the conjugal
partnership, the statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal
property. As a special defense, he alleged that prior to the year 1899 he conferred
powers of attorney upon the plaintiff to administer and collect property and credits
pertaining to him to the value of about 200,000 pesos; that the plaintiff accepted and
exercised the said power of attorney, attached the property and collected the credits
without ever having rendered any account of them. As a special preferred defense, he
alleged that neither the trial court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for
support, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any

other place in the Philippine Islands, the agreement upon the subject was neither
celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the Philippine Islands; and as to the divorce,
because the action therefore ought to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts. In conclusion,
he prayed that the court find: That the court was without jurisdiction over the two causes
of action; that even if it had jurisdiction, it could not order the payment of the sum
claimed as arrears of alimony; that, after all, the action with regard to this cause of action
has prescribed; and as to the prayer for a decree of divorce, the defendant should be
acquitted, while on the other hand the plaintiff should be required to render to the
defendant an accounting, supported by proofs, of her operations as his attorney and
administratrix of his property in Spain.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and
defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal
property be divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in event
that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners
according to law.
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition
of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with. These latter, after
various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the partition to the court, who
then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties appealed.
I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and of all other
courts of the Islands to try the case, either with regard to the fulfillment of the contract to
furnish alimony, or to decree a divorce or suspension of life in common between the
spouses: lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the
litigation; and over the persons of the contending parties, because neither of the
spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint.
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant had not
proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly had in
the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint. On the
contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that during this not
inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of
his wife in the Philippines in March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands,
had kept open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property
which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. It is also plainly shown,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 80
without proof to the contrary, that his wife resided in this city of Manila from the middle of
1896 until April, 1899, at which time she was permitted by him to change her residence.
It is affirmed by the defendant in point five of his answer to the complaint, that in May,
1900, he sent a letter instructing the plaintiff to return to Manila to live withher husband
and to be supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will of the
defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also affirmed in the said
answer, that during all of the time referred to in the complaint, and especially since 1900,
the plaintiff knew where her husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also very evident that
the contract, by virtue of which he authorized his wife to move to Spain and reside there
in such place as was agreeable to her, was executed in these Islands, "in the city of
Manila on the 4th of April, 1889," as is to be seen in the heading of the document. (B. of
E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he says that the record shows him to be a
Spanish subject, inscribed in the consulate of his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil
Code, the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill.
Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant, although a Spanish
subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself
provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may
be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein, shall be
required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish
before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry of
Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children
they may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing
the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the plaintiff is
fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. Without this supposition of having
acquired his domicile and residence in these Islands, he could not have required his wife
to return to live with him therein because this requirement could only be based on
articles 58 of the Civil Code of Spain, according to which the wife is obliged to follow her
husband wherever he wishes to establish his residence, or on article 48 of chapter 5 of
the Marriage Law in force in the Philippines, which imposes upon the wife the duty of
obeying her husband, living in his company, or of following him to wherever he transfers
his domicile or residence. And just because he was absent for a month before his wife
returned to the Philippines, he cannot be understood to have surrendered his habitual
domicile of more than seventeen years, without having established any other afterwards,
and without making any declaration in legal form, before he absented himself, of it being
his intention to change his domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house,
real property and all manner of means of subsistence. Section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like the
one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside  or be found, or in that
where the plaintiff resides.

The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but also residence
(vecindad) in Manila. In this litigation the defendant claims that, born as he says in
Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is not subject, in his marriage, to the rules governing
conjugal property, that are in force in the territories of Spain that are governed by the
common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their day), because they are opposed to
the Foral Law in force in the said Islands and which is respected by the Civil Code. Even
if this defense could be sustained herein, paragraph 2 of article 15 of the said Civil Code
would be applicable. It provides: "For the purposes of this article, residence (vecindad)
will be acquired: By residence of ten years in common  law provinces or territories,
unless before the termination of that time he manifests his will to the contrary; or by a
residence of two years, if the interested person declares this to be his will . . . In any
case, the wife will follow the condition of her husband. . . ." On no occasion had the
defendant manifested his will to the contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a
residence of seventeen years, a month before the return of his wife to these Islands. On
the contrary, when he inscribed himself in the Spanish consulate, he declared his
intention of continuing to reside in the Islands as a Spaniard and not as a Mallorquin,
subject as such to the common law of Spain.
In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands over
the subject matter of the complaint that is to try an action for divorce between two
Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his appeal: That both litigants are Spanish subjects
and that they contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with article 9 of the Civil
Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards
although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, "all questions of a civil
nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the
domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their
properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property,
the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
AUTHORITY to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon
the person and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively
by the national law of the husband and wife, and, in our case, by the Spanish law by
virtue of article 9 as above set out." (Brief, p. 12.) The appellant and defendant continues
his argument, saying: That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of
Spain, "jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with
ecclesiastical courts," while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this
being so, the action for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within
the jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons, because these
courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil
Cod of Spain, and this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 81
ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con subrogate
itself. Says this appellant: "If a law of a foreign country were of rigorous application in a
given case, a North American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical
court and therefore the North American tribunal in applying it would have to exercise a
faculty which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court." (Brief, pp. 13, 14, and 15.)
Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning cannot be
upheld. The question is precisely whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or
have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is taken for granted that the
power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal statute, but appellant
does not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a
foreigner carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the authority established by
the law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to demonstrate.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within
the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the
statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of
private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private
law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts
and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and
consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have
to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by
a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have
coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may
render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures
which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of
the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho
International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice," says the same professor, "is a principle
superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered without taking into
any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster
their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing
justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners who contract within the
country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid,
p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its
territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from
administering justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of
the given case to some court that is not the territorial one of the nation? This has never
yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of
questions of nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial
law in favor of private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is

only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the
Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in
Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of
Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in
actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack
of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which
gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without
the territory of their nation.1awphi1.net
It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibañez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not
lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects,
they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to
try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the
subject matter of the litigation.
The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the court that the
defendant had committed adultery with a certain woman in this city from the year 1899
until 1909; the third was against the finding that the adultery was accompanied by public
scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth for having decreed the divorce,
suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties.
The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we are unable to
review it, so we accept the findings of the trial court.
There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even though it were proven
would not be a cause for divorce, because no public scandal resulted therefrom nor was
there contempt displayed for the wife. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The facts must be
accepted by this tribunal as they were found by the trial court, since the evidence cannot
be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the contrary and maintains that it is a
proven fact, public and notorious, an assertion that the trial court must have found to be
proven. (Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for
divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife. There is
no law that requires this. Law 2, title 9, of the Fourth Partida does not require it.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 82
The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the finding of the trial court
that there exists conjugal property, a finding that the appellant maintains is without
foundation, and that which holds that the property in the hands of the receiver (that
sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the appellant claims to be
contrary to the law which should be applied to the case and according to which, as
alleged in the tenth assignment of error, the whole of the property should be adjudicated
to the defendant as being exclusively his.
Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the Balearic Islands and
that is also the condition of his wife, the plaintiff. Law: That although the rule of the Civil
Code is that which legally governs conjugal property, yet at the same time it admits, as
an exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law, according to which, as
applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the family is that of the division of property and
that of conjugal property is not known; so that the property pertains exclusively to the
spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it. In support of the facts, appellant cites
pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of exceptions; and of the law, the doctrinal
authority of Manresa, Gutierrez, and Alcubilla.
The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only pertinent one, is but
an affidavit filed by the defendant in which, under oath, he himself testifies as to the
Foral Law in the Balearic Islands. The adverse party says with regard to this: "This
affidavit was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge, and cannot
seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction.
Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands,
indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. We maintain
that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never submitted as proof,
never received by the trial court, and which has never been subjected to any cross-
examination, is not a means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies."
(Brief, pp. 6 and 7.)
Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the Foral Law as the
law of his personal status in the matter of the regimen of his marriage, and that to allege
this he be considered as authorized by article 15 of the Civil Code, we have said before,
in dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article 15 of the Civil Code
would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be advanced that there is a similar Foral
Law in the Philippines by virtue of paragraph 1 of the said article 15, it might be said,
though there is not at present any need to say it, that it is not in force. The two findings
attacked are in perfect accord with the law. All the property of the marriage, says article
1407 of the Civil Code, shall be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it

belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. No proof has been submitted to this
effect.
As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred in holding in the
judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the marriage a dowry of 30,000 Spanish
dollars. But the defendant himself adds that the court made no order or decree regarding
the alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth assignment of errors,
claimed that the court erred in not confirming the report of the commissioners which
gave to the said plaintiff the sum of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is unnecessary to say
anything further.
The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in
her complaint with respect to this sum; that no arrears of payment are owing for alimony,
even though payments had been stipulated in the contract, unless they are claimed by
the person who had furnished the actual support, and that alimony is due only when it is
necessary; so that, as the plaintiff has had no need of it for ten years, nor has she stated
who has furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her the amount of the arrears for all
that time; that as she has allowed ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action
prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after five years.
The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her complaint as to this
cause of action, but she considers that in equity such an omission can be supplied.
Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure determines one of the
requisites of the complaint: "A demand for the relief which the plaintiff claims." The
section goes on to say: "If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount
demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the special restitution of
property, etc., the ground of demanding such relief must be stated and the special relief
prayed for. But there may be added to the statement of the specific relief demanded a
general prayer for such further or other relief as shall be deemed equitable."
In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said section 89
[90] are complied with by setting forth in its paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of the cause
of action, that is, the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, by which the defendant obligated
himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of money monthly, for her
support, and the failure to comply with this obligation after the month of August, 1899.
Paragraph 6, as a consequence of the promise established in 4 and 5, says as follows:
"That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster actually owes the plaintiff the sum of 36,100
Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 dollars, which, reduced at the present rate of exchange,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 83
amounts to the sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency." (B. of E., p. 2.) In the case of
default on the part of the defendant "the court shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his
witnesses and assess the damages or determine the other relief to which the
plaintiff may be entitled, including the costs of the action, and render final judgment for
the plaintiff to recover such sum  or to receive such other relief as the pleadings and the
facts warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of the complaint.
This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer, exactly, are the
essential part of a complaint.
It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future, which constitutes the
first cause of action, but of certain sums stipulated in a contract. This contract is a law
for the contracting parties, a law which rises superior to those general laws which
regulate the nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the present case an entirely
voluntary one) and which govern judicial action.
An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe like all personal
ones, but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the Civil Code, after fifteen years. But even
though the provisions of article 1966 were applicable, by which an action to compel the
fulfillment of an agreement to pay alimony prescribes in five years, yet by section 50 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment has been made upon any demand founded
upon contract . . . an action may be brought . . . after such payment. . . ." And the parties
admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff secured the payment of
6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899. So that from August, 1908,
until March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the said period of five years had not
elapsed.
The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in empowering the
receiver to proceed to the separation of the property and in appointing commissioners to
make the partition and distribution between the spouses, since the principal question in
this action hinges upon the classification of the property; that it was erroneously
classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it pertained to the husband alone and
should be adjudicated to him for the reason that, as it reiterated in the tenth assignment
of error, the conjugal partnership was not subject to the provisions of the law governing
conjugal property, because such provision are totally foreign to the Foral Law of the
Balearic Islands.
The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
was in accordance with law. The only question before this court is the partition of real
property. All that referred to in the second decision appealed from, dated September 9,

1911, is urban real estate. Its classification as conjugal property is in accordance with
law, as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and that no consideration of the Foral Law
enters into the question has also been demonstrated.
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.
As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff only
P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its place
this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90, plus the
additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month, dating
from the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of payment, with legal interest upon the said
P12,959.90 from the date of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment, and,
furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments due after the filing of the
complaint, and which will continue to become due until the close of this litigation.
The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total amount of the alimony
owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum the plaintiff
had collected in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that is, 27,834.32, was
equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the Mexican peso was worth 90
centavos Philippine currency; fifth, that therefore the sum of $5,566.86 Mexican currency
was equivalent to P5,010 Philippine currency; and finally, as there was no evidence as
to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it was that current at the
time and place where the agreement was made, which was Mexican pesetas.
In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous in that, firstly, the
parties had admitted that thepesetas referred to in the contract of the 4th of April, 1899,
were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court was not empowered to define
them as being different from the kind admitted by the parties; secondly, if he were so
empowered, his interpretation should be governed by the terms of the law.
With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is made in her
complaint that the defendant had obligated himself to pay her a "monthly pension for her
support of 300 Spanish pesetas, that is, 60 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine
currency, amounts to P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this in hi answer to the
complaint, and that by his finding in a sense other than that accepted and not refuted in
the answer of the defendant, the court violated the provisions of section 94 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that the defendant in
his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint. The defendant said
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 84
that he admitted having made the agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint,
and that he stood upon its contents. The contents  of the document to which he refers is
of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and obligates himself to pay to his said wife the
sum of 300 pesetas, monthly, payable de su cuenta in the city and capital of Madrid, for
her support. . . ." He did not therefore admit the matter of the Spanish pesetas; that does
not appear in the contents of the document — the only thing he admitted in his answer.
As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article
1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of the country shall be taken into
consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word
" pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept
to interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement
was made, Mexican being then the usual and current money in the Philippines.
Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was not "Spanish pesetas"
that the contracting parties had in mind, because if the agreement had been a specific
one to pay 300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid, everyone would of course understand that
the expense of following the fluctuations of change and of the differences in value
between the money current in the country, and the Spanish pesetas, would have to be
defrayed by the obligated party; whereas, if nothing more than pesetas was mentioned,
it was necessary to decide which party should pay for the difference in value so that the
300 pesetas stipulated here should be 300 Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the
reasons of the court below for his decision this court can offer no legal grounds. The rule
of interpretation cited is the one applicable and it supports the reasoning of the decision
appealed from.
The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to her the 30,000
Spanish dollars which the commissioners proposed in their report. First she
characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the dowry of the wife delivered to the
husband, then, later, as paraphernal property brought to the marriage.
According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners, this amount of
30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and with reason. If, as was claimed, it
was inherited by the plaintiff from her uncle, it really constitutes paraphernal property
under article 1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the wife brings to the marriage
without being included in the dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the
same without being added thereto." But it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife
shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the
same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said property. In
such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal
property he may receive, or to secure said property, in the manner established for the
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 85

dowry property." Not even was there offered in evidence the public deed of delivery, nor
the equally public mortgage deed that is required by law. So that, therefore, the
necessary proof of the obligation to return paraphernal property as here demanded does
not exist.lawphil.net

The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of
September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.

The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement
of costs in this instance.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 86

Republic of the Philippines the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
SUPREME COURT claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
Manila
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
SECOND DIVISION decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998 which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,  documents being submitted.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents. The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death
BELLOSILLO, J.:
of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3On the other hand, it opined
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it
California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
heirs. 5
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed
legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,
a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the
heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and
petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and
Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one
of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case
was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the
appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November
1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it
denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings?
Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue
obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved
in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is
clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they
have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The
trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of
heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 87
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised,
among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from
the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact
had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To
this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines,
the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the
truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence
as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by
merely applying the ruling in  Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the
light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue
on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner
and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.,
was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when
their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of
this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of
their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well
lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it
did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She
even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May
1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 88

petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce SO ORDERED.
of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not
bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship
at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by
the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering
the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court

should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by
the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must
involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There
must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed
before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously,
there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of

Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate
court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead
of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to
the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 89

FIRST DIVISION Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000 Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, 
vs. On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
DECISION
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
PARDO, J.: couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted
by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for
The Case Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve
their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a
separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life;
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 modifying that
signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother.
of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City 2 declaring respondent
The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. 10
Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property
she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with
have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula
wife.
was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.
On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of
The Facts
San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment
of divorce.11
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
"Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.4
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13 Apparently, Alicia
had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula,
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. 14
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. 15 Their
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
Llorente.16
District Court, Southern District of New York. 6

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting
witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential
house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including
ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or
existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real
properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located
at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my
real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the
province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last
Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my
children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served
(sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 90
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the
Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia
R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines
Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein
Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. 18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the
will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave
due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol
Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to
the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise
void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 91

testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate
even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status
of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and
so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981
as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to
one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the
deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.33

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her
favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to Hence, this petition.35
make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her
The Issue
possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to
pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of
raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required
Llorente?
by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
granted.

The Applicable Law

"SO ORDERED."27

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will;
decision.28
and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
law.
"legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by
him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as
the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and The Civil Code clearly provides:
one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate. 30
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31 capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit
the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently
proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement
that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated
in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is
no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent
was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi  doctrine
is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in
favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw
the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2)
of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 92
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven
that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very
well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 93

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by
her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes,
since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity."44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of
successional rights to the decedent's national law. 45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County
of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall
proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 11263             November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the
facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order
dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where
they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her
parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the
plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant
and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 94
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always
spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and
induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips,
her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by
any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and
cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and
take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the
solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are
concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep.,
480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a
conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16
Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract.
But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it
continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the
legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is
regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for
the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of
no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these
principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing
the question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto
vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870,
in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on
April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law
read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually
assist each other.

ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second
paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when
he charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for
just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence
to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the
whole extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx     xxx     xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it,
either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining
in his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall
cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the
duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and
support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey
and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence,
except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support
his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward
his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by
article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of
December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions
dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 95
article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying
the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered
wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a
preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally
opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of
selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal
was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted
by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to
receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and
inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental
authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having
been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of
thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him
toward providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was
obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact
of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother
to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a
nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without
prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other
questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed
at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil.
Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code
"is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in
each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It
is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child
and had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to
support had already been established by a final judgment in a criminal case.
Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the proposition that the
option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the
supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a
result of certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon
her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all
the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the

key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all
his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted
this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the
revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and
disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband)
was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred
and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to the Audencia
Territorial  wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the
action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high
tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses
are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be
subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family
organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which
duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as
provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted,
the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one who
has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as
limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has been
decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband,
cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is
culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of the
product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would
allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each
other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision
contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible
with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent
therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in
conformity with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are
not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help
and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of
support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal
abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to
dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 96
matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without
need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the
petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil
Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the
appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly
that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously
made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the
doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the
marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true
basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine
therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was
compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily
abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is
true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this
case the wife brought an action for support against her husband who had willfully and
voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause whatever. The supreme
court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the ground that no action for
divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left
the conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention,
that the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out
of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party
abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his
company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation,
under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural
duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article
143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the
fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be
regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the
first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual
support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy
spouse does not create any illicit situation of the court above
described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its
decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the
defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 97

support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity
granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges
holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for
substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is
already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy
force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a
and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any
Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the
for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the situation of a feme sole.
husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal
violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment,
wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute heretofore filed in this case, rest.
his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their
daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of a
spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a
divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and
absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive
examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed,
the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery
being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this
court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been
announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting

divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife
has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and,
consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to
grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies
in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent
upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is
apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of
marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This
obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement
of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to
terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental
home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages
or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment
calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21076             March 31, 1965
WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO, petitioner-appellee,  Commissioners of which petitioner was duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a
vs.
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Platon A. Baysa for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On June 28, 1961, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding
petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a
non-quota immigrant. This decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners on July
12, 1961 of which petitioner was duly informed in a letter sent on the same date by the
Secretary of the Board. However, on June 28, 1962, the same Board of Commissioners,
but composed entirely of a new set of members, rendered a new decision reversing that
of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the
country. On August 9, 1962, petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an
opportunity to clarify certain points taken in the decision, but the same was denied for
lack of merit. Whereupon, on September 14, 1962, petitioner initiated the instant petition
for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which incidentally was considered by it as a petition for certiorari.
In due time, respondents filed their answer, and, after the parties had submitted a written
stipulation of facts, attaching thereto some documentary evidence, the court a
quo rendered a decision granting in, toto the relief prayed for. Thus, the court declared
valid the decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 while it restrained
respondents from excluding petitioner from the country. Respondents interposed the
present appeal.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 98
It appears that in the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in
June, 1961, petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time
to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on
January 15, 1929; that they had several children all of whom are not in the Philippines;
that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28,
1961 the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among others, that
petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Blas, a Filipino Citizen, and admitted her into the
country as a non-quota immigrant; that this decision was affirmed by the Board of
letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu proprio decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners composed of a new set of members dated June 28, 1962 the latter
found that petitioner's claim that she is the lawful wife of Perfecto Blas was without basis
in evidence as it was "bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship"; that said
Board further held that, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto Blas had
on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married
petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas
in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to
China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he
first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that
Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he
was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have
been in 1912.1äwphï1.ñët
In view of the discrepancies found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged
husband Perfecto Blas in the several investigations conducted by the immigration
authorities concerning their alleged marriage before a village leader in China in 1929,
coupled with the fact that the only basis in support of petitioner's claim that she is the
lawful wife of Perfecto Blas is "a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of
substantial proof of husband-wife relationship," the Board of Commissioners motu
proprio reviewed the record concerning the admission of petitioner into the country
resulting in its finding that she was improperly admitted. Thus, said Board made the
following comment:
The only basis in support of the claim that she is the wife of Perfecto Blas is a
mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-
wife relationship. She relies on the records of Perfecto Blas in connection with
his cancellation case and the testimony of the supposed children in the previous
admission proceeding. But this claim is belied by the admission of Perfecto Blas
himself, in the hearing conducted by a Board of special inquiry in connection
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 99

with his entry on January 23, 1947, that he was married to one Ng Yo in Ki Say, Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers
Chingkang, China in 1936, his first visit there being in 1935; he could not mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner's
therefore have been married to herein applicant in 1929. marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

The above comment cannot be disputed, it finding support in the record. Indeed, not WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. As a corollary, the petition
only is there no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to for mandamus filed before the court a quo is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but
lead one to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929.
This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. Thus, Article 15
of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is
well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be
valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court,
a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly
registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we
assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader
is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.

But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced
in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage
contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which
it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this
contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China.
Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the
law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

The statutes of other countries or states must be pleaded and proved the same
as any other fact. Courts cannot take judicial notice of what such laws are. In
the absence of pleading and proof the laws of a foreign country or state will be
presumed to be the same as our own. (Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30
Phil. 46).

In the absence of anything to the contrary as to the character of a foreign law, it

will be presumed to be the same as the domestic law on the same subject. (Lim
and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472).

In the absence of evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject

are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 18081             March 3, 1922
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.  following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the
MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,  deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and
vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.
Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.
Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as
follows: Is a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial
letter, valid in the Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the Philippines according
to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision of the Supreme Court on
the last point will affect marriages consummated by not less than one hundred and fifty
thousand Moros who profess the Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of
the cause can be realized. We proposed to give to the subject the serious consideration
which it deserves.
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on
August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was
claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate
child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate
was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had been
lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her
daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the
evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 100
allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese
marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine
Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child.
With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and
Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora
Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the
Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters
Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge,
Rosalia.
From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As to
the facts, we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court. As to
the legal issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error, these can
best be resolved under two heads, namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese marriage; and
(2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.
1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage
The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo
was married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-first year
of the Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count, on February 16, 1985, to
a young lady named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented who testified to having been
present at the marriage ceremony. There was also introduced in evidence a document in
Chinese which in translation reads as follows:
One hundred Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully answers
years of life and the venerable Chiong Ing, father of the
health for both. bridegroom, accepting his offer of marriage,
and let this document serve as proof of the
acceptance of said marriage which is to be
celebrated during the merry season of the
flowers.
I take advantage of this occasion to wish for
your and the spouses much happiness, a long
life, and prolific issue, as noble and great as

that which you brought forth. I consider the
marriage of your son Boo with my sister Lit
Chia as a mandate of God and I hope that
they treat each other with great love and
mutual courtesy and that both they and their
parents be very happy.
Given during the second moon of the twenty-
first year of the reign of the Emperor Quang
Su.
Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his
marriage during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong
Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime
thereafter took to himself a concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910,
Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears
from documents presented in evidence, was permitted to land in the Philippine Islands
as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however, never returned to his native hearth
and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any further
relations with her except once when he sent her P10.
The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of the
claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His Honor noted a
strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong
Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the
limits of truthfulness. His Honor also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year
1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo,
in the Philippine Islands. We are not disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the
trial court. The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child
existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not
establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in
which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign
marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts
of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then
necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 101
As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion ([1910]),
16 Phil., 137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines and the
Supreme Court of the United States were called upon to decide, as to the conflicting
claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant, between the descendants of an alleged
Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage. The Supreme
Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding that the Chinese
marriage was not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated by the United States
Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty years of uninterrupted
marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband and
administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage, "save upon proof
so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of
such impediment." Another case in the same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco
([1912], 22 Phil., 216).
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the
Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there
is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the
existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty
years and the two cases are the same.
The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of an
acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the affidavit of
Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North Borneo. But
we are not called upon to make a pronouncement on the question, because the
oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error.
2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is
fairly complete. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to the
year 1896. At least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine Islands.
There he was married to the Mora Adong according to the ceremonies prescribed by the
book on marriage of the Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest) Habubakar. That a
marriage ceremony took place is established by one of the parties to the marriage, the
Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one
of whom was the father of the bride, and another, the chief of the rancheria, now a
municipal councilor. The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry
of P250 in money and P250 in goods.

The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of
the father of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran. Then the Iman
asked the parents if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was
consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito net.
From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the
Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five
children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora
Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his
lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents. Thus,
when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of registration,
Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he
gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom is
prevalent among the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or friend, especially
when they do not swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to us that proof could not
be more convincing of the fact that a marriage was contracted by the Chinaman Cheong
Boo and the Mora Adong, according to the ceremonies of the Mohammedan religion.
It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced in
the very beginning of this decision, namely, Are the marriages performed in the
Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections of
the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into consideration.
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a
judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or
minister of the Gospel of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of the
word "priest," and only considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any
denomination" would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of the Christian
religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation. "Priest," according to the
lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and
considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is
to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained
by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the
Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a
religious sect having a particular name. (Haggin vs. Haggin [1892], 35 Neb., 375; In
re Reinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441; Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman
is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within
the meaning of the Marriage Law.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 102
The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form for
the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife."
The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite
for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are
capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed,
the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance, there is no question of
capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. While it is true that
during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest were addressed more to
the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora
woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live
together as husband and wife. (Travers vs. Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.
It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage Law
which have just been quoted and discussed. The particular portion of the law which, in
our opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore
solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for
want of such authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was
celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that
they have been lawfully married."
The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the
legislative intention in promulgating it was to validate marriages celebrated between
Mohammedans. To quote the judge:
This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the
Spanish law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized marriages, and it is
not to be presumed that the legislator intended by this law to validate void
marriages celebrated during the Spanish sovereignty contrary to the laws which
then governed.
What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind, nothing
could be clearer than the language used in section IX. Note for a moment the all
embracing words found in this section:
"No marriage" — Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized" —
Could any other construction than that of retrospective force be given to this phrase?
"Before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such
authority" — Could stronger language than this be invoked to announce legislative
intention? "Or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission" — Could the

legislative mind frame an idea which would more effectively guard the marriage relation
against technicality? "If it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them,
that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married" — What was the purpose
of the legislator here, if it was not to legalize the marriage, if it was celebrated by any
person who thought that he had authority to perform the same, and if either of the
parties thought that they had been married? Is there any word or hint of any word which
would restrict the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian
marriages? By what system of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve from
such precise language the curious idea that it was restricted to marriages performed
under the Spanish law before the revolutionary authorities?
In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would
ascertain from other sources the meaning and scope of Section IX of General Order No.
68.
The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the Philippines
has, time and again, been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law, and
executive proclamation. The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that "The
inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall
be secured Instructions to the Philippine Commission imposed on every branch of the
Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed ... That no form of religion and no
minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or upon any citizen of the
Islands; that, upon the other hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or
molested in following his calling, and that the separation between state and church shall
be real, entire, and absolute." The notable state paper of President McKinley also
enjoined the Commission, "to bear in mind that the Government which they are
establishing is designed . . . for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of
the Philippine Islands" and that, therefore, "the measures adopted should be made to
conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices. . . . The Philippine Bill
and the Jones Law reproduced the main constitutional provisions establishing religious
toleration and equality.
Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in the
same path. For instance, in the Treaty of April 30, 1851, entered into by the Captain
General of the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government guaranteed
"with all solemnity to the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their
religion, with which it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it will also respect their
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 103
customs." (See further Decree of the Governor-General of January 14, 1881.) For
instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of
the Court of First Instance and justices of the peace deciding civil cases in which the
parties are Mohammedans or pagans, when such action is deemed wise, may modify
the application of the law of the Philippine Islands, except laws of the United States
applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and customs. . . ."
(See further  Act No. 787, sec. 13 [  j]; Act No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the
Legislative Council amended and approved by the Philippine Commission;
Cacho vs. Government of the United States [1914], 28 Phil., 616.) Various responsible
officials have so oft announced the purpose of the Government not to interfere with the
customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs, as to make quotation of the
same superfluous.
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were inspired
by the governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the marriages of the
Indians, the Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is, that a
marriage between two Indians entered into according to the customs and laws of the
people at a place where such customs and laws are in force, must be recognized as a
valid marriage. The rule as to the Society of Quakers is, that they will be left to their own
customs and that their marriages will be recognized although they use no solemnization.
The rule as to Mormon marriages is that the sealing ceremony entered into before a
proper official by members of that Church competent to contract marriage constitutes a
valid marriage.
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.:" (Sec.
334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. (U.
S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra;
U.S. vs.Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to
safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 104

denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual
marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can render
valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate
marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4 Conn, 209; Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N.
C., 273.)
Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a
partition of the property in accordance with this decision, and for further proceedings in
accordance with law. Without special findings as to costs in this instance, it is so
ordered.

The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution
which will mot effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which
will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in
holding that the marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in
conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void, would be far
reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least one hundred
fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local custom. We then have it
within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of
the children born of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim
immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled governmental
policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.

In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court in
the cases of United States vs. Tubban ([1915]), 29 Phil., 434) and United
States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33 Phil., 285). We do not, however, believe these decisions to
be controlling. In the first place, these were criminal actions and two Justice dissented..
In the second place, in the Tubban case, the marriage in question was a tribal marriage
of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the marriage had been performed during the
Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil. In neither case, in deciding as to
whether or not the accused should be given the benefit of the so-called unwritten law,
was any consideration given to the provisions of section IX of General Order No. 68. We
are free to admit that, if necessary, we would unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine
announced in the two cases above mentioned.

We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the

Mohammedan marriage. We regard the provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as
validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.

There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is
unnecessary to decide. In resume, we find the Chinese marriage not to be proved and
that the Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child, and we find
the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow and
the legitimate children of this union the rights accruing to them under the law.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1211             January 30, 1947
CHING HUAT, petitioner,  his minor daughter Maria Ching alias  Avelina Ching.
vs.
CO HEONG (alias CO HONG, CO YONG), respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Marcelino N. Sayo for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing any lawful officer to
take from respondent and produce before this Court the person of Maria Ching alias
Avelina Ching, allegedly aged 15 years, and requiring the respondent to justify his right
to the custody of said minor, and, after hearing, to award said custody to petitioner.
It is alleged in the petition, verified by petitioner's oath, among other things, that the said
minor is his legitimate daughter; that up to June 21, 1946, said minor had been living
with and had under the custody of petitioner; that respondent, taking advantage of his
confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her godfather, persuaded and
induced her by means of trick, promises and cajolery, to leave the parental home and to
elope with him in the night of June 21, 1946, to Plaridel, Bulacan, where they were
married on the following day before the Justice of the Peace of said municipality, said
Maria Ching being at the time 15 years old; and that ever since respondent has had the
minor Maria Ching under his custody in Malolos, Bulacan, and has restrained her at her
liberty.
It is further alleged that respondent had been previously married in China to Gue Min,
said marriage being said to be subsisting at the time respondent married Maria Ching.
Petitioner further avers that Gue Min has never been declared an absentee nor
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by respondent at the time he
married Maria Ching.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 105
Respondent, in his answer, among other things, asserts that on June 21, 1946, he and
Maria Ching alias Avelina Ching were legally married before the Justice of the Peace of
Plaridel, Bulacan. He has attached to his answer a certificate (Appendix 1) of the Local
Civil Registrar of Plaridel, Bulacan, dated July 9, 1946, attesting the celebration of the
marriage above mentioned between the parties above named on June 21, 1946, and
alleges that the essential requisites for such were marriage complied with.
The question to be decided is whether petitioner still retains his right to the custody of
The fact of the civil marriage between respondent and Maria Ching having been
solemnized by the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, on June 21, 1946, is not
disputed. Petitioner himself alleges in his petition that respondent is of legal age,
meaning 21 years or more old upon the date of the petition, November 28, 1946. June
21, 1946, date of the marriage, was only 5 months and one week earlier. Both man and
woman were, therefore, of marriageable age under section 2 of Act No. 3613.
The alleged marriage of respondent to Gue Min in China has not been proven. There is
no allegation in the petition, much less is there evidence, to show that the said supposed
marriage was performed in accordance with the laws were of China inforce at the time of
its supposed performance, nor even what those laws were (Act No. 3613, section 19).
The cited section of the existing Marriage Law provides:
SEC. 19. Marriages performed abroad. — All marriages performed outside of
the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in these
Islands.
This provision is substantially the same as that contained upon the same subject in the
former Philippine Marriage Law, General Orders No. 68, which is as follows:
SEC. IV. All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid
by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these
Islands.
In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43, 49), this Court held, after
quoting the aforesaid provision of the former Marriage Law:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 106

. . . To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is
first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In the same case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court said (p. 50):
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China
in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the
Encarnacion case (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil., 137; 228 U.S., 335),
there is lacking proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. . . .
Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21, 1946, she became emancipated
on that same date (arts. 314 [1] and 315, Civil Code). This emancipation brought about
the loss by the father of the parental authority that he claims. On the other hand, by
article 48 of Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage Law of 1870, whose articles 44 to 78
were, and are now partly, in force in the Philippines (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil.,
34), the wife has the duty, among others, of living in her husband's company and of
following him to wherever he transfer his domicile or residence. (Yañez de Barbuevo vs.
Fuster, 29 Phil., 606, 612.)
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion that the petition should be, as it is
hereby, dismissed, with costs to petitioner. So ordered.

Again in that case the United States Supreme Court (228 U.S., 335, 338-339) held:

In these circumstances every presumption was in favor of the validity and good
faith of the Philippine marriage, and sound reason required that it be not
impugned and discredited through the alleged prior marriage save upon proof
so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the
existence of that impediment. . . .

On the other hand, the Philippine marriage between said respondent and Maria Ching
before the Justice of the Peace of Plaridel, Bulacan, is undisputed. It is also beyond
question that marriage was contracted by a man much over 16 years old with a girl 15
years old (Act No. 3613, section 2), neither of whom was included in any of the
exceptions mentioned in section 28 of the same Act; nor in those stated in section 29
thereof for the reason that the alleged prior Chinese marriage has not been established.

If the supposed prior Chinese marriage had been sufficiently proven, then in order that
the subsequent Philippine marriage could be valid, it would have been necessary either
(a) that the Chinese marriage should have been previously annulled or dissolved: or (b)
that the first wife of respondent should have been absent for 7 consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the respondent having news of the absentee being
alive; or (c) that the absentee should have been generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by respondent at the time of contracting the subsequent marriage, in
either of which last two cases the subsequent marriage will be valid until declared null
and void by a competent court, while in the first it will be valid without this limitation. (Act
No. 3613, section 29 [a] and [b]; section 30 [b].) But as already adverted to, the
complete absence of proof of the supposed former Chinese marriage makes sections 29
and 30 of the Marriage Law inapplicable.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 107

Republic of the Philippines consent of the bride's father or. in the absence thereof, that of the chief of the tribe to
SUPREME COURT which she belongs in an indipensable requisite for the validity of such contracts. If the
Manila absence of this requisite did not make the marriage contract between Mohammedans
void, it was easy for the prosecution to show it by refuting Iman Tahari's testimony
EN BANC inasmuch as for lack of one there were two other Imans among the State witnesses in
this case. It failed to do so, however, and from such failure we infer that the Iman's
G.R. No. L-42581             October 2, 1935 testimony for the defense is in accordance with truth. It is contended that, granting the
absolute necessity of the requisite in question, tacit compliance therewith may be
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,  presumed because it does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his opposition to
vs. this alleged marriage after he had been informed of its celebration. But this presumption
MORA DUMPO, defendant-appellant. should not be established over the categorical affirmation of Moro Jalmani, Dumpo's
father, that he did not give his consent to his daughter's alleged second marriage for the
reason that he was not informed thereof and that, at all events, he would not have given
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellant.
it, knowing that Dumpo's first marriage was not dissolved.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to first been contracted by the
accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, cannot be
RECTO, J.: considered as such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the
information.
Moro Hassan and Mora Dupo have been legally married according to the rites and
practice of the Mohammedan religion. Without this marriage being dissolved, it is alleged Wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, the accused is acquitted of the charges
that Dumpo contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived and if she should be in detention her immediate release is ordered, with the costs of
together as husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime of both instances  de oficio. So ordered.
bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty with a maximum of eight years, and one day of prision mayor and minimum of
two years, four months and twenty one days of  prision correccional, with costs. From
this judgment the accused interposed an appeal. The records of the case disclose that it
has been established by the defense, without the prosecution having presented any
objection nor evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage of the accused
is null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the ground that her father had not
given his consent thereto.

We formulate no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the validity of
a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact of which no
judicial notice may be taken and must be subject to proof in every particular case. In the
case at bar we have the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari, an Iman or Mohammedan
priest authorized to solemnize marriages between Mohammedans, to the effect that the

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21017             February 25, 1924
In re estate of JOSE YAP SIONG, deceased.  Exhibit A was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and
MARIA LAO and JOSE LAO, petitioners-appellees,  practice in China with reference to marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she
vs.
DEE TIM, YAP KIM TING, YAP KIM SENG, and YAP HU CHO, respondents-
appellants.
Salvador Barrios and Gabino S. Abaya for appellants.
Felix B. Bautista and Jose Gutierrez David for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 5th day of September, 1922, Yap Siong died in the
municipality of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, leaving a
considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An administrator was
appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and
distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each
claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner
Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to
him in holy wedlock on the 24th day of June, 1903, in the Philippine Islands (Exhibit 1)
and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore
entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.
Upon the other hand Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she
and Yap Siong were joined in the holy wedlock on the 14th day of September, 1893, in
accordance with the laws of China (Exhibits A and A-1), and that the said Yap Kim Ting,
Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.
In support of the contention of the petitioners, Maria Lao and her son Jose Lao, a great
deal of proof was presented. Exhibits 1 and 1-A, certificates of marriage, were presented
to show that she had been legally married to Yap Siong. A number of other documents
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 108
(Exhibits 9 to 13) were presented to show that Yap Siong had admitted that he was a
married man. Exhibits 14 to 17 were presented for the purpose of proving that Yap
Siong had admitted in a public document that Maria Lao was his wife.
The respondent Dee Tim presented a great deal of proof to show that she was the
legitimate wife of Yap Siong, lawfully joined to him in holy wedlock in China on the 14th
day of September, 1893. To support that contention she presented what she contended
was a certificate of marriage, marked Exhibit A — Exhibit A-1. She contended that
presented a number of witnesses. Jan Peng, a Chinaman of 52 years of age, swore that
he knew the forms of ceremonies of marriage in China, and that Exhibit A was the
ordinary and customary document issued to prove that the ceremony of marriage had
taken place. He described in detail the ceremony of marriage performed in accordance
with the customs and practice in China.
Dee Tim also presented a witness, Ty Cong Ting, a Chinaman, 32 years of age and a
lawyer, who testified concerning the laws and customs in China with reference to the
forms of marriage ceremony. He testified that he knew and was well acquainted with the
customs and practices of Chinamen in China with reference to marriages and the
manner and form in which they were celebrated, and the form of proof issued for the
purpose of proving that a marriage ceremony had been performed. He further testified
that Exhibit A was the usual proof or certificate issued for the purpose of proving that a
marriage ceremony had taken place. He further testified that Exhibit A was the usual and
ordinary proof, or certificate, if it may be called a certificate, issued to show that a
marriage ceremony had been performed between the persons mentioned therein. Mr. Ty
Cong Ting was, at the time he declared as a witness, the legal attorney of the Chinese
Consul General in the City of Manila.
The respondent Dee Tim presented several witnesses who confirmed her contention
that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong and that her three children Yap Kim Ting,
Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children, born of her marriage with
Yap Siong. To further sustain her contention she presented Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, G, H,
I, and J, documents in which Yap Siong had expressly recognized his marriage to her.
To overcome the proof adduced by Dee Tim in support of her marriage to Yap Siong,
the petitioner presented Exhibits 2,3,4,5,6,7, and 8. Said exhibits are alleged letters
supposed to have been written by an uncle in China of Yap Siong during the years 1900
to 1906, urging him to return to China for the purpose of marrying, thus attempting to

establish the fact that Yap Siong during that period was not a married man. When we
first studied the record in this case we were inclined to give said letters great credit, but
upon a further examination of the record and a further argument by the respective
parties, we are now inclined to believe that said letters were fabricated for the very
purpose of defeating the contention of Dee Tim. They were not identified properly by
persons who had reason to know that they were genuine in character and were actually
prepared in China and sent to Yap Siong in the Philippine Islands. We are of the opinion,
and we believe that was the real opinion of the trial court, that said exhibits should not
be admitted as proof to sustain the fact for which they were presented. We are now
persuaded that said letters are pure fabrications.
The petitioner further presents two or three witnesses for the purpose of showing that
the marriage between Dee Tim and Yap Siong never took place for the reason that Yap
Siong was in the Philippine Islands on the 14th day of September, 1893, and that at that
time he was living in the municipality of Bacolor, of the Province of Pampanga, and that
he never left that municipality. A careful reading of their testimony, however, does not
convince us that it is altogether reliable. The testimony which they gave was given in the
month of January, 1923, and they testified positively as to exact dates, times, and places
in the year 1897. Their testimony contains no facts, or data, or peculiar circumstances or
conditions which caused them to remember the particular facts concerning which they
testified. They gave no reason why they were able to remember the exact whereabouts
of Yap Siong during the period to which their testimony referred. Upon the contrary there
is much proof in the record that Yap Siong returned to China a number of times after his
first arrival here. The petitioner further presents some proof to show that Yap Siong had
admitted on several occasions that Dee Tim was his querida  and not his wife.
The respondents further attempted to show that Maria Lao and Jose Lao, her son, were
not the legitimate wife and son of Yap Siong, by presenting Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit L
is the baptismal certificate issued by the parish priest of the municipality of Angeles, in
which it is made to appear that on the 5th day of January, 1904, he baptized a child
named Jose Martin, a natural son of Maria Lao, and whose father was unknown. Exhibit
LL is a certificate of birth issued by the secretary of the municipality of Angeles, in which
it appears that Jose Martin Lao, a child, was born on the first day of January, 1904, a
natural son of Maria Lao. There is nothing, however, in Exhibits L or LL, which shows
that Maria Lao was responsible for the facts which they contain. Exhibit LL contains the
statement that the facts therein were not obtained from Maria Lao but from one Isabelo
Lao.
There is a notable conflict between Exhibits L and LL. Exhibit LL certifies that Jose
Martin Lao was born on the first day of January, 1904, while Exhibit L certifies that the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 109
baptism took place on the 5th day of January, 1904, and that the child was then 34 days
old. It is apparent therefore that the facts stated in one or the other of said exhibits are
untrue. And, moreover, when we consider the customs of the Filipino people in their
relation with the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, it is easily understood, in view
of the alleged fact that Maria Lao and Yap Siong had been joined in holy matrimony
under the forms of the Protestant Church, why the parish priest of the municipality of
Angeles stated in his certificate that the father of the child, then Jose Martin, was
unknown.
The respondents further attempted to show that Yap Siong and Maria Lao had never
been joined legally in holy wedlock, by the testimony of a number of witnesses to the
fact that Yap Siong had on numerous occassions asserted that Maria Lao was
his querida only. It is perhaps true that Yap Siong did on various occasions, depending
upon his interest and convenience at the particular time, state that Maria Lao was
his querida and not his wife. It is also perhaps true, for the same reason, that he stated
that Dee Tim was not his wife but his querida. Evidently he was attempting to keep the
information, that he was quite able to do, until he had passed to that bourn from which
none returns, and until a distribution of his large accumulated earnings among his heirs
became necessary.
From all of the foregoing conflicting facts, and considering all of the facts of the record,
we are forced to the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence shows the
following:
(1) That Dee Tim and Yap Siong were legally married in China in accordance
with the laws and customs in China on the 14th day of September, 1893; that
Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were the legitimate children
born of that wedlock; that Dee Tim and her said children were ignorant of the
fact that Yap Siong had legally married Maria Lao, and that Jose Lao was born
of that wedlock; and that they had no reason to believe, until after the death of
Yap Siong, that he was legally married to the petitioner herein.
(2) That Maria Lao was legally married to Yap Siong on the 24th day of June,
1903, in good faith believing that Yap Siong was not then a married man,
without any knowledge or information or suspicion to the contrary; and that Jose
Lao is the legitimate child born of that marriage of Yap Siong and Maria Lao.
In other words, we are fully convinced that a preponderance of the evidence shows that
both Dee Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong in good faith, believing
that each was his sole and separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of the fact of his
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 110

double marriage. They were each married in good faith and in ignorance of the judgment of the lower court be revoked and that the estate of Yap Siong be divided
existence of the other marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems to have equally, one-half going to Maria Lao and her son, Jose Lao, and the other one-half to
been successful in keeping each of his two wives ignorant of the fact that he was Dee Tim and her three children. And without any finding as to costs, it so ordered.
married to the other.

Under the foregoing facts, how must the property of Yap Siong be divided between the
two families? Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title 13,  partida  4), where two women
innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their
children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to
one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of
the Leyes de Partidas  is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who
innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The
good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved.
(Article 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65
U.S., 553.)

A woman who is deceived by a man who represents himself as single and who marries
him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish Law, are
entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing none
of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the
continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice upon the innocent parties
to the second marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second marriage. To
remedy that hardship under the common law and following the wise jurisprudence of
Spain, both England and many of the states of the United States adopted statutes.
(Glass vs. Glass, 114 Mass., 563; Spicer vs. Spicer, 16 Abbot's Practice [N. S.], 114;
Dyer vs. Brannock, 66 Mo., 391; Graham vs. Bennet, 2 Cal., 503; Smith vs. Smith, 1
Tex., 621 [46 Am. Dec., 121]; Clendenning vs.Clendenning, 7 Martin [La.], 587;
Patton vs. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans, 1 La. Ann., 98; Abston vs.Abston, 15
La. Ann., 137; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553; Ex parte Myra Clarke Whitney, 38
U.S., 404; Estate of Navarro, 24 La. Ann., 298; In re Taylor, 39 La. Ann., 823.)

The foregoing conclusions in no way conflict with the decision of this court in the case of
Sy Joc Lieng vs.Encarnacion (16 Phil., 137) nor with the decision of Adong vs. Cheong
Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43), for the reason that in each of said cases a preponderance of
the evidence showed that no legal marriage had been performed in China, that is, that
the alleged Chines wife and the deceased in each of those cases had never been legally
married.

Therefore the conclusion reached in the decision heretofore announced by this court in
the present case is hereby set aside and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,  children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case
No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In
said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased
with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d)
they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate
of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen
who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January
19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased
with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 111
willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on
Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others
that:
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27;
Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate
68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
are the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp.
105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as
follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with
whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun
Yen, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with
his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of
the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been
proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of
China (sic);

(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7,
1976 in favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit
"G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and
accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the
deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as
judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp.
11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however
denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled
"Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of
Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning
paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The
Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for
reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to
give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT
HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-
BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY
KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese
law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the
following testimonial and documentary evidence.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 112
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931
in Fookien, China; that she does not have a marriage certificate
because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the
betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the
one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of
her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat would be
married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that
the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with
Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah
who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on
November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living
in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several
occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a
written document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride
and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China,
the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who
is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-
be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be
their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that
on engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring some pieces
of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after
that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in her case, the
wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the
wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride
would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would give
the dowry for her daughter and then the document would be signed by
the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the
Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is signed only
by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride;
that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride
would then be placed in a carriage where she would be brought to the
town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride would be
covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the
bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her
wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were
many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the
carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the carriage and brought

her inside the house of Sy Mat; that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the
eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that as
to the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for
46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if
that document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession
of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts
of that document because of the lapse of many years and because
they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites;
that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as
husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat
went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year
they were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then
came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and
lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with
Sy Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI
decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he
was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and
that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by
the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp.  
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court
to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and,
(b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to
Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3,
1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give
name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage—1931"; and "Place of
marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968
where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married,
state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at
the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 113
Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China"
[Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage  between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance
with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition
for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta
and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil.
Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court
had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by
a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not
one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.)  ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten  foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled
therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign
country, as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions
of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted
in such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section
25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of
a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal,
61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law
and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent
to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound
to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this
Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia  [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually
exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 114
be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the
Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was
left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage  in accordance
with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial
notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have
not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc
Lieng  marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the
Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not
concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of
a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil
Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo,
p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are
entered: "Children if any: give number of children—Four"; and, "Name
—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five
children with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook

Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-
11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation
to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's
application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that
she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has
three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she
knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children
but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it
appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are
acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook
Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters
of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years
without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment,
evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and
approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only
acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for
their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband
and wife and that out of such relationship, which they have likewise
decided to definitely and finally terminate effective immediately, they
begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel
Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955;
Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo
Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 115
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS
SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that—
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and
equipments ..., shall be divided into two equal shares
between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion
Gillego who shall transfer the same to their children,
namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and
Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be
retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his obligation
to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One
Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the
rental of the two doors of the same building now
occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the 
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the
real estates and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of
Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and covenant that the
said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to
their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo
Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime  ...
[Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a
child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao
Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled
"An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of
Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the
court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of
adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal
separation of spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven,
chapters one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324]
reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were
abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts
[See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407,
August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the
issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act
No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 116
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an
incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be
determined in the main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72
SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No.
4834 **** a case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be
ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See
Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976).  But that legal
provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding is
pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the
same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63]
but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no
reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling
on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
1
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision  dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American
wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 117
with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that
the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse,
as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 118
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens,
but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained
a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of  Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 119
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have
it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 120

Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is

capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11622             January 28, 1961
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,  Australia & China
vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-11668             January 28, 1961.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, petitioner,  Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to secure the waiver
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and the COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the
deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson
(born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of
Manila on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British subject) died
on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife
moved and established their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will
executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated in the
Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as
his sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by the spouses
while residing in the Philippines, described and preliminary assessed as follows:
Gross Estate
Real Property — 2 parcels of land in Baguio,
covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379 P43,500.00
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 121
Personal Property
(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at
P10.00 each 1,770.00
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per share 79,800.00
(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc. 4,870.88
(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India,
          851.97
            Total Gross Assets P130,792.85
On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time
Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was
appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary
estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared
therein finally appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson.
of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose
in the United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted
the valuation of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of
the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the
amount of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions claimed by
the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for
judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed
the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a
total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6,
1952.
On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and
inheritance tax return in pursuance f his reservation made at the time of filing of the
preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally declared, to
P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation of P79,800.00 to P42,000.00. This change in
price per share of stock was based by the ancillary administrator on the market notation
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 122

of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco California) Stock Exchange six months from
the death of Stevenson, that is, As of August 22, 1931. In addition, the ancillary
administrator made claim for the following deductions:
Funeral expenses ($1,04326) P2,086.52
claim. For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said
amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax
Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

Judicial Expenses:
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half (½) share of the
(a) Administrator's Fee P1,204.34 surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the
(b) Attorney's Fee 6.000.00 obligations properly chargeable to such property should be deducted from the
(c) Judicial and Administration expenses net estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of
as of August 9, 1952 1,400.05 the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal property
8,604.39 belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax,
pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio real
in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not
properties (O.R. No. B-1 686836) 652.50
entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c)
Claims against the estate: for purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the
($5,000.00) P10,000.00 P10,000.00 spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the
Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22, Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and
1951 22.47   10,022.47 (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses
Sub-Total P21,365.88 and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.

In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her
rights and interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher,
respondents herein.
On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and
inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same assets of the estate
stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952, except that it contained new
claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of
P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the
U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was
allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. 71 entitled
"Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from the imposition of
estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for
the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a
consequence, it had overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of P15,259.83,
allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector denied the
From this decision, both parties appealed.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned four errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, while the assignees, Douglas and Bettina Fisher
hereinafter called respondents, made six assignments of error. Together, the assigned
errors raise the following main issues for resolution by this Court:
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half (½) of
the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in
accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) of the
National Internal revenue Code;
(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code granting exemption from the
payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines Inc.;

(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by
Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City and
the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly
appraised by the lower court;
(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for
judicial and administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for real
estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47 representing the amount of indebtedness allegedly
incurred by the decedent during his lifetime; and
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it
claims to have overpaid the government and to be refundable to it.
In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil law
that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed
to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties acquired during
their marriage. The application of this doctrine to the instant case is being disputed,
however, by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to
Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses Stevensons ought
not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by the national law of the decedent
husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged by petitioner that English laws do
not recognize legal partnership between spouses, and that what obtains in that
jurisdiction is another regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired during
the marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his
stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect
that in testate and intestate proceedings, the amount of successional rights, among
others, is to be determined by the national law of the decedent.
In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the
Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code
and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became effective only in 1950. It is true
that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory of determining the property
relation of spouses where one of them is a foreigner and they have made no prior
agreement as to the administration disposition, and ownership of their conjugal
properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in
determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a difference
between the two articles in that Article 124 1 of the new Civil Code expressly provides
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 123
that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the
Philippines or abroad while Article 1325 2 of the old Civil Code is limited to marriages
contracted in a foreign land.
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are
foreigners who married in the Philippines. Manresa, 3 in his Commentaries, has this to
say on this point:
La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas
en Espana y entre espanoles. El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero
cuando alguno de los conyuges es espanol. En cuanto a la regla procedente
cuando dos extranjeros se casan en Espana, o dos espanoles en el extranjero
hay que atender en el primer caso a la legislacion de pais a que aquellos
pertenezean, y en el segundo, a las reglas generales consignadas en los
articulos 9 y 10 de nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis supplied.)
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation of the
Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the English law even if the marriage was
celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being foreigners. But, as correctly observed
by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband
full ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by
petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer, which is not sufficient, the record
is bereft of any evidence as to what English law says on the matter. In the absence of
proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual
presumption," in presuming that the law of England on this matter is the same as our
law.4
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10,
old Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which
incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it does not encompass or contemplate to
govern the question of property relation between spouses. Said article distinctly speaks
of amount of successional rights  and this term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers
to the extent or amount of property that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from the
estate available for distribution. It needs to be pointed out that the property relation of
spouses, as distinguished from their successional rights, is governed differently by the
specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title III,
Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly
deducted the half of the conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by the
deceased Stevenson.

On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the
respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the California Revenue and
Taxation Code, on the ground that: (1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and
Taxation Code has not been duly proven by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity
exemptions granted by section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code can only be
availed of by residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a state in the United
States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of
California in that while the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes
on intangible personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance
tax..
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein
respondents, testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is
familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the
lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible
personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the
California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's California Code, a
publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full
quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the
respondents.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. 5 Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved.6
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign
laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be
proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel
Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of
Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not
exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign
law." In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco,
California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the
same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on
the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by
respondents' witness.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 124
We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or death taxes,
between the State of California and the Philippines.F
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides:
... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title in
respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his
death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not
impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible
personal property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a
resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned
by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis
supplied).
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as
pertinent, reads:.
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal
property is exempt from the tax imposed by this part if the decedent at the time
of his death was a resident of a territory or another State of the United States or
of a foreign state or country which then imposed a legacy, succession, or death
tax in respect to intangible personal property of its own residents, but either:.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in
respect to intangible personal property of residents of this State, or
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal
property of a non-resident was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes
of every character if the Territory or other State of the United States or foreign
state or country in which the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in
respect to intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of
the United States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent." (Id.)
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be total, that is,
with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the
Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or death taxes of any and every character, in
the case of the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states collects or imposes and
does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, the

reciprocity does not work. This is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in
both laws.
In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with
properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both an estate
and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On
the other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on non-
residents not citizens of the United States, 7 but does not provide for any exemption on
the basis of reciprocity. Applying these laws in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did
in the instant case, we will have a situation where a Californian, who is non-resident in
the Philippines but has intangible personal properties here, will the subject to the
payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the payment of the inheritance tax. This
being the case, will a Filipino, non-resident of California, but with intangible personal
properties there, be entitled to the exemption clause of the California law, since the
Californian has not been exempted from every character of legacy, succession, or death
tax because he is, under our law, under obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other
hand, if we exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a
Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California because under the Federal
Law, which is equally enforceable in California he is bound to pay the same, there being
no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both instances, the Filipino citizen is
always at a disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature has intended such an
unfair situation to the detriment of our own government and people. We, therefore, find
and declare that the lower court erred in exempting the estate in question from payment
of the inheritance tax.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of  Collector of Internal Revenue vs.
Lara  (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the
estate of the deceased Hugo H. Miller from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by
the Collector of Internal Revenue. It will be noted, however, that the issue of reciprocity
between the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that of the State of California was
not there squarely raised, and the ruling therein cannot control the determination of the
case at bar. Be that as it may, we now declare that in view of the express provisions of
both the Philippine and California laws that the exemption would apply only if the law of
the other grants an exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every
character, there could not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of P4,000.00 based
on the U.S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is also being claimed by respondents, we
uphold and adhere to our ruling in the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00
allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 125
exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under the provision of Section
122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under the
Federal Law. .
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land situated in
Baguio City, it is contended that their assessed values, as appearing in the tax rolls 6
months after the death of Stevenson, ought to have been considered by petitioner as
their fair market value, pursuant to section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It
should be pointed out, however, that in accordance with said proviso the properties are
required to be appraised at their fair market value and the assessed value thereof shall
be considered as the fair market value only when evidence to the contrary has not been
shown. After all review of the record, we are satisfied that such evidence exists to justify
the valuation made by petitioner which was sustained by the tax court, for as the tax
court aptly observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued by the
administrator of the estate in the Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him
at P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of said properties. On the other
hand, defendant appraised the same at P52,200.00. It is of common
knowledge, and this Court can take judicial notice of it, that assessments for
real estate taxation purposes are very much lower than the true and fair market
value of the properties at a given time and place. In fact one year after
decedent's death or in 1952 the said properties were sold for a price of
P72,000.00 and there is no showing that special or extraordinary circumstances
caused the sudden increase from the price of P43,500.00, if we were to accept
this value as a fair and reasonable one as of 1951. Even more, the counsel for
plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he was willing to purchase the said
properties at P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts we believe and
therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the real estate in Baguio
made by defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in the premises." (Decision,
p. 19).
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc., (a domestic corporation), respondents contend that their value should be
fixed on the basis of the market quotation obtaining at the San Francisco (California)
Stock Exchange, on the theory that the certificates of stocks were then held in that place
and registered with the said stock exchange. We cannot agree with respondents'
argument. The situs of the shares of stock, for purposes of taxation, being located here
in the Philippines, as respondents themselves concede and considering that they are
sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our government's

taxing authority, their fair market value should be taxed on the basis of the price
prevailing in our country.
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that the said shares
of stock commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after the
death of Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents have shown that at that
time a share of said stock was bid for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the
testimony of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never been questioned nor refuted by
petitioner either before this court or in the court below. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we are, therefore, constrained to reverse the Tax Court on this point and to
hold that the value of a share in the said mining company on August 22, 1951 in the
Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by respondents..
It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share of stock of
P.38 on the basis of the declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return.
Patently, this should not have been the case, in view of the fact that the ancillary
administrator had reserved and availed of his legal right to have the properties of the
estate declared at their fair market value as of six months from the time the decedent
died..
On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the allowance or
disallowance of which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and respondents have
appealed..
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to support the
allowance of the sum of P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.
1) Administrator's fee P1,204.34
2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00
3) Judicial and Administrative expenses   2,052.55
            Total Deductions P8,604.39
An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items were
considered deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of their approval by the probate
court to which said expenses, we may presume, had also been presented for
consideration. It is to be supposed that the probate court would not have approved said
items were they not supported by evidence presented by the estate. In allowing the
items in question, the Tax Court had before it the pertinent order of the probate court
which was submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2", p. 100, record). As the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 126
Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the probate court, as
it must have been satisfied that those expenses were actually incurred. Under the
circumstances, we see no ground to reverse this finding of fact which, under Republic
Act of California National Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter
G. Stevenson obtained we are not inclined to pass upon the claim of respondents in
respect to the additional amount of P86.52 for funeral expenses which was disapproved
by the court a quo for lack of evidence.
In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of realty taxes paid
in 1951 on the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City, which respondents claim
was disallowed by the Tax Court, we find that this claim has in fact been allowed. What
happened here, which a careful review of the record will reveal, was that the Tax Court,
in itemizing the liabilities of the estate, viz:
1) Administrator's fee P1,204.34
2) Attorney's fee 6,000.00
3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9,
1952   2,052.55
            Total P9,256.89
added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05 for judicial
and administration expenses approved by the court, making a total of P2,052.55, exactly
the same figure which was arrived at by the Tax Court for judicial and administration
expenses. Hence, the difference between the total of P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax
Court as deductions, and the P8,604.39 as found by the probate court, which is
P652.50, the same amount allowed for realty taxes. An evident oversight has
involuntarily been made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses in the final
computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the lower court and there is no
reason why it should not be. .
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section 89(b) (1) in
relation to section 89(a) (1) (E) and section 89(d), National Internal Revenue Code, the
amount of P10,022.47 should have been allowed the estate as a deduction, because it
represented an indebtedness of the decedent incurred during his lifetime. In support
thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified claim, presented to the probate court in
California by the Bank of California National Association, which it would appear, that
while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained a loan of $5,000.00 secured by pledge on
140,000 of his shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4",
pp. 53-59, record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local

probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and
because it constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal property which
the Tax Court held to be exempt from inheritance tax.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the deduction.
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular
indebtedness of the decedent is necessary. This is so although the same, it is averred
has been already admitted and approved by the corresponding probate court in
California, situs of the principal or domiciliary administration. It is true that we have here
in the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this case, but, it has been held, the
distinction between domiciliary or principal administration and ancillary
administration serves only to distinguish one administration from the other, for the two
proceedings are separate and independent. 8 The reason for the ancillary administration
is that, a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore, have any effect beyond the
limits of the country in which it was granted. Hence, we have the requirement that before
a will duly probated outside of the Philippines can have effect here, it must first be
proved and allowed before our courts, in much the same manner as wills originally
presented for allowance therein.9 And the estate shall be administered under letters
testamentary, or letters of administration granted by the court, and disposed of
according to the will as probated, after payment of just debts and expenses of
administration.10 In other words, there is a regular administration under the control of the
court, where claims must be presented and approved, and expenses of administration
allowed before deductions from the estate can be authorized. Otherwise, we would have
the actuations of our own probate court, in the settlement and distribution of the estate
situated here, subject to the proceedings before the foreign court over which our courts
have no control. We do not believe such a procedure is countenanced or contemplated
in the Rules of Court.
Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction, springs from
the provisions of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of the National Internal Revenue
Code which reads:
(d) Miscellaneous provisions — (1) No deductions shall be allowed in the case
of a non-resident not a citizen of the Philippines unless the executor,
administrator or anyone of the heirs, as the case may be, includes in the return
required to be filed under section ninety-three the value at the time of his death
of that part of the gross estate of the non-resident not situated in the
Philippines."
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 127
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-resident Stevenson
not situated in the Philippines appears in the three returns submitted to the court or to
the office of the petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement
is to enable the revenue officer to determine how much of the indebtedness may be
allowed to be deducted, pursuant to (b), number (1) of the same section 89 of the
Internal Revenue Code which provides:
(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. — In the case of a non-resident
not a citizen of the Philippines, by deducting from the value of that part of his
gross estate which at the time of his death is situated in the Philippines —
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. — That proportion of the
deductions specified in paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of this section 11 which the
value of such part bears the value of his entire gross estate wherever situated;"
In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the
indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines
bears to the total estate wherever situated. Stated differently, if the properties in the
Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets wherever situated, then only 1/5 of the
indebtedness may be deducted. But since, as heretofore adverted to, there is no
statement of the value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no part of the
indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89, letter (d), number
(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court disallowing the
deduction of the alleged indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.
In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:
(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal
partnership property constitutes his hereditary estate subject to the estate and
inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance tax, there
existing no complete total reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, nor is the decedent's estate entitled to an exemption of
P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax;
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 128

(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325
per share; and

(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the determination
of the net asset of the deceased Stevenson.

In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any actually results
after a recomputation on the basis of this decision is hereby denied in line with our
recent decision in  Collector of Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's Hospital  (G.R. No. L-
12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that, "in the absence of a statutory provision
clearly or expressly directing or authorizing such payment, and none has been cited by
respondents, the National Government cannot be required to pay interest."

WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of the

lower court is hereby affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent herewith. No costs.
So ordered.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 142820            June 20, 2003
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, 
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion
allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial
court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order 1 dated September
30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of
Makati Regional Trial Court, 2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of
nullity of marriage, and (b) the order 3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for
reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing
Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property
settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg,
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan,
Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on
November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition 5 for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order 7 dated
May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied
the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 129
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The decree provides in part:
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled
through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral
proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil
Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
The parental custody for the children
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
is granted to the father.
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or
suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of
petitioner and private respondent.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion
to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer
that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children
and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed
by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant
case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen
D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the
Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the
fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of

July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family
Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting
aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent
portion of said order provides:
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14,
1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and
considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was
included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a
divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering
further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation
to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the
property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children,
the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to these
matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was
denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000. 12
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant
case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial
Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by
her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no
conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 130
Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her
order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July
14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is
completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16,
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the
action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or
claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order
dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may
set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as
may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages

have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the
evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under
this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than
all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to
it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if
severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a
case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14,
1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the
court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as
where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory 17 and when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant
it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case,
judgment has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact
that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997
has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental
custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby
endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 131
mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g.  on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. 23Before our courts can
give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction,
our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to
the contrary.24
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody
of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German
court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she
commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had
no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. 27 More importantly, the divorce judgment
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 132

was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that
when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably
dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the
trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is
in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded
the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning
property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself
has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August
26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and
respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they
incurred any debts during their marriage." 29 Herein petitioner did not contest this
averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and
the proof.30Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no
property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this
case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the
custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent.
Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of
property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We
hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as
to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children,
namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be
remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. L-6897, November 29, 1956 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES. CLARO M. RECTO,
CLAIMANT AND APPELLEE, VS. ESPERANZA P. DB HARDEN AND FRED M.
HARDEN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Esperanza P. de Harden and Fred M. Harden from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent part of which is of the following
tenor:  "2. That the aforesaid monthly payments shall be in addition to whatever amount may be
"The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of the contract,
Exhibit JJJ or 20, is 20% of PI ,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97. 
"Wherefore, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the Commissioner with
the above-stated modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to the
sum of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND TEN
PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS (P384.110.97), representing 20% of
Esperanza P. de Harden's share in the conjugal properties owned by her and her
husband, Fred M. Harden, as contingent fee stipulated in paragraph 3 of the Contract of
Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or 20, and the said Esperanza P. de Harden is hereby
ordered to pay the said amount above-stated."'
It appears that sometime in July, 1941, appellant, Mrs. Harden, and appellee, Claro M.
Recto, executed the following: 
"CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
KNOW ALL  MEN  BY THESE PRESENTS:  may be advanced by Attorney Claro M. Recto, to be reimbursed to him either from the
"That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of, age, married to Fred M. Harden, and
temporarily residing in the Philippines, with address; at 534 Sales Street, Manila, have
engaged the services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to appear and act as my,counsel in the
action which I will file against my husband, Fred M. Harden, for the purpose of securing
an increase in the amount of support being received by me from the conjugal
partnership of myself and said Fred tt. Harden, and for the purpose likewise of protecting
and preserving my rights in the properties of the said conjugal partnership, in
contemplation of the divorce suit which I intent to file against him in the competent Court
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 133
of California and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between us, this contract
of services to be under the following conditions: 
"1. That in lieu of retainer fee, which under the circumstances I am not in a position to
pay, I hereby agree to pay Attorney Claro M. Recto, such payment to be made monthly,
during the pendency of the litigation and until the termination of the same, twenty-five
(25%) per cent of the total increase in allowance or pension which may be awarded to
me by the court over and above the amount of P1,500.00 which I now receive monthly
from defendant Fred M. Harden out of the funds of the conjugal partnership; Provided,
that should the case be terminated or an amicable settlement thereof the arrived at by
the parties before the expiration of two years from the date of the filing of the complaint, I
shall continue to pay  the said twenty-five (25%) per cent up to the end of said period.
adjudged by the court against the defendant Fred M. Harden or against the conjugal
partnership by way of litis expenses, that is, attorney's fees chargeable as expenses of
litigation.
"3. That as full and complete satisfaction of the fees of Attorney Claro M. Recto in
connection with the case above referred to, and said case being for the purposes
aforestated, that is, to secure an increase in the amount of support I now receive as well
as to protect and preserve my rights and interest in the properties of the conjugal
partnership, in contemplation of divorce and of the liquidation of said partnership, I
hereby agree to pay said Attorney Claro M. Recto twenty (20%) per cent of the value of
the share and participation which I may receive in the funds and properties of the said
conjugal partnership of myself and defendant Fred M. Harden, as a result of the
liquidation thereof either by death, divorce, judicial separation, compromise or by any
means or method by virtue of which said partnership is or may be liquidated.
"4. All expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for my account, but the same
money which' I receive by way of support or from the funds of the conjugal partnership.
"5. It is hereby understood that this contract includes the services of Attorney Claro M.
Recto in connection with the securing of the liquidation of the properties, and assets of
the conjugal partnership of myself and Fred M. Harden, upon dissolution of said
partnership or for any other cause mentioned in Paragraph (3) hereof.
"In witness whereof, I have signed these presents in the City of Manila, Philippines
this_______day of July, 1941.

s/   Esperanza P. de Harden
  t/    ESPERANZA P.  DE  HARDEN
ACCEPTED:  account by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized Representative, who at present is Mr.
    s/   Claro M. Recto
    t/   CLARO M. RECTO"  occasion; that the present funds in the Philippine National Bank in the name of Plaza
In compliance therewith, on July 12, 1941, the appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden,
commenced Civil Case No. 59634 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Esperanza P. de Harden vs. Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides." In the complaint
therein filed, it was prayed, among other things: (a) that Mrs. Harden be given the
exclusive administration of the business and all properties of the conjugal partnership of
Mr. and Mrs. Harden; (b) that, in the event of denial of this prayer, the defendants be
ordered to inform her "of everything pertaining to the administration of said business and
properties", as well as to render accounts thereof and to permit her to examine the
books and records pertinent thereto; (c) that Mr. Harden be ordered to account to Mrs.
Harden, and to return to this jurisdiction, the sum of P449,015.44 allegedly withdrawn by
him from the Philippines or sent by him to Hongkong on April 1, 1941; ( d) that defendant
Salumbides be ordered to account for ail moneys, amounting to P285,000.00, belonging
to the business and assets of said conjugal partnership and deposited by him in a safety
box, either in his name, or in that of Antonio Wilson, from"January 23 to December 23,
1940; (e) that the transfer, in the name of Salumbides, of certain shares of stock,
allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership, be rescinded and said defendant
ordered to transfer said shares of stock in the name of Mrs. Harden or in that of Mr. and
Mrs. Harden, should Mr. Harden be allowed to continue as administrator of said
partnership; (f) that the transfer, made by Mr. Harden and/or by defendant Salumbides,
as his attorney-in-fact, of 36,000 shares of stock of the Angelo Mining Company, to
some residents of Hongkong, be rescinded and said shares returned to the assets of the
conjugal partnership and placed in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; (g) that the
monthly allowance of Mrs. Harden be increased from Pl,500 to P15,000; ( h) that,
pending final decision, Mr. Harden be ordered to increase the allowance or pension of
Mrs. Harden and their daughter Sarah Elizabeth to P10,000 a month; and (i) that a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the defendants from disposing of the
assets of the conjugal partnership in fraud of Mrs. Harden.
By an order dated July 12, 1941, the court authorized the issuance of said writ, upon the
filing of the corresponding bond. It appears that, pursuant to an agreement submitted by
both parties, and with a view to avoiding unnecessary embarrassment, restraint or
inconvenience in the financial operations of the business enterprises affected by said
writ of preliminary injunction, the same w$s amended by an order dated July 19, 1941, in
the sense that  and the pre-war and post-war remittances abroad of Fred M. Harden, from which has
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 134
"* * * without prejudicing in any way the rights of the parties in this case, a separate bank
account be established in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, of Manila,
and all transactions in connection with the aforesaid businesses passed through that
Salumbides, without the necessity of securing a particular order from this Court on each
Lunch and Fred M. Harden be utilized for the purpose of starting said special bank
account in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; chat all income from the
aforesaid businesses be deposited in this special bank account and no checks be drawn
upon the same, except to pay the necessary overhead and running expenses including
purchases of tobacco, merchandise, etc., required for the proper operation of said
businesses; that a new set of books be opened by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized
representative covering all business transactions passed through said special bank
account and the same be opened for inspection by the plaintiff's duly authorized
representative.
"The order of injunction of July 12, 1941, is modified only to the above extent, and in all
other respects is maintained."
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and placed under military
occupation. Then came the liberation, in the course of which the records of this case
were destroyed. On October 23, 1946, said records were reconstituted at the instance of
appellee herein. Thereafter, the proceedings were resumed and, in due course, the
Court of First Instance of Manila rendered, on or about October 31, 1949, a decision the
dispositive part of which we quote: 
"In view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds and so holds that
"(a) Fred M. Harden abandoned his domicile of origin in New Jersey and established a
domicile of choice in Manila, Philippines, since 1901;
"(b) The matrimonial domicile of Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden was
established in Manila, Philippines, from the date of their marriage on December 14,
1917;
"(c) Since they did not execute any antenuptial contract before their marriage, all the
properties, real or personal, acquired by either or both of them on and after December
14, 1917, up to the present, over and above the sum of P20,000.00 representing Fred
M. Harden's capital, are hereby declared conjugal properties;
"(d) The total amount of Pl,944,794.37 representing deposits in safety deposit boxes in
the name of Jose Salumbides, the selling price of the house in Los Angeles, California,
already been deducted the sum of P160,000.00 covering payments for deficiency

Federal income taxes and attorney's fees, both in the tax case and the present one, is
hereby declared chargeable to the share of defendant Harden and deductible from
whatever participation he may still have in the said conjugal partnership upon the
liquidation thereof, upon his failure to return and deposit them in the name of the Plaza
Lunch with the Manila branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China up to
the time this decision shall become final;
"(e) A conjugal lien be annotated in the original and owner's duplicate of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 24393, 62436- and 54911 of the Register of Deeds of Manila
and in Original Certificate of Title No. 2292 of Quezon Province, and on all the
certificates of shares belonging to. said conjugal partnership, as well as in the
corresponding books of the companies or corporations issuing them, whereby it will be
made to appear that any subsequent alienation or encumbrance of said properties by
Fred M. Harden alone or his representative without the consent of his wife will be
deemed fraudulent and subject to revocation or cancellation for being in fraud and
prejudicial to the right of Esperanza P. de Harden;
"(f) Within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred
M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden are hereby ordered to execute a document to
be approved by this court creating and express active trust upon the remaining cash
assets and income of the conjugal partnership in the Philippines, . whereby the
Philippine Trust Company, with offices in Manila,, will act as trustee, subject to the right
of Fred M. Harden to receive therefrom the sum of P2,500.00 a month by way of
allowance and an equal amount for the plaintiff as separate support and maintenance;
"(g) Within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred M. Harden
shall inform the plaintiff of all the properties and businesses of the conjugal partnership,
be they in the Philippines or abroad, and render a true and complete accounting of the
earnings and profits thereof;
"(h) The plaintiff is entitled to Litis expensae in the amount of P175,000.00 for services
rendered by her counsel up to the rendition of this judgment, which Fred M. Harden or
the herein receiver is ordered to pay within a period of fifteen (15) days after this
decision ha? become final; and
"(i) The writ of preliminary injunction of July 12, 1941, is hereby declared permanent and.
the order of receivership of. November 20, 1946, is hereby maintained, but said auxiliary
remedies will be automatically lifted upon the conclusion of the annotation of the
conjugal lien and the execution of the deed of trust above mentioned.. Without costs.   
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
The defendants appealed from said decision to this Court, where the case was docketed
as case No. L-3687. While the appeal was thus pending before us, herein appellee filed
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 135
a manifestation and a motion, both dated February 20, 1952. In said "manifestation",
appellee stated that Mrs. Harden had instructed him, by letter, to "discontinue all
proceedings relative to" said case, "vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein,
and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing between her
and Mr. Harden", in accordance with several intruments dated January 29, 1952, and
executed without the knowledge, advise and consent of said appellee, as counsel for
Mrs. Harden, whereby: (1) Mr. and Mrs. Harden had purportedly agreed to settle their
differences in consideration of the sum of P5,000 paid by Mr. Harden to Mrs. Harden,
and a monthly pension of $500 to be paid by him to her; (2) Mr. Harden had created a
trust fund of $20,000 from which said monthly pension of $500 would be taken; and (3)
Mr. and Mrs. Harden had mutually released and forever discharged each other from all
actions, debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to the conjugal partnership, in
consideration of the sum of $1. It was further asserted, in appellee's "manifestation", that
the purpose of the said instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to defeat the
claim of the former for attorney's fees, for which reason, he prayed, in his
aforementioned motion, that
"a) pending the resolution of this motion, ,the receiver appointed herein be authorized to
continue holding the properties above mentioned in his custody in order not to defeat the
undersigned's inchoate lien on them;
"b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned and those of the plaintiff
and the defendant Fred M. Harden, in order to determine the amount of fees due to the
undersigned, by the appointment of a referee or commissioner for the reception, of such
evidence;
"c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the sum of P400,000.00 as
his fees for services rendered in behalf of the plaintiff in this case, under paragraph 3 of
the contract, Annex 'A', and to that end a charging lien therefore be established upon the
properties above-mentioned;
"d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full amount of the fees to
which the latter is found to be entitled."
Counsel for the defendants-appellants, in turn, moved for the dismissal of the case, to
which appellee objected. Acting upon the issues raised in such motion for dismissal and
in appellee's motion to establish and enforce his charging lien, as counsel for Mrs.
Harden, this Court issued on July 22, 1952, a resolution the pertinent part of which
reads:
"It will.be seen from the above that the defendants-appellants pray for the complete
dismissal of the above entitled case without prejudice to the annotation of the contingent
claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto on the property under receivership, other than the

368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company which belong to Fred M. Harden. On the
other hand, Attorney Claro M. Recto agrees to the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment, and all other interlocutory orders
which were issued in the course of this case, with the exception of th« receivership, but
objects to the dismissal of the case on the ground that, since receivership is merely an
auxiliary remedy, the present case should be allowed to remain pending for the purpose
of maintaining the receivership to safeguard his right to collect the fees that may be due
him.
"Attorney Claro M. Recto prays that a commissioner or referee be immediately
appointed by this Court to receive evidence in support of his allegations as to his
attorney's lien and its enforcement. Counsel for the defendants-appellants does not
object to this proceeding provided that the restrictions set forth by him be observed.
However, this Court does not have the proper facilities for receiving evidence in order to
determine the amount of the fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, and it is deemed
advisable that this matter be determined by the Court of First Instance. This is specially
so considering the opposition to the claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto filed by Attorney J.
W. Ferrier, Sr. in behalf of Esperanza P. de Harden.
"In view of the foregoing, the above entitled case is 'hereby remanded to the court of
origin in order to determine the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto in his
motion dated February 20, 1952.
"It is understood that, after said fees had been finally determined and paid, this case will
be completely dismissed as prayed for by the defendants-appellants, without prejudice
to considering the claim of the receiver for compensation as stated in his urgent motion
dated July 2, 1952.
"Pending the determination of the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto,
the writ of preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment, and all
interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this case, are hereby lifted and
vacated, and with regard to the receivership, the same is hereby dissolved, only with
respect to the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company. As to the rest of the
properties, the receivership shall be maintained."
In compliance with said resolution, the records of this case were remanded to the lower
court, which, on September 2, 1952, designated a commissioner to receive evidence on
the amount of the fees collectible by herein appellee and to report thereon. After due
hearing, said commissioner submitted, on February 6, 1953, a report of about one
hundred (100) pages of the printed record on appeal, setting forth, in detail, the evidence
introduced by both parties, and his findings of fact, with the following conclusion and
recommendation:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 136
"Taking into consideration the value of the properties involved in this litigation, the length
of time in which claimant had handled the same for Esperanza Harden, the volume and
quality of the work performed, the complicated legal questions involved, the
responsibility assumed by the claimant as counsel, his reputation in the bar, the
difficulties encountered by him while handling the same in which he had to work hard
every inch of the way because of the stiff oppositions filed by adverse counsel, the
diligence he employed not only in the preservation of the records in his possession
during the days of enemy occupation but also in  the protection  of the interests of
Esperanza Harden, his successful handling of said case and those cases growing out of
it whieh reached the Supreme Court, and the extra services he rendered in her behalf in
the tax and other court cases, the undersigned Commissioner concludes that claimant is
entitled to the full amount of 20% of Esperanza Harden's share of the conjugal
properties, as provided in paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit
JJJ.
"WHEREFORE, the undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that Atty.
Claro M. Recto be paid the equivalent amount of 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden's
share of the conjugal properties or the sum of P369,410.04. as his contingent fee for
services rendered in her behalf."
After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a decision dated April 30, 
1953,  adopting substantially said report of the commissioner, but increasing the
contingent, fee of appellee herein from P369,410.04, the sum recommended in the
report, to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted contract of
services, which the appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground: (1) that Mrs.
Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husband's consent; (2) that
Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees; (3)
that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly
in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (4)
that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to
bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely
bound herself or assumed the personal obligation to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20
% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to
the appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The
amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has
already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are
impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics, (see, also,

Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the
United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
'"* * *  in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of
contracts for contingent fees, provided such contracts are not in contravention of public
policy, and it is only when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage
of his client that such a claim is condemned." (See 5 Am. Jur. 369 et seq.; Ballentine,
Law dictionary, 2nd ed.r p. 276.)
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that
appellee herein had, in any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his
client Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between
them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or
to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the
interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit
she intended to file in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs.
Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution
thereof are governed pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force
in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15
of the Civil Code of the Philippines by the laws of the United States, which sanction
divorce. In short, the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein appellee, is
not. contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who
seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil.,
195; 30 C. J. S. 475), and appellants have not done so, for the circumstances
surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements,
ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were made
for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein appellee, under his
above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a judgment
in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which
turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of
P175,000, it is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as
the benefits of all orders and judgments in her favor,
in consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr. Harden and the
additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a month.
In fact, no explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed settlement between
Mr. and Mrs. Harden. One can not even consider the possibility of a reconciliation
between the spouses, the same being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for
said alleged settlement. What is more, the records show that the relations between said
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 137
spouses which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden engaged the
services of the appellee, but, even before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were separated
since 1938 had worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence by an action for divorce
filed by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of
infidelity allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
Again, it appears that appellee had rendered, under the contract in question, the
following services, for the benefit of Mrs. Harden:
1. He succeeded in defeating defendants' motion for the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction, issued by the Court on July 12, 1941, and amended on
July 19, 1941.
2.  
3. On November 12, 1946, appellee moved for the appointment of a receiver,
upon the ground that, despite said writ of preliminary injunction, the defendants
had been disposing of the properties of the conjugal partnership for the purpose
of defrauding Mrs. Harden.   After due hearing, the court, by an order dated
November 20, 1946, directed the appointment of Abelardo Perez as receiver of
said properties, upon the filing of a P10,000 bond. Defendants asked, on
February 13, 1947, that the receivership be suspended, or else, that they be
allowed to file a bond for the discharge of the receivership.   Appellee replied
objecting thereto, unless the defendants posted a P4,000,000 bond.  
Subsequently or on March 5, 1947, the defendants sought a reconsideration of
the order of November 20, 1946, and the discharge of the receiver. By an order
dated March 21, 1947, the Court authorized said discharged upon the filing, by
the defendants, of a bond in the sum of P500,000, provided that Mr. Harden
"should bring back all the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., in his name
to the Philippines for deposit with the Clerk of Court, or with the Chartered Bank
of India, Australia and China,, at Manila * * *."
4.  
5. On motion of the appellee dated March 4, 1947, the Court, by an order dated
April 5,  1947,  directed  Mr. Harden to remit to Mrs. Harden the sum of $2,500,
to be charged against her Litis expensae.   Upon similar motion, filed by
appellee on or about April 26, 1947, the Court ordered Mr. Harden, on May 13,
1947, to furnish Mrs. Harden the sum of $5,000, under the same conditions.
6.  
7. On June 21,  1947, the defendants instituted Civil Case No. G. R. No. L-1499 of
this Court, entitled "Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides vs. Emilio Pefia,
Abelardo Perez and Esperanza P. Harden" for the purpose of annulling and
setting aside, by writ of certiorari, the aforementioned orders of the lower court
dated July 12, 1941, November 20, 1946, and April 5 and May 13, 1947, and to

restrain, in the meantime, the enforcement thereof.   After appropriate
proceedings, in the course of which appellee appeared as counsel for Mrs.
Harden, and like counsel for the petitioners therein, filed several lengthy,
detailed pleadings and memoranda, decision was rendered on November 21,
1950, denying the writ of certiorari prayed for.
8.  
9. On or about September 9, 1947, appellee filed a motion alleging that despite
the writ of preliminary injunction above mentioned, the defendants had,
fraudulently and  without judicial  consent,   remitted  abroad   several sums of
money aggregating Pl,000,608.66,  and praying that Mr. Harden be ordered to
return this sum to the Philippines, within a stated period, said sum to be
deposited with the account of the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. Mr. Harden objected to said
motion. Appellee filed a rejoinder, to which Mr. Harden replied. Appellee filed a
rejoinder to the rejoinder. On October 7, 1947, the Court granted appellee's
motion. Mr. Harden sought a reconsideration, which was opposed by the
appellee on October 27, 1947, and denied by an order dated November 13,
1947. Mr. Harden moved, on November 18, 1947, for the suspension of,this
order, which was immediately objected to by the appellee and then denied by
the Court.
10.  
11. Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been complied with,
appellee filed on November 27, 1947,  a motion praying that Mr. Harden be
declared in contempt of court and punished accordingly.   Meanwhile, or on
November 24, 1947, Mr. Harden had instituted case G. R. No. L-1816 of this
Court against Hon. Emilio Pefia, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and Mrs. Harden.   In the petition therein filed, Mr. Harden applied for a
writ of certiorari annulling said orders of Judge Pefia of October 7 and
November 13, 1947, and prayed that, pending disposition of the case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents   therein  from  represented the receiver in seeking war damage payments.
enforcing  said   orders,   particularly through contempt proceedings.   Hence,
the lower court deferred action on the aforementioned motion of November 27,
1947.   After due hearing, this Court, in a resoluiaon dated February 12, 1948,
refused to issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.   Subsequently, or
on November 21, 1950, decision was rendered denying the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
12.  
13. Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R. No. 1816, dated
February 12, 1948, or to be exact on March 27, 1948, the lower court issued an
order directing Mr. Harden to comply, within five  (5)   days from notice, with the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 138
order of October 7, 1947.   On April 6, 1948,  appellee filed with the lower court
the, corresponding formal charges against Mr. Harden for contempt of court.
After due hearing, Mr. Harden was, by an order of April 28, 1948, found guilty
as charged and ordered confined "until he complies with the aforementioned
orders" of October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948. On motion of Mr. Harden, said
order of April 28, 1948 was suspended until May 4, 1948, oil which date he was
arrested and placed in confinement'at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinglupa,
Rizal. On July 10, 1948, he filed with thisjCourt a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against the Director of Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349, entitled "Fred M.
Harden vs. The Director of Prisons"), which, in due course was denied in a
decision promulgated on October 22, 1948.
 
14. During the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese, the appellee
made representations with the Japanese Government to prevent the
commandeering of a business establishment belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
Moreover, he succeeded in persuading the Japanese to refrain from interning
Mrs. Harden and her daughter and to allow her to withdraw, from the former's
deposit in a local bank, from P200 to P250 a month, for their subsistence.    He,
likewise, lent her money to meet her needs and spent the sum of P55,000 in the
preservation of the records and papers pertaining to the business and other
properties of the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
15.  
16. Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in such capacity, took
all steps essential for the proper discharge of the duties of the former.   Among
other things, appellee sought and obtained judicial authority for some important
acts of administration of, and disposition by, the receiver.   He (appellee)
secured judicial intervention for the protection and preservation of the assets of
the conjugal partnership, including orders for the delivery of certificates of stock,
the return thereof and/or its deposit with the clerk of court.   He, likewise,
17.  
18. In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Francisco Dahipan vs. Fred M. Harden" for the recovery of P113,837.17, it was
decided, through appellee's intervention, that the conjugal assets would bear
the payment of P22,767.43 only, the balance to be chargeable exclusively
against Mr. Harden's share of the conjugal partnership.
19.  
20. Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled "Abelardo Perez vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and

Fred M. Harden", for the recovery of Pl,000,608.66 and the return of stock
certificates of the Balatoc Mining Co., which had been sent abroad.
21.  
22. He (appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a million-peso federal
tax case against Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
23.  
24. Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Harden's attempts to withdraw:  (1)  $53,000
and forward the same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles,
California; (2) $50,000.00, allegedly to defray expenses in resisting a new tax
assessment against him in the United States; and (3) P65,000 for his expenses.
Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive business interests and its
assets were worth almost P4,000,000. The pleadings, motions, oppositions, rejoinders,
and memoranda filed, and the evidence introduced, in the aforementioned cases in
which appellee was pitted against one of the most experienced and able members of the
Philippine Bar were numerous, extensive and exhaustive. For instance, the record on
appeal in one of those cases, namely, G. R. No. L-45687, consisted of 966 pages.
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the appellee, the nature
and importance of the issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time (1941 to 1952)
and trouble involved therein, the skill displayed in connection with said cases, the value
of the property affected by the controversy, the professional character and standing of
the appellee, the risks assumed and the results obtained, we are of the opinion, and so
hold, that the contract of services in question is neither harsh nor oppressive or
inequitable.
Under their second assignment of error, appellants maintain that:
"The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the evidence that the legal
services of Attorney Claro  M. Recto to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden, payment for
which is sought by him in this case, have already been paid by his immediate execution
pending appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. CFI-R-59634 (SC-G.R. No. L-3687),
wherein he collected the sum of P175,000.00 for all such legal services."
Said decision, however, states clearly that the afore-mentioned sum of P175,000
represents litis expensae, and the contract between the appellee and Mrs. Harden
explicitly declares that said litis expensae shall be "in addition to"appellee's share of
25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden and his attorney's fees of 20% of
her share in the conjugal partnership. The second assignment of error is, therefore,
devoid of merit.
Appellants, further contend, that:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 139
3.  The  lower  court  erred   in  holding  that  the   inchoate   share of the wife,
Esperanza P. de Harden, in the undissolved and unliquidated conjugal partnership
properties of the Harden spouses, is capable of certain valuation before such dissolution
and liquidation,   . and summarily assessing the value of Mrs. Harden's share in such
conjugal properties without proper evidence.
4.  "The  lower court erred  in  awarding  20%   of  such  inchoate share to Attorney
Claro  M.  Recto from  Mrs. Harden's interests in the Harden conjugal properties,
summarily assessing such 20% inchoate share as of a value of P384,110.97, and
ordering the payment of said sum to Attorney Recto in pursuance of the provisions of
paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services."
Appellants' arguments in support thereof may be summarized as follows: The contract of
services in question provides that appellee's contingent fees shall be 20% of the share
of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the share of Mrs. Harden
shall be determined upon the liquidation of said partnership, which has not taken place,
as yet. What is more, it cannot be effected until the dissolution of the marriage relation
between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as this relation subsists, it follows that the
amount of attorney's fees due to appellee herein should not have been determined in the
decision appealed from.
This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made,
principally, in contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she
intended to file before a competent court in California, "and of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership between" her and Mr. Harden. Had she filed said action for divorce
and secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership would have been dissolved
and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden therein would have been fixed.
However, this cannot take place, either now,, or in the foreseeable future, owing to the
aforementioned agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were made for the
evident purpose of defeating appellee's claim for attorney's fees. In other words, the
occurrence, within the time contemplated by the parties bearing in mind the nature of,
and the circumstances under which they entered into, said contract of services of the
event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was rendered impossible by Mrs.
Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a period, she
may.not insist upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the herein
appellee, for "the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment" (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and "the debtor shall lose every right to
make use of the period" when he "violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the
creditor agreed to the period."    (Art. 1198, Civil Code.)
It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for appellee's services,
consists of three (3) parts, namely: (a) 25% of the increase in the,allowance of Mrs.
Harden; (b) litis expensae; and (c) 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The first
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 140

part wag dealt with in the first paragraph of their contract of services. The second and
third parts were the object of the second and third paragraphs, respectively,
The first paragraph limited the rights of appellee thereunder to two (2) years, in the event
of termination of the case or amicable settlement thereof within two (2) years from the
filing of the complaint. No such limitation appears in the second and third paragraphs of
said contract. Hence, the same were intended by the parties to be fully operative under
any and all conditions.

It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved has been assessed,
not summarily, but after due notice and full dress hearing, in the course of which both
parties introduced testimonial and documentary evidence. Appellants presented Exhibits'
1 to 58, whereas those of the appellee were so numerous that, having begun with
Exhibit A, his last piece of documentary evidence was marked Exhibit 26 Y's. The
transcript of the hearing, which lasted ten (10) days, covers over 220 pages.

The other assignments of error made by appellants herein are mere corollaries of those
already disposed of, and, hence, no further discussion, thereof is necessary.

In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal partnership between Mr. and
Mrs. Harden are reasonably valued at £3,841,109.70; One-half (1/2) thereof,
representing the share of Mrs. Harden, is therefore, worth P1,920,554.85: Twenty per
centum (20%) of this sum is P384,110.97, which is the contingent fee due to the
appellee, apart from the litis expensae already paid to him. Inasmuch as the appellee
has collected, also, the sum of P80,000.00, on account of said contingent fees, there
results in his favor a balance of P304,110.97.

Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, therefore,
with costs against the appellants.   So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,  however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-
appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages
against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and
Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos,
Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a
previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple
were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-
between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the
governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 141
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get
married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her
clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting
place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not,
her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the
college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married
Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the
hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño
spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate
what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the
lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February
1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not
remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing
an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated
the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and
Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued
living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March
1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as
her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew
it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less
frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged
(Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from
the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a
petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not
sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her
non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating
in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was

domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application
was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of
the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and
absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul
their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought
papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada.
She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F.
Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and
one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for
moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and
plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño
liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña
Mena Escaño liable for damages;.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 142
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the
defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-
appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our
civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the
age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to
solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the
separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature
(which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects, 3 and this is emphasized by
section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be
declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal
requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them
believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was
actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage)
will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739,
745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at
bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage,
when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu.
Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was
valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was
under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy
with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that
contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue
influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and
the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never
done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of
Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and
Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21
October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of
Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad
vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted
absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title
IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree
of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared
public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil
Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 143
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees
would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not
permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have
appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be
nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally,
because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction
where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence
that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be
existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her
claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid
divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject,
particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute
divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our
statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became
effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute
divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act
2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42
Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could
not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for
husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of

Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of
adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in
Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's
marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar,
the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the
innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so
declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person
(whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises.
Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given
in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well
known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts
have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño
and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and
influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The
testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be
merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written
before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274).
In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for
the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery
and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta,
and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded.
Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such
unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the
previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 144
was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of
Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce
their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they
abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does
the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it
was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not
concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her
and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives,
which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is
proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes
between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child
and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However,
such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable
unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He
is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his
child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of
his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his
conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the
obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences
resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home
and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously
enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to
stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied
in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in
the case of advice given to a son.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 145

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and the other to recover damages;
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not
were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez
from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on
appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez
that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While
appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion
attorneys' fees.
that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's
fees.
Neither party to recover costs.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño
and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the
filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused
them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present
society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the
court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole
deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid
in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than
the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to
Philippine law;

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6768             July 31, 1954
SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER JR., plaintiffs-appellees,  answering the complaint — alleged in her answer that she received copy of the
vs.
ALFREDO JAVIER, defendant-appellant.
David F. Barrera for appellant.
Jose P. Santillan for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite ordering him to give
a monthly allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31, 1953, and to pay them
attorney's fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court
attributing five errors to the court below. This implies that the facts are not disputed.
The important facts which need to be considered in relation to the errors assigned
appear well narrated in the decision of the court below which, for purposes of this
appeal, are quoted hereunder:
On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier
had their marriage solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court
of Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named
Alfredo Javier, Junior who was born on December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938,
defendant Alfredo Javier left for the United States on board a ship of the United
States Navy, for it appears that he had joined the United States Navy since
1927, such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca, defendant
Alfredo Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy. Because
of defendant Alfredo Javier's departure for the United States in 1938, his wife,
Salud R. Arca, who is from (Maragondon), Cavite, chose to live with defendant's
parents at Naic, Cavite. But for certain incompatibility of character (frictions
having occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and defendant's folks) plaintiff
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 146
Salud R. Arca had found it necessary to leave defendant's parents' abode and
transfer her residence to (Maragondon), Cavite — her native place Since then
the relation between plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier
became strained such that on August 13, 1940 defendant Alfredo Javier
brought an action for divorce against Salud R. Arca before the Circuit Court of
Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, docketed as civil case No. 14313 of
that court and marked as Exhibit 2(c) in this case. Having received a copy of the
complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Arca —
complaint on September 23, 1940 although she was directed to file her answer
thereto on or before September 13, 1940. In that answer she filed, plaintiff
Salud R. Arca averred among other things that defendant Alfredo Javier was
not a resident of Mobile County, State of Alabama, for the period of twelve
months preceding the institution of the complaint, but that he was a resident of
Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Another averment of interest, which is essential to
relate here, is that under paragraph 5 of her answer to the complaint for divorce,
Salud R. Arca alleged that it was not true that the cause of their separation was
desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo Javier was in the United
States at that time and she was not with him then it was because he was in
active duty as an enlisted man of the United States Navy, as a consequence of
which he had to leave for the United States without her. She further alleged that
since his departure from the Philippines for the United States, he had always
supported her and her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through allotments made
by the Navy Department of the United States Government. She denied,
furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at Naic,
Cavite, and their separation was due to physical impossibility for they were
separated by about 10,000 miles from each other. At this juncture, under the old
Civil Code the wife is not bound to live with her husband if the latter has gone to
ultra-marine colonies. Plaintiff Salud R. Arca, in her answer to the complaint for
divorce by defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be
dismissed. However, notwithstanding Salud R. Arca's averments in her answer,
contesting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of
Alabama, to take cognizance of the divorce proceeding filed by defendant
Alfredo Javier, as shown by her answer marked Exhibit 2(d), nevertheless the
Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of the
marriage of Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier, and granting the latter a decree of
divorce dated April 9, 1941, a certified copy of which is marked Exhibit
2(f). Thereupon, the evidence discloses that some time in 1946 defendant
Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines but went back to the United States.

In July, 1941 — that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on
April 9, 1941 — defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American
citizen, and bought a house and lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949,
Thelma Francis, defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him for
reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the
United States Navy, defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines,
arriving here on February 13, 1950. After his arrival in the Philippines, armed
with two decrees of divorce — one against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the
other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis — issued by the Circuit
Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javier
married Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal
Court of Manila on April 19, 1950, marked Exhibit 2(b).
At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by
the City Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with
the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13310 and
marked Exhibit 2(a). However, defendant Alfredo Javier was acquitted of the
charge of Bigamy in a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
through Judge Alejandro J. Panlilio, dated August 10, 1951, predicated on the
proposition that the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier with Maria Odvina was
made in all good faith and in the honest belief that his marriage with plaintiff
Salud R. Arca had been legally dissolved by the decree of divorce obtained by
him from the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA which had
the legal effect of dissolving the marital ties between defendant Alfredo Javier
and plaintiff Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this court's opinion that
defendant Alfredo Javier's acquittal in that Criminal Case No. 13310 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila by Judge Panlilio was due to the fact that the
accused had no criminal intent in contracting a second or subsequent marriage
while his first marriage was still subsisting.
Appellant was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud R.
Arca, another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, Alfredo
Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy
and in 1938 sailed for the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his
service leaving behind his wife and child, and on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for
divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground
abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy of the complaint, Salud R. Arca filed
an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant was not a resident of Mobile
County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the cause of their
separation was abandonment on her part but that appellant was in the United States,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 147
without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit
Court of Mobile County rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on
April 9, 1941.
The issue now to be determined is: Does this decree have a valid effect in this
jurisdiction?
The issue is not new. This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of
similar nature in a number of cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity to
the decree. In essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the validity of
a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in
order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in
which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856). Most recent of such
cases is Sikat vs. Canson,  67 Phil., 207, which involves a case of divorce also based on
the ground of desertion. In that case, John Canson claimed not only that he had legal
residence in the State of Nevada, where the action was brought, but he was an
American citizen, although it was proven that his wife never accompanied him there but
has always remained in the Philippines, and so it has been held that "it is not ... the
citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal
residence within the State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Canson
acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship
papers, this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant divorce that would
be valid in this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status,
because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired
jurisdiction over her person."
It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile
County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action
cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only
purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that
time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her was
baseless and false. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the
purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases previously
decided on the matter, but precisely took good note of them. Among the cases invoked
are Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851,
and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67. In the cases just mentioned, this court
laid down the following doctrines:

It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may
resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to
determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not
entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See  Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R.
A., 143) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does
not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L.
ed., 366.)
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's
residence in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must
be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State
for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining,
his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the
State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized
by the laws of the State of his own domicile. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)" (Ramirez  vs.
Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)
But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had
acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in
his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the
spouses being the City of Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in
West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an
appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel, did not confer
jurisdiction upon said court over her person. (Cousins Hix vs.Fluemer, 55 Phil.,
851.)
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the
Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the
husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence
and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds
of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. (Barretto Gonzales vs.
Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)
In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County
Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at
the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not
have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County when he moved to that
place in 1938 because at that time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and
merely rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore leave for shift
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 148
duty. That he never intended to live there permanently is shown by the fact that after his
marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house
and a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S.
Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he
lived ever since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with
the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent
abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
It is claimed that the Canson case cannot be invoked as authority or precedent in the
present case for the reason that the Haddeck case which was cited by the court in the
course of the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Williams vs. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287. This claim is not quite correct, for the
Haddeck case was merely cited as authority for the statement that a divorce case is not
a proceeding in rem, and the reversal did not necessarily overrule the ruling laid down
therein that before a court may acquire jurisdiction over a divorce case, it is necessary
that plaintiff be domiciled in the State in which it is filed. (Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, supra.) At any rate, the applicability of the ruling in the Canson case may be
justified on another ground: The courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on the
ground of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband,
and if the decree is predicated on another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this
jurisdiction. Said the Court in the Canson case:
. . . In Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales (55 Phil., 67), we observed:
. . . While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the
validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have
been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not
overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now enforced in these Islands.
Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and
legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside
in a foreign country."
"And Article 11, the last part of which reads
". . . prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and
those intended to promote public order and good morals shall not be rendered
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 149

without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any already been passed upon in G. R. No. L-6706. 1 These questions were resolved against
agreements entered into a foreign country." the pretense of appellant.

"It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to

citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it
be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine
Islands would grant a divorce."

The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery
on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided
for under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was granted
on the ground of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. That
our divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too liberal is not for this court
decide. (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra). The allotment of powers
between the different governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within the
confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The legislative policy on the matter
of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has been
upheld by this court (Goitia  vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252; Garcia Valdez vs.
Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil., 943-952; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855;
Chereau vs. Fuentebella, 43 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. De Castro, 48 Phil., 123;
Gorayeb vs. Hashim, supra; Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil., 42; Alkuino Lim
Pang  vs. Uy Pian Ng Shun and Lim Tingco, 52 Phil., 571; Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer,  supra; and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra).

The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known principle of
Private International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law
affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State of
the  forum. (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 8-14). It is also in keeping with our concept or
moral values which has always looked upon marriage as an institution. And such
concept has actually crystallized in a more tangible manner when in the new Civil Code
our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate altogether our law relative to
divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely to any attempt to
extend here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our customs, morals,
and traditions. (Article 11, old Civil Code; Articles 15 and 17, new Civil Code;
Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)

With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the crime of
bigamy and consequently she forfeited her right to support, and that her child Alfredo
Javier, Jr. is not also entitled to support because he has already reached his age of
majority, we do not need to consider it here, it appearing that these questions have

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20530             June 29, 1967
MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY COMPANY, INC., petitioner,  preparatory to disposing petitioner's properties at public auction.
vs.
TRINIDAD TEODORO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
De Santos and Delfino for petitioner.
V. J. Francisco and R. F. Francisco for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
The Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc., filed this petition for review by certiorari  of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case No. CA-G.R. 30916. The case relates to
the execution of a joint and several judgment for money obtained by the said company
against the Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. and Jose Corominas, Jr., in a
litigation started in 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 17014),
whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with only a slight modification in
respect of the award for attorney's fees.
The proceedings which took place thereafter are narrated in the decision sought to be
reviewed as follows:
When said decision became final, respondent Manila Sure secured on
September 20, 1961, from the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
17014 a second alias writ of execution addressed to respondent provincial
sheriff of Rizal whose deputy, together with counsel for respondent Manila
Surety, repaired to the residence of herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard Street,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and levied upon a car, some furniture, appliances and
personal properties found therein belonging solely and exclusively to the
petitioner with the exception of sewing machine which belonged to a maid by
the name of Nati Fresco, a G.E. television set which was the property of the
minor Jose Alfonso Corominas, and a baby grand piano as well as a Columbia
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 150
radio phonograph which belonged to Jose Corominas, Jr. As the petitioner was
then abroad, her sister Josefina Teodoro, to whom she had entrusted the
custody and safekeeping of the properties, had made representations to the
deputy sheriff and to the counsel of respondent Manila Surety regarding the
ownership of the petitioner over certain personal effects levied upon, but they
ignored the same and proceeded with the levy.
Thus, respondents caused the posting at several places notices of sale,
To stay the sale at public auction of petitioner's properties, she filed
on November  3, 1961, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint with
injunction, entitled "Trinidad Teodoro vs Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. and
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal," praying among other things, for damages and a
writ of preliminary injunction which was accordingly issued upon petitioner's
filing of a bond in the sum of P30,000.00 enjoining the provincial sheriff of Rizal
from selling at public auction the properties claimed by said petitioner.
However, on November 9, 1961, respondent Manila Surety filed an "Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and to Dissolve Injunction" to which an
opposition was filed.
After the parties had adduced their evidence in support of their respective
claims and after hearing their arguments, the lower court declared that the
properties in question are community properties of Trinidad Teodoro (herein
petitioner) and Jose Corominas, Jr., dissolved on May  12, 1962, the writ of
preliminary injunction it had issued and dismissed the complaint (Civil case No.
6865, CFI Rizal).
Not satisfied, Trinidad Teodoro (as plaintiff in said civil case No. 6865 of Rizal)
interposed an appeal. In the meanwhile, however, the Manila Surety filed
on May  29, 1962, in the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion for the
issuance of a third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment
debt in civil case No. 17014. Acting upon said motion the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued on June 2, 1962, the "Third Alias Writ of Execution."
Thus, on June 7,1962, deputies of the provincial sheriff of Rizal again repaired
to the residence of herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard St., Mandaluyong, and
levied upon the same properties, with the exception of the baby grand piano

and the "Columbia" phonograph which were the properties of Jose Corominas,
Jr. and which had already been sold at public auction November 6, 1961 for
P3,305.00, the Regal sewing machine owned by Nati Fresco, the beds found in
the boy's and girl's rooms, a marble dining table and chairs, a stereophonic
phonograph and the G.E. television set. And on the following day, June 8, 1962,
respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal advertised the sale at public auction of the
aforementioned properties claimed by herein petitioner, setting the date thereof
for June 16, 1962.
Trinidad Teodoro thereupon filed an original petition for injunction in the Court of
Appeals to stop the scheduled sale. On October 24, 1962 the said Court rendered the
decision now under review, granting the writ prayed for and permanently enjoining
respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at public auction the properties in
question for the satisfaction of the judgment debt of Jose Corominas, Jr.1äwphï1.ñët
The case for herein petitioner rests on the proposition that the said properties, claimed
by respondent Teodoro to be hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership established
between her and Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, and
consequently may be levied upon on execution for the satisfaction of the latter's
judgment debt. The facts relied upon in support of this theory of co-ownership are stated
in the decision of the court a quo and quoted by the Court of Appeals, as follows:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5,
1935. On November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of
the State of Nevada dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares
and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. . .
. On March 26,1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in
Hongkong. Upon their return to the Philippines they took up residence in a
rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street, . . . Manila. On September 5, 1961,
plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe
County, Nevada. U.S.A.
Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and controverted
by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership
formed by her marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been
issued on October 21, 1957.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 151
The principal issue here is the applicability of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the
situation thus created. This Article provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through then work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is
not valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the
matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been
dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the
former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void.
While Article 144 speaks, inter alia, of a void marriage without any qualification, the
Court of Appeals declined to apply it in this case on two grounds: (1) the subsisting
marriage of Corominas to Sonia Lizares constitutes an impediment to a valid marriage
between him and respondent Trinidad Teodoro, which impediment, according to a
number of decisions of the Supreme Court, precludes the establishment of a co-
ownership under said article, and (2) the funds used by said respondent in acquiring the
properties in question were "fruits of her paraphernal investments which accrued before
her marriage to Corominas."
The decisions cited under the first ground are Christensen vs. Garcia, 56 O.G. No. 16, p.
3199; Samson vs. Salaysay, 56 O.G. No. 11, p. 2401; and Osmeña vs. Rodriguez, 54
O.G. No. 20, p. 5526. In a proper case, where it may be necessary to do so in order to
resolve an unavoidable issue, the precise scope of the "no impediment to a valid
marriage" dictum in said decisions will undoubtedly deserve closer examination, since it
establishes an exception to the broad terms of Article 144. For one thing, a situation may
arise involving a conflict of rights between a co-ownership under that provision and an
existing conjugal partnership formed by a prior marriage where, for instance, the
husband in such marriage lives with another woman and with his salary or wages
acquires properties during the extra-marital cohabitation. A ruling would then be in order
to determine which — as between the co-ownership and the conjugal partnership —
could claim ascendancy insofar as the properties are concerned.
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular
properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot
be deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 152

fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs.
Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the
void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence
cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's
exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of
Corominas.

Several procedural questions have been raised by petitioner. First, that the injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals was improper since it was not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction; second, that respondent Trinidad Teodoro having elected to appeal from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, she may not pursue the remedy of
injunction as she did in this case; third, that respondent's petition for injunction in the
Court of Appeals failed to state a cause of action; fourth, that the proper remedy
available to respondent was by filing a third-party claim; and finally, that the trial judge
should have been included as party respondent in the petition for injunction.

As to the first in second points, the fact is that respondent Trinidad Teodoro perfected
her appeal to the Court of Appeals, which found that there were questions of fact
involved therein, one of them being whether the properties in question were acquired
before or after her void marriage to Corominas. In aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
therefore, the said Court could issue a writ of injunction. Of course, what happened here
was that before the record on appeal could be filed (on June 18, 1962) or approved (on
September 8, 1962) a third alias writ of execution was issued by the trial court (on June
2, 1962) and the properties in question were again levied upon by the sheriff and
advertised for sale on June 16, 1962. It was impracticable for respondent to first wait for
the appeal to be elevated to and docketed in the Court of Appeals and there secure the
ancillary remedy of injunction therein. An independent petition for injunction, under the
circumstances, was not unjustified.

Respondent could, indeed, have filed a third party claim instead as indicated in Rule 39,
Section 15.* But then her sister Josefina Teodoro did make such a claim in her behalf
after the second alias writ of execution was issued, but it was ignored and the sheriff
proceeded with the levy. In any event, a third party claim is not an exclusive remedy: the
same rule provides that nothing therein contained "shall prevent such third person from
vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action.

We do not deem it to be a reversible error for Trinidad Teodoro not to include the trial
Judge as party-respondent in her petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals. The trial
Judge would have been merely a nominal party anyway, and no substantial rights of
petitioner here have been prejudiced by the omission.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,  discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No.
1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case,
and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in
1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that
they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that
the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-
married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 153
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on
the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in
this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon
Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred
by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &

Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding
that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper
to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the
Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the
court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 154
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,  proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the
City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute
divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be
an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on
April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before
the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 155
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation
of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23,
1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that
under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime
in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-
52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of
the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that
the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave
due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet
arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both
cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz
suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent

judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6,
1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435
until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while
the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former
was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private
respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground
that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and,
upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely
a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the
offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to
try the case.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 156
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody
else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no
provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the
parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not
apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as  parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power
to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of
adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action,
it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not
mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may
not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party
being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes"
or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery
is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right
to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power
and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence,
as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of
the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to
be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already

demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates
the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or
status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not
exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to
do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the
specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse
must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can
be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the
present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced,
a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the
criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus
was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was
begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion
that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 157
convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned  23 in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was
granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American
husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business
concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his
pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 158

consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once
a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same
as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the
marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers
intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows,
even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage
contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that
the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where
the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily
apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid
foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore

cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for
adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in
favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at
bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET

ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on
October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,  declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment;
hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws
to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 159
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate
of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner – a Filipina –
and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for
the declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken
down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that
it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but
not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on
the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in
Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha
Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in
this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35,
40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 160
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in
pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a
recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts." 19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on
two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish
these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of
the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 22 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 25 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 A divorce obtained abroad by

a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first
comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local
civil registrar which shall specify the following:
x x x     x x x     x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;
x x x      x x x      x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married,
the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of
his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their
persons."
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 161
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document – a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested 33 by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. 35 However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as
a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don
the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of
sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. 42 Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce  means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 162
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no showing in the case
at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may
be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground
of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage
only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have
been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According
to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 163

duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage we REMAND the case to the court a quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which
license.50 conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity costs.
to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" SO ORDERED.
– Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan
City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification
that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was
in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family
Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. 60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was
really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193902               June 1, 2011
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 193908
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner,  This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D.
vs.
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 194075
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner, 
vs.
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the
Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case
No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No.
194075.
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 164
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites.
Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April
28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites
before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a
divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a Circuit
District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce
on June 18, 1992, as follows:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that
the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to
exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent,
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which
they have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that
both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam
prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of
reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted. Consequently,
the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.
Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.
(signed)
HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Presiding Judge3

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had
previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum,
Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under
Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage
vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos’ first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum
was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned
sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of
Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor
children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with
the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos, to wit:
1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC,
Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May
31, 2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void
Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her
marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman on July
30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos’ first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon
City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of
Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage
was bigamous and void ab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse,
should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to their father, who should have
sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community property in favor of
the children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate
succession.
2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos’ dismissal from service and
disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection
Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were dismissed
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 165
in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasum’s
appeal from the CSC’s dismissal of the administrative case was still pending
resolution.
Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum
contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004. 4
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiñones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima
facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. 5Consequently, on February 22,
2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305. 6
Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutor’s February 2, 2005
resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were
temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting
City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos’ motion
for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos. 7
Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution
of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15,
2005.8 Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary
of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.9
In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a
resolution granting Pacasum’s Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005
and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor. 10Zamoranos immediately filed an
Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for
Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in
Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and
February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice. 11Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her
twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May 17,
2006.12
Zamoranos’ second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was
likewise denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of

Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the
time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum]
to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a bigamous
marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and
Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and
[Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that
divorce by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance
with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos]
and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the second marriage entered into by
[Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30,
1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change the
validity of the first marriage entered into by them under PD 1083.
Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on
December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change
the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and
[Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the
renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in
by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on Islamic Law
and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be
considered valid and effective as between the parties while the second marriage is
merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by
Talaq dissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,]
being governed by PD 1083, x x x.
Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:
"Application
The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 166
proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a
Circuit Court.
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:
"Jurisdiction – The Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have
been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
a) Marriage;
b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
x x x x"
The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil courts
or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the Shari’[a] Court
is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against
[Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and
misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service
Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and
simple harassment.
In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so hold that
this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for annulment
of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has the
exclusive original jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the nature of
motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.13

On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the
Supreme Court of Pacasum’s appeal became final and executory and was recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgments.14
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of
Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against
Zamoranos.15
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense
charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims,
resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the
RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.16
On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos’ Motion to
Quash the Information. Zamoranos’ motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise
denied.17
Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of
the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted
to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos’ petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for
certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:
A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As
such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is
wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its
jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis
alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a petition for
certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in
scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and
resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which
is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise of
its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts complained of were
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 167
xxxx
In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos’] Motion to Quash
Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto,
and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied
[Zamoranos’] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and
legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the
[RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City’s] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for
bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the
bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioner’s motion
to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.18
Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CA’s dismissal of Zamoranos’
petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum.
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA
Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and
superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and
for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to remain.
Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions made
by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De
Guzman, under Islamic rites;
2. Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage ceremony under civil rites before
Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos’ divorce by talaq to De Guzman
severed their marriage ties;
4. "Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos]
and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code
and [the] divorce proceedings properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Shari’a Circuit Court."

5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and
6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have
no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage
entered into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has
original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos’ petition,
raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently
denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced under
Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic
rites.
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the RTC’s, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CA’s separate factual
findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.19
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction
or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts—acts which courts
have no power or authority in law to perform.20
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an
interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal. 21
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established
rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to
resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 168
and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.22
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations,
certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order,
specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the
following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice"; 23(d) to promote public
welfare and public policy;24 and (e) when the cases "have attracted nationwide attention,
making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof." 25 The first four
of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an
error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos’ motion to
quash.
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of
judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to
Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final
and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil
courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari’a Circuit Court
which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The
provision reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect
to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;

however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.26
The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to
state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on
the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage since it found that the Shari’a Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the
dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic rites.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should
have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was
valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that
Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from
that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
1. Affidavit of Confirmation27 executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who
solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites,
declaring under oath that:
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such,
authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both
parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in
accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 169
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife,
Mariam Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have
their marriage and the subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce
became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1083; registered [by] the Shari’a Circuit Court in the province of
Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I
accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Shari’a Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in
accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered
their documents;
5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Shari’a Circuit
Court was housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that
all the records, effects and office equipments of the Shari’a Circuit
Court were totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above
statements of fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal
purposes it may serve.
2. Certification28 issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which
confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3. Affidavit29 executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk
of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De
Guzman’s divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usman’s affidavit reads, in
pertinent part:
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharia’s Circuit Court in the City of
Pagadian;
2. The first time that a Sharia’s Circuit court was established in the
Island Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L.
Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of Court
of the Basilan Sharia’s Circuit Court;

3. The Sharia’s Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was
housed at the old Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan,
Philippines;
4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharia’s Circuit Court since 1985, I can
recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a
province mate of mine in Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta
(Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of their Talaq,
by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharia’s Circuit Court were lost
by reason of the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the
City of Isabela;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above
statements of fact.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are
officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another
Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and
incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.
True, the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized
under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared
that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20
(b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created the Sharia
District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court was
vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code.
There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to
try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this case. 30
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy
hinges on Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De
Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 170
Zamoranos’ Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very
least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until
Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a Circuit Court and had
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered
into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty
was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and
effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall
consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have
jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim
Filipinos.
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general
application, the former shall prevail.
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws
or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to
carry out the former.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 171

(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.
herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.
xxxx
In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazali’s Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim Section 3. Subsequent Marriages
personal laws expound thereon:
xxxx
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any provision of
this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For example, there is Article 29. By divorcee.
conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law
of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter (1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an ‘idda of
shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized "in three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at
accordance with" the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.
will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this
Code which is a special law and another special law or laws of local application. The
xxxx
latter should be liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code. 31

Chapter Three
On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:
DIVORCE (TALAQ)

TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Section 1. Nature and Form

Chapter One
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means
of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
Article 13. Application. –
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
xxxx
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
Article 46. Divorce by talaq.

(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,

(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil
during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal
Code of the Philippines shall apply.
relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only
one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed ‘idda.
xxxx

(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the
Chapter Two
right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed ‘idda by resumption of cohabitation
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 172

without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra). solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.32

xxxx
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes
irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract
another marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects
of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial
bond, entitling one to remarry.331avvphi1
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by
an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge
Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of
Bigamy.

(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with
Article 78 of this Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole
dower in case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of
the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No.
194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give
support in accordance with Article 67; and

(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements,

shall be dissolved and liquidated.

For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazali’s
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:

If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law
is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized
in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-
Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is
merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this
Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this
Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male
party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or
Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,  In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official
of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him
and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 173
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and,
in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the

rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends
that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the
RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void 15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce,
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising
after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and
an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under
the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26
of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 174
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s
assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just.
[The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,

however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 175
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of
the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate
to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 176

the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the (d) annulments of marriages;
Rules of Court.33
(e) divorces;
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign (f) legitimations;
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed (g) adoptions;
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides. (h) acknowledgment of natural children;

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree (i) naturalization; and

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office (j) changes of name.
has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally
xxxx
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been
done.
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
concerning the civil status of persons:
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching
(1) Birth and death register;
upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35 (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s
legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil register.
registry:
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
persons, in which shall be entered: registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
(a) births;
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
(b) deaths;
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
(c) marriages;
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 177

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 – both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well
as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of
the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries
in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil
Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets
in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before
a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the
RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 178

EN BANC consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing,
counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts
April 24, 2018 Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern
Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
G.R. No. 221029 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner  The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic
vs of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or
caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper
RESOLUTION action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision 1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision  dated 15 October 2012 3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese
PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Court x x x;

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro 4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce
Manila. Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter
are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
SO ORDERED.3
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's
The facts are undisputed.
marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of
cancellation of
marriage;

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry
of divorce Japanese court.
of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The
petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said
entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname,
MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for
her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be
sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan
of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to
file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country,
Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and
duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages." 6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 179
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. 7 ruling that the meaning of the law
should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the
fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to
this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an
a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are
of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage,
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 15 11 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the
marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988. 16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26. 18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil

Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet
meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to
remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of
a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g.,
on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must
still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or
she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law. 24 The aim
was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil
Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have
already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 180
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen
has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of
the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry
of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she
is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not
be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree
that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his
Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised
sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality
rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the
trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is
void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois
court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but  because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability .
The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce
decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien
spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed
the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino
spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was
filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an
accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared
with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she
initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that
the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws
of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine
courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case
filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 181
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which  divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed
from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own
representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse
can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings
in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki,  the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was
able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage
between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground
of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree
of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of
the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant
to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to
obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We
referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 182
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this
Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no
longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is
severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status
is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree
which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without
dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling
will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino
peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the
prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of
the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have
used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute
there should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to
mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the
Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. 40 As held in League
of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a
statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or
the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law
control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry
under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their
alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation
on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under
Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and
that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such
classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge
its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and
more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. 46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 183
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly,
and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. 49 On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state
for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It essentially involves a public right or
interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to
take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies
with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection clause. 54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is
unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a
Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino
is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the
instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both
are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land.
The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands.
Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on
grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law
at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he
or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in
accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the
dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply
in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is
duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages
Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of
Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to
support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith
in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e.,
satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent
of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, 59 that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage, 61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is
whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a
Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection,
rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are
more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it
was said:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 184
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure
their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 64 Nevertheless, it was not
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their
exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be
understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a
prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention
was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily
discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal
opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 185

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of
him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and respondent;
with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion
continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living whether in the Philippines or abroad;
together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity. 68 When the Philippines was
liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person
effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of
other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the
Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino
mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or
citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim
of rape;
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116 71 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the
child or a child of a petitioner; and
House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population
more than one (1) year.

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years,
Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds
either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on
for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as
amended, as follows:
follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and
the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party,
change religious or political affiliation;
in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such
party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common husband and wife;
child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance
in such corruption or inducement;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be
incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection
found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time
the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family
Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition
from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with
the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 186
customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause
the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion. 76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State
and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
is sincerely believes that they are good for country. 77While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development. 79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the
right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 80 To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not
amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all
forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in
order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of
Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"),  as amended by
R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012").Moreover, in
protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution,
the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every
human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We
disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage
of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing

"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences,
not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of
the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under
Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and
against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement
of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world,
mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all
marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are
rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. 84 In
reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 187
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and
the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as
it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting
Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. 89 The fact of
divorce must still first be proven. 90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven
by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of
an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 188

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV.
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin
(b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92 for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
SO ORDERED
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the
Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules
of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus,
We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the
divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court. 94 As it appears, the existence of
the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the
divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial
notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese
law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 189

Fourteenth Congress provisions of this Act are hereby amended, modified, superseded or repealed
Third Regular Session accordingly.

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two Section 4.  Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
thousand nine. complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of national
circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858
Approved,
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS
BELOW MARRYING AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code of the Philippines", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18)
years of age, may be legitimated."

"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.
The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation."

Section 2. Implementing Rules. – The civil Registrar General shall, in consultation with
the chairpersons of the Committee on Revision of Laws of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations of the Senate, the Council
for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), the office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine Association
of Civil Registrars (PACR) and the UP Law Center, issue the necessary
rules/regulations for the effective implementation of this Act not later than one (1) month
from its effectivity.

Section 3. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,

proclamations and/or administrative regulations which are inconsistent with the

Republic Act 8043
The Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995
"AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES TO GOVERN INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
OF FILIPINO CHILDREN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act
of 1995."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide
every neglected and abandoned child with a family that will provide such child with love
and care as well as opportunities for growth and development. Towards this end, efforts
shall be exerted to place the child with an adoptive family in the Philippines. However,
recognizing that inter-country adoption may be considered as allowing aliens not
presently allowed by law to adopt Filipino children if such children cannot be adopted by
qualified Filipino citizens or aliens, the State shall take measures to ensure that inter-
country adoptions are allowed when the same shall prove beneficial to the child's best
interests, and shall serve and protect his/her fundamental rights.      (c) Monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of the child through
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act. the term:
    (a) Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino
child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is
filed, the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued
outside the Philippines.
    (b) Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner emancipated
by law.
    (c) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development of the
Republic of the Philippines.
    (d) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
    (e) Authorized and accredited agency refers to the State welfare agency or a
licensed adoption agency in the country of the adopting parents which provide
comprehensive social services and which is duly recognized by the Department.
    (f) Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily
committed to the Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
    (g) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of the adoptive child and the applicant to
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 190
promote a mutually satisfying parent-child relationship.
    (h) Board refers to the Inter-country Adoption Board.
ARTICLE II
THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION BOARD
Sec. 4. The Inter-Country Adoption Board. — There is hereby created the Inter-
Country Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board to act as the central
authority in matters relating to inter-country adoption. It shall act as the policy-making
body for purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation and
coordination with the Department, the different child-care and placement agencies,
adoptive agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations engaged in child-care
and placement activities. As such, it shall:
    (a) Protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any
other practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to
the child;
    (b) Collect, maintain, and preserve confidential information about the child and the
adoptive parents;
authorized and accredited agency;
    (d) Prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and deter
improper practices contrary to this Act;
    (e) Promote the development of adoption services including post-legal adoption;
    (f) License and accredit child-caring/placement agencies and collaborate with them in
the placement of Filipino children;
    (g) Accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency in the placement of Filipino
children in their own country; and
    (h) Cancel the license to operate and blacklist the child-caring and placement agency
or adoptive agency involved from the accreditation list of the Board upon a finding of
violation of any provision under this Act.
Sec. 5. Composition of the Board. — The Board shall be composed of the Secretary
of the Department as ex officio Chairman, and six (6) other members to be appointed by
the President for a nonrenewable term of six (6) years: Provided, That there shall be
appointed one (1) psychiatrist or psychologist, two (2) lawyers who shall have at least
the qualifications of a regional trial court judge, one (1) registered social worker and two
(2) representatives from non-governmental organizations engaged in child-caring and
placement activities. The members of the Board shall receive a per diem allowance of
One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for each meeting attended by them:
Provided, further, That no compensation shall be paid for more than four (4) meetings a

month.  ARTICLE III
 
Sec. 6. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board shall have the following
powers and functions:
    (a) to prescribe rules and regulations as it may deem reasonably necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act, after consultation and upon favorable recommendation of
the different agencies concerned with the child-caring, placement, and adoption;
    (b) to set the guidelines for the convening of an Inter-country Adoption Placement
Committee which shall be under the direct supervision of the Board;
    (c) to set the guidelines for the manner by which selection/matching of prospective
adoptive parents and adoptive child can be made;
    (d) to determine a reasonable schedule of fees and charges to be exacted in
connection with the application for adoption;
    (e) to determine the form and contents of the application for inter-country adoption;
    (g) to institute systems and procedures to prevent improper financial gain in
connection with adoption and deter improper practices which are contrary to this Act;
    (h) to promote the development of adoption services, including post-legal adoption
services,
    (i) to accredit and authorize foreign private adoption agencies which have
demonstrated professionalism, competence and have consistently pursued non-profit
objectives to engage in the placement of Filipino children in their own country: Provided,
That such foreign private agencies are duly authorized and accredited by their own
government to conduct inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the total number
of authorized and accredited foreign private adoption agencies shall not exceed one
hundred (100) a year;
    (j) to take appropriate measures to ensure confidentiality of the records of the child,
the natural parents and the adoptive parents at all times;
    (k) to prepare, review or modify, and thereafter, recommend to the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Memoranda of Agreement respecting inter-country adoption consistent
with the implementation of this Act and its stated goals, entered into, between and
among foreign governments, international organizations and recognized international
non-governmental organizations;
    (l) to assist other concerned agencies and the courts in the implementation of this Act,
particularly as regards coordination with foreign persons, agencies and other entities
involved in the process of adoption and the physical transfer of the child; and
    (m) to perform such other functions on matters relating to inter-country adoption as
may be determined by the President.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 191
PROCEDURE
Sec. 7. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. — The Board shall ensure that all
possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and
that inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the
Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in
the Philippines before the child is placed for inter-country adoption: Provided, however,
That the maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six
hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years. 
Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-
country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the
following documents must be submitted to the Board:
    (a)Child study;
    (b)Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
    (c)Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents;
    (d)Medical evaluation /history;
    (e)Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
    (f)Recent photo of the child.
Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. — An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad
may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
    (a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older
than the child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent
by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent:
    (b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
    (c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental
authority under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an
accredited counselor in his/her country;
    (d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; 
    (e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
    (f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary
moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
    (g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws,
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations
issued to implement the provisions of this Act;
    (h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and
whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that

adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and
    (i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein
and in other applicable Philippine laws.
Sec. 10. Where to File Application. — An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be
filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or
with the Board, through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized
and accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which
application shall be in accordance with the requirements as set forth in the implementing
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board.
The application shall be supported by the following documents written and officially
translated in English.
    (a) Birth certificate of applicant(s);
    (b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable;
    (c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above ten (10) years of age,
in the form of sworn statement;
    (d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly licensed physician and
psychologist;
    (e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial capability of the
applicant(s);
    (f) Police clearance of applicant(s);
    (g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the applicant's employer and a
member of the immediate community who have known the applicant(s) for at least five
(5) years; and
    (h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his immediate family;
The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial proceedings.
Sec. 11. Family Selection/Matching. — No child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive
family unless it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be adopted locally. The
clearance, as issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the meetings, shall
form part of the records of the child to be adopted. When the Board is ready to transmit
the Placement Authority to the authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency
and all the travel documents of the child are ready, the adoptive parents, or any one of
them, shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines.  Sec. 16. Penalties. —
Sec. 12. Pre-adoptive Placement Costs. — The applicant(s) shall bear the following
costs incidental to the placement of the child;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 192
    (a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the residence of the
applicant(s) abroad, including all travel expenses within the Philippines and abroad; and
    (b) The cost of passport, visa, medical examination and psychological evaluation
required, and other related expenses.
Sec. 13. Fees, Charges and Assessments. — Fees, charges, and assessments
collected by the Board in the exercise of its functions shall be used solely to process
applications for inter-country adoption and to support the activities of the Board.
 
Sec. 14. Supervision of Trial Custody. — The governmental agency or the authorized
and accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed the application
for inter-country adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of the
child. It shall also provide family counseling and other related services. The trial custody
shall be for a period of six (6) months from the time of placement. Only after the lapse of
the period of trial custody shall a decree of adoption be issued in the said country a copy
of which shall be sent to the Board to form part of the records of the child. 
During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the governmental agency
or the authorized and accredited agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the
Board, a progress report of the child's adjustment. The progress report shall be taken
into consideration in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption.
The Department of Foreign Affairs shall set up a system by which Filipino children sent
abroad for trial custody are monitored and checked as reported by the authorized and
accredited inter-country adoption agency as well as the repatriation to the Philippines of
a Filipino child whose adoption has not been approved.
Sec. 15. Executive Agreements. — The Department of Foreign Affairs, upon
representation of the Board, shall cause the preparation of Executive Agreements with
countries of the foreign adoption agencies to ensure the legitimate concurrence of said
countries in upholding the safeguards provided by this Act.
ARTICLE IV
PENALTIES
(a) Any person who shall knowingly participate in the conduct or carrying out of an illegal
adoption, in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished with a penalty of
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 193

imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), but not more than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200.000), at the discretion of the court. For purposes of this Act, an
adoption is illegal if it is effected in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act or
established State policies, its implementing rules and regulations, executive
agreements, and other laws pertaining to adoption. Illegality may be presumed from the
following acts:
    (1)consent for an adoption was acquired through, or attended by coercion, fraud,
improper material inducement;
    (2)there is no authority from the Board to effect adoption;
    (3)the procedures and safeguards placed under the law for adoption were not
complied with; and
    (4)the child to be adopted is subjected to, or exposed to danger, abuse and
exploitation.
shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed penalties,
be penalized in accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations:
Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said
government official, employee or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer
suspension until the resolution of the case.
ARTICLE V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 18. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The Inter-country Adoption Board,
in coordination with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, and the Department of Justice, after due consultation with agencies involved in
child-care and placement, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of this Act within six (6) months after its effectivity.
Sec. 19. Appropriations. — The amount of Five million pesos (P5,000,000) is hereby
appropriated from the proceeds of the Lotto for the initial operations of the Board and
subsequently the appropriations of the same shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act for the year following its enactment.

(b)Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and
Sec. 20. Separability Clause. — If any provision, or part hereof is held invalid or
integrity of records, documents and communications of adoption applications, cases and
unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected, shall
processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1)
remain valid and subsisting.
day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000), but not
more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), at the discretion of the court.
  Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. — Any law, decree, executive order, administrative order or
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony rules and regulations contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
under this Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly. 
the acts herein enumerated.
Sec. 22. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
two or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and
shall merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by
a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article.Penalties as are herein
provided shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same
acts punishable under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations. 

Sec. 17. Public Officers as Offenders. — Any government official, employee or

functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act, or who
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 194

Tenth Congress (i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried decisions to
relinquish his/her parental authority over his/her child;

(ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological
parent(s);
Republic Act No. 8552             February 25, 1998
(iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her parental authority
and custody over his/her adopted child.
AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC
ADOPTION OF FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be
administratively or judicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
"legally available for adoption" and his/her custody transferred to the
Congress assembled:
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and
accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity shall be authorized
ARTICLE I 
to take steps for the permanent placement of the child;
GENERAL PROVISIONS

(iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a

Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of
positive environment for adoption;
1998."

(v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government and private sector
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
agencies to handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications,
ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be
and offer adoption-related services including, but not limited to, parent
provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and harmonious
preparation and post-adoption education and counseling; and
development of his/her personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no
appropriate placement or adoption within the child's extended family is available shall
(vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child's identity and
adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
culture in his/her native land, and only when this is not available shall
intercountry adoption be considered as a last resort.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest
shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be
United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social
defined as:
and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the
Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of (a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age.
Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and
assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or (b) "A child legally available for adoption"  refers to a child who has been
abandoned. voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed
and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the parental
(c) It shall also be a State policy to: authority of his/her biological parent(s) or guardian or adopter(s) in case of
rescission of adoption.

(c) "Voluntarily committed child"  is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly
relinquishes parental authority to the Department.
(d) "Involuntarily committed child"  is one whose parent(s), known or unknown,
has been permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to
abandonment; substantial, continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or
incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities.
(e) "Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper parental care or
guardianship or whose parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least
six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared as such.
(f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a social worker
oversees the adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and
adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship.
(g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the
Department to provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not
limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective
adoptive parents, and preparing the adoption home study.
(i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the
Department that provides twenty four (24)-hour residential care services for
abandoned, orphaned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children.
(j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in
the birth records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his/her
biological mother, causing such child to lose his/her true identity and status.
ARTICLE II 
PRE-ADOPTION SERVICES
Section 4. Counseling Service. – The Department shall provide the services of
licensed social workers to the following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) – Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before
and after the birth of his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 195
shall be permitted before the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months
shall be allowed for the biological parent(s) to reconsider any decision to
relinquish his/her child for adoption before the decision becomes irrevocable.
Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be offered to the biological
parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are
made and all alternatives for the child's future and the implications of each
alternative have been provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) – Counseling sessions, adoption fora and
seminars, among others, shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to
resolve possible adoption issues and to prepare him/her for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee – Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that
he/she understands the nature and effects of adoption and is able to express
his/her views on adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of maturity.
Section 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). – It shall be the duty of the Department or
the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts
to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be
registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where
he/she shall be declared abandoned.
Section 6.  Support Services. – The Department shall develop a pre-adoption program
which shall include, among others, the above mentioned services.
ARTICLE III 
ELIGIBILITY
Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children,
at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter

and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she
has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country
as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 196
Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively
or judicially declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status
to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been
consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since
minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided,  That no
proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of
said parent(s).
Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. – After being properly
counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the
adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter
if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
ARTICLE IV 
PROCEDURE

Section 10. Hurried Decisions. – In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require
proof that the biological parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her from
making hurried decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to sustain
that all measures to strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged
stay of the child in his/her own home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
Section 11. Case Study. – No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a
licensed social worker of the Department, the social service office of the local
government unit, or any child-placing or child-caring agency has made a case study of
the adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as the adopter(s), and has submitted
the report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall
confirm with the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the
birth of the adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the
responsibility of the concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for
adoption and that the documents to support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the
case study of the adopter(s) shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the
adoption is in the best interest of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of
the case studies, that the petition should be denied. The case studies and other relevant
documents and records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved
by the Department.
Section 12. Supervised Trial Custody. – No petition for adoption shall be finally
granted until the adopter(s) has been given by the court a supervised trial custody period
for at least six (6) months within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically
and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. During said period,
temporary parental authority shall be vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds
the same to be in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction
of the period. However, for alien adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial
custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s)
through a pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the prospective
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 197
adopter(s) shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled from the
date the adoptee is placed with the prospective adopter(s).
Section 13. Decree of Adoption.  – If, after the publication of the order of hearing has
been complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after
consideration of the case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report
and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to
adopt, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree
of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original petition
was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the
issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree
shall state the name by which the child is to be known.
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. – An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by
the Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the
adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname. The
original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled"  with the annotation of the
issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place and shall be sealed in the civil
registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee shall not bear any
notation that it is an amended issue.
Section 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. – All hearings in
adoption cases shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records,
books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings
shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for
purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of
the adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information to be released, restricting
the purposes for which it may be used.
ARTICLE V 
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
Section 16. Parental Authority. – Except in cases where the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee
shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).

Section 17. Legitimacy.  – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter
of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.
Section 18.  Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate
filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern.
ARTICLE VI 
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption.  – Upon petition of the adoptee, with
the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the
life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. – If the petition is granted, the parental authority of
the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall
be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and
obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the
adoptee and restore his/her original birth certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of
judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be
respected.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 198
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the
penalties imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven.
ARTICLE VII 
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
Section 21. Violations and Penalties. – (a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who shall
commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud,
improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for
adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the
name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation
of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of his/her oath of office,
shall cooperate in the execution of the abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties
herein prescribed and also the penalty of permanent disqualification.
Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and
integrity of records, documents, and communications of adoption applications, cases,
and processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and
one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), at the discretion of the
court.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated offense
under this Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 199

the acts herein enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a
syndicate or where it involves two (2) or more children shall be considered as an offense
constituting child trafficking and shall merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by
a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein
provided, shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same
acts punishable under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations.
collaboration with the Intercountry Adoption Board and other concerned agencies. The
office shall be manned by adoption experts from the public and private sectors.
Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six (6) months from the
promulgation of this Act, the Department, with the Council for the Welfare of Children,
the Office of Civil Registry General, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor
General, and two (2) private individuals representing child-placing and child-caring
agencies shall formulate the necessary guidelines to make the provisions of this Act
operative.

When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported immediately after service of
sentence and perpetually excluded from entry to the country.
Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating
any of the provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in
addition to the above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing civil
service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either
administrative or criminal, said government official, employee, or functionary concerned
shall automatically suffer suspension until the resolution of the case.
Section 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. – A person who has, prior to the
effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child shall not be punished for such
act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and
that he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth
registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity
of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with
the procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined
by the Department.
Section 25. Appropriations. – Such sum as may be necessary for the implementation
of the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the
year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 26. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive
order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended
accordingly.
Section 27. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and
subsisting.
Section 28. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
complete publication in any newspaper of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.

ARTICLE VIII 
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. – There shall be established an

Adoption Resources and Referral Office under the Department with the following
functions: (a) monitor the existence, number, and flow of children legally available for
adoption and prospective adopter(s) so as to facilitate their matching; (b) maintain a
nationwide information and educational campaign on domestic adoption; (c) keep
records of adoption proceedings; (d) generate resources to help child-caring and child-
placing agencies and foster homes maintain viability; and (e) do policy research in

Fourteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand
eight.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 9523             March 12, 2009
AN ACT REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY
AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION
ACT OF 1998, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE INTER-
COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
alternative protection and assistance shall be afforded to every child who is abandoned,
surrendered, or neglected. In this regard, the State shall extend such assistance in the
most expeditious manner in the interest of full emotional and social development of the
abandoned, surrendered, or neglected child.
It is hereby recognized that administrative processes under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development for the declaration of a child legally
available for adoption of abandoned, surrendered, or neglected children are the most
expeditious proceedings for the best interest and welfare of the child.
Section. 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency
charged to implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority
to issue the certification declaring a child legally available for adoption.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 200
(2) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or a person over
eighteen (18) years of age but is unable to fully take care of him/herself or
protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or
discrimination because of physical or mental disability or condition.
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or
guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least
three (3) continuous months, which includes a founding.
(4) Neglected Child refers to a child whose basic needs have been deliberately
unattended or inadequately attended within a period of three (3) continuous
months. Neglect may occur in two (2) ways:
(a) There is physical neglect when the child is malnourished, ill-clad,
and without proper shelter. A child is unattended when left by
himself/herself without proper provisions and/or without proper
supervision.
(b) There is emotional neglect when the child is maltreated, raped,
seduced, exploited, overworked, or made to work under conditions not
conducive to good health; or is made to beg in the streets or public
places; or when children are in moral danger, or exposed to gambling,
prostitution, and other vices.
(5) Child Legally Available for Adoption refers to a child in whose favor a
certification was issued by the DSWD that he/she is legally available for
adoption after the fact of abandonment or neglect has been proven through the
submission of pertinent documents, or one who was voluntarily committed by
his/her parent(s) or legal guardian.
(6) Voluntarily Committed Child is one whose parent(s) or legal guardian
knowingly and willingly relinquished parental authority to the DSWD or any duly
accredited child-placement or child-caring agency or institution.
(7) Child-caring agency or institution refers to a private non-profit or government
agency duly accredited by the DSWD that provides twenty-four (24) hour
residential care services for abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed
children.

(8) Child-placing agency or institution refers to a private non-profit institution or
government agency duly accredited by the DWSD that receives and processes
applicants to become foster or adoptive parents and facilitate placement of
children eligible for foster care or adoption.
(9) Petitioner refers to the head or executive director of a licensed or accredited
child-caring or child-placing agency or institution managed by the government,
local government unit, non-governmental organization, or provincial, city, or
municipal Social Welfare Development Officer who has actual custody of the
minor and who files a certification to declare such child legally available for
adoption, or, if the child is under the custody of any other individual, the agency
or institution does so with the consent of the child's custodian.
(10) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the DSWD or his duly authorized
representative.
(11) Conspicuous Place shall refer to a place frequented by the public, where
by notice of the petition shall be posted for information of any interested person.
(12) Social Case Study Report (SCSR) shall refer to a written report of the
result of an assessment conducted by a licensed social worker as to the social-
cultural economic condition, psychosocial background, current functioning and
facts of abandonment or neglect of the child. The report shall also state the
efforts of social worker to locate the child's biological parents/relatives.
Section 3. Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and
sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. It shall contain facts
necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall state the circumstances
surrounding the abandonment or neglect of the child.
The petition shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Social Case Study Report made by the DSWD, local government unit,
licensed or accredited child-caring or child-placing agency or institution charged
with the custody of the child;
(2) Proof that efforts were made to locate the parent(s) or any known relatives
of the child. The following shall be considered sufficient:
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(a) Written certification from a local or national radio or television
station that the case was aired on three (3) different occasions;
(b) Publication in one (1) newspaper of general circulation;
(c) Police report or barangay certification from the locality where the
child was found or a certified copy of a tracing report issued by the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), National Headquarters (NHQ),
Social Service Division, which states that despite due diligence, the
child's parents could not be found; and
(d) Returned registered mail to the last known address of the parent(s)
or known relatives, if any.
(3) Birth certificate, if available; and
(4) Recent photograph of the child and photograph of the child upon
abandonment or admission to the agency or institution.
Section 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. – The petition shall be filed in the
regional office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.
The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if
sufficient in form and substance and shall authorize the posting of the notice of the
petition conspicuous place for five (5) consecutive days in the locality where the child
was found.
The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render a recommendation not
later than five (5) working days after the completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit
a copy of his/her recommendation and records to the Office of the Secretary within forty-
eight (48) hours from the date of the recommendation.
Section 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. – Upon finding merit in the
petition, the Secretary shall issue a certification declaring the child legally available for
adoption within seven (7) working days from receipt of the recommendation.
Said certification, by itself shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local
civil registrar of a foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the local civil
registrar shall transmit the founding certificate to the National Statistic Office (NSO).

Section 6. Appeal. – The decision of the Secretary shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals within five (5) days from receipt of the decision by the petitioner, otherwise the
same shall be final and executory.
Section 7. Declaration of Availability for Adoption of Involuntarily Committed
Child and Voluntarily Committed Child. – The certificate declaring a child legally
available for adoption in case of an involuntarily committed child under Article 141,
paragraph 4(a) and Article 142 of Presidential Decree No. 603 shall be issued by the
DSWD within three (3) months following such involuntary commitment.
In case of voluntary commitment as contemplated in Article 154 of Presidential Decree
No. 603, the certification declaring the child legally available for adoption shall be issued
by the Secretary within three (3) months following the filing of the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment, as signed by the parent(s) with the DSWD.
Upon petition filed with the DSWD, the parent(s) or legal guardian who voluntarily
committed a child may recover legal custody and parental authority over him/her from
the agency or institution to which such child was voluntarily committed when it is shown
to the satisfaction of the DSWD that the parent(s) or legal guardian is in a position to
adequately provide for the needs of the child: Provided, That, the petition for restoration
is filed within (3) months after the signing of the Deed of Voluntary Commitment.
Section 8. Certification. – The certification that a child is legally available for adoption
shall be issued by the DSWD in lieu of a judicial order, thus making the entire process
administrative in nature.
The certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the
child is legally available in a domestic adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act
No. 8552 and in an inter-country adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No.
8043.
Section. 9. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The DSWD, together with the
Council for Welfare of Children, Inter-Country Adoption Board, two (2) representatives
from licensed or accredited child-placing and child-caring agencies or institution,
National Statistics Office and Office of the Civil Registrar, is hereby tasked to draft the
implementing rules and regulations of this Act within sixty (60) days following its
complete publication.
Upon effectivity of this Act and pending the completion of the drafting of the
implementing rules and regulations, petitions for the issuance of a certification declaring
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 202
a child legally available for adoption may be filled with the regional office of the DSWD
where the child was found or abandoned.
Section 10. Penalty. – The penalty of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person,
institution, or agency who shall place a child for adoption without the certification that the
child is legally available for adoption issued by the DSWD. Any agency or institution
found violating any provision of this Act shall have its license to operate revoked without
prejudice to the criminal prosecution of its officers and employees.
Violation of any provision of this Act shall subject the government official or employee
concerned to appropriate administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions, including
suspension and/or dismissal from the government service and forfeiture of benefits.
Section 11. Repealing Clause. – Sections 2(c)(iii), 3(b), (e) and 8(a) of Republic Act
No. 8552, Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 8043, Chapter 1 of Title VII, and VIII of
Presidential Decree No. 603 and any law, presidential decree, executive order, letter of
instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby reprealed, modified or amended accordingly.
Section 12. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and
subsisting.
Section 13. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
complete publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation or in the Official
Gazette.

Seventeenth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand
eighteen.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 11222
An Act Allowing the Rectification of Simulated Birth Records and Prescribing
Administrative Adoption Proceedings for the Purpose
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress
Assembled:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Simulated Birth Rectification
Act".
Section 2. Objectives. - This Act shall have the following objectives:
(a) To grant amnesty and allow the rectification of the simulated birth of a child
where the simulation was made for the best interest of the child, and that such
child has been consistently considered and treated by the person or persons
who simulated such birth as her, his, or their own daughter or son;
(b) To fix the status and filiation of a child whose birth was simulated by giving
such child all the benefits of adoption and ensuring that the child shall be
entitled to all the rights provided by law to legally adopted children, without any
discrimination of any kind, as well as to love, guidance, and support from the
child’s adoptive family;
(c) To exempt from criminal, civil, and administrative liability those who
simulated the birth record of a child prior to the effectivity of this
Act: Provided, That a petition for adoption with an application for the rectification
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 203
of the simulated birth record is filed within ten (10) years from the effectivity of
this Act;
(d) To provide for and allow a simpler and less costly administrative adoption
proceeding where the child has been living with the person or persons who
simulated her or his birth record for at least three (3) years before the effectivity
of this Act; and(e) To educate and inform the public about the rectification of
simulated births, and to encourage people to avail of the benefits of this Act.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for Adoption (CDCLAA)
refers to a document issued by the Secretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) or the Secretary’s duly authorized
representative as provided for by Republic Act No. 9523, otherwise known as
"An Act Requiring Certification of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to Declare a ‘Child Legally Available for Adoption’ as a
Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings, Amending for this Purpose Certain
Provisions of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998; Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995; and Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and for Other Purposes",
administratively declaring that a child is legally available for adoption which
terminates the rights of the biological parents, guardian, or other custodian to
exercise authority over the child upon issuance of the certificate;
(b) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age, or a person
eighteen (18) years of age or over who is unable to fully take care of herself or
himself or protect herself or himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, whose
birth was simulated;
(c) Foundling refers to a child who is abandoned and whose parentage is
unknown;
(d) Regional Director refers to the head of a field office of the DSWD;
(e) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the DSWD;
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 204

(f) Simulation of birth record refers to the tampering of the civil registry to make Section 7. Personal Qualifications. - Adopters must:
it appear in the record of birth that a child was born to a person who is not such
child’s biological mother, causing the loss of the true identity and status of such (a) Be Filipino citizens;
child; and
(b) Be of legal age;
(g) Social Welfare and Development Officer refers to the head of a city or
municipal social welfare and development office, which serves as the frontline (c) Possess full civil capacity and legal rights;
of a city or municipal government in the delivery of social welfare and
development programs and services. (d) Be of good moral character;

ARTICLE II (e) Have not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATED BIRTHS
(f) Be emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children; and
Section 4. Rectification of Simulated Birth Record. - Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, a person or persons who, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated
(g) Be in a position to support and care for the child in keeping with the means
the birth of a child, and those who cooperated in the execution of such simulation, shall
of the family.
not be criminally, civilly, or administratively liable for such act: Provided, That the
simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that the child has been
In case of adoption by a married couple, where one of the adopters is a foreign national
consistently considered and treated by such person or persons as her, his, or their own
married to a Filipino, the foreign national must have been residing in the Philippines for
daughter or son: Provided, further, That such person or persons has or have filed a
at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and
petition for adoption with an application for the rectification of the simulated birth record
application for rectification of simulated birth record.
within ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, finally, That all the benefits
of this Act shall also apply to adult adoptees.
Section 8. Required Consent. - After being properly counseled and informed of the right
to give or withhold approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following shall be
Section 5. Administrative Adoption and Rectification. - A person or persons who
required:
simulated the birth of a child under the conditions provided under Section 4 of this Act
may avail of administrative proceedings for the adoption and rectification of the
simulated birth record of such child: Provided, That the child has been living with the (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
person for at least three (3) years before the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further, That
a certificate declaring the child legally available for adoption (CDCLAA) is issued by the (b) The legitimate and adopted daughters and sons, ten (10) years of age or
DSWD in favor of such child. over, of the adopter and adoptee, if any;

Section 6. Inadmissible Evidence. - All petitions, documents, records, and papers (c) The illegitimate daughters and sons, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
relating to adoption and rectification of simulated births under this Act cannot be used as adopter if living with said adopter and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
evidence against those who simulated the birth of a child or who cooperated in the
execution of such simulation in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding. (d) The spouse, if any, of the adoptee.1âwphi1

ARTICLE III ARTICLE IV

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ADOPTION ADMINISTRATIVE ADOPTION PROCEDURE

Section 9. Petition. - The petition for adoption with an application for rectification of
simulated birth record shall be in the form of an affidavit and shall be subscribed and
sworn to by the petitioner or petitioners before any person authorized by law to
administer affirmations and oaths. It shall state the facts necessary to establish the
merits of the petition, and the circumstances surrounding the simulation of the birth of
the child. The petition shall be supported by the following:
(a) A copy of simulated birth or foundling certificate of the child;
(b) Affidavit of admission if the simulation of birth was done by a third person;
(c) Certification issued and signed by the punong barangay attesting that the
petitioner or petitioners is a resident or are residents of the barangay, and that
the child has been living with the petitioner or petitioners for at least three (3)
years prior to the effectivity of this Act;
(d) Affidavits of at least two (2) disinterested persons, who reside in the same
barangay where the child resides, attesting that the child has been living with
the petitioner for at least three (3) years prior to the effectivity of this Act;
(e) CDCLAA issued by the DSWD; and
(f) Photographs of the child and the petitioner or petitioners taken within the last
three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition.
A CDCLAA shall no longer be required if the adoptee is already an adult or a relative of
the adopter within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity.
Section 10. Adoption Process. - The petition shall be filed with the Office of the Social
Welfare and Development Officer (SWDO) of the city or municipality where the child
resides. The SWDO shall have seven (7) days to examine the petition and its supporting
documents and determine whether the same is sufficient in form and substance. If the
SWDO finds that the petition is insufficient in form or substance, the SWDO shall return
the same to the petitioner with a written explanation of its insufficiency. If the SWDO
finds the petition sufficient in form and substance, the SWDO shall forward the petition
and the supporting documents within three (3) days to the Regional Director.
The Regional Director shall review the petition, establish the identity of the child, and
prepare the recommendation on the petition not later than thirty (30) days from receipt
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 205
thereof. The Regional Director may require the petitioner to submit additional information
or evidence to support the petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply with such
request shall not preclude the Regional Director from acting on the petition based on the
evidence on hand.
The Regional Director shall transmit to the Secretary the recommendation on the petition
together with a copy of the petition and supporting documents.
The Secretary shall act and decide on the petition within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the recommendation of the Regional Director.
Section 11. Order of Adoption. - If the Secretary determines that the adoption shall
redound to the best interest of the child, an order of adoption shall be issued which shall
take effect on the date the petition was filed with the Office of the SWDO, even if the
petitioner dies before its issuance.
The order of adoption shall state the name by which the adoptee shall be known and
shall likewise direct the:
(a) Cancellation of the simulated birth record of the child;
(b) Issuance of the rectified birth record bearing the names of the biological
parents of the child or the issuance of a foundling certificate; and
(c) Issuance of a new birth certificate.
An administrative adoption order obtained under this Act shall have the same effect as a
decree of adoption issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
"Domestic Adoption Act of 1998".
Section 12. Civil Registry Record. - The Secretary shall immediately transmit the order
of adoption to the concerned DSWD Regional Office, which shall in turn provide copies
to the petitioners, the concerned agencies and the appropriate local civil registrar.
The Local Civil Registrar shall stamp the simulated birth record "cancelled" with an
annotation of the issuance of a new rectified certificate of birth in its place. The rectified
birth certificate bearing the names of the biological parents of the child or the foundling
certificate shall then likewise be stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance
of a new birth record in its place, and shall be sealed in the civil registry records.

Thereafter, the Local Civil Registrar shall record, register, and issue a new certificate of
birth which shall not bear any notation that it is a new or amended issue.
Section 13. Socialized Fees. - The city or municipal SWDO, the Regional Director, and
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar may charge socialized fees to those who avail of
the administrative adoption proceedings under this Act. Fees shall be waived if the
petitioner is indigent.
Section 14. Confidentiality. - All petitions, documents, records, and papers relating to
administrative adoption proceedings in the files of the city or municipal SWDOs, the
DSWD central and field offices, or any other agency or institution participating in such
proceedings shall be strictly confidential.
The disclosure of any information shall be allowed only upon the written request of the
adoptee or in the case of a minor adoptee, her or his guardian.1âwphi1
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADOPTION
Section 15. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate daughter or
son of the adopter for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights
and obligations provided by law to legitimate daughters or sons born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.
Section 16. Parental Authority. - Except where a biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee shall be severed
and the same shall then be vested in the adopter.
Section 17. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate
filiation. However, if the adoptee and her or his biological parents left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.
ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADOPTION
Section 18. Grounds for Rescission. - Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance
of the city or municipal SWDO or the DSWD if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 206
age but is incapacitated, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds
committed by the adopter:
(a) Repeated physical or verbal maltreatment by the adopter;
(b) Attempt on the life of the adoptee;
(c) Sexual assault or violence;
(d) Abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations; or
(e) Other acts that are detrimental to the psychological and emotional
development of the adoptee.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article
919 of the Civil Code.
Section 19. Rescission of Administrative Adoption. - The process for administrative
adoption as provided under Section 10 of this Act shall apply to the rescission of
administrative adoption: Provided, That the concerned SWDO, Regional Director, and
the Secretary shall act immediately on the petition for rescission bearing in mind the best
interest of the child.
The Secretary shall furnish a copy of the order of rescission to the concerned DSWD
Regional Office, which shall in turn provide copies to the petitioner, the concerned
agencies and the concerned local civil registrar. Thereafter, the concerned local civil
registrar shall cancel the new certificate of birth of the adoptee, and restore the
adoptee’s rectified birth certificate bearing the name/s of the biological parents, or the
foundling certificate, as the case may be.
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. - If the petition for rescission of administrative
adoption is granted by the Secretary, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological
parents, if known, shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The
reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 207

Successional rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of
judgment of administrative rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to administrative
rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the
penalties imposable under the Revised Penal Code if the criminal acts are proven.
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
Section 21. Violations and Penalties. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any
person who shall commit any of the following acts:
and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act within sixty (60) days from its
effectivity.
Section 24. Repealing Clause. - Section 22 of Republic Act No. 8552 is hereby
repealed. All other laws, decrees, letters of instruction, executive issuances, resolutions,
orders or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed, modified, or amended accordingly.
Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision or part of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the remaining parts or provisions not affected shall remain in
full force and effect.
Section 26. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

(a) Obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud,
improper material inducement, or other similar acts;

(b) Noncompliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by law for the
adoption; or

(c) Subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or

exploitation.

ARTICLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 22. Information Dissemination. - The DSWD, in coordination with the

Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Department of Education
(DepEd), the Department of Health (DOH), various national leagues of local government
units, the Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC), and the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA), shall disseminate to the public information regarding this Act and its
implementation.

Section 23. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Secretary, after due

consultation with the PSA, the DILG, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the CWC,
together with representatives from the Association of Local Civil Registrars, child-caring
and child-placing agencies, and child’s rights civil society organizations, shall issue rules

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164948             June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,  Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No.
2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of
America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition 3 for
the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; 4 Elma
Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; 5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who
was born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19,
1990,7 the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their
biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by
her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos
nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors
are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad;
as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children;
the minors have given their written consent 8 to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as
shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are
already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in
her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 208
children gave their written consent 9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after
publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor
children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the
petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name follow the family name of
petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises. 10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4,
2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. 11 The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) entered its appearance 12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to
appear in its behalf.13 Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the
adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings. 15 The
petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her
children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized
by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent. 16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field
Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed
Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their
adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to
provide the parental care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of
Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.

2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness
to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint
Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment
to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also
family to look after. As young adolescents they really need parental love, care,
guidance and support to ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D.
Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt
Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with
considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments was already
developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors. 17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3
weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the
adoption of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was
conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal
relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much
concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption,
they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their
temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the
benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her
children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she
already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her
children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she
believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position
to provide a secured and bright future to her children. 18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present
any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 209
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a
decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and
maintenance from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and
purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
considering that parent-children relationship has long been established between the
children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from
"Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him
to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-
mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its
brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE
THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE
THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS
REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE
PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO
SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision 22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held
that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the

children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children
could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and
was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although
petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in
its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari 26 on September 7, 2004,
assigning the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND
MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF
WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE
AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO
SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the
petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological
mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed
by the petitioner-adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or
not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in
Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 210
interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as
to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court also ruled that the liberality with which
this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent
purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective.
The Court’s position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to
inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to
approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child
but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled
and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the
written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 211

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers,
and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of
the proposed adoption.32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and
re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons
the child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such an abandonment.35 To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment
must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.36
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove
her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioner’s testimony on that
matter follows:

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia
Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said
Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is
incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent
to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia
Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she
communicated with the family?

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no A None, sir.
longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and
never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal
Q How about with her children?
grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the
children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively
A None, sir.
abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after
12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her
child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the
social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner. A I do not know, sir.

Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.
guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother
of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written Q From whom did you learn that?
consent of their legal guardian.
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his
consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. 33 The Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?
term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?
A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of
their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of
their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her
children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children financially,
even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother
also sends financial support but very minimal.39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps
them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 212
their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she
already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt. 40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that
they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which
include the petitioner had continued providing support for them. However being
ashamed of just depending on the support of her husband’s relatives, she decided to
work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in
going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care &
custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on
November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became
live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The
three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning
to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his
legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her
parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The
petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the
needs & education of minors up to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the
country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or
relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased
mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for
serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the
children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the
effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees,
and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter. 42 It would thus be against the
spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in

deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More
proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that
the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting
parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of
the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose
or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as
exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered. 44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of
Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise,
failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children 45 was notarized on
January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same
way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No.
2103,46 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign
country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are
made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister,
secretary of legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of
the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is
accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country
to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the
act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act
and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required
to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in
subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or
the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 213
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication
shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment
was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and
that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was taken,
and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the
afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document
whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate
the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to
support the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and
commitment of her children and her siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that
she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a
house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month.
Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial
backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement
in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears
that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support
the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a
position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that
the financial capacity of prospective parents should also 
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to
support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report 49 forwarded by the Department of Public
Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no
longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual
lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old,
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 214

employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around
$1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter
to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same
is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a
hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only
has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the
financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating
that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only
creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings and her children are financially
able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again
sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces
and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the
CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the
herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 215

Republic of the Philippines old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. 3 Michael
SUPREME COURT was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1
Manila August 1983.4

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 168992-93               May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records
and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000,
petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty 5 given
under Republic Act No. 8552 6(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25
years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
DECISION
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

CARPIO, J.:
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her
The Case natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael. 11

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which
dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim
and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The
trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article
185 of the Family Code.

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23
June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children 2 were named Michelle
P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in
the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner
did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable
because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and

certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in
this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption
is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child
acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty
of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to
adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case
since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband
Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA
8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 216
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children,
at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter
and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she
has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country
as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being
an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in
his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the
latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 217
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not
affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person
to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains
the age of majority or 18 years of age 16 — emancipation terminates parental authority
over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for
all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse
of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of
the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18.  Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate
filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 218

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child
is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory
heirs of each other. 18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights 19 of a
legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other
successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled 20 such as
support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples
or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of
his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until
and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption
is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion
of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a
manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied
with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the
Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case
at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the
matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption.
(Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition 1 to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the
absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive
parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be
adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of
the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 219
care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than
enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes,
shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189
of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for
every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name
or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest
of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids
the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name
is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 220

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her
natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate
heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her
relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name,
if any, will be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously
married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as
‘Mrs.’

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as
the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume
her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
name and surname employed before the legal separation.
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with Article 370.
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate
the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of
Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use .
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname
of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom
of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of
the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 221
the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of
the surname and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family
to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname
of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother,
how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his
point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father
and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article
364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person
himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example:
Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile
but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is
Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect
that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may
use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane
stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since
in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so
that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so
many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given
name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even
include the Clan name.

xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use
of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it
only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. 14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15 It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 16 The modern trend is to
consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention
of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 21 of the Family Code and
Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 222
and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is
a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 24, Article V of RA 8552 (law
on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house
built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner
provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father.
She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence,
to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain
her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption –
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 25 The interests and welfare
of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, 26 hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 223

the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized
by some way of interpreting the law."28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural

father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in

the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as
her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree
of adoption.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
October 15, 2014
G.R. No. 188801
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO and JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO,
A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" and "JAYROSE M. CASTRO", Petitioners  had homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for
vs.
JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO and ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO,
Respondents
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of
notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all
instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the
other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal
service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive
service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by
petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the
trial court that granted respondents’ decree of adoption. 3
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio
(Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is
the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne
Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria
Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City. Their
marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in
1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 224
allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between
them.4
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a
year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if
she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during
weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose
fifteen (15) years despite their separation(.)"6
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition 7 for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of
Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), 8whom Rosario alleged was his
erstwhile housekeeper.9
At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old. 10 According to the Home
Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to
a prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of former Governor
Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. 12 The report mentioned that
he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children. 13 It also
stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him
two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March 1989. 14 Under "Motivation for
Adoption," the social welfare officer noted:
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill
his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will
fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . . .
15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in
Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth’s
death in July 1995.17
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, 18 having ruled that "[n]o
opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the government

which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General." 19 A certificate of
finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed a
complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 21 In her
complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter,
Joanne, for the past 36 years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and
provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver
and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting
Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne’s knowledge and
consent.23 She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that
Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry’s wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for
his homosexual relationship with Larry.24
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in
his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always offered help,
but it was often declined. 25 He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because
they are his illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the falsification
alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him
paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because several properties
had to be sold to pay for medical treatments. 26 He then implored the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and equity." 27
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. 28
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to
annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina’s
adoption.29
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime
in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario’s affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as
"Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates
showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time
she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose
and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry,
Jose’s driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not
actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who
were married at the time of their birth. 34 On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied
the petition.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 225
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the
spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the
hearing."35
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] in
obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the
interests of his legitimate heirs" 36 but stated that its hands were bound by the trial court
decision that had already attained "finality and immutability." 37
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the
different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the
persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment
of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment. 38
When Rosario and Joanne’s motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10,
2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition
for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the
law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment. 40 They argue that because of the
fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth
certificates presented as evidence before the trial court, 41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from
them.42
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law on
jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable
parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not
only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and
such consent was never secured from Joanne.44
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have been
deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply protected by the
participation and representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized public
prosecutor."45

Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only
notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings. 46 They argue
that since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be
extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of
judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because
adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the state. 48
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with
the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner."49
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it
may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final
order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is
not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting
the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by
prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for
annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or
final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine
of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the
dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability
serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an
end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 226
courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification
is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to
the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which
annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four
years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred
by estoppel or laches.52
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action
or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. 53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other
hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment
itself but to the manner in which it is procured."54
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was
obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption
proceedings vis-à-vis the law on
adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the
adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action." 55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on
August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 56 which applies over the proceedings. The
law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.

Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the
consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock:
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:
....
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of
Michelle P. Lim:57
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 227
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose,
however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the
law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have
had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent
was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years
old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly
counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the
adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: . . . .
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among
the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will
have to share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another
person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was
over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent,
therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and
Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the
proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552.1âwphi1 Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse
and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not
enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have been
committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is
erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully
exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of
a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years from
discovery.61 Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005.
The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of the
parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. 62 Larry and Lilibeth were
residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City. 63 Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila. 65 The petition for
adoption, however, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. 66 The trial
court gave due course to the petition on Jose’s bare allegation in his petition that he was
a resident of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he was a
practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68
Second, using the process of delayed registration, 69 Jose was able to secure birth
certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry as merely the
informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured:
one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila, 71 and
another wherein the portion for the mother’s name was not filled in at all. 72 The birth
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 228
certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that
their father was Larry R. Rentegrado. 73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to the
birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation for
adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were childless, 74 to the prejudice of their
daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario
and alleged to be fraudulent.75
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in approving
his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in the proceedings
or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on the
basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured testimonies" 76 presented during the
trial. It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other
party was either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such
instrument or testimony was presented in court, thus:
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just
determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification
and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication
of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in
court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means,
including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination, resorting to the
modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of
documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been
regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not,
therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during
the trial.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court
would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 229

Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under
Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more
than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be
imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
father, her parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never even
benefited from any monetary support from her father. Despite all these adversities,
Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the University of the Philippines
College of Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in Canada. 81 These
accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed
to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is
rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper
material inducement, or other similar acts;

(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for
adoption; or

(iii)subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.

(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the
name(s)of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parents(s) shall be guilty of
simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayorin its medium period and a
fine not exceeding Fifty thousand peso (P50,000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal
liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of
adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners
also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 79 since rescission of
adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no
other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.

The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to
believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the love and care of a
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 230

Republic of the Philippines Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves
SUPREME COURT the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the
Manila EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the
intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE
THIRD DIVISION wages equivalent to one month's salary.

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990 xxx xxx xxx

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner,  10. APPLICABLE LAW:

vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE
LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES
and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for private respondents.
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the
laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have
the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this
agreement.
Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they
began discharging their job functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and
flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.

FELICIANO, J.:
On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2)
separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales
and the other with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig. 1The contracts, which became
effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended
by the mutual consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the
contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the
local branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private
respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight
stewardesses would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause
6 (b) of the employment agreement [they had) executed with [PIA]." 2
On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a
complaint, docketed as NCR-STF-95151-80, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment ("MOLE"). After several unfruitful attempts at conciliation, the MOLE
hearing officer Atty. Jose M. Pascual ordered the parties to submit their position papers
and evidence supporting their respective positions. The PIA submitted its position
paper, 3 but no evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were habitual
absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of
"personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been
discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that
practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were
terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.

In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella ordered the
reinstatement of private respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the
payment to them of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the
fixed three-year period of their employment contracts; the payment to private respondent
Mamasig of an amount equivalent to the value of a round trip ticket Manila-USA Manila;
and payment of a bonus to each of the private respondents equivalent to their one-
month salary. 4 The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of
regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that
the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to three (3) years was null
and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and
regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been
carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled
private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
On appeal, in an Order dated 12 August 1982, Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Deputy
Minister, MOLE, adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director
and affirmed the latter's award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option, in lieu
of reinstatement, "to pay each of the complainants [private respondents] their salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .". 5
In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner PIA assails the award of the Regional
Director and the Order of the Deputy Minister as having been rendered without
jurisdiction; for having been rendered without support in the evidence of record since,
allegedly, no hearing was conducted by the hearing officer, Atty. Jose M. Pascual; and
for having been issued in disregard and in violation of petitioner's rights under the
employment contracts with private respondents.
1. Petitioner's first contention is that the Regional Director, MOLE, had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint initiated by private respondents for illegal
dismissal, jurisdiction over the same being lodged in the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") It appears to us beyond dispute,
however, that both at the time the complaint was initiated in September 1980 and at the
time the Orders assailed were rendered on January 1981 (by Regional Director
Francisco L. Estrella) and August 1982 (by Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr.), the
Regional Director had jurisdiction over termination cases.
Art. 278 of the Labor Code, as it then existed, forbade the termination of the services of
employees with at least one (1) year of service without prior clearance from the
Department of Labor and Employment:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 231
Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions —  . . .
(b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down
his establishment or dismiss or terminate the employment of
employees with at least one year of service during the last two (2)
years, whether such service is continuous or broken, without prior
written authority issued in accordance with such rules and regulations
as the Secretary may promulgate . . . (emphasis supplied)
Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code, made clear that in case of a termination without the necessary clearance,
the Regional Director was authorized to order the reinstatement of the
employee concerned and the payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore,
the Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction over such termination
cases:
Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. — Any shutdown or
dismissal without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be
termination of employment without a just cause. The Regional Director
shall, in such case order the immediate reinstatement of the employee
and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or
dismissal until the time of reinstatement. (emphasis supplied)
Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Secretary of Labor, dated 23 April 1976,
was similarly very explicit about the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over
termination of employment cases:
Under PD 850, termination cases — with or without CBA — are now
placed under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Director.
Preventive suspension cases, now made cognizable for the first time,
are also placed under the Regional Director. Before PD 850,
termination cases where there was a CBA were under the jurisdiction
of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, while termination
cases where there was no CBA were under the jurisdiction of the
Conciliation Section.
In more details, the major innovations introduced by PD 850 and its
implementing rules and regulations with respect to termination and
preventive suspension cases are:

1. The Regional Director is now required to rule on every application for
clearance, whether there is opposition or not, within ten days from
receipt thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
2. The second contention of petitioner PIA is that, even if the Regional Director had
jurisdiction, still his order was null and void because it had been issued in violation of
petitioner's right to procedural due process . 6 This claim, however, cannot be given
serious consideration. Petitioner was ordered by the Regional Director to submit not only
its position paper but also such evidence in its favor as it might have. Petitioner opted to
rely solely upon its position paper; we must assume it had no evidence to sustain its
assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing was conducted, petitioner had ample
opportunity to explain its side. Moreover, petitioner PIA was able to appeal his case to
the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 7
There is another reason why petitioner's claim of denial of due process must be rejected.
At the time the complaint was filed by private respondents on 21 September 1980 and at
the time the Regional Director issued his questioned order on 22 January 1981,
applicable regulation, as noted above, specified that a "dismissal without prior clearance
shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a cause", and
the Regional Director was required in such case to" order the immediate reinstatement
of the employee and the payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismiss
until . . . reinstatement." In other words, under the then applicable rule, the Regional
Director did not even have to require submission of position papers by the parties in
view of the conclusive (juris et de jure) character of the presumption created by such
applicable law and regulation. In Cebu Institute of Technology v. Minister of Labor and
Employment, 8 the Court pointed out that "under Rule 14, Section 2, of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations, the termination of [an employee] which was without previous
clearance from the Ministry of Labor is conclusively presumed to be without [just] cause .
. . [a presumption which] cannot be overturned by any contrary proof however strong."
3. In its third contention, petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of
employment with private respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its
relationship with them was governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the
general provisions of the Labor Code. 9
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 232
Paragraph 5 of that contract set a term of three (3) years for that relationship, extendible
by agreement between the parties; while paragraph 6 provided that, notwithstanding any
other provision in the Contract, PIA had the right to terminate the employment
agreement at any time by giving one-month's notice to the employee or, in lieu of such
notice, one-months salary.
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues, since a
contract is the law between the parties. 10 The principle of party autonomy in contracts is
not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the
contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem
convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is
the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to
matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. 11 Put a little
differently, the governing principle is that parties may not contract away applicable
provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily
impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such
an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from
the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is thus
necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of
their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.
As noted earlier, both the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Minister, MOLE, in effect held
that paragraph 5 of that employment contract was inconsistent with Articles 280 and 281
of the Labor Code as they existed at the time the contract of employment was entered
into, and hence refused to give effect to said paragraph 5. These Articles read as
follows:
Art. 280. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized by this Title An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time his reinstatement.
Art. 281. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade

of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and
the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered
at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied)
In Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Ronaldo Zamora, etc., et al.,  12 the Court had occasion to
examine in detail the question of whether employment for a fixed term has been
outlawed under the above quoted provisions of the Labor Code. After an extensive
examination of the history and development of Articles 280 and 281, the Court reached
the conclusion that a contract providing for employment with a fixed period was not
necessarily unlawful:
There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from
the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to
preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should
be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals, etc.
But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown, or stated
otherwise, where the reason for the law does not exist e.g. where it is
indeed the employee himself who insists upon a period or where the
nature of the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a
specific project, a definite date of termination is a sine qua non  would
an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore
anathema Would such an agreement come within the scope of Article
280 which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of the
right of the employee to be secured in . . . (his) employment?"
As it is evident from even only the three examples already given
that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment
contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but
would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right
of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 233
engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should
be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given reasonable
interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the
whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle
of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employers" using it as a
means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is
like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a
headache by lopping off the head.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of
legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code
clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent
circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the
clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all
written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular
employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the
substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements
entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have
no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was
agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any
force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or
where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt
with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance
whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus
limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes
other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes
pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd
and unintended consequences. (emphasis supplied)
It is apparent from Brent School that the critical consideration is the presence or
absence of a substantial indication that the period specified in an employment
agreement was designed to circumvent the security of tenure of regular
employees which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. This
indication must ordinarily rest upon some aspect of the agreement other than
the mere specification of a fixed term of the ernployment agreement, or upon
evidence aliunde of the intent to evade.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 234

Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on
petitioner PIA and private respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of
together and when so read, the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law. 14
will be seen to have been effectively neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that
agreement. Paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were illegally dismissed
period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative and that public respondent Deputy Minister, MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse
one at the option of the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to of discretion nor any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their
shorten that term, at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month reinstatement with backwages. Private respondents are entitled to three (3) years
period, or even less by simply paying the employee a month's salary. Because the net backwages without qualification or deduction. Should their reinstatement to their former
effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the or other substantially equivalent positions not be feasible in view of the length of time
employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the which has gone by since their services were unlawfully terminated, petitioner should be
pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to required to pay separation pay to private respondents amounting to one (1) month's
prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during salary for every year of service rendered by them, including the three (3) years service
the limited period of three (3) years,13 and thus to escape completely the thrust of putatively rendered.
Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari  is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which the Order dated 12 August 1982 of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED, except that
specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, (1) private respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages, without deduction or
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with qualification; and (2) should reinstatement of private respondents to their former
the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 positions or to substantially equivalent positions not be feasible, then petitioner shall, in
cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to lieu thereof, pay to private respondents separation pay amounting to one (1)-month's
the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee relationship between salary for every year of service actually rendered by them and for the three (3) years
petitioner PIA and private respondents. We have already pointed out that the putative service by private respondents. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 13
relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable September 1982 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.
Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon
some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second SO ORDERED.
clause of paragraph 10, specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the
settlement of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the
relevant circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts
between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship
between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the
Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are
Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is
licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the
Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their
assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the
Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of
contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of
the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and
courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event,

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5897             April 23, 1954
KING MAU WU, plaintiff-appellee,  Chemical Bank & Trust Company for a sum not to exceed $400,000 was established
vs.
FRANCISCO SYCIP, defendant-appellant.
I.C. Monsod for appellant.
J.A. Wolfson and P. P. Gallardo for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an action to collect P59,082.92, together with lawful interests from 14 October
1947, the date of the written demand for payment, and costs. The claim arises out of a
shipment of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion sold by the plaintiff, as agent of the
defendant, to Jas. Maxwell Fassett, who in turn assigned it to Fortrade Corporation.
Under an agency agreement set forth in a letter dated 7 November 1946 in New York
addressed to the defendant and accepted by the latter on the 22nd day of the same
month, the plaintiff was made the exclusive agent of the defendant in the sale of coconut
oil and its derivatives outside the Philippines and was to be paid 2 1/2 per cent on the
total actual sale price of sales obtained through his efforts in addition thereto 50 per cent
of the difference between the authorized sale price and the actual sale price.
After the trial where the depositions of the plaintiff and of Jas. Maxwell Fassett and
several letters in connection therewith were introduced and the testimony of the
defendant was heard, the Court rendered judgment as prayed for in the complaint. A
motion for reconsideration was denied. A motion for a new trial was filed, supported by
the defendant's affidavit, based on newly discovered evidence which consists of a
duplicate original of a letter dated 16 October 1946 covering the sale of 1,000 tons of
coconut oil soap emulsion signed by Jas. Maxwell Fassett assigned by the latter to the
defendant; the letter of credit No. 20122 of the Chemical Bank & Trust Company in favor
of Jas. Maxwell Fassett assigned by the latter to the defendant; and a letter dated 16
December 1946 by the Fortrade Corporation to Jas. Maxwell Fassett accepted it on 24
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 235
December 1946, all of which documents, according to the defendant, could not be
produced at the trial, despite the use of reasonable diligence, and if produced they
would alter the result of the controversy. The motion for new trial was denied. The
defendant is appealing from said judgment.
Both parties agreed that the only transaction or sale made by the plaintiff, as agent of
the defendant, was that of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion f.o.b. in Manila,
Philippines, to Jas. Maxwell Fassett, in whose favor letter of credit No. 20112 of the
and who assigned to Fortrade Corporation his fight to the 1,000 metric tons of coconut
oil emulsion and in the defendant the letter of credit referred to for a sum not to exceed
$400,000.
The plaintiff claims that for that sale he is entitled under the agency contract dated 7
November 1946 and accepted by the defendant on 22 November of the same year to a
commission of 2 1/2 per cent on the total actual sale price of 1,000 tons of coconut oil
emulsion, part of which has been paid by the defendant, there being only a balance of
$3,794.94 for commission due and unpaid on the last shipment of 379.494 tons and 50
per cent of the difference between the authorized sale price of $350 per ton and the
actual selling price of $400 per ton, which amounts to $25,000 due and unpaid, and
$746.52 for interest from 14 October 1947, the date of the written demand.
The defendant, on the other hand, contends that the transaction for the sale of 1,000
metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was not covered by the agency contract of 22
November 1946 because it was agreed upon on 16 October 1946; that it was an
independent and separate transaction for which the plaintiff has been duly
compensated. The contention is not borne out by the evidence. The plaintiff and his
witness depose that there were several drafts of documents or letter prepared by Jas.
Maxwell Fassett preparatory or leading to the execution of the agency agreement of 7
November 1946, which was accepted by the defendant on 22 November 1946, and that
the letter, on which the defendant bases his contention that the transaction on the 1,000
metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was not covered by the agency agreement, was one
of those letters. That is believable. The letter upon which defendant relies for his
defense does not stipulate on the commission to be paid to the plaintiff as agent, and yet
if he paid the plaintiff a 2 1/2 per cent commission on the first three coconut oil emulsion
shipments, there is no reason why he should not pay him the same commission on the
last shipment amounting to $3,794.94. There can be no doubt that the sale of 1,000
metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was not a separate and independent contract from
that of the agency agreement on 7 November and accepted on 22 November 1946 by
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 236

the defendant, because in a letter dated 2 January 1947 addressed to the plaintiff,
referring to the transaction of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion, the defendant
says —
. . . I am doing everything possible to fulfill these 1,000 tons of emulsion, and
until such time that we completed this order I do not feel it very sensible on my
part to accept any more orders. I want to prove to Fortrade, yourself and other
people that we deliver our goods. Regarding your commission, it is understood
to be 2 1/2 per cent of all prices quoted by me plus 50-50 on over price.
(Schedule B.)
In another letter dated 16 January 1957 to the plaintiff, speaking of the same
transaction, the defendant says —
The contention that as the contract was executed in New York, the Court of First
Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over this case, is without merit, because a non-
resident may sue a resident in the courts of this country 1where the defendant may be
summoned and his property leviable upon execution in the case of a favorable, final and
executory judgment. It is a personal action for the collection of a sum of money which
the Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to try and decide. There is no conflict of
laws involved in the case, because it is only a question of enforcing an obligation
created by or arising from contract; and unless the enforcement of the contract be
against public policy of the forum, it must be enforced.
The plaintiff is entitled to collect P7,589.88 for commission and P50,000 for one-half of
the overprice, or a total of P57,589.88, lawful interests thereon from the date of the filing
of the complaint, and costs in both instances.

As per our understanding when I was in the States the overprice is subject to As thus modified the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
any increase in the cost of production. I am not trying to make things difficult for appellant.
you and I shall give you your 2 1/2 per cent commission plus our overprice
provided you can give me substantial order in order for me to amortize my loss
on this first deal. Unless such could be arranged I shall remit to you for the
present your commission upon collection from the bank. (Schedule C.)

In a telegram sent by the defendant to the plaintiff the former says —

. . . Your money pending stop understand you authorized some local attorneys
and my relatives to intervene your behalf. (Schedule D.)

The defendant's claim that the agreement for the sale of the 1,000 metric tons of
coconut oil emulsion was agreed upon in a document, referring to the letter of 16
October 1946, is again disproved by his letter dated 2 December 1946 to Fortrade
Corporation where he says:

The purpose of this letter is to confirm in final form the  oral agreement which we
have heretofore reached, as between ourselves, during the course of various
conversations between us and our respective representatives upon the subject
matter of this letter.

It is understood that I am to sell to you, and you are to purchase from me, 1,000
tons of coconut oil soap emulsion at a price of $400. per metric ton, i.e. 2,204.6
pounds, F.O.B. shipboard, Manila, P.I. (Exhibit S, Special. Emphasis supplied.)

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 72456 February 19, 1987
LUZ J. HENSON, petitioner,  one month before this contract expires, informs the
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ELY FUDERANAN and LUISA
COMMENDADOR, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Whether or not the judicial interpretation of the lease contract amounts to the courts'
contracting for the parties is the issue in this petition for review of the decision of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court which upheld the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the petitioner's complaint for recovery of the balance of unpaid rentals due for
one year under the lease contract in question.
The petitioner leases out office spaces in her building at #494 Soldado Street, Ermita,
Manila. The lessee in the disputed lease contract was designated as Sto. Niño Travel
and Tour Agency, a sole proprietorship duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, represented by private respondent Ely Fuderanan, its President and
General Manager.
On May 15, 1980, the petitioner received the sum of P 8,000.00 as "reservation deposit"
for Apartment No. 116 at Luz J. Henson Building for which she issued a receipt to
private respondent Fuderanan as follows:
This reservation is good up to May 15, 1980, at 4:00 P.M.; failure to
sign the Lease Contract, pay the required Three (3) months advance
rental and Three (3) months guarantee deposits, the reservation is
forfeited, monthly rental is P 2,000.00-net of W. H. Tax. Lease Contract
is for one year.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 237
On the same day, the petitioner and private respondent Fuderanan entered into a lease
contract which in part, provides:
1. That this contract shall have a duration of one year,
commencing from May 15, 1980; Provided that, at the
expiration hereof, the lease shall be deemed renewed
on a month to month basis under the same terms and
conditions as this contract, unless either party, at least
other in writing of his desire not to be bound anymore
after said period; Provided Further, that should
LESSEE terminate this contract before its termination
or be cancelled for any of the causes enumerated, the
LESSEE shall for his breach of this contract, have his
guarantee deposit automatically forfeited and still be
liable to LESSOR as penalty and liquidated damages
for the rentals of the unexpired portion of this lease,
irrespective of whether or not LESSOR subsequently
finds another person to lease the vacated premises
for the duration of said unexpired portion;
2. That LESSEE agrees to pay rentals for the
premises leased as above-described at the rate of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS Net of Withholding Tax
(P2,000.00), Philippine Currency, a month, due and
payable without need of further demand and notice on
the due date of the corresponding month, at
LESSOR's office or residence; LESSEE shall pay in
advance the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P6,000.00), Philippine Currency, as rentals for the
first two (2) months of this contract and one month
end of lease. Rentals are payable monthly in advance.
A fraction of a month is considered one month rental;
Upon execution of this contract, the LESSOR (should be LESSEE)
(shall) deposit with the LESSOR the amount equivalent to SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), three months rental. This deposit
shall answer for any damages, losses, breakage, utilities destroyed
including damages caused by renovation done on the leased premises

and any extensions thereof, and shall be returned only upon expiration
of this Lease Contract; Provided, that all Meralco Bills are fully paid and
that charges for any and all long distance calls are paid duly certified by
the PLDT Co. Nothing herein contained shall be understood as
granting the LESSEE the right to require, before the termination of this
lease, that this deposit shall be applied against over due rentals and
other outstanding accounts owing to LESSOR in order to keep the
LESSEE's account current, deposits bear no interest.
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to the lease contract between the petitioner and private respondent
Fuderanan, the latter paid Henson the amount of P6,000.00 in cash as deposit for
rentals, water service and four keys (Exhibit A-1) and P1,660.00 in cash and P4,640.00
in a postdated check as rentals due from May 15, 1980 to July 14, 1980 (Exhibit A-1
Exhibit D). This postdated check was later replaced by another postdated check of
private respondent Luisa Commendador which was dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds as indicated by the bank's dishonor slip (Exhibit D-1).
On May 30, 1980, the Chief of the Licensing and Inspection Division of the Bureau of
Tourism Services, Ministry of Tourism disapproved the request of the private
respondents to transfer their office to the premises owned by the petitioner on the
ground that the place failed to meet the minimum 50 square meter-space requirement of
the Bureau (Exhibit 6).
On June 10, 1980, the private respondents informed the petitioner in writing that they
had to vacate the leased premises in question on or about June 14, 1980 in view of the
disapproval of their request to operate their business in the office space rented from the
petitioner (Exhibit B).
On June 16, 1980, the petitioner notified the private respondents in writing of the
dishonor of Commendador's postdated check (Exhibit C).
On July 9, 1980, that petitioner wrote the private respondents demanding that they make
good their dishonored check in compliance with the terms and conditions of their lease
contract (Exhibits F and F-1).
On July 18, 1980, the private respondents replied by stating that they had to rescind the
lease contract and requested the refund of the amounts they paid by way of advance
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 238
and deposit rentals less the amount of rental due (Exhibit 5). Their request was not
granted by the petitioner (Exhibits E and E-1).
On January 16, 1981, the petitioner filed an action against the private respondents to
recover the value of the dishonored check worth P4,640.00 plus 12% interest per annum
from May 30, 1980 until paid and the amount of P22,000.00 as rental fees
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease contract between them.
On March 24, 1982, the private respondents filed their answer, which was later
amended on July 29, 1981, alleging, among others, that private respondent
Commendador was wrongly sued because she was not a party to the lease contract
having issued the check merely for accommodation purposes; that the private
respondents did not make good the dishonored check since the Ministry of Tourism had
disapproved their request to transfer their office to the petitioner's premises; and that
under the circumstances the private respondents had no other alternative but to rescind
the lease contract and vacate the premises. A counterclaim was filed for the refund of
P6,200.00 representing the advance rentals paid by the private respondents and for the
award of moral damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.
After trial, the trial court, on March 18, 1982, rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint
of the plaintiff Luz J. Henson against the defendants Ely Fuderanan
and Luisa Commendador, doing business under the name and style
"Sto. Nino Travel and Tours Agency," and upon the latter's
counterclaim against the former, ordering the plaintiff to refund to the
defendants the amount of P5,600.00. Costs against the plaintiff.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. A motion for reconsideration was
denied in a resolution dated October 9, 1985. Hence, this present petition assigning as
errors the following:
I
The Intermediate Appellate Court erred when its decision' made a new
contract' for the parties.
II

The Intermediate Appellate Court erred in rendering a decision not
sanctioned by equity.
The Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner's complaint thereby giving the
private respondents the right to a refund of the sum they advanced as rental fees when
they executed the contract of lease. The court did not find the private respondents in
breach of their obligations under said contract. In the words of the appellate court:
The reason for the non-compliance of the obligation to occupy the
leased premises came from a third party.
By "third party," it meant the Chief of the Licensing and Inspection Division of the Bureau
of Tourism Services, Ministry of Tourism.
We are constrained under the circumstances of this case to uphold the time-honored
principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Castro
v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 197). In the
case at bar, the lease contract executed by the petitioner and the private respondents
remains as the law between them. In litigations involving the adjudication of rights and
obligations between the lessor and the lessee, the lease contract shall govern (Chua
Peng Hian v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 572).
The disputed lease contract is plain and unequivocal in its terms. The stipulations are
expressed in clear and explicit language that leaves no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties. Nowhere is it provided in the contract that the fulfillment of the terms
and conditions of the lease depend upon an act of a third party, i.e., the final action to be
taken by the Chief of the Licensing and Inspection Division of the Bureau of Tourism.
Neither is there any indication from the evidence presented that would justify either of
the contracting parties to impugn the lease contract they executed.
The facts of the case constrain us to apply the rule that contracts are to be interpreted
according to their literal meaning when the terms and conditions are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties (Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 124
SCRA 630; Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276; see also Article 1370 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines). It was error on the part of the appellate court to make room for
construction of the provisions of the subject lease contract when the case plainly calls
for application thereof. We reiterate our ruling in the case of San Mauricio Mining
Company v. Ancheta (105 SCRA 371, 418) that:
xxx xxx xxx
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 239
... The primary and elementary rule of construction of documents is that
when the words or language thereof is clear and plain or readily
understandable by any ordinary reader thereof, there is absolutely no
room for interpretation or construction anymore. ... (See also Pichel v.
Alonzo, 111 SCRA 341)
The first stipulation in the disputed lease contract provided for a specific period of one
year as the duration of the lease. This ought to be followed (See Vda. de San Juan v.
Tan, 116 SCRA 447). For the respondent court to hold that the private respondents-
lessees are justified in disregarding their obligation to pay for the leased premises
throughout the term of the lease due to the requirement of the Ministry of Tourism that
travel agencies must operate their business in an area mandated by the rules is
tantamount to the court's revising the contract for the parties. The courts, be it the
original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties
(Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED, S.A., 138 SCRA 118).
Given the simple and unambiguous document of lease in this case, the lessees, at the
most, would be entitled to a refund of the advance rental fees only if the rule on equity
can be applied under the circumstances. However, there are no circumstances in this
case that warrant the application of equitable considerations.
The predicament in which Sto. Niño Travel and Tour Agency found itself is entirely of its
own making. It should have ascertained all the rules and requirements for the operation
of a travel agency before it even started to look for premises to house its office. The
petitioner had absolutely nothing to do with the private respondents' violating the
requirements. Moreover, the record shows that the petitioner-lessor offered the
occupancy of the bigger rooms in her apartments for lease to the private respondents in
order that they could meet the minimum space requirement of 50 square meters ordered
by the Ministry of Tourism. The private respondents declined the offer because they
were not willing to pay for the corresponding increase in the rental fees.
The appellate court opined that the petitioner, in offering the bigger rooms for lease at a
higher rent value, gave the private respondents no other choice but to stop the operation
of their travel agency business as against renting one of the bigger rooms and operating
at a loss in view of the increased rental fees. The records do not show upon what
evidence the respondent court based this finding. The questioned decision itself shows
that the court's conclusion is purely conjectural and cannot support the application of
equity. It states:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 240

However, the record shows that defendants-appellees finally rejected
leasing these larger rooms because the rents were "different." We
presume that, by the word "different," appellees meant the rents were
higher which they could not afford. (Emphasis supplied).
The rule that travel agencies should have at least 50 square meters of office space is a
reasonable regulation intended to dignify the business as a whole and avoid fly-by-night
operators working out of cramped and dingy quarters. If the private respondents did not
bother to look into this requirement before entering into a lease contract, they have no
right to visit upon the petitioner the results of their negligence.
The petitioner contends that under the disputed lease contract, the lessor is not bound to
make sure that her lessee realizes profit out of the latter's travel agency business while
occupying the leased premises in the same way that it is not incumbent upon her to see
to it that her lessee observes the regulatory measures laid down by the Ministry of
Tourism for travel agencies. She states that the only business with which she is
concerned is that of leasing office spaces in her apartment building to those lessees who
agree to the terms and conditions of the lease such as the private respondents. This
may be a rigid and hardhearted approach to the problem but it is correct. The contract of
lease was never conditioned on the lessees' ability to comply with governmental
requirements pertaining to their business. We also note that the contract was executed
on May 15, 1980. Part of the consideration was in the form of a postdated check for
P4,600.00. The denial by the Inspection Division of the Bureau of Tourism Services was
dated May 30, 1980. When the postdated check fell due the following day, May 31, the
funds to meet the check were insufficient and the bank had to dishonor the check.
electric, water and phone bills or the installation of safety measures in cases of fire and
other similar emergencies.
In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no question that the subject lease contract
which is the law between the parties herein admits of no gap that the rule on equity may
rightfully bridge.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered:
1. Ordering private respondent Ely Fuderanan to replace or pay the value of the
dishonored check of P4,640.00 with 12% interest per annum from May 30, 1980 until
paid;
2. Ordering private respondent Ely Fuderanan to pay the rentals corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the lease provided, however, that the P6,000.00 deposited by the
private respondent which the petitioner is obliged to return may be offset against the
unpaid rentals under the lease contract; and
3. Ordering private respondent Ely Fuderanan to pay P2,000.00 as attorney's fees plus
costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED

The private respondents argue that their failure to comply with their obligations under the
lease contract may be justified by Stipulation No. 9 in the lease contract which provides
that:

Compliance With Law. — The LESSEE shall promptly obey, execute

and fulfill any and all laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and orders of
the national or city government or of any bureau, board or commission
for the sanitation and safety of the leased premises.

The aforequoted stipulation in the lease contract must be read in the context of the
petitioner's business of leasing office spaces, not in that of the private respondents'
travel agency business. The laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, and orders which the
lessee ought to obey, execute, and fulfill pertain to those relating to the business of the
petitioner such as the payment of expenses for the deed of lease, the settlement of
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 241

Republic of the Philippines TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The
SUPREME COURT tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their
Manila daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

SECOND DIVISION While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of
their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in
at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on
the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993 already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13
on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,  two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to
vs. board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were,
INC., respondents. those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers.
Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board
the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.
denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he
was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not
be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to
book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine
NOCON, J.: Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.

Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on
007 departing from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its
of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court decision 1 dated January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion of which states as follows:
categorically ruled that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of
carriage with petitioners and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith." On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to
appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there was a breach of contract on
pay plaintiffs the following amounts:
respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of
Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is
(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment
allowed to overbook flights.
representing the price of the tickets bought by Suthira and Liana
Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
from New York City;

Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana
(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment,
Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
representing the price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;

(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty
Centavos (P8,934.50, Philippine Currency, representing the price of
Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007,
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as moral damages for all the plaintiffs'
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency,
as and for attorney's fees; and
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in
a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud
or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and
accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the
Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could
be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight
was overbooked and that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be denied
accommodation on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or
negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount
to bad faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along
with forty-eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority
over discounted tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals 3 dated October
25, 1991 states as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is
hereby MODIFIED in that the award of moral and exemplary damages
to the plaintiffs is eliminated, and the defendant-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 242
(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment,
representing the price of Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment,
representing the price of Cesar Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
(4) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review
on certiorari  and alleged the following errors committed by the respondent Court of
Appeals, to wit:
I.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON
THE PART OF RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO
OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.
II.
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA
TICKET AND PAYMENT FOR THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS.5
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be
disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 6 Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that

such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal
Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said
statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not
applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus  which
require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by
the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is
issued in such State by the defendant airline. 8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in
the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling
the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals,9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last
minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on
a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has
every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then
the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had
deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their
seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is
entitled to an award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private respondent
was not allowed to board the plane because her seat had already been given to another
passenger even before the allowable period for passengers to check in had lapsed
despite the fact that she had a confirmed ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court
held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating private respondent's rights under
their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a
result.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 243
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of
carriage amounts to bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 11 where a would-be passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage
claim and clearance from immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that she
was, in fact, included in the passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was denied
accommodation in said flight, this Court did not hesitate to affirm the lower court's finding
awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.  12 This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty
— a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be
paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch of planes
from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 because there were only 138 confirmed
economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller
planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first class passengers for the sake of
economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its
passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an
award of moral damages. 13
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of
bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of
carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA
should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly
inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such
eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were
written the name of the passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained
such a notice. An examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit
was not offered for the purpose of showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but
to show that Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New
York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged
policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at
the same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board
the plane ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding
was given priority over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 244

It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of
boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to
bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but
whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners'
contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that
effect. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were
duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of
boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to
rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York,
that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of
respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling
respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith.
Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under
their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes
respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent
TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary
damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana
Zalamea's ticket because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the
respondent court. Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act of respondent
TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence
or deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not accede to said
agreement. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners and respondent
TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course of action taken.
to Los Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court's ruling which ordered not
only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the
unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly
from New York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the
Civil Code which allows recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled
plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest. However, the award for
moral damages and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the
fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped off." An award of
P50,000.00 moral damages and another P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice
under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld
Airlines to pay damages to petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the
tickets bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to
fly to Los Angeles from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines
tickets purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that
(5) Costs of suit.
petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los
Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but
because respondent TWA could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight SO ORDERED.
which was also fully booked. 14 The purchase of the American Airlines tickets by
petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA's unjustifiable
breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In accordance with Article 2201, New
Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously
cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a
passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight
to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused
TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2935             March 23, 1909
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.
Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.  Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. The
defendant appealed. On the 12th day of October, 1905, the appellant filed his printed bill
of exceptions with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 5th day of December, 1905,
the appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 19th day of
January, 1906, the Attorney-General filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was
done in said cause until on or about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the respective
parties were requested by this court to prosecute the appeal under the penalty of having
the same dismissed for failure so to do; whereupon the appellant, by petition, had the
caused placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of February,
1909.
The facts from the record appear to be as follows:
First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the state of
Illinois, in the United States, the defendant, through a respective of the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two years
with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per
year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to
be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to
Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 245
Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the
part of the defendant, he should become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended
by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and
one-half salary paid during such period.
Third. The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of
April, 1903, and was paid half-salary from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his
arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service of the
plaintiff and refused to make further compliance with the terms of the contract.
of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23
dollars, which amount the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as expenses
incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half salary for the period consumed
in travel.
Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and
No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.
To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special
defense, alleging in his special defense that the Government of the Philippine Islands
had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said
contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was
therefore not responsible under the law.
To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the
court sustained.
Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial
of the cause, the lower court rendered a judgment against the defendant and in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of 265.90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time the
defendant quit the service of the plaintiff there was due him from the said plaintiff the
sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance due the plaintiff in the sum of 265.90 dollars.
From this judgment the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of
error:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 246

1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's special defenses. First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of
the contract in question; and
2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant on the facts.
Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the
With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that place and time the contract was made, he can not plead infancy as a defense at the
the legislative department of the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended place where the contract is being enforced.
said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect
of changing the terms of the contract made between the plaintiff and the defendant. The We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error.
legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act
of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of the contract. The right which For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.
the defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed
in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the
terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in
favor of the defendant.

The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the
contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the
contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that
State and had full authority to contract. The plaintiff [the defendant] claims that, by
reason of the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract
was made, male persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had
attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the
laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is
admitted — that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question the
defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that
matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union
National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters connected with its performance are regulated by
the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the
bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the
law of the place where the suit is brought. (Idem.)

The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when
he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult at the time he made the contract but was a
minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later, is
not tenable.

Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2521            March 22, 1906
RAFAEL MOLINA Y SALVADOR, plaintiff-appellee,  however, either in the power of attorney or in the contract upon which this action is
vs.
ANTONIO DE LA RIVA, defendant-appellant.
Gibbs and Gale, for appellant.
Pillsbury and Sutro, for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
This is an action to recover a debt due upon a contract executed July 27, 1903, whereby
plaintiff transferred to the defendant the abaca and coprax business theretofore carried
on by him at various places in the Island of Catanduanes, with all the property and right
pertaining to the said business, or the sum of 134,636 pesos and 12 cents, payable in
Mexican currency or its equivalent in local currency. Defendant paid at the time of the
execution of the contract, on account of the purchase price, the sum of P33,659 pesos
and 3 cents, promising to pay the balance on three installments P33,659 pesos and 3
cents each, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from the date of the
contract. The first installment became due July 27, 1904. It was for the recovery of this
first installment that their action was brought in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila.
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of
the subject of the action. The court overruled the demurrer and defendant refused to and
did not, as a matter of fact, answer plaintiff's complaint.
Judgment having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 33,659 pesos and
3 cents, Mexican currency, equal to 30,052 pesos and 70 centavos, Philippine currency,
an interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from July 27, 1903 and costs, the
defendant duly excepted.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 247
The appellant relies upon four assignments of error. The first error assigned by him is
that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action.
It is alleged in support of this contention that plaintiff and defendant were residents of the
Island of Catanduanes, as would appear, as the plaintiff is concerned, from a power of
attorney, executed by him to Antonio Vallejo Valencia and introduced in evidence during
the trial. This power of attorney was executed August 22, 1901. The instrument in fact
contains the statement that plaintiff was a resident of Catanduanes. Nothing is said
based, as to the residence of the defendant.
The complaint was filed March 10, 1905, and it alleges that both plaintiff and defendant
were residents of the city of Manila. This allegation was not either generally or
specifically denied by the defendant, who refused and failed to give an answer to the
complaint, having merely demurred thereto. This allegation, therefore, must be
demurred admitted. The power of attorney above referred to having been executed in
August, 1901, does not and can not by itself prove that the parties were not' residents of
the city of Manila in March, 1905, when the complaint was filed. The actual residence,
and not that which the parties had four years, prior to the filing of the complaint, is the
one that should govern the question as to the jurisdiction of the court.
A personal action like this for the record of a debt may be brought, under section 377 of
the Code of the Civil Procedure, in the Court of First Instance of the province where the
plaintiff resides or in the province where the defendant may reside, at the election of the
plaintiff. Both parties to this case being residents the city of Manila, it is apparent that the
Court of First Instance of that city had jurisdiction to try and determine this action.
It is further urged in support of the alleged want of jurisdiction on the part of the court
below, that the parties had mutually designated in the contract in question the town of
Bato, Islands of Catanduanes, as the place where all judicial and extrajudicial acts
necessary under the terms thereof should take place. Paragraph 9 of the contract
contains in fact a stipulation to that effect. This the appellant claims amounted to an
express submission by the contracting parties to jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Albay, in which the town of Bato was located, all other courts
being thereby inhibited from exercising jurisdiction over actions arising under the
contract.
We are of the opinion that the designation of the town of Bato made by the parties had
no legal force and could not have the effect of depriving the Court of First Instance of

Manila of the jurisdiction conferred on it by law. This would be true even though it may
be granted that the parties actually intended to waive the rights of domicile and
expressly submit themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Albay, contended the appellant, all of which it may be said seems to be very doubtful,
judging from the vague and uncertain manner in which the designation was made. The
jurisdiction of a court is filed by law and not by the will of the parties. As a matter of
public policy, parties can only stipulate in regard to that which is expressly authorized by
law. Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a plain and definite rule for the
purpose of determining the jurisdiction of courts according to the nature of the action.
Neither that section nor any other provision of law, of which we have any knowledge,
authorizes the parties to submit themselves by an express stipulation to the jurisdiction
of a particular court to the exclusion of the court duly vested with such jurisdiction. We
consequently hold that the agreement between the parties to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Albay, if there was any such agreement, was
null and void, in so far as it had for its object to deprive the Court of First Instance of
Manila of its own jurisdiction.
Articles 1255 and 1278 of the Civil Code relied upon by the appellant in his brief are not
applicable to cases relating to the jurisdiction of courts. The Law of Procedure and not
the Civil Code Case and defines the jurisdiction of courts. It is not true as contended by
the appellant that the right which litigants had under the Spanish law to submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of a particular court was governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code. Such right was recognized and governed by the provisions of the Law of
Procedure and not by the substantive law. The right to contract, recognized in the Civil
Code and referred to by appellant, has nothing to do with the right to establish and fix
the jurisdiction of a court. This right can only be exercised by the legislative branch of
the Government, the only one vested with the necessary power to make rules governing
the subject. In this connection it may be said that the jurisdiction of a court can not be
the subject-matter of a contract.
The second error assigned by the appellant is that the court erred in fixing in Philippine
currency the sum which the appellee should recover, without hearing evidence as to the
relative value of Mexican and Philippine currency. The amount sought to be recovered in
this action, under the terms of the contract, was 33,859 pesos and 3 cents, payable in
Mexican currency, or its equivalent in local currency.
In paragraph 4 of the complaint it is alleged that —
Under the terms of the contract the actual amount due from defendant to
plaintiff, converted into Philippine currency is 28,049 pesos and 19 centavos . . .
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 248
This contention was not denied by the defendant, who, as has been said before, simply
demurred to the complaint. Plaintiff's allegation must therefore be deemed admitted.
Consequently it was not necessary for the court to hear evidence as to the relative value
of Mexican and Philippine currency. There is no dispute between the parties as to the
fact that the 33,659 pesos and 3 Cents, Mexican currency, referred to in the contract,
were equal to 28,049 pesos and 19 centavos, Philippine currency, at the time of the
filing of the complaint.
The proof required by section 3 of Act No. 1045, cited by the appellant, should be
received only when the parties disagree as to the relative value of the currency. The
court below did not, therefore, err in not hearing evidence upon this point, even under
the assumption that no such evidence as heard in regard thereto, as claimed by the
appellant.
The appellant also assigns as error the fact that defendant was given the option to pay
the debt either in Mexican or Philippine currency, claiming that the court should have
directed payment to be made in the latter currency as required by Act No. 1045.
Assuming that this contention is correct, it should nevertheless be true that it did not
prejudice any of his essential rights. He was rather favored thereby, since he was given
an option to pay in whatever currency he might see fit. It is well known that in the case of
an alternative obligation the debtor has the right to choose the method of meeting the
obligation unless the creditor has expressly reserved that right to himself. (Art. 1132 of
the Civil Code.)
The alleged violation by the court below of the provisions of Act No. 1045 in this
particular respect is not therefore, a sufficient ground for the reversal of the judgment.
Section 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no judgment shall be reversed
for such error as has not prejudiced the substantial rights of the excepting party.
The third error assigned by the appellant is that the court erred in rendering judgment in
a sum larger than that sought to be recovered in the complaint. The prayer of the
complaint is for the specific amount of 28,049 pesos and 19 centavos, Philippine
currency, and the court in its judgment ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
30,052 pesos and 70 centavos, in the same currency.
Section 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part as follows:
The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, can not exceed that
which he shall have demanded in his complaint. . . ."

The defendant failed to answer. Under such circumstances plaintiff could not have
obtained more than what he had demanded in his complaint. Plaintiff's demand was for
the sum of 28,049 pesos and 19 centavos only. The court had no power to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for 30,052 pesos and 70 centavos. We hold that this
was error on the part of the trial court. The judgment of the court below should be
modified in this respect.
The fourth and last error assigned by the appellant is that the court took into
consideration as the basis of its judgment the contract in question, the same being null
and void. The appellant alleges in support of his contention that the contract did not bear
the internal-revenue stamp required by Act No. 1045 of the Philippine Commission
enacted January 27, 1904, and relies particularly upon the provisions of sections 9 and
10 of the act.
Section 9 reads in part as follows:
Every check, draft, note, bond, bill of exchange, and every contract whatsoever
payable in local currency . . . shall be presumably subject to the taxes levied  in
accordance with the provisions of this act, and the obligation shall rest upon the
drawer or maker, or holder or beneficiary . . . who claims exemption, to prove
that he is entitled to any of the exemptions provided in this act. No check, draft,
note, bond, bill of exchange, or any contract whatsoever payable in local
currency shall be exempted from the payment of the stamp tax provided for in
sections six and seven of this act unless the contract for which exemption is
claimed shall be registered with the Collector of Internal Revenue or his deputy
before October first, nineteen hundred and four, and a certificate be attached
thereto by the Collector of Internal Revenue, or his deputy, certifying to the
exemption.
Under section 10 —
Every check, draft, note, bond, bill of exchange, and every contract whatsoever
which is not properly stamped in accordance with the provisions of this act, shall
be void. . . .
The two sections above quoted refer to other provisions of the same Act No. 1045.
Section 9 refers expressly to sections 6 and 7. Section 9, as well as section 10, refers to
documents which should be stamped in accordance with the provisions of the same act.
These provisions are contained in sections 6 and 7 above referred to, the documents
subject to the stamp tax being therein enumerated.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 249
Section 6 provides that —
Every check, note, draft, bond, bill of exchange, and every contract whatsoever
payable wholly or in part in local currency, and drawn or made upon or
subsequent to October first, nineteen hundred and four, shall bear upon its face
an internal-revenue stamp or stamps of the face value in Philippine currency to
the amount hereinafter provided.
This same section in subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g,) enumerates the
exemptions referred to in section 9 above quoted.
Section 7 provides as follows:
Every transfer of ownership, by indorsement or otherwise, after September
thirtieth, nineteen hundred and four, of a check, draft, note, bond, bill of
exchange, or any contract whatsoever payable wholly or in part in local
currency in the Philippine Islands after the thirtieth of September, nineteen
hundred and four, . . . shall be considered a separate and distinct contract, and
as such shall require a stamp or stamps.
It seems clear from the language of these two latter sections that only such contracts
payable in local currency as were made on or after October 1, 1904, are subject to the
stamp tax. The provisions of the section in question are very clear and leave no room for
doubt. Sections 9 and 10 are merely supplementary to sections 6 and 7. They provide a
method for proving the exemption from the stamp tax and penalty in case of failure to
comply with the provisions of sections 6 and 7. These latter sections are the ones which
require a stamp tax upon all contracts payable in local currency and declare what
documents shall be subject to such tax. It is therefore necessary to construe these
sections together with sections 9 and 10 in order to arrive at the proper conclusion. A full
and correct interpretation of the act in question would not be possible if we only consider
the two latter sections. They are, as has been said before, merely supplementary to the
preceding sections.
The contract under consideration was executed July 27, 1903. Such contract was not
subject to the stamp tax provided in Act No. 1045. The penalty of nullity prescribed in
section 10 of the act is not applicable to that contract. The court, therefore, committed no
error in finding that the absence of revenue stamp did not render the contract void.
The judgment of the court below is hereby affirmed, provided, however, that the plaintiff
shall only be entitled to recover from the defendant the sum of 28,049 pesos and 19
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 250

centavos, Philippine currency, with accrued interest thereon from July 27, 1903, until
fully paid, at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, no special order being made as to costs
of this appeal.

After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered
accordingly, and let the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance for such action
as may be proper. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9403            November 4, 1914
ALLAN A. BRYAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,  delivered to them were in English, which language plaintiffs read with ease and
vs.
EASTERN AND AUSTRALIAN S. S. CO., LTD., defendant-appellant.
Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher for appellant.
Southworth, Hargis, Adams & Jordain for appellees.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an action to recover P1,915.30 damages alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of the defendant in handling the plaintiffs' baggage, whereby it fell into the
sea and was injured or destroyed.
The plaintiffs were passengers on the steamer St. Albans, which, at the time herein
complained of, was the property of the defendant corporation and was engaged in
carrying freight and passengers between Shanghai, China, and Manila, Philippine
Islands. It arrived in Manila on the morning of the 7th of January, 1913. Shortly after its
arrival plaintiffs' baggage was taken out of hold of the ship for the purpose of being
placed on the dock alongside of which the vessel was berthed. The baggage was placed
in a sling, consisting of a single rope wound once around the trunks, and was swung
from the side of the vessel. While still several feet above the wharf, the employee of the
defendant company who was operating the winch, by some act or other, permitted the
baggage to drop with great rapidity. In its passage downward it struck the side of the
ship with such force as to release it from the sling and it dropped into the water
alongside of the ship. The damages are stipulated at P1,188.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 251
The defendant, while admitting the damage caused to plaintiffs' baggage, denied that it
was the result of the company's negligence and set up as a special defense the
limitation of liability established by the contract under which the defendant undertook to
transport the plaintiffs from the city of Hongkong to Manila.
The record shows that on or about the end of December, 1912, the plaintiffs bought of
the defendant's agent in Shanghai two first-class tickets for Manila, which entitled them
to travel from Hongkong to Manila by the defendant's steamship St. Albans. The tickets
understand perfectly, and bore on their face, in large print, a statement that they were
issued subject to the conditions printed on the back. One of these conditions, printed in
legible type, was as follows:
This ticket is issued by the company and accepted by the passenger subject to
the following conditions:
The company will not hold itself responsible for any loss or damage passengers
may sustain from the following causes: From advance in or delays after
advertised date of sailing, either through the performance of His Majesty's mail
service or any other cause, from detention on the voyage, or at any of the
intermediate ports, or through steamers not meeting, or delays from accident,
from perils of the sea, or from machinery, boilers or steam, or from any at,
neglect or default whatsoever of the pilot, masters, or mariners. nor from any
consequences arising from any sanitary regulations or precautions which the
company's officers or local government authorities may deem necessary.
Personal baggage. — In order to insure as far as possible the safe custody of
luggage, passengers should personally see their luggage delivered on board.
Each adult saloon passenger may carry, free of charge, but at his own risk, 20
cubic feet of luggage; and each steerage passenger 10 cubic feet, under similar
conditions (all in excess of these quantities must be paid for at the current rate
of freight); but the company will not hold itself responsible for any loss, or
damage to or detention or overcarriage of luggage, under any circumstances
whatsoever unless it has been booked and paid for as freight.
At the time the tickets were delivered to plaintiffs in Shanghai their attention was not
especially drawn to the provisions on the back of the ticket. The plaintiffs put their
baggage on the St. Albans without paying for its transportation as freight and traveled
with such baggage to Manila.

The trial court's finding as to the negligence of defendant is based particularly on the
testimony of J. S. Stanley, Deputy Collector of Customs, and I.V. Chapman, chief
wharfinger in charge of per No. 5.
Mr. Stanley testified: "While standing at the extreme end of Pier No. 5, I witnessed a
number of trunks being lifted from the deck of the steamship St. Albans to an elevation
of about 10 per from the deck and practically the same being above the pier. The
winchman was instructed to let go. The sling dropped suddenly and was not checked at
the proper time, and the sling of trunks strucks the side of the wharf, with the result that
the trunks were forced from the sling and fell into the water. It is customary to use a rope
sling or a cargo chute running from the deck to the pier. The slings vary in size but are
sufficiently large to contain a large number of trunks and are formed of ropes running in
opposite directions forming a rope net. If these trunks had been in rope sling they would
not have fallen in the water."
Mr. Chapman testified: "When the steamship St. Albans came alongside the pier I took
all her lines and berthed her in a position for the gangway and hatchways to work.
Immediately after the ship was made fast I requested to be informed from the chief
officer where the baggage would be discharged from; he told me hatch No. 4; I went to
No. 4 hatch and asked the second officer who was there in charge of the hatch where
the baggage was to be discharged from; he said, 'Right here,' indicating No. 4 hatch. I
then told him I would have a chute there for him right away and he answered: 'All right.' I
immediately went into the pier and ordered one of the foremen and the men to take a
chute to No. 4 hatch. I was following with the foreman and behind the chute when Mr.
Stanley informed me that the baggage was over the side. The chute at this time was just
through the door about 75 feet from the hatch. On arriving there I saw that the sling and
these trunks were all lying in the water. The stevedore had a lot of his men over the side
picking up the trunks with the men from the pier helping."lawph!1.net
It is the contention of the defendant company that it is exempt from liability by virtue of
the contract appearing on the tickets already referred to and quoted; as that contract
was valid in the place where made, namely, the Colony of Hongkong, and that being the
case, it will be enforced according to its terms in the Philippine Islands. It is also urged
that it was not necessary specifically to direct the attention of the passengers to the
stipulations on the back of the ticket introduced in evidence.
The evidence relative to the law governing these contracts in Hongkong consists of the
testimony of a Hongkong barrister, learned in the law of England and her colonies, and
is to the effect that, under the law in force at the place where the contract was made, the
contract was valid and enforceable, and that it is not necessary that the attention of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 252
persons purchasing tickets from common carriers be drawn specially to the terms
thereof when printed upon a ticket which on its face shows that it is issued subject to
such conditions. The barrister also testified that under the law of England and her
colonies everything was done which was necessary to make the terms printed on the
back of the tickets a part of the contract between the parties.
It is our conclusion that the judgment must be affirmed.
It is undoubted that the contract found upon the back of the tickets is a contract found
upon the back of the tickets is a contract perfectly valid in England and her colonies and
one which would be enforced according to its terms? It will be remembered that the
contract provides "the company will not hold itself responsible for any loss, or damage to
or detention, or overcarriage of luggage, under any circumstances whatsoever, unless it
has been booked and paid for a freight." Ordinarily this language would seems to be
broad enough to cover every possible contingency, including the negligent act of
defendant's servant. To so hold, however, would run counter to the established law of
England and the United States on that subject. In the case of Prince and Company vs.
Union Lighterage Company (King's Bench Division, 1903, Vol. 1, pp. 750, 754), the
court said:
An exemption in general words not expressly relating to negligence, even
though the words are wide enough to include loss by negligence or default of
carriers' servants, must be construed as limiting the liability of the carrier as
assurer, and not as relieving him from the duty of exercising reasonable skill
and care.
The result of this decision seems to be that unless the contract of exemption specifically
refers to exemption for negligence, it will be construed as simply exempting the carrier
from his liability as insurer, in other words, from his common law liability as carrier. This
decision of the King's Bench Division is supported by many authorities and apparently
has never been questioned. Among other references made in that case is that
of Compania de Navegacion La Flecha vs. Brauer (168 U.S., 104), in which the opinion
was rendered by Mr. Justice Gray, who reviews with great thoroughness, many of which
contain exemptions quite as comprehensive as those contained in the condition under
which plaintiffs' baggage was accepted by the defendant in this case, such as that the
baggage "was to be carried at the risk of the owner" and that the "Carrier is not to be
responsible for any loss under any circumstances whatsoever." (See also Wheeler vs.
O. S. N. Co., 125 N. Y., 155; Nicholas vs. N. Y. & H. R. R .R. Co. 89 N. Y., 370.)
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 253

The reasonableness of the strict rule of construction that the courts of England and of
the State of New York apply to contracts restricting the liability of carriers with respect to
their negligence is apparent when one considers that such contracts are held to be
contrary to public policy and invalid in the Federal courts and in most of the State courts
of the Union. (The Kensington, 183 U. S., 263.)

In this connection, it may not be amiss to state that a critical examination of the
deposition of Mr. Ernet Hamilton Sharpe, Master of Arts and Bachelor of Civil Law of the
University of Oxford, Barrister at Law of London, Shanghai and Hongkong, and King's
Counsel at the latter colony, does not disclose anything contradictory to the rule just
stated. Mr. Sharpe's examination was confined to the question of the validity of the
contract indorsed upon plaintiffs' ticket exempting the defendant company from liability
for damage to their baggage. In view of the accurate answers of the learned witness to
the questions put to him as to the validity of the condition in question under English law,
there is no reason to suppose that he would not have stated correctly the rule as to
the construction of the condition had his attention been directed to that point. In any
event, this court is not, by reason of the opinion expressed by an expert witness,
precluded from advising itself as to the common law of England. (Sec. 302, Code of Civil
Procedure.)

The judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 254

Republic of the Philippines In G.R. No. 71478, during the same period, the same vessel took on board 128 cartons
SUPREME COURT of garment fabrics and accessories, in two (2) containers, consigned to Mariveles
Manila Apparel Corporation, and two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman
Enterprises and General Merchandise. The 128 cartons were insured for their stated
FIRST DIVISION value by respondent Nisshin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., for US $46,583.00, and the 2
cases by respondent Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., for US $11,385.00.
G.R. No. L-69044 May 29, 1987
Enroute for Kobe, Japan, to Manila, the vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,  loss of ship and cargo. The respective respondent Insurers paid the corresponding
vs. marine insurance values to the consignees concerned and were thus subrogated unto
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY the rights of the latter as the insured.
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. NO. 69044
No. 71478 May 29, 1987
On May 11, 1978, respondent Development Insurance & Surety Corporation
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,  (Development Insurance, for short), having been subrogated unto the rights of the two
vs. insured companies, filed suit against petitioner Carrier for the recovery of the amounts it
THE NISSHIN FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE CO., and DOWA FIRE & MARINE had paid to the insured before the then Court of First instance of Manila, Branch XXX
INSURANCE CO., LTD., respondents. (Civil Case No. 6087).

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
These two cases, both for the recovery of the value of cargo insurance, arose from the
same incident, the sinking of the M/S ASIATICA when it caught fire, resulting in the total
loss of ship and cargo.
Petitioner-Carrier denied liability mainly on the ground that the loss was due to an
extraordinary fortuitous event, hence, it is not liable under the law.
On August 31, 1979, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Development
Insurance in the amounts of P256,039.00 and P92,361.75, respectively, with legal
interest, plus P35,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. Petitioner Carrier took an appeal
to the then Court of Appeals which, on August 14, 1984, affirmed.

The basic facts are not in controversy: Petitioner Carrier is now before us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

In G.R. No. 69044, sometime in or prior to June, 1977, the M/S ASIATICA, a vessel
operated by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., (referred to hereinafter as Petitioner
Carrier) loaded at Kobe, Japan for transportation to Manila, 5,000 pieces of calorized
lance pipes in 28 packages valued at P256,039.00 consigned to Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare parts valued at P92,361.75, consigned to Central
Textile Mills, Inc. Both sets of goods were insured against marine risk for their stated
value with respondent Development Insurance and Surety Corporation.
G.R. NO. 71478
On June 16, 1978, respondents Nisshin Fire & Marine Insurance Co. NISSHIN for
short), and Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (DOWA, for brevity), as subrogees
of the insured, filed suit against Petitioner Carrier for the recovery of the insured value of
the cargo lost with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 11 (Civil Case No.
116151), imputing unseaworthiness of the ship and non-observance of extraordinary
diligence by petitioner Carrier.

Petitioner Carrier denied liability on the principal grounds that the fire which caused the
sinking of the ship is an exempting circumstance under Section 4(2) (b) of the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA); and that when the loss of fire is established, the burden
of proving negligence of the vessel is shifted to the cargo shipper.
On September 15, 1980, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of NISSHIN and
DOWA in the amounts of US $46,583.00 and US $11,385.00, respectively, with legal
interest, plus attorney's fees of P5,000.00 and costs. On appeal by petitioner, the then
Court of Appeals on September 10, 1984, affirmed with modification the Trial Court's
judgment by decreasing the amount recoverable by DOWA to US $1,000.00 because of
$500 per package limitation of liability under the COGSA.
Hence, this Petition for Review on certiorari by Petitioner Carrier.
Both Petitions were initially denied for lack of merit. G.R. No. 69044 on January 16, 1985
by the First Division, and G. R. No. 71478 on September 25, 1985 by the Second
Division. Upon Petitioner Carrier's Motion for Reconsideration, however, G.R. No. 69044
was given due course on March 25, 1985, and the parties were required to submit their
respective Memoranda, which they have done.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 71478, Petitioner Carrier sought reconsideration of the
Resolution denying the Petition for Review and moved for its consolidation with G.R. No.
69044, the lower-numbered case, which was then pending resolution with the First
Division. The same was granted; the Resolution of the Second Division of September
25, 1985 was set aside and the Petition was given due course.
At the outset, we reject Petitioner Carrier's claim that it is not the operator of the M/S
Asiatica but merely a charterer thereof. We note that in G.R. No. 69044, Petitioner
Carrier stated in its Petition:
There are about 22 cases of the "ASIATICA" pending in various courts
where various plaintiffs are represented by various counsel
representing various consignees or insurance companies. The
common defendant in these cases is petitioner herein, being the
operator of said vessel. ... 1
Petitioner Carrier should be held bound to said admission. As a general rule, the facts
alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon
it. 2 And an admission in one pleading in one action may be received in evidence against
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 255
the pleader or his successor-in-interest on the trial of another action to which he is a
party, in favor of a party to the latter action. 3
The threshold issues in both cases are: (1) which law should govern — the Civil Code
provisions on Common carriers or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act? and (2) who has
the burden of proof to show negligence of the carrier?
On the Law Applicable
The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of
the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. 4 As the cargoes in
question were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of Petitioner Carrier
is governed primarily by the Civil Code. 5 However, in all matters not regulated by said
Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by special laws. 6 Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special
law, is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code. 7
On the Burden of Proof
Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over goods, according to all the circumstances of each case. 8Common carriers are
responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods unless the same is
due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or
calamity;
xxx xxx xxx 9
Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from liability under
the phrase "natural disaster or calamity. " However, we are of the opinion that fire may
not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. This must be so as it arises almost
invariably from some act of man or by human means. 10 It does not fall within the
category of an act of God unless caused by lightning 11 or by other natural disaster or
calamity. 12 It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. 13
Article 1680 of the Civil Code, which considers fire as an extraordinary fortuitous event
refers to leases of rural lands where a reduction of the rent is allowed when more than

one-half of the fruits have been lost due to such event, considering that the law adopts a
protection policy towards agriculture. 14
As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article
1734, supra, Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in
Article 1734, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary deligence
required by law.
In this case, the respective Insurers. as subrogees of the cargo shippers, have proven
that the transported goods have been lost. Petitioner Carrier has also proved that the
loss was caused by fire. The burden then is upon Petitioner Carrier to proved that it has
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. In this regard, the Trial Court,
concurred in by the Appellate Court, made the following Finding of fact:
The cargoes in question were, according to the witnesses defendant
placed in hatches No, 2 and 3 cf the vessel, Boatswain Ernesto
Pastrana noticed that smoke was coming out from hatch No. 2 and
hatch No. 3; that where the smoke was noticed, the fire was already
big; that the fire must have started twenty-four 24) our the same was
noticed; that carbon dioxide was ordered released and the crew was
ordered to open the hatch covers of No, 2 tor commencement of fire
fighting by sea water: that all of these effort were not enough to control
the fire.
Pursuant to Article 1733, common carriers are bound to extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods. The evidence of the
defendant did not show that extraordinary vigilance was observed by
the vessel to prevent the occurrence of fire at hatches numbers 2 and
3. Defendant's evidence did not likewise show he amount of diligence
made by the crew, on orders, in the care of the cargoes. What appears
is that after the cargoes were stored in the hatches, no regular
inspection was made as to their condition during the voyage.
Consequently, the crew could not have even explain what could have
caused the fire. The defendant, in the Court's mind, failed to
satisfactorily show that extraordinary vigilance and care had been
made by the crew to prevent the occurrence of the fire. The defendant,
as a common carrier, is liable to the consignees for said lack of
deligence required of it under Article 1733 of the Civil Code. 15
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 256
Having failed to discharge the burden of proving that it had exercised the extraordinary
diligence required by law, Petitioner Carrier cannot escape liability for the loss of the
cargo.
And even if fire were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article
1734 of the Civil Code, it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the
"natural disaster" must have been the "proximate and only cause of the loss," and that
the carrier has "exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or
after the occurrence of the disaster. " This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish
satisfactorily.
Nor may Petitioner Carrier seek refuge from liability under the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, It is provided therein that:
Sec. 4(2). Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss
or damage arising or resulting from
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, in effect, found, as a fact, that
there was "actual fault" of the carrier shown by "lack of diligence" in that "when the
smoke was noticed, the fire was already big; that the fire must have started twenty-four
(24) hours before the same was noticed; " and that "after the cargoes were stored in the
hatches, no regular inspection was made as to their condition during the voyage." The
foregoing suffices to show that the circumstances under which the fire originated and
spread are such as to show that Petitioner Carrier or its servants were negligent in
connection therewith. Consequently, the complete defense afforded by the COGSA
when loss results from fire is unavailing to Petitioner Carrier.
On the US $500 Per Package Limitation:
Petitioner Carrier avers that its liability if any, should not exceed US $500 per package
as provided in section 4(5) of the COGSA, which reads:
(5) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become
liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation
of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package lawful money of

the United States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per
customary freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum in other currency,
unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the
shipper before shipment and inserted in bill of lading. This declaration if
embodied in the bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence, but all be
conclusive on the carrier.
By agreement between the carrier, master or agent of the carrier, and
the shipper another maximum amount than that mentioned in this
paragraph may be fixed: Provided, That such maximum shall not be
less than the figure above named. In no event shall the carrier be
Liable for more than the amount of damage actually sustained.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1749 of the New Civil Code also allows the limitations of liability in this wise:
Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier's liability as limited to
the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper
or owner declares a greater value, is binding.
It is to be noted that the Civil Code does not of itself limit the liability of the common
carrier to a fixed amount per package although the Code expressly permits a stipulation
limiting such liability. Thus, the COGSA which is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil
Code, steps in and supplements the Code by establishing a statutory provision limiting
the carrier's liability in the absence of a declaration of a higher value of the goods by the
shipper in the bill of lading. The provisions of the Carriage of Goods by.Sea Act on
limited liability are as much a part of a bill of lading as though physically in it and as
much a part thereof as though placed therein by agreement of the parties. 16
In G.R. No. 69044, there is no stipulation in the respective Bills of Lading (Exhibits "C-2"
and "I-3") 1 7 limiting the carrier's liability for the loss or destruction of the goods. Nor is
there a declaration of a higher value of the goods. Hence, Petitioner Carrier's liability
should not exceed US $500 per package, or its peso equivalent, at the time of payment
of the value of the goods lost, but in no case "more than the amount of damage actually
sustained."
The actual total loss for the 5,000 pieces of calorized lance pipes was P256,039 (Exhibit
"C"), which was exactly the amount of the insurance coverage by Development
Insurance (Exhibit "A"), and the amount affirmed to be paid by respondent Court. The
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 257
goods were shipped in 28 packages (Exhibit "C-2") Multiplying 28 packages by $500
would result in a product of $14,000 which, at the current exchange rate of P20.44 to US
$1, would be P286,160, or "more than the amount of damage actually sustained."
Consequently, the aforestated amount of P256,039 should be upheld.
With respect to the seven (7) cases of spare parts (Exhibit "I-3"), their actual value was
P92,361.75 (Exhibit "I"), which is likewise the insured value of the cargo (Exhibit "H")
and amount was affirmed to be paid by respondent Court. however, multiplying seven
(7) cases by $500 per package at the present prevailing rate of P20.44 to US $1 (US
$3,500 x P20.44) would yield P71,540 only, which is the amount that should be paid by
Petitioner Carrier for those spare parts, and not P92,361.75.
In G.R. No. 71478, in so far as the two (2) cases of surveying instruments are
concerned, the amount awarded to DOWA which was already reduced to $1,000 by the
Appellate Court following the statutory $500 liability per package, is in order.
In respect of the shipment of 128 cartons of garment fabrics in two (2) containers and
insured with NISSHIN, the Appellate Court also limited Petitioner Carrier's liability to
$500 per package and affirmed the award of $46,583 to NISSHIN. it multiplied 128
cartons (considered as COGSA packages) by $500 to arrive at the figure of $64,000,
and explained that "since this amount is more than the insured value of the goods, that
is $46,583, the Trial Court was correct in awarding said amount only for the 128 cartons,
which amount is less than the maximum limitation of the carrier's liability."
We find no reversible error. The 128 cartons and not the two (2) containers should be
considered as the shipping unit.
In Mitsui & Co., Ltd. vs. American Export Lines, Inc. 636 F 2d 807 (1981), the
consignees of tin ingots and the shipper of floor covering brought action against the
vessel owner and operator to recover for loss of ingots and floor covering, which had
been shipped in vessel — supplied containers. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Division, modified and affirmed holding
that:
When what would ordinarily be considered packages are shipped in a
container supplied by the carrier and the number of such units is
disclosed in the shipping documents, each of those units and not the
container constitutes the "package" referred to in liability limitation

provision of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, 4(5), 46 U.S.C.A.& 1304(5).
Even if language and purposes of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act left
doubt as to whether carrier-furnished containers whose contents are
disclosed should be treated as packages, the interest in securing
international uniformity would suggest that they should not be so
treated. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 4(5), 46 U.S.C.A. 1304(5).
... After quoting the statement in Leather's Best, supra, 451 F 2d at
815, that treating a container as a package is inconsistent with the
congressional purpose of establishing a reasonable minimum level of
liability, Judge Beeks wrote, 414 F. Supp. at 907 (footnotes omitted):
Although this approach has not completely escaped
criticism, there is, nonetheless, much to commend it.
It gives needed recognition to the responsibility of the
courts to construe and apply the statute as enacted,
however great might be the temptation to "modernize"
or reconstitute it by artful judicial gloss. If COGSA's
package limitation scheme suffers from internal
illness, Congress alone must undertake the surgery.
There is, in this regard, obvious wisdom in the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion in Hartford that technological
advancements, whether or not forseeable by the
COGSA promulgators, do not warrant a distortion or
artificial construction of the statutory term "package."
A ruling that these large reusable metal pieces of
transport equipment qualify as COGSA packages —
at least where, as here, they were carrier owned and
supplied — would amount to just such a distortion.
Certainly, if the individual crates or cartons prepared
by the shipper and containing his goods can rightly be
considered "packages" standing by themselves, they
do not suddenly lose that character upon being
stowed in a carrier's container. I would liken these
containers to detachable stowage compartments of
the ship. They simply serve to divide the ship's overall
cargo stowage space into smaller, more serviceable
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 258
loci. Shippers' packages are quite literally "stowed" in
the containers utilizing stevedoring practices and
materials analogous to those employed in traditional
on board stowage.
In Yeramex International v. S.S. Tando,, 1977 A.M.C. 1807 (E.D. Va.)
rev'd on other grounds, 595 F 2nd 943 (4 Cir. 1979), another district
with many maritime cases followed Judge Beeks' reasoning in
Matsushita and similarly rejected the functional economics test. Judge
Kellam held that when rolls of polyester goods are packed into
cardboard cartons which are then placed in containers, the cartons and
not the containers are the packages.
xxx xxx xxx
The case of Smithgreyhound v. M/V Eurygenes,  18 followed the Mitsui test:
Eurygenes concerned a shipment of stereo equipment packaged by the
shipper into cartons which were then placed by the shipper into a
carrier- furnished container. The number of cartons was disclosed to
the carrier in the bill of lading. Eurygenes followed the Mitsui test and
treated the cartons, not the container, as the COGSA
packages. However, Eurygenes indicated that a carrier could limit its
liability to $500 per container if the bill of lading failed to disclose the
number of cartons or units within the container, or if the parties
indicated, in clear and unambiguous language, an agreement to treat
the container as the package.
(Admiralty Litigation in Perpetuum: The Continuing
Saga of Package Limitations and Third World Delivery
Problems by Chester D. Hooper & Keith L. Flicker,
published in Fordham International Law Journal, Vol.
6, 1982-83, Number 1) (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Bill of Lading (Exhibit "A") disclosed the following data:
2 Containers
(128) Cartons)

Men's Garments Fabrics and Accessories Freight Prepaid
Say: Two (2) Containers Only.
Considering, therefore, that the Bill of Lading clearly disclosed the contents of the
containers, the number of cartons or units, as well as the nature of the goods, and
applying the ruling in the Mitsui and Eurygenes cases it is clear that the 128 cartons, not
the two (2) containers should be considered as the shipping unit subject to the $500
limitation of liability.
True, the evidence does not disclose whether the containers involved herein were
carrier-furnished or not. Usually, however, containers are provided by the carrier. 19 In
this case, the probability is that they were so furnished for Petitioner Carrier was at
liberty to pack and carry the goods in containers if they were not so packed. Thus, at the
dorsal side of the Bill of Lading (Exhibit "A") appears the following stipulation in fine print:
11. (Use of Container) Where the goods receipt of which is
acknowledged on the face of this Bill of Lading are not already packed
into container(s) at the time of receipt, the Carrier shall be at liberty to
pack and carry them in any type of container(s).
The foregoing would explain the use of the estimate "Say: Two (2) Containers Only" in
the Bill of Lading, meaning that the goods could probably fit in two (2) containers only. It
cannot mean that the shipper had furnished the containers for if so, "Two (2) Containers"
appearing as the first entry would have sufficed. and if there is any ambiguity in the Bill
of Lading, it is a cardinal principle in the construction of contracts that the interpretation
of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity. 20 This applies with even greater force in a contract of adhesion where a
contract is already prepared and the other party merely adheres to it, like the Bill of
Lading in this case, which is draw. up by the carrier. 21
On Alleged Denial of Opportunity to Present Deposition of Its Witnesses: (in G.R. No.
69044 only)
Petitioner Carrier claims that the Trial Court did not give it sufficient time to take the
depositions of its witnesses in Japan by written interrogatories.
We do not agree. petitioner Carrier was given- full opportunity to present its evidence but
it failed to do so. On this point, the Trial Court found:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 259
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, since after November 6, 1978, to August 27, 1979, not to
mention the time from June 27, 1978, when its answer was prepared
and filed in Court, until September 26, 1978, when the pre-trial
conference was conducted for the last time, the defendant had more
than nine months to prepare its evidence. Its belated notice to take
deposition on written interrogatories of its witnesses in Japan, served
upon the plaintiff on August 25th, just two days before the hearing set
for August 27th, knowing fully well that it was its undertaking on July 11
the that the deposition of the witnesses would be dispensed with if by
next time it had not yet been obtained, only proves the lack of merit of
the defendant's motion for postponement, for which reason it deserves
no sympathy from the Court in that regard. The defendant has told the
Court since February 16, 1979, that it was going to take the deposition
of its witnesses in Japan. Why did it take until August 25, 1979, or more
than six months, to prepare its written interrogatories. Only the
defendant itself is to blame for its failure to adduce evidence in support
of its defenses.
xxx xxx xxx 22
Petitioner Carrier was afforded ample time to present its side of the case. 23 It cannot
complain now that it was denied due process when the Trial Court rendered its Decision
on the basis of the evidence adduced. What due process abhors is absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard. 24
On the Award of Attorney's Fees:
Petitioner Carrier questions the award of attorney's fees. In both cases, respondent
Court affirmed the award by the Trial Court of attorney's fees of P35,000.00 in favor of
Development Insurance in G.R. No. 69044, and P5,000.00 in favor of NISSHIN and
DOWA in G.R. No. 71478.
Courts being vested with discretion in fixing the amount of attorney's fees, it is believed
that the amount of P5,000.00 would be more reasonable in G.R. No. 69044. The award
of P5,000.00 in G.R. No. 71478 is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, 1) in G.R. No. 69044, the judgment is modified in that petitioner Eastern
Shipping Lines shall pay the Development Insurance and Surety Corporation the amount
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 260

of P256,039 for the twenty-eight (28) packages of calorized lance pipes, and P71,540 for
the seven (7) cases of spare parts, with interest at the legal rate from the date of the
filing of the complaint on June 13, 1978, plus P5,000 as attorney's fees, and the costs.

2) In G.R.No.71478,the judgment is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20099             July 7, 1966
PARMANAND SHEWARAM, plaintiff and appellee,  976/910 from Zamboanga City bound for Manila; that defendant is a common
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., defendant and appellant.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for defendant and appellant.
Climaco and Associates for plaintiff and appellee.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Before the municipal court of Zamboanga City, plaintiff-appellee Parmanand Shewaram
instituted an action to recover damages suffered by him due to the alleged failure of
defendant-appellant Philippines Air Lines, Inc. to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance and carriage of his luggage. After trial the municipal court of Zamboanga City
rendered judgment ordering the appellant to pay appellee P373.00 as actual damages,
P100.00 as exemplary damages, P150.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the action.
Appellant Philippine Air Lines appealed to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
City. After hearing the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City modified the judgment
of the inferior court by ordering the appellant to pay the appellee only the sum of
P373.00 as actual damages, with legal interest from May 6, 1960 and the sum of
P150.00 as attorney's fees, eliminating the award of exemplary damages.
From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, appellant appeals to
this Court on a question of law, assigning two errors allegedly committed by the lower
court a quo, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff-appellee was bound by the
provisions of the tariff regulations filed by defendant-appellant with the civil
aeronautics board and the conditions of carriage printed at the back of the plane
ticket stub.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 261
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing this case or limiting the liability of the
defendant-appellant to P100.00.
The facts of this case, as found by the trial court, quoted from the decision appealed
from, are as follows:
That Parmanand Shewaram, the plaintiff herein, was on November 23, 1959, a
paying passenger with ticket No. 4-30976, on defendant's aircraft flight No.
carrier engaged in air line transportation in the Philippines, offering its services
to the public to carry and transport passengers and cargoes from and to
different points in the Philippines; that on the above-mentioned date of
November 23, 1959, he checked in three (3) pieces of baggages — a suitcase
and two (2) other pieces; that the suitcase was mistagged by defendant's
personnel in Zamboanga City, as I.G.N. (for Iligan) with claim check No. B-
3883, instead of MNL (for Manila). When plaintiff Parmanand Shewaram arrived
in Manila on the date of November 23, 1959, his suitcase did not arrive with his
flight because it was sent to Iligan. So, he made a claim with defendant's
personnel in Manila airport and another suitcase similar to his own which was
the only baggage left for that flight, the rest having been claimed and released
to the other passengers of said flight, was given to the plaintiff for him to take
delivery but he did not and refused to take delivery of the same on the ground
that it was not his, alleging that all his clothes were white and the National
transistor 7 and a Rollflex camera were not found inside the suitcase, and
moreover, it contained a pistol which he did not have nor placed inside his
suitcase; that after inquiries made by defendant's personnel in Manila from
different airports where the suitcase in question must have been sent, it was
found to have reached Iligan and the station agent of the PAL in Iligan caused
the same to be sent to Manila for delivery to Mr. Shewaram and which suitcase
belonging to the plaintiff herein arrived in Manila airport on November 24, 1959;
that it was also found out that the suitcase shown to and given to the plaintiff for
delivery which he refused to take delivery belonged to a certain Del Rosario
who was bound for Iligan in the same flight with Mr. Shewaram; that when the
plaintiff's suitcase arrived in Manila as stated above on November 24, 1959, he
was informed by Mr. Tomas Blanco, Jr., the acting station agent of the Manila
airport of the arrival of his suitcase but of course minus his Transistor Radio 7
and the Rollflex Camera; that Shewaram made demand for these two (2) items
or for the value thereof but the same was not complied with by defendant.

xxx     xxx     xxx
It is admitted by defendant that there was mistake in tagging the suitcase of
plaintiff as IGN. The tampering of the suitcase is more apparent when on
November 24, 1959, when the suitcase arrived in Manila, defendant's personnel
could open the same in spite of the fact that plaintiff had it under key when he
delivered the suitcase to defendant's personnel in Zamboanga City. Moreover, it
was established during the hearing that there was space in the suitcase where
the two items in question could have been placed. It was also shown that as
early as November 24, 1959, when plaintiff was notified by phone of the arrival
of the suitcase, plaintiff asked that check of the things inside his suitcase be
made and defendant admitted that the two items could not be found inside the
suitcase. There was no evidence on record sufficient to show that plaintiff's
suitcase was never opened during the time it was placed in defendant's
possession and prior to its recovery by the plaintiff. However, defendant had
presented evidence that it had authority to open passengers' baggage to verify
and find its ownership or identity. Exhibit "1" of the defendant would show that
the baggage that was offered to plaintiff as his own was opened and the plaintiff
denied ownership of the contents of the baggage. This proven fact that baggage
may and could be opened without the necessary authorization and presence of
its owner, applied too, to the suitcase of plaintiff which was mis-sent to Iligan
City because of mistagging. The possibility of what happened in the baggage of
Mr. Del Rosario at the Manila Airport in his absence could have also happened
to plaintiffs suitcase at Iligan City in the absence of plaintiff. Hence, the Court
believes that these two items were really in plaintiff's suitcase and defendant
should be held liable for the same by virtue of its contract of carriage.
It is clear from the above-quoted portions of the decision of the trial court that said court
had found that the suitcase of the appellee was tampered, and the transistor radio and
the camera contained therein were lost, and that the loss of those articles was due to the
negligence of the employees of the appellant. The evidence shows that the transistor
radio cost P197.00 and the camera cost P176.00, so the total value of the two articles
was P373.00.
There is no question that the appellant is a common carrier. 1 As such common carrier
the appellant, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by it according to the circumstances of each case. 2 It having
been shown that the loss of the transistor radio and the camera of the appellee, costing
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 262
P373.00, was due to the negligence of the employees of the appellant, it is clear that the
appellant should be held liable for the payment of said loss. 3
It is, however, contended by the appellant that its liability should be limited to the amount
stated in the conditions of carriage printed at the back of the plane ticket stub which was
issued to the appellee, which conditions are embodied in Domestic Tariff Regulations
No. 2 which was filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board. One of those conditions, which is
pertinent to the issue raised by the appellant in this case provides as follows:
The liability, if any, for loss or damage to checked baggage or for delay in the
delivery thereof is limited to its value and, unless the passenger declares in
advance a higher valuation and pay an additional charge therefor, the value
shall be conclusively deemed not to exceed P100.00 for each ticket.
The appellant maintains that in view of the failure of the appellee to declare a higher
value for his luggage, and pay the freight on the basis of said declared value when he
checked such luggage at the Zamboanga City airport, pursuant to the abovequoted
condition, appellee can not demand payment from the appellant of an amount in excess
of P100.00.
The law that may be invoked, in this connection is Article 1750 of the New Civil Code
which provides as follows:
A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the
loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and
just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.
In accordance with the above-quoted provision of Article 1750 of the New Civil Code, the
pecuniary liability of a common carrier may, by contract, be limited to a fixed amount. It
is required, however, that the contract must be "reasonable and just under the
circumstances and has been fairly and freely agreed upon."
The requirements provided in Article 1750 of the New Civil Code must be complied with
before a common carrier can claim a limitation of its pecuniary liability in case of loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods it has undertaken to transport. In the case
before us We believe that the requirements of said article have not been met. It can not
be said that the appellee had actually entered into a contract with the appellant,
embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket stub that was issued by the
appellant to the appellee. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the
ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the

presumption that the appellee was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and
freely agreed" to those conditions. The trial court has categorically stated in its decision
that the "Defendant admits that passengers do not sign the ticket, much less did plaintiff
herein sign his ticket when he made the flight on November 23, 1959." We hold,
therefore, that the appellee is not, and can not be, bound by the conditions of carriage
found at the back of the ticket stub issued to him when he made the flight on appellant's
plane on November 23, 1959.
The liability of the appellant in the present case should be governed by the provisions of
Articles 1734 and 1735 of the New Civil Code, which We quote as follows:
ART. 1734. Common carries are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following
causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.1äwphï1.ñët
ART. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article
1733.
It having been clearly found by the trial court that the transistor radio and the camera of
the appellee were lost as a result of the negligence of the appellant as a common
carrier, the liability of the appellant is clear — it must pay the appellee the value of those
two articles.
In the case of Ysmael and Co. vs. Barreto, 51 Phil. 90, cited by the trial court in support
of its decision, this Court had laid down the rule that the carrier can not limit its liability
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 263
for injury to or loss of goods shipped where such injury or loss was caused by its own
negligence.
Corpus Juris, volume 10, p. 154, says:
"Par. 194, 6. Reasonableness of Limitations. — The validity of stipulations
limiting the carrier's liability is to be determined by their reasonableness and
their conformity to the sound public policy, in accordance with which the
obligations of the carrier to the public are settled. It cannot lawfully stipulate for
exemption from liability, unless such exemption is just and reasonable, and
unless the contract is freely and fairly made. No contractual limitation is
reasonable which is subversive of public policy.
"Par. 195. 7. What Limitations of Liability Permissible. — a. Negligence — (1)
Rule in America — (a) In Absence of Organic or Statutory Provisions Regulating
Subject — aa. Majority Rule. — In the absence of statute, it is settled by the
weight of authority in the United States, that whatever limitations against its
common-law liability are permissible to a carrier, it cannot limit its liability for
injury to or loss of goods shipped, where such injury or loss is caused by its own
negligence. This is the common law doctrine and it makes no difference that
there is no statutory prohibition against contracts of this character.
"Par. 196. bb. Considerations on which Rule Based. — The rule, it is said, rests
on considerations of public policy. The undertaking is to carry the goods, and to
relieve the shipper from all liability for loss or damage arising from negligence in
performing its contract is to ignore the contract itself. The natural effect of a
limitation of liability against negligence is to induce want of care on the part of
the carrier in the performance of its duty. The shipper and the common carrier
are not on equal terms; the shipper must send his freight by the common
carrier, or not at all; he is therefore entirely at the mercy of the carrier unless
protected by the higher power of the law against being forced into contracts
limiting the carrier's liability. Such contracts are wanting in the element of
voluntary assent.
"Par. 197. cc. Application and Extent of Rule — (aa) Negligence of Servants. —
The rule prohibiting limitation of liability for negligence is often stated as a
prohibition of any contract relieving the carrier from loss or damage caused by
its own negligence or misfeasance, or that of its servants; and it has been
specifically decided in many cases that no contract limitation will relieve the
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 264

carrier from responsibility for the negligence, unskillfulness, or carelessness of

its employer." (Cited in Ysmael and Co. vs. Barreto, 51 Phil. 90, 98, 99).

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 265

Republic of the Philippines Lourdes and Barcelona to Lourdes. The respondents decided on the Barcelona-Lourdes
SUPREME COURT route with knowledge that only one airline, Aer Lingus, serviced it.
Manila
The Philippine Travel Bureau to which Reyes was accredited was an agent for
FIRST DIVISION international air carriers which are members of the International Air Transport
Association, popularly known as the "IATA," of which both the KLM and the Aer Lingus
are members.

G.R. No. L-31150 July 22, 1975 After about two weeks, the respondents approved the itinerary prepared for them, and
asked Reyes to make the necessary plane reservations. Reyes went to the KLM, for
KONINKLIJKE LUCHTVAART MAATSHAPPIJ N.V., otherwise known as KLM which the respondents had expressed preference. The KLM thereafter secured seat
ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES, petitioner,  reservations for the respondents and their two companions from the carriers which
vs. would ferry them throughout their trip, with the exception of Aer Lingus. When the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO T. MENDOZA and RUFINO respondents left the Philippines (without their young wards who had enplaned much
T. MENDOZA, respondents. earlier), they were issued KLM tickets for their entire trip. However, their coupon for the
Aer Lingus portion (Flight 861 for June 22, 1965) was marked "RQ" which meant "on
Picazo, Agcaoili, Santayana, Reyes and Tayao for petitioner. request".

Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso and Cudala for respondents. After sightseeing in American and European cities (they were in the meantime joined by
their two young companions), the respondents arrived in Frankfurt, Germany. They went
to a KLM office there and obtained a confirmation from Aer Lingus of seat reservations
on flight 861. After meandering in London, Paris and Lisbon, the foursome finally took
wing to Barcelona for their trip to Lourdes, France.
CASTRO, J.:

In the afternoon of June 22, 1965 the respondents with their wards went to the
In this appeal by way of certiorari  the Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V.,
Barcelona airport to take their plane which arrived at 4:00 o'clock. At the airport, the
otherwise known as the KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (hereinafter referred to as the KLM)
manager of Aer Lingus directed the respondents to check in. They did so as instructed
assails the award of damages made by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 40620 in favor
and were accepted for passage. However, although their daughter and niece were
of the spouses Rufino T. Mendoza and Consuelo T. Mendoza (hereinafter referred to as
allowed to take the plane, the respondents were off-loaded on orders of the Aer Lingus
the respondents).1äwphï1.ñët
manager who brusquely shoved them aside with the aid of a policeman and who
shouted at them, "Conos! Ignorantes Filipinos!"
Sometime in March 1965 the respondents approached Tirso Reyes, manager of a
branch of the Philippine Travel Bureau, a travel agency, for consultations about a world
Mrs. Mendoza later called up the manager of Aer Lingus and requested that they
tour which they were intending to make with their daughter and a niece. Reyes
provide her and her husband means to get to Lourdes, but the request was denied. A
submitted to them, after preliminary discussions, a tentative itinerary which prescribed a
stranger, however, advised them to take a train, which the two did; despite the third
trip of thirty-five legs; the respondents would fly on different airlines. Three segments of
class accommodations and lack of food service, they reached Lourdes the following
the trip, the longest, would be via KLM. The respondents expressed a desire to visit
morning. During the train trip the respondents had to suffer draft winds as they wore only
Lourdes, France, and discussed with Reyes two alternate routes, namely, Paris to
minimum clothing, their luggage having gone ahead with the Aer Lingus plane. They
spent $50 for that train trip; their plane passage was worth $43.35.

On March 17, 1966 the respondents, referring to KLM as the principal of Aer Lingus,
filed a complaint for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila arising from
breach of contract of carriage and for the humiliating treatment received by them at the
hands of the Aer Lingus manager in Barcelona. After due hearing, the trial court
awarded damages to the respondents as follows: $43.35 or its peso equivalent as actual
damages, P10,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as exemplary damages, and P5,000 as
attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The KLM sought complete exoneration;
the respondents prayed for an increase in the award of damages. In its decision of
August 14, 1969 the Court of Appeals decreed as follows: "Appellant KLM is condemned
to pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of $43.35 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral
damages; and P6,000 as attorney's fees and costs."
Hence, the present recourse by the KLM.
The KLM prays for exculpation from damages on the strength of the following particulars
which were advanced to but rejected by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The air tickets issued to the respondents stipulate that carriage thereunder is subject
to the "Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air," otherwise known as the "Warsaw Convention," to which the
Philippine Government is a party by adherence, and which pertinently provides. 1
ART. 30. (1) In the case of transportation to be performed by various
successive carriers and failing within the definition set out in the third
paragraph of Article I, each carrier who accepts passengers, baggage,
or goods shall be subject to the rules set out in the convention, and
shall be deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the contract of
transportation insofar as the contract deals with that part of
transportation which is performed under his supervision. 2
(2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the passenger or his
representative can take action only against the carrier who performed
the transportation during which the accident or the delay occured, save
in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed
liability for the whole journey. (emphasis supplied)
(b) On the inside front cover of each ticket the following appears under the heading
"Conditions of Contract":
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 266
1 ... (a) Liability of carrier for damages shall be limited to occurrences
on its own line, except in the case of checked baggage as to which the
passenger also has a right of action against the first or last carrier. A
carrier issuing a ticket or checking baggage for carriage over the lines
of others does so only as agent..
(c) All that the KLM did after the respondents completed their arrangements with the
travel agency was to request for seat reservations among the airlines called for by the
itinerary submitted to the KLM and to issue tickets for the entire flight as a ticket-issuing
agent.
The respondents rebut the foregoing arguments, thus:
(a) Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention has no application in the case at bar which
involves, not an accident or delay, but a willful misconduct on the part of the KLM's
agent, the Aer Lingus. Under article 25 of the same Convention the following is
prescribed:
ART. 25. (1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his
part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct. 3
(2) Similarly, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said
provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by
any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.
(emphasis by respondents)
(b) The condition in their tickets which purportedly excuse the KLM from liability appears
in very small print, to read which, as found by the Court of Appeals, one has practically
to use a magnifying glass.
(c) The first paragraph of the "Conditions of Contract" appearing identically on the KLM
tickets issued to them idubitably shows that their contract was one of continuous air
transportation around the world:
1 ... "carriage" includes the air carrier issuing this ticket and all carriers
that carry or undertake to carry the passenger or his baggage
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 267

hereunder or perform any other service incidental to such air carriage...
Carriage to be performed hereunder by several successive carrier is
regarded as a single operation.
(d) The contract of air transportation was exclusively between the respondents and the
KLM, the latter merely endorsing its performance to other carriers, like Aer Lingus, as its
subcontractors or agents, as evidenced by the passage tickets themselves which on
their face disclose that they are KLM tickets. Moreover, the respondents dealt only with
KLM through the travel agency.
series of independent contracts with the carriers which took them on the various
segments of their trip. This position of KLM we reject. The respondents dealt exclusively
with the KLM which issued them tickets for their entire trip and which in effect
guaranteed to them that they would have sure space in Aer Lingus flight 861. The
respondents, under that assurance of the internationally prestigious KLM, naturally had
the right to expect that their tickets would be honored by Aer Lingus to which, in the legal
sense, the KLM had indorsed and in effect guaranteed the performance of its principal
engagement to carry out the respondents' scheduled itinerary previously and mutually
agreed upon between the parties.

1. The applicability insisted upon by the KLM of article 30 of the Warsaw Convention 4. The breach of that guarantee was aggravated by the discourteous and highly arbitrary
cannot be sustained. That article presupposes the occurrence of either an accident or a conduct of an official of the Aer Lingus which the KLM had engaged to transport the
delay, neither of which took place at the Barcelona airport; what is here manifest, respondents on the Barcelona-Lourdes segment of their itinerary. It is but just and in full
instead, is that the Aer Lingus, through its manager there, refused to transport the accord with the policy expressly embodied in our civil law which enjoins courts to be
respondents to their planned and contracted destination. more vigilant for the protection of a contracting party who occupies an inferior position
with respect to the other contracting party, that the KLM should be held responsible for
2. The argument that the KLM should not be held accountable for the tortious conduct of the abuse, injury and embarrassment suffered by the respondents at the hands of a
Aer Lingus because of the provision printed on the respondents' tickets expressly supercilious boor of the Aer Lingus.
limiting the KLM's liability for damages only to occurrences on its own lines is
unacceptable. As noted by the Court of Appeals that condition was printed in letters so ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated August 14, 1969 is
small that one would have to use a magnifying glass to read the words. Under the affirmed, at KLM's cost.
circumstances, it would be unfair and inequitable to charge the respondents with
automatic knowledge or notice of the said condition so as to preclude any doubt that it
was fairly and freely agreed upon by the respondents when they accepted the passage
tickets issued to them by the KLM. As the airline which issued those tickets with the
knowledge that the respondents would be flown on the various legs of their journey by
different air carriers, the KLM was chargeable with the duty and responsibility of
specifically informing the respondents of conditions prescribed in their tickets or, in the
very least, to ascertain that the respondents read them before they accepted their
passage tickets. A thorough search of the record, however, inexplicably fails to show
that any effort was exerted by the KLM officials or employees to discharge in a proper
manner this responsibility to the respondents. Consequently, we hold that the
respondents cannot be bound by the provision in question by which KLM unilaterally
assumed the role of a mere ticket-issuing agent for other airlines and limited its liability
only to untoward occurrences on its own lines.

3. Moreover, as maintained by the respondents and the Court of Appeals, the passage
tickets of the respondents provide that the carriage to be performed thereunder by
several successive carriers "is to be regarded as a single operation," which is
diametrically incompatible with the theory of the KLM that the respondents entered into a

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 60673 May 19, 1992
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., petitioner,  given all his checked-in baggages except the attache case. Since Rapadas felt ill on his
vs.
JOSE K. RAPADAS and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Froilan P. Pobre for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed in toto the trial court decision on the liability of petitioner Pan American
World Airways for damages due to private respondent. The trial court ruled that the
petitioner can not avail of a limitation of liabilities for lost baggages of a passenger. The
dispositive portion of the trial court decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff by way of actual
damages the equivalent peso value of the amount of $5,228.90 and
100 paengs, nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P5,000.00, and the costs of the suit. Defendant's
counterclaim is dismissed. (Rollo, p. 13)
On January 16, 1975, private respondent Jose K. Rapadas held Passenger Ticket and
Baggage Claim Check No. 026-394830084-5 for petitioner's Flight No. 841 with the
route from Guam to Manila. While standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport,
Rapadas was ordered by petitioner's handcarry control agent to check-in his Samsonite
attache case. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-passengers were
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 268
permitted to handcarry bulkier baggages. He stepped out of the line only to go back
again at the end of it to try if he can get through without having to register his attache
case. However, the same man in charge of handcarry control did not fail to notice him
and ordered him again to register his baggage. For fear that he would miss the plane if
he insisted and argued on personally taking the valise with him, he acceded to checking
it in. He then gave his attache case to his brother who happened to be around and who
checked it in for him, but without declaring its contents or the value of its contents. He
was given a Baggage Claim Tag No. P-749-713. (Exhibit "B" for the plaintiff-respondent)
Upon arriving in Manila on the same date, January 16, 1975, Rapadas claimed and was
arrival, he sent his son, Jorge Rapadas to request for the search of the missing luggage.
The petitioner exerted efforts to locate the luggage through the Pan American World
Airways-Manila International Airport (PAN AM-MIA) Baggage Service.
On January 30, 1975, the petitioner required the private respondent to put the request in
writing. The respondent filled in a Baggage Claim Blank Form. Thereafter, Rapadas
personally followed up his claim. For several times, he called up Mr. Panuelos, the head
of the Baggage Section of PAN AM. He also sent letters demanding and reminding the
petitioner of his claim.
Rapadas received a letter from the petitioner's counsel dated August 2, 1975 offering to
settle the claim for the sum of one hundred sixty dollars ($160.00) representing the
petitioner's alleged limit of liability for loss or damage to a passenger's personal property
under the contract of carriage between Rapadas and PAN AM. Refusing to accept this
kind of settlement, Rapadas filed the instant action for damages on October 1, 1975.
Rapadas alleged that PAN AM discriminated or singled him out in ordering that his
luggage be checked in. He also alleged that PAN AM neglected its duty in the handling
and safekeeping of his attache case from the point of embarkation in Guam to his
destination in Manila. He placed the value of the lost attache case and its contents at
US$42,403.90. According to him, the loss resulted in his failure to pay certain monetary
obligations, failure to remit money sent through him to relatives, inability to enjoy the
fruits of his retirement and vacation pay earned from working in Tonga Construction
Company (he retired in August 1974) and inability to return to Tonga to comply with then
existing contracts.
In its answer, petitioner-defendant PAN AM acknowledged responsibility for the loss of
the attache case but asserted that the claim was subject to the "Notice of Baggage
Liability Limitations" allegedly attached to and forming part of the passenger ticket. The

petitioner argued that the same notice was also conspicuously posted in its offices for
the guidance of the passengers.
At the trial, private respondent showed proof of his retirement award and vacation pay
amounting to $4,750.00. He claimed that the attache case also contained other money
consisting of $1,400 allegedly given to him by his son, Jaime, as a round trip fare of his
(plaintiff-respondent) wife, but which amount was later found to be actually intended by
Jaime as payment for arrears of a lot purchased from Tropical Homes, Inc.; $3,000
allegedly given by his brothers for payment of taxes and for constructing improvements
on the Rapadas estates; and $300.00 birthday present of the spouses Mr. and Mrs.
Ruben Canonizado to plaintiff-respondent's wife. He also claimed having kept several
items in the attache case, namely –– (1) contracts and records of employment, letters of
commendation, testimonials and newspaper clippings on his achievement for 13 years in
Tonga, New Zealand and Australia, drafts of manuscripts, photographs and drivers
license alleged to be worth $20,000.00; a Polaroid camera, films, calculator, and other
personal items worth $403.90; memorabilia, autographs personally acquired from
Charles Lindberg, Lawrence Rockefeller and Ryoichi Sasakawa, a commemorative
palladium coin worth Tongan 100 paengs and unused Tongan stamps, all totalling
$7,500.00; and a plan worth $5,000.00 drawn by his son Jaime, who is an architect, for
the construction of a residential house and a 6-story commercial building. Rapadas
claimed the amount of the attache case itself to be $25.50. (See Decision in Civil Case
No. 99564 in Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 61-85)
The lower court ruled in favor of complainant Rapadas after finding no stipulation giving
notice to the baggage liability limitation. The court rejected the claim of defendant
PANAM that its liability under the terms of the passenger ticket is only up to $160.00.
However, it scrutinized all the claims of the plaintiff. It discredited insufficient evidence to
show discriminatory acts or bad faith on the part of petitioner PANAM.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this petition.
The main issue raised in the case at bar is whether or not a passenger is bound by the
terms of a passenger ticket declaring that the limitations of liability set forth in the
Warsaw Convention (October 12, 1929; 137 League of Nations Treaty Series II; See
Proclamation No. 201 [1955], 51 O.G. 4933 [October, 1955]) as amended by the Hague
Protocol (September 28, 1955; 478 UNTS 373; III PTS 515), shall apply in case of loss,
damage or destruction to a registered luggage of a passenger.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 269
The petitioner maintains that its liability for the lost baggage of respondent Rapadas was
limited to $160.00 since the latter did not declare a higher value for his baggage and did
not pay the corresponding additional charges.
The private respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is entitled to as much
damages as those awarded by the court and affirmed by the respondent appellate court.
After a review of the various arguments of the opposing parties as well as the records of
the case, the Court finds sufficient basis under the particular facts of this case for the
availment of the liability limitations under the Warsaw Convention.
There is no dispute, and the courts below admit, that there was such a Notice appearing
on page two (2) of the airline ticket stating that the Warsaw Convention governs in case
of death or injury to a passenger or of loss, damage or destruction to a passenger's
luggage.
The Notice states:
If the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a
country other than the country of departure the Warsaw Convention
may be applicable and the Convention governs and in most cases
limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect
of loss of or damage to baggage. See also notice headed "Advice to
International Passengers on Limitation of Liability." (The latter notice
refers to limited liability for death or personal injury to passengers with
proven damages not exceeding US $75,000 per passenger; Exhibit "K"
for plaintiff respondent, Table of Exhibits, p. 19)
Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the "Conditions of Contract" also appearing on page 2 of
the ticket states:
2. Carriage hereunder is subject to the rules and limitations relating to
liability established by the Warsaw Convention unless such carriage is
not "international carriage" as defined by that Convention. (Exhibit
"K", supra)
We note that plaintiff-respondent Rapadas presented as proof of the Passenger Ticket
and Baggage Check No. 026-394830084-5 a xerox copy of its page 2 which contains
the Notice and Conditions of Contract, and also page 3 which recites the Advice to

International Passengers on Limitation of Liability. He also presented two xerox copies
of Flight Coupon No. 3 of the same passenger ticket showing the fares paid for the trips
Honolulu to Guam, Guam to Manila, and Manila to Honolulu to prove his obligations
which remained unpaid because of the unexpected loss of money allegedly placed
inside the missing attache case. Rapadas explained during the trial that the same
passenger ticket was returned by him to one Mr. S.L. Faupula of the Union Steam Ship
Company of New Zealand, Ltd., Tonga who demanded the payment of the fares or
otherwise, the return of the unused plane tickets (including the subject Passenger Ticket
& Baggage Check No. 026-394830084-5). The issuance of these tickets was facilitated
by Mr. Faupula on credit.
Meanwhile, the petitioner offered as evidence Exhibit "1" also showing page 2 of the
passenger ticket to prove the notice and the conditions of the contract of carriage. It
likewise offered Exhibit "1-A", a xerox copy of a "Notice of Baggage Liability Limitations"
which the trial court disregarded and held to be non-existent. The same Exhibit "1-A"
contained the following stipulations:
NOTICE OF BAGGAGE LIABILITY LIMITATIONS –– Liability for loss,
delay, or damage to baggage is limited as follows unless a higher value
is declared in advance and additional charges are paid: (1) for most
international travel (including domestic portions of international
journeys) to approximately $8.16 per pound ($18.00 per kilo; now
$20.00 per Exhibit "13") for checked baggage and $360 (now $400 per
Exhibit "13") per passenger for unchecked baggage; (2) for travel
wholly between U.S. points, to $500 per passenger on most carriers (a
few have lower limits). Excess valuation may not be declared on certain
types of valuable articles. Carriers assume no liability for fragile or
perishable articles. Further information may be obtained from the
carrier. (Table of Exhibits, p. 45)
The original of the Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check No. 026-394830084-5 itself
was not presented as evidence as it was among those returned to Mr. Faupula. Thus,
apart from the evidence offered by the defendant airline, the lower court had no other
basis for determining whether or not there was actually a stipulation on the specific
amounts the petitioner had expressed itself to be liable for loss of baggage.
Although the trial court rejected the evidence of the defendant-petitioner of a stipulation
particularly specifying what amounts it had bound itself to pay for loss of luggage, the
Notice and paragraph 2 of the "Conditions of Contract" should be sufficient notice
showing the applicability of the Warsaw limitations.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 270
The Warsaw Convention, as amended, specifically provides that it is applicable
to international carriage  which it defines in Article 1, par. 2 as follows:
(2) For the purposes of this Convention, the expression "international
carriage" means any carriage in which, according to the agreement
between the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination, whether or not there be a breach in the carriage or a
transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another
State, even if that State is not a High Contracting Party. Carriage
between two points within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party without an agreed stopping place within the territory of another
State is not international carriage for the purposes of this Convention.
("High Contracting Party" refers to a state which has ratified or adhered
to the Convention, or which has not effectively denounced the
Convention [Article 40A(l)]).
Nowhere in the Warsaw Convention, as amended, is such a detailed notice of baggage
liability limitations required. Nevertheless, it should become a common, safe and
practical custom among air carriers to indicate beforehand the precise sums equivalent
to those fixed by Article 22 (2) of the Convention.
The Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where the baggage
check is combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket which complies with the
provisions of Article 3, par. l (c). (Article 4, par. 2) In the case at bar, the baggage check
is combined with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. The passenger ticket
complies with Article 3, par. l (c) which provides:
(l) In respect of the carriage of passengers a ticket shall be delivered
containing:
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's
journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a
country other than the country of departure, the
Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the

Convention governs and in most cases limits the
liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in
respect of loss of or damage to baggage.
We have held in the case of Ong Yiu v. Court of Appeals, supra, and reiterated in a
similar case where herein petitioner was also sued for damages, Pan American World
Airways v.  Intermediate Appellate Court  (164 SCRA 268 [1988]) that:
It (plane ticket) is what is known as a contract of "adhesion", in regards
which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party
imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket
in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who
adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he
adheres, he gives his consent. (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962 ed.,
p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, January 31,
1951, p. 49) And as held in Randolph v. American Airlines, 103 Ohio
App. 172, 144 N.E. 2d 878; Rosenchein v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
349 S.W. 2d 483, "a contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation
does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from
contracting against his own negligence.
Considering, therefore, that petitioner had failed to declare a higher
value for his baggage, he cannot be permitted a recovery in excess of
P100.00 . . . (91 SCRA 223 at page 231)
We hasten to add that while contracts of adhesion are not entirely prohibited, neither is a
blind reliance on them encouraged. In the face of facts and circumstances showing they
should be ignored because of their basically one sided nature, the Court does not
hesitate to rule out blind adherence to their terms. (See Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Teves, 83
SCRA 361, 368-369[1978])
The arguments of the petitioner do not belie the fact that it was indeed accountable for
the loss of the attache case. What the petitioner is concerned about is whether or not the
notice, which it did not fail to state in the plane ticket and which it deemed to have been
read and accepted by the private respondent will be considered by this Court as
adequate under the circumstances of this case. As earlier stated, the Court finds the
provisions in the plane ticket sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline
for loss of luggage. The passenger, upon contracting with the airline and receiving the
plane ticket, was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 271
passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid the
application of the liability limitations.
The facts show that the private respondent actually refused to register the attache case
and chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check
it in. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line, private
respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages.
Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be
removed from checked-in-luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried
Manila-paper or plastic envelope.
The alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to
pay the corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with
the requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability. Had he not wavered in
his decision to register his luggage, he could have had enough time to disclose the true
worth of the articles in it and to pay the extra charges or remove them from the checked-
in-luggage. Moreover, an airplane will not depart meantime that its own employee is
asking a passenger to comply with a safety regulation.
Passengers are also allowed one handcarried bag each provided it conforms to certain
prescribed dimensions. If Mr. Rapadas was not allowed to handcarry the lost attache
case, it can only mean that he was carrying more than the allowable weight for all his
luggages or more than the allowable number of handcarried items or more than the
prescribed dimensions for the bag or valise. The evidence on any arbitrary behavior of a
Pan Am employee or inexcusable negligence on the part of the carrier is not clear from
the petition. Absent such proof, we cannot hold the carrier liable because of
arbitrariness, discrimination, or mistreatment.
We are not by any means suggesting that passengers are always bound to the
stipulated amounts printed on a ticket, found in a contract of adhesion, or printed
elsewhere but referred to in handouts or forms. We simply recognize that the reasons
behind stipulations on liability limitations arise from the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
establishing with a clear preponderance of evidence the contents of a lost valise or
suitcase. Unless the contents are declared, it will always be the word of a passenger
against that of the airline. If the loss of life or property is caused by the gross negligence
or arbitrary acts of the airline or the contents of the lost luggage are proved by
satisfactory evidence other than the self-serving declarations of one party, the Court will
not hesitate to disregard the fine print in a contract of adhesion. (See Sweet Lines Inc. v.
Teves, supra) Otherwise, we are constrained to rule that we have to enforce the contract
as it is the only reasonable basis to arrive at a just award.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 272

We note that the finding on the amount lost is more of a probability than a proved preclude an award of attorney's fees. That provision states that the limits of liability
conclusion. prescribed in the instrument "shall not prevent the court from awarding, in accordance
with its own law, in addition, the whole or part of the court costs and other expenses of
The trial court stated: litigation incurred by the plaintiff." We, however, raise the award to P10,000.00
considering the resort to the Court of Appeals and this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent
We come now to the actual loss of $4,750.00 which the plaintiff claims Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ordered to pay the
was the amount of his retirement award and vacation pay. According to private respondent damages in the amount of US$400.00 or its equivalent in Philippine
the plaintiff, this was in cash of $100 denominations and was placed in Currency at the time of actual payment, P10,000.00 in attorney's fees, and costs of the
an envelope separate from the other money he was carrying. Plaintiff suit.
presented the memorandum award, Exhibit T-1 and the vouchers of
payment, Exhibits T-2 and T-3. Under the circumstances, recited by the
plaintiff in which the loss occurred, the Court believes that  plaintiff
could really have placed this amount in the attache case considering
that he was originally handcarrying said attache case and the same
was looked, and he did not expect that he would be required to check it
in. . . . (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 75; Emphasis ours)

The above conclusion of the trial court does not arise from the facts. That the attache
case was originally handcarried does not beg the conclusion that the amount of
$4,750.00 in cash could have been placed inside. It may be noted that out of a claim for
US$42,403.90 as the amount lost, the trial court found for only US$5,228.90 and 100
paengs. The court had doubts as to the total claim.

The lost luggage was declared as weighing around 18 pounds or approximately 8

kilograms. At $20.00 per kilogram, the petitioner offered to pay $160.00 as a higher
value was not declared in advance and additional charges were not paid. We note,
however, that an amount of $400.00 per passenger is allowed for unchecked luggage.
Since the checking-in was against the will of the respondent, we treat the lost bag as
partaking of involuntarily and hurriedly checked-in luggage and continuing its earlier
status as unchecked luggage. The fair liability under the petitioner's own printed terms is
$400.00. Since the trial court ruled out discriminatory acts or bad faith on the part of Pan
Am or other reasons warranting damages, there is no factual basis for the grant of
P20,000.00 damages.

As to the question of whether or not private respondent should be paid attorney's fees,
the Court sustains the finding of the trial court and the respondent appellate court that it
is just and equitable for the private respondent to recover expenses for litigation in the
amount of P5,000.00. Article 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention, as amended does not
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 273

Petitioner is the owner of a 374 square meter parcel of land located at Quezon St.,
Masbate, Masbate. Sometime in 1975, respondent bank, in its desire to put up a branch
in Masbate, Masbate, negotiated with petitioner for the purchase of the then
unregistered property. On May 20, 1975, a contract of LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY
Republic of the Philippines was instead forged by the parties, the pertinent portion of which reads:
SUPREME COURT
Manila 1. The LESSOR leases unto the LESSEE, an the LESSEE hereby
accepts in lease, the parcel of land described in the first WHEREAS
SECOND DIVISION clause, to have and to hold the same for a period of twenty-five (25)
years commencing from June 1, 1975 to June 1, 2000. The LESSEE,
however, shall have the option to purchase said parcel of land within a
period of ten (10) years from the date of the signing of this Contract at
a price not greater than TWO HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P210.00) per
G.R. No. 103338 January 4, 1994
square meter. For this purpose, the LESSOR undertakes, within such
ten-year period, to register said parcel of land under the TORRENS
FEDERICO SERRA, petitioner, 
SYSTEM and all expenses appurtenant thereto shall be for his sole
vs.
account.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.
If, for any reason, said parcel of land is not registered under the
TORRENS SYSTEM within the aforementioned ten-year period, the
Andres R. Amante, Jr. for petitioner.
LESSEE shall have the right, upon termination of the lease to be paid
by the LESSOR the market value of the building and improvements
R.C. Domingo, Jr. & Associates for private respondent. constructed on said parcel of land.

The LESSEE is hereby appointed attorney-in-fact for the LESSOR to

NOCON, J.:
A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally
demandable. An accepted unilateral promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a
price certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration
distinct from the price. (Article 1479, New Civil Code) The first is the mutual promise and
each has the right to demand from the other the fulfillment of the obligation. While the
second is merely an offer of one to another, which if accepted, would create an
obligation to the offeror to make good his promise, provided the acceptance is supported
by a consideration distinct from the price.
Disputed in the present case is the efficacy of a "Contract of Lease with Option to Buy",
entered into between petitioner Federico Serra and private respondent Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation. (RCBC).
register said parcel of land under the TORRENS SYSTEM in case the
LESSOR, for any reason, fails to comply with his obligation to effect
said registration within reasonable time after the signing of this
Agreement, and all expenses appurtenant to such registration shall be
charged by the LESSEE against the rentals due to the LESSOR.
2. During the period of the lease, the LESSEE covenants to pay the
LESSOR, at the latter's residence, a monthly rental of SEVEN
HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00), Philippine Currency, payable in
advance on or before the fifth (5th) day of every calendar month,
provided that the rentals for the first four (4) months shall be paid by
the LESSEE in advance upon the signing of this Contract.
3. The LESSEE is hereby authorized to construct as its sole expense a
building and such other improvements on said parcel of land, which it

may need in pursuance of its business and/or operations; provided,
that if for any reason the LESSEE shall fail to exercise its option
mentioned in paragraph (1) above in case the parcel of land is
registered under the TORRENS SYSTEM within the ten-year period
mentioned therein, said building and/or improvements, shall become
the property of the LESSOR after the expiration of the 25-year lease
period without the right of reimbursement on the part of the LESSEE.
The authority herein granted does not, however, extend to the making
or allowing any unlawful, improper or offensive used of the leased
premises, or any use thereof, other than banking and office purposes.
The maintenance and upkeep of such building, structure and
improvements shall likewise be for the sole account of the LESSEE. 1
The foregoing agreement was subscribed before Notary Public Romeo F. Natividad.
Pursuant to said contract, a building and other improvements were constructed on the
land which housed the branch office of RCBC in Masbate, Masbate. Within three years
from the signing of the contract, petitioner complied with his part of the agreement by
having the property registered and
placed under the TORRENS SYSTEM, for which Original Certificate of Title No. 0-232
was issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Masbate.
Petitioner alleges that as soon as he had the property registered, he kept on pursuing
the manager of the branch to effect the sale of the lot as per their agreement. It was not
until September 4, 1984, however, when the respondent bank decided to exercise its
option and informed petitioner, through a letter, 2 of its intention to buy the property at
the agreed price of not greater than P210.00 per square meter or a total of P78,430.00.
But much to the surprise of the respondent, petitioner replied that he is no longer selling
the property.3
Hence, on March 14, 1985, a complaint for specific performance and damages were
filed by respondent against petitioner. In the complaint, respondent alleged that during
the negotiations it made clear to petitioner that it intends to stay permanently on property
once its branch office is opened unless the exigencies of the business requires
otherwise. Aside from its prayer for specific performance, it likewise asked for an award
of P50,000.00 for attorney's fees P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and the cost of
the suit.4
A special and affirmative defenses, petitioner contended:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 274
1. That the contract having been prepared and drawn by RCBC, it took
undue advantage on him when it set in lopsided terms.
2. That the option was not supported by any consideration distinct from
the price and hence not binding upon him.
3. That as a condition for the validity and/or efficacy of the option, it
should have been exercised within the reasonable time after the
registration of the land under the Torrens System; that its delayed
action on the option have forfeited whatever its claim to the same.
4. That extraordinary inflation supervened resulting in the unusual
decrease in the purchasing power of the currency that could not
reasonably be forseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of
the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation, thus,
rendering the terms of the contract unenforceable, inequitable and to
the undue enrichment of RCBC. 5
and as counterclaim petitioner alleged that:
1. The rental of P700.00 has become unrealistic and unreasonable,
that justice and equity will require its adjustment.
2. By the institution of the complaint he suffered moral damages which
may be assessed at P100,000.00 and award of attorney's fee of
P25,000.00 and exemplary damages at P100,000.00. 6
Initially, after trial on the merits, the court dismissed the complaint. Although it found the
contract to be valid, the court nonetheless ruled that the option to buy in unenforceable
because it lacked a consideration distinct from the price and RCBC did not exercise its
option within reasonable time. The prayer for readjustment of rental was denied, as well
as that for moral and exemplary damages.7
Nevertheless, upon motion for reconsideration of respondent, the court in the order of
January 9, 1989, reversed itself, the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court reconsiders its decision dated June 6, 1988,
and hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. The defendant is hereby ordered to execute and deliver the proper
deed of sale in favor of plaintiff selling, transferring and
conveying the property covered by and described in the Original
Certificate of Title 0-232 of the Registry of Deeds of Masbate for the
sum of Seventy Eight Thousand Five Hundred Forty Pesos
(P78,540,00), Philippine Currency;
2. Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees;
3. The counter claim of defendant is hereby dismissed; and
4. Defendants shall pay the costs of suit. 8 educated man, who, at the time of the trial was already a CPA-Lawyer, and when he
In a decision promulgated on September 19, 1991, 9 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
findings of the trial court that:
1. The contract is valid and that the parties perfectly understood the
contents thereof;
2. The option is supported by a distinct and separate consideration as
embodied in the agreement;
3. There is no basis in granting an adjustment in rental.
Assailing the judgment of the appellate court, petitioner would like us to consider mainly
the following:
1. The disputed contract is a contract of adhesion.
2. There was no consideration to support the option, distinct from the
price, hence the option cannot be exercised.
3. Respondent court gravely abused its discretion in not granting
currency adjustment on the already eroded value of the stipulated
rentals for twenty-five years.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 275
There is no dispute that the contract is valid and existing between the parties, as found
by both the trial court and the appellate court. Neither do we find the terms of the
contract unfairly lopsided to have it ignored.
A contract of adhesion is one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the
stipulations in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his
"adhesion" thereto. These types of contracts are as binding as ordinary contracts.
Because in reality, the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.
Although, this Court will not hesitate to rule out blind adherence to terms where facts
and circumstances will show that it is basically one-sided. 10
We do not find the situation in the present case to be inequitable. Petitioner is a highly
entered into the contract, was already a CPA, holding a respectable position with the
Metropolitan Manila Commission. It is evident that a man of his stature should have
been more cautious in transactions he enters into, particularly where it concerns
valuable properties. He is amply equipped to drive a hard bargain if he would be so
minded to.
Petitioner contends that the doctrines laid down in the cases of
Atkins Kroll v.  Cua Hian Tek, 11 Sanchez v. Rigos, 12 and Vda.  de Quirino
v. Palarca  13 were misapplied in the present case, because 1) the option given to the
respondent bank was not supported by a consideration distinct from the price; and 2)
that the stipulated price of "not greater than P210.00 per square meter" is not certain or
definite.
Article 1324 of the Civil Code provides that when an offeror has allowed the offeree a
certain period to accept, the offer maybe withdrawn at anytime before acceptance by
communicating such withdrawal, except when the option is founded upon consideration,
as something paid or promised. On the other hand, Article 1479 of the Code provides
that an accepted unilateral promise to buy and sell a determinate thing  for a price
certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration
distinct from the price.
In a unilateral promise to sell, where the debtor fails to withdraw the promise before the
acceptance by the creditor, the transaction becomes a bilateral contract to sell and to
buy, because upon acceptance by the creditor of the offer to sell by the debtor, there is
already a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the thing which is determinate and
the price which is certain. 14 In which case, the parties may then reciprocally demand
performance.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 276

Jurisprudence has taught us that an optional contract is a privilege existing only in one x x x           x x x          x x x
party — the buyer. For a separate consideration paid, he is given the right to decide to
purchase or not, a certain merchandise or property, at any time within the agreed period, A. Well, there was an offer to buy the property at P210
at a fixed price. This being his prerogative, he may not be compelled to exercise the per square meters (sic).
option to buy before the time
expires. 15 Q. And that was in what year?

On the other hand, what may be regarded as a consideration separate from the price is A . 1975, sir.
discussed in the case of Vda.  de Quirino v. Palarca  16 wherein the facts are almost on
all fours with the case at bar. The said case also involved a lease contract with option to Q. And did you accept the offer?
buy where we had occasion to say that "the consideration for the lessor's obligation to
sell the leased premises to the lessee, should he choose to exercise his option to
A. Yes, sir. 21
purchase the same, is the obligation of the lessee to sell to the lessor the building and/or
improvements constructed and/or made by the former, if he fails to exercise his option to
Moreover, by his subsequent acts of having the land titled under the Torrens System,
buy leased premises." 17
and in pursuing the bank manager to effect the sale immediately, means that he
understood perfectly the terms of the contract. He even had the same property
In the present case, the consideration is even more onerous on the part of the lessee
mortgaged to the respondent bank sometime in 1979, without the slightest hint of
since it entails transferring of the building and/or improvements on the property to
wanting to abandon his offer to sell the property at the agreed price of P210 per square
petitioner, should respondent bank fail to exercise its option within the period
meter. 22
stipulated. 18

The bugging question then is whether the price "not greater than TWO HUNDRED
PESOS" is certain or definite. A price is considered certain if it is so with reference to
another thing certain or when the determination thereof is left to the judgment of a
specified person or persons. 19 And generally, gross inadequacy of price does not affect
a contract of sale. 20
Contracts are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which
the parties themselves have used. In the present dispute, there is evidence to show that
the intention of the parties is to peg the price at P210 per square meter. This was
confirmed by petitioner himself in his testimony, as follows:
Q. Will you please tell this Court what was the offer?
A. It was an offer to buy the property that I have in
Quezon City (sic).
Q. And did they give you a specific amount?
Finally, we agree with the courts a quo  that there is no basis, legal or factual, in
adjusting the amount of the rent. The contract is the law between the parties and if there
is indeed reason to adjust the rent, the parties could by themselves negotiate for the
amendment of the contract. Neither could we consider the decline of the purchasing
power of the Philippine peso from 1983 to the time of the commencement of the present
case in 1985, to be so great as to result in an extraordinary inflation. Extraordinary
inflation exists when there in an unimaginable increase or decrease of the purchasing
power of the Philippine currency, or fluctuation in the value of pesos manifestly beyond
the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation. 23
Premises considered, we find that the contract of "LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY"
between petitioner and respondent bank is valid, effective and enforceable, the price
being certain and that there was consideration distinct from the price to support the
option given to the lessee.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision of the appellate
court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 277

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37750 May 19, 1978
SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner,  which reads:
vs.
HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental Branch VII,
LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO TIRO, respondents.
Filiberto Leonardo, Abelardo C. Almario & Samuel B. Abadiano for petitioner.
Leovigildo Vallar for private respondents.
SANTOS, J.:
This is an original action for Prohibition with Pre Injunction filed October 3, 1973 to
restrain respondent Judge from proceeding further with Civil Case No. 4091,
entitled Leovigildo D. Tandog, Jr. and Rogelio Tiro v. Sweet Lines, Inc."  after he denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint, and the Motion for Reconsideration of said
order. 1
Briefly, the facts of record follow. Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and
Rogelio Tiro, a contractor by professions, bought tickets Nos. 0011736 and 011737 for
Voyage 90 on December 31, 1971 at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company
transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents
were to board petitioner's vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran City via the
port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many
passengers were bound for Surigao, private respondents per advice, went to the branch
office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town". Because the said vessel was already
filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid
inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that
they were, during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 278
coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan
de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other
tickets. In view thereof, private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach
of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00 before respondents Court of
First Instance of Misamis Oriental. 2
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion
was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets, i.e., Condition No. 14,
14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising
out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where
it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. 3
The motion was denied by the trial court. 4 Petitioner moved to reconnsider the order of
denial, but no avail. 5 Hence, this instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction,
'alleging that the respondent judge has departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial preoceeding" and "had acted without or in excess or in error of his jurisdicton or
in gross abuse of discretion. 6
In Our resolution of November 20, 1973, We restrained respondent Judge from
proceeding further with the case and required respondent to comment. 7 On January 18,
1974, We gave due course to the petition and required respondent to
answer. 8 Thereafter, the parties submitted their respesctive memoranda in support of
their respective contentions. 9
Presented thus for Our resolution is a question is aquestion which, to all appearances, is
one of first impression, to wit — Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's
passage tickets purchased by private respondents, which limits the venue of actions
arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu, valid and
enforceable? Otherwise stated, may a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping
stipulate thru condition printed at the back of passage tickets to its vessels that any and
all actions arising out of the ocntract of carriage should be filed only in a particular
province or city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the exclusion of all others?
Petitioner contends thaty Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable, since private
respndents acceded to tit when they purchased passage tickets at its Cagayan de Oro
branch office and took its vessel M/S "Sweet Town" for passage to Tagbilaran, Bohol —
that the condition of the venue of actions in the City of Cebu is proper since venue may

be validly waived, citing cases; 10 that is an effective waiver of venue, valid and binding
as such, since it is printed in bold and capital letters and not in fine print and merely
assigns the place where the action sing from the contract is institution likewise citing
cases; 11 and that condition No. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory, the words and
phrases "any and all", "irrespective of where it is issued," and "shag" leave no doubt that
the intention of Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of Cebu, to the exclusion
of other places; that the orders of the respondent Judge are an unwarranted departure
from established jurisprudence governing the case; and that he acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction in is the orders complained of. 12
On the other hand, private respondents claim that Condition No. 14 is not valid, that the
same is not an essential element of the contract of carriage, being in itself a different
agreement which requires the mutual consent of the parties to it; that they had no say in
its preparation, the existence of which they could not refuse, hence, they had no choice
but to pay for the tickets and to avail of petitioner's shipping facilities out of necessity;
that the carrier "has been exacting too much from the public by inserting impositions in
the passage tickets too burdensome to bear," that the condition which was printed in fine
letters is an imposition on the riding public and does not bind respondents, citing
cases; 13 that while venue 6f actions may be transferred from one province to another,
such arrangement requires the "written agreement of the parties", not to be imposed
unilaterally; and that assuming that the condition is valid, it is not exclusive and does not,
therefore, exclude the filing of the action in Misamis Oriental, 14
There is no question that there was a valid contract of carriage entered into by petitioner
and private respondents and that the passage tickets, upon which the latter based their
complaint, are the best evidence thereof. All the essential elements of a valid contract,
i.e., consent, cause or consideration and object, are present. As held in Peralta de
Guerrero, et al. v. Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., 15
It is a matter of common knowledge that whenever a passenger boards
a ship for transportation from one place to another he is issued a ticket
by the shipper which has all the elements of a written contract, Namely:
(1) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the
passenger boards the ship and the shipper consents or accepts him in
the ship for transportation; (2) cause or consideration which is the fare
paid by the passenger as stated in the ticket; (3) object, which is the
transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the place
of destination which are stated in the ticket.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 279
It should be borne in mind, however, that with respect to the fourteen (14) conditions —
one of which is "Condition No. 14" which is in issue in this case — printed at the back of
the passage tickets, these are commonly known as "contracts of adhesion," the validity
and/or enforceability of which will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in each case and the nature of the conditions or terms sought to be enforced.
For, "(W)hile generally, stipulations in a contract come about after deliberate drafting by
the parties thereto, ... there are certain contracts almost all the provisions of which have
been drafted only by one party, usually a corporation. Such contracts are
called contracts of adhesion, because the only participation of the party is the signing of
his signature or his 'adhesion' thereto. Insurance contracts, bills of lading, contracts of
make of lots on the installment plan fall into this category" 16
By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are entered into —
namely, that it is drafted only by one party, usually the corporation, and is sought to be
accepted or adhered to by the other party, in this instance the passengers, private
respondents, who cannot change the same and who are thus made to adhere thereto on
the "take it or leave it" basis — certain guidelines in the determination of their validity
and/or enforceability have been formulated in order to that justice and fan play
characterize the relationship of the contracting parties. Thus, this Court speaking
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance
Co.,  17 and later through Justice Fernando in Fieldman Insurance v. Vargas, 18 held —
The courts cannot ignore that nowadays, monopolies, cartels and
concentration of capital endowed with overwhelm economic power,
manage to impose upon parties d with them y prepared 'agreements'
that the weaker party may not change one whit his participation in the
'agreement' being reduced to the alternative 'to take it or leave it,'
labelled since Raymond Saleilles 'contracts by adherence' (contracts d'
adhesion) in contrast to those entered into by parties bargaining on an
equal footing. Such contracts (of which policies of insurance and
international bill of lading are prime examples) obviously cap for greater
strictness and vigilance on the part of the courts of justice with a view
to protecting the weaker party from abuses and imposition, and prevent
their becoming traps for the unwary.
To the same effect and import, and, in recognition of the character of contracts of this
kind, the protection of the disadvantaged is expressly enjoined by the New Civil Code —
In all contractual property or other relations, when one of the parties is
at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance

indigence, mental weakness, tender age and other handicap, the
courts must be vigilant for his  the same chance, since their alleged adhesion is presumed only from the fact that they
protection. 19
Considered in the light Of the foregoing norms and in the context Of circumstances
Prevailing in the inter-island ship. ping industry in the country today, We find and hold
that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void
and unenforceable for the following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the
inter-island ship. ping industry, it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of
the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is
Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on
transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and
interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who, under Condition
No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
1. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which We can take judicial notice, that there is a
dearth of and acute shortage in inter- island vessels plying between the country's
several islands, and the facilities they offer leave much to be desired. Thus, even under
ordinary circumstances, the piers are congested with passengers and their cargo waiting
to be transported. The conditions are even worse at peak and/or the rainy seasons,
when Passengers literally scramble to whatever accommodations may be availed of,
even through circuitous routes, and/or at the risk of their safety — their immediate
concern, for the moment, being to be able to board vessels with the hope of reaching
their destinations. The schedules are — as often as not if not more so — delayed or
altered. This was precisely the experience of private respondents when they were
relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" from M/S "Sweet Hope" and then any to the scorching
heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits, " because even
the latter was filed to capacity.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to
examine their tickets received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not
during rush hours, for conditions that may be printed much charge them with having
consented to the conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number of such
conditions m fine print, as in this case. 20
Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was prepared solely at the ms of the
petitioner, respondents had no say in its preparation. Neither did the latter have the
opportunity to take the into account prior to the purpose chase of their tickets. For, unlike
the small print provisions of contracts — the common example of contracts of adherence
— which are entered into by the insured in his awareness of said conditions, since the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 280
insured is afforded the op to and co the same, passengers of inter-island v do not have
purpose chased the tickets.
It should also be stressed that slapping companies are franchise holders of certificates
of public convenience and therefore, posses a virtual monopoly over the business of
transporting passengers between the ports covered by their franchise. This being so,
shipping companies, like petitioner, engaged in inter-island shipping, have a virtual
monopoly of the business of transporting passengers and may thus dictate their terms of
passage, leaving passengers with no choice but to buy their tickets and avail of their
vessels and facilities. Finally, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the bulk of
those who board these inter-island vested come from the low-income groups and are
less literate, and who have little or no choice but to avail of petitioner's vessels.
2. Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For,
although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by
agreement of the parties in writing t to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an
agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants,
such as the private respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions on
transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses
and to promote 21 the ends of justice. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger
residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he
would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat,
instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has branches or
offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of
these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in
the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.
Public policy is ". . . that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good ... 22 Under this principle" ... freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by
law for the good of the public. 23 Clearly, Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive
of the public good or interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of
passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus placing petitioner company at a decided
advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly legitimate claims against it. The
said condition should, therefore, be declared void and unenforceable, as contrary to
public policy — to make the courts accessible to all who may have need of their
services.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 281

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DISMISS. ED. The restraining order issued
on November 20, 1973, is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40597 June 29, 1979
AGUSTINO B. ONG YIU, petitioner,  vital documents needed for trial the next day. At 10:00 o'clock that evening, petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for Review by Certiorari, petitioner, a practicing lawyer and businessman,
seeks a reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 45005-R, which
reduced his claim for damages for breach of contract of transportation.
The facts are as follows:
On August 26, 1967, petitioner was a fare paying passenger of respondent Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. (PAL), on board Flight No. 463-R, from Mactan Cebu, bound for Butuan City.
He was scheduled to attend the trial of Civil Case No. 1005 and Spec. Procs. No. 1125
in the Court of First Instance, Branch II, thereat, set for hearing on August 28-31, 1967.
As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggage, a blue "maleta" for which he was
issued Claim Check No. 2106-R (Exh. "A"). The plane left Mactan Airport, Cebu, at
about 1:00 o'clock P.M., and arrived at Bancasi airport, Butuan City, at past 2:00 o'clock
P.M., of the same day. Upon arrival, petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be
found. According to petitioner, it was only after reacting indignantly to the loss that the
matter was attended to by the porter clerk, Maximo Gomez, which, however, the latter
denies, At about 3:00 o'clock P.M., PAL Butuan, sent a message to PAL, Cebu, inquiring
about the missing luggage, which message was, in turn relayed in full to the Mactan
Airport teletype operator at 3:45 P.M. (Exh. "2") that same afternoon. It must have been
transmitted to Manila immediately, for at 3:59 that same afternoon, PAL Manila wired
PAL Cebu advising that the luggage had been over carried to Manila aboard Flight No.
156 and that it would be forwarded to Cebu on Flight No. 345 of the same day.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 282
Instructions were also given that the luggage be immediately forwarded to Butuan City
on the first available flight (Exh. "3"). At 5:00 P.M. of the same afternoon, PAL Cebu sent
a message to PAL Butuan that the luggage would be forwarded on Fright No. 963 the
following day, August 27, 196'(. However, this message was not received by PAL
Butuan as all the personnel had already left since there were no more incoming flights
that afternoon.
In the meantime, petitioner was worried about the missing luggage because it contained
wired PAL Cebu demanding the delivery of his baggage before noon the next day,
otherwise, he would hold PAL liable for damages, and stating that PAL's gross
negligence had caused him undue inconvenience, worry, anxiety and extreme
embarrassment (Exh. "B"). This telegram was received by the Cebu PAL supervisor but
the latter felt no need to wire petitioner that his luggage had already been forwarded on
the assumption that by the time the message reached Butuan City, the luggage would
have arrived.
Early in the morning of the next day, August 27, 1967, petitioner went to the Bancasi
Airport to inquire about his luggage. He did not wait, however, for the morning flight
which arrived at 10:00 o'clock that morning. This flight carried the missing luggage. The
porter clerk, Maximo Gomez, paged petitioner, but the latter had already left. A certain
Emilio Dagorro a driver of a "colorum" car, who also used to drive for petitioner,
volunteered to take the luggage to petitioner. As Maximo Gomez knew Dagorro to be the
same driver used by petitioner whenever the latter was in Butuan City, Gomez took the
luggage and placed it on the counter. Dagorro examined the lock, pressed it, and it
opened. After calling the attention of Maximo Gomez, the "maleta" was opened, Gomez
took a look at its contents, but did not touch them. Dagorro then delivered the "maleta"
to petitioner, with the information that the lock was open. Upon inspection, petitioner
found that a folder containing certain exhibits, transcripts and private documents in Civil
Case No. 1005 and Sp. Procs. No. 1126 were missing, aside from two gift items for his
parents-in-law. Petitioner refused to accept the luggage. Dagorro returned it to the porter
clerk, Maximo Gomez, who sealed it and forwarded the same to PAL Cebu.
Meanwhile, petitioner asked for postponement of the hearing of Civil Case No. 1005 due
to loss of his documents, which was granted by the Court (Exhs. "C" and "C-1").
Petitioner returned to Cebu City on August 28, 1967. In a letter dated August 29, 1967
addressed to PAL, Cebu, petitioner called attention to his telegram (Exh. "D"),
demanded that his luggage be produced intact, and that he be compensated in the sum

of P250,000,00 for actual and moral damages within five days from receipt of the letter,
otherwise, he would be left with no alternative but to file suit (Exh. "D").
On August 31, 1967, Messrs. de Leon, Navarsi, and Agustin, all of PAL Cebu, went to
petitioner's office to deliver the "maleta". In the presence of Mr. Jose Yap and Atty.
Manuel Maranga the contents were listed and receipted for by petitioner (Exh. "E").
On September 5, 1967, petitioner sent a tracer letter to PAL Cebu inquiring about the
results of the investigation which Messrs. de Leon, Navarsi, and Agustin had promised
to conduct to pinpoint responsibility for the unauthorized opening of the "maleta" (Exh.
"F").
The following day, September 6, 1967, PAL sent its reply hereinunder quoted verbatim:
Dear Atty. Ong Yiu:
This is with reference to your September 5, 1967, letter to Mr. Ricardo
G. Paloma, Acting Manager, Southern Philippines.
First of all, may we apologize for the delay in informing you of the result
of our investigation since we visited you in your office last August 31,
1967. Since there are stations other than Cebu which are involved in
your case, we have to communicate and await replies from them. We
regret to inform you that to date we have not found the supposedly lost
folder of papers nor have we been able to pinpoint the personnel who
allegedly pilferred your baggage.
You must realize that no inventory was taken of the cargo upon loading
them on any plane. Consequently, we have no way of knowing the real
contents of your baggage when same was loaded.
We realized the inconvenience you encountered of this incident but we
trust that you will give us another opportunity to be of better service to
you.
Very truly yours,
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.
(Sgd) JEREMIAS S. AGUSTIN
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 283
Branch Supervisor
Cebu
(Exhibit G, Folder of Exhibits) 1
On September 13, 1967, petitioner filed a Complaint against PAL for damages for
breach of contract of transportation with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-10188, which PAL traversed. After due trial, the lower
Court found PAL to have acted in bad faith and with malice and declared petitioner
entitled to moral damages in the sum of P80,000.00, exemplary damages of
P30,000.00, attorney's fees of P5,000.00, and costs.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals — petitioner in so far as he was awarded
only the sum of P80,000.00 as moral damages; and defendant because of the
unfavorable judgment rendered against it.
On August 22, 1974, the Court of Appeals,* finding that PAL was guilty only of simple
negligence, reversed the judgment of the trial Court granting petitioner moral and
exemplary damages, but ordered PAL to pay plaintiff the sum of P100.00, the baggage
liability assumed by it under the condition of carriage printed at the back of the ticket.
Hence, this Petition for Review by Certiorari, filed on May 2, 1975, with petitioner making
the following Assignments of Error:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
RESPONDENT PAL GUILTY ONLY OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE AND
NOT BAD FAITH IN THE BREACH OF ITS CONTRACT OF
TRANSPORTATION WITH PETITIONER.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISCONSTRUED THE
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF
THE LOWER COURT AWARDING TO PETITIONER MORAL
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P80,000.00, EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES OF P30,000.00, AND P5,000.00 REPRESENTING
ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND ORDERED RESPONDENT PAL TO
COMPENSATE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF P100.00 ONLY,
CONTRARY TO THE EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 2220,
2229, 2232 AND 2234 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

On July 16, 1975, this Court gave due course to the Petition.
There is no dispute that PAL incurred in delay in the delivery of petitioner's luggage. The
question is the correctness of respondent Court's conclusion that there was no gross
negligence on the part of PAL and that it had not acted fraudulently or in bad faith as to
entitle petitioner to an award of moral and exemplary damages.
From the facts of the case, we agree with respondent Court that PAL had not acted in
bad faith. Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or
ill will. 2 It was the duty of PAL to look for petitioner's luggage which had been
miscarried. PAL exerted due diligence in complying with such duty.
As aptly stated by the appellate Court:
We do not find any evidence of bad faith in this. On the contrary, We
find that the defendant had exerted diligent effort to locate plaintiff's
baggage. The trial court saw evidence of bad faith because PAL sent
the telegraphic message to Mactan only at 3:00 o'clock that same
afternoon, despite plaintiff's indignation for the non-arrival of his
baggage. The message was sent within less than one hour after
plaintiff's luggage could not be located. Efforts had to be exerted to
locate plaintiff's maleta. Then the Bancasi airport had to attend to other
incoming passengers and to the outgoing passengers. Certainly, no
evidence of bad faith can be inferred from these facts. Cebu office
immediately wired Manila inquiring about the missing baggage of the
plaintiff. At 3:59 P.M., Manila station agent at the domestic airport wired
Cebu that the baggage was over carried to Manila. And this message
was received in Cebu one minute thereafter, or at 4:00 P.M. The
baggage was in fact sent back to Cebu City that same afternoon. His
Honor stated that the fact that the message was sent at 3:59 P.M. from
Manila and completely relayed to Mactan at 4:00 P.M., or within one
minute, made the message appear spurious. This is a forced
reasoning. A radio message of about 50 words can be completely
transmitted in even less than one minute depending upon atmospheric
conditions. Even if the message was sent from Manila or other distant
places, the message can be received within a minute. that is a scientific
fact which cannot be questioned. 3
Neither was the failure of PAL Cebu to reply to petitioner's rush telegram indicative of
bad faith, The telegram (Exh. B) was dispatched by petitioner at around 10:00 P.M. of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 284
August 26, 1967. The PAL supervisor at Mactan Airport was notified of it only in the
morning of the following day. At that time the luggage was already to be forwarded to
Butuan City. There was no bad faith, therefore, in the assumption made by said
supervisor that the plane carrying the bag would arrive at Butuan earlier than a reply
telegram. Had petitioner waited or caused someone to wait at the Bancasi airport for the
arrival of the morning flight, he would have been able to retrieve his luggage sooner.
In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, petitioner is not
entitled to moral damages.
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act of omission.
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Petitioner is neither entitled to exemplary damages. In contracts, as provided for in
Article 2232 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages can be granted if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, which has
not been proven in this case.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Court committed grave error when it limited
PAL's carriage liability to the amount of P100.00 as stipulated at the back of the ticket. In
this connection, respondent Court opined:
As a general proposition, the plaintiff's maleta having been pilfered
while in the custody of the defendant, it is presumed that the defendant
had been negligent. The liability, however, of PAL for the loss, in
accordance with the stipulation written on the back of the ticket, Exhibit
12, is limited to P100.00 per baggage, plaintiff not having declared a
greater value, and not having called the attention of the defendant on
its true value and paid the tariff therefor. The validity of this stipulation
is not questioned by the plaintiff. They are printed in reasonably and
fairly big letters, and are easily readable. Moreover, plaintiff had been a
frequent passenger of PAL from Cebu to Butuan City and back, and he,
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 285

being a lawyer and businessman, must be fully aware of these
conditions. 4
We agree with the foregoing finding. The pertinent Condition of Carriage printed at the
back of the plane ticket reads:
8. BAGGAGE LIABILITY ... The total liability of the Carrier for lost or
damaged baggage of the passenger is LIMITED TO P100.00 for each
ticket unless a passenger declares a higher valuation in excess of
P100.00, but not in excess, however, of a total valuation of P1,000.00
and additional charges are paid pursuant to Carrier's tariffs.
There is no dispute that petitioner did not declare any higher value for his luggage, much
less did he pay any additional transportation charge.
But petitioner argues that there is nothing in the evidence to show that he had actually
entered into a contract with PAL limiting the latter's liability for loss or delay of the
baggage of its passengers, and that Article 1750* of the Civil Code has not been
complied with.
There is another matter involved, raised as an error by PAL — the fact that on October
24, 1974 or two months after the promulgation of the Decision of the appellate Court,
petitioner's widow filed a Motion for Substitution claiming that petitioner died on January
6, 1974 and that she only came to know of the adverse Decision on October 23, 1974
when petitioner's law partner informed her that he received copy of the Decision on
August 28, 1974. Attached to her Motion was an Affidavit of petitioner's law partner
reciting facts constitutive of excusable negligence. The appellate Court noting that all
pleadings had been signed by petitioner himself allowed the widow "to take such steps
as she or counsel may deem necessary." She then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
over the opposition of PAL which alleged that the Court of Appeals Decision,
promulgated on August 22, 1974, had already become final and executory since no
appeal had been interposed therefrom within the reglementary period.
Under the circumstances, considering the demise of petitioner himself, who acted as his
own counsel, it is best that technicality yields to the interests of substantial justice.
Besides, in the 'last analysis, no serious prejudice has been caused respondent PAL.
In fine, we hold that the conclusions drawn by respondent Court from the evidence on
record are not erroneous.

While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket (Exh. "12"), he is WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant Petition is hereby denied, and the judgment
nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. "Such provisions have been held to be a sought to be reviewed hereby affirmed in toto.
part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of
the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". 5 It is what is known as a No costs.
contract of "adhesion", in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion
wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane SO ORDERED.
ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to
the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his
consent. 6 And as held in Randolph v. American Airlines, 103 Ohio App. 172, 144 N.E.
2d 878; Rosenchein vs. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 349 S.W. 2d 483, "a contract limiting
liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding
one from contracting against his own negligence.

Considering, therefore, that petitioner had failed to declare a higher value for his
baggage, he cannot be permitted a recovery in excess of P100.00.Besides, passengers
are advised not to place valuable items inside their baggage but "to avail of our V-cargo
service " (Exh. "1"). I t is likewise to be noted that there is nothing in the evidence to
show the actual value of the goods allegedly lost by petitioner.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 286

Republic of the Philippines issued by the carrier to the shipper. The expenses of loading and unloading were for the
SUPREME COURT account of the consignee.
Manila
The shipment was packed in 12 container vans and loaded on board the carrier's vessel,
SECOND DIVISION SS Verrazano Bridge. At Tokyo, Japan, the cargo was transhipped on two vessels of the
K-Line. Ten container vans were loaded on the SS Far East Friendship, while two were
loaded on the SS Hangang Glory.

G.R. No. 110581 September 21, 1994 Shortly thereafter, the consignee (herein petitioner) received from the shipper
photocopies of the bill of lading, consular invoice and packing list, as well as notice of
TELENGTAN BROTHERS & SONS, INC. (LA SUERTE CIGAR & the estimated time of arrival of the cargo.
CIGARETTE), petitioner, 
vs. On June 11, 1979, the SS Far East Friendship arrived at the port of Manila. Aside from
THE COURT OF APPEALS, KAWASAKI KISHEN KAISHA, LTD. and SMITH, BELL & the regular advertisements in the shipping section of the Bulletin Today announcing the
CO., INC., respondents. arrival of its vessels, petitioner was notified in writing of the ship's arrival, together with
information that container demurrage at the rate of P4.00 per linear foot per day for the
Juan, Luces, Luna and Associates for petitioner. first 5 days and P8.00 per linear foot per day after the 5th day would be charged unless
the consignee took delivery of the cargo within ten days.
Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for private respondents.
On June 21, 1979, the other vessel SS Hangang Glory, carrying petitioner's two other
vans, arrived and was discharged of its contents the next day. On the same day the
shipping agent Smith, Bell & Co. released the Delivery Permit for twelve (12) containers
to the broker upon payment of freight charges on the bill of lading.
MENDOZA, J.:

The next day, June 22, 1979, the Island Brokerage Co. presented, in behalf of petitioner,
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,  1 in CA-G.R. CV No.
the shipping documents to the Customs Marine Division of the Bureau of Customs. But
09514, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a case for
the latter refused to act on them because the manifest of the SS Far East
specific performance brought by petitioner.
Friendship  covered only 10 containers, whereas the bill of lading covered 12 containers.

Private respondent Kawasaki Kishen Kaisha, Ltd. (K-Line) is a foreign shipping company
The broker, therefore, sent back the manifest to the shipping agent with the request that
doing business in the Philippines, its shipping agent being respondent the Smith, Bell &
the manifest be amended. Smith, Bell & Co. refused on the ground that an amendment,
Co., Inc. It is a member of the Far East Conference, the body which fixes rates by
as requested, would violate §1005 of the Tariff and Customs Code relating to
agreement of its member-shipowners. The conference is registered with the U.S.
unmanifested cargo. Later, however, it agreed to add a footnote reading "Two container
Federal Maritime Commission. 2
vans carried by the SS Hangang Glory  to complete the shipment of twelve containers
under the bill of lading."
On May 8, 1979, the Van Reekum Paper, Inc. entered into a contract of affreightment
with the K-Line for the shipment of 468 rolls of container board liners from Savannah,
Georgia to Manila. The shipment was consigned to herein petitioner La Suerte Cigar &
Cigarette Factory. The contract of affreightment was embodied in Bill of Lading No. 602
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 287

On June 29, 1979 the manifest was picked up from the office of respondent shipping 1. Far East Friendship (Exh. H-1) June 27 — July 13 (17 days)
agent by an employee of the IBC and filed with the Bureau of Customs. The manifest
was approved for release on July 3, 1979. IBC wrote Smith, Bell & Co. to make of record 1st 5 days @ P4/day/foot
that entry of the shipment had been delayed by the error in the manifest. 5 days x P40 ft. x 10 ctrns. P 8,000.00
Next 12 days @ P8/day/foot
On July 11, 1979, when the IBC tried to secure the release of the cargo, it was informed 12 days x P8 x 40 ft. x 10 ctrns. P 38,400.00
by private respondents' collection agent, the CBCS Guaranteed Fast Collection
Services, that the free time for removing the containers from the container yard had —————
expired on June 26, 1979, in the case of the SS Far East Friendship, and on July 9, in
the case of the SS Hangang Glory, 3 and that demurrage charges had begun to run on P 46,400.00
June 27, 1979 with respect to the 10 containers on the SS Far East Friendship and on
July 10, 1979 with respect to the 2 containers shipped on board the SS Hangang Glory. 2. Hangang Glory (Exh. H) July 10 — July 13 (4 days)

On July 13, 1979, petitioner paid P47,680.00 representing the total demurrage charges 1st 4 days:
on all the containers, but it was not able to obtain its goods. On July 16, 1979 it was able 4 days x P4 x 40 ft. x 2 ctnrs. P 1,280.00
to obtain the release of two containers and on
July 17, 1979 of one more container. It was able to obtain only a partial release of the
—————
cargo because of the breakdown of the arrastre's equipment at the container yard.

TOTAL PAID ON JULY 13 P 47,680.00

This matter was reported by IBC in letters of complaint sent to the Philippine Ports
Authority. In addition, on July 16, 1979, petitioner sent a letter dated July 12, 1979 (Exh.
(Exh. H-2)
I) to Smith, Bell & Co., requesting reconsideration of the demurrage charges, on the
ground that the delay in claiming the goods was due to the alleged late arrival of the
shipping documents, the delay caused by the amendment of the manifest, and the fact B. Container demurrage paid on July 19, 1979
that two of the containers arrived separately from the other ten containers.
1. Far East Friendship
On July 19, 1979, petitioner paid additional charges in the amount of P20,160.00 for the
period July 14-19, 1979 to secure the release of its cargo, but still petitioner was unable a. on 2 containers released July 16
to get any cargo from the remaining nine container vans. It was only the next day, July
20, 1979, that it was able to have two more containers released from the container yard, 3 days x P8 x 40 ft. x 2 ctnrs. P 1,920.00
bringing to five the total number of containers whose contents had been delivered to it.
(Exh. L-2)
Subsequently, petitioner refused to pay any more demurrage charges on the ground that
there was agreement for their payment in the bill of lading and that the delay in the b. on 1 container released July 17
release of the cargo was not due to its fault but to the breakdown of the equipment at the
container yard. In all, petitioner had paid demurrage charges from June 27 to July 19, 4 days x P8 x 40 ft. x 7 cntrs. P 1,280.00
1979, in the total amount of P67,840.00, computed as follows:
(Exh. L-3)
A. Container demurrage paid on July 13, 1979
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 288

c. remaining 7 containers as of July 19 issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain private respondents from charging
additional demurrage.
6 days x P8 x 40 ft. x 7 cntrs. P 13,440.00
In their amended answer, private respondents claimed that collection of container
(Exh. L-1) charges was authorized by §§ 2, 23 and 29 of the bill of lading and that they were not
free to waive these charges because under the United States Shipping Act of 1916 it
2. Hangang Glory was unlawful for any common carrier engaged in transportation involving the foreign
commerce of the United States to charge or collect a greater or lesser compensation
a. 5th day (July 14) that the rates and charges specified in its tariffs on file with the Federal Maritime
Commission.
1 day x P4.00 x 40 ft. x 2 cntrs. P 320.00
Private respondents alleged that petitioner knew that the contract of carriage was
subject to the Far East Conference rules and that the publication of the notice of
b. July 15-19:
reimposition of container demurrage charges published in the shipping section of
the Bulletin Today  and Businessday  newspapers from February 19 — February 25,
5 days x P8.00 x 40 ft. x 2 cntrs. P 3,200.00
1979 was binding upon petitioner. They contended further that the collection of container
demurrage was an international practice which is widely accepted in ports all over the
(Exh. L) world and that it was in conformity with Republic Act No. 1407, otherwise known as the
Philippine Overseas Shipping Act of 1955.
—————
Thereafter, a writ was issued after petitioner had posted a bond of P50,000.00 and the
TOTAL P 20,160.00 container vans were released to the petitioner. On March 19, 1986, however, the RTC
dismissed petitioner's complaint. It cited the bill of lading which provided:
(Exh. L-4)
23. The ocean carrier shall have a lien on the goods, which shall
————— survive delivery, for all freight, dead freight, demurrage, damages, loss,
charges, expenses and any other sums whatsoever payable or
OVERALL TOTAL P 67,840.00 chargeable to or for the account of the Merchant under this bill of lading
....
=========
It likewise invoked clause 29 of the bill of lading which provided:
On July 20, 1979 petitioner wrote private respondent for a refund of the demurrage
charges, but private respondent replied on July 25, 1979 that, as member of the Far 29. . . .The terms of the ocean carrier's applicable tariff, including tariffs
East Conference, it could not modify the rules or authorize refunds of the stipulated covering intermodal transportation on file with the Federal Maritime
tariffs. Commission and the Interstate Commission or any other regulatory
body which governs a portion of the carriage of goods, are incorporated
Petitioner, therefore, filed this suit in the RTC for specific performance to compel private herein.
respondent carrier, through it s shipping agent, the Smith, Bell & Co., to release 7
container vans consigned to it free of charge and for a refund of P67,840.00 which it had Rule 21 of the Far East Conference Tariff No. 28-FMC No. 12 Rules and Regulations,
paid, plus attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation. Petitioner also asked for the referred to above, provides:

(D) Free Time, Demurrage, and Equipment Detention at Ports in the
Philippines.
Note: Philippine Customs Law prescribes all cargo discharged from
vessels to be given into custody of the Government Arrastre
Contractor, appointed by Philippine Customs who undertakes delivery
to the consignee.
xxx xxx xxx
Demurrage charges on Containers with CY Cargo.
1. Free time will commence at 8:00 a.m. on the first working calendar
day following completion of discharge of the vessel. It shall expire at
12:00 p.m. (midnight) on the tenth working calendar day, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.
Work stoppage at a terminal due to labor dispute or other  force
majeure as defined by the conference preventing delivery of cargo or
containers shall be excluded from the calculation of the free time for the
period of the work stoppage.
2. Demurrage charges are incurred before the container leaves the
carrier's designated CY, and shall be applicable on the container
commencing the next working calendar day following expiration of the
allowable free time until the consignee has taken delivery of the
container or has fully striped the container of its contents in the carrier's
designated CY.
Demurrage charges shall be assessed hereunder:
Ordinary containers — P4.00 per
linear foot of the container per day
for the first five days; P8.00 per
linear foot of the container per day,
thereafter.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 289
The RTC held that the bill of lading was the contract between the parties and, therefore,
petitioner was liable for demurrage charges. It rejected petitioner's claim of  force
majeure. It held:
This Court cannot also accord faith and credit on the plaintiff's claim
that the delay in the delivery of the containers was caused by the
breaking down of the equipment of the arrastre operator. Such claim
was not supported with competent evidence. Let us assume the fact
that the arrastre operator's equipment broke down still plaintiff has to
pay the corresponding demurrage charges. The possibility that the
equipment would break down was not only foreseeable, but actually,
foreseen, and was not caso fortuito. 4
The RTC, therefore, ordered:
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint with costs against it. Plaintiff is hereby
ordered to pay defendants the sum of P36,480.00 representing
demurrage charges for the detention of the seven (7) forty-footer
container vans from July 20 to August 7, 1979, with legal interest
commencing on August 7, 1979 until fully paid. And plaintiff has to pay
the sum of P10,000.00, by way of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the case was affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals as follows:
WHEREFORE, modified as indicated above deleting the award of
attorney's fees, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 5
Hence, this petition for review in which it is contended:

1 that no demurrage lies in the absence of any
showing that the vessels had been improperly
detained or that loss or damage had been incurred as
a consequence of improper detention;
2 that respondent Court's finding that private
respondent Smith Bell had promptly and on the same
day amended the defective manifest is contrary to the
evidence of record.
3 that respondent Court manifestly over-looked
undisputed evidence presented by petitioner showing
that the breakdown in the facilities and equipment of
the arrastre operator further delayed petitioner's
withdrawal of the cargo. 6
Petitioner prays for a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the refund to it
of the demurrage charges paid by it, with interest, as well as to pay attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
Our decision will be presently explained, but in brief it is this: petitioner is liable for
demurrage for delay in removing its cargo from the containers but only for the period
July 3 to 13, 1979 with respect to ten containers and from July 10 to July 13, 1979, in
respect of two other containers.
First. With respect to petitioner's liability for demurrage, petitioner's contention is that the
bill of lading does not provide for the payment of container demurrage, as Clause 23 of
the bill of lading only says "demurrage," i.e., damages for the detention of vessels, and
here there is no detention of vessels. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Magellan
Manufacturing Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals  7, where we defined "demurrage" as
follows:
Demurrage, in its strict sense, is the compensation provided for in the
contract of affreightment for the detention of the vessel beyond the time
agreed on for loading and unloading. Essentially, demurrage is the
claim for damages for failure to accept delivery. In a broad sense,
every improper detention of a vessel may be considered a demurrage.
Liability for demurrage, using the word in its strictly technical sense,
exists only when expressly stipulated in the contract. Using the term in
[its broader sense, damages in the] nature of demurrage are
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 290
recoverable for a breach of the implied obligation to load or unload the
cargo with reasonable dispatch, but only by the party to whom the duty
is owed and only against one who is a party to the shipping contract.
Whatever may be the merit of petitioner's contention as to the meaning of the word
"demurrage" in clause 23 of the bill of lading, the fact is that clause 29(a) also of the bill
of lading, in relation to Rule 21 of the Far East Conference Tariff No. 28-FMC No. 12, as
quoted above, specifically provides for the payment by the consignee of demurrage for
the detention of containers and other equipment after the so-called "free time."
Now a bill of lading is both a receipt and a contract. As a contract, its terms and
conditions are conclusive on the parties, including the consignee. What we said in one
case mutatis mutandis applies to this case:
A bill of lading operates both as a receipt and a contract . . . As a
contract, it names the contracting parties which include the consignee,
fixes the route, destination, freight rate or charges, and stipulates the
right and obligations assumed by the parties . . . . By receiving the bill
of lading, Davao Parts and Services, Inc. assented to the terms of the
consignment contained therein, and became bound thereby, so far as
the conditions named are reasonable in the eyes of the law. Since
neither appellant nor appellee alleges that any provision therein is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order —
and indeed we found none — the validity of the Bill of Lading must be
sustained and the provisions therein properly applies to resolve the
conflict between the parties. 8
As the Court of Appeals pointed out in its appealed decision, the enforcement of the
rules of the Far East Conference and the Federal Maritime Commission is in accordance
with Republic Act No. 1407, §1 of which declares that the Philippines, in common with
other maritime nations, recognizes the international character of shipping in foreign trade
and existing international practices in maritime transportation and that it is part of the
national policy to cooperate with other friendly nations in the maintenance and
improvement of such practices.
Petitioner's argument that it is not bound by the bill of lading issued by K-Line because it
is a contract of adhesion, whose terms as set forth at the back are in small prints and
are hardly readable, is without merit. As we held in Servando v. Philippine Steam
Navigation:  9

While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket (Exh.
12), he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. "Such
provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and
valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of
knowledge or assent to the regulation". It is what is known as a
contract of "adhesion," in regards to which it has been said that
contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of
contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are
contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract
is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.
(Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice JBL
Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).
Second. With respect to the period of petitioner's liability, private respondent's position is
that the "free time" expired on June 26, 1979 and demurrage began to toll on June 27,
1979, with respect to 10 containers which were unloaded from the SS Far East
Friendship, while with respect to the 2 containers which were unloaded from the
SS Hangang Glory, the free time expired on July 9, 1979 and demurrage began to run
on July 10, 1979.
This contention is without merit. Petitioner cannot be held liable for demurrage starting
June 27, 1979 on the 10 containers which arrived on the SS Far East
Friendship because the delay in obtaining release of the goods was not due to its fault.
The evidence shows that because the manifest issued by the respondent K-Line,
through the Smith, Bell & Co., stated only 10 containers, whereas the bill of lading also
issued by the K-Line showed there were 12 containers, the Bureau of Customs refused
to give an entry permit to petitioner. For this reason, petitioner's broker, the IBC, had to
see the respondent's agent (Smith, Bell & Co.) on June 22, 1979 but the latter did not
immediately do something to correct the manifest. Smith, Bell & Co. was asked to
"amend" the manifest, but it refused to do so on the ground that this would violate the
law. It was only on June 29, 1979 that it thought of adding instead a footnote to indicate
that two other container vans — to account for a total of 12 container vans consigned to
petitioner — had been loaded on the other vessel
SS Hangang Glory.
It is not true that the necessary correction was made on June 22, 1979, the same day
the manifest was presented to Smith, Bell & Co. There is nothing in the testimonies of
witnesses of either party to support the appellate court's finding that the footnote,
explaining the apparent discrepancy between the bill of lading and the manifest, was
added on June 22, 1979 but that petitioner's representative did not return to pick up the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 291
manifesst until June 29, 1979. To the contrary, it is more probable to believe the
petitioner's claim that the manifest was corrected only on June 29, 1979 (by which time
the "free time" had already expired), because Smith, Bell & Co. did not immediately
know what to do as it insisted it could not amend the manifest and only thought of
adding a footnote on June 29, 1979 upon the suggestion of the IBC.
Now June 29, 1979 was a Friday. Again it is probable the correct manifest was
presented to the Bureau of Customs only on Monday, July 2, 1979 and, therefore, it was
only on July 3 that it was approved. It was, therefore, only from this date (July 3, 1979)
that petitioner could have claimed its cargo and charged for any delay in removing its
cargo from the containers. With respect to the other two containers which arrived on the
SS Hangang Glory, demurrage was properly considered to have accrued on July 10,
1979 since the "free time" expired on July 9.
The period of delay, however, for all the 12 containers must be deemed to have stopped
on July 13, 1979, because on this date petitioner paid P47,680.00. If it was not able to
get its cargo from the container vans, it was because of the breakdown of the shifter or
cranes. This breakdown cannot be blamed on petitioners since these were cranes of the
arrastre service operator. It would be unjust to charge demurrage after July 13, 1979
since the delay in emptying the containers was not due to the fault of the petitioner.
Indeed, there is no reason why petitioner should not get its cargo after paying all
demurrage charges due on July 13, 1979. If it paid P20,180.00 more in demurrage
charges after July 13, 1979 it was only because respondents would not release the
goods. Even then petitioner was able to obtain the release of cargo from five container
vans. Its trucks were unable to load anymore cargo and returned to petitioner's premises
empty.
In sum, we hold that petitioner can be held liable for demurrage only for the period July
3-13, 1979 and that in accordance with the stipulation in its bill of lading, it is liable for
demurrage only in the amount of P28,480.00 computed as follows;
A. 10 containers ex Far East Friendship (July 3-13, 1979)
1. 1st 5 days @ P4.00/day/foot
5 days x P4 x 40 ft. x 10 ctnrs. P 8,000
2. Next 6 days @ P8.00/day/foot
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 292

6 days x P8 x 40 ft. x 10 cntrs. P 19,200 P 27,200

————

B. 2 containers ex Hangang Glory (July 10-13, 1979)

1st 4 days @ P4.00/day/foot

4 days x P4 x 40 ft. x 10 cntrs. P 1,280

————

TOTAL DEMURRAGE DUE P 28,480

=======

LESS: TOTAL PAID (P 67,840)

OVERPAYMENT (P 39,360)

As shown above there is an overpayment of P39,360.00 which should be refunded to

petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED, ORDERING the private respondents to pay to petitioner the sum of
P39,360.00 by way of refund, with legal interest.

SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 293

Republic of the Philippines SW, points 4 to 5, by proposed Road, 17.00 m. wide (Block C[LRC]
SUPREME COURT Psd-5812); points 5 to 1 by Street Lot 2 (17.00 m. wide) of the
Manila subdivision plan. On the NW, points 1 to 2 by Lot 25, Block 2 of the
subdivision plan. . . . beginning, containing an area of ONE
SECOND DIVISION THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (1,188) SQUARE
METERS.

The transaction was documented in a Deed of Sale 1 of even date, which

G.R. No. 126699 August 7, 1998 provides, among others, that the vendee would comply with certain special
conditions and restrictions on the use or occupancy of the land, among which
AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner,  are —
vs.
RAY BURTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent. Deed Restrictions: 2

a) The total height of the building to be constructed on

the lot shall not be more than forty-two (42) meters,
nor shall it have a total gross floor area of more than
five (5) times the lot area; and
MARTINEZ, J.:
b) The sewage disposal must be by means of
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (AYALA) is the owner of the Ayala estate located in Makati connection into the sewerage system servicing the
City. The said estate was originally a raw land which was subdivided for sale into area.
different lots devoted for residential, commercial and industrial purposes. The
development of the estate consisted of road and building construction and installation of
Special Conditions: 3
a central sewerage treatment plant and drainage system which services the whole Ayala
Commercial Area.
a) The vendee must obtain final approval from AYALA
of the building plans and specifications of the
On March 20, 1984, Karamfil Import-Export Company Ltd. (KARAMFIL) bought from
proposed structures that shall be constructed on the
AYALA a piece of land identified as Lot 26, Block 2 consisting of 1,188 square meters,
land;
located at what is now known as H.V. de la Costa Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City.
The said land, which is now the subject of this case, is more particularly described as
b) The lot shall not be sold without the building having
follows:
been completed; and
A parcel of land (Lot 26, Block 2, of the subdivision plan [LRC] Psd-
c) Any breach of the stipulations and restrictions
6086, being a portion of Block D, described as plan [LRC] Psd-5812
entitles AYALA to rescission of the contract.
LRC [GLRO] Rec. No. 2029) situated in the Municipality of Makati,
Province of Rizal, Is. of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., points 2 to 3 by
Lot 31, Block 2 (Creek 6.00 m. wide) of the subdivision plan, on the As a result of the sale, a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 132086 4 was issued in the
SE., points 3 to 4 by Lot 27, Block 2 of the Subdivision plan; on the name of KARAMFIL. The said special conditions and restrictions were attached as an

annex to the deed of sale and incorporated in the "Memorandum of Encumbrances" at
the reverse side of the title of the lot as Entry No. 2432/T-131086.
On February 18, 1988, KARAMFIL sold the lot to Palmcrest Development and Realty
Corporation (PALMCREST) under a Deed of Absolute Sale 5 of even date. This deed
was submitted to AYALA for approval in order to obtain the latter's waiver of the special
condition prohibiting the resale of the lot until after KARAMFIL shall have constructed a
building thereon. AYALA gave its written conformity to the sale but reflecting in its
approval the same special conditions/restrictions as in the previous sale. AYALA's
conformity was annotated on the deed of sale. 6PALMCREST did not object to the
stipulated conditions and restrictions. 7
PALMCREST in turn sold the lot to Ray Burton Development Corporation (RBDC), now
respondent, on April 11, 1988, with the agreement that AYALA retains possession of the
Owner's Duplicate copy of the title until a building is erected on said parcel of land in
accordance with the requirements and/or restrictions of AYALA. 8 The Deed of Absolute
Sale9 executed on the said date was also presented to AYALA for approval since no
building had yet been constructed on the lot at the time of the sale. As in the
KARAMFIL-PALMCREST transaction, AYALA gave its conformity to the sale, subject to
RBDC's compliance with the special conditions/restrictions which were annotated in the
deed of sale, thus:
With our conformity, subject to the compliance by the Vendees of the
Special Conditions of Sale on the reverse side of the Deed of Sale
dated March 20, 1984 per Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29, Book No. 1,
Series of 1984 of the Notary Public Silverio Aquino. 10
The conditions and restrictions of the sale were likewise entered as
encumbrances at the reverse side of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 155384
which was later issued in the name of RBDC. 11 Like PALMCREST, RBDC was
not also averse to the aforesaid conditions and restrictions. 12
Sometime in June of 1989, RBDC submitted to AYALA for approval a set of architectural
plans for the construction of a 5-storey office building on the subject lot, with a height of
25.85 meters and a total gross floor area of 4,989.402 square meters. 13 The building
was to be known as "Trafalgar Tower" but later renamed "Trafalgar Plaza." Since the
building was well within the 42-meter height restriction, AYALA approved the
architectural plans.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 294
Upon written request 14 made by RBDC, AYALA likewise agreed to release the owner's
copy of the title covering the subject lot to the China Banking Corporation as guarantee
of the loan granted to RBDC for the construction of the 5-storey building.
Meanwhile, on November 28, 1989, RBDC, together with the Makati Developers
Association, Inc. (MADAI), of which RBDC is a member, and other lot owners, filed a
complaint against AYALA before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB),
docketed as HLRB Case No. REM-A-0818 (OAALA-REM-111489-4240). The complaint
sought the nullification of the very same Deed Restrictions incorporated in the deeds of
sale of the lots purchased by the complainants from AYALA and annotated on their
certificates of title, on the grounds, inter alia, that said restrictions purportedly: (a) place
unreasonable control over the lots sold by AYALA, thereby depriving the vendees of the
full enjoyment of the lots they bought, in violation of Article 428 of the Civil Code; (b)
have been superseded by Presidential Decree No. 1096 (the National Building Code)
and Metro Manila Commission Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01; (c) violate the constitutional
provision on equal protection of the laws, since the restrictions are imposed without
regard to reasonable standards or classifications; and (d) are contracts of
adhesion 15 since AYALA would not sell the lots unless the buyers agree to the deed
restrictions. The complaint also alleged that AYALA is in estoppel from enforcing the
restrictions in question when it allowed the construction of other high-rise buildings in
Makati City beyond the height and floor area limits. AYALA was further charged with
unsound business practice.
Early in June of 1990, RBDC made another set of building plans for "Trafalgar Plaza"
and submitted the same for approval, this time to the Building Official of the Makati City
Engineer's Office, 16 not to AYALA. In these plans, the building was to be 26-storey high,
or a height of 98.60 meters, with a total gross floor area of 28,600 square meters. After
having obtained the necessary building permits from the City Engineer's Office, RBDC
began to construct "Trafalgar Plaza" in accordance with these new plans.
On July 11, 1990, the majority of the lot owners in the Makati City area, including the
Salcedo and Legaspi Village areas, in a general assembly of the Makati Commercial
Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA), approved the revision of the Deed Restrictions, which
revision was embodied in the "Consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions" 17(Revised
Deed Restrictions) wherein direct height restrictions were abolished in favor of floor area
limits computed on the basis of "floor area ratios" (FARs). In the case of buildings
devoted solely to office use in Salcedo Village — such as the "Trafalgar Plaza" — the
same could have a maximum gross floor area of only eight (8) times the lot area. Thus,
under the Revised Deed Restrictions, "Trafalgar Plaza" could be built with a maximum
gross floor area of only 9,504 square meters (1,188 sq. m. — the size of the subject lot
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 295

— multiplied by 8). Even under the Revised Deed Restrictions, Trafalgar would still (Annex "A" hereof)
exceed 19,065 square meters of floor area on the basis of a FARs of 8:1. RBDC did not and ordering
vote for the approval of the Revised Deed Restrictions and, therefore, it continued to be defendant to return
bound by the original Deed Restrictions. to plaintiff Lot 26,
Block 2 of Salcedo
In the meantime, on August 22, 1990, the HLRB En Banc rendered a decision 18 (a) Village;
upholding the Deed Restrictions; (b) absolving AYALA from the charge of unsound
business practice; and (c) dismissing HLRB Case No. REM-A-0818. MADAI and RBDC ii) Ordering the
separately appealed the decision to the Office of the President, which appeal was cancellation of
docketed as O.P. Case No. 4476. Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 155384
While the appeal was pending before the Office of the President, the September 21, (in the name of
1990 issue of the Business World magazine 19 featured the "Trafalgar Plaza" as a defendant) and
modern 27-storey structure which will soon rise in Salcedo Village, Makati City. Stunned directing the Makati
by this information, AYALA, through counsel, then sent a letter 20 to RBDC demanding Register of Deeds
the latter to cease the construction of the building which dimensions do not conform to to issue a new title
the previous plans it earlier approved. RBDC, through counsel, replied with a series of over the Lot in the
letters 21 requesting for time to assess the merits of AYALA's demand. name of plaintiff;
and
For failing to heed AYALA's bidding, RBDC was sued on January 25, 1991 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 148). AYALA's complaint for Specific d. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of
Performance or Rescission, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-220, prayed inter alia that P500,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00 and the
judgment be rendered — costs of the instant suit. 22

x x x           x x x          x x x
b. Ordering the defendant to comply with its contractual obligations and
to remove or demolish the portions or areas of the Trafalgar
Tower/Plaza Building constructed beyond or in excess of the approved
height as shown by building plans approved by the plaintiff, including
any other portion of the building constructed not in accordance with the
building plans and specifications submitted to and approved by plaintiff.
In its answer (with counterclaim) to the complaint, RBDC denied having "actual or
constructive notice of the Deed Restrictions" imposed by AYALA on the subject lot.
RBDC alleged in essence that even if said deed restrictions exist, the same are not
economically viable and should not be enforced because they constitute unreasonable
restrictions on its property rights and are, therefore, contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Moreover, RBDC claimed that the enforcement of
the deed restrictions has also been arbitrary or discriminatory since AYALA has not
made any action against a number of violators of the deed restrictions.

c. Alternatively, in the event specific performance becomes impossible: Meantime, the appeal of MADAI in O.P. Case No. 44761 was considered resolved when
it entered into a compromise agreement with AYALA wherein the latter adopted and
i) Ordering the acknowledged as binding the Revised Deed Restrictions of July 11, 1990. 23 On the
cancellation and other hand, RBDC's appeal was dismissed in an Order dated February 13, 1992, for the
rescission of the reason that, "insofar as the disposition of the appealed (HLRB) decision is concerned,
Deed of Sale dated there is virtually no more actual controversy on the subject of the 'Deed Restrictions'
March 20, 1984 because the same has been overriden by the 'Revised (Deed) Restrictions' which the

appellee Ayala Corporation has in fact acknowledged as binding and in full force and
effect . . . 24 Accordingly, aside from dismissing RBDC's appeal, the Order of February
13, 1992 also "set aside" the appealed HLRB decision. From this order, AYALA sought a
reconsideration or clarification, noting, inter alia, that while the said order has ruled that
AYALA can no longer enforce the Deed Restrictions against RBDC, it does not
expressly state that RBDC is bound by the Revised Deed Restrictions. Clarifying this
matter, the Office of the President issued a Resolution dated April 21,1992, 25 modifying
the February 13, 1992 order, ruling: (1) that RBDC is bound by the original Deed
Restrictions, but it has the option to accept and be bound by the Revised Deed
Restrictions in lieu of the former; and (2) that the "HLRB decision dated 22 August 1990,
to the extent that it absolved Ayala from the charge of unsound business practice,
subject of the basic complaint, is affirmed." This time RBDC moved for a reconsideration
of the April 21, 1992 Order, but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 15,
1993. 26 Another Resolution of March 21, 1994 27 was issued denying with finality
RBDC's second motion for reconsideration.
AYALA then filed a Manifestation 28 in Civil Case No. 91-220, informing the trial court of
the pertinent rulings/resolutions in the proceedings before the HLRB and the Office of
the President, which rulings, AYALA suggested, amount to res judicata on the issue of
the validity and enforceability of the Deed Restrictions involved in the said civil case.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on April 28, 1994 in favor of
RBDC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and as a consequence:
1. The instant case is hereby
dismissed;
2. The motion/application for the
annotation of the lis pendens is
hereby DENIED;
3. The motion/application to hold
defendant in continuing contempt is
hereby also DENIED;
4. No damages is awarded to any of
the parties;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 296
5. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay
the defendant P30,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees and litigation
expenses;
With costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 29
The trial court's decision is based on its findings that: (1) RBDC had neither actual nor
constructive notice of the 42-meter height limitation of the building to be constructed on
the subject lot; (2) even if the Deed Restrictions did exist, AYALA is estopped from
enforcing the same against RBDC by reason of the former's failure to enforce said
restrictions against other violators in the same area; (3) the Deed Restrictions partake of
the nature of a contract of adhesion; (4) since the Trafalgar Plaza building is in accord
with the minimum requirements of P.D. No. 1096 (The National Building Code), the
Deed Restrictions may not be followed by RBDC; and (5) the rulings of the HLRB and
the Office of the President do not have binding effect in the instant case.
Dissatisfied, AYALA appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of
the trial court in a Decision 30dated February 27, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 46488.
AYALA's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the Resolution 31 of October
7, 1996.
AYALA now interposes the present petition for review on certiorari, citing several errors
in the decision of the Court of Appeals, some of which involve questions of fact.
The resolution of factual issues raised in the petition would certainly call for a review of
the Court of Appeals' findings of fact. As a rule, the re-examination of the evidence
proffered by the contending parties during the trial of the case is not a function that this
Court normally undertakes inasmuch as the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
generally binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. 32 The jurisdiction of this Court
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing only errors of law. 33 A reevaluation of factual issues by this Court is
justified when the findings of fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence
on record, or when the assailed judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. 34
The present petition has shown that certain relevant facts were overlooked by the Court
of Appeals, which facts, if properly appreciated, would justify a different conclusion from
the one reached in the assailed decision.

The principal error raised here by petitioner AYALA pertains to the Court of Appeals'
finding that RBDC did not have actual or constructive notice of the 42-meter height
restriction, since what was annotated on its (RBDC's) title is the erroneous 23-meter
height limit which, according to AYALA's own witness, Jose Cuaresma, was not
applicable to RBDC. 35 Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, RBDC "has the right to
enjoy the subject property as if no restrictions and conditions were imposed thereon." 36
The above finding and conclusion of the Court of Appeals, AYALA submits, are based
on "surmises and conjectures" which are "contrary to the evidence on record and
(RBDC's) own admissions." 37
There is merit in AYALA's submission.
The erroneous annotation of the 23-meter height restriction in RBDC's title was
explained by Jose Cuaresma, AYALA's Assistant Manager for Marketing and Sales.
Cuaresma testified that when the deed of sale between PALMCREST and RBDC was
submitted to the Register of Deeds of Makati and the corresponding title was issued in
the name of RBDC, the Register of Deeds annotated the wrong height limit in Entry No.
2432 on the said title, but he emphasized that the incorrect annotation does not apply to
RBDC. 38
Jose Cuaresma further clarified that the correct height restriction imposed by AYALA on
RBDC was 42 meters. 39This height ceiling, he said, is based on the deed of restrictions
attached as annex to the deed of sale, 40 and the same has been uniformly imposed on
the transferees beginning from the original deed of sale between AYALA and
KARAMFIL. 41
This clarificatory statement of Jose Cuaresma should have cautioned the Court of
Appeals from making the unfounded and sweeping conclusion that RBDC can do
anything it wants on the subject property "as if no restrictions and conditions were
imposed thereon," on the mistaken premise that RBDC was unaware of the correct 42-
meter height limit. It must be stressed that Cuaresma's testimony is bolstered by
documentary evidence and circumstances of the case which would show that RBDC
was put on notice about the 42-meter height restriction.
The record reveals that the subject Lot 26 was first sold by AYALA to KARAMFIL under
a deed of sale (Exhibit "A") dated March 20, 1984 and duly notarized by Notary Public
Silverio Aquino. Attached to the deed of sale is an appendix of special
conditions/restrictions (deed restrictions), which provides, inter alia, that the building to
be constructed on the lot must have a total height of not more than 42 meters, and that
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 297
any building plans and specifications of the proposed structures must have the approval
of AYALA. The deed restrictions were incorporated in the memorandum of
encumbrances at the reverse side of the title of the lot as Entry No. 2432. When the lot
was sold by KARAMFIL to PALMCREST, the deed of sale (Exhibit "B") on this
transaction bears an annotation of AYALA's conformity to the transfer, with the condition
that the approval was "subject to the compliance by the vendee of the special conditions
of sale on the reverse side of the deed of sale dated March 20, 1984, per Doc. No. 140,
Page No. 29, Book No. 1, Series of 1984 of Notary Public Silverio F. Aquino" (Exhibit "B-
1"). PALMCREST later resold the lot to RBDC by virtue of a deed of sale (Exhibit "C"), to
which AYALA's approval was also annotated therein (Exhibit "C-1"), but with the same
explicit inscription that RBDC, as vendee, must comply with the special deed restrictions
appended to the AYALA-KARAMFIL deed of sale of March 20, 1984. All these three (3)
deeds of sale and the accompanying special deed restrictions imposing a 42-meter
height limit, were duly registered with the Register of Deeds. Thus, RBDC cannot
profess ignorance of the 42-meter height restriction and other special conditions of the
sale.
Verily, the deed restrictions are integral parts of the PALMCREST-RBDC deed of sale,
considering that AYALA's required conformity to the transfer, as annotated therein, was
conditioned upon RBDC's compliance of the deed restrictions. Consequently, as a
matter of contractual obligation, RBDC is bound to observe the deed restrictions which
impose a building height of not more than 42 meters.
Moreover, RBDC was fully aware that it was bound by the 42-meter height limit. This is
shown by the fact that, pursuant to the special conditions/restrictions of the sale, it
submitted to AYALA, for approval, building plans for a 5-storey structure with a height of
25.85 meters. Certainly, RBDC would not have submitted such plans had it truly
believed that it was restricted by a lower 23-meter height ceiling, in the same manner
that RBDC did not seek AYALA's approval when it later made another set of building
plans for the 26-storey "Trafalgar Plaza," knowing that the same would be disapproved
for exceeding the 42-meter height restriction. The fact that RBDC was later issued a
building permit from the Makati City Engineer's Office for the construction of the
"Trafalgar Plaza" is not a valid justification to disregard the stipulated contractual
restriction of 42 meters.
Another error which AYALA claims to have been committed by the Court of Appeals is
the latter's finding that AYALA, under the principle of estoppel, is now barred from
enforcing the deed restrictions because it had supposedly failed to act against other
violators of the said restrictions. AYALA argues that such finding is baseless and is
contrary to the Civil Code provisions on estoppel and applicable jurisprudence.

We agree with the petitioner.
In support of its finding that estoppel operates against AYALA, the Court of Appeals
merely cited its decision dated November 17, 1993, in CA-G.R. SP No. 29157,
entitled Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation, Petitioner vs. Land
Registration Authority and Ayala Corporation, Respondents, and reiterated its findings
therein, to wit:
Also, Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed of restrictions in question,
pursuant to the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Under the terms of
the deed of sale, the vendee Sy Ka Kieng assumed faithful compliance
with the special conditions of sale and with the Salcedo Village deed of
restrictions. One of the conditions was that a building would be
constructed within one year. Ayala did nothing to enforce the terms of
the contract. In fact, it even agreed to the sale of the lot by Sy Ka Kieng
in favor of the petitioner realty in 1989, or thirteen (13) years later. We,
therefore, see no justifiable reason for Ayala to attempt to enforce the
terms of the conditions of the sale against the petitioner. It should now
be estopped from enforcing the said conditions through any means.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Even assuming that petitioner RDR violated the floor area and height
restrictions, it is markedly significant that Ayala disregarded the fact
that it had previously allowed and tolerated similar and repeated
violations of the same restrictive covenants by property owners which it
now seeks to enforce against the herein petitioner. Some examples of
existing buildings in Salcedo Village that greatly exceeded the gross
floor area (5 times lot area) and height (42 meters) limitations are
(Rollo, p. 32):
(1) Pacific Star (Nauru Center Building — 29 stories
and 112.5 meters high)
(2) Sagittarius Building — 16 stories
(3) Shell House Building — 14 stories
(4) Eurovilla Building — 15 stories
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 298
(5) LPL Plaza Building — 18 stories
(6) LPL Tower Building — 24 stories. 42
An examination of the decision in the said Rosa Diana case reveals that the sole issue
raised before the appellate court was the propriety of the lis pendens annotation.
However, the appellate court went beyond the sole issue and made factual findings
bereft of any basis in the record to inappropriately rule that AYALA is in estoppel and
has waived its right to enforce the subject restrictions. Such ruling was immaterial to the
resolution of the issue of the propriety of the annotation of the lis pendens. The finding of
estoppel was thus improper and made in excess of jurisdiction.
Moreover, the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 29157 is not binding on the parties herein,
simply because, except for Ayala, RBDC is not a party in that case. Section 49, Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court (now Sec. 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) provides in part:
Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
(a) . . .;
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors
in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity; (emphasis supplied)
(c) . . . .
The clear mandate of the above-quoted rule is that a final judgment or order of a court is
conclusive and binding only upon the parties to a case and their successors in interest.
Both the present case and the Rosa-Diana case, however, involve different parties who
are not litigating "for the same thing" nor "under the same title and in the same capacity."
Hence, the Rosa-Diana decision cannot have binding effect against either party to the
instant case.

In any case, AYALA asserts that a few gross violators of the deed restrictions "have
been, or are being, proceeded against." 43 AYALA admits, though, that there are other
violations of the restrictions but these are of a minor nature which do not detract from
substantial compliance by the lot owners of the deed restrictions. AYALA submits that
minor violations are insufficient to warrant judicial action, thus:
As a rule, non-objection to trivial breaches of a restrictive covenant
does not result in loss of the right to enforce the covenant by injunction,
and acquiescence in violations of a restrictive covenant which are
immaterial and do not affect or injure one will not preclude him from
restraining violations thereof which would so operate as to cause him
to be damaged." (20 Am Jur. 2d Sec. 271, p. 835; emphasis provided).
Occasional and temporary violations by lot owners of a covenant
forbidding the use of property for mercantile purposes are not sufficient
as a matter of law to warrant a finding of a waiver or abandonment to
the right to enforce the restriction. A waiver in favor of one person and
for a limited purpose is not a waiver as to all persons generally. (id., at
836; emphasis provided). 44
It is the sole prerogative and discretion of AYALA to initiate any action against violators
of the deed restrictions. This Court cannot interfere with the exercise of such
prerogative/discretion.
How AYALA could be considered in estoppel as found by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, was not duly established. "Under the doctrine of estoppel, an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. A party may not go
back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied
upon them." 45 Here, we find no admission, false representation or concealment that can
be attributed to AYALA relied upon by RBDC.
What is clear from the record, however, is that RBDC was the party guilty of
misrepresentation and/or concealment when it resorted to the fraudulent scheme of
submitting two (2) sets of building plans, one (1) set conformed to the Deed Restrictions,
which was submitted to and approved by AYALA, 46 while another set violated the said
restrictions, and which it presented to the Makati City Building Official in order to secure
from the latter the necessary building permit. 47 It is noteworthy that after the submission
of the second set of building plans to the Building Official, RBDC continued to make
representations to AYALA that it would build the five-storey building in accordance with
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 299
the first set of plans approved by AYALA, obviously for the purpose of securing the
release of the title of the subject lot to obtain bank funding. AYALA relied on RBDC's
false representations and released the said title. Hence, RBDC was in bad faith.
AYALA further assigns as error the finding of the respondent court that, "while the Deed
of Sale to Ray Burton (RBDC) did not appear to be a contract of adhesion," however,
"the subject Deed Restrictions annotated therein appeared to be one." 48 The only basis
for such finding is that the Deed Restrictions and Special Conditions were "pre-printed"
and "prepared" by AYALA, and that RBDC's participation thereof was "only to sign the
Deed of Sale with the said restrictions and conditions." 49
The respondent court erred in ruling that the Deed Restrictions is a contract of adhesion.
A contract of adhesion in itself is not an invalid agreement. This type of contract is as
binding as a mutually executed transaction. We have emphatically ruled in the case
of Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 50 that "contracts of adhesion wherein one party
imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other . . . are contracts not entirely
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he
adheres he gives his consent." This ruling was reiterated in Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., et. al., 51 wherein we further declared through
Justice Florenz Regalado that "not even an allegation of ignorance of a party excuses
non-compliance with the contractual stipulations since the responsibility for ensuring full
comprehension of the provisions of a contract of carriage (a contract of adhesion)
devolves not on the carrier but on the owner, shipper, or consignee as the case may be."
Contracts of adhesion, however, stand out from other contracts (which are bilaterally
drafted by the parties) in that the former is accorded inordinate vigilance and scrutiny by
the courts in order to shield the unwary from deceptive schemes contained in ready-
made covenants. As stated by this Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in  Qua
Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd.: 52
The courts cannot ignore that nowadays, monopolies, cartels and
concentration of capital, endowed with overwhelming economic power,
manage to impose upon parties dealing with them cunningly prepared
"agreements" that the weaker party may not change one whit, his
participation in the "agreement" being reduced to the alternative to
"take it or leave it" labeled since Raymond Saleilles "contracts by
adherence" (contracts d' adhesion) in contrast to those entered into by
parties bargaining on an equal footing. Such contracts (of which
policies of insurance and international bill of lading are prime

examples) obviously call for greater strictness and vigilance on the part
of the courts of justice with a view to protecting the weaker party from
abuses and imposition, and prevent their becoming traps for the
unwary. 53 (Emphasis supplied)
The stringent treatment towards contracts of adhesion which the courts are
enjoined to observe is in pursuance of the mandate in Article 24 of the New Civil
Code that "(i)n all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be
vigilant for his protection."
Thus, the validity and/or enforceability of a contract of adhesion will have to be
determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and the situation of the
parties concerned.
In the instant case, the stipulations in the Deed Restrictions and Special Conditions are
plain and unambiguous which leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, there was
even no attempt on the part of RBDC to prove that, in the execution of the Deed of Sale
on the subject lot, it was a weaker or a disadvantaged party on account of its moral
dependence, ignorance, mental weakness or other handicap. On the contrary, as
testified to by Edwin Ngo, President of RBDC, the latter is a realty firm and has been
engaged in realty business, 54 and that he, a businessman for 30 years, 55 represented
RBDC in the negotiations and in the eventual purchase of the subject lot from
PALMCREST. 56 Edwin Ngo's testimony proves that RBDC was not an unwary party in
the subject transaction. Instead, Edwin Ngo has portrayed RBDC as a knowledgeable
realty firm experienced in real estate business.
In sum, there is more than ample evidence on record pinpointing RBDC's violation of the
applicable FAR restrictions in the Consolidated and Revised Deed Restrictions (CRDRs)
when it constructed the 27-storey Trafalgar Plaza. The prayer of petitioner is that
judgment be rendered as follows:
a. Ordering Ray Burton to comply with its contractual obligations in the
construction of Trafalgar Plaza' by removing or demolishing the
portions of areas thereof constructed beyond or in excess of the
approved height, as shown by the building plans submitted to, and
approved by, Ayala, including any other portion of the building
constructed not in accordance with the said building plans;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 300
b. Alternatively, in the event specific performance becomes impossible:
(1) ordering the cancellation and rescission of the
March 20, 1984 "Deed of Sale" and all subsequent
"Deeds of Sale" executed in favor of the original
vendee's successors-in-interest and ordering Ray
Burton to return to Ayala Lot 26, Lot 2 of Salcedo
Village;
(2) ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 155384 (in the name of defendant) and
directing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Makati
to issue a new title over the lot in the name of Ayala;
and
xxx xxx xxx. 57
However, the record reveals that construction of Trafalgar Plaza began in 1990,
and a certificate of completion thereof was issued by the Makati City Engineer's
Office per ocular inspection on November 7, 1996. 58 Apparently Trafalgar Plaza
has been fully built, and we assume, is now fully tenanted. The alternative
prayers of petitioner under the CRDRs, i.e., the demolition of excessively built
space or to permanently restrict the use thereof, are no longer feasible.
Thus, we perforce instead rule that RBDC may only be held alternatively liable for
substitute performance of its obligations — the payment of damages. In this regard, we
note that the CRDRs impose development charges on constructions which exceed the
estimated Gross Limits permitted under the original Deed Restrictions but which are
within the limits of the CRDRs.
In this regard, we quote hereunder pertinent portions of The Revised Deed Restrictions,
to wit:
3. DEVELOPMENT CHARGE
For any building construction within the Gross Floor Area limits defined
under Paragraphs C-2.1 to C-2.4 above, but which will result in a Gross
Floor Area exceeding certain standards defined in Paragraphs C-3.1-C
below, the OWNER shall pay MACEA, prior to the start of construction

of any new building or any expansion of an existing building, a
DEVELOPMENT CHARGE as a contribution to a trust fund to be
administered by MACEA. This trust fund shall be used to improve
facilities and utilities in the Makati Central Business District.
3.1 The amount of the development charge that shall be due from the
OWNER shall be computed as follows:
DEVELOPMENT CHARGE = A x (B - C - D)
where:
A — is equal to the Area Assessment which shall be set at Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00) until December 31, 1990. Each January 1st
thereafter, such amount shall increase by ten percent (10%) over the
Area Assessment charged in the immediately preceding year; provided
that, beginning 1995 and at the end of every successive five-year
period thereafter, the increase in the Area Assessment shall be
reviewed and adjusted by the VENDOR to correspond to the
accumulated increase in the construction cost index during the
immediately preceding five years as based on the weighted average of
wholesale price and wage indices of the National Census and Statistics
Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
B — is equal to the total Gross Floor Area of the completed or
expanded building in square meters.
C — is equal to the estimated Gross Floor Area permitted under the
original deed restrictions, derived by multiplying the lot area by the
effective original FAR shown below for each location: 59
Accordingly, in accordance with the unique, peculiar circumstance of the case at hand,
we hold that the said development charges are a fair measure of compensatory
damages which RBDC has caused in terms of creating a disproportionate additional
burden on the facilities of the Makati Central Business District.
As discussed above, Ray Burton Development Corporation acted in bad faith in
constructing Trafalgar Plaza in excess of the applicable restrictions upon a double
submission of plans and exercising deceit upon both AYALA and the Makati Engineer's
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 301
Office, and thus by way of example and correction, should be held liable to pay AYALA
exemplary damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00.
Finally, we find the complaint to be well-grounded, thus it is AYALA which is entitled to
an award of attorney's fees, and while it prays for the amount of P500,000.00, we award
the amount of P250,000.00 which we find to be reasonable under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 27, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 46488, and its Resolution dated October 7,
1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby
rendered finding that:
(1) The Deed Restrictions are valid and petitioner
AYALA is not estopped from enforcing them against
lot owners who have not yet adopted the Consolidated
and Revised Deed Restrictions;
(2) Having admitted that the Consolidated and
Revised Deed Restrictions are the applicable Deed
Restrictions to Ray Burton Development Corporation's
Trafalgar Plaza, RBDC should be, and is, bound by
the same;
(3) Considering that Ray Burton Development
Corporation's Trafalgar Plaza exceeds the floor area
limits of the Deed Restrictions, RBDC is hereby
ordered to pay development charges as computed
under the provisions of the Consolidated and Revised
Deed Restrictions currently in force.
(4) Ray Burton Development Corporation is further
ordered to pay AYALA exemplary damages in the
amount of P2,500,000.00, attorney's fees in the
amount of P250,000.00, and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58011 & L-58012 November 18, 1983
VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC., petitioner,  followed in the computation of the special or additional compensation of
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO BISULA RUBEN
ARROZA JUAN GACUTNO LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ, ALVARO ANDRADA,
NEMESIO ADUG SIMPLICIO BAUTISTA, ROMEO ACOSTA, and JOSE
ENCABO respondents.
Antonio R. Atienza for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent NLRC,
Quasha, Asperilia, Ancheta &- Valmonte Pena Marcos Law Offices for private
respondents.
RESOLUTION
 
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Before the Court en banc is a motion to reconsider the decision promulgated on July 20,
1982 which set aside the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
and reinstated the decision of the National Seamen Board.
To better understand the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, we reiterate the
background facts of the case, Taken from the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission: têñ.£îhqwâ£
It appears that on different dates in December, 1978 and January,
1979, the Seamen entered into separate contracts of employment with
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 302
the Company, engaging them to work on board M/T' Jannu for a period
of twelve (12) months. After verification and approval of their contracts
by the NSB, the Seamen boarded their vessel in Japan.
On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel complainant Rogelio H.
Bisula, received a cable from the Company advising him of the
possibility that the vessel might be directed to call at ITF-controlled
ports said at the same time informing him of the procedure to be
crew members while in said ports. ITF is the acronym for the
International Transport Workers Federation, a militant international
labor organization with affiliates in different ports of the world, which
reputedly can tie down a vessel in a port by preventing its loading or
unloading, This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the payment
of its wages rates for seafarers the so-called ITF rates, if the wages of
the crew members of a vessel who have affiliated with it are below its
prescribed rates.) In the same cable of the Company, the expressed its
regrets for hot clarifying earlier the procedure in computing the special
compensation as it thought that the vessel would 'trade in Caribbean
ports only.
On 22 March 1979, the Company sent another cable to complainant
Bisula, this time informing him of the respective amounts each of the
officers and crew members would receive as special compensation
when the vessel called at the port of Kwinana Australia, an ITF-
controlled port. This was followed by another cable on 23 March 1979,
informing him that the officers and crew members had been enrolled as
members of the ITF in Sidney, Australia, and that the membership fee
for the 28 personnel complement of the vessel had already been paid.
In answer to the Company's cable last mentioned, complainant Bisula,
in representation of the other officers and crew members, sent on 24
March 1979 a cable informing the Company that the officers and crew
members were not agreeable to its 'suggestion'; that they were not
contented with their present salaries 'based on the volume of works,
type of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in a world wide trade':
that the 'officers and crew (were) not interested in ITF membership if
not actually paid with ITF rate that their 'demand is only 50% increase
based on present basic salary and that the proposed wage increase is

the 'best and only solution to solve ITF problem' since the Company's
salary rates 'especially in tankers (are) very far in comparison with
other shipping agencies in Manila ...
In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the basic pay of the
complainant crew members, although it claimed, that it would "suffer
and absorb considerable amount of losses." The proposal was
accepted by the Seamen with certain conditions which were accepted
by the Company. Conformably with the agreement of the parties which
was effected through the cables abovementioned, the Seamen were
paid their new salary rates.
Subsequently, the Company sought authority from the NSB to cancel
the contracts of employment of the Seamen, claiming that its principals
had terminated their manning agreement because of the actuations of
the Seamen. The request was granted by the NSB Executive Director
in a letter dated 10 April 1979. Soon thereafter, the Company cabled
the Seamen informing them that their contracts would be terminated
upon the vessel's arrival in Japan. On 19 April 1979 they Arere asked
to disembark from the vessel, their contracts were terminated, and they
were repatriated to Manila. There is no showing that the Seamen were
given the opportunity to at least comment on the Company's request
for the cancellation of their contracts, although they had served only
three (3) out of the twelve (12) months' duration of their contracts.
The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
earned wages with the National Seamen Board. The Vir-jen Shipping and Marine
Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for breach of contract and recovery of excess
salaries and overtime pay against the private respondents. On July 2, 1980, the NSB
rendered a decision declaring that the seamen breached their employment contracts
when they demanded and received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their
contracted rates. The dismissal of the seamen was declared legal and the seamen were
ordered suspended.
The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB
and required the petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary benefits corresponding
to the unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of
the contract by the petitioner was without valid cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present
petition.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 303
The private respondents submit the following issues in their motion for
reconsideration: têñ.£îhqwâ£
A. THIS HONORABLE COURT DID VIOLENCE TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FINDING OF FACT
OF THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD THAT THE SEAMEN
VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACTS IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THE
FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION THAT THE SEAMEN DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR
CONTRACT.
B. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VIR-JEN'S
HAVING AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE SEAMEN'S BASIC
WAGE WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS.
C. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT TOOK
COGNIZANCE OF THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING
THAT THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT COULD BE TAKEN
COGNIZANCE OF, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN' IT
FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD VIOLATED THE
SAME.
D, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND
PETITIONER VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED BEFORE
EXPIRY DATE THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO LEGAL AND JUSTIFIABLE
GROUND FOR SUCH TERMINATION.
E. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PREPARATION BY PETITIONER OF THE TWO PAYROLLS AND
THE EXECUTION OF THE SIDE CONTRACT WERE NOT MADE IN
BAD FAITH.
F. THIS HONORABLE COURT INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
At the outset, we are faced with the question whether or not the Court en banc should
give due course to the motion for reconsideration inspite of its having been denied twice
by the Court's Second Division. The case was referred to and accepted by the Court en
banc because of the movants' contention that the decision in this case by the Second

Division deviated from Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor  (L-50734-37,
February 20, 1981), a First Division case with the same facts and issues. We are
constrained to answer the initial question in the affirmative.
A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional Law is the fact, that there is only
one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take their
bearings. (Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA
98; Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226). The majority of the Court's work is now
performed by its two Divisions, but the Court remains one court, single, unitary,
complete, and supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact that,
while ' individual Justices may dissent or partially concur with one another, when the
Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. And that voice being
authoritative should be a clear as possible.
Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, whether en banc or in Division,
may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc. (Section 2(3), Article X,
Constitution.) In the rare instances when one Division disagrees in its views with the
other Division, or the necessary votes on an issue cannot be had in a Division, the case
is brought to the Court en banc to reconcile any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify
an earlier decision, and to declare the Court's doctrine. This is what has happened in
this case.
The decision sought to be reconsidered appears to be a deviation from the Court's
decision, speaking through the First Division, in Wallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister
of Labor  (102 SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly conflicting resolutions of basically
the same issue by its two Divisions, the Court. therefore, resolved to transfer the case to
the Court en banc. Parenthetically, the petitioner's comment on the third motion for
reconsideration states that the resolution of the motion might be the needed vehicle to
make the ruling in the Wallem case clearer and more in time with the underlying
principles of the Labor Code. We agree with the petitioner.
After an exhaustive, painstaking, and perspicacious consideration of the motions for
reconsideration and the comments, replies, and other pleadings related thereto, the
Court en banc is constrained to grant the motions. To grant the motion is to keep faith
with the constitutional mandate to afford protection to labor and to assure the rights of
workers to self-organization and to just and humane conditions of work. We sustain the
decision of the respondent National labor Relations Commission.
There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common thread running
through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal prophecy, that if the respondent
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 304
seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill the en that lays the golden
egg." In other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should
remain satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of
compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their contracts of employment
are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and immutable the side contracts
which require them to falsely pretend to be members of international labor federations,
pretend to receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the increased
pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their right to ask for improved
terms of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and should suffer
instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of dissatisfaction with no
protection from their Government and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend
that Filipinos would no longer be accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their
jobs, and the still unemployed would be left hopeless.
This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of unemployment and
loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests of labor; where efforts by
workingmen to better their terms of employment would be characterized as prejudicing
the interests of labor as a whole.
In 1867 or one hundred sixteen years ago. Chief Justice Beasley of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey was ponente of the court's opinion declaring as a conspiracy the threat of
workingmen to strike in connection with their efforts to promote unionism, têñ.£îhqwâ£
It is difficult to believe that a right exists in law which we can scarcely
conceive can produce, in any posture of affairs, other than injuriois
results. It is simply the right of workmen, by concert of action, and by
taking advantage of their position, to control the business of another, I
am unwilling to hold that a right which cannot, in any, event, be
advantageous to the employee, and which must always be hurtful to
the employer, exists in law. In my opinion this indictment sufficiently
shows that the force of the confederates was brought to bear upon their
employer for the purpose of oppression and mischief and that this
amounts to a conspiracy, (State v. Donaldson, 32 NJL 151, 1867. Cited
in Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor, p. 13. Emphasis supplied)
The same arguments have greeted every major advance in the rights of the
workingman. And they have invariably been proved unfounded and false.
Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's compensation, social
security and collective bargaining to name a few were all initially opposed by employers

and even well meaning leaders of government and society as "killing the hen or goose
which lays the golden eggs." The claims of workingmen were described as outrageously
injurious not only to the employer but more so to the employees themselves before
these claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as "rights" and
before these were proved beneficial to management, labor, and the nation as a whole
beyond reasonable doubt.
The case before us does not represent any major advance in the rights of labor and the
workingmen. The private respondents merely sought rights already established. No
matter how much the petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking for the entire
industry, there is no evidence that it is typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that
it can speak for them.
The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not survive if the instant
case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem
case was decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no severe repercussions, no
drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire consequences
repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be all exception?
The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the foreign
principal. The local manning office is an agent whose primary function is recruitment and
who .usually gets a lump sum from the shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The
hiring of seamen and the determination of their compensation is subject to the interplay
of various market factors and one key factor is how much in terms of profits the local
manning office and the foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are
met. And costs include salaries of officers and crew members.
Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other
country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many of them in the vessels
sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is competence and reliability, not cheap
labor that makes our seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never
demanded the same high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan and other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to
government protection when they ask for fair and decent treatment by their employer.-,
and when they exercise the right to petition for improved terms of employment,
especially when they feel that these are sub-standard or are capable of improvement
according to internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are marginal
employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for their employees — one in keeping with
minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard wages that the employees
really receive, The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums required
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 305
by fair labor standards legislation but even go way above the minimums while earning
reasonable profits and prospering. The same is true of international employment. There
is no reason why this Court and the Ministry of Labor and. Employment or its agencies
and commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the standards and
practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive
without resorting to tricky and deceptive schemes, instead of Government maintaining
labor law and jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable, competent, and
law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign.
If any minor advantages given to Filipino seamen may somehow cut into the profits of
local manning agencies and foreign shipowners, that is not sufficient reason why the
NSB or the ILRC should not stand by the former instead of listening to unsubstantiated
fears that they would be killing the hen which lays the golden eggs.
Prescinding from the above, we now hold that neither the National Seamen Board nor
the National Labor Relations Commission should, as a matter of official policy, legitimize
and enforce cubious arrangements where shipowners and seamen enter into fictitious
contracts similar to the addendum agreements or side contracts in this case whose
purpose is to deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its ministries and agencies
should present a more honorable and proper posture in official acts to the whole world,
notwithstanding our desire to have as many job openings both here and abroad for our
workers. At the very least, such as sensitive matter involving no less than our dignity as
a people and the welfare of our workingmen must proceed from the Batasang
Pambansa in the form of policy legislation, not from administrative rule making or
adjudication
Another issue raised by the movants is whether or not the seamen violated their
contracts of employment.
The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to protect
Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard
forms embody' the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the
employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code.) They are not collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts
which the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of
time. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition their employer for
higher salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to established
principles of labor legislation. The National Labor Relations Commission, as the
appellate tribunal from decisions of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the
seamen did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal.

The respondent Commission ruled: têñ.£îhqwâ£
In the light of all the foregoing facts, we find that the cable of the
seamen proposing an increase in their wage rates was not and could
not have been intended as a threat to comp el the Company to accede
to their proposals. But even assuming, if only for the sake of argument,
that the demand or — proposal for a wage increase was accompanied
by a threat that they would report to ITF if the Company did not accede
to the contract revision - although there really was no such threat as
pointed out earlier — the Seamen should not be held at fault for asking
such a demand. In the same case cited above, the Supreme Court
held: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private
respondents was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as
contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is
not well-taken. But even if there had been such a
threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured
because it is but natural for them to employ some
means of pressing their demands for petitioner, the
refusal to abide with the terms of the Special
Agreement, to honor and respect the same, They
were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to
deprive them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious
misconduct to speak of in the case at bar which would
justify respondents' dismissal just because of their
firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by
petitioner of its obligation it entered into without any
coercion, specially on the part of private respondents.
(Emphasis supplied).
The above citation is from Wallem.
The facts show that when the respondents boarded the M/T Jannu there was no
intention to send their ship to Australia. On January 10, 1979, the petitioner sent a cable
to respondent shipmaster Bisula informing him of the procedure to be followed in the
computation of special compensation of crewmembers while in ITF controlled ports and
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 306
expressed regrets for not having earlier clarified the procedure as it thought that the
vessel would trade in Carribean ports only.
On March 22, 1979, the petitioner sent another cable informing Bisula of the special
compensation when the ship would call at Kwinana Australia.
The following day, shipmaster Bisula cabled Vir-jen stating that the officers and crews
were not interested in ITF membership if not paid ITF rates and that their only demand
was a 50 percent increase based on their then salaries. Bisula also pointed out that Vir-
jen rates were "very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila."
In reply, Vir-jen counter proposed a 25 percent increase. Only after Kyoei Tanker Co.,
Ltd., declined to increase the lumps sum amount given monthly to Vir-jen was the
decision to terminate the respondents' employment formulated.
The facts show that Virjen Initiated the discussions which led to the demand for
increased . The seamen made a proposal and the petitioner organized with a counter-
proposal. The ship had not vet gone to Australia or any ITF controlled port. There was
absolutely no mention of any strike. much less a threat to strike. The seamen had done
in act which under Philippine law or any other civilized law would be termed illegal,
oppressive, or malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted
valid modes of labor activity.
We reiterate our ruling in Wallem. têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private
respondents was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as
contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is
not well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the
commission of any threat, But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be
censured because it is but natural for them to employ
some means of pressing their demands for petitioner,
who refused to abide with the terms of the Special
Agreement, to honor and respect the same, They
were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to
deprive them of their form of expression is contrary to
law and public policy. ...
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 307

Our dismissing the petition is premised on the assumption that the Ministry of Labor and
Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the workinginan's interests and, of
course, the nation as a whole. The points raised by the Solicitor-General in his
comments refer to the issue of allowing what the petitioner importunes under the
argument of "killing the hen which lays the golden eggs." This is one of policy which
should perhaps be directed to the Batasang Pambansa and to our country's other policy
makers for more specific legislation on the matter, subject to the constitutional provisions
protecting labor, promoting social justice, and guaranteeing non-abridgement of the
freedom of speech, press, peaceable assembly and petition. We agree with the movants
that there is no showing of any cause, which under the Labor Code or any current
applicable law, would warrant the termination of the respondents' services before the
expiration of their contracts. The Constitution guarantees State assurance of the rights
of workers to security of tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II, Constitution). Presumptions and
provisions of law, the evidence on record, and fundamental State policy all dictate that
the motions for reconsideration should be granted.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. The petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-57999, 58143-53 August 15, 1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO
TANEDO, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA,
RAMON DE BELEN, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO
and VITALIANO PANGUE, petitioners,  private respondent because they demanded, upon the intervention and assistance of a
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO and MAGSAYSAY LINES,
INC., respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-64781-99 August 15, 1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO
TANEDO, RAYMUNDO PEREZ, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS,
ISIDRO BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA, VITALIANO PANGUE, RAMON DE BELEN,
EDUARDO PAGTALUNAN, ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAMON UNIANA, ERNESTO
SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and WILFREDO
CRISTOBAL, petitioners,  G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, which respectively pray for the
vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL
SEAMEN BOARD (now the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration), and
MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC., respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peñ;a and Nolasco for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 308
These petitions ask for a re-examination of this Court's precedent — setting decision
in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al.  (125 SCRA 577 [1983]). On constitutional, statutory, and factual grounds, we find no
reason to disturb the doctrine in Vir-Jen Shipping  and to turn back the clock of progress
for sea-based overseas workers. The experience gained in the past few years shows
that, following said doctrine, we should neither deny nor diminish the enjoyment by
Filipino seamen of the same rights and freedoms taken for granted by other working-
men here and abroad.
The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who were declared by the defunct
National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of breaching their employment contracts with the
third party, the International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of wages
over and above their contracted rates without the approval of the NSB. The petitioners
were ordered to reimburse the total amount of US$91,348.44 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency representing the said over-payments and to be suspended from the
NSB registry for a period of three years. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed the decision of the NSB.
In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure of the petitioners to return
the overpayments made to them upon demand by the former, filed estafa charges
against some of the petitioners. The criminal cases were eventually consolidated in the
sala of then respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo. Hence, these consolidated petitions,
nullification of the decisions of the NLRC and the NSB, and the dismissal of the criminal
cases against the petitioners.
The facts are found in the questioned decision of the NSB in G.R. No. 64781-99.
From the records of this case it appears that the facts established
and/or admitted by the parties are the following: that on different dates
in 1977 and 1978 respondents entered into separate contracts of
employment (Exhs. "B" to "B-17", inclusive) with complainant (private
respondent) to work aboard vessels owned/operated/manned by the
latter for a period of 12 calendar months and with different
rating/position, salary, overtime pay and allowance, hereinbelow
specified: ...; that aforesaid employment contracts were verified and
approved by this Board; that on different dates in April 1978
respondents (petitioners) joined the M/V "GRACE RIVER"; that on or

about October 30, 1978 aforesaid vessel, with the respondents on
board, arrived at the port of Vancouver, Canada; that at this port
respondent received additional wages under rates prescribed by the
Intemational Transport Worker's Federation (ITF) in the total amount of
US$98,261.70; that the respondents received the amounts appearing
opposite their names, to wit: ...; that aforesaid amounts were over and
above the rates of pay of respondents as appearing in their
employment contracts approved by this Board; that on November 10,
1978, aforesaid vessel, with respondent on board, left Vancouver,
Canada for Yokohama, Japan; that on December 14, 1978, while
aforesaid vessel, was at Yura, Japan, they were made to disembark.
(pp. 64-66, Rollo)
Furthermore, according to the petitioners, while the vessel was docked at Nagoya,
Japan, a certain Atty. Oscar Torres of the NSB Legal Department boarded the vessel
and called a meeting of the seamen including the petitioners, telling them that for their
own good and safety they should sign an agreement prepared by him on board the
vessel and that if they do, the cases filed against them with NSB on November 17, 1978
would be dismissed. Thus, the petitioners signed the. "Agreement" dated December 5,
1978. (Annex C of Petition) However, when they were later furnished xerox copies of
what they had signed, they noticed that the line "which amount(s) was/were received
and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNERS" was inserted therein, thereby
making it appear that the amounts given to the petitioners representing the increase in
their wages based on ITF rates were only received by them in trust for the private
respondent.
When the vessel reached Manila, the private respondent demanded from the petitioners
the "overpayments" made to them in Canada. As the petitioners refused to give back the
said amounts, charges were filed against some of them with the NSB and the
Professional Regulations Commission. Estafa charges were also filed before different
branches of the then Court of First Instance of Manila which, as earlier stated, were
subsequently consolidated in the sala of the respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo and
which eventually led to G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53.
In G.R. Nos. 64781-99, the petitioners claimed before the NSB that contrary to the
private respondent's allegations, they did not commit any illegal act nor stage a strike
while they were on board the vessel; that the "Special Agreement" entered into in
Vancouver to pay their salary differentials is valid, having been executed after peaceful
negotiations. Petitioners further argued that the amounts they received were in
accordance with the provision of law, citing among others, Section 18, Rule VI, Book I of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 309
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which provides that "the basic
minimum salary of seamen shall not be less than the prevailing minimum rates
established by the International Labor Organization (ILO) or those prevailing in the
country whose flag the employing vessel carries, whichever is higher ..."; and that the
"Agreement" executed in Nagoya, Japan had been forced upon them and that
intercalations were made to make it appear that they were merely trustees of the
amounts they received in Vancouver.
On the other hand, the private respondent alleged that the petitioners breached their
employment contracts when they, acting in concert and with the active participations of
the ITF while the vessel was in Vancouver, staged an illegal strike and by means of
threats, coercion and intimidation compelled the owners of the vessel to pay to them
various sums totalling US$104,244.35; that the respondent entered into the "Special
Agreement" to pay the petitioners' wage differentials because it was under duress as the
vessel would not be allowed to leave Vancouver unless the said agreement was signed,
and to prevent the shipowner from incurring further delay in the shipment of goods; and
that in view of petitioners' breach of contract, the latter's names must be removed from
the NSB's Registry and that they should be ordered to return the amounts they received
over and above their contracted rates.
The respondent NSB ruled that the petitioners were guilty of breach of contract because
despite subsisting and valid NSB-approved employment contracts, the petitioners
sought the assistance of a third party (ITF) to demand from the private respondent
wages in accordance with the ITF rates, which rates are over and above their rates of
pay as appearing in their NSB-approved contracts. As bases for this conclusion, the
NSB stated:
1) The fact that respondents sought the aid of a third party (ITF) and
demanded for wages and overtime pay based on ITF rates is shown in
the entries of their respective Pay-Off Clearance Slips which were
marked as their Exhs. "1" to "18", and we quote "DEMANDED ITF
WAGES, OVERTIME, DIFFERENTIALS APRIL TO OCTOBER 1978".
Respondent Suzara admitted that the entries in his Pay-Off Clearance
Slip (Exh. "1") are correct (TSN., p. 16, Dec. 6,
1979).lâwphî1.ñèt  Moreover, it is the policy (reiterated very often) by
the ITF that it does not interfere in the affairs of the crewmembers and
masters and/or owners of a vessel unless its assistance is sought by
the crewmembers themselves. Under this pronounced policy of the ITF,
it is reasonable to assume that the representatives of the ITF in

Vancouver, Canada assisted and intervened by reason of the
assistance sought by the latter.
2) The fact that the ITF assisted and intervened for and in behalf of the
respondents in the latter's demand for higher wages could be gleaned
from the answer of the respondents when they admitted that the ITF
acted in their behalf in the negotiations for increase of wages.
Moreover, respondent Cesar Dimaandal admitted that the ITF
differential pay was computed by the ITF representative (TSN, p. 7,
Dec. 12, 1979)
3) The fact that complainant and the owner/operator of the vessel were
compelled to sign the Special Agreement (Exh. "20") and to pay ITF
differentials to respondents in order not to delay the departure of the
vessel and to prevent further losses is shown in the "Agreement"
(Exhs. "R-21") ... (pp. 69-70, Rollo)
The NSB further said:
While the Board recognizes the rights of the respondents to demand for
higher wages, provided the means are peaceful and legal, it could not,
however, sanction the same if the means employed are violent and
illegal. In the case at bar, the means employed are violent and illegal
for in demanding higher wages the respondents sought the aid of a
third party and in turn the latter intervened in their behalf and prohibited
the vessel from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the vessel
acceded to respondents' demand for higher wages. To avoid suffering
further incalculable losses, the owner and/or operator of the vessel had
no altemative but to pay respondents' wages in accordance with the
ITF scale. The Board condemns the act of a party who enters into a
contract and with the use of force/or intimidation causes the other party
to modify said contract. If the respondents believe that they have a
valid ground to demand from the complainant a revision of the terms of
their contracts, the same should have been done in accordance with
law and not thru illegal means. (at p. 72, Rollo).
Although the respondent NSB found that the petitioners were entitled to the payment of
earned wages and overtime pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14,
1978, it nevertheless ruled that the computation should be based on the rates of pay as
appearing in the petitioners' NSB-approved contracts. It ordered that the amounts to
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 310
which the petitioners are entitled under the said computation should be deducted from
the amounts that the petitioners must return to the private respondent.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the NSB's findings. Hence, the petition in G.R. Nos.
64781-99.
Meanwhile, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 moved to quash the
criminal cases of estafa filed against them on the ground that the alleged crimes were
committed, if at all, in Vancouver, Canada and, therefore, Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction. The respondent judge denied the motion. Hence, the second petition.
The principal issue in these consolidated petitions is whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to the amounts they received from the private respondent representing
additional wages as determined in the special agreement. If they are, then the decision
of the NLRC and NSB must be reversed. Similarly, the criminal cases of estafa must be
dismissed because it follows as a consequence that the amounts received by the
petitioners belong to them and not to the private respondent.
In arriving at the questioned decision, the NSB ruled that the petitioners are not entitled
to the wage differentials as determined by the ITF because the means employed by
them in obtaining the same were violent and illegal and because in demanding higher
wages the petitioners sought the aid of a third party, which, in turn, intervened in their
behalf and prohibited the vessel from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the
vessel acceded to respondents' demand for higher wages. And as proof of this
conclusion, the NSB cited the following: (a) the entries in the petitioners Pay-Off
Clearance Slip which contained the phrase "DEMANDED ITF WAGES ..."; (b) the
alleged policy of the ITF in not interfering with crewmembers of a vessel unless its
intervention is sought by the crewmembers themselves; (c), the petitioners' admission
that ITF acted in their behalf; and (d) the fact that the private respondent was compelled
to sign the special agreement at Vancouver, Canada.
There is nothing in the public and private respondents' pleadings, to support the
allegations that the petitioners used force and violence to secure the special agreement
signed in Vancouver. British Columbia. There was no need for any form of intimidation
coming from the Filipino seamen because the Canadian Brotherhood of Railways and
Transport Workers (CBRT), a strong Canadian labor union, backed by an international
labor federation was actually doing all the influencing not only on the ship-owners and
employers but also against third world seamen themselves who, by receiving lower
wages and cheaper accommodations, were threatening the employment and livelihood
of seamen from developed nations.

The bases used by the respondent NSB to support its decision do not prove that the
petitioners initiated a conspiracy with the ITF or deliberately sought its assistance in
order to receive higher wages. They only prove that when ITF acted in petitioners' behalf
for an increase in wages, the latter manifested their support. This would be a logical and
natural reaction for any worker in whose benefit the ITF or any other labor group had
intervened. The petitioners admit that while they expressed their conformity to and their
sentiments for higher wages by means of placards, they, nevertheless, continued
working and going about their usual chores. In other words, all they did was to exercise
their freedom of speech in a most peaceful way. The ITF people, in turn, did not employ
any violent means to force the private respondent to accede to their demands. Instead,
they simply applied effective pressure when they intimated the possibility of interdiction
should the shipowner fail to heed the call for an upward adjustment of the rates of the
Filipino seamen. Interdiction is nothing more than a refusal of ITF members to render
service for the ship, such as to load or unload its cargo, to provision it or to perform such
other chores ordinarily incident to the docking of the ship at a certain port. It was the fear
of ITF interdiction, not any action taken by the seamen on board the vessel which led the
shipowners to yield.
The NSB's contusion that it is ITF's policy not to intervene with the plight of
crewmembers of a vessel unless its intervention was sought is without basis. This Court
is cognizant of the fact that during the period covered by the labor controversies
in Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Minister of Labor (102 SCRA 835 [1981]; Vir-Jen
Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC  (supra) and these consolidated petitions,
the ITF was militant worldwide especially in Canada, Australia, Scandinavia, and various
European countries, interdicting foreign vessels and demanding wage increases for third
world seamen. There was no need for Filipino or other seamen to seek ITF intervention.
The ITF was waiting on its own volition in all Canadian ports, not particularly for the
petitioners' vessel but for all ships similarly situated. As earlier stated, the ITF was not
really acting for the petitioners out of pure altruism. The ITF was merely protecting the
interests of its own members. The petitioners happened to be pawns in a higher and
broader struggle between the ITF on one hand and shipowners and third world seamen,
on the other. To subject our seamen to criminal prosecution and punishment for having
been caught in such a struggle is out of the question.
As stated in Vir-Jen Shipping  (supra):
The seamen had done no act which under Philippine law or any other
civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or malicious.
Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted and valid
modes of labor activity. (at page 591)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 311
Given these factual situations, therefore, we cannot affirm the NSB and NLRC's finding
that there was violence, physical or otherwise employed by the petitioners in demanding
for additional wages. The fact that the petitioners placed placards on the gangway of
their ship to show support for ITF's demands for wage differentials for their own benefit
and the resulting ITF's threatened interdiction do not constitute violence. The petitioners
were exercising their freedom of speech and expressing sentiments in their hearts when
they placed the placard We Want ITF Rates." Under the facts and circumstances of
these petitions, we see no reason to deprive the seamen of their right to freedom of
expression guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the fundamental law of
Canada where they happened to exercise it.
As we have ruled in Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor, et al. supra:
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified
because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by
the Labor Code. This contention is now well-taken. The records fail to
establish clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had
been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured
because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing
their demands for petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the
Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were only
acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their
freedom of expression is contrary to law and public policy. ... (at page
843)
We likewise, find the public respondents' conclusions that the acts of the petitioners in
demanding and receiving wages over and above the rates appearing in their NSB-
approved contracts is in effect an alteration of their valid and subsisting contracts
because the same were not obtained through. mutual consent and without the prior
approval of the NSB to be without basis, not only because the private respondent's
consent to pay additional wages was not vitiated by any violence or intimidation on the
part of the petitioners but because the said NSB-approved form contracts are not
unalterable contracts that can have no room for improvement during their effectivity or
which ban any amendments during their term.
For one thing, the employer can always improve the working conditions without violating
any law or stipulation.
We stated in the Vir-Jen case (supra) that:

The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are
designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can
take care of themselves. The standard forms embody the basic
minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the employment
contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code).lâwphî1.ñèt They are not collective bargaining
agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot improve
upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time. To state,
therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition their employer for
higher salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract runs
counter to estabhshed principles of labor legislation. The National
Labor Relations Commission, as the appellate tribunal from the
decisions of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the
seamen did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal. (at
page 589)
It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the middle of a labor
struggle between the ITF and owners of ocean going vessels halfway around the world
in Vancouver, British Columbia to first secure the approval of the NSB in Manila before
signing an agreement which the employer was willing to sign. It is also totally unrealistic
to expect the petitioners while in Canada to exhibit the will and strength to oppose the
ITF's demand for an increase in their wages, assuming they were so minded.
An examination of Annex C of the petition, the agreement signed in Japan by the
crewmembers of the M/V Grace River and a certain M. Tabei, representative of the
Japanese shipowner lends credence to the petitioners' claim that the clause "which
amount(s) was received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNER" was
an intercalation added after the execution of the agreement. The clause appears too
closely typed below the names of the 19 crewmen and their wages with no similar
intervening space as that which appears between all the paragraphs and the triple space
which appears between the list of crewmembers and their wages on one hand and the
paragraph above which introduces the list, on the other. The verb "were" was also
inserted above the verb "was" to make the clause grammatically correct but the insertion
of "were" is already on the same line as "Antonio Miranda and 5,221.06" where it clearly
does not belong. There is no other space where the word "were" could be intercalated.
(See Rollo, page 80).
At any rate, the proposition that the petitioners should have pretended to accept the
increased wages while in Vancouver but returned them to the shipowner when they
reached its country, Japan, has already been answered earlier by the Court:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 312
Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen
from any other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so
many of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this
globe. It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our
seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded
the same high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan and other developed nations. But certainly they are
entitled to government protection when they ask for fair and decent
treatment by their employer and when they exercise the right to petition
for improved terms of employment, especially when they feel that these
are sub-standard or are capable of improvement according to
internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are
marginal employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for their
employees — one in keeping with minimum wages and the other
recording the sub-standard wages that the employees really receive.
The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums required
by fair labor standards legislation but even go away above the
minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The same
is true of international employment. There is no reason why this court
and the Ministry of Labor and Employment or its agencies and
commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the
standards and practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who
claim they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive
schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and
jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable, competent, and
law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign. (Vir-Jen Shipping, supra,
pp. 587-588)
It is noteworthy to emphasize that while the Intemational Labor Organization (ILO) set
the minimum basic wage of able seamen at US$187.00 as early as October 1976, it was
only in 1979 that the respondent NSB issued Memo Circular No. 45, enjoining all
shipping companies to adopt the said minimum basic wage. It was correct for the
respondent NSB to state in its decision that when the petitioners entered into separate
contracts between 1977-1978, the monthly minimum basic wage for able seamen
ordered by NSB was still fixed at US$130.00. However, it is not the fault of the
petitioners that the NSB not only violated the Labor Code which created it and the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code but also seeks to punish the seamen for
a shortcoming of NSB itself.

Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, when it created the NSB, mandated the Board to
"(O)btain the best possible terms and conditions of employment for seamen."
Section 15, Rule V of Book I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
provides:
Sec. 15. Model contract of employment. — The NSB shall devise a
model contract of employment which shall embody all the requirements
of pertinent labor and social legislations and the prevailing standards
set by applicable International Labor Organization Conventions. The
model contract shall set the minimum standards of the terms and
conditions to govern the employment of Filipinos on board vessels
engaged in overseas trade. All employers of Filipinos shall adopt the
model contract in connection with the hiring and engagement of the
services of Filipino seafarers, and in no case shall a shipboard
employment contract be allowed where the same provides for benefits
less than those enumerated in the model employment contract, or in
any way conflicts with any other provisions embodied in the model
contract.
Section 18 of Rule VI of the same Rules and Regulations provides:
Sec. 18. Basic minimum salary of able-seamen. — The basic minimum
salary of seamen shall be not less than the prevailing minimxun rates
established by the International Labor Organization or those prevailing
in the country whose flag the employing vessel carries, whichever is
higher. However, this provision shall not apply if any shipping company
pays its crew members salaries above the minimum herein provided.
Section 8, Rule X, Book I of the Omnibus Rules provides:
Section 8. Use of standard format of service agreement. — The Board
shall adopt a standard format of service agreement in accordance with
pertinent labor and social legislation and prevailing standards set by
applicable International Labor Organization Conventions. The standard
format shall set the minimum standard of the terms and conditions to
govern the employment of Filipino seafarers but in no case shall a
shipboard employment contract (sic), or in any way conflict with any
other provision embodied in the standard format.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 313
It took three years for the NSB to implement requirements which, under the law, they
were obliged to follow and execute immediately. During those three years, the incident in
Vancouver happened. The terms and conditions agreed upon in Vancouver were well
within ILO rates even if they were above NSB standards at the time.
The sanctions applied by NSB and affirmed by NLRC are moreover not in keeping with
the basic premise that this Court stressed in the Vir-Jen Shipping case (supra) that the
Ministry now the Department of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist
primarily for the workingman's interest and the nation's as a whole.
Implicit in these petitions and the only reason for the NSB to take the side of foreign
shipowners against Filipino seamen is the "killing the goose which lays the golden eggs"
argument. We reiterate the ruling of the Court in Vir-Jen Shipping (supra)
There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common
thread running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal
prophecy, that if the respondent seamen are sustained by this Court,
we would in effect "kill the hen that lays the golden egg." In other
words, Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should
remain satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international
rates of compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their
contracts of employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron
clad, and immutable the side contracts which require: them to falsely
pretend to be members of international labor federations, pretend to
receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the
increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their
right to ask for improved terms of employment but their freedom of
speech and expression, and should suffer instant termination of
employment at the slightest sign of dissatisfaction with no protection
from their Government and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners
contend that Filipinos would no longer be accepted as seamen, those
employed would lose their jobs, and the still unemployed would be left
hopeless.
This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of unemployment and
loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests of labor; where efforts by
workingmen to better their terms of employment would be characterized as prejudicing
the interests of labor as a whole.
xxx xxx xxx

Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's
compensation, social security and collective bargaining to name a few
were all initially opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders
of government and society as "killing the hen or goose which lays the
golden eggs." The claims of workingmen were described as
outrageously injurious not only to the employer but more so to the
employees themselves before these claims or demands were
established by law and jurisprudence as "rights" and before these were
proved beneficial to management, labor, and the national as a whole
beyond reasonable doubt.
The case before us does not represent any major advance in the rights
of labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought
rights already established. No matter how much the petitioner-employer
tries to present itself as speaking for the entire industry, there is no
evidence that it is typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it
can speak for them.
The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not
survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is not
supported by evidence. The Wallem case was decided on February 20,
1981. There have been no severe repercussions, no drying up of
employment opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire
consequences repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should
Vir-Jen be an exception?
The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are
shouldered by the foreign principal. The local manning office is an
agent whose primary function is recruitment and who usually gets a
lump sum from the shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The
hiring of seamen and the determination of their compensation is subject
to the interplay of various market factors and one key factor is how
much in terms of profits the local manning office and the foreign
shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are met. And costs
include salaries of officers and crew members. (at pp. 585-586)
The Wallem Shipping case, was decided in 1981. Vir-Jen Shipping  was decided in
1983. It is now 1989. There has'been no drying up of employment opportunities for
Filipino seamen. Not only have their wages improved thus leading ITF to be placid and
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 314
quiet all these years insofar as Filipinos are concerned but the hiring of Philippine
seamen is at its highest level ever.
Reporting its activities for the year 1988, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) stated that there will be an increase in demand for seamen
based overseas in 1989 boosting the number to as high as 105,000. This will represent
a 9.5 percent increase from the 1988 aggregate. (Business World, News Briefs,  January
11, 1989 at page 2) According to the POEA, seabased workers numbering 95,913 in
1988 exceeded by a wide margin of 28.15 percent the year end total in 1987. The report
shows that sea-based workers posted bigger monthly increments compared to those of
landbased workers. (The Business Star,  Indicators, January 11, 1988 at page 2)
Augmenting this optimistic report of POEA Administrator Tomas Achacoso is the
statement of Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon that the Philippines has a big jump
over other crewing nations because of the Filipinos' abilities compared with any
European or westem crewing country. Drilon added that cruise shipping is also a
growing market for Filipino seafarers because of their flexibility in handling odd jobs and
their expertise in handling almost all types of ships, including luxury liners. (Manila
Bulletin, More Filipino Seamen Expected Development, December 27, 1988 at page
29).lâwphî1.ñèt Parenthetically, the minimum monthly salary of able bodied seamen set
by the ILO and adhered to by the Philippines is now $276.00 (id.) more than double the
$130.00 sought to be enforced by the public respondents in these petitions.
The experience from 1981 to the present vindicates the finding in Vir-Jen Shipping that
a decision in favor of the seamen would not necessarily mean severe repercussions,
drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and other dire consequences
predicted by manning agencies and recruiters in the Philippines.
From the foregoing, we find that the NSB and NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of using intimidation and illegal means in
breaching their contracts of employment and punishing them for these alleged offenses.
Consequently, the criminal prosecutions for estafa in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53
should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the National
Seamen Board and National Labor Relations Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered holding the petitioners not guilty
of the offenses for which they were charged. The petitioners' suspension from the
National Seamen Board's Registry for three (3) years is LIFTED. The private respondent
is ordered to pay the petitioners their earned but unpaid wages and overtime
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 315

pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978 according to the rates in
the Special Agreement that the parties entered into in Vancouver, Canada.

The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G. R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53, are
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 80918 August 16, 1989
JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPE, petitioner  parties entered into a compromise agreement. On December 22, 1983, petitioner
vs.
PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. and CHUAN HUP
AGENCIES, PTE. LTD., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
R. C. Carrera Law Firm for petitioner.
Eladio B. Samson for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Once again this Tribunal is faced with the issue of the validity of the quitclaim executed
by the employee's heir in favor of the employer.
Petitioner is the widow of the late Abelardo Principe who was then the Chief Engineer of
M/V OSAM Falcon, a commercial vessel of Singaporean registry owned by Chuan Hup
Agencies, Pte. Ltd. (Chuan Hup for brevity), one of the private respondents herein, who
is the principal of Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. (PSTSI), also a private
respondent herein. The contract of employment of the deceased with private respondent
Chua Hup provides, among others, that Principe would receive Singapore $2,800.00 a
month to commence on September 7, 1982, medical benefits and insurance coverage
through group hospitalization and surgical insurance and group and personal accident
insurance for a capital sum of US$75,000.00. It also provides that the laws of Singapore
shall apply in cases of disputes arising out of the said appointment and that said
disputes are to be resolved by the courts of the Republic of Singapore. 1
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 316
On September 15,1982, while Principe was on duty in Malintoc Field, Palawan,
Philippines, he suddenly contracted a serious illness which eventually resulted to his
death.2
On July 5, 1983, petitioner filed a complaint 3 against PSTSI with the Workers
Assistance and Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), seeking the payment of death compensation benefits and other
benefits accruing to her deceased husband. While the aforesaid case was pending, the
executed a release and quitclaim in favor of PSTSI in consideration of the sum of Seven
Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00) together with hospital, burial and other incidental
expenses previously disbursed by PSTSI in favor of petitioner's deceased
husband. 4 Consequently, Atty. Wellington Lachica, counsel for petitioner, with the
latter's conformity, filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice against PSTSI and
without prejudice as against Chuan Hup 5
On the basis of the compromise agreement and the motion to dismiss dated November
23, 1983, the POEA issued an order dated December 27, 1983, dismissing petitioner's
complaint with prejudice against PSTSI.
On April 21, 1986, petitioner filed with the POEA another claim for death benefits against
PSTSI, this time including Chuan Hup. The new case was docketed as POEA Case No.
(L) 86-04-328. In the decision dated January 27, 1987, the POEA dismissed the
complaint on the ground that there exist identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action between the previous case, POEA Case No. L-635-83 and the new case, and that
the present case is barred by prior judgment based on a compromise agreement in the
previous case. 6
Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).lâwphî1.ñèt  In
a resolution dated September 25, 1987, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit. 7
Hence, the present petition.
It is the position of the petitioner that the release and quitclaim that she signed in favor of
private respondent PSTSI is null and void on the ground that the consideration given in
exchange thereof in the amount of P7,000.00 is extremely low and unconscionable.
Petitioner added that she was merely misled to sign the quitclaim due to the assurance
given by PSTSI that it will help her recover the death compensation and insurance
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 317

proceeds due her deceased husband. She argued that even on the assumption that the ration domiciled
quitclaim is valid, the release should benefit PSTSI alone and should not include Chua and having its
Hup as the quitclaim was executed only in favor of PSTSI. Further she contended that principal
notwithstanding the quitclaim executed in favor of PSTSI, the latter may still be held
liable since it is an agent of Chuan Hup here in the Philippines. 8 place of business at
205 Martinez Bldg.,
The Solicitor General supports petitioner's view stating that the principle of res judicata is
inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner and PSTSI agreed that the dismissal of Dasmarinas,
the suit against the latter is without prejudice insofar as the principal Chuan Hup is Manila.
concerned; that the quitclaim is null and void as the consideration given is
unconscionably low as it is not even equal to one percent (1%) of petitioner's claim; and WITNESSETH, that:
that the quitclaim is inequitable and incongrous to the declared policy of the State to
afford protection to labor, citing Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. 9 WHEREAS, on July 5, 1983, Josefina M. Principe fled a complaint for
death benefits against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. as
We rule for the petitioner. a shipping agency of Chuan Hup Agencies Pte. Ltd. of the Republic of
Singapore for the death of her husband, Engr. Abelardo D. Principe, on
The release and quitclaim in question reads as follows: September 15, 1982 in Matinloc Field, Offshore Palawan, Philippines
while in the course of as employment as Chief Engineer of OSAM
JOSEFINA M. Falcon' in POEA Case No. (L) 635-83 of the Philippine Overseas
PRINCIPLE, of Employment Administration, entitled Josefina M. Principe vs.
legal age, Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.;'

widow, and resident WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle the above- entitled case
at 1287-E, G. amicably.
Tuazon
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of SEVEN
St., Sampaloc, THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00), Philippine currency and of the
Manila hospital, burial and other incidental expenses previously disbursed by
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., receipt of which in full is
in favor of hereby acknowledged to her full and complete satisfaction, JOSEFINA
M. PRINCIPLE have (sic) released and discharged, as she hereby
PHILIPPINE- releases and discharges, Philippine-Singapore Transport Services,
SINGAPORE Inc., its directors, officers, employees, principals and agents from any
TRANS- and all claims, actions obligations and liabilities which she have or
might have against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. in
PORT SERVICES, connection with the death of her husband Abelardo D. Principe on
INC., a domestic September 15, 1982 in Matintoc Field, Offshore Palawan under the
corpo- circumstances narrated in the aforementioned case.

That she hereby represents and warrants to Philippine-Singapore
Transport Services, Inc. that she is the surviving spouse legally entitled
to claim for damages/support which may arise from the death of said
Abelardo D. Principe, and further, that she hereby manifests that any
and all rights or claims which she, as a surviving forced heir of the late
Abelardo D. Principe might have against Philippine-Singapore
Transport Services, Inc., its directors, employees, principals and agents
arising out of or by reason of the death of said Abelardo D. Principe are
hereby deemed waived and discharged and she have (sic) Philippine-
Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers, employees,
principals and agents and whoever may be held liable, completely free
and harmless from any claim and/or liabilities that may arise from the
death of said Abelardo D. Principe (sic).
That in the event that any other person/persons, as surviving spouse of
the deceased Abelardo D. Principe should claim against Philippine-
Singapore Transport Services, Inc. for such damages/support arising
from the death of Abelardo D. Principe, and the claim is held valid, then
Josefina M. Principe hereby undertakes and agrees to reimburse to
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. the amounts hereunder
received, plus legal interest therein.
That she further states that the foregoing consideration is voluntarily
accepted by her as a full and final compromise, adjustment and
settlement of any and all claims that she may have against Philippine-
Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers, employees,
principals and agents; and she hereby irrevocably affirm (sic) that
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. has made this settlement
solely to buy peace, avoid litigation and on human consideration, and
she acknowledges that the payment of said consideration is not and
shall never be construed as an admission of liability or obligation by
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its officers, directors,
employees, principals and agents. 10
It is true that a compromise agreement once approved by the court has the effect of res
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent and
forgery. However, settled is the rule that the NLRC may disregard technical rules of
procedure in order to give life to the constitutional mandate affording protection to labor
and to conform to the need of protecting the working class whose inferiority against the
employer has always been earmarked by disadvantage. 11
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 318
The Court finds that the compromise agreement entered into by the petitioner in favor of
PSTSI was not intended to totally foreclose her right over the death benefits of her
husband. First, the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner through Atty. Lachica before the
POEA, which cited the compromise agreement entered into by the parties, clearly and
unequivocally reflects the undertaking that the release is without prejudice as regards
private respondent Chuan Hup. This fact was acknowledged in the decision of POEA
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in POEA Case No. (L) 86-04-328. It is surprising why
both the POEA and the NLRC failed to consider this aspect in the resolution of the
second complaint filed by the petitioner against PSTSI and Chuan Hup.
The second complaint was filed by petitioner to enforce the joint and several liability of
PSTSI and Chuan Hup per joint affidavit of responsibility executed by said parties in
entering into a principal agent relationship after PSTSI failed to live up to its commitment
to assist petitioner in the recovery of death compensation. 12 This observation is
supported by the provisions of the release signed by the petitioner wherein the parties
referred to therein were only the petitioner and PSTSI. The release is from any claim
against PSTSI. Chuan Hup is not a party thereto. He cannot be considered covered by
the release.
Moreover, the Court sees no reason why petitioner, with the assistance of a counsel
would ever agree to foreclose her right against Chuan Hup over the death benefits of her
husband in exchange for a very measly sum of Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00).
They must have been aware that should she pursue her case, she was assured of
getting at least One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Singapore dollars
(US$100,800.00). This Court has laid down the rule in similar cases that applying the
Singapore Maritime Laws in case of a seaman's death, the heirs of the seaman should
receive the equivalent of 36 months wages of the deceased seaman. 13
The fact that petitioner received the sum of P7,000.00 only should not be taken to mean
as a waiver of her right. The circumstances she was confronted with during that time left
her with no other alternative but to accept the same as she was in dire need of money
due to the sudden death of her husband. PSTSI contends that it was precisely because
of her need for cash that petitioner thereby totally waived her right over the death
benefits of her husband. We do not think so. What is plausible is the protestation of
petitioner that PSTSI took advantage of her financial distress and led her to signing the
release and quitclaim without explaining the consequences to her. While it may be true
that her counsel assisted her in the process, said counsel must have been persuaded by
the assurance of PSTSI that it shall help obtain for her the corresponding benefits from
Chuan Hup.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 319

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim had foreclosed petitioner's
right over the death benefits of her husband, the fact that the consideration given in
exchange thereof was very much less than the amount petitioner is claiming renders the
quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public policy. 14 The State must be firm in
affording protection to labor. The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously low
and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her legitimate
claim. 15 Equity dictates that the compromise agreement should be voided in this
instance.
Lastly, it must be noted that the first complaint of petitioner was merely an action against
PSTSI whereas in the second complaint Chuan Hup was already included. The POEA
ruled that the second complaint was merely an afterthought, and that it was a product of
a pre-conceived mind considering the interval of time from the issuance of the order of
dismissal in the previous case and the institution of the second complaint. We do not
think so. On the contrary, the Court holds that the delay was due to PSTSI's failure to
make good its promise to assist the petitioner in recovering the death benefits of her
husband. We see no other reason thereby. Hence, even if the second action was filed
beyond the three (3) year reglementary period as provided by law for such claims, We
cannot buy PSTSI's argument that the claim is already barred. The blame for the delay,
if any, can only be attributed to PSTSI.
jurisdiction conferred on it by law is void and of no legal effect. 16 In this jurisdiction labor
cases, are within the competence of the National Labor Relations Commission.
With respect to petitioner's monetary claim, since the parties agreed that the laws of
Singapore shall govern their relationship and that any dispute arising from the contract
shall be resolved by the law of that country, then the petitioner is entitled to death
benefits equivalent to 36 months salary of her husband. 17 As the wage of deceased
Abelardo Principe was S$2,800.00 a month, then petitioner is entitled to a total of
S$100,800.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The resolution of the NLRC
dated September 25,1987 is hereby set aside and another decision is hereby rendered
ordering private respondents PSTSI and Chuan Hup Agencies, Pte. Ltd. to jointly and
severally pay petitioner the sum of S$100,800. 00 in its equivalent in Philippine pesos.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

On the other hand, PSTSI argues that it cannot be held responsible on the ground that
the aforesaid affidavit of undertaking with Chua Hup is applicable only to those members
of the crew recruited by PSTSI in the Philippines for and in behalf of its principal Chuan
Hup and that since Principe was directly hired by Chuan Hup, PSTSI cannot be held
responsible as it has no privity of contract with those personnel recruited in Singapore.

The argument is untenable. This is the first time PSTSI raised this defense when it had
all the chance to do so below. Moreover, if PSTSI honestly believed it had no privity of
contract with Principe who was directly recruited by Chuan Hup, then there is no reason
why it entered into a compromise agreement with herein petitioner. From the very start,
it should have asked for the dismissal of the case against it on the ground of lack of
cause of action, but it did not do so. What is obvious is that Principe was actually
recruited by PSTSI and that he signed the employment contract with the principal Chuan
Hup. Thus, private respondents stand jointly and severally liable for the claim of
petitioner.

Anent the argument that the Philippine courts are without jurisdiction over the subject
matter as jurisdiction was, by agreement of the parties, vested in the courts of the
Republic of Singapore, it is well-settled that an agreement to deprive a court of

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152122            July 30, 2003
CHINA AIRLINES, petitioner,  using [the] CAL ticket. Before he left for said trip, the trips covered by the ticket
vs.
DANIEL CHIOK, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A common carrier has a peculiar relationship with and an exacting responsibility to its
passengers. For reasons of public interest and policy, the ticket-issuing airline acts as
principal in a contract of carriage and is thus liable for the acts and the omissions of any
errant carrier to which it may have endorsed any sector of the entire, continuous trip.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse the August 7, 2001 Decision 2 and the February 7, 2002
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 45832. The challenged
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated July 5, 1991
of Branch 31, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, in
Civil Case No. 82-13690, is hereby MODIFIED by deleting that portion
regarding defendants-appellants’ liabilities for the payment of the actual
damages amounting to HK$14,128.80 and US$2,000.00 while all other respects
are AFFIRMED. Costs against defendants-appellants." 4
The assailed Resolution denied Petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the CA5 as follows:
"On September 18, 1981, Daniel Chiok (hereafter referred to as Chiok)
purchased from China Airlines, Ltd. (CAL for brevity) airline passenger ticket
number 297:4402:004:278:5 for air transportation covering Manila-Taipei-
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 320
Hongkong-Manila. Said ticket was exclusively endorseable to Philippine
Airlines, Ltd. (PAL for brevity).
"Subsequently, on November 21, 1981, Chiok took his trip from Manila to Taipei
were pre-scheduled and confirmed by the former. When he arrived in Taipei, he
went to the CAL office and confirmed his Hongkong to Manila trip on board PAL
Flight No. PR 311. The CAL office attached a yellow sticker appropriately
indicating that his flight status was OK.
"When Chiok reached Hongkong, he went to the PAL office and sought to
reconfirm his flight back to Manila. The PAL office confirmed his return trip on
board Flight No. PR 311 and attached its own sticker. On November 24, 1981,
Chiok proceeded to Hongkong International Airport for his return trip to Manila.
However, upon reaching the PAL counter, Chiok saw a poster stating that PAL
Flight No. PR 311 was cancelled because of a typhoon in Manila. He was then
informed that all the confirmed ticket holders of PAL Flight No. PR 311 were
automatically booked for its next flight, which was to leave the next day. He then
informed PAL personnel that, being the founding director of the Philippine
Polysterene Paper Corporation, he ha[d] to reach Manila on November 25,
1981 because of a business option which he ha[d] to execute on said date.
"On November 25, 1981, Chiok went to the airport. Cathay Pacific stewardess
Lok Chan (hereafter referred to as Lok) ha[d] taken and received Chiok’s plane
ticket and his luggage. Lok called the attention of Carmen Chan (hereafter
referred to as Carmen), PAL’s terminal supervisor, and informed the latter that
Chiok’s name was not in the computer list of passengers. Subsequently,
Carmen informed Chiok that his name did not appear in PAL’s computer list of
passengers and therefore could not be permitted to board PAL Flight No. PR
307.
"Meanwhile, Chiok requested Carmen to put into writing the alleged reason why
he was not allowed to take his flight. The latter then wrote the following, to wit:
‘PAL STAFF CARMEN CHAN CHKD WITH R/C KENNY AT 1005H NO SUCH
NAME IN COMPUTER FOR 311/24 NOV AND 307/25 NOV.’ The latter sought
to recover his luggage but found only 2 which were placed at the end of the
passengers line. Realizing that his new Samsonite luggage was missing, which
contained cosmetics worth HK$14,128.80, he complained to Carmen.

"Thereafter, Chiok proceeded to PAL’s Hongkong office and confronted PAL’s
reservation officer, Carie Chao (hereafter referred to as Chao), who previously
confirmed his flight back to Manila. Chao told Chiok that his name was on the
list and pointed to the latter his computer number listed on the PAL confirmation
sticker attached to his plane ticket, which number was ‘R/MN62’.
"Chiok then decided to use another CAL ticket with No. 297:4402:004:370:5
and asked Chao if this ticket could be used to book him for the said flight. The
latter, once again, booked and confirmed the former’s trip, this time on board
PAL Flight No. PR 311 scheduled to depart that evening. Later, Chiok went to
the PAL check-in counter and it was Carmen who attended to him. As this
juncture, Chiok had already placed his travel documents, including his clutch
bag, on top of the PAL check-in counter.
"Thereafter, Carmen directed PAL personnel to transfer counters. In the
ensuing commotion, Chiok lost his clutch bag containing the following, to wit: (a)
$2,000.00; (b) HK$2,000.00; (c) Taipei $8,000.00; (d) P2,000.00; (e) a three-
piece set of gold (18 carats) cross pens valued at P3,500; (f) a Cartier watch
worth about P7,500.00; (g) a tie clip with a garnet birthstone and diamond worth
P1,800.00; and (h) a [pair of] Christian Dior reading glasses. Subsequently, he
was placed on stand-by and at around 7:30 p.m., PAL personnel informed him
that he could now check-in.
"Consequently, Chiok as plaintiff, filed a Complaint on November 9, 1982 for
damages, against PAL and CAL, as defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. 82-
13690, with Branch 31, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Manila.
"He alleged therein that despite several confirmations of his flight, defendant
PAL refused to accommodate him in Flight No. 307, for which reason he lost the
business option aforementioned. He also alleged that PAL’s personnel,
specifically Carmen, ridiculed and humiliated him in the presence of so many
people. Further, he alleged that defendants are solidarily liable for the damages
he suffered, since one is the agent of the other." 6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila held CAL and PAL jointly and severally liable
to respondent. It did not, however, rule on their respective cross-claims. It disposed as
follows:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 321
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendants to jointly and severally pay:
1. Actual damages in the amount of HK$14,128.80 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency at the time of the loss of the luggage consisting of cosmetic products;
2. US$2,000.00 or its equivalent at the time of the loss of the clutch bag
containing the money;
3. P200,000.00 by way of moral damages;
4. P50,000.00 by way of exemplary damages or corrective damages;
5. Attorney[’]s fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts due and demandable and
awarded in favor of the plaintiff; and
6. The costs of this proceedings."7
The two carriers appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals debunked petitioner’s claim that it had merely
acted as an issuing agent for the ticket covering the Hong Kong-Manila leg of
respondent’s journey. In support of its Decision, the CA quoted a purported ruling of this
Court in KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Court of Appeals8 as follows:
"Article 30 of the Warsaw providing that in case of transportation to be
performed by various successive carriers, the passenger can take action only
against the carrier who performed the transportation during which the accident
or the delay occurred presupposes the occurrence of either an accident or delay
in the course of the air trip, and does not apply if the damage is caused by the
willful misconduct on the part of the carrier’s employee or agent acting within
the scope of his employment.
"It would be unfair and inequitable to charge a passenger with automatic
knowledge or notice of a condition which purportedly would excuse the carrier
from liability, where the notice is written at the back of the ticket in letters so
small that one has to use a magnifying glass to read the words. To preclude any

doubt that the contract was fairly and freely agreed upon when the passenger
accepted the passage ticket, the carrier who issued the ticket must inform the
passenger of the conditions prescribed in the ticket or, in the very least,
ascertain that the passenger read them before he accepted the passage ticket.
Absent any showing that the carrier’s officials or employees discharged this
responsibility to the passenger, the latter cannot be bound by the conditions by
which the carrier assumed the role of a mere ticket-issuing agent for other
airlines and limited its liability only to untoward occurrences in its own lines.
"Where the passage tickets provide that the carriage to be performed
thereunder by several successive carriers ‘is to be regarded as a single
operation,’ the carrier which issued the tickets for the entire trip in effect
guaranteed to the passenger that the latter shall have sure space in the various
carriers which would ferry him through the various segments of the trip, and the
ticket-issuing carrier assumes full responsibility for the entire trip and shall be
held accountable for the breach of that guaranty whether the breach occurred in
its own lines or in those of the other carriers."9
On PAL’s appeal, the appellate court held that the carrier had reneged on its obligation
to transport respondent when, in spite of the confirmations he had secured for Flight PR
311, his name did not appear in the computerized list of passengers. Ruling that the
airline’s negligence was the proximate cause of his excoriating experience, the appellate
court sustained the award of moral and exemplary damages.
The CA, however, deleted the RTC’s award of actual damages amounting to
HK$14,128.80 and US$2,000.00, because the lost piece of luggage and clutch bag had
not actually been "checked in" or delivered to PAL for transportation to Manila.
On August 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, contending
that the appellate court had erroneously relied on a mere syllabus of KLM v. CA, not on
the actual ruling therein. Moreover, it argued that respondent was fully aware that the
booking for the PAL sector had been made only upon his request; and that only PAL, not
CAL, was liable for the actual carriage of that segment. Petitioner likewise prayed for a
ruling on its cross-claim against PAL, inasmuch as the latter’s employees had acted
negligently, as found by the trial court.
Denying the Motion, the appellate court ruled that petitioner had failed to raise any new
matter or issue that would warrant a modification or a reversal of the Decision. As to the
alleged misquotation, the CA held that while the portion it had cited appeared to be
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 322
different from the wording of the actual ruling, the variance was "more apparent than real
since the difference [was] only in form and not in substance." 10
CAL and PAL filed separate Petitions to assail the CA Decision. In its October 3, 2001
Resolution, this Court denied PAL’s appeal, docketed as GR No. 149544, for failure to
serve the CA a copy of the Petition as required by Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to
Section 5(d) of Rule 56 and paragraph 2 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court.
PAL’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality on January 21, 2002.
Only the appeal of CAL11 remains in this Court.
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
"1. The Court of Appeals committed judicial misconduct in finding liability
against the petitioner on the basis of a misquotation from KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 65 SCRA 237 and in magnifying its
misconduct by denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on a mere
syllabus, unofficial at that.
"2. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law when it did not apply
applicable precedents on the case before it.
"3. The Court of Appeals committed a non sequitur when it did not rule on the
cross-claim of the petitioner."12
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Alleged Judicial Misconduct
Petitioner charges the CA with judicial misconduct for quoting from and basing its ruling
against the two airlines on an unofficial syllabus of this Court’s ruling in KLM v. CA.
Moreover, such misconduct was allegedly aggravated when the CA, in an attempt to

justify its action, held that the difference between the actual ruling and the syllabus was
"more apparent than real."13
We agree with petitioner that the CA committed a lapse when it relied merely on the
unofficial syllabus of our ruling in KLM v. CA. Indeed, lawyers and litigants are mandated
to quote decisions of this Court accurately. 14 By the same token, judges should do no
less by strictly abiding by this rule when they quote cases that support their judgments
and decisions. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins them to perform official
duties diligently by being faithful to the law and maintaining their professional
competence.
However, since this case is not administrative in nature, we cannot rule on the CA
justices’ administrative liability, if any, for this lapse. First, due process requires that in
administrative proceedings, the respondents must first be given an opportunity to be
heard before sanctions can be imposed. Second, the present action is an appeal from
the CA’s Decision, not an administrative case against the magistrates concerned. These
two suits are independent of and separate from each other and cannot be mixed in the
same proceedings.
By merely including the lapse as an assigned error here without any adequate and
proper administrative case therefor, petitioner cannot expect the imposition of an
administrative sanction.
In the case at bar, we can only determine whether the error in quotation would be
sufficient to reverse or modify the CA Decision.
Applicability  of KLM v. CA
In KLM v. CA, the petitioner therein issued tickets to the Mendoza spouses for their
world tour. The tour included a Barcelona-Lourdes route, which was serviced by the Irish
airline Aer Lingus. At the KLM office in Frankfurt, Germany, they obtained a confirmation
from Aer Lingus of their seat reservations on its Flight 861. On the day of their
departure, however, the airline rudely off-loaded them.
When sued for breach of contract, KLM sought to be excused for the wrongful conduct
of Aer Lingus by arguing that its liability for damages was limited only to occurrences on
its own sectors. To support its argument, it cited Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention,
stating that when transportation was to be performed by various successive carriers, the
passenger could take action only against the carrier that had performed the
transportation when the accident or delay occurred.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 323
In holding KLM liable for damages, we ruled as follows:
"1. The applicability insisted upon by the KLM of article 30 of the Warsaw
Convention cannot be sustained. That article presupposes the occurrence of
either an accident or a delay, neither of which took place at the Barcelona
airport; what is here manifest, instead, is that the Aer Lingus, through its
manager there, refused to transport the respondents to their planned and
contracted destination.
"2. The argument that the KLM should not be held accountable for the tortious
conduct of Aer Lingus because of the provision printed on the respondents'
tickets expressly limiting the KLM's liability for damages only to occurrences on
its own lines is unacceptable. As noted by the Court of Appeals that condition
was printed in letters so small that one would have to use a magnifying glass to
read the words. Under the circumstances, it would be unfair and inequitable to
charge the respondents with automatic knowledge or notice of the said
condition so as to preclude any doubt that it was fairly and freely agreed upon
by the respondents when they accepted the passage tickets issued to them by
the KLM. As the airline which issued those tickets with the knowledge that the
respondents would be flown on the various legs of their journey by different air
carriers, the KLM was chargeable with the duty and responsibility of specifically
informing the respondents of conditions prescribed in their tickets or, in the very
least, to ascertain that the respondents read them before they accepted their
passage tickets. A thorough search of the record, however, inexplicably fails to
show that any effort was exerted by the KLM officials or employees to discharge
in a proper manner this responsibility to the respondents. Consequently, we
hold that the respondents cannot be bound by the provision in question by
which KLM unilaterally assumed the role of a mere ticket-issuing agent for other
airlines and limited its liability only to untoward occurrences on its own lines.
"3. Moreover, as maintained by the respondents and the Court of Appeals, the
passage tickets of the respondents provide that the carriage to be performed
thereunder by several successive carriers ‘is to be regarded as a single
operation,’ which is diametrically incompatible with the theory of the KLM that
the respondents entered into a series of independent contracts with the carriers
which took them on the various segments of their trip. This position of KLM we
reject. The respondents dealt exclusively with the KLM which issued them
tickets for their entire trip and which in effect guaranteed to them that they
would have sure space in Aer Lingus flight 861. The respondents, under that
assurance of the internationally prestigious KLM, naturally had the right to

expect that their tickets would be honored by Aer Lingus to which, in the legal
sense, the KLM had indorsed and in effect guaranteed the performance of its
principal engagement to carry out the respondents' scheduled itinerary
previously and mutually agreed upon between the parties.
"4. The breach of that guarantee was aggravated by the discourteous and
highly arbitrary conduct of an official of the Aer Lingus which the KLM had
engaged to transport the respondents on the Barcelona-Lourdes segment of
their itinerary. It is but just and in full accord with the policy expressly embodied
in our civil law which enjoins courts to be more vigilant for the protection of a
contracting party who occupies an inferior position with respect to the other
contracting party, that the KLM should be held responsible for the abuse, injury
and embarrassment suffered by the respondents at the hands of a supercilious
boor of the Aer Lingus."15
In the instant case, the CA ruled that under the contract of transportation, petitioner -- as
the ticket-issuing carrier (like KLM) -- was liable regardless of the fact that PAL was to
perform or had performed the actual carriage. It elucidated on this point as follows:
"By the very nature of their contract, defendant-appellant CAL is clearly liable
under the contract of carriage with [respondent] and remains to be so,
regardless of those instances when actual carriage was to be performed by
another carrier. The issuance of a confirmed CAL ticket in favor of [respondent]
covering his entire trip abroad concretely attests to this. This also serves as
proof that defendant-appellant CAL, in effect guaranteed that the carrier, such
as defendant-appellant PAL would honor his ticket, assure him of a space
therein and transport him on a particular segment of his trip." 16
Notwithstanding the errant quotation, we have found after careful deliberation that the
assailed Decision is supported in substance by KLM v. CA. The misquotation by the CA
cannot serve as basis for the reversal of its ruling.
Nonetheless, to avert similar incidents in the future, this Court hereby exhorts members
of the bar and the bench to refer to and quote from the official repository of our
decisions, the Philippine Reports, whenever practicable.17 In the absence of this primary
source, which is still being updated, they may resort to unofficial sources like the
SCRA.18We remind them that the Court’s ponencia, when used to support a judgment or
ruling, should be quoted accurately.19
Second Issue:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 324
Liability of the Ticket-Issuing Airline
We now come to the main issue of whether CAL is liable for damages. Petitioner posits
that the CA Decision must be annulled, not only because it was rooted on an erroneous
quotation, but also because it disregarded jurisprudence, notably China Airlines v.
Intermediate Appellate Court20 and China Airlines v. Court of Appeals.21
Jurisprudence Supports CA Decision
It is significant to note that the contract of air transportation was between petitioner and
respondent, with the former endorsing to PAL the Hong Kong-to-Manila segment of the
journey. Such contract of carriage has always been treated in this jurisdiction as a single
operation. This jurisprudential rule is supported by the Warsaw Convention, 22to which
the Philippines is a party, and by the existing practices of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA).
Article 1, Section 3 of the Warsaw Convention states:
"Transportation to be performed by several successive air carriers shall be
deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided
transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation,
whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a
series of contracts, and it shall not lose its international character merely
because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within
a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the
same High Contracting Party."23
Article 15 of IATA-Recommended Practice similarly provides:
"Carriage to be performed by several successive carriers under one ticket, or
under a ticket and any conjunction ticket issued therewith, is regarded as a
single operation."
In American Airlines v. Court of Appeals,24 we have noted that under a general pool
partnership agreement, the ticket-issuing airline is the principal in a contract of carriage,
while the endorsee-airline is the agent.
"x x x Members of the IATA are under a general pool partnership agreement
wherein they act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to contracted

passengers to boost ticket sales worldwide and at the same time provide
passengers easy access to airlines which are otherwise inaccessible in some
parts of the world. Booking and reservation among airline members are allowed
even by telephone and it has become an accepted practice among them. A
member airline which enters into a contract of carriage consisting of a series of
trips to be performed by different carriers is authorized to receive the fare for the
whole trip and through the required process of interline settlement of accounts
by way of the IATA clearing house an airline is duly compensated for the
segment of the trip serviced. Thus, when the petitioner accepted the unused
portion of the conjunction tickets, entered it in the IATA clearing house and
undertook to transport the private respondent over the route covered by the
unused portion of the conjunction tickets, i.e., Geneva to New York, the
petitioner tacitly recognized its commitment under the IATA pool arrangement to
act as agent of the principal contracting airline, Singapore Airlines, as to the
segment of the trip the petitioner agreed to undertake. As such, the petitioner
thereby assumed the obligation to take the place of the carrier originally
designated in the original conjunction ticket. The petitioner’s argument that it is
not a designated carrier in the original conjunction tickets and that it issued its
own ticket is not decisive of its liability. The new ticket was simply a
replacement for the unused portion of the conjunction ticket, both tickets being
for the same amount of US$ 2,760 and having the same points of departure and
destination. By constituting itself as an agent of the principal carrier the
petitioner’s undertaking should be taken as part of a single operation under the
contract of carriage executed by the private respondent and Singapore Airlines
in Manila."25
Likewise, as the principal in the contract of carriage, the petitioner in British Airways v.
Court of Appeals26 was held liable, even when the breach of contract had occurred, not
on its own flight, but on that of another airline. The Decision followed our ruling
in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals,27 in which we had held that the
obligation of the ticket-issuing airline remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact
that another airline had undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their destinations.
In the instant case, following the jurisprudence cited above, PAL acted as the carrying
agent of CAL. In the same way that we ruled against British Airways and Lufthansa in
the aforementioned cases, we also rule that CAL cannot evade liability to respondent,
even though it may have been only a ticket issuer for the Hong Kong-Manila sector.
Moral and Exemplary Damages
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 325
Both the trial and the appellate courts found that respondent had satisfactorily proven
the existence of the factual basis for the damages adjudged against petitioner and PAL.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the CA affirming those of the RTC will not be disturbed
by this Court.28 Indeed, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. As a rule also, only
questions of law -- as in the present recourse -- may be raised in petitions for review
under Rule 45.
Moral damages cannot be awarded in breaches of carriage contracts, except in the two
instances contemplated in Articles 1764 and 2220 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
"Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in
accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206
shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by
a common carrier.
xxx      xxx      xxx
"Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." (Italics supplied)
There is no occasion for us to invoke Article 1764 here. We must therefore determine if
CAL or its agent (PAL) is guilty of bad faith that would entitle respondent to moral
damages.
In Lopez v. Pan American World Airways,29 we defined bad faith as a breach of a known
duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
In the case at bar, the known duty of PAL was to transport herein respondent from Hong
Kong to Manila. That duty arose when its agent confirmed his reservation for Flight PR
311,30 and it became demandable when he presented himself for the trip on November
24, 1981.
It is true that due to a typhoon, PAL was unable to transport respondent on Flight PR
311 on November 24, 1981. This fact, however, did not terminate the carrier’s
responsibility to its passengers. PAL voluntarily obligated itself to automatically transfer
all confirmed passengers of PR 311 to the next available flight, PR 307, on the following

day.31 That responsibility was subsisting when respondent, holding a confirmed ticket for
the former flight, presented himself for the latter.
The records amply establish that he secured repeated confirmations of his PR 311 flight
on November 24, 1981. Hence, he had every reason to expect that he would be put on
the replacement flight as a confirmed passenger. Instead, he was harangued and
prevented from boarding the original and the replacement flights. Thus, PAL breached
its duty to transport him. After he had been directed to pay the terminal fee, his pieces of
luggage were removed from the weighing-in counter despite his protestations. 32
It is relevant to point out that the employees of PAL were utterly insensitive to his need
to be in Manila on November 25, 1981, and to the likelihood that his business affairs in
the city would be jeopardized because of a mistake on their part. It was that mistake that
had caused the omission of his name from the passenger list despite his confirmed flight
ticket. By merely looking at his ticket and validation sticker, it is evident that the glitch
was the airline’s fault. However, no serious attempt was made by PAL to secure the all-
important transportation of respondent to Manila on the following day. To make matters
worse, PAL allowed a group of non-revenue passengers, who had no confirmed tickets
or reservations, to board Flight PR 307. 33
Time and time again, this Court has stressed that the business of common carriers is
imbued with public interest and duty; therefore, the law governing them imposes an
exacting standard.34 In Singson v. Court of Appeals,35 we said:
"x x x [T]he carrier's utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its
passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and wanton
disregard of the rights of the latter, [are] acts evidently indistinguishable or no
different from fraud, malice and bad faith. As the rule now stands, where in
breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is shown to have acted
fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary
damages, in addition to actual damages, is proper." 36 (Italics supplied)
In Saludo v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court reminded airline companies that due to the
nature of their business, they must not merely give cursory instructions to their
personnel to be more accommodating towards customers, passengers and the general
public; they must require them to be so.
The acts of PAL’s employees, particularly Chan, clearly fell short of the extraordinary
standard of care that the law requires of common carriers. 38 As narrated in Chan’s oral
deposition,39 the manner in which the airline discharged its responsibility to respondent
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 326
and its other passengers manifested a lack of the requisite diligence and due regard for
their welfare. The pertinent portions of the Oral Deposition are reproduced as follows:
"Q         Now you said that flight PR 311 on 24th November was cancelled due
to [a] typhoon and naturally the passengers on said flight had to be
accommodated on the first flight the following day or the first flight
subsequently. [W]ill you tell the Honorable Deposition Officer the procedure
followed by Philippine Airlines in the handling of passengers of cancelled
flight[s] like that of PR 311 which was cancelled due to [a] typhoon?
A         The procedure will be: all the confirmed passengers from [PR] 311 24th
November [are] automatically transfer[red] to [PR] 307, 25th November[,] as a
protection for all disconfirmed passengers.
Q         Aside from this procedure[,] what do you do with the passengers on the
cancelled flight who are expected to check-in on the flights if this flight is
cancelled or not operating due to typhoon or other reasons[?] In other words,
are they not notified of the cancellation?
A         I think all these passengers were not notified because of a typhoon and
Philippine Airlines Reservation were [sic] not able to call every passenger by
phone.
Atty. Fruto:
Q         Did you say ‘were not notified?’
A         I believe they were not, but believe me, I was on day-off.
Atty. Calica:
Q         Per procedure, what should have been done by Reservations Office
when a flight is cancelled for one reason or another?
A         If there is enough time, of course, Reservations Office x x x call[s] up all
the passengers and tell[s] them the reason. But if there [is] no time[,] then the
Reservations Office will not be able to do that."40
xxx      xxx      xxx

"Q         I see. Miss Chan, I [will] show you a ticket which has been marked as
Exh. A and A-1. Will you please go over this ticket and tell the court whether this
is the ticket that was used precisely by Mr. Chiok when he checked-in at [F]light
307, 25 November ‘81?
A         [Are you] now asking me whether he used this ticket with this sticker?
Q         No, no, no. That was the ticket he used.
A         Yes, [are you] asking me whether I saw this ticket?
Atty. Fruto: Yes.
A         I believe I saw it.
Q         You saw it, O.K. Now of course you will agree with me Miss Chan that
this yellow stub here which has been marked as Exh. A-1-A, show[s] that the
status on flight 311, 24th November, is O.K., correct?
A         Yes.
Q         You agree with me. And you will also agree with me that in this ticket of
flight 311, on this, another sticker Exh. A-1-B for 24 November is O.K.?
A         May I x x x look at them. Yes, it says O.K. x x x, but [there is] no
validation.
Q         O.K. Miss Chan what do you understand by these entries here R bar M
N 6 V?41
A         This is what we call a computer reference.
Q         I see. This is a computer reference showing that the name of Mr. Chiok
has been entered in Philippine Airline’s computer, and this is his computer
number.
A         Yes.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 327
Q         Now you stated in your answer to the procedure taken, that all confirmed
passengers on flight 311, 24 November[,] were automatically transferred to 307
as a protection for the passengers, correct?
A         Correct.
Q         So that since following the O.K. status of Mr. Chiok’s reservation [on]
flight 311, [he] was also automatically transferred to flight 307 the following day?
A         Should be.
Q         Should be. O.K. Now do you remember how many passengers x x x
were transferred from flight 311, 24 November to flight 307, 25 November 81?
A         I can only give you a very brief idea because that was supposed to be air
bus so it should be able to accommodate 246 people; but how many [exactly], I
don’t know."42
xxx      xxx      xxx
"Q         So, between six and eight o’clock in the evening of 25 November ‘81,
Mr. Chiok already told you that he just [came] from the Swire Building where
Philippine Airlines had [its] offices and that he told you that his space for 311 25
November 81 was confirmed?
A         Yes.
Q         That is what he told you. He insisted on that flight?
A         Yes.
Q         And did you not try to call up Swire Building-- Philippine Airlines and
verify indeed if Mr. Chiok was there?
A         Swire House building is not directly under Philippine Airlines. it is just an
agency for selling Philippine Airlines ticket. And besides around six o’ clock
they’re close[d] in Central.

Q         So this Swire Building is an agency authorized by Philippine Airlines to
issue tickets for and on behalf of Philippine Airlines and also...
A         Yes.
Q         And also to confirm spaces for and on behalf of Philippine Airlines.
A         Yes."43
Under the foregoing circumstances, we cannot apply our 1989 ruling in China Airlines v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,44 which petitioner urges us to adopt. In that case, the
breach of contract and the negligence of the carrier in effecting the immediate flight
connection for therein private respondent was incurred in good faith. 45 Having found no
gross negligence or recklessness, we thereby deleted the award of moral and exemplary
damages against it.46
This Court’s 1992 ruling in China Airlines v. Court of Appeals 47 is likewise inapplicable. In
that case, we found no bad faith or malice in the airline’s breach of its contractual
obligation.48 We held that, as shown by the flow of telexes from one of the airline’s
offices to the others, petitioner therein had exercised diligent efforts in assisting the
private respondent change his flight schedule. In the instant case, petitioner failed to
exhibit the same care and sensitivity to respondent’s needs.
In Singson v. Court of Appeals,49 we said:
"x x x Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap
results in the death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad
faith, there are situations where the negligence of the carrier is so gross and
reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith, in which case, the passenger
likewise becomes entitled to recover moral damages."
In the present case, we stress that respondent had repeatedly secured confirmations of
his PR 311 flight on November 24, 1981 -- initially from CAL and subsequently from the
PAL office in Hong Kong. The status of this flight was marked "OK" on a validating
sticker placed on his ticket. That sticker also contained the entry "RMN6V." Ms Chan
explicitly acknowledged that such entry was a computer reference that meant that
respondent’s name had been entered in PAL’s computer.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 328
Since the status of respondent on Flight PR 311 was "OK," as a matter of right testified
to by PAL’s witness, he should have been automatically transferred to and allowed to
board Flight 307 the following day. Clearly resulting from negligence on the part of PAL
was its claim that his name was not included in its list of passengers for the November
24, 1981 PR 311 flight and, consequently, in the list of the replacement flight PR 307.
Since he had secured confirmation of his flight -- not only once, but twice -- by
personally going to the carrier’s offices where he was consistently assured of a seat
thereon -- PAL’s negligence was so gross and reckless that it amounted to bad faith.
In view of the foregoing, we rule that moral and exemplary 50 damages were properly
awarded by the lower courts.51
Third Issue:
Propriety of the Cross-Claim
We now look into the propriety of the ruling on CAL’s cross-claim against PAL. Petitioner
submits that the CA should have ruled on the cross-claim, considering that the RTC had
found that it was PAL’s employees who had acted negligently.
Section 8 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Sec. 8. Cross-claim. - A cross claim is any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include
a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-
claimant."
For purposes of a ruling on the cross-claim, PAL is an indispensable party. In BA
Finance Corporation v. CA,52 the Court stated:
"x x x. An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the
court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the
case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the
relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence
there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which
is effective, complete, or equitable.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 329

xxx      xxx      xxx

"Without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment

of a court cannot attain real finality."

PAL’s interest may be affected by any ruling of this Court on CAL’s cross-claim. Hence,
it is imperative and in accordance with due process and fair play that PAL should have
been impleaded as a party in the present proceedings, before this Court can make a
final ruling on this matter.

Although PAL was petitioner’s co-party in the case before the RTC and the CA,
petitioner failed to include the airline in the present recourse. Hence, the Court has no
jurisdiction over it. Consequently, to make any ruling on the cross-claim in the present
Petition would not be legally feasible because PAL, not being a party in the present
case, cannot be bound thereby.53

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 60501. March 5, 1993.
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TOMAS
L. ALCANTARA, respondents.
Siguion-Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako and Tomacruz, Manguiat & Associates for
petitioner.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenger & Corpus for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; BREACH THEREOF; PETITIONER
BREACHED ITS CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHEN
IT FAILED TO DELIVER HIS LUGGAGE AT THE DESIGNATED PLACE AND TIME. —
Petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private respondent when it failed to
deliver his luggage at the designated place and time, it being the obligation of a common
carrier to carry its passengers and their luggage safely to their destination, which
includes the duty not to delay their transportation, and the evidence shows that petitioner
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
2. DAMAGES; MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES PREDICATED UPON A
BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; RECOVERABLE ONLY IN INSTANCES
WHERE THE MISHAP RESULTS IN DEATH OF A PASSENGER, OR WHERE THE
CARRIER IS GUILTY OF FRAUD OR BAD FAITH; THE CONDUCT OF PETITIONER'S
REPRESENTATIVE TOWARDS RESPONDENT JUSTIFIES THE GRANT OF MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN CASE AT BAR. — Moral damages predicated upon a
breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap
results in death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. The
language and conduct of petitioner's representative towards respondent Alcantara was
discourteous or arbitrary to justify the grant of moral damages. The CATHAY
representative was not only indifferent and impatient; he was also rude and insulting. He
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 330
simply advised Alcantara to buy anything he wanted. But even that was not sincere
because the representative knew that the passenger was limited only to $20.00 which,
certainly, was not enough to purchase comfortable clothings appropriate for an
executive conference. Considering that Alcantara was not only a revenue passenger but
even paid for a first class airline accommodation and accompanied at the time by the
Commercial Attache of the Philippine Embassy who was assisting him in his problem,
petitioner or its agents should have been more courteous and accommodating to private
respondent, instead of giving him a curt reply, "What can we do, the baggage is missing.
I cannot do anything . . . Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay
Pacific." Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown
to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural
and probable consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral
and exemplary damages. Conversely, if the defendant airline is shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
3. TEMPERATE DAMAGES; RECOVERABLE ONLY UPON PROOF THAT THE
CLAIMANT SUSTAINED SOME PECUNIARY LOSS. — However, respondent Alcantara
is not entitled to temperate damages, contrary to the ruling of the court a quo, in the
absence of any showing that he sustained some pecuniary loss. It cannot be gainsaid
that respondent's luggage was ultimately delivered to him without serious or appreciable
damage.
4. WARSAW CONVENTION; DOES NOT OPERATE AS AN EXCLUSIVE
ENUMERATION OF THE INSTANCES FOR DECLARING A CARRIER LIABLE FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OR AS AN ABSOLUTE LIMIT OF THE
EXTENT OF THAT LIABILITY; DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE OPERATION OF THE
CIVIL CODE AND OTHER PERTINENT LAWS. — As We have repeatedly held,
although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country, being a
treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine government, said convention does not
operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for
breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The
Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases
and under certain limitations. However, it must not be construed to preclude the
operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less
exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers
under the contract of carriage, especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established, which is clearly the case before Us.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modification that of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in
favor of private respondent Tomas L. Alcantara.
The facts are undisputed: On 19 October 1975, respondent Tomas L. Alcantara was a
first class passenger of petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY for brevity) on
its Flight No. CX-900 from Manila to Hongkong and onward from Hongkong to Jakarta
on Flight No. CX-711. The purpose of his trip was to attend the following day, 20
October 1975, a conference with the Director General of Trade of Indonesia, Alcantara
being the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of Iligan Cement Corporation,
Chairman of the Export Committee of the Philippine Cement Corporation, and
representative of the Cement Industry Authority and the Philippine Cement Corporation.
He checked in his luggage which contained not only his clothing and articles for personal
use but also papers and documents he needed for the conference.
Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that his luggage was missing. When
he inquired about his luggage from CATHAY's representative in Jakarta, private
respondent was told that his luggage was left behind in Hongkong. For this, respondent
Alcantara was offered $20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his immediate personal
needs until the luggage could be delivered to him.
His luggage finally reached Jakarta more than twenty four (24) hours after his arrival.
However, it was not delivered to him at his hotel but was required by petitioner to be
picked up by an official of the Philippine Embassy.
On 1 March 1976, respondent filed his complaint against petitioner with the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Norte praying for temperate, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
On 18 April 1976, the trial court rendered its decision ordering CATHAY to pay Plaintiff
P20,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for temperate damages, P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 for attorney's fees, and the costs. 1
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. CATHAY assailed the conclusion of the
trial court that it was accountable for breach of contract and questioned the non-
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 331
application by the court of the Warsaw Convention as well as the excessive damages
awarded on the basis of its finding that respondent Alcantara was rudely treated by
petitioner's employees during the time that his luggage could not be found. For his part,
respondent Alcantara assigned as error the failure of the trial court to grant the full
amount of damages sought in his complaint.
On 11 November 1981, respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the
findings of fact of the trial court but modifying its award by increasing the moral damages
to P80,000.00, exemplary damages to P20,000.00 and temperate or moderate damages
to P10,000.00. The award of P25,000.00 for attorney's fees was maintained.
The same grounds raised by petitioner in the Court of Appeals are reiterated before Us.
CATHAY contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable to
respondent Alcantara for moral, exemplary and temperate damages as well as
attorney's fees; and, (2) the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the Warsaw
Convention on the liability of a carrier to its passengers.
On its first assigned error, CATHAY argues that although it failed to transport
respondent Alcantara's luggage on time, the one-day delay was not made in bad faith so
as to justify moral, exemplary and temperate damages. It submits that the conclusion of
respondent appellate court that private respondent was treated rudely and arrogantly
when he sought assistance from CATHAY's employees has no factual basis, hence, the
award of moral damages has no leg to stand on.
Petitioner's first assigned error involves findings of fact which are not reviewable by this
Court. 2 At any rate, it is not impressed with merit. Petitioner breached its contract of
carriage with private respondent when it failed to deliver his luggage at the designated
place and time, it being the obligation of a common carrier to carry its passengers and
their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to delay their
transportation, 3 and the evidence shows that petitioner acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be
recoverable in instances where the mishap results in death of a passenger, 4 or where
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. 5
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that CATHAY was
grossly negligent and reckless when it failed to deliver the luggage of petitioner at the
appointed place and time. We agree. CATHAY alleges that as a result of mechanical
trouble, all pieces of luggage on board the first aircraft bound for Jakarta were unloaded

and transferred to the second aircraft which departed an hour and a half later. Yet, as
the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner was not even aware that it left behind private
respondent's luggage until its attention was called by the Hongkong Customs authorities.
More, bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be attributed to the employees of
petitioner. While the mere failure of CATHAY to deliver respondent's luggage at the
agreed place and time did not ipso facto amount to willful misconduct since the luggage
was eventually delivered to private respondent, albeit belatedly, 6 We are persuaded
that the employees of CATHAY acted in bad faith. We refer to the deposition of Romulo
Palma, Commercial Attache of the Philippine Embassy at Jakarta, who was with
respondent Alcantara when the latter sought assistance from the employees of
CATHAY. This deposition was the basis of the findings of the lower courts when both
awarded moral damages to private respondent. Hereunder is part of Palma's testimony
— Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay Pacific." CATHAY's
"Q: What did Mr. Alcantara say, if any?
A. Mr. Alcantara was of course . . . . I could understand his position. He was furious for
the experience because probably he was thinking he was going to meet the Director-
General the following day and, well, he was with no change of proper clothes and so, I
would say, he was not happy about the situation.
Q: What did Mr. Alcantara say?
A: He was trying to press the fellow to make the report and if possible make the delivery
of his baggage as soon as possible.
Q: And what did the agent or duty officer say, if any?
A: The duty officer, of course, answered back saying 'What can we do, the baggage is
missing. I cannot do anything.' something like it. 'Anyhow you can buy anything you
need, charged to Cathay Pacific.'
Q: What was the demeanor or comportment of the duty officer of Cathay Pacific when
he said to Mr. Alcantara 'You can buy anything chargeable to Cathay Pacific'?
A: If I had to look at it objectively, the duty officer would like to dismiss the affair as soon
as possible by saying indifferently 'Don't worry. It can be found.'" 7
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 332
Indeed, the aforequoted testimony shows that the language and conduct of petitioner's
representative towards respondent Alcantara was discourteous or arbitrary to justify the
grant of moral damages. The CATHAY representative was not only indifferent and
impatient; he was also rude and insulting. He simply advised Alcantara to buy anything
he wanted. But even that was not sincere because the representative knew that the
passenger was limited only to $20.00 which, certainly, was not enough to purchase
comfortable clothings appropriate for an executive conference. Considering that
Alcantara was not only a revenue passenger but even paid for a first class airline
accommodation and accompanied at the time by the Commercial Attache of the
Philippine Embassy who was assisting him in his problem, petitioner or its agents should
have been more courteous and accommodating to private respondent, instead of giving
him a curt reply, "What can we do, the baggage is missing. I cannot do anything . . .
employees should have been more solicitous to a passenger in distress and assuaged
his anxieties and apprehensions. To compound matters, CATHAY refused to have the
luggage of Alcantara delivered to him at his hotel; instead, he was required to pick it up
himself and an official of the Philippine Embassy. Under the circumstances, it is evident
that petitioner was remiss in its duty to provide proper and adequate assistance to a
paying passenger, more so one with first class accommodation.
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is not shown to have
acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include moral and
exemplary damages. 8 Conversely, if the defendant airline is shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper.
However, respondent Alcantara is not entitled to temperate damages, contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo, in the absence of any showing that he sustained some
pecuniary loss. 9 It cannot be gainsaid that respondent's luggage was ultimately
delivered to him without serious or appreciable damage.
As regards its second assigned error, petitioner airline contends that the extent of its
liability for breach of contract should be limited absolutely to that set forth in the Warsaw
Convention. We do not agree. As We have repeatedly held, although the Warsaw
Convention has the force and effect of law in this country, being a treaty commitment
assumed by the Philippine government, said convention does not operate as an
exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of
contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. 10 The Warsaw
Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 333

certain limitations. 11 However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the attorney's fees of P25,000.00. The moral and exemplary damages shall earn interest at
Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier the legal rate from 1 March 1976 when the complaint was filed until full payment.
from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of
carriage, 12 especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is SO ORDERED.
found or established, which is clearly the case before Us. For, the Warsaw Convention
itself provides in Art. 25 that —

"(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilfull misconduct or by
such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilfull misconduct."

(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the
damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting
within the scope of his employment."

When petitioner airline misplaced respondent's luggage and failed to deliver it to its
passenger at the appointed place and time, some special species of injury must have
been caused to him. For sure, the latter underwent profound distress and anxiety, and
the fear of losing the opportunity to fulfill the purpose of his trip. In fact, for want of
appropriate clothings for the occasion brought about by the delay of the arrival of his
luggage, to his embarrassment and consternation respondent Alcantara had to seek
postponement of his pre-arranged conference with the Director General of Trade of the
host country.

In one case, 13 this Court observed that a traveller would naturally suffer mental
anguish, anxiety and shock when he finds that his luggage did not travel with him and he
finds himself in a foreign land without any article of clothing other than what he has on.

Thus, respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. We however find the
award by the Court of Appeals of P80,000.00 for moral damages excessive, hence, We
reduce the amount to P30,000.00. The exemplary damages of P20,000.00 being
reasonable is maintained, as well as the attorney's fees of P25,000.00 considering that
petitioner's act or omission has compelled Alcantara to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest. 14

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with

the exception of the award of temperate damages of P10,000.00 which is deleted, while
the award of moral damages of P80,000.00 is reduced to P30,000.00. The award of
P20,000.00 for exemplary damages is maintained as reasonable together with the

270 Phil. 108
ALITALIA VS IAC
NARVASA, J.:
Dr. Felipa Pablo -- an associate professor in the University of the Philippines, [1] and a
research grantee of the Philippine Atomic Energy Agency -- was invited to take part at a
meeting of the Department of Research and Isotopes of the Joint FAO-IAEA Division of
Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture of the United Nations in Ispra, Italy.[2] She was
invited in view of her specialized knowledge in "foreign substances in food and the
agriculture environment." She accepted the invitation, and was then scheduled by the
organizers, to read a paper on "The Fate of Radioactive Fusion Products Contaminating
Vegetable Crops."[3] The program announced that she would be the second speaker on
the first day of the meeting.[4] To fulfill this engagement, Dr. Pablo booked passage on
petitioner airline, ALITALIA.
She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in accordance with the itinerary and
time table set for her by ALITALIA.  She was however told by the ALITALIA personnel
there at Milan that her luggage was "delayed inasmuch as the same ** (was) in one of
the succeeding flights from Rome to Milan." [5] Her luggage consisted of two (2)
suitcases:  one contained her clothing and other personal items; the other, her scientific
papers, slides and other research material.  But the other flights arriving from Rome did
not have her baggage on board.
By then feeling desperate, she went to Rome to try to locate her bags herself.   There,
she inquired about her suitcases in the domestic and international airports, and filled out
the forms prescribed by ALITALIA for people in her predicament.  However, her
baggage could not be found.  Completely distraught and discouraged, she returned to
Manila without attending the meeting in Ispra, Italy.
Once back in Manila she demanded that ALITALIA make reparation for the damages
thus suffered by her. ALITALIA offered her "free airline tickets to compensate her for any
alleged damages **." She rejected the offer, and forthwith commenced the
action[6] which has given rise to the present appellate proceedings.
As it turned out, Prof. Pablo's suitcases were in fact located and forwarded to Ispra,
[7]
 Italy, but only on the day after her scheduled appearance and participation at the U.N.
meeting there.[8] Of course Dr. Pablo was no longer there to accept delivery; she was
already on her way home to Manila.  And for some reason or other, the suitcases were
not actually restored to Prof. Pablo by ALITALIA until eleven (11) months later, and four
(4) months after institution of her action.[9]
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 334
After appropriate proceedings and trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in
Dr. Pablo's favor:[10]
'(1)    Ordering the defendant (ALITALIA) to pay ** (her) the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, by way of nominal damages;
(2) Ordering the defendant to pay ** (her) the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees; (and)
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit."
ALITALIA appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court but failed to obtain a reversal of
the judgment.[11]Indeed, the Appellate Court not only affirmed the Trial Court's decision
but also increased the award of nominal damages payable by ALITALIA to P40,000.00.
[12]
 That increase it justified as follows:[13]
"Considering the circumstances, as found by the Trial Court and the negligence
committed by defendant, the amount of P20,000.00 under present inflationary conditions
as awarded ** to the plaintiff as nominal damages, is too little to make up for the
plaintiffs frustration and disappointment in not being able to appear at said conference;
and for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered from the academic community
for failure to carry out an official mission for which she was singled out by the faculty to
represent her institution and the country.  After weighing carefully all the considerations,
the amount awarded to the plaintiff for nominal damages and attorney's fees should be
increased to the cost of her round trip air fare or at the present rate of peso to the dollar
at P40,000.00."
ALITALIA has appealed to this Court on certiorari.  Here, it seeks to make basically the
same points it tried to make before the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court,
i.e.:
1) that the Warsaw Convention should have been applied to limit ALITALIA'S liability;
and
2) that there is no warrant in fact or in law for the award to Dr. Pablo of nominal
damages and attorney's fees.[14]
In addition, ALITALIA postulates that it was error for the Intermediate Appellate Court to
have refused to pass on all the assigned errors and in not stating the facts and the law
on which its decision is based.[15]
Under the Warsaw Convention,[16] an air carrier is made liable for damages for:

1) the death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if the accident causing it
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of its operations of embarking or
disembarking;[17]
2) the destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered luggage or goods, if the
occurrence causing it took place during the carriage by air;" [18] and
3) delay in the transportation by air of passengers, luggage or goods. [19]
In these cases, it is provided in the Convention that the "action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out" therein. [20]
The Convention also purports to limit the liability of the carrier in the following manner:[21]
1.       In the carriage of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger is
limited to the sum of 250,000 francs.  *** Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
2.       a) In the carriage of registered baggage and of cargo, the liability of the carrier is
limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogramme, unless the passenger or consignor has
made, at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a special
declaration of interest in delivery at destination and has paid a supplementary sum if the
case so requires.  In that case the carrier, will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the
declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value to the
consignor at delivery.
b)      In the case of loss, damage or delay of part of registered baggage or cargo, or of
any object contained therein, the weight to be taken into consideration in determining the
amount to which the carrier's liability is limited shall be only the total weight of the
package or packages concerned.  Nevertheless, when the loss, damage or delay of a
part of the registered baggage or cargo, or of an object contained therein, affects the
value of other packages covered by the same baggage check or the same air waybill,
the total weight of such package or packages shall also be taken into consideration in
determining the limit of liability.
3.       As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself the liability of the
carrier is limited to 5000 francs per passenger.
4.       The limits prescribed ** shall not prevent the court from awarding, in accordance
with its own law, in addition, the whole or part of the court costs and of the other
expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff. The foregoing provision shall not apply if
the amount of the damages awarded, excluding court costs and other expenses of the
litigation, does not exceed the sum which the carrier has offered in writing to the plaintiff
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 335
within a period of six months from the date of the occurrence causing the damage, or
before the commencement of the action, if that is later.
The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment "of the provisions
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by
such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seised of the case, is
considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct," or "if the damage is (similarly) caused
** by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment." [22] The Hague
Protocol amended the Warsaw Convention by removing the provision that if the airline
took all necessary steps to avoid the damage, it could exculpate itself completely, [23] and
declaring the stated limits of liability not applicable "if it is proved that the damage
resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, its servants or agents, done with intent to
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result."
The same deletion was effected by the Montreal Agreement of 1966, with the result that
a passenger could recover unlimited damages upon proof of wilful misconduct.[24]
The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of
an airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability.   Such a
proposition is not borne out by the language of the Convention, as this Court has now,
and at an earlier time, pointed out. [25] Moreover, slight reflection readily leads to the
conclusion that it should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the
cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to property or
delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any wilful misconduct, bad faith,
recklessness, or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or employee for
which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form
of resulting injury. The Convention's provisions, in short, do not "regulate or exclude
liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier" [26] or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Otherwise, "an air
carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute
refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd." [27] Nor may it
for a moment be supposed that if a member of the aircraft complement should inflict
some physical injury on a passenger, or maliciously destroy or damage the latter's
property, the Convention might successfully be pleaded as the sole gauge to determine
the carrier's liability to the passenger.  Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify
the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and
preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention.  It is in this sense
that the Convention has been applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts
presented by each case.
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. I.A.C.,[28] for example, the Warsaw Convention
was applied as regards the limitation on the carrier's liability, there being a simple loss of

baggage without any otherwise improper conduct on the part of the officials or
employees of the airline or other special injury sustained by the passenger.
On the other hand, the Warsaw Convention has invariably been held inapplicable, or as
not restrictive of the carrier's liability, where there was satisfactory evidence of malice or
bad faith attributable to its officers and employees. [29] Thus, an air carrier was sentenced
to pay not only compensatory but also moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees, for instance, where its employees rudely put a passenger holding a first-class ticket
in the tourist or economy section, [30] or ousted a brown Asiatic from the plane to give his
seat to a white man,[31]or gave the seat of a passenger with a confirmed reservation to
another,[32] or subjected a passenger to extremely rude, even barbaric treatment, as by
calling him a "monkey."[33]
In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the
employees of petitioner airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her,
belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable damage.  The fact is, nevertheless, that
some special species of injury was caused to Dr. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA
misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time appointed -- a breach of
its contract of carriage, to be sure -- with the result that she was unable to read the
paper and make the scientific presentation (consisting of slides, autoradiograms or films,
tables and tabulations) that she had painstakingly labored over, at the prestigious
international conference, to attend which she had traveled hundreds of miles, to
her chagrin and embarrassment and the disappointment and annoyance of the
organizers.  She felt, not unreasonably, that the invitation for her to participate at the
conference, extended by the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and
Agriculture of the United Nations, was a singular honor not only to herself, but to the
University of the Philippines and the country as well, an opportunity to make some sort
of impression among her colleagues in that field of scientific activity.  The opportunity to
claim this honor or distinction was irretrievably lost to her because of  Alitalia's breach of
its contract.
Apart from this, there can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent profound distress and
anxiety, which gradually turned to panic and finally despair, from the time she learned
that her suitcases were missing up to the time when, having gone to Rome, she finally
realized that she would no longer be able to take part in the conference.  As she herself
put it, she "was really shocked and distraught and confused."
Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the
circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in
the transport of baggage.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 336
She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage.  As
already mentioned, her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila, tardily but
safely.  She is however entitled to nominal damages -- which, as the law says, is
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered -- and this Court agrees that the respondent Court of
Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at P40,000.00.  As to the purely technical
argument that the award to her of such nominal damages is precluded by her omission
to include a specific claim therefor in her complaint, it suffices to draw attention to her
general prayer, following her plea for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
"for such other and further just and equitable relief in the premises," which certainly is
broad enough to comprehend an application as well for nominal damages.  Besides,
petitioner should have realized that the explicit assertion, and proof, that Dr. Pablo's right
had been violated or invaded by it -- absent any claim for actual on compensatory
damages, the prayer thereof having been voluntarily deleted by Dr. Pablo upon the
return to her of her baggage -- necessarily raised the issue, of nominal damages.
This Court also agrees that respondent Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's
fees to Dr. Pablo, and the amount of P5,000.00 set by it is reasonable in the
premises.  The law authorizes recovery of attorney's fees inter  alia where, as here, "the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest," [34] or "where the court deems it just and
equitable."[35]
WHEREFORE, no error being perceived in the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals, it appearing on the contrary to be entirely in accord with the facts and the law,
said decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 337

Republic of the Philippines Specifically, petitioner Korean Airlines (hereinafter called KAL) issued to Azucena
SUPREME COURT Tomas a plane ticket to Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., on Flight No. KE 612 departing
Manila from the Manila International Airport on July 29, 1977, at 2:20 p.m. She paid the fare of
P2,587.88 3 She and her husband arrived at the KAL check-in counter at 1.:50 p.m. of
FIRST DIVISION that date 4 and presented her ticket to Augusto Torres, Jr., who was in charge. Torres
refused to check her in, saying that the Immigration Office was already
G.R. No. L-61418 September 24, 1987 closed. 5 Januario Tomas, her husband, rushed to the said office, which was still open,
and was told by the immigration officer on duty that his wife could still be cleared for
KOREAN AIRLINES CO., LTD., petitioner,  departure. Januario rushed back to Torres to convey this information and asked that his
vs. wife be checked in. Torres said this was no longer possible because her seat had
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, Presiding Judge, already been given to another passenger. His reason was that Azucena had arrived late
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V. Quezon City, AZUCENA and JANUARIO and had not checked in within forty minutes before departure time. 6
TOMAS, respondents.
There is no evidence in the record of any rule requiring passengers to check in at least
forty minutes before departure time, as invoked by Torres. KAL admits that it has not
been able to cite any statutory or administrative requirement to this effect. 7 In fact, the
alleged rule is not even a condition of the plane ticket purchased by Azucena.
CRUZ, J.:

At the same time, KAL invokes the memorandum-circular of February 24, 1975, issued
This is one of the many cases that have unnecessarily clogged the dockets of this Court
by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation which says that "all passengers
because they should not have been brought to us in the first place.
authorized to leave for abroad shall be required to check in with the Immigration
Departure Control Officer at least thirty minutes before the scheduled departure." The
The issues are mainly factual. They have been resolved by the trial court, which has
record shows that Azucena was ready to comply.
been affirmed by the respondent court, except as to the award of damages, which has
been reduced. We see no reason why the decision had to be elevated to us.
If, as Torres said, he gave Azucena's seat to a chance passenger thirty-eight minutes
before departure time 8instead of waiting for Azucena, then he was intentionally violating
Time and again we have stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts. 1 We leave these
the said circular. Significantly, it was proved he was not telling the truth when he said the
matters to the lower courts, which have more opportunity and facilities to examine these
Immigration Office was already closed although it was in fact still open at the time the
matters. We have no jurisdiction as a rule to reverse their findings.  2 The exception
private respondents arrived. Moreover, the immigration officer on duty expressed his
invoked is that there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion on their part, but
willingness to clear Azucena Tomas for departure, thus indicating that she was well
we do not see it here.
within the provisions of the memorandum-circular. Torres' refusal to check her in was
clearly unjustified.
We are satisfied from the findings of the respondent court (and of the trial court) that the
private respondent was, in the language of the airline industry, "bumped off." She had a
As it appeared later, the real reason why she could not be checked in was not her
confirmed ticket. She arrived at the airport on time. However, she was not allowed to
supposed tardiness but the circumstance that Torres had prematurely given her seat to
board because her seat had already been given to another passenger. As a result, she
a chance passenger. That person certainly had less right to prior accommodation than
suffered damages for which the petitioner should be held liable.
the private respondent herself.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 338

The claim that the real party in interest is the Gold N. Apparel Manufacturing Corporation
and not the private respondent 9 is also untenable. Counsel for Azucena Tomas
declared at the trial that she was suing in her personal capacity. 10 In testifying about
her participation in the said corporation, she was only stressing her status as a
respected and well-connected businesswoman to show the extent of the prejudice
caused to her interests by the unjustified acts of the petitioner.

It is clear that the petitioner acted in bad faith in violating the private respondent's rights
under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained
as a result. We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the award should be
reduced to P50,000.00 for actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 for moral
damages, and P20,000.00 for attorney's fees, the exemplary damages to be eliminated
altogether.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED in toto, with

costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 78656 August 30, 1988
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, petitioner,  To be able to keep his schedule, Vinluan was compelled to take the economy seat
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, respondents.
Guerrero & Torres Law Offices for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Rogelio A. Vinluan is a practicing lawyer who had to travel in April, 1979 to several cities
in Europe and the U.S. to attend to some matters involving several clients. He entered
into a contract for air carriage for valuable consideration with Japan Airlines first class
from Manila to Tokyo, Moscow, Paris, Hamburg, Zurich, New York, Los Angeles,
Honolulu and back to Manila thru the same airline and other airlines it represents for
which he was issued the corresponding first class tickets for the entire trip.
On April 18, 1979, while in Paris, he went to the office of Trans World Airlines (TWA) at
the De Gaulle Airport and secured therefrom confirmed reservation for first class
accommodation on board its Flight No. 41 from New York to San Francisco which was
scheduled to depart on April 20, 1979. A validated stub was attached to the New York-
Los Angeles portion of his ticket evidencing his confirmed reservation for said flight with
the mark "OK " 1 On April 20, 1979, at about 8:00 o'clock A.M., Vinluan reconfirrred his
reservation for first class accommodation on board TWA Flight No. 41 with its New York
office. He was advised that his reservation was confirmed. He was even requested to
indicate his seat preference on said flight on said scheduled date of departure of TWA
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 339
Flight No. 41. Vinluan presented his ticket for check-in at the counter of TWA at JFK
International Airport at about 9:45 o'clock A.M., the scheduled time of the departure
being 11:00 o'clock A.M. He was informed that there was no first class seat available for
him on the flight. He asked for an explanation but TWA employees on duty declined to
give any reason. When he began to protest, one of the TWA employees, a certain Mr.
Braam, rudely threatened him with the words "Don't argue with me, I have a very bad
temper."
offered to him and he was issued a refund application" as he was downgraded from first
class to economy class.
While waiting for the departure of Flight No. 41. Vinluan noticed that other passengers
who were white Caucasians and who had checked-in later than him were given
preference in some first class seats which became available due to "no show"
passengers.
On February 15, 1980, Vinluan filed an action for damages against the TWA in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal alleging breach of contract and bad faith. After trial on the
merits, a decision was rendered the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant holding the latter liable to the for-mer for the
amount representing the difference in fare between first class and
economy class accommodations on board Flight No. 6041 from New
York to San Francisco, the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages,
the amount of P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the amount of
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, all such amounts to earn
interest at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum from February
15, 1980 when the complainant was filed until fully paid.
Correspondingly, defendant's counterclaim is dismissed. Costs against
the defendant.
SO ORDERED.

Not satisfied therewith, the TWA appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein in due
course a decision was rendered on May 27, 1987, 2 the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 8, 1984 is hereby modified by
(1) fixing the interest which appellant must pay on the awards of moral
and exemplary damages at six per cent (6%) per annum from the date
of the decision a quo, March 8, 1984 until date of full payment and (2)
reducing the attorne's fees to P50,000.00 without interest, the rest of
the decision is affirmed. Cost against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the herein petition for review.
The theory of the petitioner is that because of maintenance problems of the aircraft on
the day of the flight, TWA Flight No. 41 was cancelled and a special Flight No. 6041 was
organized to operate in lieu of Flight No. 41. 3 Flight No. 41 was to have utilized a
Lockheed 1011 with 34 first class seats, but instead, a smaller Boeing 707 with only 16
first class seats was substituted for use in Flight No. 6041. Hence, passengers who had
first class reservations on Flight No. 41 had to be accommodated on Flight No. 6041 on
a first-come, first-served basis. An announcement was allegedly made to all passengers
in the entire terminal of the airport advising them to get boarding cards for Flight No.
6041 to San Francisco and that the first ones getting them would get first preference as
to seats in the aircraft. It denied declining to give any explanation for the downgrading of
private respondent as well as the discourteous attitude of Mr. Braam.
On the other hand, private respondent asserts that he did not hear such announcement
at the terminal and that he was among the early passengers to present his ticket for
check-in only to be informed that there was no first class seat available for him and that
he had to be downgraded.
The petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse
of discretion in finding that petitioner acted maliciously and discriminatorily, and in
granting excessive moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The contention is devoid of merit. Private respondent had a first class ticket for Flight
No. 41 of petitioner from New York to San Francisco on April 20, 1979. It was twice
confirmed and yet respondent unceremoniously told him that there was no first class
seat available for him and that he had to be downgraded to the economy class. As he
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 340
protested, he was arrogantly threatened by one Mr. Braam. Worst still, while he was
waiting for the flight, he saw that several Caucasians who arrived much later were
accommodated in first class seats when the other passengers did not show up.
The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which private respondent was
subjected is undeniable. Consequently, the award of moral and exemplary damages by
the respondent court is in order. 4
Indeed, private respondent had shown that the alleged switch of planes from a
Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 was because there were only 138 confirmed
economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller plane
and not because of maintenance problems.
Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers including private respondent
Vinluan for the sake of econonmy. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its
passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their
convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral
damages.5 More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private
respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances, he was angrily rebuffed
by an employee of petitioner.
At the time of this unfortunate incident, the private respondent was a practicing lawyer, a
senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. He was a director of several companies and
was active in civic and social organizations in the Philippines. Considering the
circumstances of this case and the social standing of private respondent in the
community, he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. However, the
moral damages should be reduced to P300,000.00, and the exemplary damages should
be reduced to P200,000.00. This award should be reasonably sufficient to indemnify
private respondent for the humiliation and embarrassment that he suffered and to serve
as an example to discourage the repetition of similar oppressive and discriminatory acts.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification reducing the moral and exemplary damages
as above-stated, the decision subject of the petition for review is AFFIRMED in all other
respects, without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150843            March 14, 2003
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner,  assisted by a ground attendant by the name of Clara Lai Han Chiu. When Ms. Chiu
vs.
SPOUSES DANIEL VAZQUEZ and MARIA LUISA MADRIGAL
VAZQUEZ, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Is an involuntary upgrading of an airline passenger’s accommodation from one class to a
more superior class at no extra cost a breach of contract of carriage that would entitle
the passenger to an award of damages? This is a novel question that has to be resolved
in this case.
The facts in this case, as found by the Court of Appeals and adopted by petitioner
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., (hereinafter Cathay) are as follows:
Cathay is a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting passengers and
goods by air. Among the many routes it services is the Manila-Hongkong-Manila course.
As part of its marketing strategy, Cathay accords its frequent flyers membership in its
Marco Polo Club. The members enjoy several privileges, such as priority
for upgrading of booking without any extra charge whenever an opportunity arises. Thus,
a frequent flyer booked in the Business Class has priority for upgrading to First Class if
the Business Class Section is fully booked.
Respondents-spouses Dr. Daniel Earnshaw Vazquez and Maria Luisa Madrigal
Vazquez are frequent flyers of Cathay and are Gold Card members of its Marco Polo
Club. On 24 September 1996, the Vazquezes, together with their maid and two friends
Pacita Cruz and Josefina Vergel de Dios, went to Hongkong for pleasure and business.
For their return flight to Manila on 28 September 1996, they were booked on Cathay’s
Flight CX-905, with departure time at 9:20 p.m. Two hours before their time of departure,
the Vazquezes and their companions checked in their luggage at Cathay’s check-in
counter at Kai Tak Airport and were given their respective boarding passes, to wit,
Business Class boarding passes for the Vazquezes and their two friends, and Economy
Class for their maid. They then proceeded to the Business Class passenger lounge.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 341
When boarding time was announced, the Vazquezes and their two friends went to
Departure Gate No. 28, which was designated for Business Class passengers. Dr.
Vazquez presented his boarding pass to the ground stewardess, who in turn inserted it
into an electronic machine reader or computer at the gate. The ground stewardess was
glanced at the computer monitor, she saw a message that there was a "seat change"
from Business Class to First Class for the Vazquezes.
Ms. Chiu approached Dr. Vazquez and told him that the Vazquezes’ accommodations
were upgraded to First Class. Dr. Vazquez refused the upgrade, reasoning that it would
not look nice for them as hosts to travel in First Class and their guests, in the Business
Class; and moreover, they were going to discuss business matters during the flight. He
also told Ms. Chiu that she could have other passengers instead transferred to the First
Class Section. Taken aback by the refusal for upgrading, Ms. Chiu consulted her
supervisor, who told her to handle the situation and convince the Vazquezes to accept
the upgrading. Ms. Chiu informed the latter that the Business Class was fully booked,
and that since they were Marco Polo Club members they had the priority to be upgraded
to the First Class. Dr. Vazquez continued to refuse, so Ms. Chiu told them that if they
would not avail themselves of the privilege, they would not be allowed to take the flight.
Eventually, after talking to his two friends, Dr. Vazquez gave in. He and Mrs. Vazquez
then proceeded to the First Class Cabin.
Upon their return to Manila, the Vazquezes, in a letter of 2 October 1996 addressed to
Cathay’s Country Manager, demanded that they be indemnified in the amount of
P1million for the "humiliation and embarrassment" caused by its employees. They also
demanded "a written apology from the management of Cathay, preferably a responsible
person with a rank of no less than the Country Manager, as well as the apology from Ms.
Chiu" within fifteen days from receipt of the letter.
In his reply of 14 October 1996, Mr. Larry Yuen, the assistant to Cathay’s Country
Manager Argus Guy Robson, informed the Vazquezes that Cathay would investigate the
incident and get back to them within a week’s time.
On 8 November 1996, after Cathay’s failure to give them any feedback within its self-
imposed deadline, the Vazquezes instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City an action for damages against Cathay, praying for the payment to each of them the
amounts of P250,000 as temperate damages; P500,000 as moral damages; P500,000
as exemplary or corrective damages; and P250,000 as attorney’s fees.

In their complaint, the Vazquezes alleged that when they informed Ms. Chiu that they
preferred to stay in Business Class, Ms. Chiu "obstinately, uncompromisingly and in a
loud, discourteous and harsh voice threatened" that they could not board and leave with
the flight unless they go to First Class, since the Business Class was overbooked. Ms.
Chiu’s loud and stringent shouting annoyed, embarrassed, and humiliated them because
the incident was witnessed by all the other passengers waiting for boarding. They also
claimed that they were unjustifiably delayed to board the plane, and when they were
finally permitted to get into the aircraft, the forward storage compartment was already
full. A flight stewardess instructed Dr. Vazquez to put his roll-on luggage in the overhead
storage compartment. Because he was not assisted by any of the crew in putting up his
luggage, his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was aggravated, causing him extreme pain
on his arm and wrist. The Vazquezes also averred that they "belong to the uppermost
and absolutely top elite of both Philippine Society and the Philippine financial
community, [and that] they were among the wealthiest persons in the Philippine[s]."
In its answer, Cathay alleged that it is a practice among commercial airlines to upgrade
passengers to the next better class of accommodation, whenever an opportunity arises,
such as when a certain section is fully booked. Priority in upgrading is given to its
frequent flyers, who are considered favored passengers like the Vazquezes. Thus, when
the Business Class Section of Flight CX-905 was fully booked, Cathay’s computer
sorted out the names of favored passengers for involuntary upgrading to First Class.
When Ms. Chiu informed the Vazquezes that they were upgraded to First Class, Dr.
Vazquez refused. He then stood at the entrance of the boarding apron, blocking the
queue of passengers from boarding the plane, which inconvenienced other passengers.
He shouted that it was impossible for him and his wife to be upgraded without his two
friends who were traveling with them. Because of Dr. Vazquez’s outburst, Ms. Chiu
thought of upgrading the traveling companions of the Vazquezes. But when she checked
the computer, she learned that the Vazquezes’ companions did not have priority for
upgrading. She then tried to book the Vazquezes again to their original seats. However,
since the Business Class Section was already fully booked, she politely informed Dr.
Vazquez of such fact and explained that the upgrading was in recognition of their status
as Cathay’s valued passengers. Finally, after talking to their guests, the Vazquezes
eventually decided to take the First Class accommodation.
Cathay also asserted that its employees at the Hong Kong airport acted in good faith in
dealing with the Vazquezes; none of them shouted, humiliated, embarrassed, or
committed any act of disrespect against them (the Vazquezes). Assuming that there was
indeed a breach of contractual obligation, Cathay acted in good faith, which negates any
basis for their claim for temperate, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 342
Hence, it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for payment of P100,000 for
exemplary damages and P300,000 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
During the trial, Dr. Vazquez testified to support the allegations in the complaint. His
testimony was corroborated by his two friends who were with him at the time of the
incident, namely, Pacita G. Cruz and Josefina Vergel de Dios.
For its part, Cathay presented documentary evidence and the testimonies of Mr. Yuen;
Ms. Chiu; Norma Barrientos, Comptroller of its retained counsel; and Mr. Robson. Yuen
and Robson testified on Cathay’s policy of upgrading the seat accommodation of its
Marco Polo Club members when an opportunity arises. The upgrading of the Vazquezes
to First Class was done in good faith; in fact, the First Class Section is definitely much
better than the Business Class in terms of comfort, quality of food, and service from the
cabin crew. They also testified that overbooking is a widely accepted practice in the
airline industry and is in accordance with the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) regulations. Airlines overbook because a lot of passengers do not show up for
their flight. With respect to Flight CX-905, there was no overall overbooking to a degree
that a passenger was bumped off or downgraded. Yuen and Robson also stated that the
demand letter of the Vazquezes was immediately acted upon. Reports were gathered
from their office in Hong Kong and immediately forwarded to their counsel Atty. Remollo
for legal advice. However, Atty. Remollo begged off because his services were likewise
retained by the Vazquezes; nonetheless, he undertook to solve the problem in behalf of
Cathay. But nothing happened until Cathay received a copy of the complaint in this
case. For her part, Ms. Chiu denied that she shouted or used foul or impolite language
against the Vazquezes. Ms. Barrientos testified on the amount of attorney’s fees and
other litigation expenses, such as those for the taking of the depositions of Yuen and
Chiu.
In its decision1 of 19 October 1998, the trial court found for the Vazquezes and decreed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence to sustain the instant
complaint, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Vazquez spouses
and against defendant Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., ordering the latter to pay
each plaintiff the following:
a) Nominal damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for each plaintiff;
b) Moral damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00 for each plaintiff;

c) Exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00 for each
plaintiff;
d) Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of
P1,000,000.00 for each plaintiff; and
e) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
According to the trial court, Cathay offers various classes of seats from which
passengers are allowed to choose regardless of their reasons or motives, whether it be
due to budgetary constraints or whim. The choice imposes a clear obligation on Cathay
to transport the passengers in the class chosen by them. The carrier cannot, without
exposing itself to liability, force a passenger to involuntarily change his choice. The
upgrading of the Vazquezes’ accommodation over and above their vehement objections
was due to the overbooking of the Business Class. It was a pretext to pack as many
passengers as possible into the plane to maximize Cathay’s revenues. Cathay’s
actuations in this case displayed deceit, gross negligence, and bad faith, which entitled
the Vazquezes to awards for damages.
On appeal by the petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of 24 July
2001,2 deleted the award for exemplary damages; and it reduced the awards for moral
and nominal damages for each of the Vazquezes to P250,000 and P50,000,
respectively, and the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to P50,000 for both of them.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated that by upgrading the Vazquezes to First Class,
Cathay novated the contract of carriage without the former’s consent. There was a
breach of contract not because Cathay overbooked the Business Class Section of Flight
CX-905 but because the latter pushed through with the upgrading despite the objections
of the Vazquezes.
However, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that Ms. Chiu shouted at, or meant to
be discourteous to, Dr. Vazquez, although it might seemed that way to the latter, who
was a member of the elite in Philippine society and was not therefore used to being
harangued by anybody. Ms. Chiu was a Hong Kong Chinese whose fractured Chinese
was difficult to understand and whose manner of speaking might sound harsh or shrill to
Filipinos because of cultural differences. But the Court of Appeals did not find her to
have acted with deliberate malice, deceit, gross negligence, or bad faith. If at all, she
was negligent in not offering the First Class accommodations to other passengers.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 343
Neither can the flight stewardess in the First Class Cabin be said to have been in bad
faith when she failed to assist Dr. Vazquez in lifting his baggage into the overhead
storage bin. There is no proof that he asked for help and was refused even after saying
that he was suffering from "bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome." Anent the delay of Yuen in
responding to the demand letter of the Vazquezes, the Court of Appeals found it to have
been sufficiently explained.
The Vazquezes and Cathay separately filed motions for a reconsideration of the
decision, both of which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Cathay seasonably filed with us this petition in this case. Cathay maintains that the
award for moral damages has no basis, since the Court of Appeals found that there was
no "wanton, fraudulent, reckless and oppressive" display of manners on the part of its
personnel; and that the breach of contract was not attended by fraud, malice, or bad
faith. If any damage had been suffered by the Vazquezes, it was damnum absque
injuria, which is damage without injury, damage or injury inflicted without injustice, loss
or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the law
provides no remedy. Cathay also invokes our decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals3 where we recognized that, in accordance with the Civil Aeronautics Board’s
Economic Regulation No. 7, as amended, an overbooking that does not exceed ten
percent cannot be considered deliberate and done in bad faith. We thus deleted in that
case the awards for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for lack
of proof of overbooking exceeding ten percent or of bad faith on the part of the airline
carrier.
On the other hand, the Vazquezes assert that the Court of Appeals was correct in
granting awards for moral and nominal damages and attorney’s fees in view of the
breach of contract committed by Cathay for transferring them from the Business Class to
First Class Section without prior notice or consent and over their vigorous objection.
They likewise argue that the issuance of passenger tickets more than the seating
capacity of each section of the plane is in itself fraudulent, malicious and tainted with
bad faith.
The key issues for our consideration are whether (1) by upgrading the seat
accommodation of the Vazquezes from Business Class to First Class Cathay breached
its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes; (2) the upgrading was tainted with fraud or
bad faith; and (3) the Vazquezes are entitled to damages.
We resolve the first issue in the affirmative.

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one agrees to give
something or render some service to another for a consideration. There is no contract
unless the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) an
object certain which is the subject of the contract; and (3) the cause of the obligation
which is established.4 Undoubtedly, a contract of carriage existed between Cathay and
the Vazquezes. They voluntarily and freely gave their consent to an agreement whose
object was the transportation of the Vazquezes from Manila to Hong Kong and back to
Manila, with seats in the Business Class Section of the aircraft, and whose cause or
consideration was the fare paid by the Vazquezes to Cathay.
The only problem is the legal effect of the upgrading of the seat accommodation of the
Vazquezes. Did it constitute a breach of contract?
Breach of contract is defined as the "failure without legal reason to comply with the
terms of a contract."5 It is also defined as the "[f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform
any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract." 6
In previous cases, the breach of contract of carriage consisted in either the bumping off
of a passenger with confirmed reservation or the downgrading of a passenger’s seat
accommodation from one class to a lower class. In this case, what happened was the
reverse. The contract between the parties was for Cathay to transport the Vazquezes to
Manila on a Business Class accommodation in Flight CX-905. After checking-in their
luggage at the Kai Tak Airport in Hong Kong, the Vazquezes were given boarding cards
indicating their seat assignments in the Business Class Section. However, during the
boarding time, when the Vazquezes presented their boarding passes, they were
informed that they had a seat change from Business Class to First Class. It turned out
that the Business Class was overbooked in that there were more passengers than the
number of seats. Thus, the seat assignments of the Vazquezes were given to waitlisted
passengers, and the Vazquezes, being members of the Marco Polo Club, were
upgraded from Business Class to First Class.
We note that in all their pleadings, the Vazquezes never denied that they were members
of Cathay’s Marco Polo Club. They knew that as members of the Club, they had priority
for upgrading of their seat accommodation at no extra cost when an opportunity arises.
But, just like other privileges, such priority could be waived. The Vazquezes should have
been consulted first whether they wanted to avail themselves of the privilege or would
consent to a change of seat accommodation before their seat assignments were given
to other passengers. Normally, one would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for it
would mean a better accommodation. But, whatever their reason was and however odd
it might be, the Vazquezes had every right to decline the upgrade and insist on the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 344
Business Class accommodation they had booked for and which was designated in their
boarding passes. They clearly waived their priority or preference when they asked that
other passengers be given the upgrade. It should not have been imposed on them over
their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of
carriage with the Vazquezes.
We are not, however, convinced that the upgrading or the breach of contract was
attended by fraud or bad faith. Thus, we resolve the second issue in the negative.
Bad faith and fraud are allegations of fact that demand clear and convincing proof. They
are serious accusations that can be so conveniently and casually invoked, and that is
why they are never presumed. They amount to mere slogans or mudslinging unless
convincingly substantiated by whoever is alleging them.
Fraud has been defined to include an inducement through insidious machination.
Insidious machination refers to a deceitful scheme or plot with an evil or devious
purpose. Deceit exists where the party, with intent to deceive, conceals or omits to state
material facts and, by reason of such omission or concealment, the other party was
induced to give consent that would not otherwise have been given. 7
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known
duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. 8
We find no persuasive proof of fraud or bad faith in this case. The Vazquezes were not
induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious words or deceitful machination or
through willful concealment of material facts. Upon boarding, Ms. Chiu told the
Vazquezes that their accommodations were upgraded to First Class in view of their
being Gold Card members of Cathay’s Marco Polo Club. She was honest in telling them
that their seats were already given to other passengers and the Business Class Section
was fully booked. Ms. Chiu might have failed to consider the remedy of offering the First
Class seats to other passengers. But, we find no bad faith in her failure to do so, even if
that amounted to an exercise of poor judgment.
Neither was the transfer of the Vazquezes effected for some evil or devious purpose. As
testified to by Mr. Robson, the First Class Section is better than the Business Class
Section in terms of comfort, quality of food, and service from the cabin crew; thus, the
difference in fare between the First Class and Business Class at that time was
$250.9Needless to state, an upgrading is for the better condition and, definitely, for the
benefit of the passenger.

We are not persuaded by the Vazquezes’ argument that the overbooking of the
Business Class Section constituted bad faith on the part of Cathay. Section 3 of the
Economic Regulation No. 7 of the Civil Aeronautics Board, as amended, provides:
Sec 3. Scope. – This regulation shall apply to every Philippine and foreign air
carrier with respect to its operation of flights or portions of flights originating
from or terminating at, or serving a point within the territory of the Republic of
the Philippines insofar as it denies boarding to a passenger on a flight, or
portion of a flight inside or outside the Philippines, for which he holds confirmed
reserved space. Furthermore, this Regulation is designed to cover only honest
mistakes on the part of the carriers and excludes deliberate and willful acts of
non-accommodation. Provided, however, that overbooking not exceeding 10%
of the seating capacity of the aircraft shall not be considered as a deliberate and
willful act of non-accommodation.
It is clear from this section that an overbooking that does not exceed ten percent is not
considered deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith. 10 Here, while there
was admittedly an overbooking of the Business Class, there was no evidence of
overbooking of the plane beyond ten percent, and no passenger was ever bumped off or
was refused to board the aircraft.
Now we come to the third issue on damages.
The Court of Appeals awarded each of the Vazquezes moral damages in the amount of
P250,000. Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages
are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. 11 Thus, case
law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there must
be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether physical, mental or psychological;
(2) there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 345
and (4) the award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
of the Civil Code.12
Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be
recoverable in instances where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith or where the
mishap resulted in the death of a passenger. 13 Where in breaching the contract of
carriage the airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for
damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a
case the liability does not include moral and exemplary damages.14
In this case, we have ruled that the breach of contract of carriage, which consisted in the
involuntary upgrading of the Vazquezes’ seat accommodation, was not attended by
fraud or bad faith. The Court of Appeals’ award of moral damages has, therefore, no leg
to stand on.
The deletion of the award for exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is correct. It is
a requisite in the grant of exemplary damages that the act of the offender must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner. 15 Such
requisite is absent in this case. Moreover, to be entitled thereto the claimant must first
establish his right to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages. 16 Since the
Vazquezes are not entitled to any of these damages, the award for exemplary damages
has no legal basis. And where the awards for moral and exemplary damages are
eliminated, so must the award for attorney’s fees.17
The most that can be adjudged in favor of the Vazquezes for Cathay’s breach of
contract is an award for nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which
reads as follows:
Article 2221 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him.
Worth noting is the fact that in Cathay’s Memorandum filed with this Court, it prayed only
for the deletion of the award for moral damages. It deferred to the Court of Appeals’
discretion in awarding nominal damages; thus:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 346

As far as the award of nominal damages is concerned, petitioner respectfully
defers to the Honorable Court of Appeals’ discretion. Aware as it is that
somehow, due to the resistance of respondents-spouses to the normally-
appreciated gesture of petitioner to upgrade their accommodations, petitioner
may have disturbed the respondents-spouses’ wish to be with their companions
(who traveled to Hong Kong with them) at the Business Class on their flight to
Manila. Petitioner regrets that in its desire to provide the respondents-spouses
with additional amenities for the one and one-half (1 1/2) hour flight to Manila,
unintended tension ensued.18
Nonetheless, we agree with the injunction expressed by the Court of
Appeals that passengers must not prey on international airlines for
damage awards, like "trophies in a safari." After all neither the social
standing nor prestige of the passenger should determine the extent to
which he would suffer because of a wrong done, since the dignity
affronted in the individual is a quality inherent in him and not conferred
by these social indicators. 19
We adopt as our own this observation of the Court of Appeals.

Nonetheless, considering that the breach was intended to give more benefit and WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby partly GRANTED. The Decision of the
advantage to the Vazquezes by upgrading their Business Class accommodation to First Court of Appeals of 24 July 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 63339 is hereby MODIFIED, and
Class because of their valued status as Marco Polo members, we reduce the award for as modified, the awards for moral damages and attorney’s fees are set aside and
nominal damages to P5,000. deleted, and the award for nominal damages is reduced to P5,000.

Before writing finis to this decision, we find it well-worth to quote the apt observation of No pronouncement on costs.
the Court of Appeals regarding the awards adjudged by the trial court:

We are not amused but alarmed at the lower court’s unbelievable alacrity, bordering on
the scandalous, to award excessive amounts as damages. In their complaint, appellees
asked for P1 million as moral damages but the lower court awarded P4 million; they
asked for P500,000.00 as exemplary damages but the lower court cavalierly awarded a
whooping P10 million; they asked for P250,000.00 as attorney’s fees but were awarded
P2 million; they did not ask for nominal damages but were awarded P200,000.00. It is as
if the lower court went on a rampage, and why it acted that way is beyond all tests of
reason. In fact the excessiveness of the total award invites the suspicion that it was the
result of "prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court."

The presiding judge of the lower court is enjoined to hearken to the Supreme
Court’s admonition in Singson vs. CA (282 SCRA 149 [1997]), where it said:

The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages

depends upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances
of each case. This discretion is limited by the principle that the amount
awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to
indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of
the trial court….

and in Alitalia Airways vs. CA (187 SCRA 763 [1990], where it was held:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992
AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal guardian,
Augusto Benedicto Santos, petitioner, 
vs.
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
This case involves the Proper interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention,
reading as follows:
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either
before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of business through which the
contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.
The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Northwest
Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A.
and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines.
On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San
Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The
scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified
for his return to San Francisco. 1
On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 347
and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo
to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.
On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. On April 13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing the above-quoted article, it contended that the complaint could be
instituted only in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, before:
1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;
2. the court of its principal place of business;
3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract
had been made;
4. the court of the place of destination.
The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this
its principal place of business. Neither was the petitioner's ticket issued in this country
nor was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
On February 1, 1988, the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case. 2 The
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the lower
court. 3 On June 26, 1991, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied. 4 The petitioner then came to this Court, raising substantially the same
issues it submitted in the Court of Appeals.
The assignment of errors may be grouped into two major issues, viz:
(1) the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention; and
(2) the jurisdiction of Philippine courts over the case.
The petitioner also invokes Article 24 of the Civil Code on the protection of minors.
I
THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

A. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention violates the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw
Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by
the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument
of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was
deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence
thereto. "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed
and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof." 5
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
The petitioner contends that Article 28(1) cannot be applied in the present case because
it is unconstitutional. He argues that there is no substantial distinction between a person
who purchases a ticket in Manila and a person who purchases his ticket in San
Francisco. The classification of the places in which actions for damages may be brought
is arbitrary and irrational and thus violates the due process and equal protection clauses.
It is well-settled that courts will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it
is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination; the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party; and the resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself. 6
Courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question. This attitude is based
on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the
government a becoming respect for each other's acts.
The treaty which is the subject matter of this petition was a joint legislative-executive act.
The presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional
before it was adopted and given the force of law in this country.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 348
The petitioner's allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption.
Apparently, the Convention considered the four places designated in Article 28 the most
convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and
its passenger, as distinguished from all other places. At any rate, we agree with the
respondent court that this case can be decided on other grounds without the necessity
of resolving the constitutional issue.
B. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that Art.
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable because of a
fundamental change in the circumstances that served as its basis.
The petitioner goes at great lengths to show that the provisions in the Convention were
intended to protect airline companies under "the conditions prevailing then and which
have long ceased to exist." He argues that in view of the significant developments in the
airline industry through the years, the treaty has become irrelevant. Hence, to the extent
that it has lost its basis for approval, it has become unconstitutional.
The petitioner is invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. According to Jessup, "this
doctrine constitutes an attempt to formulate a legal principle which would justify non-
performance of a treaty obligation if the conditions with relation to which the parties
contracted have changed so materially and so unexpectedly as to create a situation in
which the exaction of performance would be unreasonable." 7 The key element of this
doctrine is the vital change in the condition of the contracting parties that they could not
have foreseen at the time the treaty was concluded.
The Court notes in this connection the following observation made in Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.: 8
The Warsaw drafters wished to create a system of liability rules that
would cover all the hazards of air travel . . . The Warsaw delegates
knew that, in the years to come, civil aviation would change in ways
that they could not foresee. They wished to design a system of air law
that would be both durable and flexible enough to keep pace with these
changes . . . The ever-changing needs of the system of civil aviation
can be served within the framework they created.
It is true that at the time the Warsaw Convention was drafted, the airline industry was
still in its infancy. However, that circumstance alone is not sufficient justification for the
rejection of the treaty at this time. The changes recited by the petitioner were,
realistically, not entirely unforeseen although they were expected in a general sense

only. In fact, the Convention itself, anticipating such developments, contains the
following significant provision:
Article 41. Any High Contracting Party shall be entitled not earlier than
two years after the coming into force of this convention to call for the
assembling of a new international conference in order to consider any
improvements which may be made in this convention. To this end, it
will communicate with the Government of the French Republic which
will take the necessary measures to make preparations for such
conference.
But the more important consideration is that the treaty has not been rejected by the
Philippine government. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate
automatically to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of
rejection, usually made by the head of State, with a statement of the reasons why
compliance with the treaty is no longer required.
In lieu thereof, the treaty may be denounced even without an expressed justification for
this action. Such denunciation is authorized under its Article 39, viz:
Article 39. (1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce
this convention by a notification addressed to the Government of the
Republic of Poland, which shall at once inform the Government of each
of the High Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of
denunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which shall
have proceeded to denunciation.
Obviously. rejection of the treaty, whether on the ground of rebus sic stantibus or
pursuant to Article 39, is not a function of the courts but of the other branches of
government. This is a political act. The conclusion and renunciation of treaties is the
prerogative of the political departments and may not be usurped by the judiciary. The
courts are concerned only with the interpretation and application of laws and treaties in
force and not with their wisdom or efficacy.
C. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in ruling that the
plaintiff must sue in the United States, because this would deny him
the right to access to our courts.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 349
The petitioner alleges that the expenses and difficulties he will incur in filing a suit in the
United States would constitute a constructive denial of his right to access to our courts
for the protection of his rights. He would consequently be deprived of this vital guaranty
as embodied in the Bill of Rights.
Obviously, the constitutional guaranty of access to courts refers only to courts with
appropriate jurisdiction as defined by law. It does not mean that a person can go
to any court for redress of his grievances regardless of the nature or value of his claim.
If the petitioner is barred from filing his complaint before our courts, it is because they
are not vested with the appropriate jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, which is
part of the law of our land.
II
THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION.
A. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is a rule merely of venue and
was waived by defendant when it did not move to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue.
By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons
performed by aircraft for hire.
International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:
(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international
transportation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to the
contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a
transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties . . .
Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties,
which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for
the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention
automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its
passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the
United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four
places where an action for damages may be brought.
Whether Article 28(1) refers to jurisdiction or only to venue is a question over which
authorities are sharply divided. While the petitioner cites several cases holding that
Article 28(1) refers to venue rather than jurisdiction, 9there are later cases cited by the
private respondent supporting the conclusion that the provision is jurisdictional. 10
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by
consent or waiver upon d court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be
changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff brought his suit
in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the defendant to make a timely
objection. In either case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction
can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition
exists against their alteration. 11
A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a
jurisdiction and not a venue provision. First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates
the places where the action for damages "must" be brought, underscores the mandatory
nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent with one of the
objectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of
international transportation by air." Third, the Convention does not contain any provision
prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase
"rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32 must refer only to Article 28(1). In fact, the last
sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in Article 28(1)
as "jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the
time when the damage occurred.
This issue was analyzed in the leading case of Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways,
Ltd., 12 where it was held:
. . . Of more, but still incomplete, assistance is the wording of Article
28(2), especially when considered in the light of Article 32. Article 28(2)
provides that "questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of
the court to which the case is submitted" (Emphasis supplied). Section
(2) thus may be read to leave for domestic decision questions
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 350
regarding the suitability and location of a particular Warsaw Convention
case.
In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction
takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in
accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction
of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only
after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be
taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the
case is submitted.
The petitioner submits that since Article 32 states that the parties are precluded "before
the damages occurred" from amending the rules of Article 28(1) as to the place where
the action may be brought, it would follow that the Warsaw Convention was not intended
to preclude them from doing so "after the damages occurred."
Article 32 provides:
Art. 32. Any clause contained in the contract and all special
agreements entered into before the damage occurred by which the
parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by this convention,
whether by deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the rules as to
jurisdiction, shall be null and void. Nevertheless for the transportation of
goods, arbitration clauses shall be allowed, subject to this convention, if
the arbitration is to take place within one of the jurisdictions referred to
in the first paragraph of Article 28.
His point is that since the requirements of Article 28(1) can be waived "after the
damages (shall have) occurred," the article should be regarded as possessing the
character of a "venue" and not of a "jurisdiction" provision. Hence, in moving to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the private respondent has waived improper venue
as a ground to dismiss.
The foregoing examination of Article 28(1) in relation to Article 32 does not support this
conclusion. In any event, we agree that even granting arguendo that Article 28(1) is a
venue and not a jurisdictional provision, dismissal of the case was still in order. The
respondent court was correct in affirming the ruling of the trial court on this matter, thus:
Santos' claim that NOA waived venue as a ground of its motion to
dismiss is not correct. True it is that NOA averred in its MOTION TO

DISMISS that the ground thereof is "the Court has no subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint" which SANTOS considers as
equivalent to "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . ." However,
the gist of NOA's argument in its motion is that the Philippines is not
the proper place where SANTOS could file the action — meaning that
the venue of the action is improperly laid. Even assuming then that the
specified ground of the motion is erroneous, the fact is the proper
ground of the motion — improper venue — has been discussed
therein.
Waiver cannot be lightly inferred. In case of doubt, it must be resolved in favor of non-
waiver if there are special circumstances justifying this conclusion, as in the petition at
bar. As we observed in Javier vs. Intermediate Court of Appeals: 13
Legally, of course, the lack of proper venue was deemed waived by the
petitioners when they failed to invoke it in their original motion to
dismiss. Even so, the motivation of the private respondent should have
been taken into account by both the trial judge and the respondent
court in arriving at their decisions.
The petitioner also invokes KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. RTC, 14 a decision of our Court
of Appeals, where it was held that Article 28(1) is a venue provision. However, the
private respondent avers that this was in effect reversed by the case of Aranas v. United
Airlines,  15 where the same court held that Article 28(1) is a jurisdictional provision.
Neither of these cases is binding on this Court, of course, nor was either of them
appealed to us. Nevertheless, we here express our own preference for the later case of
Aranas insofar as its pronouncements on jurisdiction conform to the judgment we now
make in this petition.
B. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that
under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, this case was properly
filed in the Philippines, because Manila was the destination of the
plaintiff.
The Petitioner contends that the facts of this case are analogous to those in Aanestad v.
Air Canada. 16 In that case, Mrs. Silverberg purchased a round-trip ticket from Montreal
to Los Angeles and back to Montreal. The date and time of departure were specified but
not of the return flight. The plane crashed while on route from Montreal to Los Angeles,
killing Mrs. Silverberg. Her administratrix filed an action for damages against Air Canada
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 351
in the U.S. District Court of California. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction but the motion was denied thus:
. . . It is evident that the contract entered into between Air Canada and
Mrs. Silverberg as evidenced by the ticket booklets and the Flight
Coupon No. 1, was a contract for Air Canada to carry Mrs. Silverberg to
Los Angeles on a certain flight, a certain time and a certain class, but
that the time for her to return remained completely in her power.
Coupon No. 2 was only a continuing offer by Air Canada to give her a
ticket to return to Montreal between certain dates. . . .
The only conclusion that can be reached then, is that "the place of
destination" as used in the Warsaw Convention is considered by both
the Canadian C.T.C. and the United States C.A.B. to describe at least
two "places of destination," viz., the "place of destination" of
a particular flight either an "outward destination" from the "point of
origin" or from the "outward point of destination" to any place in
Canada.
Thus the place of destination under Art. 28 and Art. 1 of the Warsaw
Convention of the flight on which Mrs. Silverberg was killed, was Los
Angeles according to the ticket, which was the contract between the
parties and the suit is properly filed in this Court which has jurisdiction.
The Petitioner avers that the present case falls squarely under the above ruling because
the date and time of his return flight to San Francisco were, as in the Aanestad case,
also left open. Consequently, Manila and not San Francisco should be considered the
petitioner's destination.
The private respondent for its part invokes the ruling in Butz v. British Airways, 17 where
the United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania) said:
. . . Although the authorities which addressed this precise issue are not
extensive, both the cases and the commentators are almost unanimous
in concluding that the "place of destination" referred to in the Warsaw
Convention "in a trip consisting of several parts . . . is the  ultimate
destination that is accorded treaty jurisdiction." . . .
But apart from that distinguishing feature, I cannot agree with the
Court's analysis in Aanestad; whether the return portion of the ticket is

characterized as an option or a contract, the carrier was legally bound
to transport the passenger back to the place of origin within the
prescribed time and. the passenger for her part agreed to pay the fare
and, in fact, did pay the fare. Thus there was mutuality of obligation and
a binding contract of carriage, The fact that the passenger could forego
her rights under the contract does not make it any less a binding
contract. Certainly, if the parties did not contemplate the return leg of
the journey, the passenger would not have paid for it and the carrier
would not have issued a round trip ticket.
We agree with the latter case. The place of destination, within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or,
specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination
of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although
the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties
indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila.
Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the
destination.
The petitioner submits that the Butz case could not have overruled the Aanestad case
because these decisions are from different jurisdictions. But that is neither here nor
there. In fact, neither of these cases is controlling on this Court. If we have preferred the
Butz case, it is because, exercising our own freedom of choice, we have decided that it
represents the better, and correct, interpretation of Article 28(1).
Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping
place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for
purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.
The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and
ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates
the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has
one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the
carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."
C. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that
under Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, this case was properly
filed in the Philippines because the defendant has its domicile in the
Philippines.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 352
The petitioner argues that the Warsaw Convention was originally written in French and
that in interpreting its provisions, American courts have taken the broad view that the
French legal meaning must govern. 18 In French, he says, the "domicile" of the carrier
means every place where it has a branch office.
The private respondent notes, however, that in Compagnie Nationale Air France vs.
Giliberto, 19 it was held:
The plaintiffs' first contention is that Air France is domiciled in the
United States. They say that the domicile of a corporation includes any
country where the airline carries on its business on "a regular and
substantial basis," and that the United States qualifies under such
definition. The meaning of domicile cannot, however, be so extended.
The domicile of a corporation is customarily regarded as the place
where it is incorporated, and the courts have given the meaning to the
term as it is used in article 28(1) of the Convention. (See  Smith v.
Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd. (2d Cir. 1971), 452 F2d 798, 802; Nudo
v. Societe Anonyme Belge d' Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne
Sabena Belgian World Airlines (E.D. pa. 1962). 207 F. Supp, 191;
Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France (S.D.N.Y. 1977), 427 F.
Suppl. 971, 974). Moreover, the structure of article 28(1), viewed as a
whole, is also incompatible with the plaintiffs' claim. The article, in
stating that places of business are among the bases of the jurisdiction,
sets out two places where an action for damages may be brought; the
country where the carrier's principal place of business is located, and
the country in which it has a place of business through which the
particular contract in question was made, that is, where the ticket was
bought, Adopting the plaintiffs' theory would at a minimum blur these
carefully drawn distinctions by creating a third intermediate category. It
would obviously introduce uncertainty into litigation under the article
because of the necessity of having to determine, and without standards
or criteria, whether the amount of business done by a carrier in a
particular country was "regular" and "substantial." The plaintiff's request
to adopt this basis of jurisdiction is in effect a request to create a new
jurisdictional standard for the Convention.
Furthermore, it was argued in another case 20 that:
. . . In arriving at an interpretation of a treaty whose sole official
language is French, are we bound to apply French law? . . . We think

this question and the underlying choice of law issue warrant some
discussion
. . . We do not think this statement can be regarded as a conclusion
that internal French law is to be "applied" in the choice of law sense, to
determine the meaning and scope of the Convention's terms. Of
course, French legal usage must be considered in arriving at an
accurate English translation of the French. But when an accurate
English translation is made and agreed upon, as here, the inquiry into
meaning does not then revert to a quest for a past or present French
law to be "applied" for revelation of the proper scope of the terms. It
does not follow from the fact that the treaty is written in French that in
interpreting it, we are forever chained to French law, either as it existed
when the treaty was written or in its present state of development.
There is no suggestion in the treaty that French law was intended to
govern the meaning of Warsaw's terms, nor have we found any
indication to this effect in its legislative history or from our study of its
application and interpretation by other courts. Indeed, analysis of the
cases indicates that the courts, in interpreting and applying the Warsaw
Convention, have, not considered themselves bound to apply French
law simply because the Convention is written in French. . . .
We agree with these rulings.
Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is
allowed to be filed under Article 28(1). By specifying the three other places, to wit, the
principal place of business of the carrier, its place of business where the contract was
made, and the place of destination, the article clearly meant that these three other
places were not comprehended in the term "domicile."
D. The petitioner claims that the lower court erred in not ruling that Art.
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention does not apply to actions based on
tort.
The petitioner alleges that the gravamen of the complaint is that private respondent
acted arbitrarily and in bad faith, discriminated against the petitioner, and committed a
willful misconduct because it canceled his confirmed reservation and gave his reserved
seat to someone who had no better right to it. In short. the private respondent committed
a tort.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 353
Such allegation, he submits, removes the present case from the coverage of the
Warsaw Convention. He argues that in at least two American cases, 21 it was held that
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention does not apply if the action is based on tort.
This position is negated by Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, 22 where the
article in question was interpreted thus:
. . . Assuming for the present that plaintiff's claim is "covered" by Article
17, Article 24 clearly excludes any relief not provided for in the
Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement. It does not,
however, limit the kind of cause of action on which the relief may be
founded; rather it provides that any action based on the injuries
specified in Article 17 "however founded," i.e., regardless of the type of
action on which relief is founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limitations established by the Warsaw System.
Presumably, the reason for the use of the phrase "however founded,"
in two-fold: to accommodate all of the multifarious bases on which a
claim might be founded in different countries, whether under code law
or common law, whether under contract or tort, etc.; and to include all
bases on which a claim seeking relief for an injury might be founded in
any one country. In other words, if the injury occurs as described in
Article 17, any relief available is subject to the conditions and
limitations established by the Warsaw System, regardless of the
particular cause of action which forms the basis on which a plaintiff
could seek
relief . . .
The private respondent correctly contends that the allegation of willful misconduct
resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the case from the comprehension of the
Warsaw Convention. The petitioner has apparently misconstrued the import of Article
25(l) of the Convention, which reads as follows:
Art. 25 (1). The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability. if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his
part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct.
It is understood under this article that the court called upon to determine the applicability
of the limitation provision must first be vested with the appropriate jurisdiction. Article
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 354

28(1) is the provision in the Convention which defines that jurisdiction. Article
22 23 merely fixes the monetary ceiling for the liability of the carrier in cases covered by
the Convention. If the carrier is indeed guilty of willful misconduct, it can avail itself of the
limitations set forth in this article. But this can be done only if the action has first been
commenced properly under the rules on jurisdiction set forth in Article 28(1).
III
THE ISSUE OF PROTECTION TO MINORS
The petitioner calls our attention to Article 24 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 24. In all contractual property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap,
the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
have to file his complaint only in any of the four places designated by Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention.
The proposed amendment bolsters the ruling of this Court that a citizen does not
necessarily have the right to sue in his own courts simply because the defendant airline
has a place of business in his country.
The Court can only sympathize with the petitioner, who must prosecute his claims in the
United States rather than in his own country at least inconvenience. But we are unable
to grant him the relief he seeks because we are limited by the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention which continues to bind us. It may not be amiss to observe at this point that
the mere fact that he will have to litigate in the American courts does not necessarily
mean he will litigate in vain. The judicial system of that country in known for its sense of
fairness and, generally, its strict adherence to the rule of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Application of this article to the present case is misplaced. The above provision assumes
that the court is vested with jurisdiction to rule in favor of the disadvantaged minor, As
already explained, such jurisdiction is absent in the case at bar.

CONCLUSION

A number of countries have signified their concern over the problem of citizens being
denied access to their own courts because of the restrictive provision of Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention. Among these is the United States, which has proposed an
amendment that would enable the passenger to sue in his own domicile if the carrier
does business in that jurisdiction. The reason for this proposal is explained thus:

In the event a US citizen temporarily residing abroad purchases a

Rome to New York to Rome ticket on a foreign air carrier which is
generally subject to the jurisdiction of the US, Article 28 would prevent
that person from suing the carrier in the US in a "Warsaw Case" even
though such a suit could be brought in the absence of the Convention.

The proposal was incorporated in the Guatemala Protocol amending the Warsaw
Convention, which was adopted at Guatemala City on March 8,
1971. 24 But it is still ineffective because it has not yet been ratified by the required
minimum number of contracting parties. Pending such ratification, the petitioner will still

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,  police for the immediate release of the detained crew members
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for  certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and
set aside the Resolution1dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision 2 dated April 10,
1996 of the Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533, 4 and the Orders5 dated
August 29, 1994 6 and February 2, 19957 that were issued by the trial court in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18394.8
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in
the questioned Decision9, are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight
Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia,
plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer
Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it
was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they
agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When
they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 355
he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy
and several security personnel heard her cries for help and
rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested
Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several
SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They
then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the
release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer
Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the
but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She
was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not
want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She
also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the
local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to
Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport
Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In September
1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to
see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police
station where the police took her passport and questioned her
about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police
put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case
against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon
flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal

Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary
to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June
27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance
from SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June
28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her
plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the
airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service
Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah,
at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to
the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her
to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to
the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. 10
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile,
to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer
and Allah continued to serve in the international
flights. 11
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 356
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila, 12 she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13 for damages against SAUDIA,
and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss 14 which raised
the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action
against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that
the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the
case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) 15.
Saudia filed a reply 16 thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint 17 wherein Al-Balawi was
dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 18.
The trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA
filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Order dated
August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try
the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law
applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994,
Morada filed her Opposition 22(To Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that
since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of
action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for
the first time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does
not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and
hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24 dated February 2, 1995,
denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the
assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and
the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on
October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant
Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994,
considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint,
which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney's fees, upon the basis of the applicable
Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines,
is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the
subject matter, and there being nothing new of substance which
might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to be
reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order 26 with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary
Restraining Order 27 dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge
from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution 28 promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the
appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and
Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled
thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals,
et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 357
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant
Petition 29 for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October
13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered the Decision 30dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled
that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and
thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held
that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss,
inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an
adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order 31 dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this
Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, 32 the instant case is now
deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-
93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the
proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private
international law as a "conflicts problem". Otherwise, the Republic
of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done by another
sovereign state which is abhorred.
II
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a
jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of
leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable
Court required the respondents to comment on petitioner's April
30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A

Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice
Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed
with liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in
CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon.
Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining
Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day
reglementary period as provided for under Section 1, Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP
NO. 36533 has not yet become final and executory and this
Honorable Court can take cognizance of this case. 33
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues
emerge for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-
18394 ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINES".
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled
at the outset. It maintains that private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of
rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a
foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule. 34
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 358
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended
Complaint is based on Articles 19 35 and 21 36 of the Civil Code, then the instant
case is properly a matter of domestic law. 37
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the
interplay of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint 38 dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign
airlines corporation doing business in the Philippines. It may be
served with summons and other court processes at Travel Wide
Associated Sales (Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114
Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
x x x           x x x          x x x
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport
Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September
1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors reauested her to
see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police
station where the police took her passport and questioned her
about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police
put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case
against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon
flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sigh a

document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary
to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June
27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance
from SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June
28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her
plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the
airline had forbidden her to take that flight. At the Inflight Service
Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah,
at the crew quarters, until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff
to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and
shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English,
sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case,
plaintiff sought the help of the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah.
The latter helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the
court. To pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights
of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely
served the international flights. 39
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 359
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a
"conflicts" case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse
laws of two or more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of
a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals
and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or
conception. 40
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. 41 The foreign
element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an
alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State
involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element
may assume a complex form. 42
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is
a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with
the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines
to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to
arise.
We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. A  conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of
jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended Complaint, 44 and the
Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals, 45 this Court held
that:
The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to
expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in
the statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent's assertion that violations of
Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum.
Based on the allegations 46 in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the
Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47 we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. 48 Its
authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 7691, to wit:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended
to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and cots or the value of
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 360
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds
Two hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
(Emphasis ours)
x x x           x x x          x x x
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court — the venue,
Quezon City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional Trial
Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at
the election of the plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the
private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is
quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass",
or "oppress" the defendant, e.g.  by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. 49
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court  a quo found it best to hear
the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would
be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains
substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of
the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial
court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions 50 praying for
the dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer
In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and
explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the
premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial
court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on
grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in  Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.: 51
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962,
aside from disputing the lower court's jurisdiction over
defendant's person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that plaintiff's cause of action has prescribed. By
interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and
Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of which it
prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor. For the court
to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it
necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's person,
who, being the proponent of the affirmative defense, should be
deemed to have abandoned its special appearance and voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by
motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person will be held to be a general appearance, if
the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 361
of the action upon the further ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. 52
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case and
that its exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given
situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 53
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that
should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should
intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always
do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two
important values should be stressed. 54
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
"characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of deciding
whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts
rule." 55The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the
proper law. 56
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact. 57An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of
a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as the  situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test
for the determination of the applicable law. 59 These "test factors" or "points of
contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his
place of sojourn, or his origin;

(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is
deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when
real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such
as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the
place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a
power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that
should govern their agreement, thelex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The  lex fori — the law of the forum — is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of
"procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of
the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or
owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment. 60 (Emphasis ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the
Amended Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we
are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion
that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah
on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges
she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person
while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 362
very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and
tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing over" or
"turning over" of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner
may have acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act
contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused additional humiliation,
misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated
the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of
petitioner's authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and
faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the
alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But
these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and
reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide
compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
"connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that
petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties,
"act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead,
petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury
allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant,
had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it
is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of  lex loci delicti
commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability 61 have been advanced to
offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the
modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of
the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to
apply now, given the factual context of this case.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 363

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the
place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered. 62
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and
lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is
a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship"
between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this
suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, 63 raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant
(herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned
with the ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the
litigants, but also for the vindication of the country's system of law and justice in
a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed
to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due
consideration of the foreign element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of
course, should be construed as prejudging the results of the case in any manner
whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for  certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case
No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby
REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem", we find, by
way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have
paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising
out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the
appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.
Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the
applicable Saudi law on the matter." 64As aptly said by private respondent, she
has "no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never
alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. 65 And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who was
invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it
[petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is". 66

Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding

the trial court's denial of defendant's (herein petitioner's) motion to dismiss the
case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after
trial was obviously available, and expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-496 December 31, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,  this Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of some of the States of the
vs.
WILLIAM FOWLER, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for appellant.
William Lane O'Neill, for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of
the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board the transport Lawton, then
navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne formed part of the cargo of
the said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay, and which were taken  lucri
causa, and with the intent to appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation, and
without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the case made and provided.
The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney being
present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the defendants presented a demurrer,
alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged,
inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime was committed on the high
seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or
upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and
asked, upon these grounds, that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the court has
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month's
imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 364
Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on
board vessel flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited the order of August
14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil Commission. He argued
that the President of the United States had unquestionable authority to authorize the
commanding general and the Civil Commission to establish a judicial system with
authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to
Union during the Mexican war and the war of secession.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the court was
without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to have been committed on the
high seas, sustained the demurrer, and ordered the discharge of the defendants, with
the costs to the Government. Against this order the prosecuting attorney appealed, and
the case was brought before this court.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the high
seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil
Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer
jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes committed on
board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are clear and precise
with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to criminal
cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the
case, Act No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the
Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven
paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and
offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within
any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft
of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws
thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the courts of First
Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed
in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our
courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on board the
same.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 365

Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed, with the There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International
costs de oficio. So ordered Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
Republic of the Philippines territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace
SUPREME COURT and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and
Manila followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
EN BANC committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
G.R. No. L-18924             October 19, 1922 authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,  In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
vs. 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant. obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee. continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or
merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable
to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the
information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having . . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country,
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which
the city. embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a
new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana
ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held
Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
and dismissed the case.
territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that
sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
no jurisdiction over said offense.
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime,
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb
like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by
jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public
peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the
proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 366

determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs.
Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local
jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the
regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels
being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed
from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the
laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other
than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as
England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page
625, Malloy says the following:
entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used
in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance
of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at
anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no
unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into
the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on
board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to
costs. So ordered.

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all
the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of
commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty
freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places,
ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are
permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts
of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and
warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants
and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection
and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of
the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was
held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our
Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24170      December 16, 1968
ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and
MOHAMMAD BANTALLA,petitioners,  The facts according to the above opinion "are not controverted." Thus: "It appears that
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if not to do
away entirely, with the evil and corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would be
frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by respondent Commissioner of Customs
in this case, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside and this
appeal from the decision of the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the controlling
principles of law do not call for a contrary conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the
legitimate authority vested in the government were not to be reduced to futility and
impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times has assumed
epidemic proportions.
The principal question raised by petitioners, owners of five sailing vessels and the cargo
loaded therein declared forfeited by respondent Commissioner of Customs for
smuggling, is the validity of their interception and seizure by customs officials on the
high seas, the contention being raised that importation had not yet begun and that the
seizure was effected outside our territorial waters..
Why such a plea could not be given the least credence without doing violence to
common sense and placing the law in disrepute would be apparent from a statement of
the case and the findings of facts as set forth in the decision now under review, of the
Court of Tax Appeals, dated November 19, 1964, the opinion being penned by the late
Associate Judge Augusto M. Luciano.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 367
His opinion starts thus: "This is an appeal from the decision of the Acting Commissioner
of Customs in Customs Case No. 113, dated September 26, 1961, (Jolo Seizure
Identification Cases Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41 & 42) decreeing the forfeiture of five (5) sailing
vessels (kumpits) named 'Iroc-Iroc,' 'Lahat-lahat,' 'Liberal Wing III,' 'Sulu Area
Command,' and 'Business,' with their respective cargoes of blue seal cigarettes and
rattan chairs for violation of Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code and
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 426 in relation with Section 1363(f) of the Revised
Administrative Code."1
on September 10, 1950, at about noon time, a customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat
ST-23 intercepted the five (5) sailing vessels in question on the high seas, between
British North Borneo and Sulu while they were heading towards Tawi-tawi, Sulu. After
ordering the vessels to stop, the customs officers boarded and found on board, 181
cases of 'Herald' cigarettes, 9 cases of 'Camel' cigarettes, and some pieces of rattan
chairs. The sailing vessels are all of Philippine registry, owned and manned by Filipino
residents of Sulu, and of less than thirty (30) tons burden. They came from Sandakan,
British North Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the Commissioner of Customs
to engage in the importation of merchandise into any port of the Sulu sea, as required by
Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code. Their cargoes were not covered by
the required import license under Republic Act No. 426, otherwise known as the Import
Control Law."2
Respondent Commissioner of Customs, as noted at the outset, affirmed the decision
rendered by the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who found cause for forfeiture under the
law of the vessels and the cargo contained therein. He was, as also already made
known, sustained by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence this petition for review.
The first two errors assigned by petitioners would impugn the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs to institute seizure proceedings and thereafter to declare the forfeiture of the
vessels in question and their cargo. They would justify their stand thus: "In the light of
the fact that the vessels involved with the articles laden therein were apprehended and
seized on the high seas, beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the said vessels
could not have touched any place or port in the Philippines, whether a port or place of
entry or not, consequently, the said vessels could not have been engaged in the
importation of the articles laden therein into any Philippine port or place, whether a port
or place of entry or not, to have incurred the liability of forfeiture under Section 1363(a)
of the Revised Administrative Code."3

Such a contention was advanced by petitioners before the Court of Tax Appeals. It met
the repudiation that it deserved. Thus: "We perfectly see the point of the petitioners but
considering the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the vessels in question,
we believe that Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code should be applied to
the case at bar. It has been established that the five vessels came from Sandakan,
British North Borneo, a foreign port, and when intercepted, all of them were heading
towards Tawi-tawi, a domestic port within the Sulu sea. Laden with foreign manufactured
cigarettes, they did not possess the import license required by Republic Act No. 426, nor
did they carry a permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in importation into
any port in the Sulu sea. Their course announced loudly their intention not merely to skirt
along the territorial boundary of the Philippines but to come within our limits and land
somewhere in Tawi-tawi towards which their prows were pointed. As a matter of fact,
they were about to cross our aquatic boundary but for the intervention of a customs
patrol which, from all appearances, was more than eager to accomplish its mission." 4
The sense of realism and the vigorous language employed by the late Judge Luciano in
rejecting such a plea deserve to be quoted. Thus: "To entertain even for a moment the
thought that these vessels were probably not bound for a Philippine port would be too
much a concession even for a simpleton or a perennial optimist. It is quite irrational for
Filipino sailors manning five Philippine vessels to sneak out of the Philippines and go to
British North Borneo, and come a long way back laden with highly taxable goods only to
turn about upon reaching the brink of our territorial waters and head for another foreign
port."5
1. We find no plausible reason not to accept in its entirety such a conclusion reached by
the Court of Tax Appeals. Nor, even if the persuasive element in the above view were
not so overwhelming, could we alter the decisive facts as found by it. For it is now
beyond question that its finding, if supported by substantial evidence, binds us, only
questions of law being for us to resolve. Where the issue raised belongs to the former
category, we lack the power of review.6
Moreover, for understandable reasons, we feel extreme reluctance to substitute our own
discretion for that of the Court of Tax Appeals in its appreciation of the relevant facts and
its appraisal of their significance. As we had occasion to state in a relatively recent
decision: "Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for this Court to set aside the
conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the very
nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax
problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, ..., there has been
an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority." 7
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 368
2. We thus could rest our decision affirming that of the Court of Tax Appeals on the
above consideration.
It might not be amiss however to devote some degree of attention to the legal points
raised in the above two assignment of errors, discussed jointly by petitioners-appellants,
alleging the absence of jurisdiction, the deprivation of property without due process of
law and the abatement of liability consequent upon the repeal of Republic Act No. 426.
Not one of the principles of law relied upon suffices to call for reversal of the action taken
by the respondent Commissioner of Customs, even if the facts presented a situation less
conclusive against the pretension of petitioners-appellants.
From the apprehension and seizure of the vessels in question on the high seas beyond
the territorial waters of the Philippines, the absence of jurisdiction of Commissioner of
Customs is predicated. Such contention of petitioners-appellants is without merit.
It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The Revised Penal
Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction
against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship ... 8 The principle of law that
sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a firm foundation for the seizure
of the five sailing vessels found thereafter to have violated the applicable provisions of
the Revised Administrative Code.9
Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Church v. Hubbart, 10 an 1804 decision, that a state has the right to
protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the
high seas. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall: "The authority of a nation within its
own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its
cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its
duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond
the limits of its territory."
The question asked in the brief of petitioners-appellants as to whether the seizure of the
vessels in question and the cargoes on the high seas and thus beyond the territorial
waters of the Philippines was legal must be answered in the affirmative.
4. The next question raised is the alleged denial of due process arising from such
forfeiture and seizure. The argument on the alleged lack of validity of the action taken by
the Commissioner of Customs is made to rest on the fact that the alleged offense
imputed to petitioners-appellants is a violation of Section 1363(a) and not Section

1363(f). The title of Section 1363 is clear, "Property subject to forfeiture under customs
laws." The first subsection thereof, (a) cover any vessel including cargo unlawfully
engaged in the importation of merchandise except a port of entry. Subsection (f) speaks
of any merchandise of any prohibited importation, the importation of which is effected or
attempted contrary to law and all other merchandise which in the opinion of the Collector
of Customs have been used are or were intended to be used as instrument in the
importation or exportation of the former.
From the above recital of the legal provisions relied upon, it would appear most clearly
that the due process question raised is insubstantial. Certainly, the facts on which the
seizure was based were not unknown to petitioners-appellants. On those facts the
liability of the vessels and merchandise under the above terms of the statute would
appear to be undeniable. The action taken then by the Commissioner of Customs was in
accordance with law.
How could there be a denial of due process? There was nothing arbitrary about the
manner in which such seizure and forfeiture were effected. The right to a hearing of
petitioners-appellants was respected. They could not have been unaware of what they
were doing. It would be an affront to reason if under the above circumstances they could
be allowed to raise in all seriousness a due process question. Such a constitutional
guaranty, basic and fundamental, certainly should not be allowed to lend itself as an
instrument for escaping a liability arising from one's own nefarious acts.
5. Petitioners-appellants would further assail the validity of the action taken by the
respondent Commissioner of Customs by the plea that the repeal of Republic Act No.
426 abated whatever liability could have been incurred thereunder. This argument raised
before the Court of Tax Appeals was correctly held devoid of any persuasive force. The
decision under review cited our opinion in Golay-Buchel & Cie v. Commissioner of
Customs11 to the effect that the expiration of the Import Control Law "did not produce the
effect of declaring legal the importation of goods which were illegally imported and the
seizure and forfeiture thereof as ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and
void."
Roxas v. Sayoc  12 announced that principle earlier. Thus: "Herein, we are concerned
with the effect of the expiration of a law, not with the abrogation of a law, and we hold
the view that once the Commissioner of Customs has acquired jurisdiction over the
case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650 will not divest him of his jurisdiction
thereon duly acquired while said law was still in force. In other words, we believe that
despite the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 the Commissioner of Customs retained
his jurisdiction over the case and could continue to take cognizance thereof until its final
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 369
determination, for the main question brought in by the appeal from the decision of the
Collector of Customs was the legality or illegality of the decision of the Collector of
Customs, and that question could not have been abated by the mere expiration of
Republic Act No. 650. We firmly believe that the expiration of Republic Act No. 650
could not have produced the effect (1) of declaring legal the importation of the cotton
counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of declaring the seizure and
forfeiture ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void; in other words it
could not have the effect of annulling or setting aside the decision of the Collector of
Customs which was rendered while the law was in force and which should stand until it
is revoked by the appellate tribunal."
As late as 1965, in Bombay Dept. Store v. Commissioner of Customs, 13 we had occasion
to reaffirm the doctrine in the above two decisions, the present Chief Justice, speaking
for the Court, stating that such expiration of the period of effectivity of Republic Act No.
650 "did not have the effect of depriving the Commissioner of Customs of the
jurisdiction, acquired by him prior thereto, to act on cases of forfeiture pending before
him, which are in the nature of proceeding in rem...."
It is thus most evident that the Court of Tax Appeals had not in any wise refused to
adhere faithfully to controlling legal principles when it sustained the action taken by
respondent Commissioner of Customs. It would be a reproach and a reflection on the
law if on the facts as they had been shown to exist, the seizure and forfeiture of the
vessels and cargo in question were to be characterized as outside the legal competence
of our government and violative of the constitutional rights of petitioners-appellants.
Fortunately, as had been made clear above, that would be an undeserved reflection and
an unwarranted reproach. The vigor of the war against smuggling must not be hampered
by a misreading of international law concepts and a misplaced reliance on a
constitutional guaranty that has not in any wise been infringed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 19, 1964,
is affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28882 May 31, 1971
TIME, INC., petitioner,  out under curious circumstance were asked to explain in court. One
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, ELISEO S.
ZARI, as Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for petitioner.
Angel C. Cruz Law Office for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to annul certain orders
of the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, issued in its Civil Case No. 10403,
entitled "Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Time, Inc., and Time-Life
International, Publisher of 'Time' Magazine (Asia Edition)", and to prohibit the said court
from further proceeding with the said civil case.
Upon petitioner's posting a bond of P1,000.00, this Court, as prayed for, ordered, on 15
April 1968, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition alleges that petitioner Time, Inc., 1 is an American corporation with principal
offices at Rocketfeller Center, New York City, N. Y., and is the publisher of "Time", a
weekly news magazine; the petition, however, does not allege the petitioner's legal
capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippine. 2
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 370
In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 10403, therein plaintiffs (herein respondents) Antonio J.
Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile seek to recover from the herein petitioner damages
upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine, in its
issue of 18 August 1967, of an essay, entitled "Corruption in Asia", which, in part, reads,
as follows:
The problem of Manila's mayor, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, is a case in
point. When it was discovered last year that the mayor's coffers
contained far more pesos than seemed reasonable in the light of his
income, an investigation was launched. Witnesses who had helped him
government official admitted lending Villegas P30,000 pesos ($7,700)
without interest because he was the mayor's compadre. An assistant
declared he had given Villegas loans without collateral because he
regarded the boss as my own son. A wealthy Manila businessman
testified that he had lent Villegas' wife 15,000 pesos because the
mayor was like a brother to me. With that, Villegas denounced the
investigation as an invasion of his family's privacy. The case was
dismissed on a technicality, and Villegas is still mayor. 3
More specifically, the plaintiffs' complaint alleges, inter alia  that:
(4) Defendants, conspiring and confederating, published a libelous
article, publicly, falsely and maliciously imputing to Plaintiffs the
commission of the crimes of graft, corruption and nepotism; that said
publication particularly referred to Plaintiff Mayor Antonio J. Villegas as
a case in point in connection with graft, corruption and nepotism in
Asia; that said publication without any doubt referred to co-plaintiff Juan
Ponce Enrile as the high government official who helped under curious
circumstances Plaintiff Mayor Antonio J. Villegas in lending the latter
approximately P30,000.00 ($7,700.00) without interest because he was
the Mayor's compadre; that the purpose of said Publications is to cause
the dishonor, discredit and put in public contempt the Plaintiffs,
particularly Plaintiff Mayor Antonio J. Villegas.
On motion of the respondents-plaintiffs, the respondent judge, on 25 November 1967,
granted them leave to take the depositions "of Mr. Anthony Gonzales, Time-Life
international", and "Mr. Cesar B. Enriquez, Muller & Phipps (Manila) Ltd.", in connection
with the activities and operations in the Philippines of the petitioner, and, on 27

November 1967, issued a writ of attachment on the real and personal estate of Time,
Inc.
Petitioner received the summons and a copy of the complaint at its offices in New York
on 13 December 1967 and, on 27 December 1967, it filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, relying upon the provisions of
Republic Act 4363. Private respondents opposed the motion.
In an order dated 26 February 1968, respondent court deferred the determination of the
motion to dismiss until after trial of the case on the merits, the court having considered
that the grounds relied upon in the motion do not appear to be indubitable.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the deferment private respondents again
opposed.
On 30 March 1968, respondent judge issued an order re-affirming the previous order of
deferment for the reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act. No. 4363,
amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, is not applicable to actions against
non-resident defendants, and because questions involving harassment and
inconvenience, as well as disruption of public service do not appear indubitable. ..."
Failing in its efforts to discontinue the taking of the depositions, previously adverted to,
and to have action taken, before trial, on its motion to dismiss, petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The orders for the taking of the said depositions, for deferring determination of the
motion to dismiss, and for reaffirming the deferment, and the writ of attachment are
sought to be annulled in the petition..
There is no dispute that at the time of the publication of the allegedly offending essay,
private respondents Antonio Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile were the Mayor Of the City
of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance and concurrently Acting Commissioner of
Customs, respectively, with offices in the City of Manila. The issues in this case are:
1. Whether or not, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 the respondent Court
of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for damages
arising from an allegedly libelous publication, considering that the action was instituted
by public officers whose offices were in the City of Manila at the time of the publication; if
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 371
it has no jurisdiction, whether or not its erroneous assumption of jurisdiction may be
challenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari or prohibition; and
2. Whether or not Republic Act 4363 is applicable to action against a foreign corporation
or non-resident defendant.
Provisions of Republic Act No. 4363, which are relevant to the resolution of the
foregoing issues, read, as follows:
Section 1. Article three hundred sixty of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Twelve hundred and eighty-nine,
is further amended to read as follows:
'ART. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who
shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business
manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; Provided, however, That where one of the
offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila
at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case
such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous

matter is printed and first published; Provided,further, That the civil
action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed
and vice versa; Provided,  furthermore, That the court where the
criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts; And provided finally, That
this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the
civil and/or criminal actions which have been filed in court at the time of
the effectivity of the law
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect only if and when, within thirty days
from its approval, the newspapermen in the Philippines shall organize,
and elect the members of, a Philippine Press Council, a private agency
of the said newspapermen, whose function shall be to promulgate a
Code of Ethics for them and the Philippine press investigate violations
thereof, and censure any newspaperman or newspaper guilty of any
violation of the said Code, and the fact that such Philippine Press
Council has been organized and its members have been duly elected
in accordance herewith shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the
President of the Philippines.
Under the first proviso in section 1, the venue of a civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations is localized upon the basis of, first, whether the offended party or
plaintiff is a public officer or a private individual; and second, if he is a public officer,
whether his office is in Manila or not in Manila, at the time of the commission of the
offense. If the offended party is a public officer in the office in the City of Manila, the
proviso limits him to two (2) choices of venue, namely, in the Court of First instance of
the City of Manila or in the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published ..."
The complaint lodged in the court of Rizal by respondents does not allege that the
libelous article was printed and first published in the province of Rizal and, since the
respondents-plaintiffs are public officers with offices in Manila at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, it is clear that the only place left for them wherein to
file their action, is the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 372
The limitation of the choices of venue, as introduced into the Penal Code through its
amendments by Republic Act 4363, was intended "to minimize or limit the filing of out-of-
town libel suits" to protect an alleged offender from "hardships, inconveniences and
harassments" and, furthermore, to protect "the interest of the public service" where one
of the offended parties is a public officer."4 The intent, of the law is clear: a libeled public
official might sue in the court of the locality where he holds office, in order that the
prosecution of the action should interfere as little as possible with the discharge of his
official duties and labors. The only alternative allowed him by law is to prosecute those
responsible for the libel in the place where the offending article was printed and first
published. Here, the law tolerates the interference with the libeled officer's duties only for
the sake of avoiding unnecessary harassment of the accused. Since the offending
publication was not printed in the Philippines, the alternative venue was not open to
respondent Mayor Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance Enrile, who were
the offended parties.
But respondents-plaintiffs argue that Republic Act No. 4363 is not applicable where the
action is against non-existent defendant, as petitioner Time, Inc., for several reasons.
They urge that, in enacting Republic Act No. 4363, Congress did not intend to protect
non-resident defendants as shown by Section 3, which provides for the effectivity of the
statute only if and when the "newspapermen in the Philippines" have organized a
"Philippine Press Council" whose function shall be to promulgate a Code of Ethics for
"them" and "the Philippine press"; and since a non-resident defendant is not in a position
to comply with the conditions imposed for the effectivity of the statute, such defendant
may not invoke its provisions; that a foreign corporation is not inconvenienced by an out-
of-town libel suit; that it would be absurd and incongruous, in the absence of an
extradition treaty, for the law to give to public officers with office in Manila the second
option of filing a criminal case in the court of the place where the libelous article is
printed and first published if the defendant is a foreign corporation and that, under the
"single publication" rule which originated in the United States and imported into the
Philippines, the rule was understood to mean that publications in another state are not
covered by venue statutes of the forum.
The implication of respondents' argument is that the law would not take effect as to non-
resident defendants or accused. We see nothing in the text of the law that would sustain
such unequal protection to some of those who may be charged with libel. The official
proclamation that a Philippine Press Council has been organized is made a pre-
condition to the effectivity of the entire Republic Act No. 4363, and no terms are
employed therein to indicate that the law can or will be effective only as to some, but not
all, of those that may be charged with libeling our public officers.

The assertion that a foreign corporation or a non-resident defendant is not
inconvenienced by an out-of-town suit is irrelevant and untenable, for venue and
jurisdiction are not dependent upon convenience or inconvenience to a party; and
moreover, venue was fixed under Republic Act No. 4363, pursuant to the basic policy of
the law that is, as previously stated, to protect the interest of the public service when the
offended party is a public officer, by minimizing as much as possible any interference
with the discharge of his duties.
That respondents-plaintiffs could not file a criminal case for libel against a non-resident
defendant does not make Republic Act No. 4363 incongruous of absurd, for such
inability to file a criminal case against a non-resident natural person equally exists in
crimes other than libel. It is a fundamental rule of international jurisdiction that no state
can by its laws, and no court which is only a creature of the state, can by its judgments
or decrees, directly bind or affect property or persons beyond the limits of the state. 5 Not
only this, but if the accused is a corporation, no criminal action can lie against
it,6 whether such corporation or resident or non-resident. At any rate, the case filed by
respondents-plaintiffs is case for damages.
50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 differentiates the "multiple publication" and "single publication" rules
(invoked by private respondents) to be as follows:
The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single
publication was to the effect that each communication of written or
printed matter was a distinct and separate publication of a libel
contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule
('multiple publication' rule) is still followed in several American
jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the American Law Institute.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the 'single publication' rule which
originated in New York, under which any single integrated publication,
such as one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one
broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action,
regardless of the number of times it is exposed to different people. ...
These rules are not pertinent in the present scheme because the number of causes of
action that may be available to the respondents-plaintiffs is not here in issue. We are
here confronted by a specific venue statute, conferring jurisdiction in cases of libel
against Public officials to specified courts, and no other. The rule is that where a statute
creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and
where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive,
unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act No. 4363
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 373
should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question of
venue should be waived by the defendant, which was not the case here. Only thus can
the policy of the Act be upheld and maintained. Nor is there any reason why the
inapplicability of one alternative venue should result in rendering the other alternative,
also inapplicable.
The dismissal of the present petition is asked on the ground that the petitioner foreign
corporation failed to allege its capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippines.
Respondents rely on section 69 of the Corporation law, which provides:
SEC. 69. No foreign corporation or corporations formed, organized, or
existing under any laws other than those of the Philippines shall be
permitted to ... maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the recovery of
any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless it shall have the license
prescribed in the section immediately preceding. ..." ...;
They also invoke the ruling in Marshall-Wells Co. vs. Elser & Co., Inc.7 that no foreign
corporation may be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts unless it shall have
the license required by the law, and the ruling in Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Cebu
Stevedoring Co., Inc.8 that "where ... the law denies  to a foreign corporation the right to
maintain suit unless it has previously complied with a certain requirement, then such
compliance or the fact that the suing corporation is exempt therefrom, becomes a
necessary averment in the complaint." We fail to see how these doctrines can be a
propos in the case at bar, since the petitioner is not "maintaining any suit" but is merely
defending one against itself; it did not file any complaint but only a corollary defensive
petition to prohibit the lower court from further proceeding with a suit that it had no
jurisdiction to entertain.
Petitioner's failure to aver its legal capacity to institute the present petition is not fatal, for
...
A foreign corporation may, by writ of prohibition, seek relief against the
wrongful assumption of jurisdiction. And a foreign corporation seeking a
writ of prohibition against further maintenance of a suit, on the ground
of want of jurisdiction in which jurisdiction is not bound by the ruling of
the court in which the suit was brought, on a motion to quash service of
summons, that it has jurisdiction.9
It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since respondent court has not
definitely ruled on the motion to dismiss, nor held that it has jurisdiction, but only
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 374

argument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent court's
lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action; and the rulings of this Court are that writs of
certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of action on
such a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for this petition
for review by certiorari, it would be premature because it seeks to have
a review of an interlocutory order. But as it would be useless and futile
to go ahead with the proceedings if the court below had no jurisdiction
this petition was given due course.' (San Beda vs. CIR, 51 O.G. 5636,
5638).
'While it is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be deferred until
the trial and an order to that effect is interlocutory, still where it clearly
appears that the trial judge or court is proceeding in excess or outside
of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings.
(Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al. vs. Ibañez, et al., 50 Off. Gaz.
1036; Enrique v. Macadaeg, et al., 47 Off. Gaz. 1207; see also San
Beda College vs. CIR, 51 Off. Gaz. 5636.)' (University of Sto. Tomas v.
Villanueva, L-13748, 30 October 1959.).
(1) The under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363, actions for damages by public officials for libelous publications against them can
only be filed in the courts of first instance ofthe city or province where the offended
functionary held office at the time ofthe commission of the offense, in case the libelous
article was first printed or published outside the Philippines.
(2) That the action of a court in refusing to rule, or deferring its ruling, on a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or for improper venue, is in
excess of jurisdiction and correctable by writ of prohibition or certiorari sued out in the
appellate Court, even before trial on the merits is had.
WHEREFORE, the writs applied for are granted: the respondent Court of First Instance
of Rizal is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case No. 10403;
and its orders issued in connection therewith are hereby annulled and set aside,.
Respondent court is further commanded to desist from further proceedings in Civil case
No. 10403 aforesaid. Costs against private respondents, Antonio J. Villegas and Juan
Ponce Enrile.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Supreme Court is made
permanent.

Similarly, in Edward J. Nell Co. vs. Cubacub, L-20843, 23 June 1965, 14 SCRA 419, this
Court held:

'.......................................................... It is a settledrule that the

jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint; and when a motion to dismiss is filed for
lack of jurisdiction those allegations are deemed admitted for purposes
of such motion, so that it may be resolved without waiting for the trial.
Thus it has been held that the consideration thereof may not be
postponed in the hope that the evidence may yield other qualifying or
concurring data which would bring the case under the court's
jurisdiction.'

To the same effect are the rulings in: Ruperto vs. Fernando, 83 Phil. 943; Administrator
of Hacienda Luisita Estate vs. Alberto, L-12133, 21 October 1958.

Summing up, We hold:


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27897 December 2, 1927
WESTERN EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY COMPANY, WESTERN ELECTRIC
COMPANY, INC., W. Z. SMITH and FELIX C. REYES, plaintiffs-appellees,  August 23, 1926.
vs.
FIDEL A. REYES, as Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, HENRY
HERMAN, PETER O'BRIEN, MANUEL B. DIAZ, FELIPE MAPOY and ARTEMIO
ZAMORA, defendants-appellants.
J. W. Ferrier for appellants.
DeWitt, Perkins and Bradly for appellees.
STATEMENT
October 23, 1926, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, plaintiffs filed the following
complaint against the defendants:
Now come the plaintiffs in the above entitled case, by the undersigned their
attorneys, and to this Honorable Court respectfully show:
I. That the Western Equipment and Supply Company is a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Nevada, United States of America; that
the Western Electric Company, Inc., is likewise a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York, United States of America; and that the
plaintiffs W. Z. Smith and Felix C. Reyes are both of lawful age and residents of
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands.
II. That the defendant Fidel A. Reyes is the duly appointed and qualified
Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry and as such Director is
charged with the duty of issuing and denying the issuance of certificates of
incorporation to persons filing articles of incorporation with the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 375
III. That the defendants Henry Herman, Peter O' Brien, Manuel B. Diaz, Felipe
Mapoy and Artemio Zamora are all of lawful age and are residents of the City of
Manila, Philippines Islands.
IV. That on or about May 4, 1925, the plaintiff the Western Equipment and
Supply Company applied to the defendant Director of the Bureau of Commerce
and Industry for the issuance of a license to engage in business in the
Philippine Islands and, accordingly, on May 20, 1926, a provisional license was
by said defendant issued in its favor, which license was made permanent on
V. That from and since the issuance of said provisional license of May 20,.
1926, said plaintiff Western Equipment and Supply Company has been and still
is engaged in importing and selling in the Philippine Islands the electrical and
telephone apparatus and supplies manufactured by the plaintiff Western Electric
Company, Inc., its offices in the City of Manila being at No. 600 Rizal Avenue, in
the charge and management of the plaintiff Felix C. Reyes, its resident agent in
the Philippine Islands.
VI. That the electric and telephone apparatus and supplies manufactured by the
plaintiff Western Electric Company, Inc., have been sold in foreign and
interstate commerce and have become well and thoroughly known to the trade
in all countries of the world for the past fifty years; that at present time the
greater part of all telephone equipment used in Manila and elsewhere in the
Philippine Islands was manufactured by the said Western Electric Company,
Inc., and sold by it in commerce between the United States and the Philippine
Islands; that about three fourths of such equipment in use throughout the world
are of the manufacture of said "Western Electric Company, Inc.," and bear its
corporate name; and that these facts are well known to the defendant Henry
Herman who for many years up to May 20, 1926, has himself been buying said
products from the plaintiff Western Electric Company, Inc., and selling them in
the Philippine Islands.
VII. That the name `Western Electric Company, Inc., has been registered as a
trade-mark under the provisions of the Act of Congress of February 20, 1905, in
the office of the Commissioner of Patents, at Washington, District of Columbia,
and said trade-mark remains in force to this date.

VIII. That on or about . . ., the defendants Henry Herman, Peter O' Brien,
Manuel B. Diaz, Felipe Mapoy and Artemio Zamora filed articles of
incorporation with the defendant Director of the Bureau of Commerce and
Industry with the intention of organizing a domestic corporation to be known as
the "Western Electric Company, Inc.," for the purpose principally of
manufacturing, buying, selling and generally dealing in electrical and telephone
apparatus and supplies.
IX. That the purpose of said defendant in attempting to incorporate under the
corporate name of plaintiff Western Electric Company, Inc., is to profit and trade
upon the plaintiff's business and reputation, by misleading and deceiving the
public into purchasing the goods manufactured or sold by them as those of
plaintiff Western Electric Company, Inc., in violation of the provisions of Act No.
666 of the Philippine Commission, particularly section 4 thereof.
X. That on October 20, 1926, plaintiff W. Z. Smith was authorized by the Board
of Directors of the Western Electric Company, Inc., to take all necessary steps
for the issuance of a license to said company to engage in business in the
Philippine Islands and to accept service of summons and process in all legal
proceedings against said company, and on October 21, 1926, said plaintiff W.
Z. Smith filed a written application for the issuance of such license with the
defendant Director of Bureau of Commerce and Industry, which application,
however, has not yet been acted upon by said defendant.
XI. That on October 18, 1926, the plaintiff W. Z. Smith formally lodged with the
defendant Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry his protest, and
opposed said attempted incorporation, by the defendants Henry Herman, Peter
O'Brien, Manuel B. Diaz, Felipe Mapoy and Artemio Zamora, of the `Western
Electric Company, Inc.,' as a domestic corporation, upon the ground among
others, that the corporate name by which said defendants desire to be known,
being identical with that of the plaintiff Western Equipment and Supply
Company, will deceive and mislead the public purchasing electrical and
telephone apparatus and supplies. A copy of said protest is hereunto annexed,
and hereby made a part hereof, marked Exhibit A.
XII. That the defendant Fidel A. Reyes, Director of the Bureau of Commerce
and Industry has announced to these plaintiffs his intention to overrule the
protest of plaintiffs, and to issue to the other defendants a certificate of
incorporation constituting said defendants a body politic and corporate under
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 376
the name "Western Electric Company, Inc.," unless restrained by this Honorable
Court.
XIII. That the issuance of a certificate of incorporation in favor of said
defendants under said name of "Western Electric Company, Inc.," would, under
the circumstances hereinbefore stated, constitute a gross abuse of the
discretionary powers conferred by law upon the defendant Director of the
Bureau of Commerce and Industry.
XIV. That the issuance of said certificate of incorporation would, if carried out,
be in violation of plaintiff's rights and would cause them irreparable injury which
could not be compensated in damages, and from which petitioner would have
no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law, other than that
herein prayed for.
They prayed for a temporary injunction, pending the final decision of the court when it
should be made permanent, restraining the issuance of the certificate of incorporation in
favor of the defendants under the name of Western Electric Company, Inc., or the use of
that name for any purpose in the exploitation and sale of electric apparatus and
supplies. The preliminary writ was issued.
For answer the defendant Fidel A. Reyes, as Director of the Bureau of Commerce and
Industry, admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the complaint, and as to
paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, he alleges that he has no information upon which to form a
belief, and therefore denies them. He admits the allegations of paragraph 8, and denies
paragraph 9. He denies the first part of paragraph 10, but admits that an application for a
license to do business was filed by the Western Electric Company, Inc., as alleged. He
admits paragraphs 11 and 12, and denies paragraphs 13 and 14, and further alleges
that the present action is prematurely brought, in that it is an attempt to coerce his
discretion, and that the mere registration of the articles of incorporation of the locally
organized Western Electric Company, Inc., cannot in any way injure the plaintiffs, and
prays that the complaint be dismissed.
For answer the defendants Herman, O' Brien, Diaz, Mapoy and Zamora admit the
allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the complaint, and deny paragraph 7, but
allege that on October 15, 1926, the articles of incorporation in question were presented
to the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry for registration. They deny
paragraphs 9 and 10, except as to the filing of the application. They admit the
allegations made in paragraph 11, but alleged that W. Z. Smith was without any right or
authority. Admit the allegations of paragraph 12, but deny the allegations of paragraphs

13 and 14, and allege that the Western Electric Company, Inc., has never transacted
business in the Philippine Islands; that its foreign business has been turned over to the
International Standard Electric Corporation; that the action is prematurely brought; and
that the registration of the articles of incorporation in question cannot in any way injure
plaintiffs.
Wherefore, such defendants pray that the preliminary injunction be dissolved, and
plaintiffs' cause of action be dismissed, with costs.
The case was tried and submitted upon the following stipulated facts:
Now come the parties plaintiff and defendants in the above entitled cause, by
their respective undersigned attorneys, and for the purpose of this action, agree
that the following facts are true:
I. That the Western Equipment and Supply Company is a foreign corporation,
organized under the laws of the State of Nevada, United States of America; that
the Western Electric Company, Inc., is likewise a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York, United States of America; and that the
plaintiff W. Z. Smith and Felix C. Reyes, are both of lawful age and residents of
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands.
II. That the defendant Fidel A. Reyes is the duly appointed and qualified
Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry and as such Director is
charge with the duty of issuing and/or denying the issuance of certificates of
incorporation to persons filing articles of incorporation with the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry.
III. That the defendants, Henry Herman, Peter O' Brien, Manuel B. Diaz, Felipe
Mapoy and Artemio Zamora are all of lawful age and all residents of the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands.
IV. That on or about May 4, 1925, the plaintiff, the Western Equipment and
Supply Company, through its duly authorized agent, the plaintiff, Felix C. Reyes,
applied to the defendant Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry for
the issuance of a license to engage in business in the Philippine Islands and on
May 20, 1926, said defendant issued in favor of said plaintiff a provisional
license for that purpose which was permanent on August 23, 1926.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 377
V. That the plaintiff, Western Electric Company, Inc., has ever been licensed to
engage in business in the Philippine Islands, and has never engaged in
business therein.
VI. That from and since the issuance of said provisional license of May 20,
1926, to the plaintiff, Western Equipment and Supply Company, said plaintiff
has been and still is engaged in importing and selling in the Philippine Islands
electrical and telephone apparatus and supplies manufactured by the plaintiff
Western Electric Company, Inc. (as well as those manufactured by other
factories), said Western Equipment and Supply Company's offices in the City of
Manila being at No. 600 Rizal Avenue, and at the time of the filing of the
complaint herein was under the charge and management of the plaintiff, Felix
C. Reyes, its then resident agent in the Philippine Islands.
VII. That the electrical and telephone apparatus and supplies manufactured by
the plaintiff, Western Electric Company, Inc., have been sold in foreign and
interstate commerce for the past fifty years, and have acquired high trade
reputation throughout the world; that at the present time the greater part of all
telephone equipment used in Manila, and elsewhere in the Philippine Islands,
was manufactured by the said plaintiff, Western Electric Company, Inc., and
sold by it for exportation to the Philippine Islands; that such equipment,
manufactured by the said Western Electric Company, Inc., and bearing its
trade-mark "Western Electric" or its corporate name is generally sold and used
throughout the world; that a Philippine Corporation known as the `Electric
Supply Company, Inc.,' has been importing the manufactures of the plaintiff,
Western Electric Company, Inc., into the Philippine Islands for the purpose of
selling the same therein, and that the defendant Henry Herman, is the President
and General Manager of said corporation.
VIII. That the words `Western Electric' have been registered by the plaintiff,
Electric Company, Inc., as a trade-mark under the provisions of the Act of
Congress of February 20, 1905, in the office of the Commissioner of the Patents
at Washington, District of Columbia, and said trade-mark remains in force as
the property of said plaintiff to this date.
IX. That the plaintiff, Western Electric Company, Inc., is advertising its
manufacturers in its own name by means of advertising its manufactures in its
own name by means of advertisements inserted in periodicals which circulate
generally throughout the English and Spanish speaking portions of the world,
and has never abandoned its corporate name or trade-mark, but, on the

contrary, all of its output bears said corporate name and trade-mark, either
directly upon the manufactured article or upon its container, including that sold
and used in the Philippine Islands.
X. That on October 15, 1926, the defendants Henry Herman, Peter O'Brien,
Manuel B. Diaz, Felipe Mapoy and Artemio Zamora signed and filed articles of
incorporation with the defendant, Fidel A. Reyes, as Director of the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry, with the intention of organizing a domestic corporation
under the Philippine Corporation Law to be known as the "Western Electric
Company, Inc.," for the purpose, among other things or manufacturing, buying,
selling and dealing generally in electrical and telephone apparatus and supplies;
that said defendants Peter O'Brien, Felipe Mapoy and Artemio Zamora are
employees of the said Electrical Supply Company, of which said defendant,
Henry Herman, is and has been, during the period covered by this stipulation,
the president and principal stockholder; and that they, together with the said
defendant Herman, signed said articles of incorporation for the incorporation of
a domestic company to be known and the "Western Electric Company, Inc.,"
with full knowledge of the existence of the plaintiff Western Electric Company,
Inc., of its corporate name, of its trade-mark, "Western Electric," and of the fact
that the manufactures of said plaintiff bearing its trade-mark or corporate name
are in general use in the Philippine Islands and in the United States.
XI. That on October 20, 1926, the plaintiff, W. Z. Smith, was authorized by the
Board of Directors of the plaintiff, Western Electric Company, Inc., to take all
necessary steps for the issuance of a license to said company to engage in
business in the Philippine Islands, and to accept service of summons and
process in all legal proceedings against said company, and on October 21,
1926, said plaintiff, W. Z. Smith, filed a written application for the issuance of
such license with the defendant Director of the Bureau of Commerce and
Industry, which application, however, has not yet been acted upon by said
defendant.
XII. That on October 18, 1926, the Philippine Telephone and Telegraph Co., by
its general manager, the plaintiff W. Z. Smith. lodged with the defendant
Director of the registration of the proposed corporation by the defendants Henry
Herman, Peter O'Brien, Manuel B. Diaz, Felipe Mapoy and Artemio Zamora, to
be known as the Western Electric Company, Inc., as a domestic corporation
under the Philippine Corporation Law. A copy of said protest, marked Exhibit A,
hereunto attached and is hereby made a part of this stipulation.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 378
XIII. That the defendant, Fidel A. Reyes, Director of the Bureau of Commerce
and Industry, announced his intention of overrule said protest and will, unless
judicially restrained therefrom, issue to the other defendants herein a certificate
of incorporation, constituting said defendants a Philippine body politic and
corporate under the name of "Western Electric Company, Inc."
XIV. That the defendant, Henry Herman, acting in behalf of said corporation,
Electrical Supply Company, Inc., has written letters to Messrs. Fisher, DeWitt,
Perkins & Brady, acting as attorneys for plaintiff, Western Electric Company,
Inc., copies of which are hereunto annexed and hereby made a part hereof,
marked Exhibits B, C and D.
XV. That the defendants, while admitting the facts set out in paragraph VII and
IX regarding the business done, merchandise sold and advertisements made
throughout the world by the plaintiff Western Electric Company, Inc., insist and
maintain that said allegations of fact are immaterial and irrelevant to the issues
in the present case, contending that such issued should be determined upon
the facts as they exist in the Philippine Islands alone.
To which were attached Exhibits A, B, C and D.
The lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs as prayed for in their complaint, and
made the temporary injunction permanent, from which the defendants appeal and assign
the following errors:
The lower court erred:
(1) When it granted the writ of preliminary injunction (pages 9 and 10, record; 12
to 14, B. of E.).
(2) When it held that the Western Electric Co., Inc., a foreign corporation, had a
right to bring the present suit in courts of the Philippine Islands, wherein it is
unregistered and unlicensed, as was done in the decision upon the petition for a
preliminary injunction (pages 97 to 115 record), and in repeating such holding in
the final decision herein (pages 51 and 52, B. of E.), as well as in basing such
holding upon the decision of this Honorable Supreme Court in Marshall-Wells
Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co. (46 Phil., 70.)

(3) When it found that the plaintiff, the Western Electric Co., Inc., has any such
standing in the Philippine Islands or before the courts thereof as to authorize it
to maintain an action therein under the present case.
(4) When it found that the other plaintiffs herein have any rights in the present
controversy or any legal standing therein.lawphi1.net
(5) In ordering the issuance of a permanent injunction restraining the defendant
Fidel A. Reyes, as Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, from
issuing a certificate of incorporation in favor of the other defendants under the
name of "Western Electric Co., Inc.," or any similar name, and restraining the
other defendants from using the name "Western Electric Co., Inc.," or any like
name, in the manufacture of sale of electrical and telephone apparatus and
supplies or as a business name or style in the Philippine Islands.
(6) In finding that the purpose of the defendants, other than the defendant Fidel
A. Reyes, in seeking to secure the registration of a local corporation under the
name of "Western Electric Co., Inc.," was "certainly not an innocent one,"
thereby imputing to said defendants a fraudulent and wrongful intent.
(7) In failing to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint with costs against the plaintiffs.
(8) In overruling and denying defendants' motion for a new trial.
 
JOHNS, J.:
The appellants say that the two questions presented are:
Has a foreign corporation, which has never done business in the Philippine
Islands, and which is unlicensed and unregistered therein, any right to maintain
an action to restrain residents and inhabitants of the Philippine Islands from
organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as such foreign
corporation?
Has such foreign corporation a legal right to restrain an officer of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, i. e., the Director of the Bureau of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 379
Commerce and Industry from exercising his discretion, and from registering a
corporation so organized by residents and inhabitants of the Philippine Islands?
As to the first question, the appellees say that it should be revised, so as to read as
follows:
Has a foreign corporation which has never done business in the Philippine
Islands, and which is unlicensed and unregistered therein, any right to maintain
an action to restrain residents and inhabitants of the Philippine Islands from
organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as such foreign
corporation, when said residents and inhabitants have knowledge of the
existence of such foreign corporation, having dealt with it, and sold its
manufactures, and when said foreign corporation is widely and favorably known
in the Philippine Islands through the use therein of its products bearing its
corporate and trade name, and when the purpose of the proposed domestic
corporation is to deal in precisely the same goods as those of the foreign
corporation?
As to the second, the appellees say that the question as propounded by the appellants
is not fully and fairly stated, in that it overlooks and disregards paragraphs 12 and 13 of
the stipulation of facts, and that the second question should be revised to read as
follows:
Has an unregistered corporation which has not transacted business in the
Philippine Islands, but which has acquired a valuable goodwill and high
reputation therein, through the sale, by importers, and the extensive use within
the Islands of products bearing either its corporate name, or trade-mark
consisting of its corporate name, a legal right to restrain an officer of the
Commerce and Industry, with knowledge of those facts, from issuing a
certificate of incorporation to residents of the Philippine Islands who attempt to
organize a corporation for the purpose of pirating the corporate name of such
foreign corporation, of engaging in the same business as such foreign
corporation, and of defrauding the public into thinking that its goods are those of
such foreign corporation, and of defrauding such foreign corporation and its
local dealers of their legitimate trade?
We agree with the revisions of both questions as made by the appellees, for the reason
that they are more in accord with the stipulated facts. First, it is stipulated that the
Western Electric Company, Inc., "has never engaged in business in the Philippine
Islands."

In the case of Marshall-Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co. (46 Phil., 70, 76), this court
held:
The noncompliance of a foreign corporation with the statute may be pleaded as
an affirmative defense. Thereafter, it must appear from the evidence, first, that
the plaintiff is a foreign corporation, second, that it is doing business in the
Philippines, and third, that it has not obtained the proper license as provided by
the statute.
If it had been stipulated that the plaintiff, Western Electric Company, Inc., had been
doing business in the Philippine Islands without first obtaining a license, another and a
very different question would be presented. That company is not here seeking to enforce
any legal or contract rights arising from, or growing out of, any business which it has
transacted in the Philippine Islands. The sole purpose of the action:
"Is to protect its reputation, its corporate name, its goodwill, whenever that reputation,
corporate name or goodwill have, through the natural development of its trade,
established themselves." And it contends that its rights to the use of its corporate and
trade name:
Is a property right, a right in rem, which may assert and protect against all the world, in
any of the courts of the world — even in jurisdictions where it does not transact business
— just the same as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against
trespass, or conversion. Citing sec. 10, Nims on Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks
and cases cited; secs. 21-22, Hopkins on Trade-Marks, Trade Names and Unfair
Competition and cases cited." That point is sustained by the authorities, and is well
stated in Hanover Star Milling Co. vs. Allen and Wheeler Co. (208 Fed., 513), in which
they syllabus says:
Since it is the trade and not the mark that is to be protect, a trade-mark
acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or states or nations, but
extends to every market where the trader's goods have become known and
identified by the use of the mark.
In Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Lambert (42 Phil., 633, 640), this court said:
In order that competition in business should be unfair in the sense necessary to
justify the granting of an injunction to restrain such competition it must appear
that there has been, or is likely to be, a diversion of trade from the business of
the complainant to that of the wrongdoer, or methods generally recognized as
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 380
unfair; . . . In most, if not all, of the cases in which relief has hitherto been
granted against unfair competition the means and methods adopted by the
wrongdoer in order to divert the coveted trade from his rival have been such as
were calculated to deceive and mislead the public into thinking that the goods or
business of the wrongdoer are the goods or business of the rival. Diversion of
trade is really the fundamental thing here, and if diversion of trade be
accomplished by any means which according to accepted legal canons are
unfair, the aggrieved party is entitled to relief.
In Shaver vs. Heller & Merz Co. (48 C.C. A., 48; 108 Fed., 821; 65 L. R. A., 878,. 881), it
is said:
The contention of counsel for the appellants here is a confusion of the bases of
two classes of suits, — those for infringements of trade-marks, and those for
unfair competition in trade. . . . In the former, title to the trade-marks is
indispensable to a good cause of action; in the latter, no proprietary interest in
the words, names, or means by which the fraud is perpetrated is requisite to
maintain a suit to enjoin it. It is sufficient that the complainant is entitled to the
custom — the goodwill — of a business, and that this goodwill is injured, or is
about to be injured, by the palming off of the goods of another as his.
The remaining question as to the jurisdiction of the courts over the defendant Reyes, as
Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, has been adversely decided to his
contention in the case of Asuncion vs. De Yriarte  (28 Phil., 67), in which, among other
things, it is said:
If, therefore, the defendant erred in determining the question presented when
the articles were offered for registration, then that error will be corrected by this
court in this action and he will be compelled to register the articles as offered. If,
however, he did not commit an error, but decided that question correctly, then,
of course, his action will be affirmed to the extent that we will deny the relief
prayed for.
It is very apparent that the purpose and intent of Herman and his associates in seeking
to incorporate under the name of Western Electric Company, Inc., was to unfairly and
unjustly compete in the Philippine Islands with the Western Electric Company, Inc., in
articles which are manufactured by, and bear the name of, that company, all of which is
prohibited by Act No. 666, and was made known to the defendant Reyes by the letter
known in the record to the defendant Reyes by the letter known in the record as Exhibit
A.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 381

As appellees say:

These defendant, Herman and his associates, are actually asking the
Government of the Philippine Island to permit them to pirate the name of the
Western Electric Company, Inc., by incorporating thereunder, so that they may
deceive the people of the Philippine Islands into thinking that the goods they
propose to sell are goods of the manufacture of the real Western Electric
Company. It would be a gross prostitution of the powers of government to utilize
those powers in such a way as to authorize such a fraud upon the people
governed. It would be the grossest abuse of discretion to permit these
defendants to usurp the corporate mane of the plaintiff, and to trade thereupon
in these Islands, in fraud of the Philippine public and of the true owners of the
name and the goodwill incidental thereto.

The plaintiff, Western Electric Company, Inc., has been in existence as a corporation for
over fifty years, during which time it has established a reputation all over the world
including the Philippine Islands, for the kind and quality of its manufactured articles, and
it is very apparent that the whole purpose and intent of Herman and his associates in
seeking to incorporate another corporation under the identical name of Western Electric
Company, Inc., and for the same identical purpose as that of the plaintiff, is to trespass
upon and profit by its good name and business reputation. The very fact that Herman
and his associates have sought the use of that particular name for that identical purpose
is conclusive evidence of the fraudulent intent with which it is done.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19906               April 30, 1969
STERLING PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, plaintiff-appellant,  but the Court orders defendants to add a distinctive word or words in their mark to
vs.
FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, and ALLIED
MANUFACTURING AND TRADING CO., INC., defendant-appellants.
SANCHEZ, J.:
In this, a case for trademark infringement and unfair competition, each of the principal
suitors, namely, plaintiff Sterling Products International, Inc., 1 and defendant
Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 2 seeks to exclude the other from use in the
Philippines of the trademarks BAYER and BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE. SPI asks this
Court to strike down FBA's registration of BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE covering industrial
and agricultural products — insecticides and other chemicals, not medicines — from the
supplemental register. FBA, for its part, prays for the cancellation from the principal
register of SPI's certificates of registration of the trademarks aforesaid for medicines.
Contending parties are doing business in the Philippines. SPI markets Bayer Aspirin,
Aspirin for Children and Cafiaspirina. The BAYER and BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE are
being used by SPI in the Philippines only for said products — Bayer Aspirin, Cafiaspirina
and Bayer Aspirin for Children. On the containers (bottles or printed celophane strips,
which, in turn, are placed in cardboard boxes) of Bayer Aspirin, Aspirin for Children and
Cafiaspirina, SPI features the trademarks BAYER and BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE. FBA
thru Allied Manufacturing & Trading Co., Inc. 3 distributes "Folidol" and other industrial
and agricultural chemicals. FBA's "Folidol" (in steel or fiber drums or aluminum
containers) displays a replica of SPI's trademark BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE; on the tin
cap and label of the container.
The conflict apparent, suit followed.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 382
The trial court declared itself "in favor of the solution that favors division of the market
rather than monopoly." But to avoid confusion, it directed defendants "to add a
distinctive word, or words in their mark to indicate that their products come from
Germany." The judgment below reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, both complaint and counterclaim are dismissed without costs; the
Court sustains plaintiff's right to use the Bayer trademark for its medicines, and
defendants' right to use it for chemicals, insecticides, and other products not medicines,
indicate that their products come from Germany.4
Both parties appealed: Plaintiff, insofar as the judgment "dismisses plaintiff's complaint
and sustains defendants' right to use the BAYER trademark for their chemicals,
insecticides, and other products not medicines"; 5 and defendants, from the portions of
the aforementioned decision particularly those which dismiss the counterclaim of the
defendants for the cancellation of the registrations by the plaintiff of the trademarks
Bayer and Bayer Cross and which allow the plaintiff "to continue using the Bayer
trademarks for medicines."6
And now to the facts.
The word BAYER was the surname of Friedrich Bayer, a German, who, on August 1,
1868, organized a drug company bearing his name — Friedr Bayer et comp. — at
Barmen, Germany. The company was at first engaged in the manufacture and sale of
chemicals. At about the year 1888 it started to manufacture pharmaceutical preparations
also. A change of name from Friedr Bayer to Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedr. Bayer & Co.
(FFB, for short) effective July 1, 1881 was followed in 1912 by a change of principal
place of business from Elberfeld to Luverkusen, Germany. 7 Its products came to be
known outside Germany. With the discovery in 1899 of the Bayer Aspirin, the mark
BAYER acquired prestige. The time was ripe to register the trademarks. The record,
however, does not clearly show when the word BAYER was registered as a trademark in
Germany. The BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE trademark was registered in Germany on
January 6, 1904 — No. 65777.8 It was intended to be used on "medicines for human
beings and animals, disinfectants preservatives, tar dyestuffs and chemical preparations
for dyes and for photographic purposes." 9 This registered trademark consists of the
BAYER CROSS encircled by the company's name Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedr. Bayer &
Co. Elberfeld.

When the company was merged with other German companies in 1925 to form the I.G.
Farbenindustrie, the name of the former company was deleted from the trademark and
what remained was the present BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE. A new registration was
effected on June 17, 1929 in Germany and for which it was issued a certificate with
serial no. 404341. The trademark BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE was registered by FFB
and its subsidiaries in other parts of the world, viz, in Norway, England, Denmark, and
Argentina in 1904; in Japan and the United States in 1908; in Spain in 1911; in Peru in
1913.
Sometime in 1895, FFB established a subsidiary in New York, United States. It was
named Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. Its purpose was to sell FFB's products in the
United States and Canada. It was this subsidiary that registered the trademarks BAYER
and BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE in the United States between the years 1907-1908.
Sometime in 1913, FFB organized another subsidiary — The Bayer Co., Inc. of New
York. This new subsidiary was authorized by FFB to negotiate for and acquire the
trademarks, goodwill, assets and property of Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. By an
agreement dated June 12, 1913 (Exh. 106) Bayer of New York purchased for the sum of
US $750,000.00 Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co.'s "right for the sale in the United States
and Canada of the drugs, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and any and all other products
and articles manufactured and (or) controlled by Leverkusen" (FFB) and its "trademarks,
good will and other assets and property."
On April 6, 1917,10 the United States declared war on Germany. Pursuant to the
provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Alien Property Custodian classified
The Bayer Co., Inc. of New York as an enemy-controlled corporation. Hence, the Alien
Property Custodian seized its assets about the early part of 1918. Between December
1918 and January 1919, all the assets of The Bayer Co., Inc. of New York were sold by
the Alien Property Custodian to Sterling Drug, Inc. for the sum of US $5,310,000.00. The
Bayer Co., Inc. of New York then became a subsidiary of Sterling Drug, Inc. Winthrop
Chemical Co., Inc. was later organized as a new subsidiary of Sterling Drug, Inc. to
manufacture and sell the physicians' drugs which had been acquired" by the purchase of
the Bayer Co., Inc. Winthrop's operation was evidently hampered because 'the Germans
had kept manufacturing processes secret, so that the manufacture of physicians' drugs
on a commercial scale became an almost insoluble problem. 11
Sterling Drug, Inc. secured registrations of the BAYER trademarks in different countries
of the world.12
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 383
It would appear that the trademark BAYER for medicines was known in the Philippines
about the close of the 19th century. This appears on page 88 of the Revista
Farmaceutica de Filipinos Año I, Numero 7, 3 de Julio de 1893. Before World War I,
BAYER products entering the Philippines came from Germany.
In 1922, a worldwide conflict of interests occurred between Farbenfabriken vorm.
Friedrich Bayer & Co. and The Bayer Co., Inc. of New York, in reference to the
trademarks BAYER and BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE as they were applied to various
products.
Two agreements resolved this conflict, both executed on April 9, 1923 in London,
England: one, between FFB and Winthrop Chemical Co., Inc. (Exh. 66), and the other
between FFB and Bayer New York (Exh. WWW). Under the terms of the agreement with
Winthrop Chemical Co., Inc., FFB stipulated, amongst others: (1) not to contest anymore
Winthrop's right over the trademarks BAYER and BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE; (2) to
discontinue the use of said trademarks in the United States which was understood to
include the Philippines under par. 16 of said agreement; and (3) to disclose all secrets of
other processes relating to the manufacture of pharmaceuticals.
Paragraph 26 of the FFB — Bayer New York agreement reads —
26. NEW YORK (The Bayer Company, Inc. of New York) agree that they will not sell or
offer for sale any goods other than hereunder or those they may market for Winthrop as
hereinbefore provided and other than Aspirin and compounds of Aspirin which New York
shall continue to market for their own account in the United States of America, Puerto
Rico, the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands and the Panama Zone. 13
In 1925, Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedrich Bayer & Co. became I.G. Farbenindustrie, AG.
This necessitated a new agreement incorporating Exh. 66 with modifications. Said new
agreement was signed on November 15, 1926 between I.G. Farbenindustrie and
Winthrop.
On September 5, 1941, in the anti-trust suits against Sterling Drug, Inc., Winthrop
Chemicals Co. and The Bayer Co., of New York, two consent decrees [Exh. 68 (No. 15-
363) and Exh. 69: (No. 15-364)] were promulgated by the U.S. District Court for
Southern New York. Said consent decrees declared the April 9 1923, cartel agreements
violative of the U.S. anti-trust laws. One reason given is that the German company, FFB
(later I.G. Farbenindustrie) — FBA's predecessors — was excluded from the U.S.
pharmaceutical market. The sentence, however, contains a saving clause, thus —

The Bayer contract of 1923, the Bayer contract of 1926, and any and all amendments or
supplements thereto are declared and adjudged to be unlawful under the Anti-Trust
Laws of the United States, and the defendants Bayer and Sterling, and their respective
successors an subsidiaries, or any of them, be and they are hereby enjoined and
restrained from carrying out or enforcing any of the aforesaid contracts, or any
supplements, amendments or modifications thereof, or from paying to I.G. Farben, its
subsidiaries, successors, or assigns, any royalties or share of profits pursuant to said
contracts with respect to sales following the effective date of this decree.
Provided, however, that nothing herein contained in this Sec. III shall:lawphi1.nêt
xxx     xxx     xxx
Affect in any way the rights or title of the defendant Bayer, its successors, subsidiaries or
assigns, in or to the name "Bayer" and the "Bayer Cross" mark or registrations thereof,
or
Affect or diminish any right, title or interest of said defendants, their successor
subsidiaries or assigns, in or to or under any heretofore acquired and presently existing
patents, patent applications, patent licenses, trade-marks, trade-names (such as the
name "Bayer" and the "Bayer Cross" mark and registrations thereof), processes or
formulae relating to the manufacturing, processing, use or sale of aspirin, aspirin
compounds, pharmaceutical or other drug or chemical products, or impair any rights or
remedies of said defendants, their successors, subsidiaries or assigns, provided by
statute or convention, and by suits for damages, injunction or other remedy with respect
to any such patents, patent applications, patent licenses or trademarks.... 14
Meanwhile, in 1935, plaintiff Sterling Products International, Inc. (SPI) a Delaware
corporation, a subsidiary of Sterling Drug, Inc. of New York, was issued a license to do
business in the Philippines.15 The trademarks BAYER and BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE
were then registered in the Philippines under the old Trademark Law (Act 666) by The
Bayer Co., Inc.; the BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE trademark on April 18, 1939 for which it
was issued Certificate of Registration No. 13081; the BAYER trademark on April 22,
1939 for which it was issued Registration Certificate No. 13089. These trademark rights
were assigned to SPI on December 30, 1942 and the assignment was recorded in the
Philippines Patent Office on March 5, 1947. With the passage of Republic Act 166
repealing the old Trademark Law (Act 666), SPI was issued by the Philippines Patent
Office on June 18, 1948 two new certificates of registration: No. 1260-S for BAYER
CROSS IN CIRCLE; No. 1262-S for BAYER. The registration of these trademarks was
only for "Medicines".
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 384
Came World War II. I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. was seized by the allied powers. In 1945,
after World War II, I.G. Farbenindustrie AG. was decartelized by the Allied High
Commission. The unit known as Farbenfabriken Bayer was transferred in 1953 to
Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft (FBA), one of the defendants in this case,
which was organized in 1951.
Sometime in 1958, defendant Allied Manufacturing & Trading Co., Inc. (AMATCO)
started selling FBA's products especially "Folidol" a chemical insecticide which bears the
BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE trademark.16
On November 18, 1959, FBA applied for the registration of the BAYER CROSS IN
CIRCLE trademark with the Philippines Patent Office for animal and plant destroying
agents. The examiner's report dated December 17, 1959 stated that the subject mark
appears to be similar to SPI's registered BAYER trademarks as covered by Certificates
of Registration Nos. 1260-S and 1262-S. He concluded that "[r]egistration of applicant's
mark is proscribed by Section 4-d of the Statute because it would cause confusion or
mistake or [to] deceive purchasers."17 This action of the Philippines Patent Office drew a
reply from FBA. In its letter dated February 1, 1960 applicant FBA, thru counsel, said
that it "offers no question or objection to the assertion of the Examiner that the
registrant's mark and that of the applicant are similar to each other. It emphasized the
fact that it was seeking registration in the Supplemental Register. Its concluding
statement runs thus:.
Being aware of the duties and obligations of a trademark user in the Philippines and the
penalties provided for in the pertinent law on tradermarks and being aware also that
Supplemental Registration is not a prima facie evidence of ownership of mark but merely
a recordation of the use as in fact the mark is actually being used by the applicant in the
Philippines, it is respectfully urged that this [application] be given due course. 18
On February 25, 1960, FBA was issued a certificate of registration in the Supplemental
Register, SR-304.
We now grapple with the problems raised in the separate appeals.
1. A rule widely accepted and firmly entrenched because it has come down through the
years is that actual use in commerce or business is a prerequisite to the acquisition of
the right of ownership over a trademark. This rule is spelled out in our. Trademark Law
thus:

SEC. 2-A. Ownership of trade-marks, trademark names and service-mark; how
acquired. — Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any kind or who
engages in any lawful business, or who renders any lawful service in commerce, by
actual use thereof in manufacture or trade, in business, and in the service rendered,
may appropriate to his, exclusive use a trademark, a trade-name, or a service-mark not
so appropriated by another, to distinguish his merchandise, business, or service from
the merchandise, business or service of others. The ownership or possession of a
trademark, trade-name, service mark, heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this
section provided, shall be recognized and protected in the same manner and to the
same extent as are other property rights known to the law. (As inserted by Section 1 of
Republic Act 638)
It would seem quite clear that adoption alone of a trademark would not give exclusive
right thereto. Such right grows out of their actual use." 19 Adoption is not use. One may
make advertisements, issue circulars, give out price lists on certain goods; but these
alone would not give exclusive right of use. For trademark is a creation of use. The
underlying reason for all these is that Purchasers have come to understand the mark as
indicating the origin of the wares.20 Flowing from this is the trader's right to protection in
the trade he has built up and the goodwill he has accumulated from use of the
trademark. Registration of a trademark, of course, has value: it is an administrative act
declaratory of a pre-existing right. Registration does not, however, perfect a trademark
right.
The BAYER trademarks registered in the Philippines to which plaintiff SPI may lay claim,
as correctly stated in the decision below, are those which cover medicines only. For, it
was on said goods that the BAYER trademarks were actually used by it in the
Philippines. Therefore, the certificates of registration for medicines issued by the
Director of Patents upon which the protection is enjoyed are only for medicines. Nothing
in those certificates recited would include chemical or insecticides.
But plaintiff insists that the statement of the applicant (The Bayer Co., Inc.) in its
registrations of the BAYER marks states that "the merchandise for which the trademark
is appropriated is d. — Chemicals, Medicines and Pharmaceutical Preparations."
Plaintiff's position is that such statement determines the goods for which said marks had
been registered. Validity does not attach to this proposition. First, the statement itself
admits that "the particular description of the articles comprised in said class (d) on which
the trademark is used is Medicines."21 It is not used for chemicals.
Then, Section 11 of the Trademark Law requires that the certificate of registration state
"the particular goods . . . for which it is registered." This is controlling. Under Section 11
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 385
aforesaid, likewise to be entered in the certificate of registration is "the date of the first
use in commerce or business. SPI may not claim "first use" of the trademarks prior to
the registrations thereof on any product other than medicines.
Besides, Section 7 of the same Trademark Act directs that upon the filing of the
application and the payment of the required fee, the "Director [of Patents] shall cause an
examination of the application" — for registration of the trademark — "to be made, and,
if on such examination it shall appear that the applicant is entitled to registration, the
Director . . . shall cause the mark . . . to be published in the Official Gazette." This
examination, it would seem to us, is necessary in order that the Director of Patents may
be satisfied that the application conforms to the requirement of actual use in commerce
of the trademark in Section 2 and 2-A of the Trademark Law; and that the statement in
said application — as to the "first use" thereof and "the goods . . . in connection with
which the mark . . . is used" (Section 5) — is true.
Really, if the certificate of registration were to be deemed as including goods not
specified therein, then a situation may arise whereby an applicant may be tempted to
register a trademark on any and all goods which his mind may conceive even if he had
never intended to use the trademark for the said goods. We believe that such omnibus
registration is not contemplated by our Trademark Law.
Because of this and of the fact that the Bayer trademarks were never used in the
Philippines by plaintiff except for medicines — Aspirin, Aspirin for Children and
Cafiaspirina — we find ourselves unwilling to draw a hard and fast rule which would
absolutely and under all circumstances give unqualified protection to plaintiff against the
use of said trademarks by all others on goods other than medicines.
2. Neither will the 1927 registration in the United States of the BAYER trademark for
insecticides serve plaintiff any. The United States is not the Philippines. Registration in
the United States is not registration in the Philippines. At the time of the United States
registration in 1927, we had our own Trademark Law, Act No. 666 aforesaid of the
Philippine Commission, which provided for registration here of trademarks owned by
persons domiciled in the United States.
What is to be secured from unfair competition in a given territory is the trade which one
has in that particular territory. There is where his business is carried on; where the
goodwill symbolized by the trademark has immediate value; where the infringer may
profit by infringement.

There is nothing new in what we now say. Plaintiff itself concedes 22 that the principle of
territoriality of the Trademark Law has been recognized in the Philippines, citing
Ingenohl vs. Walter E. Olsen, 71 L. ed. 762. As Callmann puts it, the law of trademarks
"rests upon the doctrine of nationality or territoriality." 23
Accordingly, the 1927 registration in the United States of the BAYER trademark would
not of itself afford plaintiff protection for the use by defendants in the Philippines of the
same trademark for the same or different products.
3. A question basic in the field of trademarks and unfair competition is the extent to
which a registrant of a trademark covering one product may invoke the right to protection
against the use by other(s) of the same trademark to identify merchandise different from
those for which the trademark has been appropriated.
Plaintiff's trenchant claim is that it should not be turned away because its case comes
within the protection of the confusion of origin rule. Callmann notes two types of
confusion. The first is the confusion of goods "in which event the ordinarily prudent
purchaser would be induced to purchase one product in the belief that he was
purchasing the other." In which case, "defendant's goods are then bought as the
plaintiff's, and the poorer quality of the former reflects adversely on the plaintiff's
reputation." The other is the confusion of business: "Here though the goods of the
parties are different, the defendant's product is such as might reasonably be assumed to
originate with the plaintiff, and the public would then be deceived either into that belief or
into the belief that there is some connection between the plaintiff and defendant which,
in fact, does not exist."24
A judicial test giving the scope of the rule of confusion of origin is Ang vs.
Teodoro  (December 14, 1942), 74 Phil. 50. Briefly, the facts of the just cited case are as
follows: Toribio Teodoro, at first in partnership with Juan Katindig and later as sole
proprietor, had continuously used "Ang Tibay" both as trademark and as tradename in
the manufacture and sale of slippers, shoes and indoor baseballs since 1910. He
formally registered it as a trademark on September 29, 1915 and as a tradename on
January 3, 1933. Ana L. Ang registered the same trademark "Ang Tibay" for pants and
shirts on April 11, 1932 and established a factory for the manufacture of said articles in
1937. Suit was lodged by Teodoro against Ang to cancel the latter's registration of the
trademark "Ang Tibay" and to perpetually enjoin her from using the said trademark on
goods manufactured and sold by her. The judgment of the trial court absolved defendant
(Ana L. Ang) from the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
reversed. On appeal by certiorari, we affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We
there said:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 386
"In the present state of development of the law on Trade-Marks, Unfair Competition, and
Unfair Trading, the test employed by the courts to determine whether noncompeting
goods are or are not of the same class is confusion as to the origin of the goods of the
second user. Although two noncompeting articles may be classified under two different
classes by the Patent Office because they are deemed not to possess the same
descriptive properties, they would, nevertheless, be held by the courts to belong to the
same class if the simultaneous use on them of identical or closely similar trademarks
would be likely to cause confusion as to the origin, or personal source, of the second
user's goods. They would be considered as not falling under the same class only if they
are so dissimilar or so foreign to each other as to make it unlikely that the purchaser
would think the first user made the second user's goods.
Such construction of the law is induced by cogent reasons of equity and fair dealing. The
courts have come to realize that there can be unfair competition or unfair trading even if
the goods are noncompeting, and that such unfair trading can cause injury or damage to
the first user of a given trademark, first, by prevention of the natural expansion of his
business and, second, by having his business reputation confused with and put at the
mercy of the second user. When noncompetitive products are sold under the mark, the
gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the
mark created by its first user, inevitably results. The original owner is entitled to the
preservation of the vauable link between him and the public that has been created by his
ingenuity and the merit of his wares or services. Experience has demonstrated that
when a well-known trademark is adopted by another even for a totally different class of
goods, it is done to get the benefit of the reputation and advertisements of the originator
of said mark, to convey to the public a false impression of some supposed connection
between the manufacturer of the article sold under the original mark and the new articles
being tendered to the public under the same or similar mark. As trade has developed
and commercial changes have come about, the law of unfair competition has expanded
to keep pace with the times and the element of strict competition in itself has ceased to
be the determining factor. The owner of a trademark or trade-name has a property right
in which he is entitled to protection, since there is damage to him from confusion of
reputation or goodwill in the mind of the public as well as from confusion of goods. The
modern trend is to give emphasis to the unfairness of the acts and to classify and treat
the issue as a fraud.25
The thoughts expressed in Ang Tibay command respect Conduct of business should
conform to ethical business standards. Unfairness is proscribed. The invocation of equity
is bottomed upon the injunction that no one should "reap where he has not sown." 26

Nonetheless, "[i]t has been emphasized that each case presents a unique problem
which must be answered by weighing the conflicting interests of the litigants." 27 With this
in mind, we are convinced that the case before us is not to be analogized with Ang
Tibay. The factual setting is different. His Honor, Judge Magno S. Gatmaitan (now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals), the trial judge, so found. He reached a
conclusion likewise different. And the reasons, so well stated by His Honor, are these:
1st). — It was not plaintiff's predecessor but defendant's namely Farbenfabriken
or Bayer Germany that first introduced the medical products into the Philippine
market and household with the Bayer mark half a century ago; this is what the
Court gathers from the testimony of Frederick Umbreit and this is the implication
even of Exhs. 48, 49, 66 and as already shown a few pages back; 28
2nd). — There is thus reason plausible enough for defendant' plea that as
Sterling was not the "originator" of the Bayer mark, the rule in Ang vs. Teodoro,
supra, is not applicable; and this is correct notwithstanding Exhs. 106 and 63
and even giving unto these documents full force and virtue, because purchase
of the assets of Elberfeld, defendants' previous affiliate in New York, by Bayer
of New York, even if that were to be held to include purchase of the Bayer mark,
did not make the purchaser Bayer of New York the originator of the mark;
especially since Bayer of New York was only another subsidiary of Bayer
Germany or Farbenfabriken which was the real originator;
3rd). — The Court is also impelled to believe that the evidence establishes that
among the common people of the Philippines the "Bayer" medicines come from
Germany; this the Court deduces from the testimony of witness Florisa Pestano
who only reproduced the belief of her grandmother; the Court might as well say
that plaintiff itself has not discouraged that belief because the drug and its
literature that came from the plaintiff and its affiliate would show that it
represented its medicines to have come from defendant 29 and were
manufactured in Germany with that Bayer mark; thus Exh. 70 30 which is the
price list of 1928 of Botica de Sta. Cruz on page 6 indicates that Winthrop
Chemical Company of New York, — plaintiff's subsidiary — was a distributor of
I.G. Farbenindustrie, A.G. Leverkusen Germany; Exh. 80 31 which is a medical
diary published by Winthrop for 1934 on page 148 manifested that the journal,
"Practical Therapeutics" was published by I.G. Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellachaft for Winthrop Chemical Company, Inc.; "with particular
reference to the pharmacological products, sera and vaccines originated and
prepared in the laboratories of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G."; and Exh. 79 a, b,
c, d and e which are prospectuses for the medicines, Mitigal, Afridol, Aspirins,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 387
Novalgina and My-Salvarsan32 showed that these products were manufactured
for Winthrop by I.G. Farbenindustrie; and then Exh. 81 the Revista Boie of 1928
would show that Winthrop represented itself as the distributor of the products of
Bayer of Germany otherwise known as I.G. Farbenindustrie, "segun la alta
calidad de la marca original";33 the Court being also impelled to add in this
connection that it has to take judicial notice of a belief of long standing common
among the people in the Philippines that German products are of very high
quality and it is only natural for a distributor or a retailer to take advantage of
that, and as it is not debated that "Bayer" is a German surname, (see plaintiff's
rebuttal Exh. QQQQ, see also p. 7 plaintiff's reply memorandum wherein it is
said that this surname is a "pretty common one among members of the
Germany race") it is all so very easy to associate the Bayer trademark with
products that come from Germany and to believe that they are of high quality;
4th). — The rationale of the doctrine in Ang vs. Teodoro, supra being that:
The Courts have come to realize that there can be unfair competition or unfair trading
even if the goods are non-competing, and that such unfair trading can cause injury or
damage to the first user of a given trade mark, first, by prevention of the natural
expansion of his business, and second, by having his business reputation confused with
and put at the mercy of the second user. 74 Phil. 55-56;
and the Court having found out that the 'first user' was Bayer Germany and it was this
that had built up the Bayer mark and plaintiff apparently having itself encouraged that
belief even after it had acquired the Bayer mark in America, thru forced sale, of
defendant's subsidiary there in 1918, Exhs. 79, 80, 81, to apply the Ang Tibay rule in the
manner advocated by Sterling would, the Court fears, produce the reverse result and the
consequence would be not equity but injustice. 34
It would seem to us that the fact that plaintiff rode on the German reputation in the Bayer
trademark has diluted the rationally of its exclusionary claim. Not that the free ride in the
name of defendant's German predecessor was sporadic. It is continuing. Proof of this is
the label on the box used by plaintiff (Exhibit U) in the distribution of Bayer Aspirin. This
box bears prominently on the front part the legend "Genuine" in red color and two
arrows: the first pointing to BAYER CROSS IN CIRCLE, and the second, to BAYER
Aspirin. At the back thereof in big letters are the words "BAYER ASPIRIN", followed in
small letters "Used since 1900" and down below the small words "Mfd. in the Phil. by
Winthrop Stearns, Inc. for STERLING PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL,
INCORPORATED." In plaintiff's prospectus (Exhibit 1) found in the box of Bayer Aspirin
tablets, children's size, there is the significant statement: "GENUINE BAYER — Each

Children's Size Bayer Aspirin tablet is stamped with the Bayer Cross, the trademark of
the genuine Bayer product. This means that your child is getting the same gentle-to-the-
system Bayer Aspirin that has been used for over 50 years by millions of normal people
without ill effect."
With the background of prior use in the Philippines of the word BAYER by FBA's
German predecessor and the prior representations that plaintiff's medicines sold in the
Philippines were manufactured in Germany, the facts just recited hammer on the mind of
the public that the Aspirin. Cafiaspirina and Aspirin for Children being marketed for
plaintiff in the Philippines come from the same source — the German source — and in
use since 1900. That this view is far from far-fetched, is illustrated by the testimony of
plaintiff's own witness, Dr. Antonio Vasquez, viz:
Q. Have you ever heard of a pharmaceutical company of Bayer of Germany, or
a company in Germany named Bayer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since when have you heard of this pharmaceutical company in Germany
with the name Bayer, since when have you heard of that?
A. I have always taken the name Bayer as associated with Winthrop & Stearns.
Q. But, you said a while ago....
Witness.
.... Yes .....
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. ... that you have heard of a pharmaceutical company with the name of Bayer
in Germany?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know if this Winthrop & Stearns you mentioned has ever been
connected with Bayer Company of Germany?
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 388
A. I have always understood that they were distributing drugs of Bayer &
Company.35
4. The Ang Tibay doctrine, we believe, is not to be read as shunting aside the time-
honored teaching that he who comes into equity must do so with clean hands. 36 Plaintiff
cannot now say that the present worth of its BAYER trademarks it owes solely to its own
efforts; it is not insulated from the charge that as it marketed its medicines it did so with
an eye to the goodwill as to quality that defendants' predecessor had established.
There is no whittling away of the identity of plaintiff's trademarks. Plaintiff is not the first
user thereof in the Philippines. The trademarks do not necessarily link plaintiff with the
public. Plaintiff must show injury; it has not. On the contrary, representations as to the
place of manufacture of plaintiff's medicines were untrue, misleading. Plaintiff could still
be tagged with the same deception "which (it) complains of in the
defendant(s)."37 Appropriate it is to recall here our observation in the Ang Tibay opinion,
viz: "On our part may we add, without meaning to be harsh, that a self-respecting person
does not remain in the shelter of another but builds one of his own." 38
Plaintiff, the owner in this country of the trademarks BAYER for medicines, has thus
forfeited its right to protection from the use of the same trademarks by defendants for
products different therefrom — insecticides and other chemicals.
5. But defendants ask us to delist plaintiff's BAYER trademarks for medicines from the
Principal Register, claiming right thereto for said use. Said trademarks had been
registered since 1939 by plaintiff's predecessor. The Bayer Co., Inc.
Defendants' claim is stale; it suffers from the defect of non-use. 39 While it is conceded
that FBA's predecessors first introduced medical products with the BAYER trademarks
in the Philippine market, it is equally true that, after World War I, no definite evidence
there is that defendants or their professors traded in the Philippines in medicines with
the BAYER trademarks thereafter. FBA did not seasonably voice its objection. Lack of
protest thereto connoted acquiescence. And this; notwithstanding the fact that the 1923
and 1926 agreements were set aside in the anti-trust suits. Defendants did use the
marks; but it was much later, i.e., in 1958 — and on chemicals and insecticides — not
on medicines. FBA only bestirred itself and challenged plaintiff's right to the trademarks
on medicines when this suit was filed. Vigilantibus non dormientibus equitas subvenit. 40
The net result is that, as the trial court aptly observed, plaintiff may hold on to its BAYER
trademarks for medicines. And defendants may continue using the same trademarks for
insecticides and other chemicals, not medicines.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 389

6. Defendants balk at the ruling below which directs them "to add a distinctive word or
words in their mark to indicate that their products come from Germany." 41

We are left under no doubt as to the reasonableness of the formula thus fashioned. It
avoids the mischief of confusion of origin — defendant FBA's product would not be
mistaken for those of plaintiff. It reduces friction. We perceive of no prejudice to
defendants. The order does not visit defendant FBA with reprobation or condemnation.
Rather, said defendant would be enhancing the value of and would be sponsoring its
own products. Anyway, a statement that its products come from Germany is but a
statement of fact.

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. No costs.
So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63796-97 May 2, 1984
LA CHEMISE LACOSTE, S. A., petitioner,  trademarks used on clothings and other goods specifically sporting apparels sold in
vs.
HON. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XLIX, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila and GOBINDRAM
HEMANDAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-65659 May 2l, 1984
GOBINDRAM HEMANDAS SUJANANI, petitioner,  the registration of the same trademark under the Principal Register. The Patent Office
vs.
HON. ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, in his capacity as Minister of Trade and Industry, and
HON. CESAR SAN DIEGO, in his capacity as Director of Patents, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioners in 63796-97.
Ramon C. Fernandez for private respondent in 63796-97 and petitioner in 65659.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
It is among this Court's concerns that the Philippines should not acquire an unbecoming
reputation among the manufacturing and trading centers of the world as a haven for
intellectual pirates imitating and illegally profiting from trademarks and tradenames
which have established themselves in international or foreign trade.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A., a well known European manufacturer of clothings and sporting
apparels sold in the international market and bearing the trademarks "LACOSTE"
"CHEMISE LACOSTE", "CROCODILE DEVICE" and a composite mark consisting of the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 390
word "LACOSTE" and a representation of a crocodile/alligator. The petitioner asks us to
set aside as null and void, the order of judge Oscar C. Fernandez, of Branch XLIX,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, granting the motion to quash the
search warrants previously issued by him and ordering the return of the seized items.
The facts are not seriously disputed. The petitioner is a foreign corporation, organized
and existing under the laws of France and not doing business in the Philippines, It is
undeniable from the records that it is the actual owner of the abovementioned
many parts of the world and which have been marketed in the Philippines since 1964,
The main basis of the private respondent's case is its claim of alleged prior registration.
In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued
Reg. No. SR-2225 (SR stands for Supplemental Register) for the trademark "CHEMISE
LACOSTE & CROCODILE DEVICE" by the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts,
sportswear and other garment products of the company. Two years later, it applied for
eventually issued an order dated March 3, 1977 which states that:
xxx xxx xxx
... Considering that the mark was already registered in the
Supplemental Register in favor of herein applicant, the Office has no
other recourse but to allow the application, however, Reg. No. SR-2225
is now being contested in a Petition for Cancellation docketed as IPC
No. 1046, still registrant is presumed to be the owner of the mark until
after the registration is declared cancelled.
Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to respondent Gobindram Hemandas all rights,
title, and interest in the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & DEVICE".
On November 21, 1980, the petitioner filed its application for registration of the
trademark "Crocodile Device" (Application Serial No. 43242) and "Lacoste" (Application
Serial No. 43241).The former was approved for publication while the latter was opposed
by Games and Garments in Inter Partes Case No. 1658. In 1982, the petitioner filed a
Petition for the Cancellation of Reg. No. SR-2225 docketed as Inter Partes Case No.
1689. Both cases have now been considered by this Court in Hemandas v. Hon.
Roberto Ongpin (G.R. No. 65659).

On March 21, 1983, the petitioner filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a
letter-complaint alleging therein the acts of unfair competition being committed by
Hemandas and requesting their assistance in his apprehension and prosecution. The
NBI conducted an investigation and subsequently filed with the respondent court two
applications for the issuance of search warrants which would authorize the search of the
premises used and occupied by the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and Garments
both owned and operated by Hemandas.
The respondent court issued Search Warrant Nos. 83-128 and 83-129 for violation of
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, "it appearing to the satisfaction of the judge after
examining under oath applicant and his witnesses that there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that Gobindram Hemandas ... has in his control and possession in his
premises the ... properties subject of the offense," (Rollo, pp. 67 and 69) The NBI agents
executed the two search warrants and as a result of the search found and seized
various goods and articles described in the warrants.
Hemandas filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that the trademark used
by him was different from petitioner's trademark and that pending the resolution of IPC
No. 1658 before the Patent Office, any criminal or civil action on the same subject matter
and between the same parties would be premature.
The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion arguing that the motion to quash was
fatally defective as it cited no valid ground for the quashal of the search warrants and
that the grounds alleged in the motion were absolutely without merit. The State
Prosecutor likewise filed his opposition on the grounds that the goods seized were
instrument of a crime and necessary for the resolution of the case on preliminary
investigation and that the release of the said goods would be fatal to the case of the
People should prosecution follow in court.
The respondent court was, however, convinced that there was no probable cause to
justify the issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in its order dated March 22, 1983, the
search warrants were recalled and set aside and the NBI agents or officers in custody of
the seized items were ordered to return the same to Hemandas. (Rollo, p. 25)
The petitioner anchors the present petition on the following issues:
Did respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 391
(i) in reversing the finding of probable cause which he himself had
made in issuing the search warrants, upon allegations which are
matters of defense and as such can be raised and resolved only upon
trial on the merits; and
(ii) in finding that the issuance of the search warrants is premature in
the face of the fact that (a) Lacoste's registration of the subject
trademarks is still pending with the Patent Office with opposition from
Hemandas; and (b) the subject trademarks had been earlier registered
by Hemandas in his name in the Supplemental Register of the
Philippine Patent Office?
Respondent, on the other hand, centers his arguments on the following issues:
I
THE PETITIONER HAS NO CAPACITY TO SUE BEFORE PHILIPPINE COURTS.
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ORDER DATED APRIL
22, 1983.
Hemandas argues in his comment on the petition for certiorari  that the petitioner being a
foreign corporation failed to allege essential facts bearing upon its capacity to sue before
Philippine courts. He states that not only is the petitioner not doing business in the
Philippines but it also is not licensed to do business in the Philippines. He also cites the
case of Leviton Industries v. Salvador  (114 SCRA 420) to support his contention
The Leviton  case, however, involved a complaint for unfair competition under Section
21-A of Republic Act No. 166 which provides:
Sec. 21 — A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark
or tradename has been registered or assigned under this Act may bring
an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false
designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been
licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act numbered
Fourteen Hundred and Fifty-Nine, as amended, otherwise known as
the Corporation Law, at the time it brings the complaint; Provided, That

the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a
citizen, or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a
similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines.
We held that it was not enough for Leviton, a foreign corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of New York, United States of America, to merely allege that
it is a foreign corporation. It averred in Paragraph 2 of its complaint that its action was
being filed under the provisions of Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, as amended.
Compliance with the requirements imposed by the abovecited provision was necessary
because Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166 having explicitly laid down certain
conditions in a specific proviso, the same must be expressly averred before a successful
prosecution may ensue. It is therefore, necessary for the foreign corporation to comply
with these requirements or aver why it should be exempted from them, if such was the
case. The foreign corporation may have the right to sue before Philippine courts, but our
rules on pleadings require that the qualifying circumstances necessary for the assertion
of such right should first be affirmatively pleaded.
In contradistinction, the present case involves a complaint for violation of Article 189 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Leviton case is not applicable.
Asserting a distinctly different position from the Leviton argument, Hemandas argued in
his brief that the petitioner was doing business in the Philippines but was not licensed to
do so. To support this argument, he states that the applicable ruling is the case
of Mentholatum Co., Inc. v. Mangaliman: (72 Phil. 524) where Mentholatum Co. Inc., a
foreign corporation and Philippine-American Drug Co., the former's exclusive distributing
agent in the Philippines filed a complaint for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition against the Mangalimans.
The argument has no merit. The Mentholatum case is distinct from and inapplicable to
the case at bar. Philippine American Drug Co., Inc., was admittedly selling products of
its principal Mentholatum Co., Inc., in the latter's name or for the latter's account. Thus,
this Court held that "whatever transactions the Philippine-American Drug Co., Inc. had
executed in view of the law, the Mentholatum Co., Inc., did it itself. And, the
Mentholatum Co., Inc., being a foreign doing business in the Philippines without the
license required by Section 68 of the Corporation Law, it may not prosecute this action
for violation of trademark and unfair competition."
In the present case, however, the petitioner is a foreign corporation not doing business
in the Philippines. The marketing of its products in the Philippines is done through an
exclusive distributor, Rustan Commercial Corporation The latter is an independent entity
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 392
which buys and then markets not only products of the petitioner but also many other
products bearing equally well-known and established trademarks and tradenames. in
other words, Rustan is not a mere agent or conduit of the petitioner.
The rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Investments pursuant to its rule-
making power under Presidential Decree No. 1789, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Investment Code, support a finding that the petitioner is not doing business in the
Philippines. Rule I, Sec. 1  (g) of said rules and regulations defines "doing business" as
one" which includes, inter alia:
(1) ... A foreign firm which does business through middlemen acting on
their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or
commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing business in the
Philippines. But such indentors, commercial brokers or commission
merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the
Philippines.
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the
Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an
independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its
account, and not in the name or for the account of a principal Thus,
where a foreign firm is represented by a person or local company which
does not act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm the latter is
doing business in the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the above provisions to the facts of this case, we find and conclude that the
petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines. Rustan is actually a middleman acting
and transacting business in its own name and or its own account and not in the name or
for the account of the petitioner.
But even assuming the truth of the private respondent's allegation that the petitioner
failed to allege material facts in its petition relative to capacity to sue, the petitioner may
still maintain the present suit against respondent Hemandas. As early as 1927, this
Court was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines needs no license to sue before Philippine courts for infringement of
trademark and unfair competition. Thus, in Western Equipment and Supply Co. v.
Reyes  (51 Phil. 115), this Court held that a foreign corporation which has never done
any business in the Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do business

here, but is widely and favorably known in the Philippines through the use therein of its
products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a legal right to maintain an action in
the Philippines to restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof from organizing a
corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign corporation, when it appears
that they have personal knowledge of the existence of such a foreign corporation, and it
is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is to deal and trade in
the same goods as those of the foreign corporation.
We further held:
xxx xxx xxx
... That company is not here seeking to enforce any legal or control
rights arising from, or growing out of, any business which it has
transacted in the Philippine Islands. The sole purpose of the action:
Is to protect its reputation, its corporate name, its goodwill, whenever
that reputation, corporate name or goodwill have, through the natural
development of its trade, established themselves.' And it contends that
its rights to the use of its corporate and trade name:
Is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect
against all the world, in any of the courts of the world-even in
jurisdictions where it does not transact business-just the same as it
may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against trespass, or
conversion. Citing sec. 10, Nims on Unfair Competition and
TradeMarks and cases cited; secs. 21-22, Hopkins on TradeMarks,
Trade Names and Unfair Competition and cases cited.' That point is
sustained by the authorities, and is well stated in Hanover Star Mining
Co. v. Allen and Wheeler Co. (208 Fed., 513). in which the syllabus
says:
Since it is the trade and not the mark that is to be protected, a trade-
mark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or states
or nations, but extends to every market where the trader's goods have
become known and Identified by the use of the mark.
Our recognizing the capacity of the petitioner to sue is not by any means novel or
precedent setting. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases illustrating instances when
foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines may nonetheless sue in our
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 393
courts. In East Board Navigation Ltd, v. Ysmael and Co., Inc.  (102 Phil. 1), we
recognized a right of foreign corporation to sue on isolated transactions. In General
Garments Corp. v. Director of Patents (41 SCRA 50), we sustained the right of Puritan
Sportswear Corp., a foreign corporation not licensed to do and not doing business in the
Philippines, to file a petition for cancellation of a trademark before the Patent Office.
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded this
petition for certiorari was a letter complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas with
a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. If prosecution
follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the
Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines
and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is
essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party
although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become,
therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We cannot snow a possible violator
of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the
aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for
unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are
moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France
are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international commitment
of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we
entered into because it is in our national interest to do so.
The Paris Convention provides in part that:
ARTICLE 1
(1) The countries to which the present Convention applies constitute
themselves into a Union for the protection of industrial property.
(2) The protection of industrial property is concerned with patents, utility
models, industrial designs, trademarks service marks, trade names,
and indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of
unfair competition.
xxx xxx xxx

ARTICLE 2
(2) Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may
hereafter grant, to nationals, without prejudice to the rights specially
provided by the present Convention. Consequently, they shall have the
same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any
infringement of their rights, provided they observe the conditions and
formalities imposed upon nationals.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 6
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, either administratively if their
legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse
or to cancel the registration and to prohibit the use of a trademark
which constitutes a reproduction, imitation or translation, liable to
create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of
the country of registration or use to be well-known in that country as
being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of the
present Convention and used for Identical or similar goods. These
provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark
constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation
liable to create confusion therewith.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 8
A trade name shall be protected in all the countries of the Union without
the obligation of filing or registration, whether or not it forms part of
a trademark.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 10bis
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 394
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to persons entitled
to the benefits of the Union effective protection against unfair
competition.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 10ter
(1) The countries of the Union undertake to assure to nationals of the
other countries of the Union appropriate legal remedies to repress
effectively all the acts referred to in Articles 9, 10 and l0bis.
(2) They undertake, further, to provide measures to permit syndicates
and associations which represent the industrialists, producers or
traders concerned and the existence of which is not contrary to the
laws of their countries, to take action in the Courts or before the
administrative authorities, with a view to the repression of the acts
referred to in Articles 9, 10 and 10bis, in so far as the law of the country
in which protection is claimed allows such action by the syndicates and
associations of that country.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 17
Every country party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in
accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure the
application of this Convention.
It is understood that at the time an instrument of ratification or
accession is deposited on behalf of a country; such country will be in a
position under its domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this
Convention. (61 O.G. 8010)
xxx xxx xxx
In Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T Eaton Co.  (234 F. 2d 633) the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals had occasion to comment on the extraterritorial application of the Paris
Convention It said that:

[11] The International Convention is essentially a compact between the
various member countries to accord in their own countries to citizens of
the other contracting parties trademark and other rights comparable to
those accorded their own citizens by their domestic law. The underlying
principle is that foreign nationals should be given the same treatment in
each of the member countries as that country makes available to its
own citizens. In addition, the Convention sought to create uniformity in
certain respects by obligating each member nation 'to assure to
nationals of countries of the Union an effective protection against unfair
competition.'
[12] The Convention is not premised upon the Idea that the trade-mark
and related laws of each member nation shall be given extra-territorial
application, but on exactly the converse principle that each nation's law
shall have only territorial application. Thus a foreign national of a
member nation using his trademark in commerce in the United States
is accorded extensive protection here against infringement and other
types of unfair competition by virtue of United States membership in the
Convention. But that protection has its source in, and is subject to the
limitations of, American law, not the law of the foreign national's own
country. ...
By the same token, the petitioner should be given the same treatment in the Philippines
as we make available to our own citizens. We are obligated to assure to nationals of
"countries of the Union" an effective protection against unfair competition in the same
way that they are obligated to similarly protect Filipino citizens and firms.
Pursuant to this obligation, the Ministry of Trade on November 20, 1980 issued a
memorandum addressed to the Director of the Patents Office directing the latter:
xxx xxx xxx
... to reject all pending applications for Philippine registration of
signature and other world famous trademarks by applicants other than
its original owners or users.
The conflicting claims over internationally known trademarks involve
such name brands as Lacoste, Jordache, Gloria Vanderbilt, Sasson,
Fila, Pierre Cardin, Gucci, Christian Dior, Oscar de la Renta, Calvin
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 395
Klein, Givenchy, Ralph Lauren, Geoffrey Beene, Lanvin and Ted
Lapidus.
It is further directed that, in cases where warranted, Philippine
registrants of such trademarks should be asked to surrender their
certificates of registration, if any, to avoid suits for damages and other
legal action by the trademarks' foreign or local owners or original users.
The memorandum is a clear manifestation of our avowed adherence to a policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations. It is not, as wrongly alleged by the private
respondent, a personal policy of Minister Luis Villafuerte which expires once he leaves
the Ministry of Trade. For a treaty or convention is not a mere moral obligation to be
enforced or not at the whims of an incumbent head of a Ministry. It creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties founded on the generally accepted principle of
international law of pacta sunt servanda which has been adopted as part of the law of
our land. (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3). The memorandum reminds the Director of
Patents of his legal duty to obey both law and treaty. It must also be obeyed.
Hemandas further contends that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned order of April 22, 1983.
A review of the grounds invoked by Hemandas in his motion to quash the search
warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They are
matters of defense which should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the case.
For instance, on the basis of the facts before the Judge, we fail to understand how he
could treat a bare allegation that the respondent's trademark is different from the
petitioner's trademark as a sufficient basis to grant the motion to quash. We will treat the
issue of prejudicial question later. Granting that respondent Hemandas was only trying
to show the absence of probable cause, we, nonetheless, hold the arguments to be
untenable.
As a mandatory requirement for the issuance of a valid search warrant, the Constitution
requires in no uncertain terms the determination of probable cause by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce (Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 3). Probable cause has traditionally meant such facts
and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that are in themselves
sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof
(People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667).

This concept of probable cause was amplified and modified by our ruling in Stonehill v.
Diokno,  (20 SCRA 383) that probable cause "presupposes the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws."
The question of whether or not probable cause exists is one which must be decided in
the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations (Central Bank v. Morfe, 20 SCRA
507). We agree that there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of the
existence of probable cause since, as we have recognized in Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA
310), the existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the
facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. More so it is plain that
our country's ability to abide by international commitments is at stake.
The records show that the NBI agents at the hearing of the application for the warrants
before respondent court presented three witnesses under oath, sworn statements, and
various exhibits in the form of clothing apparels manufactured by Hemandas but carrying
the trademark Lacoste. The respondent court personally interrogated Ramon Esguerra,
Samuel Fiji, and Mamerto Espatero by means of searching questions. After hearing the
testimonies and examining the documentary evidence, the respondent court was
convinced that there were good and sufficient reasons for the issuance of the warrant.
And it then issued the warrant.
The respondent court, therefore, complied with the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. At that point in time, it was fully
convinced that there existed probable cause. But after hearing the motion to quash and
the oppositions thereto, the respondent court executed a complete turnabout and
declared that there was no probable cause to justify its earlier issuance of the warrants.
True, the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any,
but the rectification must, as earlier stated be based on sound and valid grounds. In this
case, there was no compelling justification for the about face. The allegation that vital
facts were deliberately suppressed or concealed by the petitioner should have been
assessed more carefully because the object of the quashal was the return of items
already seized and easily examined by the court. The items were alleged to be fake and
quite obviously would be needed as evidence in the criminal prosecution. Moreover, an
application for a search warrant is heard ex parte.  It is neither a trial nor a part of the
trial. Action on these applications must be expedited for time is of the essence. Great
reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the testimonies under oath of the
complainant and the witnesses. The allegation of Hemandas that the applicant withheld
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 396
information from the respondent court was clearly no basis to order the return of the
seized items.
Hemandas relied heavily below and before us on the argument that it is the holder of a
certificate of registration of the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE
DEVICE". Significantly, such registration is only in the Supplemental Register.
A certificate of registration in the Supplemental Register is not prima facie evidence of
the validity of registration, of the registrant's exclusive right to use the same in
connection with the goods, business, or services specified in the certificate. Such a
certificate of registration cannot be filed, with effect, with the Bureau of Customs in order
to exclude from the Philippines, foreign goods bearing infringement marks or trade
names (Rule 124, Revised Rules of Practice Before the Phil. Pat. Off. in Trademark
Cases; Martin, Philippine Commercial Laws, 1981, Vol. 2, pp. 513-515).
Section 19-A of Republic Act 166 as amended not only provides for the keeping of the
supplemental register in addition to the principal register but specifically directs that:
xxx xxx xxx
The certificates of registration for marks and trade names registered on
the supplemental register shall be conspicuously different from
certificates issued for marks and trade names on the principal register.
xxx xxx xxx
The reason is explained by a leading commentator on Philippine Commercial Laws:
The registration of a mark upon the supplemental register is not, as in
the case of the principal register, prima facie evidence of (1) the validity
of registration; (2) registrant's ownership of the mark; and (3)
registrant's exclusive right to use the mark. It is not subject to
opposition, although it may be cancelled after its issuance. Neither may
it be the subject of interference proceedings. Registration on the
supplemental register is not constructive notice of registrant's claim of
ownership. A supplemental register is provided for the registration of
marks which are not registrable on the principal register because of
some defects (conversely, defects which make a mark unregistrable on
the principal register, yet do not bar them from the supplemental

register.) (Agbayani, II Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 1978, p.
514, citing Uy Hong Mo v. Titay & Co., et al., Dec. No. 254 of Director
of Patents, Apr. 30, 1963);
Registration in the Supplemental Register, therefore, serves as notice that the registrant
is using or has appropriated the trademark. By the very fact that the trademark cannot
as yet be entered in the Principal Register, all who deal with it should be on guard that
there are certain defects, some obstacles which the user must Still overcome before he
can claim legal ownership of the mark or ask the courts to vindicate his claims of an
exclusive right to the use of the same. It would be deceptive for a party with nothing
more than a registration in the Supplemental Register to posture before courts of justice
as if the registration is in the Principal Register.
The reliance of the private respondent on the last sentence of the Patent office action on
application Serial No. 30954 that "registrant is presumed to be the owner of the mark
until after the registration is declared cancelled" is, therefore, misplaced and grounded
on shaky foundation, The supposed presumption not only runs counter to the precept
embodied in Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent
Office in Trademark Cases but considering all the facts ventilated before us in the four
interrelated petitions involving the petitioner and the respondent, it is devoid of factual
basis. And even in cases where presumption and precept may factually be reconciled,
we have held that the presumption is rebuttable, not conclusive, (People v. Lim Hoa,
G.R. No. L10612, May 30, 1958, Unreported). One may be declared an unfair
competitor even if his competing trademark is registered (Parke, Davis & Co. v. Kiu Foo
& Co., et al., 60 Phil. 928; La Yebana Co. v. Chua Seco & Co., 14 Phil. 534).
By the same token, the argument that the application was premature in view of the
pending case before the Patent Office is likewise without legal basis.
The proceedings pending before the Patent Office involving IPC Co. 1658 do not
partake of the nature of a prejudicial question which must first be definitely resolved.
Section 5 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that:
A petition for the suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a pre-judicial question in a civil case, may only be
presented by any party before or during the trial of the criminal action.
The case which suspends the criminal prosecution must be a civil case which is
determinative of the innocence or, subject to the availability of other defenses, the guilt
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 397
of the accused. The pending case before the Patent Office is an administrative
proceeding and not a civil case. The decision of the Patent Office cannot be finally
determinative of the private respondent's innocence of the charges against him.
In Flordelis v. Castillo (58 SCRA 301), we held that:
As clearly delineated in the aforecited provisions of the new Civil Code
and the Rules of Court, and as uniformly applied in numerous decisions
of this Court, (Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837 (1920); Aleria v.
Mendoza, 83 Phil. 427 (1949); People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357 (1954);
Brito-Sy v. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., 102 Phil 482 (1957);
Mendiola v. Macadael, 1 SCRA 593; Benitez v. Concepcion, 2 SCRA
178; Zapante v. Montesa, 4 SCRA 510; Jimenez v. Averia, 22 SCRA
1380.) In Buenaventura v. Ocampo (55 SCRA 271) the doctrine of
prejudicial question was held inapplicable because no criminal case but
merely an administrative case and a civil suit were involved. The Court,
however, held that, in view of the peculiar circumstances of that case,
the respondents' suit for damages in the lower court was premature as
it was filed during the pendency of an administrative case against the
respondents before the POLCOM. 'The possibility cannot be
overlooked,' said the Court, 'that the POLCOM may hand down a
decision adverse to the respondents, in which case the damage suit
will become unfounded and baseless for wanting in cause of action.')
the doctrine of pre-judicial question comes into play generally in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action both penned and
there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure  of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case.
In the present case, no civil action pends nor has any been instituted. What was pending
was an administrative case before the Patent Office.
Even assuming that there could be an administrative proceeding with exceptional or
special circumstances which render a criminal prosecution premature pending the
promulgation of the administrative decision, no such peculiar circumstances are present
in this case.

Moreover, we take note of the action taken by the Patents Office and the Minister of
Trade and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court in the case of La Chemise
Lacoste S. A. v. Ram Sadhwani  (AC-G.R. No. SP-13356, June 17, 1983).
The same November 20, 1980 memorandum of the Minister of Trade discussed in this
decision was involved in the appellate court's decision. The Minister as the
"implementing authority" under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the protection of
Industrial Property instructed the Director of Patents to reject applications for Philippine
registration of signature and other world famous trademarks by applicants other than its
original owners or users. The brand "Lacoste" was specifically cited together with
Jordache, Gloria Vanderbilt, Sasson, Fila, Pierre Cardin, Gucci, Christian Dior, Oscar
dela Renta, Calvin Klein, Givenchy, Ralph Laurence, Geoffrey Beene, Lanvin, and Ted
Lapidus. The Director of Patents was likewise ordered to require Philippine registrants of
such trademarks to surrender their certificates of registration. Compliance by the
Director of Patents was challenged.
The Intermediate Appellate Court, in the La Chemise Lacoste S.A. v. Sadhwani decision
which we cite with approval sustained the power of the Minister of Trade to issue the
implementing memorandum and, after going over the evidence in the records, affirmed
the decision of the Director of Patents declaring La Chemise Lacoste &A. the owner of
the disputed  trademark and crocodile or alligator device.  The Intermediate Appellate
Court speaking through Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza stated:
In the case at bar, the Minister of Trade, as 'the competent authority of
the country of registration,' has found that among other well-known
trademarks 'Lacoste' is the subject of conflicting claims. For this
reason, applications for its registration must be rejected or refused,
pursuant to the treaty obligation of the Philippines.
Apart from this finding, the annexes to the opposition, which La
Chemise Lacoste S.A. filed in the Patent Office, show that it is the
owner of the trademark 'Lacoste' and the device consisting of a
representation of a crocodile or alligator by the prior adoption and use
of such mark and device on clothing, sports apparel and the like. La
Chemise Lacoste S.A, obtained registration of these mark and device
and was in fact issued renewal certificates by the French National
Industry Property Office.
xxx xxx xxx
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 398
Indeed, due process is a rule of reason. In the case at bar the order of
the Patent Office is based not only on the undisputed fact of ownership
of the trademark by the appellee but on a prior determination by the
Minister of Trade, as the competent authority under the Paris
Convention, that the trademark and device sought to be registered by
the appellant are well-known marks which the Philippines, as party to
the Convention, is bound to protect in favor of its owners. it would be to
exalt form over substance to say that under the circumstances, due
process requires that a hearing should be held before the application is
acted upon.
The appellant cites section 9 of Republic Act No. 166, which requires
notice and hearing whenever an opposition to the registration of a
trademark is made. This provision does not apply, however, to
situations covered by the Paris Convention, where the appropriate
authorities have determined that a well-known trademark is already that
of another person. In such cases, the countries signatories to the
Convention are obliged to refuse or to cancel the registration of the
mark by any other person or authority. In this case, it is not disputed
that the trademark Lacoste is such a well-known mark that a hearing,
such as that provided in Republic Act No. 166, would be superfluous.
The issue of due process was raised and fully discussed in the appellate court's
decision. The court ruled that due process was not violated.
In the light of the foregoing it is quite plain that the prejudicial question argument is
without merit.
We have carefully gone over the records of all the cases filed in this Court and find more
than enough evidence to sustain a finding that the petitioner is the owner of the
trademarks "LACOSTE", "CHEMISE LACOSTE", the crocodile or alligator device, and
the composite mark of LACOSTE and the representation of the crocodile or alligator.
Any pretensions of the private respondent that he is the owner are absolutely without
basis. Any further ventilation of the issue of ownership before the Patent Office will be a
superfluity and a dilatory tactic.
The issue of whether or not the trademark used by the private respondent is different
from the petitioner's trade mark is a matter of defense and will be better resolved in the
criminal proceedings before a court of justice instead of raising it as a preliminary matter
in an administrative proceeding.

The purpose of the law protecting a trademark cannot be overemphasized. They are to
point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed, to secure to
him, who has been instrumental in bringing into market a superior article of
merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill, and to prevent fraud and imposition
(Etepha v. Director of Patents, 16 SCRA 495).
The legislature has enacted laws to regulate the use of trademarks and provide for the
protection thereof. Modern trade and commerce demands that depredations on
legitimate trade marks of non-nationals including those who have not shown prior
registration thereof should not be countenanced. The law against such depredations is
not only for the protection of the owner of the trademark but also, and more importantly,
for the protection of purchasers from confusion, mistake, or deception as to the goods
they are buying. (Asari Yoko Co., Ltd. v. Kee Boc, 1 SCRA 1; General Garments
Corporation v. Director of Patents, 41 SCRA 50).
The law on trademarks and tradenames is based on the principle of business integrity
and common justice' This law, both in letter and spirit, is laid upon the premise that,
while it encourages fair trade in every way and aims to foster, and not to hamper,
competition, no one, especially a trader, is justified in damaging or jeopardizing
another's business by fraud, deceipt, trickery or unfair methods of any sort. This
necessarily precludes the trading by one dealer upon the good name and reputation built
up by another (Baltimore v. Moses, 182 Md 229, 34 A (2d) 338).
The records show that the goodwill and reputation of the petitioner's products bearing
the trademark LACOSTE date back even before 1964 when LACOSTE clothing
apparels were first marketed in the Philippines. To allow Hemandas to continue using
the trademark Lacoste for the simple reason that he was the first registrant in the
Supplemental Register of a trademark used in international commerce and not
belonging to him is to render nugatory the very essence of the law on trademarks and
tradenames.
We now proceed to the consideration of the petition in Gobindram Hemandas Suianani
u. Hon. Roberto  V Ongpin, et al. (G.R. No. 65659).
Actually, three other petitions involving the same trademark and device have been filed
with this Court.
In Hemandas & Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. No. 63504) the
petitioner asked for the following relief:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 399
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed (a) that
the Resolutions of the respondent Court of January 3, 1983
and February 24, 1983 be nullified; and that the Decision of the same
respondent Court of June 30, 1983 be declared to be the law on the
matter; (b) that the Director of Patents be directed to issue the
corresponding registration certificate in the Principal Register; and (c)
granting upon the petitioner such other legal and equitable remedies as
are justified by the premises.
On December 5, 1983, we issued the following resolution:
Considering the allegations contained, issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the petition for review, the respondent's
comment thereon, and petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court
Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.
The Court further Resolved to CALL the attention of the Philippine
Patent Office to the pendency in this Court of G.R. No. 563796-97
entitled 'La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Hon. Oscar C. Fernandez and
Gobindram Hemandas' which was given due course on June 14, 1983
and to the fact that G.R. No. 63928-29 entitled 'Gobindram Hemandas
v. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A., et al.' filed on May 9, 1983 was dismissed
for lack of merit on September 12, 1983. Both petitions involve the
same dispute over the use of the trademark 'Chemise Lacoste'.
The second case of Gobindram Hemandas vs. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A., et al.  (G.R.
No. 63928-29) prayed for the following:
I. On the petition for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, an order
be issued after due hearing:
l. Enjoining and restraining respondents Company, attorneys-in-fact,
and Estanislao Granados from further proceedings in the unfair
competition charges pending with the Ministry of Justice filed against
petitioner;
2. Enjoining and restraining respondents Company and its attorneys-in-
fact from causing undue publication in newspapers of general
circulation on their unwarranted claim that petitioner's products are
FAKE pending proceedings hereof; and

3. Enjoining and restraining respondents Company and its attorneys-in-
fact from sending further threatening letters to petitioner's customers
unjustly stating that petitioner's products they are dealing in are FAKE
and threatening them with confiscation and seizure thereof.
II. On the main petition, judgment be rendered:
l. Awarding and granting the issuance of the Writ of Prohibition,
prohibiting, stopping, and restraining respondents from further
committing the acts complained of;
2. Awarding and granting the issuance of the Writ of Mandamus,
ordering and compelling respondents National Bureau of Investigation,
its aforenamed agents, and State Prosecutor Estanislao Granados to
immediately comply with the Order of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch XLIX, Manila, dated April 22, 1983,
which directs the immediate return of the seized items under Search
Warrants Nos. 83-128 and 83-129;
3. Making permanent any writ of injunction that may have been
previously issued by this Honorable Court in the petition at bar: and
4. Awarding such other and further relief as may be just and equitable
in the premises.
As earlier stated, this petition was dismissed for lack of merit on September 12, 1983.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration, the Court on November 23, 1983 resolved to
deny the motion for lack of merit and declared the denial to be final.
Hemandas v. Hon. Roberto Ongpin  (G.R. No. 65659) is the third petition.
In this last petition, the petitioner prays for the setting aside as null and void and for the
prohibiting of the enforcement of the following memorandum of respondent Minister
Roberto Ongpin:
MEMORANDUM:
FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 400
Philippine Patent Office
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 913 dated 7 October 1983 which strengthens the rule-
making and adjudicatory powers of the Minister of Trade and Industry and provides inter
alia, that 'such rule-making and adjudicatory powers should be revitalized in order that
the Minister of Trade and Industry can ...apply more swift and effective solutions and
remedies to old and new problems ... such as the infringement of internationally-known
tradenames and trademarks ...'and in view of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court in the case of LA CHEMISE LACOSTE, S.A., versus RAM SADWHANI  [AC-G.R.
Sp. No. 13359 (17) June 1983] which affirms the validity of the MEMORANDUM of then
Minister Luis R. Villafuerte dated 20 November 1980 confirming our obligations under
the PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY to
which the Republic of the Philippines is a signatory, you are hereby directed to
implement measures necessary to effect compliance with our obligations under said
convention in general, and, more specifically, to honor our commitment under Section 6
bis  thereof, as follows:
1. Whether the trademark under consideration is well-known in the
Philippines or is a mark already belonging to a person entitled to the
benefits of the CONVENTION, this should be established, pursuant to
Philippine Patent Office procedures in inter partes and ex parte cases,
according to any of the following criteria or any combination thereof:
(a) a declaration by the Minister of Trade and Industry that' the
trademark being considered is already well-known in the Philippines
such that permission for its use by other than its original owner will
constitute a reproduction, imitation, translation or other infringement;
(b) that the trademark is used in commerce internationally, supported
by proof that goods bearing the trademark are sold on an international
scale, advertisements, the establishment of factories, sales offices,
distributorships, and the like, in different countries, including volume or
other measure of international trade and commerce;
(c) that the trademark is duly registered in the industrial property
office(s) of another country or countries, taking into consideration the
dates of such registration;

(d) that the trademark has been long established and obtained goodwill
and general international consumer recognition as belonging to one
owner or source;
(e) that the trademark actually belongs to a party claiming ownership
and has the right to registration under the provisions of the aforestated
PARIS CONVENTION.
2. The word trademark, as used in this MEMORANDUM, shall include
tradenames, service marks, logos, signs, emblems, insignia or other
similar devices used for Identification and recognition by consumers.
3. The Philippine Patent Office shall refuse all applications for, or
cancel the registration of, trademarks which constitute a reproduction,
translation or imitation of a trademark owned by a person, natural or
corporate, who is a citizen of a country signatory to the PARIS
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY.
4. The Philippine Patent Office shall give due course to the Opposition
in cases already or hereafter filed against the registration of trademarks
entitled to protection of Section 6 bis of said PARIS CONVENTION as
outlined above, by remanding applications filed by one not entitled to
such protection for final disallowance by the Examination Division.
5. All pending applications for Philippine registration of signature and
other world famous trademarks filed by applicants other than their
original owners or users shall be rejected forthwith. Where such
applicants have already obtained registration contrary to the
abovementioned PARIS CONVENTION and/or Philippine Law, they
shall be directed to surrender their Certificates of Registration to the
Philippine Patent Office for immediate cancellation proceedings.
6. Consistent with the foregoing, you are hereby directed to expedite
the hearing and to decide without delay the following cases pending
before your Office:
1. INTER PARTES CASE NO. 1689-Petition filed by La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. for the cancellation of Certificate of Registration No. SR-
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 401
2225 issued to Gobindram Hemandas, assignee of Hemandas and
Company;
2. INTER PARTES CASE NO. 1658-Opposition filed by Games and
Garments Co. against the registration of the trademark Lacoste sought
by La Chemise Lacoste, S.A.;
3. INTER PARTES CASE NO. 1786-Opposition filed by La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. against the registration of trademark Crocodile Device
and Skiva sought by one Wilson Chua.
Considering our discussions in G.R. Nos. 63796-97, we find the petition in G.R. No.
65659 to be patently without merit and accordingly deny it due course.
In complying with the order to decide without delay the cases specified in the
memorandum, the Director of Patents shall limit himself to the ascertainment of facts in
issues not resolved by this decision and apply the law as expounded by this Court to
those facts.
One final point. It is essential that we stress our concern at the seeming inability of law
enforcement officials to stem the tide of fake and counterfeit consumer items flooding
the Philippine market or exported abroad from our country. The greater victim is not so
much the manufacturer whose product is being faked but the Filipino consuming public
and in the case of exportations, our image abroad. No less than the President, in issuing
Executive Order No. 913 dated October 7, 1983 to strengthen the powers of the Minister
of Trade and Industry for the protection of consumers, stated that, among other acts, the
dumping of substandard, imitated, hazardous, and cheap goods, the infringement of
internationally known tradenames and trademarks, and the unfair trade practices of
business firms has reached such proportions as to constitute economic sabotage. We
buy a kitchen appliance, a household tool, perfume, face powder, other toilet articles,
watches, brandy or whisky, and items of clothing like jeans, T-shirts, neck, ties, etc. —
the list is quite length — and pay good money relying on the brand name as guarantee
of its quality and genuine nature only to explode in bitter frustration and genuine nature
on helpless anger because the purchased item turns out to be a shoddy imitation, albeit
a clever looking counterfeit, of the quality product. Judges all over the country are well
advised to remember that court processes should not be used as instruments to,
unwittingly or otherwise, aid counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of the
law as it seeks to protect the Filipino consuming public and frustrate executive and
administrative implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to international
conventions and treaties.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 402

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. NOS. 63797-97 is hereby GRANTED. The order
dated April 22, 1983 of the respondent regional trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Our Temporary Restraining Order dated April 29, 1983 is ma(i.e. PERMANENT.
The petition in G.R. NO. 65659 is DENIED due course for lack of merit. Our Temporary
Restraining Order dated December 5, 1983 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE, effective
immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46720             June 28, 1940
WELLS FARGO BANK & UNION TRUST COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,  that as to real and tangible personal property of a non-resident decedent, located in the
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent-appellee.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion for
appellee.
Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, James Madison Ross and Federico Agrava as
amici curiæ.
MORAN, J.:
An appeal from a declaratory judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
Birdie Lillian Eye, wife of Clyde Milton Eye, died on September 16, 1932, at Los
Angeles, California, the place of her alleged last residence and domicile. Among the
properties she left her one-half conjugal share in 70,000 shares of stock in the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, an anonymous partnership (sociedad anonima),
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with is principal office in the
City of Manila. She left a will which was duly admitted to probate in California where her
estate was administered and settled. Petitioner-appellant, Wells Fargo Bank & Union
Trust Company, was duly appointed trustee of the created by the said will. The Federal
and State of California's inheritance taxes due on said shares have been duly paid.
Respondent Collector of Internal Revenue sought to subject anew the aforesaid shares
of stock to the Philippine inheritance tax, to which petitioner-appellant objected.
Wherefore, a petition for a declaratory judgment was filed in the lower court, with the
statement that, "if it should be held by a final declaratory judgment that the transfer of
the aforesaid shares of stock is legally subject to the Philippine inheritance tax, the
petitioner will pay such tax, interest and penalties (saving error in computation) without
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 403
protest and will not file to recover the same; and the petitioner believes and t herefore
alleges that it should be held that such transfer is not subject to said tax, the respondent
will not proceed to assess and collect the same." The Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment, holding that the transmission by will of the said 35,000 shares of
stock is subject to Philippine inheritance tax. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
Petitioner concedes (1) that the Philippine inheritance tax is not a tax property, but upon
transmission by inheritance (Lorenzo vs. Posadas, 35 Off. Gaz., 2393, 2395), and (2)
Philippines, the Philippine inheritance tax may be imposed upon their transmission by
death, for the self-evident reason that, being a property situated in this country, its
transfer is, in some way, defendant, for its effectiveness, upon Philippine laws. It is
contended, however, that, as to intangibles, like the shares of stock in question, their
situs is in the domicile of the owner thereof, and, therefore, their transmission by death
necessarily takes place under his domiciliary laws.
Section 1536 of the Administrative Code, as amended, provides that every transmission
by virtue of inheritance of any share issued by any corporation of sociedad
anonima  organized or constituted in the Philippines, is subject to the tax therein
provided. This provision has already been applied to shares of stock in a domestic
corporation which were owned by a British subject residing and domiciled in Great
Britain. (Knowles vs. Yatco, G. R. No. 42967. See also  Gibbs vs. Government of P. I.,
G. R. No. 35694.) Petitioner, however, invokes the rule laid down by the United States
Supreme Court in four cases (Farmers Loan & Trust Company vs. Minnesota, 280 U.S.
204; 74 Law. ed., 371; Baldwin vs. Missouri, 281 U.S., 586; 74 Law. ed., 1056,
Beidler vs. South Carolina Tax Commission 282 U. S., 1; 75 Law. ed., 131; First
National Bank of Boston vs. Maine, 284 U. S., 312; 52 S. Ct., 174, 76 Law. ed., 313; 77
A. L. R., 1401), to the effect that an inheritance tax can be imposed with respect to
intangibles only by the State where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death,
and that, under the due-process clause, the State in which a corporation has been
incorporated has no power to impose such tax if the shares of stock in such corporation
are owned by a non-resident decedent. It is to be observed, however, that in a later case
(Burnet vs. Brooks, 288 U. S., 378; 77 Law. ed., 844), the United States Supreme Court
upheld the authority of the Federal Government to impose an inheritance tax on the
transmission, by death of a non-resident, of stock in a domestic (America) corporation,
irrespective of the situs of the corresponding certificates of stock. But it is contended that
the doctrine in the foregoing case is not applicable, because the due-process clause is
directed at the State and not at the Federal Government, and that the federal or national
power of the United States is to be determined in relation to other countries and their

subjects by applying the principles of jurisdiction recognized in international relations. Be
that as it may, the truth is that the due-process clause is "directed at the protection of the
individual and he is entitled to its immunity as much against the state as against the
national government." (Curry vs. McCanless, 307 U. S., 357, 370; 83 Law. ed., 1339,
1349.) Indeed, the rule laid down in the four cases relied upon by the appellant was
predicated on a proper regard for the relation of the states of the American Union, which
requires that property should be taxed in only one state and that jurisdiction to tax is
restricted accordingly. In other words, the application to the states of the due-process
rule springs from a proper distribution of their powers and spheres of activity as ordained
by the United States Constitution, and such distribution is enforced and protected by not
allowing one state to reach out and tax property in another. And these considerations do
not apply to the Philippines. Our status rests upon a wholly distinct basis and no
analogy, however remote, cam be suggested in the relation of one state of the Union
with another or with the United States. The status of the Philippines has been aptly
defined as one which, though a part of the United States in the international sense, is,
nevertheless, foreign thereto in a domestic sense. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244,
341.)
At any rate, we see nothing of consequence in drawing any distinct between the
operation and effect of the due-process clause as it applies to the individual states and
to the national government of the United States. The question here involved is
essentially not one of due-process, but of the power of the Philippine Government to tax.
If that power be conceded, the guaranty of due process cannot certainly be invoked to
frustrate it, unless the law involved is challenged, which is not, on considerations
repugnant to such guaranty of due process of that of the equal protection of the laws, as,
when the law is alleged to be arbitrary, oppressive or discriminatory.
Originally, the settled law in the United States is that intangibles have only one situs for
the purpose of inheritance tax, and that such situs is in the domicile of the decedent at
the time of his death. But this rule has, of late, been relaxed. The maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam, upon which the rule rests, has been described as a mere "fiction of
law having its origin in consideration of general convenience and public policy, and
cannot be applied to limit or control the right of the state to tax property within its
jurisdiction" (State Board of Assessors vs. Comptoir National D'Escompte, 191 U. S.,
388, 403, 404), and must "yield to established fact of legal ownership, actual presence
and control elsewhere, and cannot be applied if to do so result in inescapable and patent
injustice." (Safe Deposit & Trust Co. vs. Virginia, 280 U. S., 83, 91-92) There is thus a
marked shift from artificial postulates of law, formulated for reasons of convenience, to
the actualities of each case.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 404
An examination of the adjudged cases will disclose that the relaxation of the original rule
rests on either of two fundamental considerations: (1) upon the recognition of the
inherent power of each government to tax persons, properties and rights within its
jurisdiction and enjoying, thus, the protection of its laws; and (2) upon the principle that
as o intangibles, a single location in space is hardly possible, considering the multiple,
distinct relationships which may be entered into with respect thereto. It is on the basis of
the first consideration that the case of Burnet vs.Brooks, supra, was decided by the
Federal Supreme Court, sustaining the power of the Government to impose an
inheritance tax upon transmission, by death of a non-resident, of shares of stock in a
domestic (America) corporation, regardless of the situs of their corresponding
certificates; and on the basis of the second consideration, the case of
Cury vs. McCanless, supra.
In Burnet vs. Brooks, the court, in disposing of the argument that the imposition of the
federal estate tax is precluded by the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment, held:
The point, being solely one of jurisdiction  to tax, involves none of the other
consideration raised by confiscatory or arbitrary legislation inconsistent with the
fundamental conceptions of justice which are embodied in the due-process
clause for the protection of life, liberty, and property of all persons — citizens
and friendly aliens alike. Russian Volunteer Fleet vs. United States, 282 U. S.,
481, 489; 75 Law ed., 473, 476; 41 S. Ct., 229; Nicholas vs. Coolidge, 274 U.
S., 531; 542, 71 Law ed., 1184, 1192; 47 S. Ct., 710; 52 A. L. R., 1081;
Heiner vs. Donnon, 285 U.S., 312, 326; 76 Law ed., 772, 779; 52 S. Ct., 358. If
in the instant case the Federal Government had jurisdiction to impose the tax,
there is manifestly no ground for assailing it. Knowlton vs. Moore, 178 U.S., 41,
109; 44 Law. ed., 969, 996; 20 S. Ct., 747; MaGray vs. United States, 195 U.S.,
27, 61; 49 Law. ed., 78; 97; 24 S. Ct., 769; 1 Ann. Cas., 561; Flint  vs. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U.S., 107, 153, 154; 55 Law. ed., 389, 414, 415; 31 S. Ct., 342;
Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1312; Brushaber vs. Union p. R. Co., 240 U.S., 1, 24; 60
Law. ed., 493, 504; 36 S. Ct., 236; L. R. A., 1917 D; 414, Ann. Cas, 1917B, 713;
United States vs. Doremus, 249 U. S., 86, 93; 63 Law. ed., 439, 496; 39 S. Ct.,
214. (Emphasis ours.)
And, in sustaining the power of the Federal Government to tax properties within its
borders, wherever its owner may have been domiciled at the time of his death, the court
ruled:
. . . There does not appear, a priori, to be anything contrary to the principles of
international law, or hurtful to the polity of nations, in a State's taxing property

physically situated within its borders, wherever its owner may have been
domiciled at the time of his death. . . .
As jurisdiction may exist in more than one government, that is, jurisdiction
based on distinct grounds — the citizenship of the owner, his domicile, the
source of income, the situs of the property — efforts have been made to
preclude multiple taxation through the negotiation of appropriate international
conventions. These endeavors, however, have proceeded upon express or
implied recognition, and not in denial, of the sovereign taxing power as exerted
by governments in the exercise of jurisdiction upon any one of these grounds. . .
. (See pages 396-397; 399.)
In Curry vs. McCanless, supra, the court, in deciding the question of whether the States
of Alabama and Tennessee may each constitutionally impose death taxes upon the
transfer of an interest in intangibles held in trust by an Alabama trustee but passing
under the will of a beneficiary decedent domiciles in Tennessee, sustained the power of
each State to impose the tax. In arriving at this conclusion, the court made the following
observations:
In cases where the owner of intangibles confines his activity to the place of his
domicile it has been found convenient to substitute a rule for a reason, cf. New
York ex rel., Cohn vs. Graves, 300 U.S., 308, 313; 81 Law. ed., 666, 670; 57 S.
Ct., 466; 108 A. L. R., 721; First Bank Stock Corp. vs. Minnesota, 301 U. S.,
234, 241; 81 Law. ed., 1061, 1065; 57 S. Ct., 677; 113 A. L. R., 228, by saying
that his intangibles are taxed at their situs and not elsewhere, or perhaps less
artificially, by invoking the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam.
Blodgett vs. Silberman, 277 U.S., 1; 72 Law. ed., 749; S. Ct., 410, supra;
Baldwin vs. Missouri, 281 U. S., 568; 74 Law. ed., 1056; 50 S. Ct., 436; 72 A. L.
R., 1303, supra, which means only that it is the identify owner at his domicile
which gives jurisdiction to tax. But when the taxpayer extends his activities with
respect to his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection and benefit of
the laws of another state, in such a way as to bring his person or properly within
the reach of the tax gatherer there, the reason for a single place of taxation no
longer obtains, and the rule even workable substitute for the reasons may exist
in any particular case to support the constitutional power of each state
concerned to tax. Whether we regard the right of a state to tax as founded on
power over the object taxed, as declared by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316; 4 Law. ed., 579, supra, through
dominion over tangibles or over persons whose relationships are source of
intangibles rights, or on the benefit and protection conferred by the taxing
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 405
sovereignty, or both, it is undeniable that the state of domicile is not deprived,
by the taxpayer's activities elsewhere, of its constitutional jurisdiction to tax, and
consequently that there are many circumstances in which more than one state
may have jurisdiction to impose a tax and measure it by some or all of the
taxpayer's intangibles. Shares or corporate stock be taxed at the domicile of the
shareholder and also at that of the corporation which the taxing state has
created and controls; and income may be taxed both by the state where it is
earned and by the state of the recipient's domicile. protection, benefit, and
power over the subject matter are not confined to either state. . . .(p. 1347-
1349.)
. . . We find it impossible to say that taxation of intangibles can be reduced in
every case to the mere mechanical operation of locating at a single place, and
there taxing, every legal interest growing out of all the complex legal
relationships which may be entered into between persons. This is the case
because in point of actuality those interests may be too diverse in their
relationships to various taxing jurisdictions to admit of unitary treatment without
discarding modes of taxation long accepted and applied before the Fourteen
Amendment was adopted, and still recognized by this Court as valid. (P. 1351.)
We need not belabor the doctrines of the foregoing cases. We believe, and so hold, that
the issue here involved is controlled by those doctrines. In the instant case, the actual
situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled therein.
And besides, the certificates of stock have remained in this country up to the time when
the deceased died in California, and they were in possession of one Syrena McKee,
secretary of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, to whom they have been
delivered and indorsed in blank. This indorsement gave Syrena McKee the right to vote
the certificates at the general meetings of the stockholders, to collect dividends, and
dispose of the shares in the manner she may deem fit, without prejudice to her liability to
the owner for violation of instructions. For all practical purposes, then, Syrena McKee
had the legal title to the certificates of stock held in trust for the true owner thereof. In
other words, the owner residing in California has extended here her activities with
respect to her intangibles so as to avail herself of the protection and benefit of the
Philippine laws. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Philippine Government to tax must be
upheld.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993
PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES OF
TABAC REUNIES, S.A., petitioners  registration issued by the Philippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973, May 28, 1964, and
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco Law Office for petitioners.
Teresita Gandionco-Oledan for private respondent.
MELO, J.:
In the petition before us, petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada),
Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the
faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court
when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had
issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from
manufacturing and selling "MARK" cigarettes in the local market.
Banking on the thesis that petitioners' respective symbols "MARK VII", "MARK TEN",
and "LARK", also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation,
petitioners twice solicited the ancillary writ in the course the main suit for infringement
but the court of origin was unpersuaded.
Before we proceed to the generative facts of the case at bar, it must be emphasized that
resolution of the issue on the propriety of lifting the writ of preliminary injunction should
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 406
not be construed as a prejudgment of the suit below. Aware of the fact that the
discussion we are about to enter into involves a mere interlocutory order, a discourse on
the aspect infringement must thus be avoided. With these caveat, we shall now shift our
attention to the events which spawned the controversy.
As averred in the initial pleading, Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized
under the laws of the State of Virginia, United States of America, and does business at
100 Park Avenue, New York, New York, United States of America. The two other plaintiff
foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are
similarly not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction.
As registered owners "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per certificates of
March 25, 1964, plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco
Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly
identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of Section 22 of the
Trademark Law, and should, therefore, be precluded during the pendency of the case
from performing the acts complained of via a preliminary injunction (p. 75, Court of
Appeals Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132).
For its part, Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration
with the Philippine Patent Office subject to the affirmative and special defense on
misjoinder of party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it has been
authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing
the trademark "MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word which cannot be exclusively
appropriated (p.158, Court of Appeals Rollo in A.C.-G.R. SP No. 13132). On March 28,
1983, petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction was denied by the Presiding Judge of
Branch 166 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed
at Pasig, premised upon the following propositions:
Plaintiffs admit in paragraph 2 of the complaint that ". . . they are 
not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated
transaction . . .". This simply means that they are not engaged in the
sale, manufacture, importation, expor[t]ation and advertisement of their
cigarette products in the Philippines. With this admission, defendant
asks: ". . . how could defendant's "MARK" cigarettes cause the former
"irreparable damage" within the territorial limits of the Philippines?"
Plaintiffs maintain that since their trademarks are entitled to protection
by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention of which the
Philippines is a member and ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate

of the Philippines and as such, have the force and effect of law under
Section 12, Article XVII of our Constitution and since this is an action
for a violation or infringement of a trademark or trade name by
defendant, such mere allegation is sufficient even in the absence of
proof to support it. To the mind of the Court, precisely, this is the issue
in the main case to determine whether or not there has been an
invasion of plaintiffs' right of property to such trademark or trade name.
This claim of plaintiffs is disputed by defendant in paragraphs 6 and 7
of the Answer; hence, this cannot be made a basis for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.
There is no dispute that the First Plaintiff is the registered owner of
trademar[k] "MARK VII" with Certificate of Registration No. 18723,
dated April 26,1973 while the Second Plaintiff is likewise the registered
owner of trademark "MARK TEN" under Certificate of Registration No.
11147, dated May 28, 1963 and the Third Plaintiff is a registrant of
trademark "LARK" as shown by Certificate of Registration No. 10953
dated March 23, 1964, in addition to a pending application for
registration of trademark "MARK VII" filed on November 21, 1980 under
Application Serial No. 43243, all in the Philippine Patent Office. In
same the manner, defendant has a pending application for registration
of the trademark "LARK" cigarettes with the Philippine Patent Office
under Application Serial No. 44008. Defendant contends that since
plaintiffs are "not doing business in the Philippines" coupled the fact
that the Director of Patents has not denied their pending application for
registration of its trademark "MARK", the grant of a writ of preliminary
injunction is premature. Plaintiffs contend that this act(s) of defendant is
but a subterfuge to give semblance of good faith intended to deceive
the public and patronizers into buying the products and create the
impression that defendant's goods are identical with or come from the
same source as plaintiffs' products or that the defendant is a licensee
of plaintiffs when in truth and in fact the former is not. But the fact
remains that with its pending application, defendant has embarked in
the manufacturing, selling, distributing and advertising of "MARK"
cigarettes. The question of good faith or bad faith on the part of
defendant are matters which are evidentiary in character which have to
be proven during the hearing on the merits; hence, until and unless the
Director of Patents has denied defendant's application, the Court is of
the opinion and so holds that issuance a writ of preliminary injunction
would not lie.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 407
There is no question that defendant has been authorized by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue to manufacture cigarettes bearing the trademark
"MARK" (Letter of Ruben B. Ancheta, Acting Commissioner addressed
to Fortune Tobacco Corporation dated April 3, 1981, marked as Annex
"A", defendant's "OPPOSITION, etc." dated September 24, 1982).
However, this authority is qualified . . . that the said brands have been
accepted and registered by the Patent Office not later than six (6)
months after you have been manufacturing the cigarettes and placed
the same in the market." However, this grant ". . . does not give you
protection against any person or entity whose rights may be prejudiced
by infringement or unfair competition in relation to your indicated
trademarks/brands". As aforestated, the registration of defendant's
application is still pending in the Philippine Patent Office.
It has been repeatedly held in this jurisdiction as well as in the United
States that the right or title of the applicant for injunction remedy must
be clear and free from doubt. Because of the disastrous and painful
effects of an injunction, Courts should be extremely careful, cautious
and conscionable in the exercise of its discretion consistent with
justice, equity and fair play.
There is no power the exercise of which is more
delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation,
and sound discretion, or (which is) more dangerous in
a doubtful case than the issuing of an injunction; it is
the strong arm of equity that never ought to be
extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts
of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate
remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the
injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted
only by the protecting preventive process of injunction.
(Bonaparte v. Camden, etc. N. Co., 3 F. Cas. No. 1,
617, Baldw. 205, 217.)
Courts of equity constantly decline to lay down any
rule which injunction shall be granted or withheld.
There is wisdom in this course, for it is impossible to
foresee all exigencies of society which may require
their aid to protect rights and restrain wrongs. (Merced
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 408

M. Go v. Freemont, 7 Gal. 317, 321; 68 Am. Dec.
262.)
It is the strong arm of the court; and to render its
operation begin and useful, it must be exercised with
great discretion, and when necessary requires it.
(Attorney-General v. Utica Inc. Co., P. John Ch. (N.Y.)
371.)
In the process of denying petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order
denying issuance of the requested writ, the court of origin took cognizance of the
certification executed on January 30, 1984 by the Philippine Patent Office attesting to
the fact that private respondent's application for registration is still pending appropriate
action. Apart from this communication, what prompted the trial court judge to entertain
the idea of prematurity and untimeliness of petitioners' application for a writ of
preliminary injunction was the letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue date February
2, 1984 which reads:

Having taken a panoramic view of the position[s] of both parties as MRS. TERESITA GANDIONGCO OLEDAN
viewed from their pleadings, the picture reduced to its minimum size Legal Counsel
would be this: At the crossroads are the two (2) contending parties, Fortune Tobacco Corporation
plaintiffs vigorously asserting the rights granted by law, treaty and
jurisprudence to restrain defendant in its activities of manufacturing, Madam:
selling, distributing and advertising its "MARK" cigarettes and now
comes defendant who countered and refused to be restrained claiming In connection with your letter dated January 25, 1984, reiterating your
that it has been authorized temporarily by the Bureau of Internal query as to whether your label approval automatically expires or
Revenue under certain conditions to do so as aforestated coupled by becomes null and void after six (6) months if the brand is not accepted
its pending application for registration of trademark "MARK" in the and by the patent office, please be informed that no provision in the
Philippine Patent Office. This circumstance in itself has created a Tax Code or revenue regulation that requires an applicant to comply
dispute between the parties which to the mind of the Court does not with the aforementioned condition order that his label approved will
warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. remain valid and existing.

It is well-settled principle that courts of equity will Based on the document you presented, it shows that registration of this particular
refuse an application for the injunctive remedy where
label still pending resolution by the Patent Office. These being so , you may
the principle of law on which the right to preliminary
injunction rests is disputed and will admit of doubt, therefore continue with the production said brand of cigarette until this Office is
without a decision of the court of law establishing officially notified that the question of ownership of "MARK" brand is finally
such principle although satisfied as to what is a resolved.
correct conclusion of law upon the facts. The fact,
however, that there is no such dispute or conflict does Very truly yours,
not in itself constitute a justifiable ground for the court
to refuse an application for the injunctive relief. TEODORO D. PAREÑO
(Hackensack Impr. Commn. v. New Jersey Midland P. Chief, Manufactured Tobacco
Co., 22 N.J. Eg. 94.) Tax Division
TAN-P6531-D2830-A-6
Hence, the status quo existing between the parties prior to the filing of (p. 348, Rollo.)
this case should be maintained. For after all, an injunction, without
reference to the parties, should be violent, vicious nor even vindictive.
(pp. 338-341, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)

It appears from the testimony of Atty. Enrique Madarang, Chief of the Trademark
Division of the then Philippine Patent Office that Fortune's application for its trademark is
still pending before said office (p. 311, Rollo).
Petitioners thereafter cited supervening events which supposedly transpired since March
28, 1983, when the trial court first declined issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, that
could alter the results of the case in that Fortune's application had been rejected, nay,
barred by the Philippine Patent Office, and that the application had been forfeited by
abandonment, but the trial court nonetheless denied the second motion for issuance of
the injunctive writ on April 22, 1987, thus:
For all the prolixity of their pleadings and testimonial evidence, the
plaintiffs-movants have fallen far short of the legal requisites that would
justify the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. For one,
they did not even bother to establish by competent evidence that the
products supposedly affected adversely by defendant's trademark now
subject of an application for registration with the Philippine Patents
Office, are in actual use in the Philippines. For another, they
concentrated their fire on the alleged abandonment and forfeiture by
defendant of said application for registration.
The Court cannot help but take note of the fact that in their complaint
plaintiffs included a prayer for issuance preliminary injunction. The
petition was duly heard, and thereafter matter was assiduously
discussed lengthily and resolved against plaintiffs in a 15-page Order
issued by the undersigned's predecessor on March 28, 1983. Plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration was denied in another well-argued 8 page
Order issued on April 5, 1984,, and the matter was made to rest.
However, on the strength of supposed changes in the material facts of
this case, plaintiffs came up with the present motion citing therein the
said changes which are: that defendant's application had been rejected
and barred by the Philippine Patents Office, and that said application
has been deemed abandoned and forfeited. But defendant has refiled
the same.
Plaintiffs' arguments in support of the present motion appear to be a
mere rehash of their stand in the first above-mentioned petition which
has already been ruled upon adversely against them. Granting that the
alleged changes in the material facts are sufficient grounds for a motion
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 409
seeking a favorable grant of what has already been denied, this motion
just the same cannot prosper.
In the first place there is no proof whatsoever that any of plaintiffs'
products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the
trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for
commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines. Secondly as shown
by plaintiffs' own evidence furnished by no less than the chief of
Trademarks Division of the Philippine Patent Office, Atty. Enrique
Madarang, the abandonment of an application is of no moment, for the
same can always be refiled. He said there is no specific provision in the
rules prohibiting such refiling (TSN, November 21, 1986, pp. 60 & 64,
Raviera). In fact, according to Madarang, the refiled application of
defendant is now pending before the Patents Office. Hence, it appears
that the motion has no leg to stand on. (pp. 350-351, Rolloin G. R. No.
91332.)
Confronted with this rebuff, petitioners filed a previous petition for certiorari before the
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 78141, but the petition was referred to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals initially issued a resolution which set aside the court of origin's
order dated April 22, 1987, and granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining Fortune, its agents, employees, and representatives, from manufacturing,
selling, and advertising "MARK" cigarettes. The late Justice Cacdac, speaking for the
First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 13132, remarked:
There is no dispute that petitioners are the registered owners of the
trademarks for cigarettes "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK".
(Annexes B, C and D, petition). As found and reiterated by the
Philippine Patent Office in two (2) official communications dated April 6,
1983 and January 24, 1984, the trademark "MARK" is "confusingly
similar" to the trademarks of petitioners, hence registration was barred
under Sec. 4 (d) of Rep. Act. No. 166, as amended (pp. 106, 139,
SCA rollo). In a third official communication dated April 8, 1986, the
trademark application of private respondent for the "MARK" under
Serial No. 44008 filed on February 13, 1981 which was declared
abandoned as of February 16, 1986, is now deemed forfeited, there
being no revival made pursuant to Rule 98 of the Revised Rules of
Practitioners in Trademark Cases." (p. 107, CA rollo). The foregoing

documents or communications mentioned by petitioners as "the
changes in material facts which occurred after March 28, 1983", are not
also questioned by respondents.
Pitted against the petitioners' documentary evidence, respondents
pointed to (1) the letter dated January 30, 1979 (p. 137, CA rollo) of
Conrado P. Diaz, then Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
temporarily granting the request of private respondent for a permit to
manufacture two (2) new brands of cigarettes one of which is brand
"MARK" filter-type blend, and (2) the certification dated September 26,
1986 of Cesar G. Sandico, Director of Patents (p. 138, CA rollo) issued
upon the written request of private respondents' counsel dated
September 17, 1986 attesting that the records of his office would show
that the "trademark MARK" for cigarettes is now the subject of a
pending application under Serial No. 59872 filed on September 16,
1986.
Private respondent's documentary evidence provides the reasons
neutralizing or weakening their probative values. The penultimate
paragraph of Commissioner Diaz' letter of authority reads:
Please be informed further that the authority herein
granted does not give you protection against any
person or entity whose rights may be prejudiced by
infringement or unfair competition in relation to your
above-named brands/trademark.
while Director Sandico's certification contained similar conditions as
follows:
This Certification, however, does not give protection
as against any person or entity whose right may be
prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition in
relation to the aforesaid trademark nor the right to
register if contrary to the provisions of the Trademark
Law, Rep. Act No. 166 as amended and the Revised
Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases.
The temporary permit to manufacture under the trademark "MARK" for
cigarettes and the acceptance of the second application filed by private
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 410
respondent in the height of their dispute in the main case were
evidently made subject to the outcome of the said main case or Civil
Case No. 47374 of the respondent Court. Thus, the Court has not
missed to note the absence of a mention in the Sandico letter of
September 26, 1986 of any reference to the pendency of the instant
action filed on August 18, 1982. We believe and hold that petitioners
have shown a prima facie case for the issuance of the writ of
prohibitory injunction for the purposes stated in their complaint and
subsequent motions for the issuance of the prohibitory writ. (Buayan
Cattle Co. vs. Quintillan, 125 SCRA 276)
The requisites for the granting of preliminary injunction are the
existence of the right protected and the facts against which the
injunction is to be directed as violative of said right. (Buayan Cattle Co.
vs. Quintillan, supra; Ortigas & Co. vs. Ruiz, 148 SCRA 326). It is a writ
framed according to the circumstances of the case commanding an act
which the Court regards as essential to justice and restraining an act it
deems contrary to equity and good conscience (Rosauro vs. Cuneta,
151 SCRA 570). If it is not issued, the defendant may, before final
judgment, do or continue the doing of the act which the plaintiff asks
the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment
rendered afterwards granting the relief sought by the plaintiff (Calo vs.
Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). Generally, its grant or denial rests upon the
sound discretion of the Court except on a clear case of abuse (Belish
Investment & Finance Co. vs. State House, 151 SCRA 636).
Petitioners' right of exclusivity to their registered trademarks being clear
and beyond question, the respondent court's denial of the prohibitive
writ constituted excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse discretion. If the
lower court does not grant preliminary injunction, the appellate court
may grant the same. (Service Specialists, Inc. vs. Sheriff of Manila, 145
SCRA 139). (pp. 165-167, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
After private respondent Fortune's motion for reconsideration was rejected, a motion to
dissolve the disputed writ of preliminary injunction with offer to post a counterbond was
submitted which was favorably acted upon by the Court of Appeals, premised on the
filing of a sufficient counterbond to answer for whatever perjuicio petitioners may suffer
as a result thereof, to wit:
The private respondent seeks to dissolve the preliminary injunction
previously granted by this Court with an offer to file a counterbond. It

was pointed out in its supplemental motion that lots of workers
employed will be laid off as a consequence of the injunction and that
the government will stand to lose the amount of specific taxes being
paid by the 
private respondent. The specific taxes being paid is the sum total of
P120,120, 295.98 from January to July 1989.
The petitioners argued in their comment that the damages caused by
the infringement of their trademark as well as the goodwill it generates
are incapable of pecuniary estimation and monetary evaluation and not
even the counterbond could adequately compensate for the damages it
will incur as a result of the dissolution of the bond. In addition, the
petitioner further argued that doing business in the Philippines is not
relevant as the injunction pertains to an infringement of a trademark
right.
After a thorough re-examination of the issues involved and the
arguments advanced by both parties in the offer to file a counterbond
and the opposition thereto, WE believe that there are sound and cogent
reasons for US to grant the dissolution of the writ of preliminary
injunction by the offer of the private respondent to put up a
counterbond to answer for whatever damages the petitioner may suffer
as a consequence of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction.
The petitioner will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a
consequence of the lifting of the preliminary injunction considering that
they are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the cigarettes with
the trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply
answer for such damages.
While the rule is that an offer of a counterbond does not operate to
dissolve an injunction previously granted, nevertheless, it is equally
true that an injunction could be dissolved only upon good and valid
grounds subject to the sound discretion of the court. As WE have
maintained the view that there are sound and good reasons to lift the
preliminary injunction, the motion to file a counterbond is granted. (pp.
53-54, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 411
Petitioners, in turn, filed their own motion for re-examination geared towards
reimposition of the writ of preliminary injunction but to no avail (p. 55, Rollo in G.R. No.
91332).
Hence, the instant petition casting three aspersions that respondent court gravely
abused its discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction when:
I. . . . it required, contrary to law and jurisprudence, that in order that
petitioners may suffer irreparable injury due to the lifting of the
injunction, petitioners should be using actually their registered
trademarks in commerce in the Philippines;
II. . . . it lifted the injunction in violation of section 6 of Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court; and
III. . . . after having found that the trial court had committed grave
abuse of discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction for having refused to
issue the writ of injunction to restrain private respondent's acts that are
contrary to equity and good conscience, it made a complete about face
for legally insufficient grounds and authorized the private respondent to
continue performing the very same acts that it had considered contrary
to equity and good conscience, thereby ignoring not only the mandates
of the Trademark Law, the international commitments of the
Philippines, the judicial admission of private respondent that it will have
no more right to use the trademark "MARK" after the Director of
Patents shall have rejected the application to register it, and the
admonitions of the Supreme Court. (pp. 24-25, Petition; pp. 25-
26, Rollo.)
To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners, as foreign
corporations not engaged in local commerce, rely on section 21-A of the Trademark Law
reading as follows:
Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or
trade-name has been registered or assigned under this act may bring
an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false
designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been
licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered
Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise known as the
Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided, That the

country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a
citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a
similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As
inserted by Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 638.)
to drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a
cause of action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception
that another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to
do so. Judging from a perusal of the aforequoted Section 21-A, the
conclusion reached by petitioners is certainly correct for the proposition
in support thereof is embedded in the Philippine legal jurisprudence.
Indeed, it was stressed in General Garments Corporation vs. Director of Patents (41
SCRA 50 [1971]) by then Justice (later Chief Justice) Makalintal that:
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the ruling in the Mentholatum
case was subsequently derogated when Congress, purposely to
"counteract the effects" of said case, enacted Republic Act No. 638,
inserting Section 21-A in the Trademark Law, which allows a foreign
corporation or juristic person to bring an action in Philippine courts for
infringement of a mark or tradename, for unfair competition, or false
designation of origin and false description, "whether or not it has been
licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered
Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise known as the
Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint."
Petitioner argues that Section 21-A militates against respondent's
capacity to maintain a suit for cancellation, since it requires, before a
foreign corporation may bring an action, that its trademark or
tradename has been registered under the Trademark Law. The
argument misses the essential point in the said provision, which is that
the foreign corporation is allowed thereunder to sue "whether or not it
has been licensed to do business in the Philippines" pursuant to the
Corporation Law (precisely to counteract the effects of the decision in
the Mentholatum case). (at p. 57.)
However, on May, 21, 1984, Section 21-A, the provision under consideration, was
qualified by this Court in La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez (129 SCRA 373
[1984]), to the effect that a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may
have the right to sue before Philippine Courts, but existing adjective axioms require that
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 412
qualifying circumstances necessary for the assertion of such right should first be
affirmatively pleaded (2 Agbayani Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 1991 Ed., p. 598;
4 Martin, Philippine Commercial Laws, Rev. Ed., 1986, p. 381). Indeed, it is not sufficient
for a foreign corporation suing under Section 21-A to simply allege its alien origin.
Rather, it must additionally allege its personality to sue. Relative to this condition
precedent, it may be observed that petitioners were not remiss in averring their
personality to lodge a complaint for infringement (p. 75, Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132)
especially so when they asserted that the main action for infringement is anchored on an
isolated transaction (p. 75, Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132; Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. vs.
Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 1037 (1966), 1 Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Fifth Rev. Ed., 1988, p. 103).
Another point which petitioners considered to be of significant interest, and which they
desire to impress upon us is the protection they enjoy under the Paris Convention of
1965 to which the Philippines is a signatory. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned,
there is no necessity to treat the matter with an extensive response because adherence
of the Philippines to the 1965 international covenant due to  pact sunt servanda had
been acknowledged in La Chemise (supra at page 390).
Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there
can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law that foreign
corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action
for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal
standing to sue is alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.
In assailing the justification arrived at by respondent court when it recalled the writ of
preliminary injunction, petitioners are of the impression that actual use of their
trademarks in Philippine commercial dealings is not an indispensable element under
Article 2 of the Paris Convention in that:
(2) . . . . no condition as to the possession of a domicile or
establishment in the country where protection is claimed may be
required of persons entitled to the benefits of the Union for the
enjoyment of any industrial property of any industrial property rights. (p.
28, Petition; p. 29, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
Yet petitioners' perception along this line is nonetheless resolved by Sections 2 and 2-A
of the Trademark Law which speak loudly, about necessity of actual commercial use of
the trademark in the local forum:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 413

Sec. 2. What are registrable. — Trademarks, tradenames and service international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative
marks owned by persons, corporations, partnerships or associations enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16).
domiciled in the Philippines and by persons, corporations, partnerships
or associations domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in The aforequoted basic provisions of our Trademark Law, according to Justice Gutierrez,
accordance with the provisions of this Act; Provided, That said Jr., in Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (203 SCRA 583 [1991]),
trademarks, tradenames, or service marks are actually in use in have been construed in this manner:
commerce and services not less than two months in the
Philippines before the time the applications for registration are filed; A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use
And provided, further, That the country of which the applicant for in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of
registration is a citizen grants by law substantially similar privileges to ownership over a trademark or a tradename.
citizens of the Philippines, and such fact is officially certified, with a
certified true copy of the foreign law translated into the English xxx xxx xxx
language, by the government of the foreign country to the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines. (As amended by R.A. No. 865).
These provisions have been interpreted in Sterling Products
International, Inc. v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Actiengesellschaft (27
Sec. 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, tradenames and service marks; SCRA 1214 [1969]) in this way:
how acquired. — Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in
merchandise of any kind or who engages in any lawful business, or
A rule widely accepted and firmly entrenched because
who renders any lawful service in commerce, by actual use thereof in
it has come down through the years is that actual use
manufacture or trade, in business,and in the service rendered, may
in commerce or business is a prerequisite to the
appropriate to his exclusive use a trademark, a tradename, or a service
acquisition of the right of ownership over a trademark.
mark not so appropriated by another, to distinguish his merchandise,
business or service from the merchandise, business or service of
x x x           x x x          x x x
others. The ownership or possession of a trademark, tradename,
service mark, heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this section
provided, shall be recognized and protected in the same manner and to . . . Adoption alone of a trademark would not give
the same extent as are other property rights known to the law. (As exclusive right thereto. Such right grows out of their
amended by R.A. No. 638). (Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate actual use. Adoption is not use. One may make
Appellate Court, 203 SCRA 583 [1991], at pp. 589-590; emphasis advertisements, issue circulars, give out price lists on
supplied.) certain goods; but these alone would not give
exclusive right of use. For trademark is a creation of
use. The underlying reason for all these is that
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks
purchasers have come to understand the mark as
regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an
indicating the origin of the wares. Flowing from this is
international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal
the trader's right to protection in the trade he has built
tribunal (Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906,
up and the goodwill he has accumulated from use of
8 Sessions 93; Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20).
the trademark. . . .
Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal
sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of In fact, a prior registrant cannot claim exclusive use of the trademark
unless it uses it in commerce.

We rule[d] in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals (118
SCRA 526 [1982]):
3. The Trademark law is very clear. It requires actual commercial use
of the mark prior to its registration. There is no dispute that respondent
corporation was the first registrant, yet it failed to fully substantiate its
claim that it used in trade or business in the Philippines the subject
mark; it did not present proof to invest it with exclusive, continuous
adoption of the trademark which should consist among others, of
considerable sales since its first use. The invoices (Exhibits 7, 7-a, and
8-b) submitted by respondent which were dated way back in 1957
show that the zippers sent to the Philippines were to be used as
"samples" and "of no commercial value". The evidence for respondent
must be clear, definite and free from inconsistencies. (Sy Ching v. Gaw
Lui, 44 SCRA 148-149) "Samples" are not for sale and therefore, the
fact of exporting them to the Philippines cannot be considered to be
equivalent to the "use" contemplated by the law. Respondent did not
expect income from such "samples". There were no receipts to
establish sale, and no proof were presented to show that they were
subsequently sold in the Philippines. (Pagasa Industrial Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, 118 SCRA 526 [1982]; Emphasis Supplied)
The records show that the petitioner has never conducted any business
in the Philippines. It has never promoted its tradename or trademark in
the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipino except the very few who may
have noticed it while travelling abroad. It has never paid a single
centavo of tax to the Philippine government. Under the law, it has no
right to the remedy it seeks. (at pp. 589-591.)
In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of
lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark
Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify
issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the
Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for
petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its
trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the
personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to
protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 414
Going back to the first assigned error, we can not help but notice the manner the
ascription was framed which carries with it the implied but unwarranted assumption of
the existence of petitioners' right to relief. It must be emphasized that this aspect of
exclusive dominion to the trademarks, together with the corollary allegation of
irreparable injury, has yet to be established by petitioners by the requisite quantum of
evidence in civil cases. It cannot be denied that our reluctance to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction is due to judicial deference to the lower courts, involved as there is
mere interlocutory order (Villarosa vs. Teodoro, Sr., 100 Phil. 25 [1956]). In point of
adjective law, the petition has its roots on a remedial measure which is but ancillary to
the main action for infringement still pending factual determination before the court of
origin. It is virtually needless to stress the obvious reality that critical facts in an
infringement case are not before us more so when even Justice Feliciano's opinion
observes that "the evidence is scanty" and that petitioners "have yet to submit copies or
photographs of their registered marks as used in cigarettes" while private respondent
has not, for its part, "submitted the actual labels or packaging materials used in selling
its "Mark" cigarettes." Petitioners therefore, may not be permitted to presume a given
state of facts on their so called right to the trademarks which could be subjected to
irreparable injury and in the process, suggest the fact of infringement. Such a ploy would
practically place the cart ahead of the horse. To our mind, what appears to be the
insurmountable barrier to petitioners' portrayal of whimsical exercise of discretion by the
Court of Appeals is the well-taken remark of said court that:
The petitioner[s] will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as
a consequence of the lifting of the preliminary injunction considering
that they are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the cigarettes
with the trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will
amply answer for such damages. (p. 54. Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint (p. 319, Rollo G.R. No.
91332) as well as in the very petition filed with this Court (p. 2, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332)
indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines, for these frank
representations are inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right which can
breached (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 3, Rule 58,
Revised Rules of Court). Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show
that there exists a right to be protected and that the facts against which injunction is
directed are violative of said right (Searth Commodities Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 207 SCRA 622 [1992]). It may be added in this connection that albeit
petitioners are holders of certificate of registration in the Philippines of their symbols as
admitted by private respondent, the fact of exclusive ownership cannot be made to rest
solely on these documents since dominion over trademarks is not acquired by the mere

fact of registration alone and does not perfect a trademark right (Unno Commercial
Enterprises, Inc. vs. General Milling Corporation, 120 SCRA 804 [1983]).
Even if we disregard the candid statements of petitioners anent the absence of business
activity here and rely on the remaining statements of the complaint below, still, when
these averments are juxtaposed with the denials and propositions of the answer
submitted by private respondent, the supposed right of petitioners to the symbol have
thereby been controverted. This is not to say, however, that the manner the complaint
was traversed by the answer is sufficient to tilt the scales of justice in favor of private
respondent. Far from it. What we are simply conveying is another basic tenet in remedial
law that before injunctive relief may properly issue, complainant's right or title must be
undisputed and demonstrated on the strength of one's own title to such a degree as to
unquestionably exclude dark clouds of doubt, rather than on the weakness of the
adversary's evidence, inasmuch as the possibility of irreparable damage, without prior
proof of transgression of an actual existing right, is no ground for injunction being
mere damnum absque injuria (Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. CFI of Negros
Occidental, 42 SCRA 577 [1971]; Francisco, Rules of Court, Second ed., 1985, p. 225; 3
Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 82).
On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the thought of
having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the
manufacture and sale of private respondent's "MARK" cigarettes who might be
retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a
result of the issuance of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this, during the
pendency of the case before the trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues
represented to be close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the
status quo is maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners
inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines.
With reference to the second and third issues raised by petitioners on the lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent court acted well
within its prerogatives under Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of
injunction.  — The injunction may be refused or, if granted ex parte,
may be dissolved, upon the insufficiency of the complaint as shown by
the complaint itself, with or without notice to the adverse party. It may
also be refused or dissolved on other grounds upon affidavits on the
part of the defendants which may be opposed by the plaintiff also by
affidavits. It may further be refused or, if granted, may be dissolved, if it
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 415
appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the
injunction, the issuance or continuance thereof, as the case may be,
would cause great damage to the defendant while the plaintiff can be
fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the
defendant files a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned that
he will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or
the dissolution of the injunction. If it appears that the extent of the
preliminary injunction granted is too great, it must be modified.
Under the foregoing rule, injunction may be refused, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on
the following instances:
(1) If there is insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the allegations
therein. Refusal or dissolution may be granted in this case with or
without notice to the adverse party.
(2) If it appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the
injunction, the issuance or continuance thereof would cause great
damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated
for such damages as he may suffer. The defendant, in this case, must
file a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned that he will pay
all damages which plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution
of the injunction.
(3) On the other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendant
which may be opposed by the plaintiff also affidavits.
Modification of the injunction may also be ordered by the court if it
appears that the extent of the preliminary injunction granted is too
great. (3 Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 99; Francisco, supra, at p.
268.)
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not
engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage
can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed
on the absence of their "right" to be protected. At any rate, and assuming  in gratia
argumenti that respondent court erroneously lifted the writ it previously issued, the same
may be cured by appeal and not in the form of a petition for certiorari (Clark vs.
Philippine Ready Mix Concrete Co., 88 Phil. 460 [1951]). Verily, and mindful of the rule
that a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order which is always under the
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 416

control of the court before final judgment, petitioners' criticism must fall flat on the
ground, so to speak, more so when extinction of the previously issued writ can even be
made without previous notice to the adverse party and without a hearing (Caluya vs.
Ramos, 79 Phil. 640 [1974]; 3 Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 81).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 14, 1989 and November 29, 1989 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154342             July 14, 2004
MIGHTY CORPORATION and LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE TABACO,
INC., petitioner,  name and for its own account.5
vs.
E. & J. GALLO WINERY and THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners Mighty Corporation and
La Campana Fabrica de Tabaco, Inc. (La Campana) seek to annul, reverse and set
aside: (a) the November 15, 2001 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 65175 affirming the November 26, 1998 decision, 2 as modified by the June 24, 1999
order,3 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 (Makati RTC) in Civil Case
No. 93-850, which held petitioners liable for, and permanently enjoined them from,
committing trademark infringement and unfair competition, and which ordered them to
pay damages to respondents E. & J. Gallo Winery (Gallo Winery) and The Andresons
Group, Inc. (Andresons); (b) the July 11, 2002 CA resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration4and (c) the aforesaid Makati RTC decision itself.
I.
The Factual Background
Respondent Gallo Winery is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines
but organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, United States of
America (U.S.), where all its wineries are located. Gallo Winery produces different kinds
of wines and brandy products and sells them in many countries under different
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 417
registered trademarks, including the GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO GALLO wine
trademarks.
Respondent domestic corporation, Andresons, has been Gallo Winery’s exclusive wine
importer and distributor in the Philippines since 1991, selling these products in its own
Gallo Winery’s GALLO wine trademark was registered in the principal register of the
Philippine Patent Office (now Intellectual Property Office) on November 16, 1971 under
Certificate of Registration No. 17021 which was renewed on November 16, 1991 for
another 20 years.6 Gallo Winery also applied for registration of its ERNEST & JULIO
GALLO wine trademark on October 11, 1990 under Application Serial No. 901011-
00073599-PN but the records do not disclose if it was ever approved by the Director of
Patents.7
On the other hand, petitioners Mighty Corporation and La Campana and their sister
company, Tobacco Industries of the Philippines (Tobacco Industries), are engaged in
the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of tobacco products for which they
have been using the GALLO cigarette trademark since 1973. 8
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) approved Tobacco Industries’ use of GALLO
100’s cigarette mark on September 14, 1973 and GALLO filter cigarette mark on March
26, 1976, both for the manufacture and sale of its cigarette products. In 1976, Tobacco
Industries filed its manufacturer’s sworn statement as basis for BIR’s collection of
specific tax on GALLO cigarettes.9
On February 5, 1974, Tobacco Industries applied for, but eventually did not pursue, the
registration of the GALLO cigarette trademark in the principal register of the then
Philippine Patent Office.10
In May 1984, Tobacco Industries assigned the GALLO cigarette trademark to La
Campana which, on July 16, 1985, applied for trademark registration in the Philippine
Patent Office.11 On July 17, 1985, the National Library issued Certificate of Copyright
Registration No. 5834 for La Campana’s lifetime copyright claim over GALLO cigarette
labels.12
Subsequently, La Campana authorized Mighty Corporation to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the GALLO trademark.13 BIR approved Mighty Corporation’s use of

GALLO 100’s cigarette brand, under licensing agreement with Tobacco Industries, on
May 18, 1988, and GALLO SPECIAL MENTHOL 100’s cigarette brand on April 3,
1989.14
Petitioners claim that GALLO cigarettes have been sold in the Philippines since 1973,
initially by Tobacco Industries, then by La Campana and finally by Mighty Corporation. 15
On the other hand, although the GALLO wine trademark was registered in the
Philippines in 1971, respondents claim that they first introduced and sold the GALLO
and ERNEST & JULIO GALLO wines in the Philippines circa1974 within the then U.S.
military facilities only. By 1979, they had expanded their Philippine market through
authorized distributors and independent outlets. 16
Respondents claim that they first learned about the existence of GALLO cigarettes in the
latter part of 1992 when an Andresons employee saw such cigarettes on display with
GALLO wines in a Davao supermarket wine cellar section. 17 Forthwith, respondents sent
a demand letter to petitioners asking them to stop using the GALLO trademark, to no
avail.
II.
The Legal Dispute
On March 12, 1993, respondents sued petitioners in the Makati RTC for trademark and
tradename infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for damages and
preliminary injunction.
Respondents charged petitioners with violating Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) 18 and RA 166 (Trademark
Law),19 specifically, Sections 22 and 23 (for trademark infringement), 20 29 and 3021 (for
unfair competition and false designation of origin) and 37 (for tradename
infringement).22 They claimed that petitioners adopted the GALLO trademark to ride on
Gallo Winery’s GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO GALLO trademarks’ established
reputation and popularity, thus causing confusion, deception and mistake on the part of
the purchasing public who had always associated GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO
GALLO trademarks with Gallo Winery’s wines. Respondents prayed for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and ex parte restraining order, plus P2 million as actual
and compensatory damages, at least P500,000 as exemplary and moral damages, and
at least P500,000 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 23
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 418
In their answer, petitioners alleged, among other affirmative defenses, that: petitioner’s
GALLO cigarettes and Gallo Winery’s wines were totally unrelated products; Gallo
Winery’s GALLO trademark registration certificate covered wines only, not cigarettes;
GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were sold through different channels of trade;
GALLO cigarettes, sold at P4.60 for GALLO filters and P3 for GALLO menthols, were
low-cost items compared to Gallo Winery’s high-priced luxury wines which cost
between P98 to P242.50; the target market of Gallo Winery’s wines was the middle or
high-income bracket with at least P10,000 monthly income while GALLO cigarette
buyers were farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-income workers; the dominant
feature of the GALLO cigarette mark was the rooster device with the manufacturer’s
name clearly indicated as MIGHTY CORPORATION while, in the case of Gallo Winery’s
wines, it was the full names of the founders-owners ERNEST & JULIO GALLO or just
their surname GALLO; by their inaction and conduct, respondents were guilty of laches
and estoppel; and petitioners acted with honesty, justice and good faith in the exercise
of their right to manufacture and sell GALLO cigarettes.
In an order dated April 21, 1993, 24 the Makati RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondent’s
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, 25 holding that respondent’s
GALLO trademark registration certificate covered wines only, that respondents’ wines
and petitioners’ cigarettes were not related goods and respondents failed to prove
material damage or great irreparable injury as required by Section 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court.26
On August 19, 1993, the Makati RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondents’ motion for
reconsideration. The court reiterated that respondents’ wines and petitioners’ cigarettes
were not related goods since the likelihood of deception and confusion on the part of the
consuming public was very remote. The trial court emphasized that it could not rely on
foreign rulings cited by respondents "because the[se] cases were decided by foreign
courts on the basis of unknown facts peculiar to each case or upon factual surroundings
which may exist only within their jurisdiction. Moreover, there [was] no showing that
[these cases had] been tested or found applicable in our jurisdiction." 27
On February 20, 1995, the CA likewise dismissed respondents’ petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 32626, thereby affirming the Makati RTC’s denial of
the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. 28
After trial on the merits, however, the Makati RTC, on November 26, 1998, held
petitioners liable for, and permanently enjoined them from, committing trademark
infringement and unfair competition with respect to the GALLO trademark:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (sic) and against
the defendant (sic), to wit:
a. permanently restraining and enjoining defendants, their distributors,
trade outlets, and all persons acting for them or under their instructions,
from (i) using E & J’s registered trademark GALLO or any other
reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of said trademark,
either singly or in conjunction with other words, designs or emblems
and other acts of similar nature, and (ii) committing other acts of unfair
competition against plaintiffs by manufacturing and selling their
cigarettes in the domestic or export markets under the GALLO
trademark.
b. ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs –
(i) actual and compensatory damages for the injury and
prejudice and impairment of plaintiffs’ business and goodwill
as a result of the acts and conduct pleaded as basis for this
suit, in an amount equal to 10% of FOURTEEN MILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(PHP14,235,000.00) from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid;
(ii) exemplary damages in the amount of PHP100,000.00;
(iii) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of
PHP1,130,068.91;
(iv) the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED."29
On June 24, 1999, the Makati RTC granted respondent’s motion for partial
reconsideration and increased the award of actual and compensatory damages to 10%
of P199,290,000 or P19,929,000.30
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Makati RTC decision and subsequently denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 419
III.
The Issues
Petitioners now seek relief from this Court contending that the CA did not follow
prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it held that: [a] RA 8293 (Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines [IP Code]) was applicable in this case; [b] GALLO cigarettes and
GALLO wines were identical, similar or related goods for the reason alone that they
were purportedly forms of vice; [c] both goods passed through the same channels of
trade and [d] petitioners were liable for trademark infringement, unfair competition and
damages.31
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that this petition which invokes Rule 45 does not
involve pure questions of law, and hence, must be dismissed outright.
IV.
Discussion
THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
IN THIS CASE OBLIGE THE COURT TO REVIEW
THE CA’S FACTUAL FINDINGS
As a general rule, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must raise only
"questions of law"32 (that is, the doubt pertains to the application and interpretation of law
to a certain set of facts) and not "questions of fact" (where the doubt concerns the truth
or falsehood of alleged facts),33 otherwise, the petition will be denied. We are not a trier
of facts and the Court of Appeals’ factual findings are generally conclusive upon us. 34
This case involves questions of fact which are directly related and intertwined with
questions of law. The resolution of the factual issues concerning the goods’ similarity,
identity, relation, channels of trade, and acts of trademark infringement and unfair
competition is greatly dependent on the interpretation of applicable laws. The
controversy here is not simply the identity or similarity of both parties’ trademarks but
whether or not infringement or unfair competition was committed, a conclusion based on
statutory interpretation. Furthermore, one or more of the following exceptional
circumstances oblige us to review the evidence on record: 35

(1) the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and
conjectures;
(2) the inference of the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd and impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case, and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee;
(6) the findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(7) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted [by the evidence] on record. 36
In this light, after thoroughly examining the evidence on record, weighing, analyzing and
balancing all factors to determine whether trademark infringement and/or unfair
competition has been committed, we conclude that both the Court of Appeals and the
trial court veered away from the law and well-settled jurisprudence.
Thus, we give due course to the petition.
THE TRADEMARK LAW AND THE PARIS
CONVENTION ARE THE APPLICABLE LAWS,
NOT THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE
We note that respondents sued petitioners on March 12, 1993 for trademark
infringement and unfair competition committed during the effectivity of the Paris
Convention and the Trademark Law.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 420
Yet, in the Makati RTC decision of November 26, 1998, petitioners were held liable not
only under the aforesaid governing laws but also under the IP Code which took effect
only on January 1, 1998,37 or about five years after the filing of the complaint:
Defendants’ unauthorized use of the GALLO trademark constitutes trademark
infringement pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 166, Section 155 of
the IP Code, Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, and Article 16 (1) of the TRIPS
Agreement as it causes confusion, deception and mistake on the part of the
purchasing public.38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA apparently did not notice the error and affirmed the Makati RTC decision:
In the light of its finding that appellants’ use of the GALLO trademark on its
cigarettes is likely to create confusion with the GALLO trademark on wines
previously registered and used in the Philippines by appellee E & J Gallo
Winery, the trial court thus did not err in holding that appellants’ acts not
only violated the provisions of the our trademark laws (R.A. No. 166 and R.A.
Nos. (sic)  8293) but also Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. 39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
We therefore hold that the courts a quo erred in retroactively applying the IP Code in
this case.
It is a fundamental principle that the validity and obligatory force of a law proceed from
the fact that it has first been promulgated. A law that is not yet effective cannot be
considered as conclusively known by the populace. To make a law binding even before
it takes effect may lead to the arbitrary exercise of the legislative power. 40 Nova
constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis.  A new state of the law ought
to affect the future, not the past. Any doubt must generally be resolved against the
retroactive operation of laws, whether these are original enactments, amendments or
repeals.41 There are only a few instances when laws may be given retroactive
effect,42 none of which is present in this case.
The IP Code, repealing the Trademark Law, 43 was approved on June 6, 1997. Section
241 thereof expressly decreed that it was to take effect only on January 1, 1998, without
any provision for retroactive application. Thus, the Makati RTC and the CA should have
limited the consideration of the present case within the parameters of the Trademark
Law and the Paris Convention, the laws in force at the time of the filing of the complaint.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
Although the laws on trademark infringement and unfair competition have a common
conception at their root, that is, a person shall not be permitted to misrepresent his
goods or his business as the goods or business of another, the law on unfair competition
is broader and more inclusive than the law on trademark infringement. The latter is more
limited but it recognizes a more exclusive right derived from the trademark adoption and
registration by the person whose goods or business is first associated with it. The law on
trademarks is thus a specialized subject distinct from the law on unfair competition,
although the two subjects are entwined with each other and are dealt with together in the
Trademark Law (now, both are covered by the IP Code). Hence, even if one fails to
establish his exclusive property right to a trademark, he may still obtain relief on the
ground of his competitor’s unfairness or fraud. Conduct constitutes unfair competition if
the effect is to pass off on the public the goods of one man as the goods of another. It is
not necessary that any particular means should be used to this end. 44
In Del Monte Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,45 we distinguished trademark
infringement from unfair competition:
(1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas
unfair competition is the passing off of one's goods as those of another.
(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary, whereas in
unfair competition fraudulent intent is essential.
(3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a
prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not
necessary.
Pertinent Provisions on Trademark
Infringement under the Paris
Convention and the Trademark Law
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention,46 an international agreement binding on the
Philippines and the United States (Gallo Winery’s country of domicile and origin)
prohibits "the [registration] or use of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction,
imitation or translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the
competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well-known in that country
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 421
as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of the [Paris] Convention
and used for identical or similar  goods. [This rule also applies] when the essential part of
the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation  liable to
createconfusion therewith." There is no time limit for seeking the prohibition of the use of
marks used in bad faith.47
Thus, under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, the following are the elements of
trademark infringement:
(a) registration or use by another person of a trademark which is a reproduction,
imitation or translation liable to create confusion,
(b) of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of
registration or use48 to be well-known in that country and is already the mark of
a person entitled to the benefits of the Paris Convention, and
(c) such trademark is used for identical or similar goods.
On the other hand, Section 22 of the Trademark Law holds a person liable for
infringement when, among others, he "uses without the consent of the registrant, any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark or
tradename in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods,
business or services or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods or
services, or identity of such business; or reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate
any such mark or tradename and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods, business or
services."49 Trademark registration and actual use are material to the complaining party’s
cause of action.
Corollary to this, Section 20 of the Trademark Law 50 considers the trademark registration
certificate as prima facieevidence of the validity of the registration, the registrant’s
ownership and exclusive right to use the trademark in connection with the goods,
business or services as classified by the Director of Patents 51 and as specified in the
certificate, subject to the conditions and limitations stated therein. Sections 2 and 2-A 52 of
the Trademark Law emphasize the importance of the trademark’s actual use in
commerce in the Philippines prior to its registration. In the adjudication of trademark
rights between contending parties, equitable principles of laches, estoppel, and
acquiescence may be considered and applied.53

Under Sections 2, 2-A, 9-A, 20 and 22 of the Trademark Law therefore, the following
constitute the elements of trademark infringement:
(a) a trademark actually used in commerce in the Philippines and registered in
the principal register of the Philippine Patent Office
(b) is used by another person in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or
advertising of any goods, business or services or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as
to the source or origin of such goods or services, or identity of such business; or
such trademark is reproduced, counterfeited, copied or colorably imitated by
another person and such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation is
applied to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods,
business or services as to likely cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers,
(c) the trademark is used for identical or similar goods, and
(d) such act is done without the consent of the trademark registrant or assignee.
In summary, the Paris Convention protects well-known trademarks only (to be
determined by domestic authorities), while the Trademark Law protects all trademarks,
whether well-known or not, provided that they have been registered and are in actual
commercial use in the Philippines. Following universal acquiescence and comity, in case
of domestic legal disputes on any conflicting provisions between the Paris Convention
(which is an international agreement) and the Trademark law (which is a municipal law)
the latter will prevail.54
Under both the Paris Convention and the Trademark Law, the protection of a registered
trademark is limited only to goods identical or similar to those in respect of which such
trademark is registered and only when there is likelihood of confusion. Under both laws,
the time element in commencing infringement cases is material in ascertaining the
registrant’s express or implied consent to another’s use of its trademark or a colorable
imitation thereof. This is why acquiescence, estoppel or laches may defeat the
registrant’s otherwise valid cause of action.
Hence, proof of all the elements of trademark infringement is a condition precedent to
any finding of liability.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 422
THE ACTUAL COMMERCIAL USE IN THE
PHILIPPINES OF GALLO CIGARETTE
TRADEMARK PRECEDED THAT OF
GALLO WINE TRADEMARK.
By respondents’ own judicial admission, the GALLO wine trademark was registered in
the Philippines in November 1971 but the wine itself was first marketed and sold in the
country only in 1974 and only within the former U.S. military facilities, and outside
thereof, only in 1979. To prove commercial use of the GALLO wine trademark in the
Philippines, respondents presented sales invoice no. 29991 dated July 9, 1981
addressed to Conrad Company Inc., Makati, Philippines and sales invoice no. 85926
dated March 22, 1996 addressed to Andresons Global, Inc., Quezon City, Philippines.
Both invoices were for the sale and shipment of GALLO wines to the Philippines during
that period.55 Nothing at all, however, was presented to evidence the alleged sales of
GALLO wines in the Philippines in 1974 or, for that matter, prior to July 9, 1981.
On the other hand, by testimonial evidence supported by the BIR authorization letters,
forms and manufacturer’s sworn statement, it appears that petitioners and its
predecessor-in-interest, Tobacco Industries, have indeed been using and selling GALLO
cigarettes in the Philippines since 1973 or before July 9, 1981. 56
In Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 57 we reiterated our
rulings in Pagasa Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 58 Converse Rubber
Corporation vs. Universal Rubber Products, Inc., 59 Sterling Products International, Inc.
vs. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 60 Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,61 and Philip Morris vs. Court of Appeals, 62 giving utmost importance to
the actual commercial useof a trademark in the Philippines prior to its registration,
notwithstanding the provisions of the Paris Convention:
xxx xxx xxx
In addition to the foregoing, we are constrained to agree with petitioner's
contention that private respondent failed to prove prior actual commercial
use of its "LEE" trademark in the Philippines before filing its application
for registration with the BPTTT and hence, has not acquired ownership
over said mark.
Actual use in commerce in the Philippines is an essential prerequisite for
the acquisition of ownership over a trademark pursuant to Sec. 2 and 2-A of
the Philippine Trademark Law (R.A. No. 166) x x x

xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the 1965 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property relied upon by private respondent and Sec. 21-A of the Trademark
Law (R.A. No. 166) were sufficiently expounded upon and qualified in the
recent case of Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (224 SCRA 576
[1993]):
xxx xxx xxx
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on
trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the
Philippines must subordinate an international agreement
inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal
tribunal (Mortisen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of
Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions, 93; Paras, International Law and World
Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the fact that international law
has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply
the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal
sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most
countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not
superior, to national legislative enactments.
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, (a foreign corporation) may have the capacity to
sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the
Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but
the question of whether they have an exclusive right over their
symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend
on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with
Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for
petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity
need not be actually using the trademark in commerce in the
Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file
a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to
protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local
market.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 423
xxx xxx xxx
Undisputably, private respondent is the senior registrant, having obtained
several registration certificates for its various trademarks "LEE," "LEE RIDERS,"
and "LEESURES" in both the supplemental and principal registers, as early as
1969 to 1973. However, registration alone will not suffice. In Sterling
Products International, Inc. v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft (27
SCRA 1214 [1969]; Reiterated inKabushi Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court  (203 SCRA 583 [1991]) we declared:
xxx xxx xxx
A rule widely accepted and firmly entrenched because it has come
down through the years is that actual use in commerce or business
is a prerequisite in the acquisition of the right of ownership over a
trademark.
xxx xxx xxx
The credibility placed on a certificate of registration of one's trademark, or its
weight as evidence of validity, ownership and exclusive use, is qualified. A
registration certificate serves merely as prima facieevidence. It is not
conclusive but can and may be rebutted by controverting evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, however, we reverse the findings of the Director of
Patents and the Court of Appeals. After a meticulous study of the records,
we observe that the Director of Patents and the Court of Appeals relied
mainly on the registration certificates as proof of use by private
respondent of the trademark "LEE" which, as we have previously
discussed are not sufficient. We cannot give credence to private
respondent's claim that its "LEE" mark first reached the Philippines in the
1960's through local sales by the Post Exchanges of the U.S. Military
Bases in the Philippines (Rollo, p. 177) based as it was solely on the self-
serving statements of Mr. Edward Poste, General Manager of Lee (Phils.),
Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the H.D. Lee, Co., Inc., U.S.A., herein
private respondent. (Original Records, p. 52) Similarly, we give little
weight to the numerous vouchers representing various advertising
expenses in the Philippines for "LEE" products. It is well to note that

these expenses were incurred only in 1981 and 1982 by LEE (Phils.), Inc.
after it entered into a licensing agreement with private respondent on 11
May 1981. (Exhibit E)
On the other hand, petitioner has sufficiently shown that it has been in the
business of selling jeans and other garments adopting its "STYLISTIC MR.
LEE" trademark since 1975 as evidenced by appropriate sales invoices to
various stores and retailers. (Exhibit 1-e to 1-o)
Our rulings in Pagasa Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals  (118 SCRA 526
[1982])  and  Converse Rubber Corp. v. Universal Rubber Products, Inc., (147
SCRA 154 [1987]), respectively, are instructive:
The Trademark Law is very clear. It requires actual commercial use of
the mark prior to its registration. There is no dispute that respondent
corporation was the first registrant, yet it failed to fully
substantiate its claim that it used in trade or business in the
Philippines the subject mark; it did not present proof to invest it
with exclusive, continuous adoption of the trademark which
should consist among others, of considerable sales since its first
use. The invoices submitted by respondent which were dated way
back in 1957 show that the zippers sent to the Philippines were to
be used as "samples" and "of no commercial value." The evidence
for respondent must be clear, definite and free from inconsistencies.
"Samples" are not for sale and therefore, the fact of exporting them to
the Philippines cannot be considered to be equivalent to the "use"
contemplated by law. Respondent did not expect income from such
"samples." There were no receipts to establish sale, and no proof were
presented to show that they were subsequently sold in the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
For lack of adequate proof of actual use of its trademark in the Philippines
prior to petitioner's use of its own mark and for failure to establish
confusing similarity between said trademarks, private respondent's action
for infringement must necessarily fail. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing jurisprudence and respondents’ judicial admission that
the actual commercial use of the GALLO wine trademark was subsequent to its
registration in 1971 and to Tobacco Industries’ commercial use of the GALLO cigarette
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 424
trademark in 1973, we rule that, on this account, respondents never enjoyed the
exclusive right to use the GALLO wine trademark to the prejudice of Tobacco Industries
and its successors-in-interest, herein petitioners, either under the Trademark Law or the
Paris Convention.
Respondents’ GALLO trademark
registration is limited to wines only
We also note that the GALLO trademark registration certificates in the Philippines and in
other countries expressly state that they cover wines only, without any evidence or
indication that registrant Gallo Winery expanded or intended to expand its business to
cigarettes.63
Thus, by strict application of Section 20 of the Trademark Law, Gallo Winery’s exclusive
right to use the GALLO trademark should be limited to wines, the only product indicated
in its registration certificates. This strict statutory limitation on the exclusive right to use
trademarks was amply clarified in our ruling in Faberge, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court:64
Having thus reviewed the laws applicable to the case before Us, it is not difficult
to discern from the foregoing statutory enactments that private respondent may
be permitted to register the trademark "BRUTE" for briefs produced by it
notwithstanding petitioner's vehement protestations of unfair dealings in
marketing its own set of items which are limited to: after-shave lotion, shaving
cream, deodorant, talcum powder and toilet soap. Inasmuch as petitioner has
not ventured in the production of briefs, an item which is not listed in its
certificate of registration, petitioner cannot and should not be allowed to
feign that private respondent had invaded petitioner's exclusive
domain. To be sure, it is significant that petitioner failed to annex in its Brief the
so-called "eloquent proof that petitioner indeed intended to expand its mark
‘BRUT’ to other goods" (Page 27, Brief for the Petitioner; page 202, Rollo).
Even then, a mere application by petitioner in this aspect does not suffice and
may not vest an exclusive right in its favor that can ordinarily be protected by
the Trademark Law. In short, paraphrasing Section 20 of the Trademark Law
as applied to the documentary evidence adduced by petitioner, the
certificate of registration issued by the Director of Patents can confer
upon petitioner the exclusive right to use its own symbol only to those
goods specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions and limitations
stated therein. This basic point is perhaps the unwritten rationale of Justice
Escolin in Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Ng Sam (115 SCRA 472 [1982]),

when he stressed the principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in American Foundries vs. Robertson (269 U.S. 372, 381, 70 L ed 317, 46 Sct.
160) that one who has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does
not prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others for
products which are of a different description. Verily, this Court had the
occasion to observe in the 1966 case of George W. Luft Co., Inc. vs. Ngo
Guan (18 SCRA 944 [1966]) that no serious objection was posed by the
petitioner therein since the applicant utilized the emblem "Tango" for no other
product than hair pomade in which petitioner does not deal.
This brings Us back to the incidental issue raised by petitioner which private
respondent sought to belie as regards petitioner's alleged expansion of its
business. It may be recalled that petitioner claimed that it has a pending
application for registration of the emblem "BRUT 33" for briefs (page 25, Brief
for the Petitioner; page 202, Rollo) to impress upon Us the Solomonic wisdom
imparted by Justice JBL Reyes in Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat  (24 SCRA 1018
[1968]), to the effect that dissimilarity of goods will not preclude relief if
the junior user's goods are not remote from any other product which the
first user would be likely to make or sell (vide, at page 1025). Commenting
on the former provision of the Trademark Law now embodied substantially
under Section 4(d) of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, the erudite jurist
opined that the law in point "does not require that the articles of manufacture of
the previous user and late user of the mark should possess the same
descriptive properties or should fall into the same categories as to bar the latter
from registering his mark in the principal register." (supra at page 1026).
Yet, it is equally true that as aforesaid, the protective mantle of the
Trademark Law extends only to the goods used by the first user as
specified in the certificate of registration following the clear message
conveyed by Section 20.
How do We now reconcile the apparent conflict between Section 4(d)
which was relied upon by Justice JBL Reyes in the Sta. Ana case and
Section 20? It would seem that Section 4(d) does not require that the
goods manufactured by the second user be related to the goods produced
by the senior user while Section 20 limits the exclusive right of the senior
user only to those goods specified in the certificate of registration. But the
rule has been laid down that the clause which comes later shall be given
paramount significance over an anterior proviso upon the presumption that it
expresses the latest and dominant purpose. (Graham Paper Co. vs. National
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 425
Newspapers Asso. (Mo. App.) 193 S.W. 1003;  Barnett vs. Merchant's L. Ins.
Co.,  87 Okl. 42; State ex nel Atty. Gen. vs. Toledo, 26 N.E., p. 1061; cited
by Martin, Statutory Construction Sixth ed., 1980 Reprinted, p. 144). It
ineluctably follows that Section 20 is controlling and, therefore, private
respondent can appropriate its symbol for the briefs it manufactures
because as aptly remarked by Justice Sanchez in Sterling Products
International Inc. vs. Farbenfabriken Bayer(27 SCRA 1214 [1969]):
"Really, if the certificate of registration were to be deemed as
including goods not specified therein, then a situation may arise
whereby an applicant may be tempted to register a trademark on
any and all goods which his mind may conceive even if he had
never intended to use the trademark for the said goods. We
believe that such omnibus registration is not contemplated by our
Trademark Law." (1226).
NO LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION, MISTAKE
OR DECEIT AS TO THE IDENTITY OR SOURCE
OF PETITIONERS’ AND RESPONDENTS’
GOODS OR BUSINESS
A crucial issue in any trademark infringement case is the likelihood of confusion, mistake
or deceit as to the identity, source or origin of the goods or identity of the business as a
consequence of using a certain mark. Likelihood of confusion is admittedly a relative
term, to be determined rigidly according to the particular (and sometimes peculiar)
circumstances of each case. Thus, in trademark cases, more than in other kinds of
litigation, precedents must be studied in the light of each particular case. 65
There are two types of confusion in trademark infringement. The first is "confusion of
goods" when an otherwise prudent purchaser is induced to purchase one product in the
belief that he is purchasing another, in which case defendant’s goods are then bought as
the plaintiff’s and its poor quality reflects badly on the plaintiff’s reputation. The other is
"confusion of business" wherein the goods of the parties are different but the
defendant’s product can reasonably (though mistakenly) be assumed to originate from
the plaintiff, thus deceiving the public into believing that there is some connection
between the plaintiff and defendant which, in fact, does not exist. 66
In determining the likelihood of confusion, the Court must consider: [a] the resemblance
between the trademarks; [b] the similarity of the goods to which the trademarks are

attached; [c] the likely effect on the purchaser and [d] the registrant’s express or implied
consent and other fair and equitable considerations.
Petitioners and respondents both use "GALLO" in the labels of their respective cigarette
and wine products. But, as held in the following cases, the use of an identical mark does
not, by itself, lead to a legal conclusion that there is trademark infringement:
(a) in Acoje Mining Co., Inc. vs. Director of Patent, 67 we ordered the approval of
Acoje Mining’s application for registration of the trademark LOTUS for its soy
sauce even though Philippine Refining Company had prior registration and use
of such identical mark for its edible oil which, like soy sauce, also belonged to
Class 47;
(b) in Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Ng Sam and Director of Patents, 68 we
upheld the Patent Director’s registration of the same trademark CAMIA for Ng
Sam’s ham under Class 47, despite Philippine Refining Company’s prior
trademark registration and actual use of such mark on its lard, butter, cooking
oil (all of which belonged to Class 47), abrasive detergents, polishing materials
and soaps;
(c) in Hickok Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Santos Lim Bun
Liong,69 we dismissed Hickok’s petition to cancel private respondent’s HICKOK
trademark registration for its Marikina shoes as against petitioner’s earlier
registration of the same trademark for handkerchiefs, briefs, belts and wallets;
(d) in Shell Company of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 70 in a minute
resolution, we dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit and affirmed the
Patent Office’s registration of the trademark SHELL used in the cigarettes
manufactured by respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation, notwithstanding
Shell Company’s opposition as the prior registrant of the same trademark for its
gasoline and other petroleum products;
(e) in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 71 we dismissed ESSO’s
complaint for trademark infringement against United Cigarette Corporation and
allowed the latter to use the trademark ESSO for its cigarettes, the same
trademark used by ESSO for its petroleum products, and
(f) in Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs. Court of Appeals and NSR Rubber
Corporation,72 we affirmed the rulings of the Patent Office and the CA that NSR
Rubber Corporation could use the trademark CANON for its sandals (Class 25)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 426
despite Canon Kabushiki Kaisha’s prior registration and use of the same
trademark for its paints, chemical products, toner and dyestuff (Class 2).
Whether a trademark causes confusion and is likely to deceive the public hinges on
"colorable imitation"73 which has been defined as "such similarity in form, content, words,
sound, meaning, special arrangement or general appearance of the trademark or
tradename in their overall presentation or in their essential and substantive and
distinctive parts as would likely mislead or confuse persons in the ordinary course of
purchasing the genuine article."74
Jurisprudence has developed two tests in determining similarity and likelihood of
confusion in trademark resemblance:75
(a) the Dominancy Test applied in Asia Brewery, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 76 and
other cases,77 and
(b) the Holistic or Totality Test used in Del Monte Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals78 and its preceding cases.79
The Dominancy Test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features of the competing
trademarks which might cause confusion or deception, and thus infringement. If the
competing trademark contains the main, essential or dominant features of another, and
confusion or deception is likely to result, infringement takes place. Duplication or
imitation is not necessary; nor is it necessary that the infringing label should suggest an
effort to imitate. The question is whether the use of the marks involved is likely to cause
confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or deceive purchasers. 80
On the other hand, the Holistic Test requires that the entirety of the marks in question be
considered in resolving confusing similarity. Comparison of words is not the only
determining factor. The trademarks in their entirety as they appear in their respective
labels or hang tags must also be considered in relation to the goods to which they are
attached. The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant
words but also on the other features appearing in both labels in order that he may draw
his conclusion whether one is confusingly similar to the other. 81
In comparing the resemblance or colorable imitation of marks, various factors have been
considered, such as the dominant color, style, size, form, meaning of letters, words,
designs and emblems used, the likelihood of deception of the mark or name's tendency
to confuse82 and the commercial impression likely to be conveyed by the trademarks if
used in conjunction with the respective goods of the parties. 83

Applying the Dominancy and Holistic Tests, we find that the dominant feature of the
GALLO cigarette trademark is the device of a large rooster facing left, outlined in black
against a gold background. The rooster’s color is either green or red – green for GALLO
menthols and red for GALLO filters. Directly below the large rooster device is the word
GALLO. The rooster device is given prominence in the GALLO cigarette packs in terms
of size and location on the labels.84
The GALLO mark appears to be a fanciful and arbitrary mark for the cigarettes as it has
no relation at all to the product but was chosen merely as a trademark due to the
fondness for fighting cocks of the son of petitioners’ president. Furthermore, petitioners
adopted GALLO, the Spanish word for rooster, as a cigarette trademark to appeal to one
of their target markets, the sabungeros (cockfight aficionados).85
Also, as admitted by respondents themselves,86 on the side of the GALLO cigarette
packs are the words "MADE BY MIGHTY CORPORATION," thus clearly informing the
public as to the identity of the manufacturer of the cigarettes.
On the other hand, GALLO Winery’s wine and brandy labels are diverse. In many of
them, the labels are embellished with sketches of buildings and trees, vineyards or a
bunch of grapes while in a few, one or two small roosters facing right or facing each
other (atop the EJG crest, surrounded by leaves or ribbons), with additional designs in
green, red and yellow colors, appear as minor features thereof. 87 Directly below or above
these sketches is the entire printed name of the founder-owners, "ERNEST & JULIO
GALLO" or just their surname "GALLO," 88which appears in different fonts, sizes, styles
and labels, unlike petitioners’ uniform casque-font bold-lettered GALLO mark.
Moreover, on the labels of Gallo Winery’s wines are printed the words "VINTED AND
BOTTLED BY ERNEST & JULIO GALLO, MODESTO, CALIFORNIA." 89
The many different features like color schemes, art works and other markings of both
products drown out the similarity between them – the use of the word “GALLO” ― a
family surname for the Gallo Winery’s wines and a Spanish word for rooster for
petitioners’ cigarettes.
WINES AND CIGARETTES ARE NOT
IDENTICAL, SIMILAR, COMPETING OR
RELATED GOODS
Confusion of goods is evident where the litigants are actually in competition; but
confusion of business may arise between non-competing interests as well. 90
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 427
Thus, apart from the strict application of Section 20 of the Trademark Law and Article
6bis of the Paris Convention which proscribe trademark infringement not only of goods
specified in the certificate of registration but also of identical or similar goods, we have
also uniformly recognized and applied the modern concept of "related goods." 91Simply
stated, when goods are so related that the public may be, or is actually, deceived and
misled that they come from the same maker or manufacturer, trademark infringement
occurs.92
Non-competing goods may be those which, though they are not in actual competition,
are so related to each other that it can reasonably be assumed that they originate from
one manufacturer, in which case, confusion of business can arise out of the use of
similar marks.93 They may also be those which, being entirely unrelated, cannot be
assumed to have a common source; hence, there is no confusion of business, even
though similar marks are used.94 Thus, there is no trademark infringement if the public
does not expect the plaintiff to make or sell the same class of goods as those made or
sold by the defendant.95
In resolving whether goods are related,96 several factors come into play:
(a) the business (and its location) to which the goods belong
(b) the class of product to which the goods belong
(c) the product's quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the package, wrapper
or container 97
(d) the nature and cost of the articles98
(e) the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics with
reference to their form, composition, texture or quality
(f) the purpose of the goods99
(g) whether the article is bought for immediate consumption, 100 that is, day-to-day
household items101
(h) the fields of manufacture102
(i) the conditions under which the article is usually purchased 103 and

(j) the channels of trade through which the goods flow, 104 how they are distributed,
marketed, displayed and sold.105
The wisdom of this approach is its recognition that each trademark infringement case
presents its own unique set of facts. No single factor is preeminent, nor can the
presence or absence of one determine, without analysis of the others, the outcome of an
infringement suit. Rather, the court is required to sift the evidence relevant to each of the
criteria. This requires that the entire panoply of elements constituting the relevant factual
landscape be comprehensively examined. 106 It is a weighing and balancing process. With
reference to this ultimate question, and from a balancing of the determinations reached
on all of the factors, a conclusion is reached whether the parties have a right to the relief
sought.107
A very important circumstance though is whether there exists a likelihood that an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers will be misled, or simply confused,
as to the source of the goods in question. 108 The "purchaser" is not the "completely
unwary consumer" but is the "ordinarily intelligent buyer" considering the type of product
involved.109 He is "accustomed to buy, and therefore to some extent familiar with, the
goods in question. The test of fraudulent simulation is to be found in the likelihood of the
deception of some persons in some measure acquainted with an established design and
desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design has been associated. The
test is not found in the deception, or the possibility of deception, of the person who
knows nothing about the design which has been counterfeited, and who must be
indifferent between that and the other. The simulation, in order to be objectionable, must
be such as appears likely to mislead the ordinary intelligent buyer who has a need to
supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks to purchase." 110
Hence, in the adjudication of trademark infringement, we give due regard to the goods’
usual purchaser’s character, attitude, habits, age, training and education. 111
Applying these legal precepts to the present case, petitioner’s use of the GALLO
cigarette trademark is not likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive the
"ordinarily intelligent buyer" of either wines or cigarettes or both as to the identity of the
goods, their source and origin, or identity of the business of petitioners and respondents.
Obviously, wines and cigarettes are not identical or competing products. Neither do they
belong to the same class of goods. Respondents’ GALLO wines belong to Class 33
under Rule 84[a] Chapter III, Part II of the Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases while
petitioners’ GALLO cigarettes fall under Class 34.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 428
We are mindful that product classification alone cannot serve as the decisive factor in
the resolution of whether or not wines and cigarettes are related goods. Emphasis
should be on the similarity of the products involved and not on the arbitrary classification
or general description of their properties or characteristics. But the mere fact that one
person has adopted and used a particular trademark for his goods does not prevent the
adoption and use of the same trademark by others on articles of a different
description. 112
Both the Makati RTC and the CA held that wines and cigarettes are related products
because: (1) "they are related forms of vice, harmful when taken in excess, and used for
pleasure and relaxation" and (2) "they are grouped or classified in the same section of
supermarkets and groceries."
We find these premises patently insufficient and too arbitrary to support the legal
conclusion that wines and cigarettes are related products within the contemplation of the
Trademark Law and the Paris Convention.
First, anything –- not only wines and cigarettes ― can be used for pleasure and
relaxation and can be harmful when taken in excess. Indeed, it would be a grave abuse
of discretion to treat wines and cigarettes as similar or related products likely to cause
confusion just because they are pleasure-giving, relaxing or potentially harmful. Such
reasoning makes no sense.
Second, it is common knowledge that supermarkets sell an infinite variety of wholly
unrelated products and the goods here involved, wines and cigarettes, have nothing
whatsoever in common with respect to their essential characteristics, quality, quantity,
size, including the nature of their packages, wrappers or containers. 113
Accordingly, the U.S. patent office and courts have consistently held that the mere fact
that goods are sold in one store under the same roof does not automatically mean that
buyers are likely to be confused as to the goods’ respective sources, connections or
sponsorships. The fact that different products are available in the same store is an
insufficient standard, in and of itself, to warrant a finding of likelihood of confusion. 114
In this regard, we adopted the Director of Patents’ finding in Philippine Refining Co., Inc.
vs. Ng Sam and the Director of Patents:115
In his decision, the Director of Patents enumerated the factors that set
respondent’s products apart from the goods of petitioner. He opined and we
quote:

"I have taken into account such factors as probable purchaser attitude
and habits, marketing activities, retail outlets, and commercial
impression likely to be conveyed by the trademarks if used in
conjunction with the respective goods of the parties, I believe that ham
on one hand, and lard, butter, oil, and soap on the other are
products that would not move in the same manner through the
same channels of trade. They pertain to unrelated fields of
manufacture, might be distributed and marketed under dissimilar
conditions, and are displayed separately even though they
frequently may be sold through the same retail food
establishments. Opposer’s products are ordinary day-to-day
household items whereas ham is not necessarily so. Thus, the goods
of the parties are not of a character which purchasers would likely
attribute to a common origin.
The observations and conclusion of the Director of Patents are correct. The
particular goods of the parties are so unrelated that consumers, would not, in
any probability mistake one as the source of origin of the product of the other.
(Emphasis supplied).
The same is true in the present case. Wines and cigarettes are non-competing and are
totally unrelated products not likely to cause confusion vis-à-vis the goods or the
business of the petitioners and respondents.
Wines are bottled and consumed by drinking while cigarettes are packed in cartons or
packages and smoked. There is a whale of a difference between their descriptive
properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics like form, composition, texture
and quality.
GALLO cigarettes are inexpensive items while GALLO wines are not. GALLO wines are
patronized by middle-to-high-income earners while GALLO cigarettes appeal only to
simple folks like farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-income workers. 116 Indeed,
the big price difference of these two products is an important factor in proving that they
are in fact unrelated and that they travel in different channels of trade. There is a distinct
price segmentation based on vastly different social classes of purchasers. 117
GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines are not sold through the same channels of trade.
GALLO cigarettes are Philippine-made and petitioners neither claim nor pass off their
goods as imported or emanating from Gallo Winery. GALLO cigarettes are distributed,
marketed and sold through ambulant and sidewalk vendors, small local sari-saristores
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 429
and grocery stores in Philippine rural areas, mainly in Misamis Oriental, Pangasinan,
Bohol, and Cebu.118 On the other hand, GALLO wines are imported, distributed and sold
in the Philippines through Gallo Winery’s exclusive contracts with a domestic entity,
which is currently Andresons. By respondents’ own testimonial evidence, GALLO wines
are sold in hotels, expensive bars and restaurants, and high-end grocery stores and
supermarkets, not through sari-sari  stores or ambulant vendors.119
Furthermore, the Makati RTC and the CA erred in relying on Carling Brewing Company
vs. Philip Morris, Inc.120 to support its finding that GALLO wines and GALLO cigarettes
are related goods. The courts a quo should have taken into consideration the
subsequent case of IDV North America, Inc. and R & A Bailey Co. Limited vs. S & M
Brands, Inc.:121
IDV correctly acknowledges, however, that there is no per se rule that the use
of the same mark on alcohol and tobacco products always will result in a
likelihood of confusion. Nonetheless, IDV relies heavily on the decision in John
Walker & Sons, Ltd. vs. Tampa Cigar Co., 124 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S.D. Fla.
1954), aff’d, 222 F. 2d 460 (5th Cir. 1955), wherein the court enjoined the use of
the mark "JOHNNIE WALKER" on cigars because the fame of the plaintiff’s
mark for scotch whiskey and because the plaintiff advertised its scotch whiskey
on, or in connection with tobacco products. The court, in John Walker &
Sons,  placed great significance on the finding that the infringers use was
a deliberate attempt to capitalize on the senior marks’ fame. Id. At
256. IDV also relies on Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 297 F.
Supp. 1330, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 1968), in which the court enjoined the
defendant’s use of the mark "BLACK LABEL" for cigarettes because it
was likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff’s well-known mark "BLACK
LABEL" for beer.
xxx xxx xxx
Those decisions, however, must be considered in perspective of the
principle that tobacco products and alcohol products should be
considered related only in cases involving special
circumstances.Schenley Distillers, Inc. v. General Cigar Co., 57C.C.P.A.
1213, 427 F. 2d 783, 785 (1970). The presence of special circumstances
has been found to exist where there is a finding of unfair competition or
where a ‘famous’ or ‘well-known mark’ is involved and there is a
demonstrated intent to capitalize on that mark. For example, in John Walker
& Sons, the court was persuaded to find a relationship between products, and

hence a likelihood of confusion, because of the plaintiff’s long use and
extensive advertising of its mark and placed great emphasis on the fact that the
defendant used the trademark ‘Johnnie Walker with full knowledge of its fame
and reputation and with the intention of taking advantage thereof.’ John Walker
& Sons, 124 F. Supp. At 256; see Mckesson & Robbins, Inc. v. P. Lorillard
Co., 1959 WL 5894, 120 U.S.P.Q. 306, 307 (1959) (holding that the decision
in John Walker & Sons was ‘merely the law on the particular case based upon
its own peculiar facts’); see also Alfred Dunhill,  350 F. Supp. At 1363
(defendant’s adoption of ‘Dunhill’ mark was not innocent). However,
in Schenley, the court noted that the relation between tobacco and whiskey
products is significant where a widely known arbitrary mark has long been used
for diversified products emanating from a single source and a newcomer seeks
to use the same mark on unrelated goods. Schenley,  427 F.2d. at 785.
Significantly, in Schenley, the court looked at the industry practice and the facts
of the case in order to determine the nature and extent of the relationship
between the mark on the tobacco product and the mark on the alcohol product.
The record here establishes conclusively that IDV has never advertised
BAILEYS liqueurs in conjunction with tobacco or tobacco accessory products
and that IDV has no intent to do so. And, unlike the defendant in  Dunhill,  S & M
Brands does not market bar accessories, or liqueur related products, with its
cigarettes. The advertising and promotional materials presented a trial in this
action demonstrate a complete lack of affiliation between the tobacco and
liqueur products bearing the marks here at issue.
xxx xxx xxx
Of equal significance, it is undisputed that S & M Brands had no intent, by
adopting the family name ‘Bailey’s’  as the mark for its cigarettes, to capitalize
upon the fame of the ‘BAILEYS’ mark for liqueurs. See Schenley, 427 F. 2d at
785.  Moreover, as will be discussed below, and as found in Mckesson &
Robbins, the survey evidence refutes the contention that cigarettes and
alcoholic beverages are so intimately associated in the public mind that
they cannot under any circumstances be sold under the same mark
without causing confusion. See Mckesson & Robbins, 120 U.S.P.Q. at 308.
Taken as a whole, the evidence here demonstrates the absence of the ‘special
circumstances’ in which courts have found a relationship between tobacco and
alcohol products sufficient to tip the similarity of goods analysis in favor of the
protected mark and against the allegedly infringing mark. It is true that
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 430
BAILEYS liqueur, the world’s best selling liqueur and the second best
selling in the United States, is a well-known product. That fact alone,
however, is insufficient to invoke the special circumstances connection
here where so much other evidence and so many other factors disprove a
likelihood of confusion. The similarity of products analysis, therefore,
augers against finding that there is a likelihood of confusion. (Emphasis
supplied).
In short, tobacco and alcohol products may be considered related only in cases
involving special circumstanceswhich exist only if a famous mark is involved and there is
a demonstrated intent to capitalize on it. Both of these are absent in the present case.
THE GALLO WINE TRADEMARK IS NOT A
WELL-KNOWN MARK IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE PARIS CONVENTION IN THIS CASE
SINCE WINES AND CIGARETTES ARE NOT
IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR GOODS
First, the records bear out that most of the trademark registrations took place in the late
1980s and the 1990s, that is, after Tobacco Industries’ use of the GALLO cigarette
trademark in 1973 and petitioners’ use of the same mark in 1984.
GALLO wines and GALLO cigarettes are neither the same, identical, similar nor related
goods, a requisite elementunder both the Trademark Law and the Paris Convention.
Second, the GALLO trademark cannot be considered a strong and distinct mark in the
Philippines. Respondents do not dispute the documentary evidence that aside from
Gallo Winery’s GALLO trademark registration, the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer also issued on September 4, 1992 Certificate of Registration No.
53356 under the Principal Register approving Productos Alimenticios Gallo, S.A’s April
19, 1990 application for GALLO trademark registration and use for its "noodles,
prepared food or canned noodles, ready or canned sauces for noodles, semolina, wheat
flour and bread crumbs, pastry, confectionery, ice cream, honey, molasses syrup, yeast,
baking powder, salt, mustard, vinegar, species and ice." 122
Third and most important, pursuant to our ruling in  Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs. Court of
Appeals and NSR Rubber Corporation,123 "GALLO" cannot be considered a "well-known"
mark within the contemplation and protection of the Paris Convention in this case since
wines and cigarettes are not identical or similar goods:

We agree with public respondents that the controlling doctrine with respect to
the applicability of Article 8 of the Paris Convention is that established
in Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (203 SCRA 59
[1991]). As pointed out by the BPTTT:
"Regarding the applicability of Article 8 of the Paris Convention,
this Office believes that there is no automatic protection afforded
an entity whose tradename is alleged to have been infringed
through the use of that name as a trademark by a local entity.
In Kabushiki Kaisha Isetan vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et.
al., G.R. No. 75420, 15 November 1991, the Honorable Supreme Court
held that:
‘The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property does not automatically exclude all countries of
the world which have signed it from using a tradename
which happens to be used in one country. To illustrate —
if a taxicab or bus company in a town in the United
Kingdom or India happens to use the tradename ‘Rapid
Transportation,’ it does not necessarily follow that ‘Rapid’
can no longer be registered in Uganda, Fiji, or the
Philippines.
This office is not unmindful that in (sic)  the Treaty of Paris for the
Protection of Intellectual Property regarding well-known marks and
possible application thereof in this case. Petitioner, as this office sees
it, is trying to seek refuge under its protective mantle, claiming that the
subject mark is well known in this country at the time the then
application of NSR Rubber was filed.
However, the then Minister of Trade and Industry, the Hon. Roberto V.
Ongpin, issued a memorandum dated 25 October 1983 to the Director
of Patents, a set of guidelines in the implementation of Article
6bis of the Treaty of Paris. These conditions are:
a) the mark must be internationally known;
b) the subject of the right must be a trademark, not a patent or
copyright or anything else;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 431
c) the mark must be for use in the same or similar kinds of
goods; and
d) the person claiming must be the owner of the mark (The
Parties Convention Commentary on the Paris Convention.
Article by Dr. Bogsch, Director General of the World
Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, Switzerland,
1985)’
From the set of facts found in the records, it is ruled that the Petitioner
failed to comply with the third requirement of the said
memorandum that is the mark must be for use in the same or
similar kinds of goods. The Petitioner is using the mark "CANON"
for products belonging to class 2 (paints, chemical products)
while the Respondent is using the same mark for sandals (class
25).
Hence, Petitioner's contention that its mark is well-known at the
time the Respondent filed its application for the same mark
should fail." (Emphasis supplied.)
Consent of the Registrant and
Other air, Just and Equitable
Considerations
Each trademark infringement case presents a unique problem which must be answered
by weighing the conflicting interests of the litigants.124
Respondents claim that GALLO wines and GALLO cigarettes flow through the same
channels of trade, that is, retail trade. If respondents’ assertion is true, then both goods
co-existed peacefully for a considerable period of time. It took respondents almost 20
years to know about the existence of GALLO cigarettes and sue petitioners for
trademark infringement. Given, on one hand, the long period of time that petitioners
were engaged in the manufacture, marketing, distribution and sale of GALLO cigarettes
and, on the other, respondents’ delay in enforcing their rights (not to mention implied
consent, acquiescence or negligence) we hold that equity, justice and fairness require
us to rule in favor of petitioners. The scales of conscience and reason tip far more
readily in favor of petitioners than respondents.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 432

Moreover, there exists no evidence that petitioners employed malice, bad faith or fraud,
or that they intended to capitalize on respondents’ goodwill in adopting the GALLO mark
for their cigarettes which are totally unrelated to respondents’ GALLO wines. Thus, we
rule out trademark infringement on the part of petitioners.
PETITIONERS ARE ALSO NOT LIABLE
FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION
Under Section 29 of the Trademark Law, any person who employs deception or any
other means contrary to good faith by which he passes off the goods manufactured by
him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or who commits any acts calculated to produce said result, is
guilty of unfair competition. It includes the following acts:
All told, after applying all the tests provided by the governing laws as well as those
recognized by jurisprudence, we conclude that petitioners are not liable for trademark
infringement, unfair competition or damages.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review meritorious, the same is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 65175 and the November 26, 1998 decision and the June 24, 1999 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57 in Civil Case No. 93-850 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint against petitioners DISMISSED.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.

(a) Any person, who in selling his goods shall give them the general
appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods
themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or
the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which
would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are
those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual manufacturer or dealer,
or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the
public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of
such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a
like purpose;

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means
calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of
another who has identified such services in the mind of the public;

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or
who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to
discredit the goods, business or services of another.

The universal test question is whether the public is likely to be deceived. Nothing less
than conduct tending to pass off one man’s goods or business as that of another
constitutes unfair competition. Actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of
customers by reason of defendant’s practices must always appear. 125 On this score, we
find that petitioners never attempted to pass off their cigarettes as those of respondents.
There is no evidence of bad faith or fraud imputable to petitioners in using their GALLO
cigarette mark.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46631             November 16, 1939
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, petitioner,  her person. Petitioner's objection, motion and demurrer having been overruled as well as
vs.
ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, EUGENE ARTHUR
PERKINS, and BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, respondents.
Alva J. Hill for petitioner.
Ross, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso for respondent Judge and Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company.
DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for respondent Perkins.
MORAN, J.:
On July 6, 1938, respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, instituted an action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for
dividends amounting to P71,379.90 on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his name,
payment of which was being withheld by the company; and, for the recognition of his
right to the control and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others. To the
complaint, the company filed its answer alleging, by way of defense, that the withholding
of such dividends and the non-recognition of plaintiff's right to the disposal and control of
the shares were due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by the
petitioner herein, Idonah Slade Perkins, and by one George H. Engelhard. The answer
prays that the adverse claimants be made parties to the action and served with notice
thereof by publication, and that thereafter all such parties be required to interplead and
settle the rights among themselves. On September 5, 1938, the trial court ordered
respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins to include in his complaint as parties defendant
petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H. Engelhard. The complaint was
accordingly amended and in addition to the relief prayed for in the original complaint,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 433
respondent Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and George Engelhard
be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any
claim they assert thereon. Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon the
non-resident defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard, pursuant to
the order of the trial court. On December 9, 1938, Engelhard filed his answer to the
amended complaint, and on December 10, 1938, petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins,
through counsel, filed her pleading entitled "objection to venue, motion to quash, and
demurrer to jurisdiction" wherein she challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over
her motion for reconsideration of the order of denial, she now brought the present
petition for certiorari, praying that the summons by publication issued against her be
declared null and void, and that, with respect to her, respondent Judge be permanently
prohibited from taking any action on the case.
The controlling issue here involved is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila
has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the present petitioner as a non-resident
defendant, or, notwithstanding the want of such jurisdiction, whether or not said court
may validly try the case. The parties have filed lengthy memorandums relying on
numerous authorities, but the principles governing the question are well settled in this
jurisdiction.
Section 398 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a non-resident defendant
is sued in the Philippine courts and it appears, by the complaint or by affidavits, that the
action relates to real or personal property within the Philippines in which said defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding such person from any interest therein, service of
summons maybe made by publication.
We have fully explained the meaning of this provision in El Banco Español Filipino vs.
Palanca, 37 Phil., 921, wherein we laid down the following rules:
(1) In order that the court may validly try a case, it must have jurisdiction over
the subject-matter and over the persons of the parties. Jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is acquired by concession of the sovereign authority which
organizes a court and determines the nature and extent of its powers in general
and thus fixes its jurisdiction with reference to actions which it may entertain
and the relief it may grant. Jurisdiction over the persons of the parties is
acquired by their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its
authority, or by the coercive power of legal process exerted over their persons.

(2) When the defendant is a non-resident and refuses to appear voluntary, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person even if the summons be served
by publication, for he is beyond the reach of judicial process. No tribunal
established by one State can extend its process beyond its territory so as to
subject to its decisions either persons or property located in another State.
"There are many expressions in the American reports from which it might be
inferred that the court acquires personal jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the case. In truth, the
proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident cannot be
acquired by publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the
American courts until after the decision had been rendered by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff  (95 U.S.,
714; 24 Law. ed., 565). In the light of that decisions which have subsequently
been rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that jurisdiction over the
person cannot be thus acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to
question; and it is now fully established that a personal judgment upon
constructive or substituted service against a non-resident who does not appear
is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted
process, including service by publication and personal service outside of the
jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems to
be found in the case where the non-resident defendant has expressly or
impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R.
A. [N. S.], 292; see also L.R.A. 585; 35 L.R.A. [N.S.], 312.)
(3) The general rule, therefore, is that a suit against a non-resident cannot be
entertained by a Philippine court. Where, however, the action is in rem or quasi
in rem in connection with property located in the Philippines, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res, and its jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident
is non-essential. In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is
not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property,
potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from
the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is
impliedly recognized by law. "An illustration of what we term potential
jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land
under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking
actual physical control over the property , assumes, at the instance of some
person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property
and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world."
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 434
(4) As before stated, in an action in rem or quasi in rem  against a non-resident
defendant, jurisdiction over his person is non-essential, and if the law requires
in such case that the summons upon the defendant be served by publication, it
is merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. If any be said,
in this connection, that "may reported cases can be cited in which it is assumed
that the question of the sufficiency of publication or notice in the case of this
kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is
sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This
phraseology was undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of the
analogy between service by publication and personal service of process upon
the defendant; and, as has already been suggested, prior to the decision
of Pennoyer v. Neff  (supra), the difference between the legal effects of the two
forms of service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the modes of
expression which had already been moulded into legal tradition before that case
was decided have been brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the
legal principle here involved is not affected by the peculiar languages in which
the courts have expounded their ideas."lawphi1.net
The reason for the rule that Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person
of a non-resident, as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in  Pennoyer
v. Neff, supra, may be found in a recognized principle of public law to the effect that "no
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory. Story, Confl. L., ch. 2; Wheat, Int. L., pt. 2, ch. 2. The several States are of
equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power
from all others. And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws
of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by
comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory
so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. "Any exertion of authority of
this sort beyond this limit," says Story, "is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such
persons or property in any other tribunals." Story, Confl. L., sec. 539." (Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S., 714; 24 Law. ed., 565, 568-569.).
When, however, the action relates to property located in the Philippines, the Philippine
courts may validly try the case, upon the principle that a "State, through its tribunals,
may subject property situated within its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of
the demand of its own citizens against them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no
respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are domiciled.
Every State owes protection to its citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is
a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by
such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State's

jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals
can inquire into the non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can
then be carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If
the non-resident has no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals
can adjudicate." (Pennoyer v. Neff, supra.)
In the instant case, there can be no question that the action brought by Eugene Arthur
Perkins in his amended complaint against the petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, seeks to
exclude her from any interest in a property located in the Philippines. That property
consists in certain shares of stocks of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,
a sociedad anonima, organized in the Philippines under the provisions of the Spanish
Code of Commerce, with its principal office in the City of Manila and which conducts its
mining activities therein. The situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction where the
corporation is created, whether the certificated evidencing the ownership of those shares
are within or without that jurisdiction. (Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Permanent ed.
Vol. 11, p. 95). Under these circumstances, we hold that the action thus brought is quasi
in rem, for while the judgement that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in
rem, "it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent
partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem." (50 C.J., p 503). As held by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff (supra);
It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem  is one taken directly against
property, and has for its object the disposition of the property, without reference
to the title of individual claimants; but , in a large and more general sense, the
terms are applied to actions between parties, where the direct object is to reach
and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein.
The action being in quasi in rem, The Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident. In order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of
due process, summons has been served upon her by publication. There is no question
as to the adequacy of publication made nor as to the mailing of the order of publication
to the petitioner's last known place of residence in the United States. But, of course, the
action being quasi in rem and notice having be made by publication, the relief that may
be granted by the Philippine court must be confined to the res, it having no jurisdiction to
render a personal judgment against the non-resident. In the amended complaint filed by
Eugene Arthur Perkins, no money judgment or other relief in personam is prayed for
against the petitioner. The only relief sought therein is that she be declared to be without
any interest in the shares in controversy and that she be excluded from any claim
thereto.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 435
Petitioner contends that the proceeding instituted against her is one of interpleading and
is therefore an action in personam. Section 120 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides
that whenever conflicting claims are or may be made upon a person for or relating to
personal property, or the performance of an obligation or any portion thereof, so that he
may be made subject to several actions by different persons, such person may bring an
action against the conflicting claimants, disclaiming personal interest in the controversy,
and the court may order them to interplead with one another and litigate their several
claims among themselves, there upon proceed to determine their several claims. Here,
The Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, in its answer to the complaint filed by
Eugene Arthur Perkins, averred that in connection with the shares of stock in question,
conflicting claims were being made upon it by said plaintiff, Eugene Arthur Perkins, his
wife Idonah Slade Perkins, and one named George H. Engelhard, and prayed that these
last two be made parties to the action and served with summons by publication, so that
the three claimants may litigate their conflicting claims and settle their rights among
themselves. The court has not issued an order compelling the conflicting claimants to
interplead with one another and litigate their several claims among themselves, but
instead ordered the plaintiff to amend his complaint including the other two claimants as
parties defendant. The plaintiff did so, praying that the new defendants thus joined be
excluded fro any interest in the shares in question, and it is upon this amended
complaint that the court ordered the service of the summons by publication. It is
therefore, clear that the publication of the summons was ordered not in virtue of an
interpleading, but upon the filing of the amended complaint wherein an action quasi in
rem  is alleged.
Had not the complaint been amended, including the herein petitioner as an additional
defendant, and had the court, upon the filing of the answer of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company, issued an order under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
calling the conflicting claimants into court and compelling them to interplead with one
another, such order could not perhaps have validly been served by publication or
otherwise, upon the non-resident Idonah Slade Perkins, for then the proceeding would
be purely one of interpleading. Such proceeding is a personal action, for it merely seeks
to call conflicting claimants into court so that they may interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves, and no specific relief is prayed for against them, as
the interpleader have appeared in court, one of them pleads ownership of the personal
property located in the Philippines and seeks to exclude a non-resident claimant from
any interest therein, is a question which we do not decide not. Suffice it to say that here
the service of the summons by publication was ordered by the lower court by virtue of an
action quasi in rem  against the non-resident defendant.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 436

Respondents contend that, as the petitioner in the lower court has pleaded over the
subject-matter, she has submitted herself to its jurisdiction. We have noticed, however,
that these pleas have been made not as independent grounds for relief, but merely as
additional arguments in support of her contention that the lower court had no jurisdiction
over the person. In other words, she claimed that the lower court had no jurisdiction over
her person not only because she is a non-resident, but also because the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action and that the issues therein involved
have already been decided by the New York court and are being relitigated in the
California court. Although this argument is obviously erroneous, as neither jurisdiction
over the subject-matter nor res adjudicata  nor lis pendens has anything to do with the
question of jurisdiction over her person, we believe and so hold that the petitioner has
not, by such erroneous argument, submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Voluntary appearance cannot be implied from either a mistaken or superflous reasoning
but from the nature of the relief prayed for.

For all the foregoing, petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-
appellee,  the country in which it may be situated.
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this
case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the
partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the
Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval
of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza
until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 437
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws
of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10
of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not
in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on
such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this
point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the
approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration
that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore,
no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our
laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein
appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will,
it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 438

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice,
nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable
length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property
and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand
whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution
of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo
as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with
the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply
with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not
respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792
of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be

considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national
law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of
the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently
valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall
govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being
contrary to law.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.  Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.  U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,  September 15, 1958.
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by
the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 439
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition"
wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the
delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00
each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his
first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which
is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving

the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on
June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict
of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position
is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of
the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 440
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must
be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount  of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern
his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard
to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 441

successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23145      November 29, 1968
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D.
TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,  appellant's brief: "On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.
Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary administrator, the
County Trust Company of New York, United States of America, of the estate of the
deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on March 27, 1960, to
surrender to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines the stock certificates owned by
her in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate
claims of local creditors, the lower court, then presided by the Honorable Arsenio
Santos, now retired, issued on May 18, 1964, an order of this tenor: "After considering
the motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as well as the
opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost
for all purposes in connection with the administration and liquidation of the Philippine
estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares of stock
standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said
certificates cancelled, and (3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary
administrator or to the Probate Division of this Court."1
From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary
administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, but by the Philippine corporation,
the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot possibly prosper. The challenged
order represents a response and expresses a policy, to paraphrase Frankfurter, arising
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 442
out of a specific problem, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of
specific remedies, with full and ample support from legal doctrines of weight and
significance.
The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet Consolidated,
Inc., Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among
others, two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant, the certificates being
in the possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the
domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased. 2 Then came this portion of the
administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez
was appointed ancillary administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted by
the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciary administrator in
New York and the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to which of them was
entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question. On January 27, 1964, the
Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust
Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the
Clerk of Court. The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the order, and on
February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order
declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the
name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or]
considered as lost."3
It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is
immaterial" as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession of the stock
certificates in question; appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator
because the said stock certificates are in existence, they are today in the possession of
the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A...." 4
It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be
declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to
observe certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be
issued. Hence, its appeal.
As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The challenged
order constitutes an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated
by the wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a
court decree. How, then, can this order be stigmatized as illegal?

As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called for by
the realities of the situation. What cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful
defiance, if it had not actually reached it, cannot without undue loss of judicial prestige,
be condoned or tolerated. For the law is not so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness
as to preclude such a solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make clear its
being buttressed by indisputable principles and supported by the strongest policy
considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor of the
judiciary no less than that of the country. Through this challenged order, there is thus
dispelled the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by the persistence of
the domiciliary administrator to hold on to the stock certificates after it had, as admitted,
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by entering its
appearance through counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a petition for relief from a
previous order of March 15, 1963.
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to
what was decreed. For without it, what it had been decided would be set at naught and
nullified. Unless such a blatant disregard by the domiciliary administrator, with residence
abroad, of what was previously ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it
would have entailed, insofar as this matter was concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh
complete paralysis of judicial authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee
ancillary administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within
the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his duty to
settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors. 5 As Justice Tuason speaking
for this Court made clear, it is a "general rule universally recognized" that administration,
whether principal or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a decedent found within
the state or country where it was granted," the corollary being "that an administrator
appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or
country."6
It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an
earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than
one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the
country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both
countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed
the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary
administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 443
proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines].
The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country
other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of
the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs." 7
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in
her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is
equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance
and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot
therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue 8 finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could
it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather conclusive fashion
for the legality of the challenged order, how does appellant, Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
propose to carry the extremely heavy burden of persuasion of precisely demonstrating
the contrary? It would assign as the basic error allegedly committed by the lower court
its "considering as lost the stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of Benguet
belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, ..." 9 More specifically, appellant would
stress that the "lower court could not "consider as lost" the stock certificates in question
when, as a matter of fact, his Honor the trial Judge knew, and does know, and it is
admitted by the appellee, that the said stock certificates are in existence and are today
in the possession of the domiciliary administrator in New York." 10
There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court. That certainly
does not suffice to call for the reversal of the appealed order. Since there is a refusal,
persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the
shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in
considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary administrator could
be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.

Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to
depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the party or entity, in this case domiciled
abroad, which thus far has shown the utmost persistence in refusing to yield obedience.
Certainly, appellant would not be heard to contend in all seriousness that a judicial
decree could be treated as a mere scrap of paper, the court issuing it being powerless to
remedy its flagrant disregard.
It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower court did not
correspond exactly with the facts. To be more blunt, the quality of truth may be lacking in
such a conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered however, again to borrow from
Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends
have played an important part in its development." 11
Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state fictions "were
devices to advance the ends of justice, [even if] clumsy and at times offensive." 12 Some
of them have persisted even to the present, that eminent jurist, noting "the quasi
contract, the adopted child, the constructive trust, all of flourishing vitality, to attest the
empire of "as if" today." 13 He likewise noted "a class of fictions of another order, the
fiction which is a working tool of thought, but which at times hides itself from view till
reflection and analysis have brought it to the light." 14
What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that fictions as
such played in the law. There should be then on the part of the appellant a further
refinement in the catholicity of its condemnation of such judicial technique. If ever an
occasion did call for the employment of a legal fiction to put an end to the anomalous
situation of a valid judicial order being disregarded with apparent impunity, this is it.
What is thus most obvious is that this particular alleged error does not carry persuasion.
3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention by
its invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be
followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would stress that in the
event of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate
or certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new
certificate or certificates would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the
ownership [thereof]."15
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-
law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order
now in question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as
far as it is concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of the stock
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 444
certificates ..." Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to
such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between
the above by-law and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution overrides a statute, to
which, however, the judiciary must yield deference, when appropriately invoked and
deemed applicable. It would be most highly unorthodox, however, if a corporate by-law
would be accorded such a high estate in the jural order that a court must not only take
note of it but yield to its alleged controlling force.
The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled unless the
appealed order be set aside for its inconsistency with one of its by-laws does not
impress us. Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid defense,
assuming that such apprehension of a possible court action against it could possibly
materialize. Thus far, nothing in the circumstances as they have developed gives
substance to such a fear. Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to appellant do not
suffice to nullify the lawful exercise of judicial authority.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught
with implications at war with the basic postulates of corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being created by
operation of law...."16 It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its
will. As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial
person, owing its existence through creation by a sovereign power." 17 As a matter of
fact, the statutory language employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the
Dartmouth College decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." 18
The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A corporation is
not in fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as though it were a person by
process of fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person distinct and separate from its
individual stockholders.... It owes its existence to law. It is an artificial person created by
law for certain specific purposes, the extent of whose existence, powers and liberties is
fixed by its charter."19Dean Pound's terse summary, a juristic person, resulting from an
association of human beings granted legal personality by the state, puts the matter
neatly.20
There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to
quote from Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social and legal entity,

independent of state recognition and concession." 21 A corporation as known to Philippine
jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of
the state according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights
and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot
legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding
the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of
persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary
than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the appropriate court action to
enforce its right. Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control in those instances,
where a duty under the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal proceeding is cast
upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to
confer upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but license which cannot be
tolerated. It is to argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the source of its
very existence; it is to contend that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully
require could be ignored at will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 22 it was shown that in a
guardianship proceedings then pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans
Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum of money paid to the minor
under guardianship, alleging that the lower court had previously granted its petition to
consider the deceased father as not entitled to guerilla benefits according to a
determination arrived at by its main office in the United States. The motion was denied.
In seeking a reconsideration of such order, the Administrator relied on an American
federal statute making his decisions "final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact"
precluding any other American official to examine the matter anew, "except a judge or
judges of the United States court." 23 Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator
appealed.
In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus: "We are of
the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked
by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veterans' Administrator final and
conclusive when made on claims property submitted to him for resolution; but they are
not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but
as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator
(which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the
Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 445
where the Veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their
jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty
that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a
party, conclusive on our courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of judicial
discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans'
Administrator."
It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final
and conclusive, determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely
worse if through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons
within our jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend
on the whim or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more
offensive to the dignity of the bench or the honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which appellant
Benguet Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept
the validity of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal. Certainly we must at all
pains see to it that it does not succeed. The deplorable consequences attendant on
appellant prevailing attest to the necessity of negative response from us. That is what
appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed. It is
always easy to conjure extreme and even oppressive possibilities. That is not decisive. It
does not settle the issue. What carries weight and conviction is the result arrived at, the
just solution obtained, grounded in the soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by
its correspondence with what a sense of realism requires. For through the appealed
order, the imperative requirement of justice according to law is satisfied and national
dignity and honor maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the
Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-
appelant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 446

Republic of the Philippines the whole of the estate of his wife if she die intestate to the exclusive of any other next of
SUPREME COURT kin.) On October 1, 1921, the brother Alfred D' Almeida was, on his petition, appointed
Manila administrator of the Manila estate of the deceased consisting of P109,732.55. This sum
it appears, was on deposit in the Manila banks under and by virtue of guardianship
EN BANC proceedings for the late Carmen Theodora Johannes, which were finally terminated by
the discharge of the guardian, the Philippine Trust Company, on January 16, 1922.
G.R. No. 18600             March 9, 1922
The burden of the relator's contention is that the Honorable George R. Harvey, as judge
B. E. JOHANNES, husband of Carmen Theodora Johannes, deceased, as a of First Instance of the City of Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing
administrator;  Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on deposit in the Philippines,
CARLOS D'ALMEIDA and IDA JOHANNES, with her husband, J. E. and that an administration in the jurisdiction is unnecessary. Accordingly, relators pray
JOHANNES, relators,  the court to annul the appointment of Alfred D'Almeida and to issue an order directing
vs. the Judge of First Instance to have placed to the credit of B. E. Johannes as
Honorable GEORGE R. HARVEY, as judge of First Instance of Manila, ALFREDO administrator of the estate of Carmen Theodora Johannes all of the funds of the late
D'ALMEIDA, brother of Carmen Johannes, as administrator, and PHILIPPINE Carmen D'Almeida Johannes, now on deposit and subject to the order of the court, with
TRUST COMPANY, as late guardian for a certain cash deposit of Carmen P5,000 as damages. The respondents, Judge Harvey, and the administrator Alfred
Johannes, respondent. D'Almeida, in compliance with the order to show cause why the writ should not issue,
contend that the respondent judge has not in any manner acted in excess of the
Amzi B. Kelly for relators. jurisdiction duly conferred upon and exercised by him in the manner provided by law,
Fisher & Dewitt and Francis B. Mahoney for respondents. and that an order appointing an administrator is a final and appealable order.

MALCOLM, J.: Certain general observations may possibly serve to clarify the situation.

The relevant facts disclosed by this petition for certiorari and the return thereto may be It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person
stated as follows: dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign
country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction
of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee  Carmen D'Almeida, died intestate in Singapore,
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because
Straits Settlements, on August 31, 1921. Of her immediate family there remained the
a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of
husband, B. E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida and Alfred
the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state
D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the husband, the brother
has no authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a
Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred was
person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his las domicile, property to be
in Manila. The Singapore heirs apparently joined in asking that letters of administration
administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to
be granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements to B. E. Johannes, the
be distributed among his heirs. (23 C. J., 1010, et seq.; 24 C. J., 1109, et seq.;
lawful husband of the deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the husband of the
Wilkins vs. Ellett [1882], 108 U. S., 256; Perez vs. Aguerria [1901], 1 Porto Rico Fed.,
deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the husband was named the administrator
443; Vaughn vs. Barret [1833], 5 Vt., 333.)
of the property of the deceased wife, which was locally situate within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements. (Under the British law [22 & 23 Charles II
c 10, 29 Charles II c 3, and James II c 17], it would seem that the husband is entitled to The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the late Carmen
Theodora Johannes in Singapore, Straits Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 447

Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary administration,

conformable to the provisions of sections 601, 602, and 603 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to
pay the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the surplus to
the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin. Such administration
appears to be required in this jurisdiction since the provisions of section 596 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which permit of the settlement of certain estates without legal
proceedings, have not been met. The decision of this court in Baldemor vs. Malangyaon
([1916]), 34 Phil., 368), on which relators rely, is then not in point because predicated
directly on the provisions of the section last cited.

It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an

administrator is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to
name someone else. This preference has particular force under Spanish law
precedents. (4 Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, 1085.) However,
the Code of Civil Procedure, in section 642, while naming the surviving husband or wife,
as the case may be, as one to whom administration can be granted, leaves this to the
discretion of the court to determine, for it may be found that the surviving spouse is
unsuitable for the responsibility. Moreover, nonresidence is a factor to be considered in
determining the propriety of the appointment, and in this connection, it is to be noted that
the husband of the deceased, the administrator of the principal administration, resides in
Singapore. Undoubtedly, if the husband should come into this jurisdiction, the court
would give consideration to this petition that he be named the ancillary administrator for
local purposes. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the domicilliary
representative, if he applies therefor, or to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence
of express statutory requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other
person. (24 C. J., 1114.)

There is still another aspect to the case. This is that pursuant to section 783 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance appointing an administration of
the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination of the rights of the
parties thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is appealable. (Sy Hong
Eng vs. Sy Lioc Suy [1907], 8 Phil., 594.)

As we reach the conclusion that the Court of First Instance has not acted in excess of its
jurisdiction, and as there in an appeal, certiorari will not lie. Accordingly, the writ prayed
for cannot be granted. Costs against the relators. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4718             March 19, 1920
SY JOC LIENG, SY YOC CHAY, SY JUI NIU and SY CHUA NIU, plaintiffs, appellees-
appellants,  the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia, deceased, at the time of his death, nor the amount of
vs.
PETRONILA ENCARNACION, GREGORIO SY QUIA, PEDRO SY QUIA, JUAN SY
QUIA and GENEROSO MENDOZA SY QUIA, defendants, appellants-appellees.
Bishop and O'Brien, for plaintiffs, appellees and appellants.
Rosado, Sanz and Opisso, M. Legaspi, and Ledesma and Sumulong, for defendants,
appellants and appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On the 4th day of December, 1905, the said Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Joc Chay, Sy Jui Niu and
Sy Chua Niu filed an amended complaint against the said defendants, alleging: That in
or about the year 1847 was married in the city of Amoy to Yap Puan Niu, of which
marriage the following male children were born, to wit; Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, they
being the only legitimate heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that in or about the
year 1882 Sy By Bo died intestate in China, leaving as his only surviving children and
legitimate heirs the plaintiffs Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Jui Niu; that in about the year 1880
the other child of Sy Quia, Sy By Guit, also died intestate in China, leaving as his only
surviving children and legitimate heirs the other plaintiffs, Sy Joc Lieng and Sy Chua
Niu; that in or about the year 1891 Yap Puan Niu died intestate in grandchildren, who
are the plaintiffs in this case; that in the year 1894 Vicente Romero Sy Quia died
intestate in this city of Manila, leaving his surviving grandchildren, the plaintiffs, as his
only legitimate heirs.
That Vicente Romero Sy Quia acquired during his lifetime a large amount of property,
consisting of personal and real property in the Philippine Islands, mostly located in the
city of Manila, amounting to P1,000,000 Philippine currency; that on or about the 3rd of
August, 1990, the defendants illegally, without any rights, and in the absence of the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 448
plaintiffs herein, took possession of all the said personal and real property left by the
said Sy Quia, deceased, and since then have managed and administered the same,
alleging to be the owners thereof; that since the said 3rd day of August, 1900, the
defendants and each of them have converted and are converting part of the property of
the said Sy Quia, deceased, to the use and benefit of each of them, and a large part of
the said property, consisting of real property unknown to the plaintiffs, they being in
possession thereof as owners, exercising over them acts of ownership, and converting
them to their own use; that it has been impossible for the plaintiffs to discover, ascertain,
and have knowledge of each and all the items of real and personal property belonging to
personal and real property converted by the defendants, except such as is described in
the accompanying document marked: "Exhibit A," which is a part of the complaint; that
the property described in said document is a part of the estate left by the deceased Sy
Quia at the time of his death, aside and apart from the personal and real property
converted by the defendants, who are, and each one of them is, in possession and
custody of all the deeds, instruments, contracts, books, and papers relating to the title
and conversion of the said real and personal property, which titles and the description
thereof could not be proven without sworn statements of the defendants and of each one
of them; that the plaintiffs are informed and believe that the said real and personal
property belonging to the estate of the said Sy Quia, and which is now held and
controlled by the defendants, has a value of approximately P1,000,000, Philippine
currency.
That the plaintiffs are the only descendants and legitimate heirs of the deceased Sy
Quia, they being entitled to the possession of all the property of his estate, as well as of
the real and personal property converted as aforesaid, and the defendants having
appropriated the same, with all the rents and profits thereof, it is impossible for the
plaintiffs to ascertain and discover the true amount of the said rents and profits, which
aggregate several thousand pesos, all of which said property is in danger of being lost,
to the irreparable damage of the plaintiffs, unless and except a receiver is appointed to
take charge of the preservation and custody of the same in order to protect the interests
of the said plaintiffs, and enable the court to determine the actual value of the real and
personal property of the estate at the time of the death of the said Sy Quia, as well as
the value of the real and personal property subsequently converted by the defendants,
together with the rents and profits of the whole estate, converted by the defendants to
their own use and benefit; wherefore it is necessary that said defendants be required to
render detailed accounts of the real and personal property and rents and profits of the
estate, and that it be ascertained by the sworn statement of the said defendants what

the actual value of the real and personal property of the said estate, with the rents and
profits, thus converted and held by them, is.
They accordingly prayed that defendants be directed to render under oath a complete
and detailed account of all the property left by Sy Quia at the time of his death, of the
administration, custody, control, conversion and disposal thereof, of the conversion of
the same, and of the rents and profits of the original property, as well as of the property
thus converted, including in the said accounting both such properties with the rents and
profits; that, upon the giving of the necessary bond, a receiver be appointed to
administer the original property, as well as the property converted, during the pendency
of the present litigation, the said complete and detailed account under oath as aforesaid
to be submitted to the court, covering the original property as well as the property
converted, with all the rents and profits, and that thereupon a receiver be appointed to
take charge and control of the administration of the whole of said property.
They further prayed that it be adjudged and decreed that the defendants are the only
descendants and heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia from and since the time of
his death, and that they are the only legitimate owners of the real and personal property
left by him, and of the whole said property converted by the defendants, and that they
are entitled to the possession of the whole of the said property and the rents and profits
accruing therefrom; that it be decreed that the defendants have not and never had any
right, title, or interest to the said property, nor to the rents and profits thereof, the same
being held by them as mere trustees for the benefit of the plaintiffs and each of them,
further praying for any other relief which the court may deem just and equitable, and for
the costs of this action.
ANSWER
The defendants, Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro Sy Quia, and Juan Sy Quia, answering
the foregoing complaint, specifically deny the paragraphs 1,2,3, 4, 5, and 6 of the
complaint, which relate to the paternity and status of the plaintiffs, and to the death of
their grandmother and parents, and also deny generally all and each of the allegations
contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the complaint relating
to the succession and actual condition of the estate of the deceased Sy Quia, except as
otherwise expressly admitted as true in the said answer.
As a special defense and in opposition to the complaint, the defendants allege that prior
to the year 1852 Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia was an infidel known only by the
name of Sy Quia, he having resided in the Philippine Islands for many years prior
thereto; that on June 8, 1852, the said infidel Chinaman Sy Quia was converted to the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 449
Christian religion, and was baptized in the parish church of San Vicente, Province of
Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, under the name of Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, as
shown by his certificate of baptism marked "Exhibit 1," and made an integral part of the
answer; that on June 9, 1853, the Christian Chinaman Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia
contracted canonical marriage in accordance with the laws then if force in these Islands,
with the defendant Petronila Encarnacion, a native of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, as shown by his
certificate of marriage marked "Exhibit 2," which is made an integral part of the answer;
that the said Vicente Sy Quia and his wife, Petronila Encarnacion, fixed their residence
and conjugal domicile in these Islands until the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by
the death of the husband on January 9, 1984; that at the time of their marriage Vicente
Romero Sy Quia had no property, and brought no property into the marriage, but that
the wife brought to the marriage a small capital which was the foundation of the
subsequent fortune acquired by the spouses by their labor and industry, and by the labor
and industry of the children, five in number, named Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio, Pedro
and Juan, all of whom have always been in continuous possession of baptism marked
"Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7," to be considered as an integral part of the answer.
That on January 9, 1894, Vicente Romero Sy Quia died intestate in the city of Manila,
and after the necessary legal proceedings under the legislation then in force, his
surviving children, Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan, and his grandchildren
Generoso Mendoza, representing his mother, Maria Romero Sy Quia, deceased, were
declared by a decree of the Court of First Instance of the district of Quiapo, dated
January 26 of the said year, to be the heirs abintestate of the said deceased, as shown
by a copy of the said decree, marked "Exhibit 3," as an integral part of the answer,
Apolinaria Romero Sy Quia, one of the children recognized as heirs of their deceased
father, having died on the 1st of May, 1900, leaving as her only legitimate heir her
surviving mother, Petronila Encarnacion.
That since January 9, 1894, when Vicente Romero Sy Quia, died the defendants have
been in quiet, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession as owners in good faith and with a
just title, of the property which constitutes the estate of their deceased father, they never
having been heretofore disturbed therein by the plaintiffs or any of them, notwithstanding
the fact that the said plaintiffs were here in the Philippine Islands, and all the property
included in the inventory made at the time of the partition of the estate of the deceased
Sy Quia, was acquired by him subsequent to the year 1853 when he married the
defendant Petronila Encarnacion; that a great portion of the real property included in the
said inventory was acquired by Petronila Encarnacion after the death of her husband,
and that in the title deeds of a considerable portion of the property bought during the
lifetime of Sy Quia, Petronila Encarnacion appears as the vendee, wherefore the
defendants Pedro Sy Quia, and Petronila Encarnacion prayed the court that they be

acquitted of the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiffs, and that they, the
defendants, be granted such other and further relief as might be just and equitable.
The other defendant, Gregorio Sy Quia, answering the complaint, denied all and each of
the allegations therein contained, and further specifically denied that Sy Quia had
married in or about the year 1847 at Amoy, China, the Chinese woman Yap Puan Niu,
and that said Sy Bi Bo and Sy By Guit were the legitimate children and heirs of the
deceased Sy Quia, also that the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Joc Chay, Sy Jui Niu and Sy
Chua Niu were the grandchildren and legitimate heirs of the deceased Vicente Romero
Sy Quia; that as a special defense he alleged that the deceased Sy Quia, many years
prior to 1852, while a non-Christian Chinese subject, definitely fixed his residence and
domicile in the Philippine Islands, subjecting himself to the laws then therein force; that
in the year 1852 Sy Quia was baptized, having been converted to the Catholic faith, on
the 11th of June of that year, the ceremony taking place at the parish church of San
Vicente, he being then named Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, and on June 9 of the
following year he contracted marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in accordance with the
rites of the Catholic Church, and in conformity with the laws then in the force in the
Philippine islands, as shown by the church certificates marked "Exhibits A and B."
That Sy Quia and his wife Petronila Encarnacion since their marriage continuously
resided in the Philippine Islands until the 9th of January, 1894, when the husband died
intestate, they having had since their marriage five children, among the, Gregorio, who
subscribes this answer, according to canonical certificate Exhibit C; that the deceased
Sy Quia brought no property into the conjugal partnership, but Petronila Encarnacion did
bring with her the small capital of P5,000, with which, through their labor and industry at
first, and subsequently by the labor and industry of their children, they had acquired the
large amount of property existing at the time of the death of the husband, said property
so acquired being located in the Philippine Islands; that on the 23d of January, 1894, by
an order of the Court of First Instance of the district of Quiapo, the surviving children of
Sy Quia, named Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro, and Juan, and Sy Quia's grandchild
Generoso Mendoza, representing his (Generoso's) deceased mother, Maria Romero Sy
Quia, were declared to be the heirs abintestate of the said Sy Quia, as shown by a copy
of the said decree, marked "Exhibit D," the defendants having taken possession from
that date of the property left by the deceased Sy Quia, they having continued so in
possession in the quality of owners, with just title and good faith, adversely, publicly,
quietly and peacefully, until the plaintiffs presented their complaint to the court; that on
the 1st day of May, 1900, Apolinaria Romero Sy Quia died a spinster and intestate,
leaving as her only legitimate heir her mother, Petronila Encarnacion; that the plaintiffs
at the time of death of Vicente Romero Sy Quia had knowledge of his demise, and had
notice that the defendants had petitioned to the court for a declaration, which they
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 450
obtained, to the effect that they were the heirs of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia,
deceased; and that at no time were the plaintiffs or their parents recognized or
considered by the said Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia, as his descendants, heirs or
relatives; wherefore defendant prayed that judgment be entered declaring that the
plaintiffs had no right or interest to or in the estate of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy
Quia, and that the defendants are the only legitimate heirs of the said Sy Quia, taxing
the costs against the plaintiffs.
The last of the defendants, Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, answering the complaint on the
18th of January, 1906, alleged that he denied all and each of the allegations contained
in paragraphs 1 to 16, inclusive, of the complaint, and that he also specifically denied
that the deceased Sy Quia, whose Christian name is Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia,
had married at Amoy, China, the woman Yap Puan Niu, in or about the year 1847, or at
any time previous or subsequent thereto; that the said Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were
the legitimate children and heirs of the deceased Sy Quia; that the plaintiffs Sy Joc
Lieng, Sy Joc Chay, Sy Jui Niu, and Sy Chua Niu were the legitimate descendants or
heirs of the deceased Sy Quia.
As a special defense, defendant alleged that the Chinaman Sy Quia came to the
Philippine Islands as an immigrant a long time prior to 1852, fixing his residence and
domicile therein, and subjecting himself to the laws then in force in this country; that in
the said year 1852, Sy Quia having been converted to Christianity, was baptized in the
parish church of San Vicente, Ilocos Sur, and named Vicente Ruperto Romero Sy Quia,
as shown by the canonical certificates exhibited by the defendants, and marked
"Exhibits 1 and A," which are made a part of this answer; that on June 9, Vicente
Ruperto Romero Sy Quia was married by the Church to Petronila Encarnacion in
accordance with the canonical laws, as shown by the certified copies of the marriage
certificate, marked "Exhibits 2 and B," introduced by the other defendants; that Sy Quia
and his wife Petronila Encarnacion established themselves and fixed their conjugal
domicile in the Philippine Islands, where they continued to reside until the 9th of
January, 1894, when the marriage was dissolved by the death of the husband in Manila;
that the said spouses since their marriage had five children, of whom Apolinaria died a
spinster, and Maria, who had married, died leaving of a child, the defendant Generoso
Mendoza and the other children of the deceased Sy Quia, named Gregorio, Pedro, and
Juan, having survived; that Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of his marriage owned
no property, while Petronila Encarnacion brought to the conjugal partnership a small
capital, amounting to P5,000, which was the foundation of the large fortune
subsequently acquired by them through their labor and industry, subsequently
augmented with the aid of their own children.

That on the 9th of January, 1894, Vicente Romero Sy Quia died, and after the necessary
legal proceedings under the law of civil procedure then in force in these Islands, the
Court of the First Instance by a decree dated the 26th of the said month and year,
declared that the surviving children, Apolinaria, Gregorio, Pedro, and Juan, and his
grandchild Generoso Mendoza, representing his mother, Maria, deceased, were the
heirs of the deceased Sy Quia, intestate, as shown by Exhibits 8 and D, introduced by
the other defendants; that on May, 1, 1900, the oldest daughter, Apolinaria, died
intestate and single, leaving as her only heir mother Petronila Encarnacion; that since
the death of the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia the defendants had been in quiet, public,
peaceful, and uninterrupted possession of the property left by the deceased Sy Quia,
having held the same adversely, with good faith and just title; and that they have never
disturbed by the plaintiffs in such possession, notwithstanding the fact that they, the
plaintiffs, were in the Philippine Islands at the time of the death of Vicente Romero Sy
Quia, and had knowledge of the fact that the defendants had applied to the Court of First
Instance for and secured a declaration to the effect that they were the heirs of the
deceased Sy Quia; and that neither the plaintiffs nor the said Sy By Bio and Sy By Guit
had ever been recognized or considered by the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia as
his descendants, heirs or relatives, they never having been in possession of the legal
status of children or legitimate descendants of the said Sy Quia; wherefore this
defendant prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of all the defendants, acquitting
them of the complaint, and directing that the plaintiffs pay the costs.
AMENDMENT TO THE COMPLAINT.
The plaintiffs on the 31st of January, 1906, presented by way of reply to the answers of
the various defendants an amendment to the original complaint, denying generally and
specifically all and each of the material allegations set out in the answers of the
defendants and alleging that the pretended marriage between Vicente Romero Sy Quia
and Petronila Encarnacion was not a lawful marriage, but a false and fraudulent one,
without any force, efficacy, or legal validity, the certificate of marriage presented by the
defendants not being a true and correct certificate of marriage, the same being false,
fraudulent, and without any force, efficacy, or legal validity, for the reason that on June
9, 1853, Vicente Romero Sy Quia was and thereafter continued to be the lawful husband
of one Yap Puan Niu, until the year 1891, when she died, and that the marriage of Sy
Quia with the said Yap Puan Niu, since 1847 and until her death in 1891, was
continuously in full force and effect, Sy Quia not having married again after the death of
the said wife; and that Apolinaria, Maria, Gregorio, Pedro and Juan, the alleged
legitimate children of Vicente Romero Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion, were not and
never had been the legitimate children of Sy Quia, and that they were not and never had
been his legitimate heirs and descendants, the certificates of baptism produced by the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 451
defendants, and marked "exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7," not being true nor proper, but false
and fraudulent, and of no force, efficacy, or legal validity, the said children not being the
legitimate descendants of the deceased Sy Quia. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the amended
complaint are a repetition of similar paragraphs contained in the original.
ANSWER TO THE AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The defendants, Generoso Mendoza, Petronila Encarnacion, Pedro Sy Quia, Gregorio
Sy Quia, and Juan Sy Quia, filed their answers to the amended complaint on the 7th and
3th of February, 1906, denying all and each of the allegations contained in paragraphs
2, 3, 4, and 5 of the amended complaint, stating that they ratified each and all of the
allegations, denials and defenses contained in their previous answer, which they
reproduced therein, and that they renewed their prayer that judgment be rendered
acquitting them of the said complaint, with the costs against the plaintiffs.
On June 19, 1906, counsel for Petronila Encarnacion notified the court in writing of the
death of the said Petronila Encarnacion, who died in this city on the 6th of the said
month, and as counsel for the other defendants, Pedro and Juan Sy Quia, moved the
court that in accordance with section 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order be
made directing that the action be proceeded with in the name of the administrator of her
estate, Pedro Sy Quia, which motion was granted without any objection on the part of
the plaintiffs' attorney, on June 21, 1906.
On August 20, 1906, it was stipulated between counsel for both parties that by order of
the court of deposition of several witnesses then designated by the plaintiffs be taken at
Amoy, China, before the consul, vice-consul, or a consular agent of the United States in
the said city, during the days and in manner agreed upon, in accordance with section
362 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendants being authorized to take the
deposition of such witnesses as they might desire to present in the manner agreed
upon.
On November 8, 1906, counsel for plaintiffs informed the court of the death of one of the
plaintiffs, Sy Jui Niu, at Amoy, China, on or about the 28th of July of the said year, and
she having died intestate, the court on November 8, appointed C. W. O'Brien as special
administrator of her estate, and said counsel thereupon asked the court to allow the
action to be continued by him, and by a subsequent petition filed on the 13th of the
same month, the administrator C. W. O' Brien, appointed as aforesaid, filed a written
appearance as such administrator of the estate of the deceased Sy Jui Niu.

On a petition filed on the 17th of November, 1906, counsel for both parties informed the
court that the documents presented by the defendants, and marked "Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, and 7, and A, B, C," which are certificates of baptism, marriage, and burial, should
be considered as original and authentic documents, so as to avoid the necessity of
presenting the originals themselves, which were bound in book form, together with other
documents relating to persons who had no connection with this litigation.
On the 4rth of January, 1907, the defendants presented a motion to the Court of First
Instance, asking that the depositions taken before the consul of the United States at
Amoy, China, as given by the witnesses for the plaintiffs, named Li Ung Bing, Sy Peng,
Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chia, Sy Kay Tit, Yap Chong, Sy Boan, Sy Kong Len, and Sy
Hong Oan, whose testimony the plaintiffs attempted to introduce in this action, be not
admitted, defendants' motion being based on the ground that the said depositions
contained a formal defect concerning the manner in which the oath was administered to
the witnesses.
In a petition filed on a same date, January 4, the defendants reproduced their former
motion, alleging as a further ground in support thereof that the certificates by the officer
who took the said depositions did not comply with the essential requisites by law, and
after due notice to the plaintiffs, a hearing was had upon the said petition on January 7,
1907. After the recital of the evidence introduced by both parties, and after the
documents exhibited by them, together with the depositions taken at Vigan of various
witnesses for the defendants, and of the depositions taken at Amoy, China, had been
united to the record, the Court of First Instance on the 26th of February, 1908, rendered
a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Chua Niu, and C.
W. O' Brien, the latter as guardian of Sian Han, and the defendants Gregorio Sy Quia,
Pedro Sy Quia, Juan Sy Quia, and Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, and the heirs of the
deceased Petronila Encarnacion, presented by the one of the defendants, Pedro Sy
Quia, as the administrator of the property, were the heirs of the property of the estate of
Vicente Romero Sy Quia, now deceased, consisting of one-half of the property
distributed by the order of the Court of the First Instance of the district of Quiapo of the
3rd of August, 1900, in the following form: To Sy Joc Lieng, one-ninth; Sy Yoc Chay,
one-ninth; Sy Chua Niu, one-ninth; C. W. O' Brien, as the guardian of Sian Han, one-
ninth; Pedro Sy Quia, one-ninth; Juan Sy Quia, one-ninth, Gregorio Sy Quia, one-ninth;
Generoso Mendoza Sy Quia, one-ninth, and the heirs of Petronila Encarnacion,
represented by Pedro Sy Quia as the administrator of the latter's estate, one-ninth; the
heirs of the said Petronila Encarnacion, represented by the administrator of her estate,
being the owners with the right to possession of the other half of the property left by
Vicente Romero Sy Quia at the time of his death.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 452
That the defendants, Gregorio, Pedro, Juan, and Generoso, and Pedro Sy Quia, as the
administrator of the property of his mother Petronila Encarnacion and as a
representative of the latter's heirs, render a statement of the property which was
distributed among them under and by virtue of the order of the Court of First Instance of
the 3rd of August, 1900.
That the said defendants and each of them render an accounting of the rents and profits
of all the property respectively received by them from the dates when they were
delivered to them, it being understood that if upon making the inventory of the property it
appears that the portion thereof assigned to Petronila Encarnacion as her share does
not exceed one-half of all the property left by Vicente Romero Sy Quia, at the time of his
death, it will not be necessary to render an accounting of the rents and profits of the
portion to her thus assigned.
That a receiver, to be selected later, be appointed upon the giving of a sufficient bond,
the amount of which will be hereafter fixed, to take charge and possession of all the
property known as aforesaid, it being understood that if upon making a list of the said
property it appears that the part thereof assigned to Petronila Encarnacion as her share
does not exceed one-half of all the property of the estate of Vicente Romero Sy Quia at
the time of his death, the said receiver shall only take possession of one-half of the
property assigned to the other persons who have accounted for them. The Court of First
Instance made no special order as to costs.
To this decision of the trial court counsel for the defendants, Pedro Sy Quia, by himself
and as administrator of the estate of Petronila Encarnacion, Juan Sy Quia, Gregorio Sy
Quia, and Generoso Mendoza, duly excepted, and by a motion presented to the court
asked that the said judgment be set aside and a new trial granted, on the ground that
the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision in favor of the plaintiffs, and because
the decision of the trial court was contrary to law, the findings of the fact being plainly
and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Upon notice to counsel for plaintiffs, a
hearing was had upon said motions, which were subsequently overruled by the court.
Defendants having duly excepted to the order of the court overruling the same, and
upon filing their bill of exceptions, asked the court to unite to the same all of the
evidence taken and introduced by both parties, with the documents and pleadings
presented during the course of the trial, the transcript of the stenographic notes
containing the testimony of the witnesses, and the depositions taken at Vigan and Amoy,
which said bill of exceptions defendants asked the court to approved and certify to the
Supreme Court, with all of the said evidence which was made an integral part thereof.

By an order entered on the 28th of March, 1908, the court upon certifying the bill of
exceptions, directed that the execution of the judgment be not stayed in so far as it
required the defendants to submit a statement showing the property received by them,
and to render an account of all the rents and profits, upon giving a bond satisfactory to
the court, to secure the fulfillment of the judgment in case the same be totally or partially
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The trial court in deciding the motion for appointment of a receiver, and after hearing
both parties, made an order on the 17th of March, 1908, appointing Gregorio Sy Quia as
receiver of the property in question, upon the giving of the bond in the sum of P400,000,
to be approved by the court, and in case that the person thus appointed did not accept,
the appointment would be set aside, and a stranger duly qualified substituted. To this
order of the court the defendants Pedro Sy Quia and Juan Sy Quia duly excepted, and
on the 27th of March, 1908, there was united to the proper files the personal bond for
P400,000 given by the receiver.
By another order made on the said 17th day of March, the court deciding the motion that
a time be fixed within which the defendants should report to the court whatever property
belonging to the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia was distributed among them,
directed that the defendants Juan Sy Quia, Generoso Mendoza and Pedro Sy Quia, the
latter by himself and as administrator of the estate of Petronila Encarnacion, submit a
statement of the property distributed among them under and by virtue of the order of the
3rd day of August, 1900, on or before the 23rd day of March, 1908, and that Gregorio Sy
Quia submit a similar statement on or before the 31st day of the said month and year.
Pedro Sy Quia and Juan Sy Quia excepted to this order of the court dated March 17 as
aforesaid, requiring them to submit a statement of the property they had received, and
asked to the court to approve and to have united to the original bill of exceptions, the
additional one duly presented by them, and notwithstanding the objection of counsel for
plaintiffs, the court by an order dated April 4, 1908, certified the supplementary bill of
exceptions; and considering that the appointment of Gregorio Sy Quia as receiver was
made at the suggestion of the defendants in open court, at which time the amount of the
bond was fixed with the knowledge of the defendants, also the order of the court
directing that a statement of the property received by the defendants be submitted to the
court within a specified time, the court ordered that the execution of the judgment be not
stayed in so far as the latter order of the court was concerned, and the original bill of
exceptions, together with the supplementary one, was duly forwarded to the clerk of this
court in connection with the appeal taken and allowed.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 453
The plaintiffs, upon being notified of the said judgment of the court, excepted thereto,
and requested in writing that the court modify its decision and conclusions of law by
declaring that the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng, Sy Yoc Chay, Sy Chua Niu, and C. W. O'Brien,
as the guardian of Sian Han, were they were entitled to all the property left by the latter,
and distributed under the order of the court of the 3rd of August, 1900; that Petronila
Encarnacion, deceased, and her children and heirs had no interest in the said estate of
Sy Quia; that they were not the heirs of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia; that the
receiver appointed by the court be authorized to take possession of all the property left
by the said deceased, especially the property which was distributed by the decree of the
court of the 3rd of August, 1900, together with the rents and profits, and that the said
judgment be modified, awarding the plaintiffs the costs of the action, and directing that
defendants submit an accounting of the property in litigation.
This action has its purpose primarily to recover from the present possessors the property
left at the time of his death in this city by the Christian Chinaman, Vicente Romero Sy
Quia, the plaintiffs alleging that three of them are the grandchildren and one the great-
grandson of the deceased Sy Quia by his lawful marriage in his own country with their
deceased grandmother, yap Puan Niu. So that the marriage of the said Sy Quia with this
woman in China is practically the fundamental basis of the action brought by the
plaintiffs for the recovery of the inheritance against the defendants, who appear to be the
children of the deceased Sy Quia by his marriage in these Islands with the native,
Petronila Encarnacion.
Does the record show that the Chinaman Sy Quia removed from Vigan, Philippine
Islands, to his native town or village of Am Thau, Amoy, China, in 1847, and then
married in accordance with the rites and ceremonies of his native country, Yap Puan
Niu?
Plaintiffs having failed to present at the trial the matrimonial letters which should have
been exchanged between the contracting parties at the time the said marriage was
performed, according to the ancient laws and customs of the Celestial Kingdom, and
there being no allegation in the complaint as to the day and month of the common
calendar year, or of the Chinese calendar year, when the said marriage took place, there
is no ground on which to base the conclusion that such an important act in the life of Sy
Quia has been duly established by authentic documents, nor is his alleged voyage to
China from the port of Manila for the purpose of contracting such marriage, satisfactorily
proven thereby, for the plaintiffs have likewise failed to introduce in evidence the
passport, required by the legislation then in force, which should and would have been
then issued to Sy Quia in order to enable him to leave this country and return to his own.
(See superior decree of December 20, 1849.)

Seven witnesses, named Sy Peng, Lim Chio, yap Si Tan, Yap Chia, Sy Kai Tit, Yap
Chong, and Sy Boan, whose respective ages are not less than 71 nor more than 80
years, in their testimony or depositions before the vice-consul of the United States at
Amoy, having promised to tell the truth, affirmed through an interpreter that they were
present at the ceremony of the wedding of the said Sy Quia with the Chinese woman
Yap Puan Niu; that Sy Quia, who was in these Islands, having been expressly called to
China by his father for the purpose of marrying the said Yap Puan Niu, accordingly
returned to his native town or village of Am Thau, and, after being married to Yap Puan
Niu, remained in the said village three of four years with his wife, by whom he had two
children, Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit, the latter having been born one year after the birth of
the former.
To overcome the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, the defendants presented
nine witnesses, to wit: Felix Millan, Aniceto Singson, Norberta Feril, Remigio Tongson,
Estefania Crisologo, Alejandra Singson, Benita Encarnacion, Paulino Revilla, and
Silveria Damian, whose respective ages were not less than 71 nor more than 87 years,
except Aniceto Singson, who was only 66 years of age, who testified, some of them in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and the others before the justice of the peace of
Vigan by virtue of a commission, that they knew Sy Quia when he was an unmarried
resident of the city of Vigan, for six or seven years according to most of the said
witnesses, and for five years according to others, prior to his marriage with Petronila
Encarnacion, they having known him when he was a clerk of Jose Gloria Lecaroz, a
resident of Manila, the witness Revilla stating that he was a gobernadorcillo in 1852,
when Sy Quia, after being converted to the Christian religion, was baptized in the church
of San Vicente, the priest of which, who was his (Revilla's) uncle, being frequently visited
by the said Sy Quia for the purpose of the latter's instruction in the new religion, and that
Sy Quia upon being baptized was named Vicente Ruperto Romero, after his godfather
Romero, who was at that time the clerk of the court; Silveria Damian further testified that
to the best of her recollection Sy Quia arrived in Vigan in the year 1848, stopping at her
house, Sy Quia being a friend and countryman of her husband, who was also a
Chinaman, and that she knew that Sy Quia was then bachelor, that he was baptized
some years later, and on the following year was married to Petronila Encarnacion.
Silveria Damian, her husband and other witnesses in the case attended the wedding.
It will be seen therefore that the record contains strikingly conflicting evidence, that is to
say, the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs is directly in conflict with that adduced by
the defendants for while the witnesses for the plaintiffs asserted that Sy Quia was at Am
Thau, Amoy, in 1847, and contracted marriage in that year with Yap Puan Niu, with
whom be continued to live for about three or four years thereafter, during which time the
children Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit were born; the witnesses for the defendants on the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 454
other hand affirmed that Sy Quia was at the time in Vigan, and that he did not leave that
city during the six or seven years, according to most of the witnesses, and during the
five years, according to the others, which immediately preceded his marriage with
Petronila Encarnacion in 1853.
In order to determine whether the weight and preponderance of the evidence is with the
plaintiffs or in favor of the defendants, in accordance with the provisions of section 273
of the Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes necessary to examine and analyze each of
the declarations of the respective witnesses presented at the trial, and ascertain the
result of their various declarations taken as a whole, bearing in mind the circumstances
of the case, the probability or improbability of their testimony, with due regard to the
nature of the facts as to which they testified, their degree of intelligence, and the manner
in which they testified.
The presence of Sy Quia in Vigan, and his presence at the same time at Am Thau,
Province of Amoy, China, for a period of four years, to wit, from 1847 to 1850, two facts
which are directly inconsistent with each other, might have been satisfactorily
established by the testimony of witnesses, but the only proof of the fact of the marriage
alleged to have been contracted Sy Quia at the said Chinese town in 1847 could only
have consisted of the matrimonial letters or cards which should have been exchanged
between the families or the two contracting parties in the manner referred to by the
witness Li Ung Bing, the interpreter of the American Consulate, who was called by the
plaintiffs themselves, and whose testimony in this respect is uniformly corroborated by
Nicolay in his book entitled "Historia de las Creencias," by Ratzel in his book entitled
"Las Razas Humanas," by Cantu in his work entitled "Historia Universal," and by the
authors of the "Spanish American Encyclopedia Dictionary." These matrimonial letters,
once they have been mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the
essential requisite required by laws of that country in order that a Chinese marriage may
be considered duly solemnized, and at the same time are the best proof of its having
actually taken place.
The party obliged to exhibit these letters can only be relieved from the necessity of so
doing by proving that the same have been lost or disappeared, for in the absence of
such proof (there being none of this character in the record), they must be produced at
the trial in order to establish the fact of the marriage alleged to have taken place, and
only in the cases expressly excepted by law can any other proof, such as testimony of
witnesses, be allowed, but the letters themselves must be produced as evidence of the
contract to which they relate, in accordance with the provisions of section 285 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

The failure to produce the said matrimonial letters which according to some of the
witnesses for the plaintiffs, were exchanged between both families prior to the
celebration of the marriage of Sy Quia with yap Puan Niu, and the lack of proof that they
had been destroyed or lost, give rise to the legal presumption can not be overcome by
the testimony of witnesses, some of them incompetent, while the testimony of others is
conflicting, not to say contradictory, in itself, a s well as highly improbable; for this is a
most important contract, which, according to the ancient laws and customs of China,
must be evidenced by such letter or cards, and the fact that these letters have not been
produced shows that the marriage never took place; if they actually exist they should be
exhibited, for it is a well-known rule that where the evidence is wilfully suppressed, it is
presumed that it would be adverse to the party presenting the same, if produced. (Sec.
334, par. 5, Code of Civil Procedure.)
Entering upon the an analysis of the testimony of the witness for the plaintiffs, it will be
notice that Sy Peng stated that upon the death of Sy Quia, the women of his house
extended their sympathy, as customary, to his widow in China. This, however, is not
true, because it appears in the record as a proved fact that Yap Puan Niu died in 1891,
while that Sy Quia died in this city in 1894. Lim Chio affirmed that Sy By Bo, the alleged
son of Sy Quia, had two children by his wife, one of them being Sy Yoc Chay.
This is not true, because Sy Yoc Chay was only an adopted son. The witness Yap Si
Tan testified that Yap Puan Niu lost a natural child, whose name she did not remember,
and in his place adopted Sy Hoc Chay as her son. This fact is not testified to by any of
the other witnesses, who simply said that the adoption had been made by Sy By Bo. The
witness Yap Chio, 72 years of age, who testified that he had been present at the
wedding of Sy Quia with Yap Puan Niu, must have been 8 years old at the time. The
other witness, Sy Kai Tit, who was 71 years of age, and who according to himself, was
about 12 years old at that time, stated that he had taken part in the investigation made
as to the status and condition of the bride, Yap Puan Niu, having assisted Sy Quia's
parents and the mediator in the investigation. Another witness by the name of Sy Boan
testified that by Sy Quia, when he died in this city, was survived by his wife, Yap Puan
Niu, who was still living in China, this being in direct contradiction with the established
fact that Yap Puan Niu died before Sy Quia. This witness further said that when Sy Quia
returned for the second time to China, in order to attend his parent's funeral, his alleged
wife, Yap Puan Niu, was still living, his testimony in this respect being in contradiction
with that of the other witness, Lim Chio, Yap Si Tan, Yap Chio and Sy Kai Tit.
The testimony of these witnesses, most of whom have seriously contradicted
themselves upon important points in the course of their examination, and some of them,
considering the fact that they were very young in 1847, having told a very improbable
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 455
story, claiming that they had assisted Sy Quias's parents in bringing about the latter's
marriage, can be given no credence by the courts to sustain a finding that Sy Quia
actually married Yap Puan Niu, much less so the marriages of Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit,
who are alleged to be the legitimate children of the said Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu, and
the marriage of Sy Jui Niu, the mother of Sian Han, a grandson of Sy By Bo and a great-
grandson of Sy Quia, for the reason that there were not introduced in evidence at the
trial the matrimonial letters that must have been exchanged before the celebration of
these marriages, all of these witnesses having simply said that they attended the
wedding of Sy Quia and Yap Puan Niu, that their said sons were also subsequently
married and each had two children, and that Sy By Bo adopted Sy Yoc Chay in place of
one of his deceased children. From the testimony of these witnesses, taken as a whole,
it is impossible to arrive at the truth and to lay the foundation of a just judgment in
accordance with the law.
The witness Sy Hien, who claims to be a younger of Sy Quia., and was a witness for the
plaintiffs, among the many conflicting statements, as may be seen from his testimony,
said that this certificates of marriage, which presumably consisted of similar matrimonial
letters or cards, were unkept in his own town, and that he was unable to state the
difference in age between himself, who was 59 years old, and his brother Sy Quia, who,
had hew lived, would to-day be about 80 years old, unless he was permitted to examine
a certain book kept in his own home in China (p. 116 of the record). His testimony
clearly shows that such matrimonial letters are duly preserved and that the date of birth
of the members of a family is noted or entered in a book kept in the paternal residence,
in like manner as the death of such members of the family is recorded by mortuary
inscriptions on tablets, a practice which is very natural among people who live in civilized
communities and cities with a civilization of their own and who, like the Chinese,
notwithstanding their remarkable backwardness with reference to more advanced and
cultured races, generally speaking are not barbarians and do not lived a nomad or
savage life.
The mortuary inscription upon one of the tablets presented in evidence at the time of
taking the evidence of some of the witnesses who were called by the plaintiffs for the
purpose of establishing that the deceased, Sy Quia, had in his lifetime married Yap
Puan Niu, an English translation of which appears in the records, are not conclusive or
supplementary proof of the said marriage, because they are absolutely false and
contrary to the actual facts with reference to Sy Quia, for the latter was still alive in 1891,
when he was presumed to be dead according to the said inscription, he having actually
died in January, 1894; therefore the said mortuary tablet, and the inscriptions appearing
thereon, can not serve to corroborate the testimony of the witnesses who testified to the
celebration of the marriage, because such tablet and inscriptions are glaringly false, the

fact that the witness Sy Peng said that this tablet, together with others, was taken by him
from the temple or sanctuary of Sy Quia's family at Am Thau, to be introduced as
evidence in this action, to the contrary notwithstanding. The falsity of the inscription of
Sy Quia's death, when he was still alive, made upon a tablet which was evidently
prepared with remarkable haste and temerity, is borne out by the witness Li Ung Bing,
the interpreter of the American consulate, who claimed to be familiar with the laws and
customs of his country, for, according to him, where Chinese die out of China no
inscription is made at the place of their former residence in China, upon such tablets, of
the fact of their death; and as it is a fact, admitted by the plaintiffs, that Sy Quia died in
Manila and was buried in La Loma cemetery, there is no doubt that the tablet in question
was fraudulently prepared and fabricated to supply the lack of documentary proof as to
the so-much-talked-about marriage in China which is the fundamental basis of plaintiff's
claim.
In the administrative proceedings that Sy Quia must have instituted for the purpose of
securing the necessary permission to marry Petronila Encarnacion, and at the
investigation which, after the obtaining of such permission, must have been conducted
by the ecclesiastical court of the bishopric of Vigan, he, Sy Quia, necessarily must have
declared that he was single, as evidently he did, according to the testimony of the
witness Roman Gray, 72 years of age, then a clerk of that court, whose testimony under
oath is supported by that of other witnesses, two of them being of the same race as Sy
Quia, and in view of the result of the said proceedings and investigation, conducted as
aforesaid, the parish priest of the said city of Vigan was authorized to marry Vicente Sy
Quia to Petronila Encarnacion, the certificate of marriage reciting the fact that there was
no impediment whatever to the performance of the marriage.
Without the aforesaid permission of the Governor-General, sought and obtained in
accordance with sections 34 and 35 of the superior decree of the 20th of December,
1849, the vicar-general of the bishopric of Vigan would no have admitted the testimony
given by the witnesses in the investigation for the purpose of proving that Vicente Sy
Quia was single and free to marry, nor could the parish priest have performed the
marriage ceremony without first securing the necessary authority from the court of the
vicar-general in the name of the bishop.
Therefore the result of those proceedings and the canonical certificate, evidencing the
marriage of Vicente Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion, corroborate to the effect that Sy
Quia was single and had resided for many years in that city before he married Petronila
Encarnacion, and that he could not have spent four years at Am Thau, province of
Amoy, China, during that period, as alleged.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 456
With reference to the validity of the efficacy of the canonical certificates and the certified
copies thereof introduced here in evidence, we adhere to and follow the doctrine laid
down by this court in the case of the United States vs. Nicolas Arceo (11 Phil. Rep.,
530), No. 4539, wherein this court said:
The canonical entries in parochial books have not lost the character of public
documents for the purpose of proving such acts as are therein related,
inasmuch as, since the change of sovereignty in these Islands, no legal
provision has been promulgated to destroy the official and public character that
the said entries had under the former regime.
Parish priests continue in the legal custody of the parochial books kept during
the former sovereignty, and as such legal custodians kept during the former
sovereignty, and as such legal custodians they may issue literal copies in the
form of certificates of the entries contained therein, in like manner as custodians
of archives.
To strengthen the proof introduced by the plaintiffs as to Sy Quia's marriage to Yap
Puan Niu, an attempt was made to establish that the said Yap Puan Niu had been twice
in Manila, the last time in 1886; that on these two occasions she stopped for five or six
months at the house of Sy Tay, Sy Quia's brother, and that Sy Quia frequently called on
her at the said house; but notwithstanding the testimony of some witnesses who testified
to this effect, particularly Sy Hien, who claimed to be one of Sy Quia's brothers, and who
testified long after Sy Quia's death, we have in he record the sworn statement to the
contrary by the Chinese woman, Ana Quang Su, the wife of the said Sy Tay, who
positively testified that upon the two occasions that the said Yap Puan Niu stopped as a
guest at the house of her husband for a period of five or six months, she had never seen
Sy Quia call on her, Yap Puan Niu, and that the said Yap Puan Niu never went out of the
house but remained at home as was customary with Chinese women, adding that she
would have been otherwise, because said Yap Puan Niu occupied a room adjoining hers
in the same house, the witness being always at home, further saying that her husband
Sy Tay supported the said guest, Yap Puan Niu, and paid for her transportation both
ways between Manila and China, and that Sy Joc Lien and Sy Yoc Chay, who on
successive dates came to Manila from China, also stopped at her, the witness's house,
where they lived at the expense and under the orders of her husband Sy Tay. The
testimony of this witness is of the utmost importance, and has not been impugned or
discredited in any way in this case.
The witness, Roman Gray, above referred to, affirmed that while he was clerk of the
ecclesiastical court of Vigan, which position he had held since 1850, he met the

Chinaman Sy Quia when the latter went to his court for the purpose of being baptized as
a Christian, stating that the said Sy Quia several years thereafter, in 1853, presented a
petition for permission to marry, whereupon the necessary proceedings were instituted,
in which said proceedings two Chinese witnesses and Sy Quia was single and free to
marry, and a decree was subsequently entered authorizing the performance of the
marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, the witness further stating that he had read the
proceedings but that in 1898 the papers were destroyed by the insurgents, who removed
everything from the place where the archives were kept and occupied the premises for
some length of time.
Aside from what has been said before, there is no other evidence in the record to show
that the plaintiffs, particularly Sy Chua Niu, Sy Joc Lieng and Sy Yoc Chay, were ever
recognized as legitimate grandchildren and adopted grandchild, respectively, and that
Sian Han is the great-grandchild of the said Sy Quia, nor is there any proof to show that
the plaintiffs Sy Joc Lieng and Sy Chua Niu have been continuously in possession of the
legal status of children of the said Sy By Guit, and the said Sy Yoc Chay as the adopted
child of Sy By Bo, and Sian Han as the grandchild of the said of Sy By Bo, and Sian Han
as Sy By Guit, is said to be the legitimate son of Sy Quia by his wife, Yap Puan Niu.
Further, there is no evidence to the effect that Sy Quia had ever provided for the support
of Yap Puan Niu, nor that Petronila Encarnacion at any time delivered money, as
alleged, to Sy Joc Lieng and Sy Yoc Chay by reason of their hereditary income,
inasmuch as the delivery of the sum of P4,000 to the said Sy Joc Lieng, entered in a
book kept by Sy Tay, as per the copy of the entries appearing on page 300 of the book
marked "A. S.," is no proof of the payment of a part of the inheritance, and without any
express declaration on the part of Petronila Encarnacion, an entry in a book kept by the
firm of Sy Tay could not be binding upon the said Encarnacion, this, aside from the fact
the entries do not show the reason why this sum of P4,000 was charged to the account
of Petronila Encarnacion and credited to Sy Joc Lieng; and, even if we admit as true the
statement of the witness Emilio Medina that in his presence, the said Sy Joc Lieng
received an additional sum of P2,000 from Petronila Encarnacion there is no evidence to
show why this sum was paid to and received by the said Sy Joc Lieng; the witness
himself said that the receipt made out at the time set forth that the money was for
commercial purposes.
It likewise appears from the record that the plaintiffs, who now seek to be recognized as
the grandchildren, and Sian Han as the great-grandchild of the deceased Sy Quia,
incidentally attempting to recover the property which the said Quia left at the time of his
death, have not shown by competent documentary proof that Sy By Bo and Sy By Guit
were in fact the children of Sy Quia by his wife Yap Puan Niu; that Sy Yoc Lieng and Sy
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 457
Chua Niu are the children of Sy By Guit; that Sy Yoc Chay is the adopted child of Sy By
Bo, and Sian Han the son of Sy Jui Niu, who was the daughter of the said Sy By Bo, for
the parentage and affiliation of the said parties, as well as the marriage of Sy By Bo and
Sy By Guit, the adoption of Sy Yoc Chay, and the marriage of Sy Jui Niu, should have
been established by means of the documents in which such facts are customarily
recorded, as stated by Sy Hien, one of the witnesses for the plaintiffs and who also
alleged to be a brother of Sy Quia; the testimony of the witnesses, the most dangerous
and risky of evidence, not being sufficient to sustain a finding that the court erred in its
estimation of the facts, since the preponderance of the evidence must be fixed precisely
where the judge believes the truth lies, taking into consideration the facts which were
sought to be established, together with the nature of the same and the circumstances of
the case; and it should be noted that for the lack of documentary evidence it is
impossible to determine on what date Sy Quia was actually married, if he was married at
all, to Yap Puan Niu; and considering as a whole the evidence introduced by the
plaintiffs as to stay and residence of the said Sy Quia in the city of Vigan, Philippine
Islands, during the three or four years when it is alleged he was at Amoy and there
married, it can not be said that the preponderance of the evidence lies with the plaintiffs.
It further appears that the record while the body of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy
Quia was lying in state at the house where he died, in January, 1894, for the purpose of
performing the ceremony of robing a descendant of the deceased with the nine silk suits
which had been prepared for the corpse in accordance with the Chinese custom, and
although Sy Hien, a brother of the deceased, was in charge of the ceremonies, it did not
occur to him to dress Sy Yoc Chay in these garments, he, Sy Yoc Chay, being the son
of Sy By Bo, and if the said Sy Hien thought that this would not be proper for the reason
that Sy Yoc Chay was merely an adopted son, it is significant that Sy Joc Lieng, who
was also present or at least in the house, was not dressed in the said nine suits, but the
same were worn by Tomas Sy Quia, the eldest son of Gregorio, who for this purpose
was expressly taken out of the college where he was at the time, as testified to by the
several witnesses, among them Macario Pavila, a resident merchant of Pangasinan,
who chanced to be at house on that occasion. The statement of Sy Hien to the effect
that he did not remember the said ceremony, is not worthy of credit in view of the
positive testimony of the defendants Pedro and Juan and of the witness Pavila, who,
together with several Chinese, among them Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joc Lieng, witnessed
the same. The latter's statement that he was not present at the ceremony on account of
his having temporarily left the house in order to carry out certain instructions received by
him, can not be believed, for, if it is a fact that he was the proper person to wear the said
nine silk suits according to the customs of his country, the master of the ceremonies
would have suspended the same until he, Sy Joc Lieng, returned to the house; but
instead of this eldest son of Gregorio Sy Quia was brought, it is alleged, from the college

where he was, his father Gregorio being at the time in Vigan, for the investiture of the
nine robes before they were placed upon the corpse. From all this it may be inferred that
Sy Yoc Chay, who denied that the said ceremony took place, and Sy Joc Lieng, were
not, as a matter of fact, the grandsons of Sy Quia, as Sy Hien, a brother of the
deceased, who conducted the ceremony well knew, and that the only descendant to be
designated in accordance with traditional customs of the Chinese was Gregorio Sy Quia,
the eldest son of the deceased, and, in his absence, the latter's eldest son, Tomas Sy
Quia, which designation was accordingly made.
In the addition to the foregoing considerations it should be stated that the sworn
statement by Vicente Romero Sy Quia before the civil and ecclesiastica authorities of
the city of Vigan in the proceedings which were instituted in 1853 in connection with his
marriage in the parish church of that city, the continued possession for a period of many
years of the status of a single man enjoyed by him and recognized and accepted by the
whole community of the capital of the Province of Ilocos Sur, the belief on the part of his
townsmen and neighbors that he was in fact a single man, all these facts being
corroborated, as they are, by the uniform testimony of the witnesses for the defendants,
and the unexplained silence on the part of his alleged wife, Yap Puan Niu, who might
have asserted whatever rights she may had as the legitimate wife of Sy Quia before the
tribunals of this country, if she really had any, completely overcome and destroy the
improvised parol evidence as to the pretended marriage of Sy Quia in China, the
performance of which was for the first time alleged in December, 1905, after Sy Quia's
death and the demise of the latter's brother, Joaquin Martinez Sy Tiong Tay, who,
having sheltered in his house the woman Yap Puan Niu on the two occasions aforesaid,
as well as the plaintiffs Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joc Lieng since these latter landed in the
Philippines, might have testified to the existence of the marriage, thus supporting the
plaintiff's claim to the Sy Quia estate.
It is admitted by the plaintiffs in this case that the two of them, Sy Yoc Chay and Sy Joc
Lieng, and the woman Yap Puan Niu, when they came to this country stopped at the
house of the said Sy Tiong Tay, who provided for their support and maintenance, gave
employment to the first two in his own business and paid for the transportation of the
woman to Manila and back to China on the two occasions when she came to this
country; and, notwithstanding the truth and certainty of these facts, the plaintiffs,
nevertheless, did not even endeavor to show that the said Sy Tiong Tay had defrayed all
these expenses by order and on account of his brother Sy Quia, a fact which would
appear from the entries in the books kept by him as a merchant, of such payments were
really made in behalf of the said Sy Quia. The plaintiffs introduced in evidence a certain
book alleged to belong to the firm of Sy Tay for the purpose of establishing a certain
payment made by Petronila Encarnacion to the said plaintiffs. They, however, were
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 458
unable to produce any book to show that the expenses incurred by the said Sy Tay for
the maintenance and support of the said plaintiffs and of the woman, Yap Puan Niu, as
well as the latter's travelling expenses were paid by and on account of Sy Quia.
They were unable to explain the reason for these disbursements made by Sy Tay for the
benefit of two of the plaintiffs and their alleged grandmother, notwithstanding the fact
that death had forever stilled the lips of the two brothers, Sy Tay and Sy Quia, plaintiffs
having confined themselves to attributing to him whom they believed to be the wealthier
of the two brothers, who unfortunately can not now speak, the paternity and parentage
of a family which is not proved to be his.
This court, in the strictest administration of justice and in conformity with the law, can not
admit that plaintiffs have proved four marriages and three generations, since the
evidence introduced by them in support of these facts only consists of the testimony of
witnesses, most of whom have made conflicting statements and some have contradicted
themselves, as for instance the brother of Sy Quia, Sy Hien, whose testimony is
absolutely unworthy of credence, and other witnesses have told improbable stories and
testified as to things which are not likely to occur in the natural and ordinary course of
human events.
Even assuming that Sy Quia before he became a Christina actually married Yap Puan
Niu in 1847, as alleged, and that his second marriage in 1853 with a Christian woman,
by whom he had five children and with whom he lived contentedly in these Islands since
the marriage until he died, covering a period of forty-one years, while the first marriage
was still in full force and effect, was null and void, he, Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having
therefore married twice in violation of the law, the plaintiffs, nevertheless, would not be
entitled to the relief sought by them in their complaint.
There is not the slightest evidence in the record which even tends to indicate that Sy
Quia, at the time of his marriage at Vigan in 1853 with Petronila Encarnacion, brought at
Vigan in 1853 with Petronila Encarnacion, brought any property or money into the
conjugal partnership. The fact that he dud not is not surprising, as he was then a mere
clerk in the employment of another Chinaman by the name of Jose Gloria, who was a
resident of this city, with a salary of P200 per annum, as per testimony of Silveria
Damian, an aged woman, whose husband was also a Chinaman and worked for the
same man that Sy Quia did and for the same salary; while, on the other hand, there is
evidence in the record to the effect that Petronila Encarnacion, who belonged to a
wealthy family of Vigan, brought to the marriage, as a gift from her parents, the sum of
P5,000, which, together with their common labor and industry, was the basis of the
fortune accumulated by both husband and wife in the course of years.

Therefore, even assuming that the second marriage which was contracted by Sy Quia at
Vigan was void, while a former marriage alleged to have been performed at Amoy,
China, was still in full force and effect, and upon which the plaintiffs in this case base
their contention, the second marriage, however, produced civil effects under the laws
here in force in 1853, the time when it was performed. These laws are as follows:
Law 3, title 3, Partida 4, provides in part as follows:
Further, if people marry advisably, knowing that such impediment existed, and
that for this reason they should not have married, the children which may be
born will not be legitimate; but if only one of the contradicting parties, and not
both, was cognizant of the existence of such impediment, the children will be
legitimate, for the ignorance of one of the contracting parties excuses them, and
no one can say that they are not legitimate children.
Law 1, title 13, Partida  4 provides in part as follows:
And even if it should happen that between those who are married manifestly
in facie ecclesia such impediment exists which would require that the marriage
be set aside, the children which may be born to them before the contracting
parties knew that the impediment existed, will be legitimate. And this would also
be if neither of the contracting parties knew that the impediment existed, will be
legitimate. And this would also be the case if neither of the contracting parties
knew that the impediment existed, as well as if only one of them had knowledge
thereof, for the ignorance on the part of one of them, would make the children
legitimate. But if after knowing with certainty that the impediment existed
between them, they should have children, any that should be born subsequent
thereto will not be legitimate. But, if while such impediments exists without the
knowledge of both parties or of either of them, they should be accused before
the judges of the Holy Church, and before the impediment is duly established
and final judgment entered, children be born to them, such children as may be
born while the doubt exists, will be legitimate.
The Civil Code has merely reproduced with certain modifications to the provisions of the
old legislation in force in 1853 as to the civil effects of a void marriage where both
parties married in good faith, as well as where only one of them acted in good faith, for
whether one or both married in good faith, the marriage will produce civil effects only in
favor of the innocent spouse, and of the children born of this void marriage.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 459
If in all the acts of life good faith is to be presumed unless the contrary is proven, it can
no be denied that Petronila Encarnacion acted in good faith when she married Vicente
Romero Sy Quia in 1853, since there is no evidence in the record to the effect that she
knew before or after her marriage that the said Vicente Romero Sy Quia was married in
China to another woman.
The marriage contracted by a Christian Chinese at the time when Sy Quia was married
in the Philippines, was preceded by such formalities, and so many requisites had first to
be complied with, that it was difficult, not to say impossible, that in the natural and
ordinary course of things the marriage could have been performed if there were any
impediment at all thereto. In the case of Sy Quia, not only for many years was he
considered in the city of Vigan by the community at large as a bachelor, his name
appearing as such in the municipal census, but it must be fairly assumed that when he
instituted the proceedings before the civil authorities, and ecclesiastical proceedings in
the ecclesiastical court of Vigan, in order to secure permission and authority to marry in
accordance with the various decrees then in force, among them the decree of the 20th
of December, 1849, he must have positively said then that he was a bachelor, and this
fact must have appeared from the summary investigation conducted by the
ecclesiastical authorities of Vigan for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not he was
a bachelor and free to marry, and when at last the parish priest of Vigan was authorized
to proceed with the marriage ceremony, there is little room for doubt that Petronila
Encarnacion, as well as her family, relying upon the result of both proceedings, and
upon the license or authority granted by the government, and the authority given by the
vicar-general in the name of the bishop, for the performance of the marriage, they
consented thereto in the best of good faith, particularly Petronila Encarnacion, to the
latter's union to Vicente Romero Sy Quia in lawful wedlock.
If, on the contrary, it were true that Sy Quia had married in China many years before,
there is no doubt that he acted in bad faith by deceiving his wife Petronila Encarnacion,
as well as the civil and ecclesiastical authorities of this country, perjuring himself. And
upon the assumption that the marriage with Petronila Encarnacion was void by reason of
the existence of a prior undissolved marriage, the second marriage, nevertheless,
produced its civil effects in favor of the deceived spouse, and of the children born to
them, who, notwithstanding the nullity of the second marriage, are in the eyes of the law
legitimate, as though they had been born of parents lawfully married.
Therefore, assuming that Vicente Romero Sy Quia acted in bad faith by concealing the
fact of his marriage at the investigation made by the authorities for the purpose of
determining whether or not he was a bachelor and free to marry, one of the civil effects
produced by the marriage thus rendered void was that Sy Quia thereby absolutely

forfeited all his rights and interest to one-half of the conjugal property appearing in the
instrument partition, Exhibit A. F., and by operation of law all the property which would
otherwise have belonged to him, became the property of his wife, Petronila Encarnacion,
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code applicable provisions.
Law 16, title 17, Partida  7, with reference to this subject, provides:
Notorious wickedness is committed by men who knowingly marry twice while their first
wife is living, and the same may be said of women who marry twice knowing that their
first husband is still alive. Because such marriages give offense to God, and bring about
great damages and dishonor to those who are deceived, and they should be careful to
marry well and properly, as directed by the holy Church, for they would otherwise be
married to persons with whom they would later live in sin, and while they endeavor to be
happy in their marriage, and have children, the first wife or first husband appears when
least expected, and disrupts the marriage, and on account of this rupture many women
are dishonored and ruined forever, and men are disgraced in many ways. We therefore
command that everyone who should knowingly enter into such a marriage, in any
manners specified in this law, be hence banished to some island for five years, and that
he forfeit whatever he may own at the place where the marriage was performed, and
that it be given to his children or his grandchildren, if he has any, and if he has no
children or grandchildren, one-half of such property should go to the persons deceived,
and the other half to the king's chamber; and if both parties knew the one of them was
married, and wilfully married to him or her, then both shall be banished, each to a
separate island, and the property of either of them who may have no children should go
to the king's chamber."
Article 1417 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
The conjugal partnership expires on the dissolution of the marriage or when it is
declared void.
The spouse who, by reason of his or her bad faith, caused the annulment, shall
not receive any share of the property of the partnership.
This article embodies and reproduces under different aspects the provisions contained
in articles 72, 1333, subsection 3, 1373, 1378, and 1429 of the same code, and a mere
reading of this article, together with the provisions of law 16 of the Partidas above
quoted, will show the difference between the two. It will be noticed that the code
contains more favorable and less strict provisions on this subject than the law of
the Partidas, wherefore, in accordance with the rule 3 of the transitory provisions of the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 460
said code, the intestate succession of the deceased Vicente Romero Sy Quia should be
governed and regulated by the new code, which was in force on January 9, 1894, the
date of Sy Quia's death.
True, article 72 of the said code is included in title 4, the application and enforcement of
which in these Islands was suspended under the former sovereignty; but there is no
doubt that article 1417 and the other sections cited are now in force, said article 1417
providing that the spouse who by reason of his or her bad faith causes the annulment of
the marriage, shall not receive any share of the property of the conjugal partnership.
It should be born in mind that on account of the unexplained silence of Yap Puan Niu
during her lifetime, and the silence of the plaintiffs during Sy Quia's lifetime, the conjugal
partnership constituted in 1853 between Sy Quia and Petronila Encarnacion was
dissolved in 1894 by the death of the husband, and only then, when the Civil Code was
already in operation, would their presumptive heirs have acquired a right to claim the
inheritance, for the right to inherit while the deceased was still living is a mere right in
expectancy, and not until after the decease of the person whose succession is in
concern can such a right be said to exist or to be duly acquired. See the preamble to the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain on the subject in its
judgment of the 24th of June, 1897, wherein the court said:
That upon the settlement and distribution of the estate of a person who dies
subsequent to the promulgation of the Civil Code, any action for the recovery of
the property of the estate should be governed by the provisions of the said
code, in conformity with the first rule and the one preceding the last, of the
transitory provisions, because the rule as to the nonretroactivity of the new law
only applies to rights acquired under the former legislation; and it is a well-
known fact that hereditary rights exist only after the demise of the decedent;
and the trial court having so decided, it did not infringe the provisions of laws 11
and 12, title 13, Partida 6, and the general provisions of the transitory rules for
the application of the Civil Code.
However, as a matter of fact the action instituted by plaintiffs in 1905, claiming the
property left by Sy Quia at the time of his death, is based especially upon the alleged
nullity of the second marriage on account of the existence of the former performed in
China. Therefore, the rights claimed by the plaintiffs should be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code which has been in operation since 1899
and under which the rights now asserted by the plaintiffs might have sprung and been
acquired by them, this assuming that the alleged first marriage was actually performed in

China and that the claimants were in fact the issue of the said pretended marriage of Sy
Quia and Yap Puan Niu.
Since the 9th of June, 1853, when Vicente Romero Sy Quia married Petronila
Encarnacion, the conjugal partnership commenced to exist between the two spouses. All
the property acquired by them up to the time of the dissolution of the said partnership on
account of the death of Sy Quia on January 9, 1894, belonged to this partnership. (law
1, title 3, of the Fuero Real; Laws 1, 3 and 4, title 4, book 10, of the Novisima
Recopilacion; and arts. 1393, 1401, 1403-1407, Civil Code.)
During the Sy Quia's lifetime the validity of his marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, as
has been said before, was never questioned, no one having indicated any defect which
rendered the same void. It was only after his death that the plaintiffs ventured to attack
the validity of the same by claiming that they were his legitimate heirs and as such
entitled to his estate.
The Laws of the Partidas above cited, as well as the Civil Code, both recognize as a fact
that a marriage contracted in good faith, by one at least of the parties to the same,
produces the same civil effects as a valid marriage with reference to the innocent
spouse and the children born of such marriage, even though the same be subsequently
declared null and void.
It can not be denied that Petronila Encarnacion married Sy Quia in the best of good
faith, there being not the slightest proof to the contrary so far as the records shows.
Therefore, being innocent, she must be held to have acquired all the rights to which a
wife is ordinarily entitled, and neither she nor her children can be made to suffer the
consequences of the nullity of such marriage, this, assuming that the marriage was void;
nor can they in any event be made to suffer the consequences of the bad faith of her
husband Sy Quia.
The nullity of the marriage, once declared by the courts, may deprive the partnership
created by the marriage of the alleged spouses of its otherwise legal character, but can
not destroy the legal consequences of the marital union while it is existed. Consequently
the children are considered legitimate, and the innocent spouse is unquestionably
entitled to one-half of the conjugal property acquired during the marriage.
From the legal provisions above cited, especially the sections of the Civil Code referred
to, it necessarily follows that the half of the conjugal property to which Vicente Romero
Sy Quia would have been otherwise entitled, on account of the alleged nullity of his
marriage with Petronila Encarnacion and of his bad faith in contracting the same, was
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 461
forfeited by him and by operation of the law passed to the other spouse, Encarnacion;
and the plaintiffs, in their alleged capacity as legitimate descendants of the said Sy Quia,
deceased, can not now claim the said property, as the decedent, by the express
provisions of the law, absolutely forfeited his right to the said half of the property
acquired during the marriage. Such marriage must be considered null and void if it is
true, as alleged by the plaintiffs, that Sy Quia's marriage with Yap Puan Niu was still in
full force and effect when he married Petronila Encarnacion.
Counsel for plaintiffs now ask this court to modify the judgment appealed from and
declare that the said plaintiffs are the only legitimate heirs of Sy Quia and consequently
entitled to his entire estate, together with all rents and profits, for which judgment should
be entered in their favor with costs. In support of their contention they have assigned
various errors as committed by the trial court, among them that the court erred in finding
as a conclusion of law that the said Sy Quia was a subject of the Chinese Empire and
that his estate should be distributed in accordance with the laws of China.
It is an admitted fact that Sy Quia was a native Chinaman and therefore a foreigner; that
he came to this country in 1839 or 1840, when he was 12 years of age. He having
resided in these Islands since then and until January, 1894, when he died, that is to say,
for a period of more than 53 years, having obtained for this purpose the necessary
license or permission, and having been converted to the Catholic religion, marrying a
native woman in the city of Vigan and establishing his domicile first in the Province of
Ilocos and later in this city of Manila, with the intention of residing here permanently,
engaging in his business generally and acquiring real estate, it is unquestionable that by
virtue of all these acts he acquired a residence and became definitely domiciled in these
Islands with the same rights as any nationalized citizen in accordance with the laws in
force in these Islands while he lived here and until his death.
It should be noticed that, as the laws have no retroactive effect, in order to determine
what rights Sy Quia had actually since he removed to the Philippines in 1839 or 1840, it
will be necessary to resort to the laws in force at that time; and the provisions of the Civil
Code promulgated in November, 1889, could not affect in the least rights thus acquired
by virtue of his long residence in these Islands. Article 3 of the Civil Code is as follows;
"Laws shall not have retroactive effect unless otherwise prescribed therein." This
provision is in accordance with the provisions of law 15, title 14, Partida  3.
The legislation then in force on the subject of naturalization and residence of foreigners
in the Philippine Islands will be found in the following laws. Law 1, title 11, book 6 of
the Novisima Recopilacion, is as follows:

We permit that the subjects of other kingdoms (provided they are Catholics and
friendly to our Crown) who may desire to come here to practice their trade or
profession may do so, and we command that if they do now practice some trade
or profession and live twenty leagues inland from any port, they shall be forever
exempt from the payment of taxes, and shall be likewise exempt for a period of
six years, from the payment of municipal taxes and from the performance of any
ordinary or extraordinary services, as well as from holding office as members of
municipal councils at the place where they may reside; and they, like other
residents, shall be permitted to use the common pastures and enjoy all the
privileges accorded to the latter; and we hereby command the authorities to
provide them with house and lands, if necessary. And other foreigners, whether
they have any trade or profession,  provided they have lived in this kingdom for
a period of ten years  in a home of their own, and have been married to native
women for a period of six years, shall be admitted to all the offices of the
republic except to those of magistrate, governor, mayor, elderman, warden,
treasurer, revenue collector, secretary of city council, or any other government
position of trust. As to these latter offices, as well as to all ecclesiastical offices,
all existing laws shall continue in full force and effect, etc.
And law 3 of the same title and book of the Novisima Recopilacion provides:
There shall be considered as denizens, in the first place, all foreigners who
obtain the privilege of naturalization and those who are born in these kingdoms;
those who residing therein may be converted to our Holy faith; those who, being
self-supporting, establishes their domicile therein; those who ask for and obtain
residence in any town thereof; those who marry a native woman of the said
kingdoms and are domiciled therein; and in the case of a foreign woman who
marries a native man, she thereby becomes subject to the same laws and
acquires the same domicile as her husband; those who establish themselves in
the country by acquiring real property; those who have a trade or profession
and go there to practice the same; also those who practice some mechanical
trade therein or keep a retail store; those who hold public or honorary offices or
any such position whatever which can only be held by natives; those who enjoy
the privilege of the common pastures and other privileges usually accorded to
other residents; those who shall reside in the said kingdoms for a period of ten
years in a home of their own; and also those foreigners who, in accordance with
the common law, royal orders and other laws of the kingdoms, may have
become naturalized or acquired residence therein, they being obliged to pay the
same taxes as the natives for the legal and fundamental reason that they also
participate in their privileges, etc.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 462
Article 18 of the Code of Commerce of May 30, 1829, which was in operation until 1888 ,
is as follows:
Foreigners who have become naturalized or have the acquired residence in
Spain in the manner provided by law may freely engage in commerce with the
same rights and under the same conditions as natives of the kingdom.
Although the royal decree to the colonies, with the exception of section 28 thereof,
nevertheless, it is only proper to call attention to the provisions of the said decree in so
far as they have any bearing upon the case at bar, in view of the provisions of laws 1
and 2, title 1, book 2, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies, which direct that the
laws of Castile shall be observed in all cases not otherwise covered by said laws.
Section 2 of the said royal decree of 1852 is as follows:
Foreigners who have gained or obtained a residence, in accordance with the
laws, shall be considered Spanish subjects.
Section 3 provides that all other foreigners who reside in Spain without having taken out
naturalization papers, or otherwise gained a residence therein, shall continue to be
foreigners. And section 12 provides:
Those persons shall not be legally considered as foreigners, under any
circumstances, who have failed to register as such in the registry or transients
or domiciled persons kept by the civil authorities of the provinces or with the
consuls of the respective nations.
It is a proven and undeniable fact that Sy Quia resided in the Philippines for more than
fifty years, he having only absented himself occasionally for a short time with the
intention of immediately returning to the Islands; and it is also a fact that in various
documents and public instruments executed before notaries public, which have been
introduced in evidence marked as "Exhibits 1, 2, and 3," he was a resident of the district
of Binondo having declared in one of the said documents that he was a freeholder. If
continuous residence in these Islands for a period of more than fifty years, and by virtue
of the fact that he had permanently established himself in this country, living in a house
of his own, with his wife and children, and having acquired real estate therein, did
become a domiciled denizen under the laws then in force, even if it be held that the royal
decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was applicable to these Islands by virtue of the
provision contained in the Laws of the Indies, the legal status of Vicente Rometro Sy
Quia has not changed, because the provisions of the said decree does not in any way
affect the rights acquired by him and the supreme court of Spain in a judgment of the

30th of April, 1861, in construing this provision of the law, declared and held that the
purpose of the royal decree of the 17th of November, 1852, was not to promulgate a
new law, but merely to condense and embody in one single act the various provisions
then in force with reference to foreigners, and to preserve the fuero de estranjeria  (the
rights which foreigners had in certain cases to invoke their own laws) in the same
manner as it existed before. In another judgment of the 29th of August of the same year
the said supreme court of Spain held that under the provisions of law 3, title 11, book 6,
of the Novisima Recopilacion, there should be considered as domiciled denizens of
Spain all foreigners who, being self-supporting, established their domicile in the country;
the double inscription in the registry, as required by the royal decree of the 17th of
November, 1852, being no obstacle thereto.
Many years prior to promulgation of the Civil Code in these Islands, there was published
in the Official Gazette of this city on September 18, 1870, the decretal law of the 4th of
July of the said relating to foreigners, section 2 of which provides:
Foreigners who, in accordance with the laws, shall be come naturalized beyond
the seas, in any town of the Spanish provinces beyond the seas, shall be
considered as Spanish subjects.
After dividing into three different classes the foreigners who should come into and
establish themselves in the provinces beyond the seas, classifying them respectively as
domiciled, transient, and immigrant foreigners, the said section provided that —
"Domiciled foreigners are those who have a regular residence and have lived for three
years in any province or who may have lived for such residents in the registry of
domiciled persons kept for this purpose," etc.
Section 7 of the said decree provides as follows:
Any foreign residing in the provinces beyond the seas, in order to be considered
as such foreigner under the laws of the country, shall register in the registry of
foreigners to be kept for this purpose by the civil supreme authorities and by the
consuls of their respective nations.
The above-quoted sections of the said decree are in harmony with similar sections
contained in the decree of the 17th of November, 1852, which, as has been said, was
never extended to these Islands — with the exception of section 28 thereof relating to
the settlement of the estates of deceased foreigners. The doctrine laid down by the
supreme court of Spain with reference to the interpretation and proper construction of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 463
the said decree is not, therefore, inconsistent with the provisions of the decree or law of
1870, also relating to foreigners.
True that prior to 1870 there existed in these Islands no registry of foreigners and that
even the civil registry was not then in operation of titles 4 and 12 of the Civil Code
relating thereto having been suspended by telegraphic order of the 29th of December,
1889. It is also true that no registry was kept by the foreign consulates and that there
was no Chinese consul here at that time. However, if the Chinaman Sy Quia had really
intended to preserve his nationality and the protection of the laws of this country, he
would have registered in the registry which was kept by the Government here after the
publication in these Islands of the said decree of 1870; and under the theory of the law a
foreigner, in order to have the right to invoke the laws of his own country, must register
in the proper registries as such foreigner; if Sy Quia did not see fit to so register at any
time prior to his death in 1894, we must presume that he did not do so because he
desired to preserve the rights which he had acquired as a resident of Manila.
Continuous and permanent residence in this country for a period of years, and the rights
thereby acquired as a denizen of any town, were always taken into consideration by the
Spanish legislators in determining the rights of a foreigner residing in Spanish territory.
The constitution of 1812 provides in section 5 that there shall be considered as Spanish
subjects:
2. Foreigners who have obtained from the cortes a certificate of naturalization;
and, 3. Those who have otherwise gained residence in accordance with the
laws of the country and lived as such residents for a period of ten years in any
town of the kingdom.
A similar provision is contained in section 1 of the constitution of 1845, paragraph 4 of
which is as follows:
Spanish subjects are those who, having otherwise obtained a certificate of
naturalization, have, nevertheless, gained residence in any town of the
kingdom.
It becomes necessary to refer to the Spanish laws which were applicable or in operation
in these Islands at the time that Vicente Romero Sy Quia gained residence and acquired
the status of a domiciled denizen of the municipality of Vigan and subsequently of this
city of Manila, for the reason that they were the only laws regulating his personal rights.

In addition to what has been said for the purpose of demonstrating that Vicente Romero
Sy Quia acquired the legal status of a domiciled resident of these Islands, we should not
forget to say that the Chinese residents of these Islands under the former sovereignty,
and particularly at the time that Sy Quia gained a residence in this Archipelago, were
governed by the Laws of the Indies and other special laws, some of them quite ancient;
although they had no consul or any other representative of the Chinese Government,
they, nevertheless, had a gobernadorcillo who was elected by their most prominent
citizens, subject to the approval of the Governor-General. They were governed by laws
different from the general laws of the country and paid a tax different from that which
was paid by the natives and foreigners, and, upon their landing for the purpose of
establishing themselves in the Islands, they had to obtain what was known as a
resident's license and secure passports and permits whenever they desired to leave the
Islands, and not only had they to obtain such permission from the Government, but also
from their native wife, if they were married. It should be noticed also that they were not
permitted to land in Manila without first obtaining a permit from the Government, and that
they had to state before the Chinese immigration authorities whether they came here as
mere transients, or visitors for a period of three months, which could be extended if they
really intended to establish themselves in the country. For this purpose certain
proceedings were instituted before the immigrant was given the said resident's license.
This license entitled them to more liberty and privileges in their business journeys and
excursions through the provinces than the other transients who merely had permission
to stay here three months. All this may be verified by reference to the decrees of the
31st of August, 1839; 16th of September, 1840; 13th of December, 1843; and 20th of
December, 1849.
It should be noticed further that section 19 of the said decree of the 16th of September,
1840, provided that the children always follow the status of their father and pay the same
taxes, except the children of Chinese who, according to the decree of the 2nd of May,
1786, were considered as Chinese mestizos. These decrees may be found In the work
entitled "Legislacion Ultra Marina," by Rodriguez San Pedro, vol. 2, pp. 471-483, and
vol. 8, p. 401.
The foregoing will clearly show that Vicente Romero Sy Quia gained residence in these
Islands under the laws of the Novisima Recopilacion. Therefore the questions raised by
those who now claimed to be his descendants should be decided in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippines to which Sy Quia submitted himself from the time he
applied for a resident's license and abstained from registering in 1870 as a foreigner.
Most of the property left by him being the real, the same is subject to the laws of the
country in which it is located.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 464
In support of what has been said with reference to the special laws governing in the
Philippines concerning Chinese, we will cite the decision in a case where a Chinese
Christian by the name of Bonifacio Lim Tuaco requested that the children of Chinese
married to native women, whether pure relatives or half-castes, pay the same taxes as
their father and be permitted to wear the same costume as the latter up to the age of 25.
The Spanish Government, inspired by the traditional spirit of the ancient special laws
relating to Chinese residents in these islands, after consulting various heads of
departments and obtaining in a royal order of the 24th of February, 1880, which was
communicated to the Governor-General of these islands and published in the Official
Gazette April 17, 1880.
The plaintiffs in this case have invoked certain provisions of the Chinese laws as one of
the grounds of the action by them instituted and now contend that the estate of Vicente
Romero Sy Quia, deceased, should be distributed in accordance with the laws of that
country. Even disregarding the fact that the plaintiffs should have, but have not, alleged
in their complaint, as one of the facts constituting their cause of action, the existence of
a law passed and promulgated in China, the existence of which law, being foreign,
should have been alleged in the complaint, the fact remains that there is absolutely no
evidence in the record as to the existence of the Chinese laws referred to by plaintiffs in
their subsequent pleadings, the evidence of this character introduced by them consisting
of books or pamphlets written in Chinese characters and marked "Exhibits AH, AI, AJ,
and AK," which they claim contain a compilation of the laws of China, being useless and
of no value.
It may be that they contain, as plaintiffs claim, the laws of China, but we have no
Spanish translation of them, they being the written with characters which are absolutely
unknown to this court and to the defendants. Further, the plaintiffs have not introduced
expert testimony in the manner and form prescribed by section 292 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and, finally, there is no evidence that these four books or pamphlets were
printed by authority of the Chinese Government or that they have been duly
authenticated by the certificate of competent authorities or that they are properly sealed
with the seal of the nation to which they belong. For this reason the said books or
pamphlets can not, under any circumstance, be considered as documentary proof of the
laws of China.
Section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
Books printed or published under the authority of the United States, or of one of
the States of the United States, or a foreign country, and purporting to contain
statutes, codes, or other written law of such State or country, or proved to be

commonly admitted in the tribunals of such State or country as evidence of the
written law thereof, are admissible in the Philippine Islands as evidence of such
law.
Section 301 of the same code provides:
A copy of the written law, or other public writing of any State or country, attested
by the certificate of the officer having been charge of the original, under the seal
of the State or country, is admissible as evidence of such law or writing.
Section 302 provides as follows:
The oral testimony of the witnesses, skilled herein, is admissible as evidence of
he unwritten law of the United States or of any State of the United States, or
foreign country, as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions
of the courts of the United States or of such State or country, or proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts.
The jurisprudence of American and Spanish tribunals is uniform on this subject. For he
purposes of this decision however it will be sufficient to refer to the judgment of the
supreme court of Spain of the 26th of May, 1887, wherein it is said:
Whenever a foreign law is invoked in our Tribunals, its existence must be
satisfactorily established as any other fact.
If the pamphlets or books, written in Chinese characters, do not satisfactorily establish
the existence of certain Chinese laws invoked by the plaintiffs, no only because such
pamphlets or books lack the aforesaid formalities and requisites, but further because
there is no evidence as to the nature of the laws contained in those books or pamphlets
and the subjects with which they deal; on the introduced for the purpose of establishing
the authenticity of the laws which, according to the plaintiffs, are contained in the said
books, were unable to say positively at least that the book marked Exhibit AH consul of
this city, Sy Int Chu, after stating that he had never made a regular study of the laws of
his country, simply consulting the same in connection with his official reports, admitted
that he had never read or seen the original copy of this alleged compilation, the books
not being duly certified, adding that he could not say whether the book marked "Exhibit
AH" was a exact copy of the original.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 465
The testimony of the witness Ly Ung Bing, the interpreter, as to the written and unwritten
laws of China, does not show, as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, that he knew
such laws alleged to be contained in the said books. He merely confined himself to
expressing his own opinion with reference to two classes thoroughly conversant with the
laws of China, his testimony, considering the manner in which he testified, can not even
be accepted as partial evidence that the said four books really contain the written and
unwritten laws of China.
From the foregoing facts and provisions of law referred to we conclude:
First. That it has not been duly established in this case that the Chinaman Sy Quia,
married in 1847 at Am Thau, Amoy, China, the woman Yap Puan Niu, or that the
plaintiffs are the descendants of the said Sy Quia, for the reason that the marriage of Sy
By Bo, Sy By Guit and Sy Jui Niu, respectively, the affiliation and parentage of the latter
and of Sy Chua Niu and Sian Han, and the adoption of Sy Yoc Chay have not been
proven.
Second. That, even assuming that Sy Quia actually married Yap Puan Niu, in 1847, and
that the second marriage with Petronila Encarnacion in 1853 is, therefore, void, Sy Quia
having contracted this second marriage in bad faith by concealing the fact that his
former wife was still living his half of the property of the conjugal partnership between
him and his second wife, who married him in good faith, was forfeited by operation of
law in favor of his said second wife, for although the law recognizes civil effects to a void
marriage, it nevertheless, deprives the party who married in bad faith of his share in the
community property acquired during the existence of the marriage up to the time of its
annulment.
Third. That, as a consequence of the foregoing conclusion and under the same
hypothesis, the plaintiffs, as the descendants of Sy Quia by his first marriage, have no
right to claim Sy Quia's share in the conjugal property acquired during his second
marriage with Petronila Encarnacion for the reason that by the express provision of the
law the half of the said conjugal property which would have otherwise belonged to the
husband was transmitted to Petronila Encarnacion, together with the other half of the
said property to which she was rightfully entitled under the law as the deceived wife.
Fourth. That, under the same hypothesis that the marriage of Sy Quia with Petronila
Encarnacion is void, his former marriage not having been dissolved when he married the
said Petronila Encarnacion, the children by the second marriage are, nevertheless,
legitimate, this being one of the civil effects of a marriage contracted in good faith, as in
this case, at least on the part of one of the contracting parties, Petronila Encarnacion.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 466

Fifth. That Vicente Romero Sy Quia, having become a regularly domiciled denizen under
the laws above cited by reason of his long residence in this country for more than fifty
years and by reason of the further fact that he married a native woman, established
himself in this city with a home of his own, acquired real property and engaged in
business generally, most of the property left by him at the time of his death being the
real property, the questions raised by plaintiff's petition must be determined in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines to which Sy Quia submitted himself when he
came to the Islands and secured a residence therein, and not in accordance with any
other foreign or unknown law.

Sixth. That, aside from the fact that it does not specifically appear from the record what
are the Chinese laws applicable to the issues of this case, there is no proof of the
existence of the Chinese laws referred to by the plaintiffs, nor is there anything to show
that the books or pamphlets introduced by them in evidence contain any specific laws of
the Celestial.

The foregoing disposes explicitly or implicitly, affirmatively or otherwise, of all the

questions raised by the various assignments of error submitted by both parties; and in
our opinion it is not necessary to dispose of each of them in detail in view of the
conclusion at which the court has arrived in this most important litigation.

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the
judgment of the trial court, appealed from both parties, should be reversed, and that we
should, and do hereby, absolve the defendants of the complaint upon which this action
was instituted, without any special order as to the costs of both instances. The bond
given by the receiver, Gregorio Sy Quia, is hereby discharged and the petition
heretofore made for the appointment of a new receiver is hereby denied. It is so ordered.

Carson and Elliot, JJ., concur.


G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,  to interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307).
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,  otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR
GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION
CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA,
ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and
AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents
and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.
BARREDO, J.:p
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the
respondent court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as null
and void for having been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the respondent
court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina A.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 467
Magno to perform or do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the
petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular Administratrix of above-
named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadings filed by her
and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private respondent
Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch);
with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on August 8, 1967
upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the orders of the
respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and
its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.
Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-
three (33) appeals from different orders of the same respondent court approving or
the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
THE FACTS
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on
November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows:
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid
out of my estate.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or
located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and
to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with
or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for
any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to
dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other
minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee

simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect
to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong
to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however,
that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved
property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock,
Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the
same during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to
subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein. and may sell unimproved
town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I
give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike,
namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie
Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named
in item Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have
gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, to be executor of this, my last will and testament, and direct
that no bond or other security be required of him as such executor.
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the
probate court, in the administration of my estate, other than that
necessary to prove and record this will and to return an inventory and
appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of
respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles Newton Hodges being
appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 468
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges)
had been appointed Special Administrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the
same date as follows:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE
PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS
ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN DOING
WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned
attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. — That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament,
a copy of which is attached to the petition for probate of the same.
2. — That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles
Newton Hodges is directed to have the right to manage, control use
and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same
way, a provision was placed in paragraph two, the following: "I give,
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and
(to) hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime."
3. — That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner
was engaged in the business of buying and selling personal and real
properties, and do such acts which petitioner may think best.
4. — That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants
or ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as
executor surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent.
5. — That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the
business of petitioner and the deceased, especially in the purchase
and sale of properties. That proper accounting will be had also in all
these transactions.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N.
Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue

the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he
had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N.
Hodges, that the business in which said petitioner and the deceased
were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is
named and appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed or
authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to
perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:
MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES,
MORTGAGES THAT THE EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND
SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE EXECUTOR MAY DO
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED
LINNIE JANE HODGES.
Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his
undersigned attorney, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
1. — That according to the last will and testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor as the surviving spouse and legatee
named in the will of the deceased; has the right to dispose of all the
properties left by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as follows:
Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or
located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and
to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 469
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said
estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part
thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with
or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for
any other term or time, any property which he may deem proper to
dispose of; to lease any of the real property for oil, gas and/or other
minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee
simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect
to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong
to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire. ...
2. — That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left
as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the lifetime of herein
Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of
the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was
and is engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal properties,
even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize
said C.N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the
business of buy and sell, which motion was favorably granted by the
Honorable Court.
3. — That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had
been buying and selling real and personal properties, in accordance
with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
4. — That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the
herein Executor to have all the sales, leases, conveyances or
mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.
5. — That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases
and mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon.
Court. and subsequent sales conveyances, leases and mortgages in
compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and within
the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also be approved;

6. — That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly
accounts, and the properties conveyed can also be accounted for,
especially the amounts received.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by the Executor, be
approved by the Hon. Court, and also the subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with the wishes of
the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with
authorization and approval of the Hon. Court.
City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
(Annex "G", Petition.)
which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as
follows:
ORDER
As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the
Court considers well taken all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED.
The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.
So ordered.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
(Annex "H", Petition.)
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval,
Hodges alleged:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 470
Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the
deceased, renders the following account of his administration covering
the period from January 1, 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account
may be found in detail in the individual income tax return filed for the
estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net
worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as
well as the income and expenses, copy of which is hereto attached and
made integral part of this statement of account as Annex "A".
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the
statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets
and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income
tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A", be
approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.
That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
examining the herein accounts be given notice, as herein executor is
the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the
last will and testament already probated by the Honorable court.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959.
(Annex "I", Petition.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order
worded thus:
Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the
statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and
liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual income tax
return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A" is
approved.
SO ORDERED.
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959.

(Annex "J", Petition.)
His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1,
1960 to December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise accompanied by allegations
identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the respective
orders approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially
identical to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements
of account just mentioned, the following assertions related thereto made by respondent-
appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications discernible in the record to
be disputable:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the
Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as
of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the
combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided
evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to
this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate
as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual
Statement of Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed
thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of
his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 471
Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual
Statement of Account by the Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C.N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1960 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined
conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this,
he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93, Appellee's Brief.)
Likewise the following:
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven
brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green
ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately
omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's
name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the
records "in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or
believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested
in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. .
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was
administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax return
on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes"
to the question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing the
will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as
the surviving spouse, he answered:
"None, except for purposes of administering the
Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It
is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased
to distribute the remaining property and interests of
the deceased in their Community estate to the
devisees and legatees named in the will when the
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration
are finally determined and paid."

Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he
executed an "affidavit" wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he
stated in Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns as to his having
renounced what was given him by his wife's will. 1
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12,
1958. He listed all the assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie
Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated expressly
that her estate which has come into his possession as executor was
"one-half of all the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90,
Appellee's Brief.)
Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote
wholly or at least, extensively from some of the pleadings and orders whenever We feel
that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and clearer view of the important
and decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate appraisal of their
respective positions in regard thereto.
The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-
mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26, 1962, when on account of
the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had
been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's
estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the
following:
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A 
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled
proceedings, to the Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane
Hodges (deceased), her husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act
as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by this Hon. Court dated
June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed
Executor and had performed the duties as such.
2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was
stricken ill, and brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 472
unfortunately, he died on December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of
the death certificate hereto attached and marked as Annex "A".
3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament
of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real and personal properties that may
remain at the death of her husband Charles Newton Hodges, the said
properties shall be equally divided among their heirs. That there are
real and personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges, which
need to be administered and taken care of.
4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of
Charles Newton Hodges, have not as yet been determined or
ascertained, and there is necessity for the appointment of a general
administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue of the estate to the
heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal
partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall
be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the wife.
5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of
the existence of the last will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges,
with similar provisions as that contained in the last will and testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last will and testament of Charles
Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and
will be presented in due time before this honorable Court.
6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an
Administratrix be appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a
Special Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to
perform the duties required by law, to administer, collect, and take
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both
spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as
provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration, because the last will and testament of deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and in the
meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time, a Special
Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of
being lost, damaged or go to waste.

8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges
and C.N. Hodges, who had been employed for around thirty (30) years,
in the person of Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same
time Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the
Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified
person to serve the duties of Administratrix and Special Administratrix
and is willing to act as such.
9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum
which the Hon. Court believes reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully
prayed that, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers
and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the
reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno.
(Annex "O", Petition.)
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel
for the Executor dated December 25, 1962, which the Court finds
meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby appointed
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter
case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept
in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both
spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed.
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), and after having done so, let letters
of Administration be issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)
On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of
respondent Magno herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 473
representative of the heirs of deceased Charles Newton Hodges (who
had) arrived from the United States of America to help in the
administration of the estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-
Special Administrator of the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow -
Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such co-special administrator
on January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion of
the same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who had) arrived
from the United States with instructions from the other heirs of the
deceased to administer the properties or estate of Charles Newton
Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.)
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special
Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the will of Hodges, 2 with a prayer for the
issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was
followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be
appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the
court issued the corresponding order of probate and letters of administration to Joe
Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.
At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges
bequeathed her whole estate to her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said
husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in like manner, provided
that "at the death of my said husband — I give devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike —".
Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly
liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon
the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be
determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters.
And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done, furthermore, there is the
issue of whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines or those of Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more, as
already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or manifestations indicating
that as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving
spouse — "except for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community
Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes
and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and
controversies now before Us for resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation that

ensued upon the death of Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite understandably,
the lower court's actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in
consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.
Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from
which the trial court proceeded in issuing its questioned orders. And, regretably, none of
the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of valuable assistance in clearing up the
matter.
To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant
in the appealed cases, one with green cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at
the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed upon by the parties under which
the respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act conjointly, but
since no copy of the said agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no
way of knowing when exactly such agreement was entered into and under what specific
terms. And while reference is made to said modus operandi in the order of September
11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal, reading thus:
The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina
A. Magno, in answer to the charges contained in the motion filed by
Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer to the said charges,
Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a
written manifestation.
After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf
of the administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that
everything that happened before September 3, 1964, which was
resolved on September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was
simply due to a misunderstanding between the representative of the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in
order to restore the harmonious relations between the parties, the
Court ordered the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus
operandi before September 1, 1964, until after the Court can have a
meeting with all the parties and their counsels on October 3, as
formerly agreed upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and
Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty. Rizal Quimpo.
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his
manifestation shall not be resolved by this Court until October 3, 1964.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 474
SO ORDERED.
there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except that
again, reference thereto was made in the appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages
292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as follows:
On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and
locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take
immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to place its own locks
and keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965
thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that
Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City
where PCIB holds office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral
damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is prayed that an order
be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the said
office, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and place
thereon its own locks and keys for security purposes; instructing the
clerk of court or any available deputy to witness and supervise the
opening of all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even
date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she was
compelled to close the office for the reason that the PCIB failed to
comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I.
Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates
should remain in status quo  to their modus operandi as of September
1, 1964.
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt
the operation of the office of both estates, the Court aside from the
reasons stated in the urgent motion and opposition heard the verbal
arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for
Administratix Magno.
After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all
doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo
City in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative
and deputy clerk of court Albis of this branch not later than 7:30

tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said
estates could operate for business.
Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated
September 11, 1964, it is hereby ordered:
(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of
the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and estates of C.N. Hodges;
(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the
account of either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then
deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
the estate of C.N. Hodges;
(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250
in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as
administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;
(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to
inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her
possession in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also
directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records,
documents and papers it may have in its possession;
(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have
access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the
protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner the
accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C.N.
Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie
Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges.
Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix
Magno in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized
representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized
representative, both estates or any of the estates should not close it
without previous consent and authority from this court.
SO ORDERED.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 475
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from the
properties in the name of Hodges should be deposited in a joint account of the two
estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-called modus operandi was no longer
operative, but again there is nothing to show when this situation started.
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages
188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record
on Appeal) it is alleged that:
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of
the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs. William
Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to
be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
various legal counsel representing the aforementioned parties entered
into an amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable
Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money
were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates
and that the assets (to the extent they existed) of both estates would be
administered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963
Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and
ownership of one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative,
seventy-five percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N. Hodges or
Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964
(pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended
its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of
the afore-described basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets
claimed by both estates.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates exists
in the record, and so, We are not informed as to what exactly are the terms of the same
which could be relevant in the resolution of the issues herein.
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the
Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her
own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows:

Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R.
Quimpo filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964
asking for the approval of the Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which
Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their services to protect and
defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these proceedings and
the same has been signed by and bears the express conformity of the
attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan.
It is further prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges be directed to pay the retailers fee of said lawyers, said
fees made chargeable as expenses for the administration of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11, 1964, on the ground that payment of
the retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said
Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the 100% claim of the
estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
is premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and Manglapus are
representing conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking
that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and
Quimpo be denied because no evidence has been presented in
support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the opposition of
counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is
claimed that expenses of administration include reasonable counsel or
attorney's fees for services to the executor or administrator. As a
matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the
PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp.
1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees for said law firm
has been approved by the Court in its order dated March 31, 1964. If
payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges,
in like manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of
attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the
reply to the opposition to the Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 476
principally that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
are not similarly situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is an heir of
Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the former for
the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp.
1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
formally entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307).
Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating
therein that Judge Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties to
submit memorandum in support of their respective contentions. It is
prayed in this manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion
dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation
dated January 5, 1965 asking that after the consideration by the court
of all allegations and arguments and pleadings of the PCIB in
connection therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent motion of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965 approving the
motion dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement annexed to said
motion. The said order further states: "The Administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever check or
checks may be necessary for the above purpose and the administrator
of the estate of C. N. Hodges is ordered to countersign the same. (pp.
6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion
dated January 13, 1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which
was issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and void and to enjoin
the clerk of court and the administratrix and administrator in these
special proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce or
comply with the provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In
support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of
January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was never
delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge
Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the drawer of the late
Judge Querubin in his office when said drawer was opened on January

13, 1965 after the death of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr.,
the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive Judge Rovira
and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-
6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for
reconsideration dated February 23, 1965 asking that the order dated
January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the
personal heir;
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between
them;
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the
prejudice of the other heirs not represented by said attorneys;
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the
estate;
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-
6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges filed a motion to submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the
manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents directly appertaining
thereto be considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp.
6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of
both the Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada,
hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes that the order of January 4,
1965 is null and void for the reason that the said order has not been
filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the lifetime
of Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the said
manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated
and considered in this instant order. It is worthy to note that in the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 477
motion dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V, Sp. 1307)
which has been filed by Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty.
Gibbs and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual
services rendered. However, the fee agreement dated February 27,
1964, between the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and
Atty. Gibbs which provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in
addition to specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement for
expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by the Court
and said lawyers have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp.
Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null
and void.
The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by
the attorneys for the administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is granted and the agreement annexed thereto is hereby
approved.
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby
directed to be needed to implement the approval of the agreement
annexed to the motion and the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges is directed to countersign the said check or checks as the case
may be.
SO ORDERED.
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but
simultaneous administrations.
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion
of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale executed by it as administrator of the
estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on appeal herein:
Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land
of the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp.
Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty.
Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs and
Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal R.
Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering

the allegations and reasons therein stated, the court believes that the
deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the
Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno, Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the PCIB
should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A.
Magno could sign the deeds of sale.
SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator
of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties registered in his name, should be co-
signed by respondent Magno.3 And this was not an isolated instance.
In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to
execute final deeds of sale pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C.
N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green ROA), motions for
the approval of final deeds of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A.
Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe
Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were
approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Magno's counsel,
Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken
over the bulk of the assets of the two estates, started presenting these
motions itself. The first such attempt was a "Motion for Approval of
Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages"
dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel for the
appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2)
cancellations of mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and
D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of the appellant
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion
was approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by
another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final deed
of sale again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was
again approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates
having been opened, a flood ensued: the appellant subsequently filed
similar motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 478
cancellations of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A.
Magno and the appellant.
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone
will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol as having presented for court approval
deeds of sale of real properties signed by both appellee Avelina A.
Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion dated
September 21, 1964 — 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4,
1964 — 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1, 1964 — 4 deeds
of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965 — 8 deeds of sale; (f)
motion dated May 7, 1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very
extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many motions
filed concerning deeds of sale of real properties executed by C. N.
Hodges the lower court has had to constitute special separate
expedientes in Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include
mere motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the conjugal
properties of the Hodges spouses.
As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3,
1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion for
Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and Cancellations of
Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596)
the allegations of which read:
"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell"
real property, and the prospective buyers under said contracts have
already paid the price and complied with the terms and conditions
thereof;
"2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors
have already paid their debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of
the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to release therefrom;
"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp. Proc.
No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor —
Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros
Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 479

Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto,
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City the Court believes that payment to both the administrator of the testate
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City estate of C. N. Hodges and the administratrix of the testate estate of
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two estates is proper and
legal.
and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —
WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or
Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo either of them.
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City SO ORDERED.
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City (Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City given authority to act alone. For instance, in the other appealed order of December 19,
1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the respondent court approved
"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will payments made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court who had helped
not reduce the assets of the estates so as to prevent in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows:
any creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his
dividend." Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve
payment of overtime pay dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable
And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing: and are believed by this Court to be a proper charge of administration
chargeable to the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the
of the Rules of Court, this honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the
of sale and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113-117, Appellee's testate estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to
Brief.) countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime
pay as shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.
None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
SO ORDERED.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the
respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its other appealed (Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)
order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green Record on Appeal, said
respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee Western Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno
Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in the name of
parties with whom Hodges had contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether they
pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as were executed by him before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this nature
Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus: which are also on appeal herein are the following:

1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving the
deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on
February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958,
after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure
of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.
2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966
pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on September 13, 1960, after the
death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view
of failure of said appellee to pay the installments on time.
3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966
pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the death of
his wife.
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to
a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the death of his wife.
5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185,  id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a
"contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212,  id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant
to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death of his wife.
7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213,  id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on
June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges
on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his wife.
8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and
Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966,
respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18,
1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 480
9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a
"contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before the death of his wife, which
contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of appellee
Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139,  id., approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a
"contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the death of his wife, which
contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee
Pablico to pay the installments due on time.
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed of
sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on September
6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 5, 1951, before
the death of his wife.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale
executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two
in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966,
respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on
May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959,
after her death.
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of
sale executed by petitioner alone and without the concurrence of respondent Magno,
and such approvals have not been the subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner
points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited
assignments of error have already been discussed previously. In the
first abovecited error, the order alluded to was general, and as already
explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself,
superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of
sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of
this appeal, as well as the particular orders approving specific final
deeds of sale executed by the appellant, Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee, Avelina A.
Magno, nor by any party for that matter, and which are now therefore
final.

Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all
embracing significance developed. On October 5, 1963, over the signature of Atty.
Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel
for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-
explanatory motion was filed:
URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND
DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE
OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF THE ASSETS OF
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE
DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C N.
HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS
ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME
THEREFROM.
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe
Hodges, through his undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled
proceedings, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last
Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed
November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary
to C. N. Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp.
Proc. 1307).
(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the
following allegations in a Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by
Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to
all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges."
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 481
(p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the
Executory, for the reasons stated in his motion dated
December 11, 1957 which the court considers well
taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
executor is further authorized to execute subsequent
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in
the last will and testament of the latter."
(p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and
accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P.
Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other things
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the
time and place of examining the herein account, be
given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated by the Honorable
Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.).
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual
Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel
Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among other
things:
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the
time and place of examining the herein account, be
given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or

legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testament of the
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court."
(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual
Statement of Account By The Executor for the Year 1960" submitted
through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
That no person interested in the Philippines be given
notice, of the time and place of examining the herein
account, as herein Executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testament of the
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P.
Gellada filed only in Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable
Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter
case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept
in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both
spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed."
(p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to
Avelina Magno pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of
December 25, 1962
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 482
"With full authority to take possession of all the
property of said deceased in any province or
provinces in which it may be situated and to perform
all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
property, said Administratrix and/or Special
Administratrix having filed a bond satisfactory to the
Court."
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P.
Gellada of January 21, 1963 issued Letters of Administration to:
(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges; and
(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges.
(p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a
motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963
for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following
order:
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar
escrituras de venta definitiva de propiedades
cubiertas por contratos para vender, firmados, en
vida, por el finado Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez
que el precio estipulado en cada contrato este
totalmente pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a la
misma a firmar escrituras de cancelacion de hipoteca
tanto de bienes reales como personales cada vez que

la consideracion de cada hipoteca este totalmente
pagada.
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe
ser sometida para la aprobacion de este Juzgado."
(p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
[Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe
Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for
Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, alleges:
3. — That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie
Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges have been
receiving in full, payments for those "contracts to sell"
entered into by C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and
the purchasers have been demanding the execution
of definite deeds of sale in their favor.
4. — That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies
deeds of sale executed by the Administratrix and by
the co-administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges respectively, in compliance with the terms
and conditions of the respective "contracts to sell"
executed by the parties thereto."
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16,
1963 are all registered in the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges.
(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been
advertising in the newspaper in Iloilo thusly:
For Sale
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 483
All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.
Avelina A. Magno
Administratrix
(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid
and still is paying sums of money to sundry persons.
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during
the hearings before this Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963
that the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the assets belonging
to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election by C. N.
Hodges wherein he claimed and took possession as sole owner of all
of said assets during the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges on the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under
her Last Will and Testament.
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of
her administration as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However,
from manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel,
Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will claim that at least fifty per
cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the deceased spouses and the
rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to the Higdon family
who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that
this Honorable Court, after due hearing, order:
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the
funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into
her possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any
character remaining in her possession;

(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues,
Avelina A. Magno to stop, unless she first secures the conformity of
Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized representative, such as the
undersigned attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney-in-fact of
a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:
(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:
(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.
(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable in the premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)
Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all
the heirs of Hodges approved by the court, and because the above motion of October 5,
1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs,
petitioner filed the following:
MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING
MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING AND RESOLVE
"URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND
DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE
OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED
LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C. N. HODGES
EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE
RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME
THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter
referred to as PCIB), the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges,
deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672, through its undersigned
counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an
"Urgent Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of the
Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The Conjugal
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 484
Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and
Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an
amicable agreement entered into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the heirs
of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the
dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of
administration to the PCIB.
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of
the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as the
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs. William
Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to
be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
various legal counsel representing the aforenamed parties entered into
an amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court,
wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums of money were to
be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates
and that the assets (to the extent they existed)of both estates would be
administrated jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963
Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and
ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,) (or, in the alternative,
seventy-five percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or
Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964
(pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended
its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of
the aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges to one hundred percent (100%) of the assets
claimed by both estates.
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the
aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for
hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of October 5, 1963.

5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was
absent in the United States, this Honorable Court ordered the indefinite
postponement of the hearing of the Motion of October 5, 1963.
6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
the PCIB has not been able to properly carry out its duties and
obligations as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges because of
the following acts, among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those who
claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges:
(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in
exclusive control of all of the assets in the Philippines
of both estates including those claimed by the estate
of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by her locking
the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on
August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until
ordered to do so by this Honorable Court on
September 7, 1964.
(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she
alone may decide how the assets of the estate of C.N.
Hodges should be administered, who the PCIB shall
employ and how much they may be paid as
evidenced in party by her refusal to sign checks
issued by the PCIB payable to the undersigned
counsel pursuant to their fee agreement approved by
this Honorable Court in its order dated March 31,
1964.
(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and
turns over possession of the records and assets of the
estate of C.N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the
Higdon Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as evidenced in
part by the cashing of his personal checks.
(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute
checks prepared by the PCIB drawn to pay expenses
of the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by
the check drawn to reimburse the PCIB's advance of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 485
P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes reported
due and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court,
particularly those of January 24 and February 1, 1964, and the
mandate contained in its Letters of Administration issued on January
24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
"full authority to take possession of
all the property of the deceased C.
N. Hodges
"and to perform all other acts necessary for the
preservation of said property." (p. 914, CFI Rec., S.P.
No. 1672.)
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the
right to the immediate exclusive possession and control of all of the
properties, accounts receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other
assets, including the documentary records evidencing same, which
existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death,
December 25, 1962, and were in his possession and registered in his
name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines registered
in the name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on
December 25, 1962. All of the assets of which the PCIB has knowledge
are either registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or were
derived therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962.
9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges,
deceased, succeeded to all of the rights of the previously duly
appointed administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges'
death, this Honorable Court appointed Miss Avelina A.
Magno simultaneously as:
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
(p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307) to replace the
deceased C. N. Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was

appointed Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P.
No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1307).
(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1307).
(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court
appointed Harold K. Davies as co-special
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges along with
Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1307).
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of
Avelina A. Magno, Harold K. Davies resigned in favor
of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672)
who thereupon was appointed on January 22, 1963
by this Honorable Court as special co-administrator of
the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec.
S.P. No. 1672) along with Miss Magno who at that
time was still acting as special co-administratrix of the
estate of C. N. Hodges.
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the
part of Avelina A. Magno, this Honorable Court
appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as
co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp.
76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672).
10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable
Court of December 25, 1962, took possession of all Philippine Assets
now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take
possession of the assets registered in the name of C. N. Hodges alone
only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N.
Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court on February 22,
1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators
of the estate of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take over
from Miss Magno the full and exclusive possession of all of the assets
of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on January 24,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 486
1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N.
Hodges in substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the
PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole and exclusive
possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this
Honorable Court approved same, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January
18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672); which
shows or its face the:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as
"Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and Special Administratrix of the Estate of C. N.
Hodges";
(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting
for the heirs of C.N. Hodges; and
(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer
acting for the Higdon family who claim to be the only
heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec.,
S. P. No. 1672).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on
January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol as of January 23, 1964, filed February 24,
1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and pp.
1806-1848, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March
3, 1964.
(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware
of no report or accounting submitted by Avelina A.
Magno of her acts as administratrix of the estate of

Linnie Jane Hodges or special administratrix of the
estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the accounting of
Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the
estate of C.N. Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to
which Miss Magno manifested her conformity (supra).
12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to
receive P10,000.00
"for her services as administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges"
and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964,
at
"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an
employee of both estates."
24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders
of this Honorable Court of same date, the PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the exclusive possession of all
records, properties and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of the
date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the possession
of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to
the possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe
Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of the estate of C.
N. Hodges.
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable
request of PCIB concerning the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges,
the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an employee of the estate of C. N.
Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On September 1, 1964 Miss Magno
locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB
access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September
3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss
Magno to reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street
and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than September 8, 1964.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 487
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court
is again in physical possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N.
Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid
records, properties and assets because Miss Magno continues to
assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues to use
her own locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to
know the combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated
within the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite the fact that said
combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime.
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges were assessed and paid on the basis that C. N.
Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal
counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid
assessment and the payment of the corresponding Philippine death
taxes.
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges except to resolve the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and
grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and control of all of the
records, properties and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges were ordered by this Honorable Court in special Proceedings
No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in
fact took possession of them before his death and asserted and
exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the
sole beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions
that this Honorable court:
(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest
possible date with notice to all interested parties;
(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as
Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-
Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds,

properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her
possession, with full details of what she has done with them;
(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties
and assets of any character remaining in her possession;
(4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues,
order Avelina A. Magno and her representatives to stop interferring with
the administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the PCIB and its
duly authorized representatives;
(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208
Guanco Street, Iloilo City as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges
and approve her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective August 31,
1964;
(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and
others allegedly representing Miss Magno from entering the premises
at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N.
Hodges without the express permission of the PCIB;
(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and
equitable in the premises. (Annex "U" Petition.)
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of
Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as
PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned
counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie
Jane Hodges, American citizens originally from the State of Texas,
U.S.A., acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties
in the Philippines and in the States of Texas and Oklahoma, United
States of America. All said properties constituted their conjugal estate.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 488
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses,
this Honorable Court, in its orders dated March 31 and December 12,
1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p.
----), conclusively found and categorically ruled that said spouses had
lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had,
therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they retained
until the time of their respective deaths.
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of
Iloilo her Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent to the present issue
are the second, third, and fourth  provisions, which we quote in full
hereunder.
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal
and real, wherever situated, or located, to my
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to
hold unto him, my said husband during his natural
lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties of said estate by
sale of any part thereof which he think best, and the
purchase of any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee
simple or for any other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any
of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute
fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments
and income from said estate shall belong to him, and
he is further authorized to use any part of the principal
of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided
herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise

dispose of any of the improved property now owned
by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock,
Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease,
manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, as
above provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide
any farmland and sell lots therein, and may sell
unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real
and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share
and share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy
Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray
Higdon."
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo
his Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie
Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the identical language she used
in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City,
predeceasing her husband by more than five (5) years. At the time of
her death, she had no forced or compulsory heir, except her husband,
C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by various brothers and sisters
mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience, we shall refer to
as the HIGDONS.
6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last
Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"),
and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of her estate without bond.
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1, 1957, this
Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 489
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic of its
testamentary provisions, should be governed by Philippine laws
because:
(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended
Philippine laws to govern her Will;
(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found", shall prevail. However, the
Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of
the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the
domiciliary law (Philippine law — see paragraph
2, supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions
and successional rights over movables (personal
properties), and the law of the situs of the property
(also Philippine law as to properties located in the
Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties).
Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and
applied by our Supreme Court in the case of "In The
Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E.
Christensen", G.R. No. 
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine
law should apply to the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges
and to the successional rights to her estate insofar as
her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines
are concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss
what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane
Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas, because the
only assets in issue in this motion are those within the
jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-
captioned Special Proceedings.
8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of
spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them.
Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half
(1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting

their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton
Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the
conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal
estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only
portion of the conjugal estate capable of inheritance by her heirs.
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie
Jane Hodges cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will,
be enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments
accruing after her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane Hodges' Will
provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any
part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire."
(Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and income" must be credited to
the one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N.
Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable
of inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no more than one-
half (1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her death
on May 23, 1957.
10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the
surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants
is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at
least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary
disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of
the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half
(1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil Code.)
Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges,
C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or seventy-
five (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, (1/2 or
50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of
inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income"
accruing to said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane
Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges
as her sole and exclusive heir with full authority to do what he pleased,
as exclusive heir and owner of all the assets constituting her estate,
except only with regards certain properties "owned by us, located at, in
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 490
or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without relying on our
laws of succession and legitime, which we have cited above, C. N.
Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his wife, was entitled
to the entirely to his wife's estate in the Philippines.
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the
successor are transmitted from the death of the decedent". Thus, title
to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges
immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the convenience of
this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how
the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in
accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.
13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges as above-stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate.
He operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts
in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name
alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late
Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25,
1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession
and control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned
expressly and impliedly by various orders of this Honorable Court, as
follows:
(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C.
N. Hodges "is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which
he was engaged, and to perform acts which he had been doing while
the deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)
(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the
following fact, alleged in the verified Motion dated December 11, 1957
filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as
conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the

deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p.
44; emphasis supplied.)
issued the following order:
"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor,  for the
reasons stated in his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the
Court considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby
APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of
the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
24 ems
(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified
inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his
counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among
other things,
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the
time and place of examining the herein account, be
given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last
will and testament already probated by the Honorable
Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78;
emphasis supplied.)
(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified
"Annual Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his
counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among
other things.
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the
time and place of examining the herein account, be
given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 491
accordance with the last will and testament ofthe
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court."
(CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 81-82; emphasis
supplied.)
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified
"Annual Statement of Account By The Executor For the Year 1960"
submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he
alleged:
"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time
and place of examining the herein account, as herein executor is the
only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in
accordance with the last will and testament ofthe deceased, already
probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane
Hodges, not only by law, but in accordance with the dispositions of her
will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the
spouses. The entirely of said conjugal estate pertained to him
exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and authorized,
as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and control all the
conjugal assets as owner.
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in
connection with the estate of his wife, this Honorable Court has (1)
declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges
as sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will.
Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal
and juridical personality, it had no assets or properties located in the
Philippines registered in its name whatsoever at the time of the death
of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph,
provides as follows:
"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,

residue and remainder of my estate both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally
divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
share alike, namely:
"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell,
Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray
Higdon."
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and
remainder", at least to the extent of the Philippine assets, which
remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate of C. N. Hodges.
18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of
Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is without merit because said provision is void
and invalid at least as to the Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway,
affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to the
properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance from his
wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.
(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the
Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges acquired,
not merely a usufructuary right, but absolute title and
ownership to her estate. In a recent case involving a
very similar testamentary provision, the Supreme
Court held that the heir first designated acquired full
ownership of the property bequeathed by the will, not
mere usufructuary rights. (Consolacion Florentino de
Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-
13876, February 28, 1962.)
(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code
clearly provide that no charge, condition or
substitution whatsoever upon the legitime can be
imposed by a testator. Thus, under the provisions of
Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the
legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of
the deceased spouse. Consequently, the above-
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 492
mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges
is clearly invalid insofar as the legitime of C. N.
Hodges was concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of the
1/2 portion of the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire
conjugal estate of the deceased.
(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution
provided for and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles
857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution,
sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article
859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article
863). All other substitutions are merely variations of
these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four
of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not
fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly
no obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first
heir designated, to preserve the properties for the
substitute heirs. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo
et al. vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. 
L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution.
However, in order that a vulgar or simple substitution
can be valid, three alternative conditions must be
present, namely, that the first designated heir (1)
should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish
to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be
incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply
to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution
provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will
is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is
void. Manresa, commenting on these kisses of
substitution, meaningfully stated that: "... cuando el
testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por
fallecimiento de este nombra otro u otros, ha de
entenderse que estas segundas designaciones solo
han de llegar a tener efectividad en el caso de que el
primer instituido muera antes que el testador, fuera o
no esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a
ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when another heir is
designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the
second designation can have effect only in case the

first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or
not that was the true intention of said testator. Since
C. N. Hodges did not die before Linnie Jane Hodges,
the provision for substitution contained in Linnie Jane
Hodges' Willis void.
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for
substitution in the Will, C. N. Hodges' inheritance to
the entirety of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate is
irrevocable and final.
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of
the conjugal estate appeared and was registered in him exclusively as
owner. Thus, the presumption is that all said assets constituted his
estate. Therefore —
(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted
heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the
legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be affected by any
testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file their claim
against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the
present time to full custody and control of all the conjugal estate of the
spouses.
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate
administration, where the administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges
estate exercises an officious right to object and intervene in matters
affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and
reception of evidence, this Honorable Court declare:
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed
exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal estate of the spouses
Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on May 23, 1957;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C.
N. Hodges as his share as partner in the conjugal partnership;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 493
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate
accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges;
5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in
the Philippines, plus all the "rents, emoluments and income" above-
mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of
distribution to his heirs upon termination of Special Proceedings No.
1672;
6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled
to full and exclusive custody, control and management of all said
properties; and
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, as well as the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or
participate in the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and
equitable in the premises."
(Record, pp. 265-277)
Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21,
1965, private respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of
Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully states and manifests:
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges
were American citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after having
amassed and accumulated extensive properties in the Philippines;
2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will
and testament (the original of this will now forms part of the records of

these proceedings as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
Folio I, pp. 17-18);
3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo
at the time survived by her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and
several relatives named in her last will and testament;
4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed
and duly heard, this Honorable Court issued an order admitting to
probate the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have
any claims against the decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already been
printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40)
and the reglamentary period for filing such claims has long ago lapsed
and expired without any claims having been asserted against the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the
Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this
Honorable Court;
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already
admitted to probate contains an institution of heirs in the following
words:
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate, both personal
and real, wherever situated or located, to my beloved
husband, Charles Newton Hodges to have and to hold
unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his
lifetime, and, he is hereby given the right to make any
changes in the physical properties of said estate, by
sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and
the purchase of any other or additional property as he
may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 494
simple or for any other term or time, any property
which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any
of the real property for oil, gas and/or other minerals,
and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute
fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such
property as he elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is
further authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided
herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved property now owned
by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock Texas,
but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and
enjoy the same during his lifetime, above provided. He
shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell
lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles
Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all of the
rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real
and personal, wherever situated or located, to be
equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share
and share alike, namely:
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy
Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy
Higdon.
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers
and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior to
the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of such
deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share
which would have gone to such brother or sister had
she or he survived."
7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already
above-quoted, Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over
all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested

remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate to her
relatives named therein;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission
to probate of her last will and testament, but during the lifetime of
Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles Newton Hodges with full and
complete knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred upon him
by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of the estate and
later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and
clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and
usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges pursuant to her last will and testament, are her named
brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell,
Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter two being
the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon, Sadie
Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, American
citizens, with residence at the State of Texas, United States of
America;
10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23,
1957, she was the co-owner (together with her husband Charles
Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest in their conjugal
properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957, which properties are
now being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately
by the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the
Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are under
the control and supervision of this Honorable Court;
11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the
interests of husband and wife in the combined conjugal estate, as there
has been no such separation or segregation up to the present, both
interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of "rents,
emoluments and income", the entire estate having been continually
devoted to the business of the spouses as if they were alive;
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined
conjugal estate was earning "rents, emoluments and income" until her
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 495
death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to be saddled with any more
charges or expenditures which are purely personal to her in nature, and
her estate kept on earning such "rents, emoluments and income" by
virtue of their having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were bequeathed
for life under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton
Hodges in the combined conjugal estate existing as of May 23, 1957,
while it may have earned exactly the same amount of "rents,
emoluments and income" as that of the share pertaining to Linnie Jane
Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges, expenditures, and other
dispositions which are purely personal to him in nature, until the death
of Charles Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges as they exist today, the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion more than
fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion to which the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be exactly
determined by the following manner:
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the
combined conjugal estate as they existed on the
death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957 — one-
half of these assets belong to the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges;
b. An accounting must be made of the "rents,
emoluments and income" of all these assets — again
one-half of these belong to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges;
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a
deduction of charges, disbursements and other
dispositions made by Charles Newton Hodges
personally and for his own personal account from May
23, 1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as other
charges, disbursements and other dispositions made

for him and in his behalf since December 25, 1962 up
to the present;
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the
liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the conjugal estate, and
distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and
prayed that this Honorable Court, after a hearing on the factual matters
raised by this motion, issue an order:
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell,
Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs under the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only persons entitled to
her estate;
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in
accordance with the system enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion;
c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined
conjugal estate and its delivery to the Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs to whom they properly
belong and appertain.
(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted, as
it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion and in addition to opposing
the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part
that:
1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the
supposed estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for
Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges";
2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters
pending before this Honorable Court, such as:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 496
a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable
Court of documents relating to the allegation of
Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges
"through ... written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges';
b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery
to the Estate of C. N. Hodges of All the Assets of the
Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May 23,
1957 Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and Income
Therefrom";
c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts
of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as
administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts
involved therein being matters of record, and therefore require only the
resolution of questions of law;
3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have
could be very easily threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two
administrators only results in confusion and is unduly burdensome
upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly
because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to
answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously collected
and held, as well as those which she continues to inofficiously collect
and hold;
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and
inconveniences not only the estate but also third-parties dealing with
it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)

and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations of
its earlier motion of September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that:
1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the
administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;
2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina
Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank;
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No.
1307) closed;
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of
heirs in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters
hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent
court denied the foregoing motion, holding thus:
ORDER
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22,
1966 of administrator PCIB praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina
Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and
income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this motion,
immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the
administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and
consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are
resolved.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 497
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending
before this court such as (a) the examination already ordered by this
Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of Avelina
Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written declaration and sworn
public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate
and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent
motion for accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all
the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23, 1957 plus all the
rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various motions to
resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of September 14,
1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title
as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial
involving no issues of facts and only require the resolution of question
of law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a
motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as
attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N. Hodges
is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal but also the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges.
Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in
consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges.
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and
accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada
in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C. N.
Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Court.
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of
accounts submitted by the executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty.
Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated that the executor, C. N.
Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement
of accounts submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960

which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is
stated that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N.
Hodges claimed all the assets belonging to the deceased spouses
Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the Philippines; that
administratrix Magno has executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the
testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of
administratrix Magno has been filed asking that the motion be denied
for lack of merit and that the motion for the official declaration of heirs
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation and
reception of evidence.
It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of
documents which are in the possession of administratrix Magno can be
made prior to the hearing of the motion for the official declaration of
heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as
well as the other motion) dated September 14, 1964 have been
consolidated for the purpose of presentation and reception of evidence
with the hearing on the determination of the heirs of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the motion for
the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is
the one that constitutes a prejudicial question to the motions dated
October 5 and September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found
meritorious and granted by the Court, the PCIB's motions of October 5,
1963 and September 14, 1964 will become moot and academic since
they are premised on the assumption and claim that the only heir of
Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges.
That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the
determination of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage
since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed a motion for
official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim of any
heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in the
administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 498
not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are
claiming her estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the
PCIB has been filed alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of the
PCIB is not to seek deferment of the hearing and consideration of the
motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to
declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for
administratrix Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets
of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which has come
to her possession plus all rents and income.
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno
dated May 19, 1966 has been filed alleging that the motion dated
December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of all conveyances made
by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority for all subsequent
conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order
dated December 14, 1957 only approved the conveyances made by C.
N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any
claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to
declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the
lapse of more than five (5) years after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges;
that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no order of
adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express
declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of heirs in the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the
PCIB as well as those in the opposition and rejoinder of administratrix
Magno, the Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to be well taken for
the reason that so far there has been no official declaration of heirs in
the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no disposition of
her estate.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby
DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)
In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner
alleged inter alia that:

It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was
based on the fact that:
a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased,
Linnie Jane Hodges, the late Charles Newton Hodges
was the sole heir instituted insofar as her properties in
the Philippines are concerned;
b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said
late Charles Newton Hodges rights over said
properties which, in sum, spell ownership, absolute
and in fee simple;
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore,
"not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal,
but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was
granted by this Honorable Court "for the reasons stated" therein.
Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the
sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by" the late
Charles Newton Hodges, but also all "the subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be approved and authorized.
This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for the
reasons stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not
only approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the
late Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all subsequent
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the
said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X", Petition)
and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had
already been factually, although not legally, closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges
and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the properties of the estate of his
wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18, 1967,
respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and held that "the court
believes that there is no justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be
considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno "for
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 499
official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to
above, was set for hearing.
In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1,
1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the
orders in question were issued in two separate testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307
and 1672, in the court below).
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein,
appeals from the following:
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent
Magno of overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal) together
with the subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232,id.)
October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-
456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof.
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds
executed by petitioner to be co-signed by respondent Magno, as well
as the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying
reconsideration.
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295,  id.) enjoining the
deposit of all collections in a joint account and the same order of
February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which included the denial
of the reconsideration of this order of October 27, 1965.
4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the
payment of attorney's fees, fees of the respondent administratrix, etc.
and the order of February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration thereof.
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335,  id.) allowing appellee
Western Institute of Technology to make payments to either one or
both of the administrators of the two estates as well as the order of
March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration.
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Carles,
Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero

and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion), together with the two
separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp.
308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration of said
approval.
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on
Appeal, approving similar deeds of sale executed by respondent
Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and
Premaylon, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed.
8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow
Record on Appeal, directing petitioner to surrender to appellees
Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral, Causing,
Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering the lands
involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion for
reconsideration was filed either.
Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just
as they affect distinctly different individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its
brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals
before Us, for which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with
these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors,
the respective discussions and arguments under all of them covering also the
fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus
making it feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases
together.4
The assignments of error read thus:
I to IV
THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO
ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 500
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.
V to VIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES,
ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO
ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY
HAVE NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
IX to XII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES,
PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C.
ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON
(LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO.
102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT
NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE
NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACTS TO SELL.

XIX to XXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES
ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS,
AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
XXII to XXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES,
JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.
XXVI to XXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF
SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO
CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR
S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SPELL WHICH WERE
CANCELLED AND RESCINDED.
XXX to XXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
OWNERSHIP OVER REAL PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO CARLES,
JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XXXV to XXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO
AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 501
AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY
HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND
PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE IN
ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL
CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF
P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.
XXXIX to XL
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT,
EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT
APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION
CORONADO.
XLI to XLIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
XLIV to XLVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF
SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO,
ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,

PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM WITH
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED
THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO
CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAID
APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A
PROBATE COURT.
L THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS
OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
LI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH
HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE
ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE EXECUTED WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF
P2,337.50.
LII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE
IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH
THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
RULES OF COURT.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 502
LIII to LXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO
SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS OF
SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN
FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO
CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO,
PURIFICACION CORONADO, BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO
THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND GRACIANO L.
LUCERO.
LXII
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED
NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF HAVING
BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK.
LXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING
THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON NOVEMBER 23,
1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF WAS
FOR NOVEMBER 20, 1965.
LXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN
THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965,
IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF
CONTAINED THEREIN.
LXV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE,
WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE
PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.
LXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF
THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER
THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT TO
SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LXVII
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF
PAYMENTS BY THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL EXECUTED BY IT
AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A
PERSON OTHER THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR.
LXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
RETAINER'S FEES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 503
OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR
LAWYERS.
LXXI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.
LXXII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL
DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO
SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND NOT BY
THE LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED
ADMINISTRATOR OF HIS ESTATE.
LXXIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXIV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
LEGAL EXPENSES OF LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES.
LXXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR
BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.

LXXVI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF
COMPENSATION TO THE PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES,
THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN THERE IS
NEITHER SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
LXXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF
THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON
HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE APPELLANT,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE
RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE
STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's
Brief.)
To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual
setting of these cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs
of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as administratrix, with the proposed
appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that respondent court did actually order
such proposed replacement, but the Court declared the said order of respondent court
violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see
Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B.
Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed
administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26,
1972 informed the Court that a motion had been filed with respondent court for the
removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N.
Hodges had already been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her
husband. Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 504
Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution of
September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed
thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed with respondent
court, informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N.
Hodges had already been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain
other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with
the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not
possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator of the Hodges estate.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION CASES
I
As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all
the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of PCIB. Considering, however, that these
appeals revolve around practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that
some of them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to
be stated and explained make it of no consequence whether or not the orders
concerned have become final by the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them,
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals.
II
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and
Prohibition instead of Appeal
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition in view of the existence of the remedy of appeal
which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to
take into account that there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all
these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably
cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and
consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without taking account
anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which would be
involved in as many individual appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and
proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present

cases. In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may
be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or
is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances of the given
case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay,
augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant
to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic
issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil
action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable,
for purposes of resolving the common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the
conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental
issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render
more simple the determination of the secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly,
respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorariand prohibition must be
overruled.
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial &
Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.
III
On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate  thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of all functions
Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its
jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further recognizing after December 14,
1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning
purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for such
posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was
already allowed to assert and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant
to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done in
Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of
PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as
sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to
him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307,
hence respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 505
After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is
patently untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the
sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to
such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court of the estate of
a decedent is its most important function, and this Court is not disposed to encourage
judges of probate proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in making
orders in such regard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned, like the
heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, the devisees and legatees, should
know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations ensuing
from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case may be,
thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations similar to
those that have developed unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in
instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have
already actually distributed among themselves their respective shares therein to the
satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are
adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final
order of declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special proceeding
instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the respective rights of all the
parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or administrator
and responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of the probate court to
such effect.
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule
90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance
to the widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law have been paid, the court, on the application of
the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate,
and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person

is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time
as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there
should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of
the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall
not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which
is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and
specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the
court.
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral
charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make a
declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the
residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p.
397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37
Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p.
86, Appellee's Brief)
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to
Section 1, Rule 90) what brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a
close is the order of distribution directing delivery of the residue to the
persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by
the deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings
and orders before Us that the above indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of
heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been complied with
when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already stated, We are not
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 506
persuaded that the proceedings leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely
of the motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E,
and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the law
contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied upon
by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to the
date of the motion), plus a general advance authorization to enable said "Executor — to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the
said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will
and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of adjudication
of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In fact, the motion of
December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order in question did not pray for
any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did allege that "herein
Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly
added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey, lease or
dispose of the properties in the Philippines — during his lifetime", thereby indicating that
what said motion contemplated was nothing more than either the enjoyment by Hodges
of his rights under the particular portion of the dispositions of his wife's will which were to
be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the conjugal estate,
pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority referred to in
said motions and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule
109 which permits, in appropriate cases, advance or partial implementation of the terms
of a duly probated will before final adjudication or distribution when the rights of third
parties would not be adversely affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing
the surviving spouse to dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final
liquidation, when it appears that no creditors of the conjugal partnership would be
prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p.
887) albeit, from the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges
meant to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted
allegations of said motions read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of the
rights unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters
to whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted
upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23, 1965,
when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute of Technology by its
order We have quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date, November 23,
1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial

declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In
this connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way of some kind of
estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on pages 54-
67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the
sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have
done if it were really convinced that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the
order of adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn
when Magno filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of what should
correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the indubitable
implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole
estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the
same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever
should remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect,
therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as
he might possibly dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the
allegations in his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as
suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any
degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain
thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary
provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as to
prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges'
intention in his motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial
court's orders granting said motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded,
could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Hodges
of the whole estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers and
sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the fact that
no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be attributed, firstly, to the
failure of Hodges to send notices to any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, and,
secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken said
motions to be for the final distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him
to be able, pending such final distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his
lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in accordance with the bequest in his
favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms of Section 2 of
Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal estate. In any event, We do not
believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not
only because of the clear language of the will but also because none of the interested
parties had been duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof. Stated differently, if the
orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be read in the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 507
sense contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and
void.
Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19,
1956, (unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its
insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs.
Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the
order of adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel
attempted to be drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the
trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order of adjudication and
distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed their
motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the
order of the lower court in that respect read as follows:
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra
procedente bajo la condicion de que no se hara entrega ni adjudicacion
de los bienes a los herederos antes de que estos presten la fianza
correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del Codigo
de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido
nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza
podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a cada
heredero segun el testamento. Creo que no es obice para la
terminacion del expediente el hecho de que la administradora no ha
presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley,
estan exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que son
legatarios del residuo o remanente de los bienes y hayan prestado
fianza para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el
testamento que la administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha
condicion.
POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a
la mocion de Ramon Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los
unicos herederos del finado Antonio Ventenilla son su esposa
Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon
Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose
Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla,
Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los
difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador,
declarando, ademas que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al
remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de

deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de sus
coherederos, conforme esta mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a,
11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago hecho por la
administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del
testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la Escuela a
Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del
alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al
principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes,
conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declarar en este
auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por
terminada la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la
administradora, y cancelando su fianza.
ASI SE ORDENA.
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person cannot be but
perfunctory.
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner
do not appear ex-facie to be of the same tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and,
what is more, the circumstances attendant to its issuance do not suggest that such was
the intention of the court, for nothing could have been more violative of the will of Mrs.
Hodges.
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the
years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly
claimed that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in
accordance with the last will and testament already probated," there is "no (other)
person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to
be given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an
absolute manner and without regard to the contingent interests of her brothers and
sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally permissible, much
less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that,
legally speaking, the terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, there
are enough circumstances extant in the records of these cases indicating that he had no
such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question,
Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no
descendants and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as
surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even promised that
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 508
"proper accounting will be had — in all these transactions" which he had submitted for
approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his
responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as
appellee:
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by
the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of
Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that
the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62,
divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar
year 1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath,
the said estate as having earned income of P164,201.31, exactly one-
half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual
Statement of Account by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed
thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of
his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual
Statement of Account by the Executor for the year 1960" of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of Mr. C. N.
Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31,
1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined
conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie
Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual evenly between
him and the estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
having earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net

income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-93, id.)
In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven
brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green
ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate unfortunately
omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA).
Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's
name included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the
records "in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think
or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are
interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his
own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years
after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging
exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could
have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at
least, so much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime,
to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his
tax return in the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And assuming
that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the
basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his
recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter
in these proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that under the
peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax
laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of
the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death,
and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then
is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due
time.
It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May
27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the aforementioned statements of account was
the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed the motion of December 26,
1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs.
Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of
the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may
remain at the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall
be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was Hodges'
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 509
lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of
the situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of
Hodges' own understanding thereof.
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1,
1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court
dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made in the above quotation from
respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who verified the motion.
Said allegations read:
1. — That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering
the probate of the will.
2. — That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges were enumerated. However, in the petition as well
as in the testimony of Executor during the hearing, the name Roy
Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was unintentionally omitted
the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon and son
David Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A.
3. — That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased
Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they
were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, it is requested of the Hon. Court to insert the names of Aline
Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the
said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex
2 of Magno's Answer — Record, p. 260)
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of
Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, copies
of which are annexed to respondent Magno's answer, which purportedly contain
Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the
alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation authorities, identified as
Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex
5. In said Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:

2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between
(1) the provisions made in his or her favor by the will and (11) dower,
curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and
electing to take dower, curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing
the return, is any action described under question 1 designed or
contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to
surviving spouse" the following:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts,
taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests
of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and
legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid. (Annex 4,
Answer — Record, p. 263)
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the
United States Estate Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all
right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate, as
shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said
return, a copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and made
a part hereof.
The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby
ratify and confirm, the declaration made in Schedule M of said
return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part
to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the
estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made
to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income
taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 510
Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23,
1957. (Annex 5, Answer — Record, p. 264)
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the
court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the present
proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence in the record nor fail to
note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the circumstances
related to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents,
considering they are supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of
the governments of the United States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen any
possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges' manifest
intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in fact.
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs
of his wife, We find it very hard to believe that Hodges did ask the court and that the
latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be adjudicated
to him without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of her brothers and
sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us
more factual and fairer to assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as
executor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind the following admonition made
by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued
to be conjugal property in the hands of the defendant Lasam. It is
provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made and
this court in construing this provision in connection with section 685 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of
November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the death
of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating
the affairs of the partnership without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs.
Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., 395; De la Rama vs.
De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio
vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476;
Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566;
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case
of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that
court discussed the powers of the surviving spouse in the

administration of the community property. Attention was called to the
fact that the surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal
property after the death of the wife, was a trustee of unique character
who is liable for any fraud committed by him with relation to the
property while he is charged with its administration. In the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as the law stood prior to
Act No. 3176) and the high degree of trust reposed in him stands out
more clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner of a half interest
in his own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to
administer. He could therefore no more acquire a title by prescription
against those for whom he was administering the conjugal estate than
could a guardian against his ward or a judicial administrator against the
heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure,
with relation to prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not
apply ... in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving
husband in the administration and liquidation of the conjugal estate
occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not
permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely
to those for whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of
administration and liquidation. No liquidation was ever made by Lasam
— hence, the conjugal property which came into his possession on the
death of his wife in September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a
continuing and subsisting trust. He should have made a liquidation
immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be permitted to take
advantage of his own wrong. One of the conditions of title by
prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is possession "under
a claim of title exclusive of any other right". For a trustee to make such
a claim would be a manifest fraud.
And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that
Hodges arrogated everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his
wife's brothers and sisters.
PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as
adjudicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing future dispositions made by
Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would necessarily render the said orders
void for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which such
dispositions may be made and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the
probate court may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be
that the said orders should be declared ineffective either way they are understood,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 511
considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as
adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to the surface,
relative to PCIB's observations based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the
supposed irregularity would involve no more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities
of procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties
interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on
account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that none of such parties are
objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance by the trial court of
the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in nor impediment to
Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority contained in said orders. This
solution is definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense
suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will not cause any
prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the
innocent parties who relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent
provisions of the will of said decedent.
Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his
wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items designated in the balance sheet, copy of
which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no copy of
said Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of
the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of considerable real and
other personal kinds of properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to
be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and authority to dispose of
any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death, such
remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there is no pretension,
much less any proof that Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the
contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he had kept them more or less
intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of Hodges, there was no more
estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do
exist which constitute such estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be
closed.
Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the
Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing that she has ever been legally
removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority
from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our resolution of September 8,
1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is
not questioning said respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear

that PCIB has any standing to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a complete
stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges'
death, their conjugal partnership had not yet been liquidated and, inasmuch as the
properties composing the same were thus commingled pro indiviso and, consequently,
the properties pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it is
PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer everything,
and all that respondent Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties
constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and
delivered to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the Testate
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some properties
included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of
Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in the proceedings pending the
establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an ordinary action
should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on
questions of title between the estate of the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party
or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other.
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation
obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim of a third party the basis of which is
alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present cases what gave rise to the
claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the properties of
the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties,
were the orders of the trial court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings
themselves, more specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often
mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the parties is
something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And
since in the ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties herein
involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends on the legal meaning and
effect of said orders, the claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of
the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their
true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not the
estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative of
Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her will?
At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems
confronting the courts and the parties in these cases was the failure of Hodges to
secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death in
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 512
December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her estate
and the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any showing that he ever
exerted any effort towards the early settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand,
there are enough indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact
her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his
death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his
interests in his own half of the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso
with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be
conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain
to his co-heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a
premium for such procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of
his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in question,
which would necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal
partnership, thereby identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time which
properties should be considered as constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the
remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among
themselves.
To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular
party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the protection of the rights of
everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and from this point of view, it
maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no fear of undue
disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6
of Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters of administration should be
granted that the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone
but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the one
assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking both of
these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory
submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties
were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical
that both estates should be administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their
segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted because the
actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the
other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, the
administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty bound to do as
executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly
provides that "The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of
the first testator." It goes without saying that this provision refers also to the
administrator of an executor like PCIB here.

We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it
is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership
of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits that the
liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in
which one it should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of
the husband's estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the
pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just cited.
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the
pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more
importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's will who had, as such, failed
for more than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which was not
difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were no serious
obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs
other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell possible
prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the existence of
any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are now
faced with the pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as
early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All
things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better
served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges
exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the considered
opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both administrators of the
two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each
other.
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's
contention that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs.
Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a certain extent, this contention
is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or
vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because
there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or
(2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article
859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 513
imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone
else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does,
that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition
exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject,
(Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only
when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default
of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857,  id.) and, in the present case, no such
possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges
cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his
inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges,
subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-
law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to
be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over
them6 only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and
absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he
was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his
death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the
right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon
the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence
of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate
then.
Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her
estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges
during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also
during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his
disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself.
The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under
Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving
spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no
surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal
partnership properties may be considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement
as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code 7 should be applied. On the one hand, petitioner
claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her

death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the
principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under
the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more
than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already
explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have
disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand,
respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since
allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in
Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question
of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the
Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which,
according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal
partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further
maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under the will in favor of
his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already
mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly
questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas
provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best,
indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings.
The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the
evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their
respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the
pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us to be adequate
enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. For one
thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of
Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent
Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related issues
which the parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper to mention here. In Justice,
therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first
be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for
the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs.
Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.
To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition
for certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which corresponding laws are
applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for granted either of the
respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter, 8 and regardless also
of whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his
inheritance in any degree, it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 514
submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties
which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or
distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2)
that, more specifically, inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas
applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact, and, considering that the sole
difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to the
supposed legitime of Hodges — it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a
legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all future
purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of
Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the conjugal
estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact,
and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the
laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention
constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further
proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what
might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3)
that Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges
cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to its logical conclusion, there having
been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved;
and (4) that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein.
Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as
already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not
Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in
whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by
the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be the
applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-
fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence of
properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of
the size and extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from reference made thereto by
both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the records on appeal,
and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the more
concrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support of
their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and factual issues. In the
interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further evidence in
relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein
involved. After all, the court a quo  has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is
best for all concerned that it should do so in the first instance.
Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the
remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, it may be mentioned here

that during the deliberations, the point was raised as to whether or not said holding
might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no reliable
evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator
which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view of
the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases should be
returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law provides, it is
premature for Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the
testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of inheritance to which the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the
considered view that, at this stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared
inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner
PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could
in any event be less than that We have fixed above.
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of
Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law.
Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to
be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the
rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge
of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually
ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim
otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs.
Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West Virginia,
on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the
laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of
Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., vol. 2,
1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far
from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must
be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the
requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which
an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract
from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under
the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 515
Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West
Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed."
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of
the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have presented opposing
versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda regarding the matter. And even if
We took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain
provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates
of that case and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous
conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the meantime.
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in
conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois — we note that it
does not affirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony
adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with reference
to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial
judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly executed by
examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited
in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p.
426; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial notice of the
laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so,
he was in our opinion mistaken. That section authorizes the courts here
to take judicial notice, among other things, of the acts of the legislative
department of the United States. These words clearly have reference to
Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to
hold that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the
multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that
any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in
the same section, where it is said that our courts may take judicial
notice of matters of public knowledge "similar" to those therein
enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes
of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are
determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine
courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in
taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such
error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition

does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of
Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because
the assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court
raises no question based on such supposed error. Though the trial
court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in
the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon
application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that
the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general
terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and
personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion
of law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied contain no
reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the
appellant's brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness
of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this
point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign
laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have any controversy or are more or
less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular
case before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the
need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence
on the point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions
of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to be applied,
the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We have fixed
above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it
could be otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show
that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, concedes that
upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the
amount of the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and
respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB may not
now or later pretend differently.
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB
states categorically:
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and
testamentary successions both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 516
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found", while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses
being nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules,
provides that the domiciliary law (in this case Philippine law) governs
the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or
personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case also
Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located in the
Philippines), governs with respect to immovable properties, and
applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by
this Honorable Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R.
No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine
law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will
and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as
well as to immovables situated in the Philippines.
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:
The law governing successional rights.
As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, was an American citizen. There is also no question that she
was a national of the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no
question that she had her domicile of choice in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the above-cited
orders of the lower court, pronouncements which are by now res
adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under

consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the
national law of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of
Texas, as governing succession "both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its
conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or
personal property, while the law of the situs governs with respect to
immovable property. Such that with respect to both movable property,
as well as immovable property situated in the Philippines, the law of
Texas points to the law of the Philippines.
Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and
applied by this Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen" (G.R.
No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine
law governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will and Testament
of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights
to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables
situated in the Philippines.
The subject of successional rights.
Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or
community property of the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and
Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be divided into
two, one-half pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own
property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the
conjugal partnership property immediately pertained to Charles Newton
Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any successional rights.
There can be no question about this.
Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code
provides:
If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he
shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 517
the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely
dispose of the other half.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the
testator was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the
testator died within three months from the time of the
marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the
sole heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate,
except when they have been living as husband and
wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the
legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified
in the preceding paragraph.
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a
fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge,
condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that
in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership property as his own
conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately entitled
to one-half of the half conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane
Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following
appears:
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines
(pp. 19-20, petition). This is now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20,
petition).
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine,
Philippine law governs the successional rights over the properties left
by the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition).
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges
properties pertains to the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21,
petition). This is not questioned by the respondents.

d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
automatically inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of the
Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of his deceased
spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton
Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of the deceased, Linnie
Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp. 23-25,
petition).
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole
ownership of the Hodges properties and the probate court sanctioned
such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact assumed such
ownership and such was the status of the properties as of the time of
his death (pp. 29-34, petition).
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier
part of this option.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas,
there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all
the conjugal properties.
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases
of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result
in that the Philippine laws on succession should control. On that basis, as We have
already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of the
conjugal partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is no legal
impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her
brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the same constitutes
an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be recalled, PCIB's position
that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two
propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament
violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event,
by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had
already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her
estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We have
overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the
application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 518
inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws
of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are
being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or
subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id, p.
65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31,
1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings
hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable
laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided
therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from
Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that
to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies between the
respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible
consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass
of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as
to whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his
own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of
Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such
dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals,
corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties
constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his
motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make
sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include
his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right over his
own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the
will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the
proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be
considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate
which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said
products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to
her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges
must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate
considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not
have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such
dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that
the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the

peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended
also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of
the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of Mrs.
Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and
distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
THE APPEALS
A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief
would readily reveal that all of them are predicated mainly on the contention that
inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all the properties constituting
his wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court
per its order of December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any
estate of Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the
various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in accordance with
law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be
untenable in fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the time
being the two estates should be administered conjointly by the respective administrators
of the two estates, it should follow that said assignments of error have lost their
fundamental reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to
the respective orders in question, if commonly among some of them, which need further
clarification. For instance, some of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone or
without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB further
claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction of
the trial court or that the procedure followed was not in accordance with the rules.
Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with the merits of each of the appeals.
Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled  pro-
indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower court to liquidate the conjugal
partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs.
Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say, without any
qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts
complained of in these appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial
court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling  pro-indiviso of the two estates that
should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator of
the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter should not have authority to
act independently from her. And considering that the lower court failed to adhere
consistently to this basic point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act
independently of each other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of
facts above, the Court has to look into the attendant circumstances of each of the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 519
appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they
may all be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo  to observe
the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to the
substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and undesirable
proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other words,
We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant in
the record, there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox
approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being exercised by
numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in
accordance with the letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the
confusion that might result later from PCIB's continuing to administer all the community
properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of the separate estate of Mrs.
Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the meantime with a relative degree of
regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification
of the injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and
December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely barred from
any participation in the administration of the properties herein involved. In the
September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings
1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that the respective administrators therein "act
conjointly — none of them to act singly and independently of each other for any
purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing or
administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges'
estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position which could
result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other parties concerned.
It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this date, more than a year after said
resolution, the same has not been given due regard, as may be gleaned from the fact
that recently, respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a motion to declare
PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated
motions for reconsideration thereof have all been denied soon after they were filed. 9
Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our
mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the more complicated ones in that order,
without regard to the numerical sequence of the assignments of error in appellant's brief
or to the order of the discussion thereof by counsel.
Assignments of error numbers
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.

These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965
providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred to involving properties in the name of
Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N.
Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on
Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing order, (pp. 276-277,  id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27, 1965
enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash
collections (that) had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should be
withdrawn and since then (sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix Magno — allow the
PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her
possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow
Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in
its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall
have access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized
representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of
transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N.
Hodges", (pp. 292-295,  id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966, denying, among
others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to.
(pp. 455-456, id.)
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the
Court's above-mentioned resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction
previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly, with what We have said the
trial court should have always done pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering,
by this decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide
for joint action by the two administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding out to
have been done and should be done until the two estates are separated from each
other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the foregoing assignments of error
must be, as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 520
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with
expenditures made by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges,
in connection with her administration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of error
Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys fees provided for in
the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs
of Mrs. Hodges.
More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay
paid to six employees of the court and three other persons for services in copying the
court records to enable the lawyers of the administration to be fully informed of all the
incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved as proper legal
expenses of administration per the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222,   id.) and
repeated motions for reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9,
1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277,  id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-
456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV
question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the agreement of June 6,
1964 between Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs
of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R.
Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who
had agreed "to prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in
certain cases now pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo —, more
specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 —" (pp. 126-129,  id.) and directing
Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks maybe needed to
implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the
"administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges — to countersign the said check or checks
as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of which order of approval was
denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456,  id.) Assignment Number LXXVI
imputes error to the lower court's order of October 27, 1965, already referred to above,
insofar as it orders that "PCIB should counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in
favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of Linnie
Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p.
294, id.)
Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that
there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned
expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in effect expenditures from
the estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution above of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way
the remaining issues between the parties in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the
final result will surely be that there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges

of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said appellee had
the right, as such administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to
be paid for her own services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not
collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her credit.
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the
authority to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in the manner she had done in the
agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness of the amount therein
stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the probate court in
determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious
size of the estate in question and the nature of the issues between the parties as well as
the professional standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed upon require
the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to
the estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being
the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels' services would redound to the
benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a premature
distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail.
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs.
Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the interests involved in her estate are
distinct and different from those involved in her estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar
as the matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator
of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is without personality to question
the actuations of the administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of
Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates are
segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement in
question will prejudice any portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should
have a say on the attorney's fees and other expenses of administration assailed by
PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have been duly represented in the agreement
itself by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any
objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these
appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question,
including the attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination and
segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 521
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that
at this stage of the controversy among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the
existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this respect, the interest of
respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain that
it exists, which is naturally common and identical with and inseparable from the interest
of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both
Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact, such
an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both. The possibility of
conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage,
quite remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial
conflict of interest between them arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the
probate court can very well take care of in the course of the independent proceedings in
Case No. 1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We
cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate and the heirs of Mrs.
Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to
the heirs constitutes premature partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a
matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have any interest. In any event,
since, as far as the records show, the estate has no creditors and the corresponding
estate and inheritance taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges,
have already been paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively
small amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection, it may be added that,
although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an administrator is in the
first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final
analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his
conformity thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to
said fees by the probate court is proper.
For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI
should be as they are hereby overruled.
Assignments of error I to IV,
XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of
sale of real properties registered in the name of Hodges but executed by appellee
Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in implementation of
corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously executed by Hodges

during the interim between May 23, 1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962,
the day he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the,
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala, executed on
April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa,
executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on
February 21, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
and the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the contract to
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano
Lucero, executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased,
Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26,
1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between
the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed
on February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title
No. 13815."
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to
the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to have dominion over all her estate during his
lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales
that he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his
death, the implementation of said contracts may be undertaken only by the administrator
of his estate and not by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the
same theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales, in which the
respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by Hodges
before the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis,
Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges
after the death of his wife, those enumerated in the quotation in the immediately
preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention cannot be sustained. As
already explained earlier, 11* all proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 522
made by Hodges after the death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts
of her estate and, therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and
sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds, whether in
cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by
Hodges to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby
belong to him anymore at the time of his death, they automatically became part of the
inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question involve transactions
which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees
should be considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be
distributed and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.
The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the
lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At first blush, it would appear that as to
them, PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility. Considering, however, that the
adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous repercussions and would
bring about considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued
already in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is
inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation involving them by
overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which would
not, after all, detract materially from what should substantially correspond to each and all
of the parties concerned.
To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved;
as much as possible, they should not be made to suffer any prejudice on account of
judicial controversies not of their own making. What is more, the transactions they rely
on were submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from already known
and recorded actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had
authority to act on their motions, since appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to
their transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one of
the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question were
executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had previously authorized
or otherwise sanctioned expressly many of her act as administratrix involving
expenditures from the estate made by her either conjointly with or independently from
PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-
appellees merely followed precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly,
unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly
fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are
equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if

it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only one-fourth of the conjugal
properties of the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact, one-half of
her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In
none of its numerous, varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has
PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any conflict with
the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds of sale
executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those corresponding to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have been actually under her control and
administration had Hodges complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership.
Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by
the appealed orders referred to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who
could, therefore, have the requisite interest to question them would be only the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death of
his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of the will of his wife, he did not have to
submit those contracts to the court nor follow the provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4,
5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple
reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May
27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court
"to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had
been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which according to the
motion on which the court acted was "of buying and selling personal and real
properties", and "to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of
the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the
wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In
other words, if Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do
so by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the legality of such
grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for its main
contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted as heir-
adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders would still suffice.
As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which
the deeds in question were based were executed by Hodges before or after the death of
his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons already stated, that the properties covered
by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the estate of
Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court
may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not
objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in nature, all things
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 523
considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights already created in favor of
innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned orders are not disturbed.
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of
error under discussion.
Assignments of error V to VIII,
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the
respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms and conditions embodied in the
deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed that
some of them never made full payments in accordance with the respective contracts to
sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral
and Salvador S. Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally
cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view
of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is again
premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in question could
not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above that, it being
evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the
properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
to avoid unnecessary legal complications, it can be assumed that said properties form
part of such estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions,
whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations
made by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and,
whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate were
strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the
persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government because of the still
unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections were
raised by said parties or that they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of
PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.
Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.
PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are
fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to
contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as

administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of the right
to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court
"arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate court, the power to determine the
contending claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real property," since
it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective
contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned were
complied with by the latter. What is worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has
taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative of
the issue".
Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's
having agreed to ignore the cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the buyers-
appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive. Since We have already
held that the properties covered by the contracts in question should be deemed to be
portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a
complete stranger in these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs.
Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in interest having the right to oppose the
consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones who
are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under
discussion have no basis and must accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.
With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court
requiring PCIB to surrender the respective owner's duplicate certificates of title over the
properties covered by the sales in question and otherwise directing the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of title in
favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion,
the trial court was within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give
way, by withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding registration
of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.
Assignments of error LXII to LXVII
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring
appellee Western Institute of Technology. As will be recalled, said institute is one of the
buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell executed by Hodges prior to the
death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the total amount of
P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence it
received under date of October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection,
separately and respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective
capacities as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 524
in the case of PCIB it made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except
by paying all your past due account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would
"appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring this account up-to-date
and to reduce the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On
November 3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and
willing to pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but uncertain whether it
should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount
with the court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting
on this motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted in
the narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both or either of the two
administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant — can pay to both estates or either
of them", considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is
as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are
entitled thereto."
The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From
the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not served with a copy of the
Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered and resolved on November
23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what
the order grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive
aspect, it is contended that the matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of
the probate court and that the order authorized payment to a person other than the
administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.
The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must
assume, absent any clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly
by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other hand, there is nothing
irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three days after the date set for
hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that appellants' motion for
reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was denied by the trial court on March
7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief granted is
not within the general intent of the Institute's motion.
Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that
they are mere reiterations of contentions We have already resolved above adversely to
appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the
propriety of not disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in all
these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey
property executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being
implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that Section 8 of

Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be taken up in a separate
action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales herein
involved, the interested parties are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is
properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant
to the provisions of the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed automatic
rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of
herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the said
contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they
amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral accepted "promises
to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) thepactum
commissorium or the automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of
public policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller
(10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been made in
connection with the transactions herein involved.
Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
Number LXII to LXVII.
SUMMARY
Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein
taken up and resolved are rather numerous and varied, what with appellant making
seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the
court a quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and extent of our
rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole
situation be made together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal
aspects. .
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as
that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a
half. In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of
them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to
have and to hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the
condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of
what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to
the brothers and sisters of the latter.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 525
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was
appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date,
he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged,
(buying and selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been
doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs.
Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as
Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part owner
of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED.
The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances,
leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of
account of his administration, with the particularity that in all his motions, he always
made it point to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines of the time and
place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with the last will and testament
already probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until
December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her
share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to have and to
hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my
said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided
among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision naturally made it
imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest,
residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death,
may be readily known and identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The
record gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it appears
therein:
1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth
of C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges
repeatedly and consistently reported the combined income of the
conjugal partnership and then merely divided the same equally

between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more
importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate
income tax returns for each calendar year for each resulting half of
such combined income, thus reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
had its own income distinct from his own.
2. That when the court a quo  happened to inadvertently omit in its
order probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her
brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost no time in
asking for the proper correction "in order that the heirs of deceased
Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they
were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges".
3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he
expressly stated that "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no
descendants or ascendants except brothers and sisters and herein
petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's
brothers and sisters from the inheritance.
4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the
United States inheritance tax authorities indicating that he had
renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs,
which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an alleged
affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and in which
he even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming and
renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his)
estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income
which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", his wife, since
her death.
On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of
herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court
as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings
No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the
latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault
or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost,
damaged or go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of
December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 526
1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and
when Special Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was
opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-
Administrator of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno
and Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with
each administrator acting together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB
used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in transactions
it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for approval as their joint
acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen,
for which reason, each of them began acting later on separately and independently of
each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers
whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate
independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearing in the
name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion
of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether or not in fact
any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership pertaining
to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures,
hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and
dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption
that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All of these independent and
separate actuations of the two administrators were invariably approved by the trial court
upon submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was
more cognizant than anyone else about the ins and outs of the businesses and
properties of the deceased spouses because of her long and intimate association with
them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator
separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present judicial
controversies came about.
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as
well as the approval by the court a quo  of the annual statements of account of Hodges,
PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed
with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, and
that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer
and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate
left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a petition
for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders allowing respondent
Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set

aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her
brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary
substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance
with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be enforced.
It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both
residents of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in Aznar vs. Garcia, or
the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more
than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she
was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and
872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary injunction against Magno and
allowed PCIB to act alone.
At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving
individual acts of appellee Magno in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of
administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-
appellees covering properties which are still registered in the name of Hodges,
purportedly pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said
orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or
indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the two
estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of
May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary
rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the court's general sanction
of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course of
administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given
by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of
her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing directly to her
brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, she claims that
the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges,
there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her
share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She further maintains that, in
any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his inheritance from his
wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters effective
at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized,
We overrule PCIB's contention that the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957
amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We recognize the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 527
present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties, which, while
registered in that name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share
of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent
provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and undisposed of by her
husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters share and share
alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not
warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final
adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a
conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had
not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made.
Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate
would be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of
portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted
under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third parties, inasmuch
as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the
record, and on the assumption that Hodges' purported renunciation should not be
upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one-
fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever
Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957,
when she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to
remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds thereof,
whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's
estate, unless it can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of
Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact,
and considering the respective positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it
can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free
portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of
her will may not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the
difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges,
PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-
fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is
none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent
proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any
consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate
of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party

related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other
controverted fact, create estoppel.
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in
favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But
neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a
lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted
her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that
the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his
lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof at the time
of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of default
of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them.
Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the
provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs,
whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the operative
contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the
institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited
by law.
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and
sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the
proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and
the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by
Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively
renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining
and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to
make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance
by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such
further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is
beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could
not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole
share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during
his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested
administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as
of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have
been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then,
for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil
Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 528
such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already
the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in
predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an
estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and sisters and that
respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted correctly and
within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be
denied. The Court feels however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
and the determination of the specific properties constituting her estate, the two
administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of September 8,
1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.
Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee
Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious
that, with Our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons
stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the
assumption We find justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by
appellant PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that should correspond to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and administration
expenses in question.
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee
Magno, as administratrix, covering properties registered in the name of Hodges, the
details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must be made between those
predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, on the
one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death.
As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees
constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as
may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said
payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in
the relevant provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size and value of the
properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of all
the properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said properties
may be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing
that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone, including the
government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of
a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the assailed orders should be
affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise
the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 529

that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the government has objected to any of the and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672,
orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there exists no reason for said orders to whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by
be set aside. petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by
the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator 12; and this
DISPOSITIVE PART arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and
renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions
DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. that may result from the said resolution.
Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after
payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to
enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.
as administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final judgment is
ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one
the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal additional appeal docket fees, but this decision shall nevertheless become final as to
issue of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective notices to them
his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one- hereof in accordance with the rules.
fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the
wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to
remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's
estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and
second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no
deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence, the
preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6,
1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-
appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in
Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings
1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as
such administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall
continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of their respective
estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should
immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses,
to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly
identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-
fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or
delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307,
while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said respondent

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,  Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011
of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)"
based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file
the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where
he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 530
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation
to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of
the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-

11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements
may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the
view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file
the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground
of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was therefore
entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty
parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would
be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and
therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others)
to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 531
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held that the "trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court
should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In
its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court
reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki
as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety
of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the
Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled
that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x
x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to
dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping
of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same
provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters
of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x
x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy.
In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially
if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse"
who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always
be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or
a particular fact." 37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case
the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 532
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The Japanese Family
Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore
be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing
a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive
for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara also denied that he inflicted
any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no
reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the

rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment
of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule
of lex nationalii  in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 533
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment  as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of
the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence
of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts
are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment
is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external
to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency
and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have
a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." 67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree
of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of
the marriage.71
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 534
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse
to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband
or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled
that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most
of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest,
the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry
of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite  of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 535
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or
her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 536

and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute Decision.
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign SO ORDERED.
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without

prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the
crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago."
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 537

Republic of the Philippines 6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that
SUPREME COURT by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando
Manila on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A
copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex ‘D’ and made
FIRST DIVISION an integral part hereof.

G.R. No. 195432               August 27, 2014 7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December
2005. A copy of the JapaneseFamily Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the
EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,  divorce he obtained and his remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by
vs. the Consulate-General of Japan and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent. is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an integral part hereof.

DECISION 8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to
indicate her surname withher husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at
SERENO, CJ: the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until
she can prove bycompetent court decision that her marriage with her said
husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
nullification of the Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (R TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45, 1 City of San Fernando, Pampanga, xxxx
in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.
12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her said husband
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE Masatomi Y. Ando musttherefore be honored, considered and declared valid,
until otherwise declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then,
petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a
The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:
Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’ Hence, this
petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. 2
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese
National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which
Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A' and made an integral
was later raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs
part hereof.
(DFA) as respondent and prayed for the following reliefs before the lower court:

4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly

WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after
granted under Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with
proper proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-
General of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part hereof. 5. Said Divorce (a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina T.
Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A Ando and her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a
copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ competent court;
and made an integral part hereof.

(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under
the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and
(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s marriage to
her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner
under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol".
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.3
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and action,
as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to Masatomi Y.
Ando, herein petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in
Candaba, Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was obtained
and granted in Japan, with respect to the their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that
petitioner herein complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code –
that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our
country.
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner does not
have any causeof action and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. In the same vein, though there is other adequate remedy available to the
petitioner, such remedy is however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to
act upon and grant, as it isonly the family court which is vested with such authority and
jurisdiction.4
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated 15 November 2010. In anOrder dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted
the motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in
her petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the
Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the interest ofsubstantial justice, the
Order of the Court dated November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of Court
for proper endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction for appropriateaction
and/or disposition.5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 538
January 2011, the trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner
had no cause of action. The Order reads thus:
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is
already her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family
Codeconsidering that the first one, though allegedly terminated by virtue of the divorce
obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is
considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando
cannot be honored and considered asvalid at this time.
Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact that
no judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does not make
the same valid because such declaration under Article 40 ofthe Family Code is
applicable onlyin case of re-marriage. More importantly, the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to make a marriage valid.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative. 6
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8
February2011, considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) nor
respondent was furnished with copies of the motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole issue
of whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the
wife or the husband who can file a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to filea direct petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with even more reason can it not
collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further,
petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even one that is void or voidable –
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of
divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a
mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license. Any irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage, such as with respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the

legality of the marriage. Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for a petition for
declaratory relief have been complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration to
the OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had yet to
issue a summons to respondent; thus, it had yet to acquire jurisdiction over them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter
raised the following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the juratin the
Verification thereof only stated that the affiant had exhibited "her currentand valid proof
of identity," which proof was not properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition
by a Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before
a Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal effects of remarriage; (3)
petitioner failed to show that she had first exhausted all available administrative
remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act No. (R.A.)
8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action
of declaratory relief; and (4) petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was
a mere scrap of paper and did not toll the running of the period to appeal. Hence, the
RTC Order dated 14 January 2011 is now final.
On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the issues
raised therein.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner
incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first
appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was
toquestion the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s
name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted
on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional documentary requirements before
a married woman may obtain a passport under the name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be
made inaccordance with the following provisions:
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 539
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of
her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the
original or certifiedtrue copy of her marriage contract, and one photocopy
thereof.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a
foreigner, shall be required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance
and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport
for the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true
copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the
Court Order effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must
present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the
Philippine Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over the place where
the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular
mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shari’ah
Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband, the applicant must present the original or certified true copy of the Death
Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shari’ah
Court, in which case the applicant may choose to continue to use her husband’s
surname or resume the use of her maiden surname. From the above provisions, it is
clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she
needed to present were the following: (1) the original or certified true copyof her
marriage contract and one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a
Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has
jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign
diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine
passport under her second husband’s name.1âwphi1 Should her application for a
passport be denied, the remedies available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A.
8239, which reads thus:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 540

Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an
Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the action instituted in the proper forum.
right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review
may be had to the Courts in due course. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse
to the proper remedies available.
The IRR further provides in detail:
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 10
Appeal

In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or
restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the
Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.

Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the
denial of her application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A.
8239. Petitioner’s argument that her application "cannot be said to havebeen either
denied, cancelled or restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved party
entitled to appeal",7 as instead she "was merely told" 8 that her passport cannot be
issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event
of the denial of her application.

Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid,
petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign
divorce from her first husband.

In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be

recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact. 10

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,11 we are still unable to grant the
prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or
evidence presented on record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi,
and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law. 12 Hence, any declaration
as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77085 April 26, 1989
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION (PISC), GEORGE LIM,
MARCOS BAUTISTA, CARLOS LAUDE, TAN SING LIM, ANTONIO LIU LAO, ONG
TEH, PHILIPPINE CONSORTIUM CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PACIFIC
MILLS, INC., and UNIVERSAL STEEL SMELTING CO., INC., petitioners,  Defendants Philippine Construction Consortium Corporation, Pacific
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, as Judge presiding
Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, INTERPOOL, LTD. and
SHERIFF NORBERTO V. DOBLADA JR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
The subject of the present Petition is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12
December 1986, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10614. The appellate court upheld the Order of
Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granting the issuance of a writ of
execution, in Civil Case No. Q-39927.
The undisputed facts are stated in the appealed decision:
Plaintiff [respondent Interpool, Ltd.] is a foreign corporation, duly
organized and existing under the laws of Bahamas Islands with office
and business address at 630, 3rd Avenue, New York, New York, and
not licensed to do, and not doing business, in the Philippines.
Defendants Philippine International Shipping Corporation, Philippine
Construction Consortium Corporation, Pacific Mills Inc., and Universal
Steel Smelting Company, Inc., are corporations duly organized and
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 541
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. The other
defendants, George Lim Marcos Bautista, Carlos Laude, Tan Sing Lim,
Antonio Liu Lao and Ong Teh are Philippine residents.
In 1979 to 1981, the defendant, Philippine International Shipping
Corporation (PISC) leased from the plaintiff and its wholly owned
subsidiary, the Container Trading Corporation, several containers
pursuant to the Membership Agreement and Hiring Conditions (Exhibit
B) 1 and the Master Equipment Leasing Agreement (Exhibit C ), 2 both
dated June 8, 1979.
Mills Inc. and Universal Steel Smelting Company, guaranteed to pay
(sic) all monies due, or to become due, to the plaintiff from (PISC) and
any liability of the latter arising out of the leasing or purchasing of
equipment from the plaintiff or any of its subsidiaries, affiliates and/or
agents of I.S.C. dry cargo containers and/or chassis, including but not
limited, to per diem leasing charges, damages protection plan charges,
damages charge and/or replacement costs of constructively and/or
totally lost containers as well as handling and drop-off charges (Exhibit
J). 3
The other defendants, namely: 1) George Lim; 2) Marcos Bautista; 3)
Carlos Laude 4) Tan Sing Lim; 5) Antonio Liu Lao and 6) Ong Teh,
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed to pay (sic) plaintiff all
payments due to it under the Master Equipment Leasing Agreement
(Exhibit C) and Membership Agreement and Hiring Conditions (Exhibit
B) dated June 8, 1979, in the amounts at the time and in the manner
set out in the said agreements and to indemnify plaintiff against all
claims, liabilities, costs, damages and expenses (including legal fees)
suffered or incurred by plaintiff, arising out of or in connection with any
failure by defendant Philippine International Shipping Corporation to
perform any of its obligations under the aforesaid Agreements (Exhibit
D, E, F, G, H, and I). 4
In 1979 to 1981, defendant Philippine International Shipping
Corporation incurred outstanding and unpaid obligations with the
plaintiff, in the amount of $94,456.28, representing unpaid per diems,
drop-off charges, interest and other agreed charges.

The plaintiff sent letters to the defendants (Exhibit K, L, M, N 0, P, Q, R,
S and T ), 5 demanding payment of their outstanding and unpaid
obligations, but to no avail, so plaintiff was constrained to file a case
against the principal defendant, (PISC) before the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York, which was docketed as 83 Civil
290 (EW) Plaintiff obtained a Default Judgment on July 3, 1983 against
(PISC) ordering it to pay the plaintiff the sum of $80,779.33, as
liquidated damages, together with interest in the amount of $13,676.95
and costs in the amount of $80.00. or for a total judgment of
$94,456.28 (Exhibit A). 6
Because of the unjustifiable failure and refusal of PISC and its
guarantors to jointly and severally pay their obligations to the plaintiff,
the latter filed on November 16, 1983 a complaint [docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-39927, Branch 93, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City]
(Annex A) 7 to enforce the default judgment of the U.S. District Court
against the defendant PISC and also to enforce the individually
executed Continuing Guaranties of the other defendants (Annexes D,
E, F, G, H, I, and J of the Complaint).
The defendants (herein petitioners) were duly summoned, but they
failed to answer the complaint. On motion of the plaintiff, they were
declared in default 8 and the plaintiff (herein private respondent) was
allowed to present its evidence ex parte.
On April 11, 1985 the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff,  9 the
dispositive part reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, ordering:
1) The defendant, Philippine International Shipping Corporation, and
the defendants-Guarantors, to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the
liquidated amount of $80,779.33, together with interest in the amount of
$13,676.95 and costs in the amount of $80.00 or a total of $94,456.28,
pursuant to the Default Judgment rendered by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York, or in the Philippine
currency equivalent of the aforesaid amount of $94,456.28, computed
at the time of payment, with interest for late payment at the rate of 18%
per annum from July 4, 1983, until fully paid;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 542
2) The defendant, Philippine International Shipping Corporation, and
the defendants-Guarantors, to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum
equivalent to twenty (20%) percent of the total amount due from the
defendants by way of attorney's fees; and
3) To pay the costs.
On May 17, 1985, the defendants appealed the decision to this
Appellate Court (AC-G.R. UDK No. 7383) which dismissed the appeal
on November 13, 1985 for failure of the appellants to pay the docketing
fee despite their receipt of the notice to do so on August 26,
1985. 10 Entry of that final resolution was made on December 6,1985.
In view of the finality of the decision, the plaintiff filed on July 23, 1986
a motion for execution and for appointment of a special sheriff to
enforce it. 11
Over the defendants' opposition, the trial court issued an order of
execution on October 15, 1986 and appointed Norberto V. Doblado, Jr.,
of the office of the Makati Sheriff, as special sheriff for the purpose
(Annex D). 12
On 20 November 1986, petitioners (defendants below) filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition to Annul Judgment (docketed as C.A.-GR SP No. 10614) 13directed at the 15
October 1986 Order of the Regional Trial Court. On 12 December 1986, the appellate
court rendered a Decision 14 denying that petition for lack of merit. A Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.15
In the instant Petition for Review, filed with this Court on 27 February 1987, petitioners
allege that both the Default Judgment rendered by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of New York, in 83 Civil 290 (EW), and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-39927, are null and void essentially on jurisdictional
grounds. In the first instance, petitioners contend that the U.S. District Court never
acquired jurisdiction over their persons as they had not been served with summons and
a copy of the Complaint in 83 Civil 290 (EW). In the second instance, petitioners contend
that such jurisdictional ty effectively prevented the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
from taking cognizance of the Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-39927 and from enforcing
the U.S. District Court's Default Judgment against them. Petitioners contend, finally, that
assuming the validity of the disputed Default Judgment, the same may be enforced only

against petitioner Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC) the other nine (9)
petitioners not having been impleaded originally in the case filed in New York, U.S.A.
The Petition must fail.
1. To begin with, the evidence of record clearly shows that the U.S.
District Court had validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner (PISC)
under the procedural law applicable in that forum i.e., the U.S. Federal
Rules on Civil Procedure. Copies of the Summons and Complaint 16 in
83 Civil 290 (EW) which were in fact attached to the Petition for Review
filed with this Court, were stamped "Received, 18 Jan 1983, PISC
Manila."  indicating that service thereof had been made upon and
acknowledged by the (PISC) office in Manila on, 18 January 1983, and
that (PISC) had actual notice  of such Complaint and Summons.
Moreover, copies of said Summons and Complaint had likewise been
served upon Prentice-Hall Corporation System, Inc. (New York),
petitioner PISCs agent, expressly designated by it in the Master
Equipment Leasing Agreement with respondent Interpool. "for the
purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New
York, USA with respect to any claim or controversy arising out of or
relating to directly or indirectly, this Lease." 17 The record also shows
that petitioner PISC, without, however, assailing the jurisdiction of the
U.S. District Court over the person of petitioner, had filed a Motion to
Dismiss 18 the Complaint in 83 Civil 290 (EW) which Motion was
denied. All of the foregoing matters, which were stated specifically in
the U.S. District Court's disputed Default Judgement, 19 have not been
disproven or otherwise overcome by petitioners, whose bare and
unsubstantiated allegations cannot prevail over clear and convincing
evidence of record to the contrary.
That foreign judgment-which had become final and executory, no appeal having been
taken therefrom and perfected by petitioner PISC-is thus "presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties [i.e., PISC and Interpool] and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title." 20 We note, further that there has been in this case no showing by
petitioners that the Default Judgment rendered by the U.S. District Court in 83 Civil 290
(EW) was vitiated by "want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. " 21 In other words, the Default Judgment imposing upon petitioner PISC a
liability of U.S.$94,456.28 in favor of respondent Interpool, is valid and may be enforced
in this jurisdiction.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 543
2. The existence of liability (i.e., in the amount of U.S.$94,456.28) on
the part of petitioner PISC having been duly established in the U.S.
case, it was not improper for respondent Interpool, in seeking
enforcement in this jurisdiction of the foreign judgment imposing such
liability, to have included the other nine (9) petitioners herein (i.e.,
George Lim, Marcos Bautista, Carlos Laude,Tan Sing Lim, Antonio Liu
Lao, Ong Teh Philippine Consortium Construction Corporation, Pacific
Mills, Inc. and Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc.) as defendants in Civil
Case No. Q- 39927, filed with Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. With respect to the latter, Section 6, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court expressly provides:
Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in
these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action;  but the court
may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection
with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. (Emphasis
supplied)
The record shows that said nine (9) petitioners had executed continuing guarantees" to
secure performance by petitioner PISC of its contractual obligations, under the
Membership Agreement and Hiring Conditions and Master Equipment Leasing
Agreement with respondent Interpool. As guarantors, they had held themselves out as
liable. "whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative," to respondent Interpool under
their separate "continuing guarantees" executed in the Philippines, for any breach of
those Agreements on the part of (PISC) The liability of the nine (9) other petitioners was,
in other words, not based upon the Membership Agreement and the Master Equipment
Leasing Agreement to which they were not parties. The New York award of U.S.
$94,456.28 is precisely premised upon a breach by PISC of its own obligations under
those Agreements. We, therefore, consider the nine (9) other petitioners as persons 44
against whom [a] right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions [has been] alleged to exist." as contemplated in the Rule quoted
above and, consequently, properly impleaded as defendants in Civil Case No. Q-39927.
There was, in other words, no need at all, in order that Civil Case No. Q-39927 would
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 544

prosper, for respondent Interpool to have first impleaded the nine (9) other petitioners in
the New York case and there obtain judgment against all ten (10) petitioners.

3. Petitioners' argument of lack or absence of jurisdiction on the part of

the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, on the alleged ground of non-
service of notice or summons in Civil Case No. Q-39927, does not
persuade. But we do not need to address this specific argument. For
even assuming (though merely arguendo) that none of the ten (10)
petitioner herein had been served with notice or summons below, the
record shows, however, that they did in fact file with the Regional Trial
Court a Motion for Extension of Time to file Answer 22 (dated 9
December 1983) as well as Motion for Bill of Particulars 23 (dated 15
December 1983), both addressing respondent Interpool's .Complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-39927. In those pleadings, petitioners not only
manifested their intention to controvert the allegations in the Complaint,
but they neither questioned nor assailed the jurisdiction of the trial
court, either over the case filed against them or over their individual
persons, as defendants therein. There was here, in effect, voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the Quezon City trial court by
petitioners, who are thereby estopped from asserting otherwise before
this Court. 24

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is DENIED and the Decision dated 12
December 1986 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 10614, is hereby
AFFIRMED. This Resolution is immediately executory. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 545

Republic of the Philippines It appears that for more than twelve years the plaintiff and defendant have been wholly
SUPREME COURT estranged and living apart. During this period each has attempted to convict the other of
Manila infidelity; but the prosecution instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff for adultery
and the later prosecution for concubinage instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant
EN BANC were both unsuccessful.

G.R. No. L-25577             March 3, 1927 While the question of the defendant's civil liability for the support claimed by the plaintiff
was still undetermined, the defendant sought refuge in the State of Nevada; and, on
AFIFE ABDO CHEYBAN GORAYEB, plaintiff-appellee,  December 1, 1924, there obtained a decree of divorce from the plaintiff in the court of
vs. the Second Judicial District of the State of Nevada. He then returned to the Philippine
NADJIB TANNUS HASHIM, defendant and appellant. Islands, and on October 20, 1925, the plaintiff filed a motion in civil case No. 19115,
alleging that the defendant had failed to pay the pension of P500 per month, which had
C. A. Sobral for appellant. been awarded to her in the decision of December 24, 1923, and praying that he be
Gibbs and McDonough for appellee. adjudged to be in contempt of court and that he be fined and sentenced to imprisonment
for six months and until he should comply with the order. In response to this motion the
defendant pleaded the decree of divorce obtained by him from the Nevada court,
STREET, J.:
claiming that said decree had the effect of dissolving the bonds of matrimony between
himself and the plaintiff and of relieving him from all liability to pay the persion claimed.
This appeal is an incident arising out of civil case No. 19115 instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Manila on November 12, 1920, wherein the plaintiff, Afife Abdo
Upon hearing the cause the trial court found that, while, as a matter of fact, the
Cheyban Gorayeb ,has obtained a judgment requiring the defendant (who is also her
defendant was in arrears in the payment of the pension, nevertheless the defense
husband) Nadjib Tannus Hashim, to pay to her a monthly stipend by way of support. In
asserted by him had been put forth in good faith. His Honor therefore absolved the
connection with the institution of said action the plaintiff procured an order requiring the
defendant from the contempt charge, with costs de oficio. At the same time it was
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 per month as alimony,   pendente lite.
declared that the civil obligation created by the previous orders of the court remained in
Vigorous efforts were made by the defendant to precure the abrogation of this order not
full force and effect, notwithstanding the decree of divorce upon which the defendant
only in the court of origin but in this court by writ of certiorari; but these efforts was
relied, and he was ordered to continue the payment of the pension at the reduced rate of
unsuccessful.1 Upon finally hearing the cause upon its merits, the Honorable Vicente
P100 per month. From so much of this order as declares the defendant civilly liable for
Nepomuceno, presiding in the court of First Instance, under date of December 24, 1923,
the pension claimed by the plaintiff the defendant appealed, and it is this appeal that is
awarded the plaintiff permanent alimony at the rate of P500 per month, beginning
now before us.
November 12, 1920, the date of the filing of the complaint. This judgment was
subsequent affirmed by this court upon appeal. 2 On January 23, 1926, the lower court,
after due hearing, reduced the rate of alimony to P100, at which amount it now stands. The only question necessary to be here considered relates to the civil liability of the
defendant for the monthly stipend which has been judicially awarded to the plaintiff and
the amount of said liability, supposing the obligation still to subsist. Upon the first point
Meanwhile, the plaintiff had caused execution to issue against the defendant to enforce
the trial court held that the obligation of the defendant to pay the stipend had the opinion
the payment of the provisional allowance of P1,000 per month, and various valuable
that this conclusion is correct. There can be no other reasonable inference drawn from
properties belonging to the defendant were sold under execution for the amount of
the defendant's acts than that the procuring of the divorce in Nevada was a mere device
P34,000. After judgment had become final under the order of December 24, 1923, still
on the part of the defendant to rid himself of the obligation created by the judgment of
another property belonging to the defendant was sold under execution for the sum of
the Philippine court and that his temporary sojourn in the State of Nevada was a mere
P6,710. The proceeds of these sales were paid in due course to the plaintiff.
ruse unaccompanied by any genuine intention his part to acquire a legal domicile in that

State. This being true, the divorce granted by the Nevada court cannot be recognized by
the courts of this country.
In Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855), this court held, in conformity with the rule declared
by the Supreme Court of the United States, that the court of a country in which neither of
the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status;
and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The
voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court
with jurisdiction. In the same case this court went on to say: "It follows that, to give a
court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the
judicial forum, his residence must be  bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile
and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no
intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
courts of that State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not
recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile. (14 Cyc., 817, 818).
From this it will be seen that a divorce granted in one State may be called in question in
the courts of another and its validity determined upon the evidence relating to domicile of
the parties to the divorce. This undoubtedly involves a collateral attack upon the decree
of divorce; but, as has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, it is now
too late to deny the right collaterally to impeach a decree of divorce in the courts of
another State by proof that the court granting the divorce had no jurisdiction, even
though the record purports to show jurisdiction and the appearance of the parties
(German Savings and Loan Society vs. Dormitzer, 192, U.S., 125).
The rule above referred to has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to
prevail in the courts of the various States of the American Union, not withstanding the
existence of the constitutional provision requiring the courts of every State to give full
faith and credit to judgments obtained in other States. There is no similar constitutional
provision in force in these Islands, but, under section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the judicial records of the courts of the United States and of the several states and
Territories of the United States have the same force in the Philippine Islands as in the
place where the judgment was obtained. But there is nothing in this provision that would
require the courts of this country to give any greater consideration to the judgment of the
court of an American State than is conceded to it in other States and districts of the
United States, in conformity with the doctrine sustained by the Supreme Court of the
United States and upheld in the courts of those States where the marriage tie is best
guarded.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 546
In the application of the rule above stated the circumstance that the parties to the
present action contracted marriage in Syria, instead of the Philippine Islands, is not
material to the case. The fact that they contracted marriage lawfully, wherever the act
may have been accomplished, created the status of married persons between them; and
the question with which we are here concerned is not as to the marriage, but as to the
divorce conceded to the defendant in the State of Nevada.
Section 309 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, declaring that a judgment obtained in an
American court shall have the same effect in the Philippine Islands as in the place where
such judgment was obtained, contains a qualification expressed in the following words:
"except that it can only be enforce here by an action or special proceeding." Upon this
provision the attorneys for the plaintiff plant a proposition to the effect that a Philippine
court cannot recognized the decree of divorce granted by the Nevada court upon the
mere exemplification of a certified copy of the decree; and it is insisted that, in order to
get the benefit of said decree, it is necessary for the defendant to institute an
independent action or special proceeding in one of our courts for the purpose of
obtaining a judicial ratification of the decree of divorce. But it will be remembered that
the defendant pleaded the decree of divorce by way of defense in his answer; and if the
decree of divorce had been such as to have entitled it to recognition here, the defendant
could in our opinion have obtained the benefit of it in this action. The provision in
question no doubt contemplates primarily the situation where affirmative action has to be
taken in the Philippine Islands to give effect to the foreign judgment as where the plaintiff
desires to obtain execution upon property in these Islands to satisty a judgment obtained
abroad. But a decree of divorce operates on the marriage status; and if effective at all, it
dissolves the marriage tie, without the necessity of any affirmative proceeding in any
other court. At any rate, all that was intended to be secured by the provision requiring an
action or proceeding here was that the courts of this country should have an opportunity
to pass judicially upon the efficacy of the judgment. This purpose is accomplished as
well where the foreign judgment is relied upon in an answer and duly proved, as where
the original action is actually brought by the holder of the judgment. It could not have
been intended by the authors of section 309 that the holder of the foreign judgment must
be deprived of the benefit of it merely because he happens to be defendant rather than
plaintiff in an action brought in our courts.
From what has been said it follows that the objections interposed by the plaintiff to the
manner in which the defendant seeks to avail himself of his alleged decree of divorce
are not well taken; but for reasons already stated, the decree itself is of no force in this
jurisdiction. It supplies therefore no justification for the defendant's failure to pay alimony.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 547

But it is said that, even conceding that the defendant is technically liable for alimony, he
should nevertheless be relieved from the order requiring him to pay alimony, in view of
the fact that the plaintiff has been overpaid upon account of alimony. In this connection
reliance is placed upon the supposed retroactive effect of the order of December 24,
1923, fixing the plaintiff's stipend definitely at P500 per month, while the original order
granting alimony,  pendente lite, was at the rate of P1,000 per month; and, as will be
remembered, judgment was executed at that rate for an amount much in excess of what
have been obtained if the rate of P500 per month had been allowed from the beginning.
It is insisted that the plaintiff should be required to refund this excess or at least that it
should be considered an equitable set-off against the claim for present alimony.
maintain respectable existence. In the case before use the amount accruing to the
plaintiff is only P100 per month, which is an exceedingly modest amount, considered
from any point of view.
It results that we find no error whatever in the appealed judgment, either as regards the
liability of the defendant for alimony or its amount.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs
against the appellant.

It is true that the original order granting alimony at the rate of P1,000 per month was of a
provisional character, and the final order fixing the alimony at P500 per month was given
retroactive effect to the beginning of the litigation. At first blush, therefore, the facts
appear to supply an equitable consideration in favor of the defendant as regards his
alimony account; but upon examining the situation more minutely, it will be found that
the case is not precisely such as it appears to on the surface. It is true that the plaintiff
secured execution of the order for alimony in an amount in excess of what she finally
became entitled to upon alimony account, but it is nevertherless true that the property
thus acquired by the plaintiff was made subject in her hands to the preexisting debts
properly chargeable against the conjugal partnership; and litigation already determined
in this court, or now pending before it, shows that the plaintiff has already lost, or is in a
way to lose, a great part, if not all, of the property so secured upon execution .
Furthermore, it is evident that she has not yet received in cash the amount actually due
her for alimony. It is therefore evident that there is nothing in the supposed over
execution of the claim for alimony which raises any equitable consideration in the
defendant's favor.

In addition to this, it must be remembered that alimony is an allowance for support and is
fixed with a view to enable the party entitled thereto to confront obligations for current
necessities. The demands of to-day and tomorrow cannot always be satisfactorily met
from the resources of yesterday, and it seems inconsistent with the very nature of the
obligation to offset against claims for current alimony sums of money that have been
improperly taken under previous orders. It has accordingly been held by American
courts that excessive payments made under valid, though erroneous, prior orders
cannot be offset against claims for current alimony (19 C. J., p. 226; Lishey vs. Lishey, 6
Lea [Tenn.], 418; Johnson vs. Johnson [Tenn. Ch. A.], 49 S. W., 305). Spanish
jurisprudence appears to confirm this view (6 Manresa, Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, p.
80; 20 Jur. Civ., Recurcos y Competencias, p. 566). This doctrine would seem to be
applicable with full force so far as regards the right to the amount strictly necessary to

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22470 May 28, 1970
SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL, plaintiff-appellee,  defendant on May 7, 1949, copy of which is attached hereto and made
vs.
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, INC., defendant-appellant.
S. Emiliano Calma for plaintiff-appellee.
Salonga, Ordoñez & Associates for defendant-appellant.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal taken by Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 41103 entitled Soorajmull Nagarmull vs.
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company, Inc." of the following tenor:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, Soorajmull Nagarmull, ordering the defendant,
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc. to pay said plaintiff the sum of
18,562 rupees and 8 annas, with reservation for the plaintiff to prove its
equivalent in Philippine pesos on the date of the filing of the complaint,
plus the costs of suit.
The parties submitted to the trial court the following, stipulation of facts:
1. Under Contract G/14370 dated May 6, 1949, plaintiff, a foreign
corporation with offices at No. 8 Dalhousie Square (East) Calcutta,
India, agreed to sell to defendant, a domestic corporation with offices at
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 548
the Chronicle Building, Aduana Street, Manila, 1,700,000 pieces of
Hessian bags at $26.20 per 100 bags, C.I.F. Iloilo. Shipment of these
bags was to be made in equal installments of 425,000 pcs. or 425
bales (1,000 pcs. to a bale during each of the months of July, August,
September and October, 1949. A copy of this contract marked Annex
'A' and the Calcutta Jute Fabrics Shippers Association Form 1935
which was made a part of the contract and marked as Annex 'A-l' are
hereto attached.
2. This agreement was confirmed in a letter by the plaintiff to the
a part hereof as Annex 'B'; .
3. On September 8, 1949, plaintiff advised defendant that of the 850
bales scheduled for shipment in July and August, the former was able
to ship only 310 bales owing to the alleged failure of the Adamjee Jute
Mills to supply the goods in due time. Copy of plaintiff's letter is
attached hereto as Annex 'C' and made an integral part hereof; "4. In a
letter dated September 29, 1949, defendant requested plaintiff to ship
100 bales of the 540 bales defaulted from the July and August
shipments. A copy of this letter marked Annex 'D' is hereto attached. In
this connection, it may also be mentioned that of the 425 bales
scheduled for shipment in September, 54 bales were likewise defaulted
resulting in a total of 154 bales which is now the object of the
controversy.
5. Defendant requested plaintiff to pay 5% of the value of the 154 bales
defaulted as penalty which plaintiff did.
6. Meanwhile, on October 1, 1949, the Government of India increased
the export duty of jute bags from 80 to 350 rupees per ton, and on
October 5, 1949, plaintiff requested defendant to increase its letter of
credit to cover the enhanced rate of export duty imposed upon the
goods that were to be shipped in October, reminding the latter that
under their agreement, any alteration in export duty was to be for the
buyer's account. Copy of plaintiff's letter is attached hereto as Annex
'E';

7. On October 25, 1949, defendant, in compliance with plaintiff's
request, increased the amount of its letter of credit by $10,986.25 to
cover the increase in export duty on 425 bales scheduled under the
contract for the shipment in October, 1949. A copy of defendants letter
marked Annex 'F' is hereto attached;
8. On October 27, 1949, plaintiff wrote to defendant for a further
increase of $4,000.00 in its letter of credit to cover the shipment of 154
bales which under the contract should have been included in the July,
August and September shipments. A copy of said letter is attached
hereto as Annex 'G';
9. On November 17, 1949, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter reiterating
its claim for $4,000.00 corresponding to the increased export taxes on
the 154 bales delivered to defendant from the defaulted shipments for
the months of July, August and September, 1949. A copy of said letter
is attached hereto as Annex 'H';
10. On February 6, 1951, defendant received notification from the
Bengal Chamber of Commerce Tribunal of Arbitration in Calcutta, India,
advising it that on December 28, 1950, Plaintiff applied to said Tribunal
for arbitration regarding their claim. The Tribunal requested the
defendant to send them its version of the case. This, defendant did on
March 1, 1951, thru the then Government Corporate Counsel, former
Justice Pompeyo Diaz. A copy of the letter of authority is attached as
Annex 'I';
11. The case was heard by the Tribunal of Arbitration on July 5, 1951.
Having previously requested the Secretary Foreign Affairs for
Assistance, defendant was represented at the hearing by the Philippine
Consulate General in Calcutta, India, by Consul Jose Moreno. A copy
of the authority, consisting of the letter of Government Corporate
Counsel Pompeyo Diaz, dated March 1, 1951, and 1st Indorsement
thereon, dated March 2, 1951, are attached hereto as Annexes 'J' and
'J-1';
12. As presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration, the whole case revolved
on the question of whether or not defendant is liable to the plaintiff for
the payment of increased export taxes imposed by the Indian
Government on the shipments of jute sacks. Defendant contended that
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 549
if the jute sacks in question were delivered by plaintiff in the months of
July, August, and September, 1949, pursuant to the terms of the
contract, then there would have been no increased export taxes to pay
because said increased taxes became effective only on October 1,
1949, while on the other hand, plaintiff argued that the contract
between the parties and all papers and documents made parts thereto
should prevail, including defendant's letter of September 29, 1949;
13. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration, refused
to sustain defendant's contention and decided in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of 18,562 rupees
and 8 annas. This award was thereafter referred to the Calcutta High
Court which issued a decree affirming the award;
14. For about two years, the plaintiff attempted to enforce the said
award through the Philippine Charge de'Affaires in Calcutta, the Indian
Legation here in the Philippines, and the Department of Foreign Affairs.
On September 22, 1952, plaintiff, thru the Department of Foreign
Affairs, sought to enforce its claim to which letter defendant replied on
August 11, 1952, saying that they are not bound by the decision of the
Bengal Chamber of Commerce and consequently are not obligated to
pay the claim in question. Copies of said letters are attached hereto as
Annexes 'K' and 'L', respectively;
15. For more than three years thereafter, no communication was
received by defendant from the plaintiff regarding their claim until
January 26, 1956, when Atty. S. Emiliano Calma wrote the defendant a
letter of demand, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex 'M';
16. On February 3, 1956, defendant's counsel replied informing Atty. S.
Emiliano Calma that it refuses to pay plaintiff's claim because the same
has no foundation in law and in fact. A copy of this letter is attached
hereto as Annex 'N';
17. Thereafter, no communication was received by defendant from
plaintiff or its lawyers regarding their claim until June, 1959, when the
present complaint was filed.
FINALLY, parties thru their respective counsel, state that much as they
have endeavored to agree on all matters of fact, they have failed to do

so on certain points. It is, therefore respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that parties be allowed to present evidence on the
disputed facts.
Thereafter the parties submitted additional evidence pursuant to the reservation they
made in the above stipulation.
The appeal was elevated to the Court of Appeals but the latter, by its resolution of
January 27, 1964, elevated it to this Court because the additional documents and oral
evidence presented by the parties did not raise any factual issue, and said court further
found that "the three assigned errors quoted above all pose questions of law."
As may be gathered from the pleadings and the facts stipulated, the action below was
for the enforcement of a foreign judgment: the decision rendered by the Tribunal of
Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta, India, as affirmed by the
High Court of Judicature of Calcutta. The appealed decision provides for its enforcement
subject to the right reserved to appellee to present evidence on the equivalent in
Philippine currency of the amount adjudged in Indian currency. The record does not
disclose any evidence presented for that purpose subsequent to the rendition of
judgment.
To secure a reversal of the appealed decision appellant claims that the lower court
committed the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT LICENSED TO
TRANSACT BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES, HAS THE RIGHT TO
SUE IN PHILIPPINE COURTS.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S DEFAULT, AND INSTEAD RELIED SOLELY
ON THE AWARD OF THE BENGAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION.
III
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 550
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE WAS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES.
The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the decision of the Tribunal of
Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, as affirmed by the High Court of
Judicature of Calcutta, is enforceable in the Philippines.
For the purpose of this decision We shall assume that appellee — contrary to appellant's
contention — has the right to sue in Philippine courts and that, as far as the instant case
is concerned, it is not guilty of laches. This notwithstanding, We are constrained to
reverse the appealed decision upon the ground that it is based upon a clear mistake of
law and its enforcement will give rise to a patent injustice.
It is true that under the provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment
for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court "is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title", but when suit
for its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said judgment "may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact" (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon the facts of record, We are constrained to hold that the decision sought to be
enforced was rendered upon a "clear mistake of law" and because of that it makes
appellant — an innocent party — suffer the consequences of the default  or breach of
contract committed by appellee.
There is no question at all that appellee was guilty of a breach of contract when it failed
to deliver one-hundred fifty-four Hessian bales which, according to the contract entered
into with appellant, should have been delivered to the latter in the months of July, August
and September, all of the year 1949. It is equally clear beyond doubt that had these one-
hundred fifty-four bales been delivered in accordance with the contract aforesaid, the
increase in the export tax due upon them would not have been imposed because said
increased export tax became effective only on October 1, 1949.
To avoid its liability for the aforesaid increase in the export tax, appellee claims that
appellant should be held liable therefor on the strength of its letter of September 29,
1949 asking appellee to ship the shortage. This argument is unavailing because it is not
only illogical but contrary to known principles of fairness and justice. When appellant
demanded that appellee deliver the shortage of 154 bales it did nothing more than to
demand that to which it was entitled as a matter of right. The breach of contract
committed by appellee gave appellant, under the law and even under general principles
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 551

of fairness, the right to rescind the contract or to ask for its specific performance, in
either case with right to demand damages. Part of the damages appellant was clearly
entitled to recover from appellee growing out of the latter's breach of the contract
consists precisely of the amount of the increase decreed in the export tax due on the
shortage — which, because of appellee's fault, had to be delivered after the effectivity of
the increased export tax.

To the extent, therefore, that the decisions of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce and of the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta fail to apply to
the facts of this case fundamental principles of contract, the same may be impeached,
as they have been sufficiently impeached by appellant, on the ground of "clear mistake
of law". We agree in this regard with the majority opinion in Ingenohl vs. Walter E. Olsen
& Co. (47 Phil. 189), although its view was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States (273 U.S. 541, 71 L. ed. 762) which at that time had jurisdiction to review by
certiorari decisions of this Court. We can not sanction a clear mistake of law that would
work an obvious injustice upon appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside, with costs.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 552

Republic of the Philippines VI. The lower court erred in denying the motion for new trial on the ground that
SUPREME COURT the decision is contrary to the law and the evidence.
Manila
Briefly stated, the pertinent facts of the case, that we glean from the records, are as
EN BANC follows: The appellant Emilie Elmira Renee Boudard, in her capacity as widow of Marie
Theodore Jerome Boudard and as guardian of her coappellants, her children born
G.R. No. L-45193             April 5, 1939 during her marriage with the deceased, obtained a judgment in their favor from the civil
division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China, on June 27, 1934, for
EMILIE ELMIRA RENEE BOUDARD, RAYMOND ANTONIN BOUDARD,  the sum of 40,000piastras, equivalent, according to the rate of exchange at the time of
GINETTE ROSE ADELAIDE BOUDARD and MONIQUE VICTOIRE the rendition of the judgment, to P56,905.77, Philippine currency, plus interest the
BOUDARD, plaintiffs-appellants,  amount or rate of which is not given. The judgment was rendered against Stewart Eddie
vs. Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the trial before said
STEWART EDDIE TAIT, defendant-appellee. court.

Ramirez and Ortigas for appellants.
Gibbs, McDonough and Ozaeta for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the
case instituted by them, thereby overruling their complaint, and sentencing them to pay
the costs. They now contend in their brief that:
I. The lower court erred in not admitting Exhibits D, E, F and H to M-1 of
plaintiffs.
II. The lower court erred in declaring that it was indispensable for the defendant
to be served with summons in Hanoi.
III. The lower court erred in declaring that service by publication, with personal
notice by the French Consul in Manila, was not sufficient.
IV. The lower court erred in declaring that the Court of Hanoi had no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
V. The lower court erred in dismissing this case, instead of sentencing the
defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amounts claimed in the complaint as
adjudged by the Court of Hanoi; and
Appellants' action, by virtue of which they obtained the foregoing judgment, was based
on the fact that Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart
Eddie Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of said Tait, although "outside of the
fulfillment of a duty", according to the English translation of a certified copy of the
decision in French, presented by the appellants. The dismissal of appellants' complaint
by the lower court was based principally on the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Hanoi
to render the judgment in question, for the execution of which this action was instituted
in this jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was discovered in the decision itself of the
Court of Hanoi which states that the appellee was not a resident of, nor had a known
domicile in, that country.
The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively proves that neither the appellee nor his
agent or employees were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased
Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard had never, at any time, been his employee. The
appellee's first intimation of his having been sued and sentenced to pay a huge sum by
the civil division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi was when he was served with
summons in the present case.
Passing now to the consideration of the errors assigned by the appellants, we must say
that it was really unnecessary for the lower court to admit Exhibit D, E, F and H to M-1,
nor can these exhibits be admitted as evidence, for, as to the first point, the appellants
failed to show that the proceedings against the appellee in the Court of Hanoi were in
accordance with the laws of France then in force; and as to the second point, it appears
that said documents are not of the nature mentioned in sections 304 and 305 of Act No.
190. They are not copies of the judicial record of the proceedings against the appellee in

the Court of Hanoi, duly certified by the proper authorities there, whose signatures
should be authenticated by the Consul or some consular agent of the United States in
said country. The appellants argue that the papers are the original documents and that
the Honorable French Consul in the Philippines had confirmed this fact. Such argument
is not sufficient to authorize a deviation from a rule established and sanctioned by law.
To comply with the rule, the best evidence of foreign judicial proceedings is a certified
copy of the same with all the formalities required in said sections 304 and 305 for only
thus can one be absolutely sure of the authenticity of the record. On the other hand said
exhibits or documents, if admitted, would only corroborate and strengthen the evidence
of the appellee which in itself is convincing, and the conclusion of the lower court that
the appellee is not liable for the amount to which he was sentenced, as alleged, for he
was not duly tried or even summoned in conformity with the law. It is said that the
French law regarding summons, according to its English translation presented by the
appellants, is of the following tenor:
"SEC. 69 (par. 8). Those who have no known residence in France, in the place of their
present residence: if the place is unknown, the writ shall be posted at the main door of
the hall of the court where the complaint has been filed; a second copy shall be given to
the Attorney-General of the Republic who shall visae the original." But then, Exhibits E,
E-1, F and F-1 show that the summons alleged to have been addressed to the appellee,
was delivered in Manila on September 18, 1933, to J. M. Shotwell, a representative or
agent of Churchill & Tait Inc., which is an entity entirely different from the appellee.
Moreover, the evidence of record shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the
time mentioned in the complaint of the appellants, nor were his employees or
representatives. The rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign
country, regarding payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is
duly served on him within such foreign country before the proceedings.
The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as
to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the
state which renders the judgment. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S., 714; 24 Law.
ed., 565; Twining vs. New Jersy, 211 U. S., 78; 29 S. Ct., 14; 53 Law. ed., 97;
Continental National Bank of Boston vs. Thurber, 143 N. Y., 648; 37 N. E., 828.)
The process of a court of one state cannot run into another and summon a party
there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him. (Hess vs. Pawloski, 274
U. S., 352, 355; 47 S. Ct., 632, 633 [71 Law. ed., 109].) Notice sent outside the
state to a nonresident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him
personally for money recovery. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S., 741 [24 Law. ed.,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 553
565].) There must be actual service within the State of notice upon him or upon
some one authorized to accept service for him. (Goldey vs. Morning News, 156
U. S., 518 [15 S. Ct., 559; 39 Law. ed., 517].) A personal judgment rendered
against a nonresident, who has neither been served with process nor appeared
in the suit, is without validity. (McDonald vs. Mabee, 243 U. S., 90 [37 S. Ct.,
343; 61 Law, ed., 608; L. R. A. 1917F, 485].) The mere transaction of business
in a state by nonresident natural persons does not imply consent to be bound
by the process of its courts. (Flexner vs. Farson, 248 U. S., 289 [39 S. Ct., 97;
63 Law. ed., 250].)" (Cited in Skandinaviska Granit Aktiebolaget vs. Weiss, 234
N. Y. S., 202, 206, 207.)
The process of a court has no extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction is
acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the
boundaries of the state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign country
against a resident of his country having no property in such foreign country
based on process served here, any effect here against either the defendant
personally or his property situated here. (5 R. C. L., 912.)
Process issuing from the courts of one state or country cannot run into another,
and although a nonresident defendant may have been personally served with
such process in the state or country of his domicile, it will not give such
jurisdiction as to authorize a personal judgment against him. (23 Cyc., 688.)
It can not be said that the decision rendered by the Court of Hanoi should be conclusive
to such an extent that it cannot be contested, for it merely constitutes, from the viewpoint
of our laws, prima facie evidence of the justness of appellants' claim, and, as such,
naturally admits proof to the contrary. This is precisely the provision of section 311 of Act
No. 190, as interpreted in the case of Ingenohl vs. Walter E. Olsen & Co. (47 Phil.,
189):0
The effect of a judgment of any other tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment, is as follows:
1. In case of a judgment against a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
upon the title to the thing;
2. In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 554

jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. (Sec. 311 of Act No. 190.)

In view of the foregoing considerations, our conclusion is that we find no merit in the
errors assigned to the lower court and the appealed judgment is in accordance with the
law.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 555

Republic of the Philippines proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff
SUPREME COURT under the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant
Manila in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket
sales, with claim for damages.
FIRST DIVISION
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was issued by the 36th Civil
Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan against defendant at its
office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku,
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995 Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons
was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a person in the
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,  office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive
vs. court processes was in Manila and would be back on April 24, 1980.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.
On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the
summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming that he was
no longer an employee of the defendant.
PADILLA, JR., J.:
After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the
Tokyo District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
summons served at the head office of the defendant in Manila. On July
Appeals affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint to enforce the judgment of a
11, 1980, the Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the
Japanese court. The principal issue here is whether a Japanese court can acquire
Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic
jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons
channels upon the defendant's head office in Manila.
through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila
after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando
Balingit the writ of summons (p. 276, Records). Despite receipt of the
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter NORTHWEST), a corporation
same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the
organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in Civil
Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and on
Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Manila, a judgment
[January 29, 1981], rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay
rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against private respondent C.F. Sharp &
the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the
Company, Inc., (hereinafter SHARP), a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws.
rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up to and until payment is
completed (pp. 12-14, Records).
As found by the Court of Appeals in the challenged decision of 10 November 1993, 1 the
following are the factual and procedural antecedents of this controversy:
On March 24, 1981, defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit
copy of the judgment. Defendant not having appealed the judgment,
On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp
the same became final and executory.
& Company, through its Japan branch, entered into an International
Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized
the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the

Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May
20, 1983, a suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 54.2
On July 16, 1983, defendant filed its answer averring that the judgment
of the Japanese Court sought to be enforced is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been rendered without due and
proper notice to the defendant and/or with collusion or fraud and/or
upon a clear mistake of law and fact (pp. 41-45, Rec.).
Unable to settle the case amicably, the case was tried on the merits.
After the plaintiff rested its case, defendant on April 21, 1989, filed a
Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence based on two
grounds: 
(1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is null and void for want
of jurisdiction and (2) the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law
and public policy and rendered without due process of law. Plaintiff filed
its opposition after which the court a quo rendered the now assailed
decision dated June 21, 1989 granting the demurrer motion and
dismissing the complaint (Decision, pp. 376-378, Records). In granting
the demurrer motion, the trial court held that:
The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in
this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant considering that this is an
action in personam; the Japanese Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
because jurisprudence requires that the defendant be
served with summons in Japan in order for the
Japanese Court to acquire jurisdiction over it, the
process of the Court in Japan sent to the Philippines
which is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer
jurisdiction over the defendant in the case before the
Japanese Court of the case at bar. Boudard versus
Tait 67 Phil. 170. The plaintiff contends that the
Japanese Court acquired jurisdiction because the
defendant is a resident of Japan, having four (4)
branches doing business therein and in fact had a
permit from the Japanese government to conduct
business in Japan (citing the exhibits presented by the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 556
plaintiff); if this is so then service of summons should
have been made upon the defendant in Japan in any
of these alleged four branches; as admitted by the
plaintiff the service of the summons issued by the
Japanese Court was made in the Philippines thru a
Philippine Sheriff. This Court agrees that if the
defendant in a foreign court is a resident in the court
of that foreign court such court could acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant but it
must be served upon the defendant in the territorial
jurisdiction of the foreign court. Such is not the case
here because the defendant was served with
summons in the Philippines and not in Japan.
Unable to accept the said decision, plaintiff on July 11, 1989 moved for
reconsideration of the decision, filing at the same time a conditional
Notice of Appeal, asking the court to treat the said notice of appeal "as
in effect after and upon issuance of the court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration."
Defendant opposed the motion for reconsideration to which a Reply
dated August 28, 1989 was filed by the plaintiff.
On October 16, 1989, the lower court disregarded the Motion for
Reconsideration and gave due course to the plaintiff's Notice of
Appeal. 3
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with the latter in
its reliance upon Boudard vs.Tait  4 wherein it was held that "the process of the court has
no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant
by serving him beyond the boundaries of the state." To support its position, the Court of
Appeals further stated:
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal
service of summons within the forum is required for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant (Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125
SCRA 230). To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is
necessary (Dial Corp vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 739).

But while plaintiff-appellant concedes that the collection suit filed is an
action in personam, it is its theory that a distinction must be made
between an action in personam against a resident defendant and an
action in personam  against a non-resident defendant. Jurisdiction is
acquired over a non-resident defendant only if he is served personally
within the jurisdiction of the court and over a resident defendant if by
personal, substituted or constructive service conformably to statutory
authorization. Plaintiff-appellant argues that since the defendant-
appellee maintains branches in Japan it is considered a resident
defendant. Corollarily, personal, substituted or constructive service of
summons when made in compliance with the procedural rules is
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render judgment in personam.
Such an argument does not persuade.
It is a general rule that processes of the court cannot lawfully be served
outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the court from which it
issues (Carter vs. Carter; 41 S.E. 2d 532, 201) and this is regardless of
the residence or citizenship  of the party thus served (Iowa-Rahr vs.
Rahr, 129 NW 494, 150 Iowa 511, 35 LRC, NS, 292, Am. Case 1912
D680). There must be actual service within the proper territorial limits
on defendant or someone authorized to accept service for him. Thus, a
defendant, whether a resident or not in the forum where the action is
filed, must be served with summons within that forum.
But even assuming a distinction between a resident defendant and
non-resident defendant were to be adopted, such distinction applies
only to natural persons and not in the corporations. This finds support
in the concept that "a corporation has no home or residence in the
sense in which those terms are applied to natural persons" (Claude
Neon Lights vs. Phil. Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607). Thus, as cited by
the defendant-appellee in its brief:
Residence is said to be an attribute of a natural person, and can be
predicated on an artificial being only by more or less imperfect analogy.
Strictly speaking, therefore, a corporation can have no local residence
or habitation. It has been said that a corporation is a mere ideal
existence, subsisting only in contemplation of law — an invisible being
which can have, in fact, no locality and can occupy no space, and
therefore cannot have a dwelling place. (18 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 693 citing
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 557
Kimmerle v. Topeka, 88 370, 128 p. 367; Wood v. Hartfold F. Ins. Co.,
13 Conn 202)
Jurisprudence so holds that the foreign or domestic character of a
corporation is to be determined by the place of its origin where its
charter was granted and not by the location of its business activities
(Jennings v. Idaho Rail Light & P. Co., 26 Idaho 703, 146 p. 101), A
corporation is a "resident" and an inhabitant of the state in which it is
incorporated and no other (36 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 49).
Defendant-appellee is a Philippine Corporation duly organized under
the Philippine laws. Clearly, its residence is the Philippines, the place of
its incorporation, and not Japan. While defendant-appellee maintains
branches in Japan, this will not make it a resident of Japan. A
corporation does not become a resident of another by engaging in
business there even though licensed by that state and in terms given
all the rights and privileges of a domestic corporation (Galveston H. &
S.A.R. Co. vs. Gonzales, 151 US 496, 38 L ed. 248, 4 S Ct. 401).
On this premise, defendant appellee is a non-resident corporation. As
such, court processes must be served upon it at a place within the
state in which the action is brought and not elsewhere (St. Clair vs.
Cox, 106 US 350, 27 L ed. 222, 1 S. Ct. 354).5
It then concluded that the service of summons effected in Manila or beyond the territorial
boundaries of Japan was null and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District
Court over the person of SHARP; hence, its decision was void.
Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, NORTHWEST elevated the case to
this Court contending that the respondent court erred in holding that SHARP was not a
resident of Japan and that summons on SHARP could only be validly served within that
country.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.6
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of
a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a

subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere,
enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.7Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In
an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of
summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also
void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori  or the internal law of the
forum.8 In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered
that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. As to
what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and
must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. 9 Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly
attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present
evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the
assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by
the Japanese court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese  attempts at service were made at SHARP's Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful.
law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual
presumption 10 may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed
to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines,
service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for
that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the government official
designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation
is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction
unless made upon him. 11
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 558
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government
official designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign
insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking
corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other
foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of
process is so made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy
of the summons or other legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office.
The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service. 12
SHARP contends that the laws authorizing service of process upon the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Superintendent of Banks, and the Insurance Commissioner,
as the case may be, presuppose a situation wherein the foreign corporation doing
business in the country no longer has any branches or offices within the Philippines.
Such contention is belied by the pertinent provisions of the said laws. Thus, Section 128
of the Corporation Code 13 and Section 190 of the Insurance Code 14 clearly contemplate
two situations: (1) if the corporation had left the Philippines or had ceased to transact
business therein, and (2) if the corporation has no designated agent. Section 17 of the
General Banking Act 15 does not even speak a corporation which had ceased to transact
business in the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized
to receive court processes in Japan. This silence could only mean, or least create an
impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the designated government official or on
any of SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be availed of. The respondent,
however, insists that only service of any of its officers or employees in its branches in
Japan could be resorted to. We do not agree. As found by the respondent court, two
On the first attempt, Mr. Dinozo, who was believed to be the person authorized to accept
court process, was in Manila. On the second, Mr. Dinozo was present, but to accept the
summons because, according to him, he was no longer an employee of SHARP. While it
may be true that service could have been made upon any of the officers or agents of
SHARP at its three other branches in Japan, the availability of such a recourse would
not preclude service upon the proper government official, as stated above.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that
summons for SHARP be served at its head office in the Philippine's after the two
attempts of service had failed. 16 The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court
of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the
Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons
together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which,

in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila . Thereafter, the court
processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the
same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on
the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such
manner of service is not valid under Philippine laws holds no water. 17
In deciding against the petitioner, the respondent court sustained the trial court's reliance
on Boudard vs.  Tait  18where this Court held:
The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over
nonresidents, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon
personal service within the state which renders the judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
The process of a court, has no extraterritorial effect, and no jurisdiction
is acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the
boundaries of the state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign
country against a resident of this country having no property in such
foreign country based on process served here, any effect here against
either the defendant personally or his property situated here.
Process issuing from the courts of one state or country cannot run into
another, and although a nonresident defendant may have been
personally served with such process in the state or country of his
domicile, it will not give such jurisdiction as to authorize a personal
judgment against him.
It further availed of the ruling in Magdalena Estate, Inc.  vs.  Nieto 19 and Dial
Corp. vs. Soriano, 20 as well as the principle laid down by the Iowa Supreme Court in the
1911 case of Raher vs.  Raher. 21
The first three cases are, however, inapplicable. Boudard  involved the enforcement of a
judgment of the civil division of the Court of First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China.
The trial court dismissed the case because the Hanoi court never acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant considering that "[t]he, evidence adduced at the trial
conclusively proves that neither the appellee [the defendant] nor his agent or employees
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 559
were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore Jerome
Boudard had never, at any time, been his employee." In Magdalena Estate, what was
declared invalid resulting in the failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendants in an action in personam was the service of summons through
publication against non-appearing resident defendants. It was claimed that the latter
concealed themselves to avoid personal service of summons upon them. In Dial, the
defendants were foreign corporations which were not, domiciled and licensed to engage
in business in the Philippines and which did not have officers or agents, places of
business, or properties here. On the other hand, in the instant case, SHARP was doing
business in Japan and was maintaining four branches therein.
Insofar as to the Philippines is concerned, Raher is a thing of the past. In that case, a
divided Supreme Court of Iowa declared that the principle that there can be no
jurisdiction in a court of a territory to render a personal judgment against anyone upon
service made outside its limits was applicable alike to cases of residents and non-
residents. The principle was put at rest by the United States Supreme Court when it
ruled in the 1940 case of Milliken vs.  Meyer  22 that domicile in the state is alone
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for
purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service or
personal service without the state. This principle is embodied in section 18, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court which allows service of summons on residents temporarily out of the
Philippines to be made out of the country. The rationale for this rule was explained
in Milliken as follows:
[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the
mere fact of his absence from the state. The state which accords him
privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his
domicile may also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges
of residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the
protection of its laws, are inseparable" from the various incidences of
state citizenship. The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the
relationship to the state which domicile creates. That relationship is not
dissolved by mere absence from the state. The attendant duties, like
the rights and privileges incident to domicile, are not dependent on
continuous presence in the state. One such incident of domicile is
amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the
state, where the state has provided and employed a reasonable
method for apprising such an absent party of the proceedings against
him. 23

The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was incorporated. 24 In a strict
technical sense, such domicile as a corporation may have is single in its essence and a
corporation can have only one domicile which is the state of its creation. 25
Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one-state may, for certain purposes, be regarded a
resident in another state in which it has offices and transacts business. This is the rule in
our jurisdiction and apropos thereto, it may be necessery to quote what we stated
in State Investment House, Inc, vs. Citibank, N.A., 26 to wit:
The issue is whether these Philippine branches or units may be
considered "residents of the Philippine Islands" as that term is used in
Section 20 of the Insolvency Law . . . or residents of the state under the
laws of which they were respectively incorporated. The answer cannot
be found in the Insolvency Law itself, which contains no definition of the
term, resident, or any clear indication of its meaning. There are
however other statutes, albeit of subsequent enactment and effectivity,
from which enlightening notions of the term may be derived.
The National Internal Revenue Code declares that the term "'resident
foreign corporation' applies to a foreign corporation engaged in trade or
business within the Philippines," as distinguished from a "'non-resident
foreign corporation' . . . (which is one) not engaged in trade or
bussiness within the Philippines." [Sec. 20, pars. (h) and (i)].
The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential Decree No. 1034, states "that
branches, subsidiaries, affiliation, extension offices or any other units of
corporation or juridical person organized under the laws of any foreign
country operating in the Philippines shall be considered residents of the
Philippines. [Sec. 1(e)].
The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, places "branches and
agencies in the Philippines of foreign banks . . . (which are) called
Philippine branches," in the same category as "commercial banks,
savings associations, mortgage banks, development banks, rural
banks, stock savings and loan associations" (which have been formed
and organized under Philippine laws), making no distinction between
the former and the latter in so far as the terms "banking institutions"
and "bank" are used in the Act [Sec. 2], declaring on the contrary that
in "all matters not specifically covered by special provisions applicable
only to foreign banks, or their branches and agencies in the Philippines,
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 560
said foreign banks or their branches and agencies lawfully doing
business in the Philippines "shall be bound by all laws, rules, and
regulations applicable to domestic banking corporations of the same
class, except such laws, rules and regulations as provided for the
creation, formation, organization, or dissolution of corporations or as fix
the relation, liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of members,
stockholders or officers of corporation. [Sec. 18].
This court itself has already had occasion to hold [Claude Neon Lights,
Fed. Inc. vs. Philippine Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607] that a foreign
corporation licitly doing business in the Philippines, which is a
defendant in a civil suit, may not be considered a non-resident  within
the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment against a
defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands; [Sec. 424, in relation to
Sec. 412 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure; Sec. 1(f), Rule
59 of the Rules of 1940, Sec. 1(f), Rule 57, Rules of 1964] in other
words, a preliminary attachment may not be applied for and granted
solely on the asserted fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in the Philippines — and is consequently and
necessarily, "a party who resides out of the Philippines."
Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a party not residing in the
Philippines, or as a party who resides out of the country, then, logically,
it must be considered a party who does reside in the Philippines, who is
a resident of the country. Be this as it may, this Court pointed out that:
. . . Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to
assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do
business here, to the status of domestic corporations.
(Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459, and Marshall Wells Co.
vs. Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We think it would
be entirely out of line with this policy should we make
a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the
petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of
seizure by attachment when it has complied not only
with every requirement of law made specially of
foreign corporations, but in addition with every
requirement of law made of domestic
corporations. . . .
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 561

Obviously, the assimilation of foreign corporations authorized to do of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and another in its stead is hereby rendered
business in the Philippines "to the status of domestic corporations, ORDERING private respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to
subsumes their being found and operating as corporations, NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said case, with
hence, residing, in the country. interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint therein until the said
foreign judgment is fully satisfied.
The same principle is recognized in American law: that the residence of
a corporation, if it can be said to have a residence, is necessarily where Costs against the private respondent.
it exercises corporate functions . . .;" that it is considered as dwelling "in
the place where its business is done . . .," as being "located where its SO ORDERED.
franchises are exercised . . .," and as being "present where it is
engaged in the prosecution of the corporate enterprise;" that a "foreign
corporation licensed to do business in a state is a resident of any
country where it maintains an office or agent for transaction of its usual
and customary business for venue purposes;" and that the "necessary
element in its signification is locality of existence." [Words and Phrases,
Permanent Ed., vol. 37, pp. 394, 412, 493].

In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly
registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of
the processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such,
was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have
assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. 27

Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was

valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty.

We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary
damages to be without merit. We find no evidence that would justify an award for
attorney's fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary damages warranted. Under Article 2234 of
the Civil Code, before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damaged. There being no such proof presented by
NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages may be adjudged in its favor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision is
AFFIRMED insofar as it denied NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and exemplary damages but REVERSED insofar as in sustained the trial
court's dismissal of NORTHWEST's complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637 of Branch 54

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 73765               August 26, 1991
HANG LUNG BANK, LTD., petitioner,  Defendants herein, IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that: —
vs.
HON. FELINTRIYE G. SAULOG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch CXLII, Makati, Metro Manila, and CORDOVA CHIN
SAN, respondents.
Belo, Abiera & Associates for petitioner.
Castelo Law Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari which is anchored on grave abuse of discretion,
are two orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLII of Makati, Metro Manila
dismissing the complaint for collection of a sum of money and denying the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal order on the ground that petitioner, a Hongkong-based
bank, is barred by the General Banking Act from maintaining a suit in this jurisdiction.
The records show that on July 18, 1979, petitioner Hang Lung Bank, Ltd., which was not
doing business in the Philippines, entered into two (2) continuing guarantee agreements
with Cordova Chin San in Hongkong whereby the latter agreed to pay on demand all
sums of money which may be due the bank from Worlder Enterprises to the extent of the
total amount of two hundred fifty thousand Hongkong dollars (HK $250,000). 1
Worlder Enterprises having defaulted in its payment, petitioner filed in the Supreme
Court of Hongkong a collection suit against Worlder Enterprises and Chin San.
Summonses were allegedly served upon Worlder Enterprises and Chin San at their
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 562
addresses in Hongkong but they failed to respond thereto. Consequently, the Supreme
Court of Hongkong issued the following:
JUDGMENT
THE 14th DAY OF JUNE, 1984
No notice of intention to defend having been given by the 1st and 2nd
(1) the 1st Defendant (Ko Ching Chong Trading otherwise known as the
Worlder Enterprises) do pay the Plaintiff the sum of HK$1,117,968.36 together
with interest on the respective principal sums of HK$196,591.38,
HK$200,216.29, HK$526,557.63, HK$49,350.00 and HK$3,965.50 at the rates
of 1.7% per month (or HK$111.40 per day), 18.5% per annum (or HK$101.48
per day), 1.85% per month (or HK$324.71 per day), 1.55% per month (or
HK$25.50 per day) and 1.7% per month (or HK$2.25 per day) respectively from
4th May 1984 up to the date of payment; and
(2) the 2nd Defendant (Cordova Chin San) do pay the Plaintiff the sum of
HK$279,325.00 together with interest on the principal sum of HK$250,000.00 at
the rate of 1.7% per month (or HK$141.67 per day) from 4th May 1984 up to the
date of payment.
AND IT IS ADJUDGED that the 1st and 2nd Defendants do pay the Plaintiff the
sum of HK$970.00 fixed costs.
N.J. BARNETT
Registrar
Thereafter, petitioner through counsel sent a demand letter to Chin San at his Philippine
address but again, no response was made thereto. Hence, on October 18, 1984,
petitioner instituted in the court below an action seeking "the enforcement of its just and
valid claims against private respondent, who is a local resident, for a sum of money
based on a transaction which was perfected, executed and consummated abroad." 2
In his answer to the complaint, Chin San raised as affirmative defenses: lack of cause of
action, incapacity to sue and improper venue. 3

Pre-trial of the case was set for June 17, 1985 but it was postponed to July 12, 1985.
However, a day before the latter pre-trial date, Chin San filed a motion to dismiss the
case and to set the same for hearing the next day. The motion to dismiss was based on
the grounds that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue and that venue was improperly
laid.
Acting on said motion to dismiss, on December 20, 1985, the lower court 4 issued the
following order:
On defendant Chin San Cordova's motion to dismiss, dated July 10, 1985;
plaintiff's opposition, dated July 12, 1985; defendant's reply, dated July 22,
1985; plaintiff's supplemental opposition, dated September 13, 1985, and
defendant's rejoinder filed on September 23, 1985, said motion to dismiss is
granted.
Section 14, General Banking Act provides:
"No foreign bank or banking corporation formed, organized or existing
under any laws other than those of the Republic of the Philippines,
shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines, or maintain
by itself any suit for the recovery of any debt, claims or demands
whatsoever until after it shall have obtained, upon order of the
Monetary Board, a license for that purpose."
Plaintiff Hang Lung Bank, Ltd. with business and postal address at the 3rd
Floor, United Centre, 95 Queensway, Hongkong, does not do business in the
Philippines. The continuing guarantee, Annexes "A" and "B" appeared to have
been transacted in Hongkong. Plaintiff's Annex "C" shows that it had already
obtained judgment from the Supreme Court of Hongkong against defendant
involving the same claim on June 14, 1984.
The cases of Mentholatum Company, Inc. versus Mangaliman, 72 Phil. 524
and Eastern Seaboard Navigation, Ltd. versus Juan Ysmael & Company, Inc.,
102 Phil. 1-8, relied upon by plaintiff, deal with isolated transaction in the
Philippines of foreign corporation. Such transaction though isolated is the one
that conferred jurisdiction to Philippine courts, but in the instant case, the
transaction occurred in Hongkong.
Case dismissed. The instant complaint not the proper action.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 563
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order but it was denied for lack of
merit.6 Hence, the instant petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of said orders "so as
to allow petitioner to enforce through the court below its claims against private
respondent as recognized by the Supreme Court of Hongkong." 7
Petitioner asserts that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in: (a) holding that
the complaint was not the proper action for purposes of collecting the amount
guaranteed by Chin San "as recognized and adjudged by the Supreme Court of
Hongkong;" (b) interpreting Section 14 of the General Banking Act as precluding
petitioner from maintaining a suit before Philippine courts because it is a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines despite the fact that it does not
do business here; and (c) impliedly sustaining private respondent's allegation of
improper venue.
We need not detain ourselves on the issue of improper venue. Suffice it to state that
private respondent waived his right to invoke it when he forthwith filed his answer to the
complaint thereby necessarily implying submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 8
The resolution of this petition hinges on a determination of whether petitioner foreign
banking corporation has the capacity to file the action below.
Private respondent correctly contends that since petitioner is a bank, its capacity to file
an action in this jurisdiction is governed by the General Banking Act (Republic Act No.
337), particularly Section 14 thereof which provides:
SEC. 14. No foreign bank or banking corporation formed, organized or existing
under any laws other than those of the Republic of the Philippines shall be
permitted to transact business in the Philippines, or maintain by itself or
assignee any suit for the recovery of any debt, claims, or demand whatsoever,
until after it shall have obtained, upon order of the Monetary Board, a license for
that purpose from the Securities and Exchange Commissioner. Any officer,
director or agent of any such corporation who transacts business in the
Philippines without the said license shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than one year nor more than ten years and by a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos. (45 O.G. No. 4, 1647,
1649-1650)

In construing this provision, we adhere to the interpretation given by this Court to the
almost identical Section 69 of the old Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) which reads:
SEC. 69. No foreign corporation or corporation formed, organized, or existing
under any laws other than those of the Philippines shall be permitted to transact
business in the Philippines or maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the
recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless it shall have the
license prescribed in the section immediately preceding. Any officer, director or
agent of the corporation or any person transacting business for any foreign
corporation not having the license prescribed shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years or by a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by
both such imprisonment and fine, in the discretion of the Court.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted this last quoted provision as not
altogether prohibiting a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines
from suing or maintaining an action in Philippine courts. 9What it seeks to prevent is a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license from gaining
access to Philippine courts. As elucidated in Marshall-Wells Co. vs. Elser & Co., 46 Phil.
70:
The object of the statute was to subject the foreign corporation doing business
in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of its courts. The object of the statute was
not to prevent it from performing single acts but to prevent it from acquiring a
domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to
render it amenable to suit in the local courts. The implication of the law is that it
was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which
happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines from
securing redress from Philippine courts, and thus, in effect, to permit persons to
avoid their contract made with such foreign corporation. The effect of the statute
preventing foreign corporations from doing business and from bringing actions
in the local courts, except on compliance with elaborate requirements, must not
be unduly extended or improperly applied. It should not be construed to extend
beyond the plain meaning of its terms, considered in connection with its object,
and in connection with the spirit of the entire law.
The fairly recent case of Universal Shipping Lines vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court,10 although dealing with the amended version of Section 69 of the old Corporation
Law, Section 133 of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68), but which is
nonetheless apropos, states the rule succinctly: "it is not the lack of the prescribed
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 564
license (to do business in the Philippines) but doing business without license, which bars
a foreign corporation from access to our courts."
Thus, we have ruled that a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines may file a suit in this country due to the collision of two vessels at the harbor
of Manila11 and for the loss of goods bound for Hongkong but erroneously discharged in
Manila.12
Indeed, the phraseologies of Section 14 of the General Banking Act and its almost
identical counterpart Section 69 of the old Corporation Law are misleading in that they
seem to require a foreign corporation, including a foreign bank or banking corporation,
not licensed to do business and not doing business in the Philippines to secure a license
from the Securities and Exchange Commission before it can bring or maintain an action
in Philippine courts. To avert such misimpression, Section 133 of the Corporation Code
is now more plainly worded thus:
No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license,
or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any
action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines.
Under this provision, we have ruled that a foreign corporation may sue in this jurisdiction
for infringement of trademark and unfair competition although it is not doing business in
the Philippines13 because the Philippines was a party to the Convention of the Union of
Paris for the Protection of IndustrialProperty.14
We even went further to say that a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines may not be denied the right to file an action in our courts for an isolated
transaction in this country.15
Since petitioner foreign banking corporation was not doing business in the Philippines, it
may not be denied the privilege of pursuing its claims against private respondent for a
contract which was entered into and consummated outside the Philippines. Otherwise
we will be hampering the growth and development of business relations between Filipino
citizens and foreign nationals. Worse, we will be allowing the law to serve as a protective
shield for unscrupulous Filipino citizens who have business relationships abroad.
In its pleadings before the court, petitioner appears to be in a quandary as to whether
the suit below is one for enforcement or recognition of the Hongkong judgment. Its
complaint states:
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 565

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court, this notwithstanding, defendant failed and refused and still continue to
most respectfully alleges that: fail and refuse to make any payment to plaintiff on the aforesaid
amount of HK$279,325.00 plus interest on the principal sum of
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by HK$250,000.00 at the rate of (HK$141.67) per day from May 4, 1984
virtue of the laws of Hongkong with business and postal address at the up to the date of payment;
3rd Floor, United Centre, 95 Queensway, Hongkong, not doing
business in the Philippines, but is suing for this isolated transaction, but 5. In order to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of herein
for purposes of this complaint may be served with summons and legal plaintiff, it has engaged the services of undersigned counsel, to file the
processes of this Honorable Court, at the 6th Floor, Cibeles Building, suit at bar, and for whose services it has agreed to pay an amount
6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila, while defendant Cordova equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and owing, as of and by way
Chin San, may be served with summons and other legal processes of of attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
this Honorable Court at the Municipality of Moncada, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines; WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant:
2. On July 18, 1979 and July 25, 1980, the defendant executed
Continuing Guarantees, in consideration of plaintiff's from time to time a) To pay plaintiff the sum of HK$279,325.00 together with interest on
making advances, or coming to liability or discounting bills or otherwise the principal sum of HK$260,000.00 at the rate of HK$1.7% (sic) per
giving credit or granting banking facilities from time to time to, or on month (or HK$141.67 per day) from May 4, 1984 until the aforesaid
account of the Wolder Enterprises (sic), photocopies of the Contract of amount is paid in full;
Continuing Guarantees are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B",
respectively, and made parts hereof; b) To pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and
demandable as of and by way of attorney's fees; and
3. In June 1984, a complaint was filed by plaintiff against the Wolder
Enterprises (sic) and defendant Cordova Chin San, in The Supreme c) To pay costs of suit, and
Court of Hongkong, under Case No. 3176, and pursuant to which
complaint, a judgment dated 14th day of July, 1984 was rendered by Plaintiff prays for such other and further reliefs, to which it may by law and
The Supreme Court of Hongkong ordering to (sic) defendant Cordova equity, be entitled.16
Chin San to pay the plaintiff the sum of HK$279,325.00 together with
interest on the principal sum of HK$250,000.00 at the rate of HK$1.7%
The complaint therefore appears to be one of the enforcement of the Hongkong
per month or (HK$141.67) per day from 4th May, 1984 up to the date
judgment because it prays for the grant of the affirmative relief given by said foreign
the said amount is paid in full, and to pay the sum of HK$970.00 as
judgment.17 Although petitioner asserts that it is merely seeking the recognition of its
fixed cost, a photocopy of the Judgment rendered by The Supreme
claims based on the contract sued upon and not the enforcement of the Hongkong
Court of Hongkong is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an
judgment18it should be noted that in the prayer of the complaint, petitioner simply copied
integral part hereof.
the Hongkong judgment with respect to private respondent's liability.

4. Plaintiff has made demands upon the defendant in this case to pay
However, a foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not recognized in the
the aforesaid amount the last of which is by letter dated July 16, 1984
jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being sought.1âwphi1 Hence, in the interest of
sent by undersigned counsel, a photocopy of the letter of demand is
justice, the complaint should be considered as a petition for the recognition of the
hereto attached as Annex "D" and the Registry Return Card hereto
Hongkong judgment under Section 50 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order that the
attached as Annex "E", respectively, and made parts hereof. However,
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 566

defendant, private respondent herein, may present evidence of lack of jurisdiction,

notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact and law, if applicable.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the lower court are hereby set aside. Civil Case
No. 8762 is reinstated and the lower court is directed to proceed with dispatch in the
disposition of said case. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PROVISIONS
CONSTI
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law.
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 567
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.
RPC
Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone,
but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

PROVISIONS
NCC
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. (9a)
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)
Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not
fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where
their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.
(41a)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 568
Article 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make a will in any
of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be
probated in the Philippines. (n)
Article 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
prescribes. (n)
Article 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall
have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines. (n)
Article 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument,
either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. (669)
Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign
country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the
country where they may have been executed. (733a)
Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have
his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place
where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had
his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. (n)
Article 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
(n)
Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. (1254a)
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. (1255a)
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 569

Article 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be
certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.

Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it
came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered
into in the place where the offer was made. (1262a)

Article 1251. Payment shall be made in the place designated in the obligation.

There being no express stipulation and if the undertaking is to deliver a determinate

thing, the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the
obligation was constituted.

In any other case the place of payment shall be the domicile of the debtor.

If the debtor changes his domicile in bad faith or after he has incurred in delay, the
additional expenses shall be borne by him.

These provisions are without prejudice to venue under the Rules of Court. (1171a)

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

FAMCODE
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (52a)
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or
religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to
the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the
absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.
(56a)
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-
general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 570
marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer
with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official.
(75a)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637
and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time
of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such
party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards,
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3
of the preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a
crime involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at
the time of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism
existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
(86a)
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and
within the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or
guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of
twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at
any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no
knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal
charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane
spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Articles 45, by the injured party, within five
years after the discovery of the fraud;
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 571
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five
years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within
five years after the marriage. (87a)
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in
a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the
spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their
choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall
also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n)
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by
Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in

cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of
the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the
requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage
shall be null and void.
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity
of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered
legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall
likewise be legitimate.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses
for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community
property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations
shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 572
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and
moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the
benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced
against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good
faith. (117a)
Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the
following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom. (118)
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of
absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or
any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed
upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code
shall govern. (119a)
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must
be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66,
67, 128, 135 and 136. (121)
Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed
by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not
prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the
marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties. (122a)

Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property
relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of
the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not
situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is
located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the
Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws
require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. (124a)
Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding
articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the
prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take
place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages
shall be valid. (125a)
TITLE VI
PATERNITY AND FILIATION  authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
Chapter 1. Legitimate Children
Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may
be legitimate or illegitimate. (n)
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the
husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and
his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument
shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a,
258a)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 573
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
otherwise provided in this Code. (n)
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual
intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the
second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)
Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within
three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall
govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former
marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of
the former marriage;

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage. (259a)
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following
the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or
illegitimacy. (261a)
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one
year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband
or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the
birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as
defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if
they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child
has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall
be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a)
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period
prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for
bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted
therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)
Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 574
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a,
266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which
to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases,
their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on
Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them
by the Civil Code. (264a)
Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a

legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)
Chapter 4. Legitimated Children
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other may be legitimated. (269a)
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.
The annulment of a viodable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (270a)
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (272a)
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a)
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage
shall benefit their descendants. (274)
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights,
within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. (275a)
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final
accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 575
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by
law. (28a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 187. The following may not be adopted:
(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or
his or her spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no
diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been
previously revoked or rescinded. (30a, EO 91 and PD 603)
TITLE IX
PARENTAL AUTHORITY 
Chapter 1. General Provisions
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property
of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the
caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development
of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred
except in the cases authorized by law. (313a)
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are
obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)

Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the
one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in
the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his
parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime
against the descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)
Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person
shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes
necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other
children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial
proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly
accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 576
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility
over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall
be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if
it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority 
Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect
to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by
right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping
with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their
interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise
their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad

company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances;
and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and
guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem
when the best interests of the child so requires. (317)
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution
exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child
resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be
entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a
summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of
the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also
order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures
as it may deem just and proper. (318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment
of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or
in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child
whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 577
instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper.
(391a)
Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority
Upon the Property of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court
appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is
a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the
court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property
or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for
general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place
where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of
the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents
and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second
paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is
under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has
remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or
industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall
be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer
provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited
primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
(321a, 323a)

Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their
properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to
the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not
less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger,
unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus
give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. (322a)
Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also
terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the
purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of
parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising
parental authority. (327a)
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person
exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The
authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or
amnesty of the offender. (330a)
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 578
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend
parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from
culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental
authority. lawphi1.net
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the
court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as
may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a
case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause
therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed
him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the
court of such authority. (n)
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same
authority over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

RULES OF COURT
RULE 38
Relief from Judgments, Orders, or Other Proceedings
Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order, is conclusive upon the title to the thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
(50a)
RULE 73
Venue and Process
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedents is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
RULE 77
Conflicts – 2nd Outline 579
Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines and Administration of Estate
Thereunder
Section 4. Estate, how administered. — When a will is thus allowed, the court shall
grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such
letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in
the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
operate upon it; and the residue, if any shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another
state or country.
RULE 78
Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. — No person
in competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason
of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by
reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Section 4. Letters testamentary issued when will allowed. — When a will has been
proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person
named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust, and gives bond as
required by these rules.
RULE 88
Payment of the Debts of the Estate
Section 9. Estate of insolvent non-resident, how disposed of. — In case administration
is taken in the Philippine of the estate of a person who was at the time of his death an
 Conflicts – 2nd Outline 580

inhabitant of another country, and who died insolvent, hi estate found in the Philippines embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
shall, as far as practicable, be so disposed of that his creditors here and elsewhere may officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
receive each an equal share, in proportion to their respective credits. the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)

RULE 110 Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
Prosecution of Offenses that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any,
Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. — or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private
vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or
other vehicle passed during such its trip, including the place of its departure and
arrival.
Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument duly acknowledged or
proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being  prima facie  evidence of the execution of
the instrument or document involved. (31a)
Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. —  Documents written in
an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a
translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their
attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial. (34a)

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its

voyage, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first
port of entry or of any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during
such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.

(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of
the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal
action is first filed. (15a)

RULE 132

Presentation of Evidence

Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in

paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the