G.R. No.
109373 March 20, 1995 salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION,
PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and members, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as
Liquidator of Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking Corporation ,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T.
VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG
JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question
involved is the same: whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act
No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or
an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of
Appeals reached opposite results on this question and consequently applied
different periods for appealing.
The facts are as follows:
I.
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution
No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under
liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.2
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the
Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved,
after which creditors filed their claims with the court.
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,4 President of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the
Central Bank.
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization
(Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-
intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential,
Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC. In its order dated
September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered payment of the principal claims
of the Union.5
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On
October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of
the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his
September 13, 19916 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for
reconsideration. This order was received by the Liquidator on December 9,
1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and
a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23,
1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General in behalf of Nañagas.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the
Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15
days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his September 13,
1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied
reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for
issuance of a writ of Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991,
likewise filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in
the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of
stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of the total
subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that their claim
constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled to preference in
payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC
directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their
claim as preferred creditors.7
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30,
1992 he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court
on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice
of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in
the case of the Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal
stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of
the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the
judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order granting the
Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
1
II.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court
denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the
Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which
the cases were separately raffled, rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R.
No. 09373) the Fifth Division8 held in the case of the Union that the
proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the
period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30
days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of
his receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was
brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the
lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the
Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the
Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action.
Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered
therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on
the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period
during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal
was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's
petition.
III.
Present Proceedings
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the suit.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition for
certiorari filed by Nañagas who was without any legal authority to file it.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special
proceeding governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of
appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on time.
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of
appeal filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking
Corporation s a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple
appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders
whose right to receive payment as such would accrue only after all the
creditors of the insolvent bank have been paid.
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is
not in the nature of foreign investment as it is understood in law.
4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and
proved.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made
with grave abuse of discretion.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is
whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the
nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days
and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the
trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a
liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days
from notice of the decision or final order appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or
decision appealed from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases the
period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the
judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the
entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered
consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of
the Rules of Court.
2
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in
paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the
period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is
an ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The
Fourteenth Division stated:
The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court where there are conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same
subject matter, a person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for
interpleader to compel the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several
claims among themselves. (Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62
which, like an ordinary action, may be appealed only within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the
preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with
or may serve to supplement the provisions of the rule relating to such civil
actions are applicable to special civil actions. This embraces Rule 41
covering appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as
"an ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another
for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every
other remedy including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact shall be by special proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special
proceeding, the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an
asset of a bank is not "one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact." Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, the petition is not
intended to establish the fact of insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the
bank had already been previously determined by the Central Bank in
accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before the petition was filed. All that
needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank and thus the
assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases
categorized as a special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court, nor among the special proceedings that may be appealed under
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court provide:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by
which the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by
special proceeding.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special
proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:"
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from
special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one
against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status,
right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another,
his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment
of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish
the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent
corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary
action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right
nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for
affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor
state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's
insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the
settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations.
Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's
3
state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of
payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do
not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader
involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest
therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the
Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets
and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors.13 He is thus charged with
insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants
and in the order of payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement
of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The
two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the
payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the
estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged
with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability
of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with
the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their
order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in
proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of
the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of
cases properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding.
The first phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims.
Upon the approval of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court
in the liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the bank are
required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end with the
declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without
basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the liquidation court allowing
the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary
or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed
by the party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan
prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in
detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were
earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property
is available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the
liquidation proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in accordance with
the order of legal priority and the approved distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or
disallowance of a particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the
operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple
appeals are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by its nature,
affects only the particular claims involved, and which may assume finality if
no appeal is made therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation where multiple
appeals are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the
Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims
against the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court.
Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is
individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to a
particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims
unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and distinct from the
others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order allowing or
disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the
others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original
records of the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They
remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of
appeal is instead required to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate
court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings.
Consequently, a record on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal
made. Hence, the period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a
record on appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's
notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of
receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors.
However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he
failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required
under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases
where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several
claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to
any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must
remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting
the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the
4
Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he has authority "to
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different do whatever may be necessary for these purposes." This authority includes
reason. the power to appeal from the decisions or final orders of the court which he
believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find
that the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension
Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of of time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not
appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank.
10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's This contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor
claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the
on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on appeal. OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign
Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal and the
the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal. Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly
signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's lawyers of the PDIC. 17
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should,
therefore, be affirmed. WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions
appealed from are AFFIRMED.
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act
No. 265, the court merely assists in adjudicating the claims of creditors, SO ORDERED.
preserves the assets of the institution, and implements the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as representative of the
Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the order of the court or
appeal from it. It contends that since the Monetary Board had previously
admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting aside the amount of
P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there was nothing else for
the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.
The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function
of the trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders
of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by
the Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary
Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith." 14 As this Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard
may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may
interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether
or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its
limits and has never been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad
faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).

In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but
also of the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in
behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all

5
G.R. No. 192828 : November 28, 2011
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, v.
HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME
CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her
son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1red under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the December 14, 2009 Decision2red and July 8,
2010 Resolution3red of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
assailed Orders dated March 15, 2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the
respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in
Civil Case No. 02-105251.4red
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,5red the
respondents filed a Complaint6red against the petitioners and Stronghold
Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena
Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of
Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon
Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for " Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of
[a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction, " was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:
First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as
Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents
Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children
of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes).
Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-
law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresent
edhimself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was
adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996,
Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as the
prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for
murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have remain
edunserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon
the authority of Article 9197red of the New Civil Code (NCC), the
respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence,
prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the
police investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of
Antonio, the former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon
misrepresented that there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio.
The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the
titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels of land, cash
and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's
possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was
sweet-talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank,
Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name
of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium units in
Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but which
were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented
to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete
shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from
the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon had convinced them
to execute an Agreement8red and a Waiver9red on August 20, 1996. The
terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on
the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the amount of
P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of
the execution of the said instruments and had not received any amount from
Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.
Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which
constitute 60% of the latter's total capitalstock, were illegally transferred by
Ramon to his own name through a forged document of sale executed after
Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim
6
that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is baseless.
Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air through
Ramon's machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate10red adjudicating solely to himself
Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the
said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real
properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the
Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to
post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may
eventually surface in connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant
Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.
Sixth Cause of Action . Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in
Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another
parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-
defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of
Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the
conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages
Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares
in the estate of Antonio.
The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant
RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from
disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to the estate of the
deceased ANTONIO CHING;
4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father
ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate
of his father;
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the
six [6] parcels of land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his
name covered by TCT No. x x x;
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by
plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral,
invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO
WING from the names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the
defendant ANTONIO CHING's name for having been illegally procured
through the falsification of their signatures in the document purporting the
transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being
contrary to law and existing jurisprudence;
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x
RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA
ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x
sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally procured the
ownership and titles of the above properties;
x x x.
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12red alleging forum
shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the
real parties in interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13red denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14red dated April 7, 2005
impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global
Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative
to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the
amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The
respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA
and that it be immediately released to them. Alternatively, the respondents
prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it
during the pendency of the case.
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim.
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16red admitting the
respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had
already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global
Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed
willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's
deposits. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the
aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3, 2006.
7
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss18red the
respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued
that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the
respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of
Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of nullity. Hence,
jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting
as an ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19red denying the petitioners'
Motion to Dismiss on grounds:
In the case at bar , an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the
action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties described
in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action. And
as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the nullity of
the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly
executed by defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of
establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have translated this action
into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint.
With regard [to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of
the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in itself poses
an issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial
evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was
intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-
trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching
and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there can be disinheritance in
intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally
disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court , the issue
of disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the Complaint, can
be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at this stage, it has not been
sufficiently established whether or not there is a will.20red (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for
certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856,
raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion
when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the
Amended Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the
respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a special proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision21red
denying the petition for certiorari on grounds:
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the
causes of action of the amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in
the said complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be
threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were
substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged fraudulent
acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also
instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the
consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify
Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him
from disposing or alienating the subject properties, including the P4 Million
deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with
the trial court that the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer
to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to
be contested in a probate court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and
complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses
set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs)
are entitled to recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted
therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the
defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the question
of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners
(defendants).22red Hence, we focus our resolution on the issue of
jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not on the
defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of
the petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a special
proceeding since the nullification of the subject documents could be achieved
in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the evidence of
8
the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined
during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.23red (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a
Resolution24red issued on July 8, 2010.
The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25red is anchored on the issue
of:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the PETITIONERS on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the Amended Complaint, to wit, (a) filiations with
Antonio of Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of common-law wives,
Lucina and Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c) determination
of the extent of Antonio's estate; and (d) other matters which can only be
resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine
(a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary
rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.26red Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the
contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to
receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are
matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding
and not of an ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed27red the instant petition claiming that the
petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos.
17550728red and 183840,29red both involving the contending parties in the
instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before
this Court. Further, in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30red the SC declared that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having
validly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having
actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from
challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and
Amended Complaint.31red
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to deny the instant petition.
The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing
them to file their reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant
Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011,
the petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply only
on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.
Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when
they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that
the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from
questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the
latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still
in order.Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought, among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor
of the respondents of the CPPA now under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case
No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special
proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of
the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.32red A
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact.33red It is distinguished from an ordinary civil
action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.34red To initiate a special
proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees
with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and
Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any
instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case
No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and
does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint,
seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under
Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the
complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status
as Antonio's heirs.
9
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be
declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes'
possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The
respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by
the RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits
with Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the
respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior
possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on
the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be
emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the
Agreement35red and Waiver36red prayed to be nullified. Hence, even
without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents
have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of
their claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and that
Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them.
Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs
issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well.
Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a
declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under
Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be
strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still
follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have
been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking
cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the
issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters which need not
be threshed out in a special proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition
to the respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;38red and (b)
Manifestation39red through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.
SO ORDERED.

In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,37red the Court

declared:

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the
court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction
of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents
subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil
action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents
from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon . In the event that the RTC will
find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only
consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to
the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251 was not instituted to
conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special

10
[G.R. NO. 168913 : March 14, 2007]
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA
A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE,
ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L.
ALCOVER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-
983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and
Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu
Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29,
1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982
directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding
decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot.
The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L.
Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio
and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an
opposition to petitioner's application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed
their Answer2 calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC
No. N-983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and
which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner's application on the ground
of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC,
on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's application on the ground of
res judicata.3 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari which raises the sole
issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in
LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become
final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been
issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26,
2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents'
motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5 and as no action for revival of the said
decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive
period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment passé[d] into
extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of
res judicata.7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. -
The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon
the expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice
of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as
in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the
court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree
to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the
corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to
registration. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land,
with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the
applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his
name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It
becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a
judgment of confirmation and registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's
approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's
application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on
the whole world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-
983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued
the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the
Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having
claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all
11
resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by the
Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court;
and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they
instead submitted to the court a mere special work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of
Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court
for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to
issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they
act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with
the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have
no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in
relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer
the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and
not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute
of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of
respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d etre why Section 6, Rule
39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28,
1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above
assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a
land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of
Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion,
and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable
against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After
the ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession
of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec.
6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon
the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
SO ORDERED.
12
G.R. No. L-18799 March 31, 1964
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance,
Negros Occidental, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein, over their objection, raising the
question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in
consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez
as a special co-administrator of the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla.
The pertinent antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec.
Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12
of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the
universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother
and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the
probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on
each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of
one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed
by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order
appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased, for the
reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner
and his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal
property is done, the Court cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of
the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by
the special administrator. Hence, although it is true that the petitioner
Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the property subject of the Will,
the Court finds it impossible for the present time to appoint any person other
than the petitioner as special administrator of the property until after the
partition is ordered, for the reason that the properties mentioned in the Will
are in the name of the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of the
deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the
will, as it was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of
the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the
court a petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla)
as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the
will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent.
Said petition was heard on February 20, at which hearing, respondent's
counsel orally moved for postponement, because respondent's principal
counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was not present. The court
ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Eliezar
Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the
will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the
court a petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he
failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment and
qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of
the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the
ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special
administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted by him, before
said petition for his removal was filed.1äwphï1.ñët
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed
with the court a petition for appointment of Conchita as special co-
administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition
February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint
Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, (2) approval of respondent's record
appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove respondent as special
administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special co-
administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special co-
administrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on grounds that (a) the law
allows only one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959
estops the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator
(c) such appointment is unfair to respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of
the whole property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the
administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock between two special
administrators would ruin the management of the property, including those of
13
respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel
elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed full time in the PCAPE, with
office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions of a co-administrator,
and (2) there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator in an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of
Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary
injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-
administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with
the petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court
of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which
was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds
that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00,
and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not
on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the
grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the
decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to
or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the
writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null
and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the
writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not
being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed
from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the
amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special
co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is
only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of
respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory
submitted by respondent as special administrator is valued at P362,424.90.
This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment
of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the
probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where
petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground
that the amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is
still pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering
that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per
inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be
administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the
deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held
that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the
marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-
2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v.
Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where
appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this
Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in
controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July
31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30,
1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings
in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved
therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have
original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable
where the amount or value involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the
amount involved being either the appellant's interest or the value of the entire
estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's rights or
the entire administration of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an
estate the amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in
controversy for purposes of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it
is to be observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the probate
proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole
estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 thereof, or
approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a pecuniary standard
on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value of the matter in
14
controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that
the appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment
of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to
restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator.
It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and,
consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the
value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate
in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had
no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount of
"P90,000.00 more or less", as the amount involved in the case, upon
authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But this case is
inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the
estate, nor to an order denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a
particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the
estate. In an analogous case involving the administration of a trust fund, the
United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit
court, in a suit to compel the stockholders of a corporation to pay their
subscriptions to stock to realize the fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00,
this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that
the amounts decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly
et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as
distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section
17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special
proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special
proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842).
On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes special
proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178). Moreover,
Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary
civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not
inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions
relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the
same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total
claim of the parties and not the combined claims against each other
determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the
instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that
the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate proceedings is that
of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by
respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the
whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced to a
pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more
than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by
respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable, because unlike the instant case,
it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate
proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was
appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in
view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over "all cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred
thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and that "all cases which
may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of
Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it
had originally been brought before it".
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special
administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need for it. Note
that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the
reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely
temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly
appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for
the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another one is
appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to
liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests of
petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate,
would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas v.
Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount
involved in the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate steps be taken
on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the probate of the
will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act
on the matter.
15
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set
aside and another one entered also setting aside the order of the trial court of
March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. Without
costs. So ordered.

16
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO,
CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent
Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila
Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion
Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita
Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1
respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with
the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among
other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February
1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left
real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date,
the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April
1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested
persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new
and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the
petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu
court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special
administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of
the said court, giving as reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the
notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the
petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of
the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition
with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said
last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to
Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964,
the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on
petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano
Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate
proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by
respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they
challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate
courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion
to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing
the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition
for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view
of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in
Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to
dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding
over an intestate proceeding."4 The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order
follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition
and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don
17
Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his
death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March
1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the
aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors
do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he
died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will
should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed in
the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of
the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained
as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will
indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a
resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament
of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that
the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that
he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also
of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as
his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will
be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or
considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The
petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first
choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction
of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City
court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April
1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for
probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour
intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors
appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing
in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City
court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their
opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the
testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the
notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had
been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the
three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the
notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and
the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates,
income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that
the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also
affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15
May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as
having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all
formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as
probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the
will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof,
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No.
Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding
that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate
proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is
that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is
that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of
(1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or
not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate
was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-
7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of
18
the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another
court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964,
Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated
that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready
for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court
to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge
was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to
jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but
only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings.
At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not
depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing
the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and
the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from
proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending
before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions
heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein
and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for
review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate
court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament
and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in
compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is
tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the
Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April
1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over
intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the
petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and
testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the
Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or
certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed
without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes
Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition and
to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution
and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in
law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all
its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's
last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the
following considerations: —
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts
of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate
estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down
the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to
prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly
assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule
provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs.
Co Ho9 as follows:
19
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases
the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view
because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has
been submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province
where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all
the creditors, have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who
also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision
raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial
court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider
such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings
including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court
will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew
before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of
mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to
require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206,
December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing
that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where
he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction
of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and,
as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over
the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section
56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since,
however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law
of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where
each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is
not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue.
And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it
stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to
take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance,
and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for
probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it
a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit
in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by
the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to
the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the
parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as
claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline
to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the
Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the
probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and
venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance
of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition
since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance
over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all
other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is
undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City
court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the
estate.
20
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before
it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference
of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule
of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon
City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be
declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in
admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority
against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a
last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this
case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations
therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should
have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the
Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No.
6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to
the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose
with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit
we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable
procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived
the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of
a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when
Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing
of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962
when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963
that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling
the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed
but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of
all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court
is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the
same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more
so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented
for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first
choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and
domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court
— could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original
case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
21
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity
of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had
the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the
late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a
legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is
considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of
First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the
question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both
factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in
the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of
the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and
the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his
residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as
so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido
Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will
and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference
and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual residence
of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja
ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical
ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held
applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for
itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had
already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu
court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual
finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should
likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary
finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of
waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon
City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it
is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition
for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando
vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time
of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a
pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding
upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a court
having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity."
19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were
to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding
the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's
last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence,
the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition
for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed
decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where
the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's
action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in
accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had
in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net
result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court
of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra,
"the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the
question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and
annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same
proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is
too obvious to require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of
the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the
decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule
73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different
courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating
conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and
that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who
unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to
who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of
whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the
decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament
22
and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire
consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in
consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under
all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court
(where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the
Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12,
1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the
decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly
entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would
be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu
and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new
proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a
testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate
proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the
Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow
had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and
entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money
and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule
73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the
death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to
be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides
in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in
Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and
exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of
the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and
petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and
go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and
conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court
did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining
to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the
testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow
and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it
(the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the
allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It
is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition
proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate
proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free
(pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and
admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of
venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's
order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner
as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be
overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as
it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and
transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference
and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will
and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without
bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and
actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and
authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to
repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to
revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that
indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City
was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.
23
G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000 properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings.
TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE
DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION SO ORDERED.
COMPANY, INC. respondents.
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition9 which
BUENA, J.: contained the following averments:

May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be 3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following
included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person? business entities, to wit:

Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on Business Entity Address:
certiorari, the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April xxx xxx xxx
1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated Alliance Marketing, Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
04 July 19952 , 12 September 19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court. xxx xxx xxx
Speed Distributing Inc. 910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo Highway,
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose Bacoor, Cavite.
estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95- xxx xxx xxx
23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, Auto Truck TBA Corp. 2251 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
represented by George Luy, Petitioner".1âwphi1.nêt xxx xxx xxx
Active Distributors, Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Homes,
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are xxx xxx xxx
corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which Action Company 100 20th Avenue Murphy, Quezon City or
owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. 92-D Mc-Arthur Highway Valenzuela Bulacan.

On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving
spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March
1995, a joint petition5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the
inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion6 for the lifting of
lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of
the decedent.
In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin
motions, in this wise:
3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with
the public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however,
personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders
and officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above
business entities were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed
therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the
following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly
Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other banks
whose identities are yet to be determined.

Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, 5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the
expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage
Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further with petitioner, to wit:
ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as well as those

24
Corporation Title Location
xxx xxx xxx
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo TBA
Corporation Cainta, Rizal
q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance, Metro Manila
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax
Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
xxx xxx xxx
7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor
Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the
existence of his marriage with petitioner.
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim
which petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to
this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents
covering the same as soon as possible.
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion
issued an order10 , thus:
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the
annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been deleted
and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and
51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123,
236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant
petition.
SO ORDERED.
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
administrator11 and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special
administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of
administration were accordingly issued.
In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew
private respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:
The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the
corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim,
Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a
matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs.
Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular
court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension
of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the
assets of the corporation are also assets of the estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the
SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply
a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his
lifetime, acquired several properties and put up corporations as his
instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED.
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed
by petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under
enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to
produce and submit to the special administrators, through this Honorable
Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order their respective records of
the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the names
of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the
transactions made or done concerning savings/current accounts from
January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14 , with an urgent
prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the
Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as
a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private
respondents, rendered the assailed decision15 , the decretal portion of which
declares:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari
is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July
4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The
impugned order issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified
insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are concerned.
25
SO ORDERED.
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner
Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of
error16 :
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower
court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the
private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y.
Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to
repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules
81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the petitioner,
from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate as expressly
provided in the said Rules.
Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders
issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court
of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on
jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 769117 , which introduced amendments to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value
of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in
probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings,
testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper
cases, where the value of the personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in
Metro Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the demand
does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged, Provided, that
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and costs
shall be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided further, that
where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
xxx xxx xxx
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over
matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on
the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain properties,
albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may
extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate
proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19 :
26
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may
be instituted by the parties.
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs.
RAMOLETE21 , We made an exposition on the probate court's limited
jurisdiction:
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and
the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22 , We had occasion to elucidate, through
Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa23 :
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court),
acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no
power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and
all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the
reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular
matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land
registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural
one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. . . .
. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the
Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a situation on which
this Court has already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under
the Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent
corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent
Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of
whether these properties should be included or not is merely provisional in
nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate
action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are
registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence
pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and finds
applicability, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to
support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the
law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere
incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. . . .
. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness
of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered
as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case
at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. . .
.
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence
was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title
of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes
collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the
property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens
system, We categorically stated:
. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
27
court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. . . .
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the
Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of
private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality
separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents'
motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court,
acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate
court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain
properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge,
albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true that
such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should
be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar
circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the
Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously
opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the
impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in
utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private
respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act
transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence
on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private
respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention,
petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and
wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the
instant case.25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of the
petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao
which among others, contained averments that the incorporators of Uniwide
Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and participation in the
organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added
that the persons whose names appeared on the articles of incorporation of
Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since
they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the
corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix
their respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for
that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.28
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a
personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the
same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity
shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to
the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29 , We
enunciated:
. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal
act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention
of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the
perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law covers and
isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it
will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of
individuals. . . .
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the
protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.30
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced
when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another
corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate
fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.31
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or
complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of
policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will
28
or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been used by the
defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory
or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of
any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil".32
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or
nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient
reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals
which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September
1995 is AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the

wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.34

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to
adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the
veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the
affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing
considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty
probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to
stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the
affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the
lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of
said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule
of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.

Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs.

LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:

Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing
the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of
Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted
without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority
to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private
respondent corporations.

29
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl,
petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO,
Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the
situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought
to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for
letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia,
"that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba,
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973,
contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of
administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate;
there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the
appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G.
Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G.
Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special
administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular
administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court,
Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule
as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in
the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was
obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the
estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as
officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the
Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for
the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the
allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was
elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last
place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia;
(3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the
original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has
expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate
in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the
regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was
opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts
to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the
court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was
deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of
jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado
G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying
for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the
hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia
opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar
on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the
personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of
Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing
30
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation
petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not
been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G.
Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the
deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said
Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded
sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom
the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one,
to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the
hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to
Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another,
filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want
of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion
of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia.
Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the
special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the
Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the court
that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement
with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association
should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already
been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and
possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the
decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa
B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like
"married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to
dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been
resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to
reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the
supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original
petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent
at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B.
Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973
to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of
previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the
making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of
her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that
filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute
and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special
administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets
of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as
they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing
(cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d)
appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e)
delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the
office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July
19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one,
directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar
pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate;
another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor
vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon
Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the
name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or
"married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C)
before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was
Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence
certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his
death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
31
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death,
and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first
district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a
special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily
to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the
questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying
their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss
the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the
delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule,
and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the
proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G.
Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case
was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a
petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same
intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B.
Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa
B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B.
Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge
Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings
therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested,
however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision
of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being
the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings
before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome
of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding,
Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already
filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge
Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit
of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January
12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on
February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in
G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the
32
decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this
is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next
of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death,
and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to
grant letters of administration.
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically
the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of
the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over
the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the
court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a
given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by
procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority
shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is
not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the
person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of
something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do
with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is
just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of
First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes
the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place
of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is
upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue."
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of
his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex
vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes
and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length
of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary.
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B.
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his
death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on
April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her,
the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also
resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate
presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition,
Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia
33
G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three
months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney
dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels
of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring
part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina
B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative
that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that
in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B.
Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper
venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special
administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims
preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13
Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when
the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules,
however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now
allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration
by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14
Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in
the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions
to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason,
equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular
administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a
special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order
of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a
special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in
this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the
decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession
over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in
the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not
more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next
of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the
fruits than the naked ownership of a property.
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the
widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia
maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G.
Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any
successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is
prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be
emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing
court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the
decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is
one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the
court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis
of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient
reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated
therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the
First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the
name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these
documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving
spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior
courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly
assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of
justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the
latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of
Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be
required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
34
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-
42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate
obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia

Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with
costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

35
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of
MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED
in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by
her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live
Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her
late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters
of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement
of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas
City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC
decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be
issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this
Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV
No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
36
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT
ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE,
THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY
FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO
QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE
QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial
Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of
the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on
the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac
where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of
his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the
time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985,
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is
void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his
marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous
appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and
binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals
erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void
marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23
applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
37
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to
wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia,
we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to
Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less
than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed
by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas,
Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage
and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to
the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of
marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of
time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing
that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that
Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted
to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters
of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
38
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited
in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers
to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by

the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With
the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right
of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law,
is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and
7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

39
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for
certiorari — docketed as G.R. L-21938 — against the respondents Juan
Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros
Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as
the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively — praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of
19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros
court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and
the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying
petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to
the settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently
annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the
respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings,
petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from
proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of
this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No.
6344, supra, and failing to declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as
prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila
court erred in failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in
the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this
Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading
entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this
Court as G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the reasons therein stated, that
judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on
December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record
on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further
commanding said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due
course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring
action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari
(G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer
traversing petitioner's contention that the respondent courts had committed
grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition for
certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite
(Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural
son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said
decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for
his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's
motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special
administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for the
hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in
accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or
another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special
administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents
herein, filed an opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he
was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a
Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has
been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon
receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to
commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following
grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will,
there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2)
that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate
said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the
40
decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were
attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the
Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's
motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending
before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on
July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond
and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this
court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed
by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the
approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the
Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27,
1963, be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for being
incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved
by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the
Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to petitioner's
abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal
filed by the petitioner is hereby disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition
for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to
intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the
proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said
court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during
the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment
for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable
from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he
commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been
acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final
judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros
Court has not gone farther than the appointment of a special administrator in
the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed
to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had
in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the
document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition
for probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as
stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963
denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention,
Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding
pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a
copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed
with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from
the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner
Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the
proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a)
whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No.
6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court
similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the
Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First
Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that
is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons — whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over
such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular
Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced,
is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a
decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had
estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident
alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance
41
in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance
are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city where the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this
premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken
cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said
decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to
settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will,
and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left
a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte
Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of
Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court — particularly in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled to commence the corresponding
separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support
the view that he should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros
Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for
said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In
the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation,
especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the result
of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second
place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente
Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already
informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a
will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said
court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his
motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the
Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it
may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for
probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding
pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same
deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear
that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344,
he had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros
Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to
the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose
with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit
we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable
procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived
the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of
a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when
Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing
of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962
when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963
that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling
the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed
but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of
all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court
is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
42
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for
so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition for
raised too late. mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge petitioner.
Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the
contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the
decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If the
petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his
contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate
estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for
indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful
character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment."

We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to

prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask
for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for
determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the
deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether
or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural
child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13
Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227,
and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).

Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939),
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore
stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental
petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give
due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said
court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the
order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second
being an order denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said
order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said
heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be
other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse
still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer
question the validity of said orders.

43
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y.
BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO
Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS, vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE
A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular,
petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the
RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso
E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint,
they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless
on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which
were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-
77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his
name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners
who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by
way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c)
the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no
showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11
finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against
Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their
relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could
already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the
contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s
son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence
he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno
and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated
February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on
which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance
was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or
not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint
is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely
on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless
of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the
same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be
true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint,
the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in
the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary
44
action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In
the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other
precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful
heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and
not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this
case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not
in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made
only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,
appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether
the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship
cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In
this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s
heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined
in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement
should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-
2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding
to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child
who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in
an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for

the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the
issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

45
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao
Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively.
The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal
properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99,
over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-
8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved
that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother,
Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly,
Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any
accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents
and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City
either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s
actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother
used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated
due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street,
Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously
executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s
affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments,
motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually
resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a
matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their
last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon
City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death
certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said
document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
decedents’ residence on the death certificates in good faith and through
honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that
their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely
transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for the
same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard.
The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence
of the decedents’ residence in light of the other documents showing
otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the
position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the
petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8
After the parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial
court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the
estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was
denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in
1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last
place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on
the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V.
Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot
disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for
lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the
court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
46
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for
review, anchored on the following grounds:
I SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN
A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY
CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY
RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO,
100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY
RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL
PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE
OF DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE
DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN
ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL
ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT
OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE
ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER
THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE
PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS
THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES
CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be
had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence,
or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters
of administration granted in the proper court located in the province where
the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et
al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the
time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following
factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen;
and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the
decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for
medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City
as their permanent residence.1âwphi1.nêt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The
decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of
transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then
47
suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase
a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able
to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move
therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and
hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that
Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical
presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have
transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to
sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in
his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they
were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly,
it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To
our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner
recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover,
petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate,
accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were
thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We
agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates
were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over
their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the
time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at
the time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not
to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to
permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we
held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the
terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents
have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time
prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on
record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to
petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents’
physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the
decedents’ stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any
substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual findings stemmed from an
erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held
to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule
4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which
applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in
the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose
of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is
significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the
settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and
where most of the decedents’ properties are located.
Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are
kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed
that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he
establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place
different from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains
extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be
formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates
between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In
48
Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled
that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have
one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly
held that venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was
properly laid in the Quezon City court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

49
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner, vs. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS,
Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM,
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to
annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a
probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at
78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by
his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward
Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and
Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which
ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One
will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property
of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate
outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two
children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of
the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside
this country, the testator said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita
Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm
Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will
disposing of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate
Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third
Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of
Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe
Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C,
pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in
Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10,
1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and
the codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4,
1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm,
Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife),
Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda
and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their
mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah
regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B.
Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-
fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and
Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's
Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half
conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be
less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par.
4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate".
It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm
(par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share
equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris
should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable
estate and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25,
1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp.
75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that
forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of the
first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo
B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance
intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was
named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground
of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She
also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to
the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found
in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,
through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.
50
Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss
and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned
Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the
record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and
approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-called
Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and
Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned
out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel
and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90,
testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold
for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM
Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by
lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two
children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated
to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth
(1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention
at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced
Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved to
defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion
moot considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and
project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he
was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the
Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who
negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to
sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of
Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that Maxine
paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no
objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The
court noted the certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no
movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm
Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the
Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present
intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that
motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm
filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for
Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the
firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11,
1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished
the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was then
superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On
September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of
Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition
praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that
the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters
of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel
and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them
and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to
the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise
agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm
died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack
of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be
dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and
heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23,
Rollo).
Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills
and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and
98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is
51
anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated
with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment
an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to
dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders,
notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is

dissolved. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

52
G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner, vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS,
Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G.
Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed
decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated
September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and
enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in
said case, except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of
improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the
appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American
Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-
President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of
Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was
raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a
Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives
and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the
other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation
doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other
credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE
Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants
(herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX,
and may be served with summons and other court processes at their office
address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor
of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued
to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's
daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the
United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when
petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel
Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the
Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi
Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they
resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's
account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000.
Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of
account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in
June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were
canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded
feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched
political and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts which
were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay
him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the
complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of
action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid
because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that
respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover,
notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not
allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax
certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay
City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner
Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the
said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case
for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of
Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or
Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that
any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and
unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district
thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to
take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he
possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that
of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated
53
Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever
since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at
Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger
obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate
is not determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the
affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of
the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents.
The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue
was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was
and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern
Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to
dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking
government official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial
notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual
residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the
case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing
venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the
permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and
circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but
one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715
[1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied
the same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the
appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the
September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting
of a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary
restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting
respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid.
It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its Orders dated
September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge
thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo
against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that personal
actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate
court, because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte.
Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The
appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of
Appeals5 where the Court distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile"
in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation
with the term residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws
that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while
residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact,
this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary
Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving
stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place
of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized
for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community tax certificate, as
indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same
54
community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed
against respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the
community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is
located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was
also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing
circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions
of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required
proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent
congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be
taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had
yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of
Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was
actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the
court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It
opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or
Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option
of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is
not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred
upon him by the Rules of Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law governing
venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is
fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party
litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e.,
to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of
justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due
course to respondents' affirmative defense of improper venue in order to
avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with
the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or
even to wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a
powerful and influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance
could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors
Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the
civil action before the court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum
shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the
locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the
appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders
must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent
judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to
desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The
temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of
preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein
respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in
the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages
that private respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the
issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are
not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case
for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or
any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the
appellate court, in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion
for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review with the
Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-
mentioned Decision and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in
a way probably not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed
fact that herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of
Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence (sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of
improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the
rules on venue, and even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing
the complaint in Maasin City was only to vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the
appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was
improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one
55
of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident
of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the
court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4
of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to
plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the
Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed
to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and
evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of
plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where
defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If
plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his
complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He
alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to
comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding
that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the
filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that
petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay
City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court
as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner
Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his
complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the
court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court
had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for
purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed
in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance
means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff
or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by
the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by
taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of
justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly
synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an
established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary
stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well
emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily
supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October,
1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval
v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that -
'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place
of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for
emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule
4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may
be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
56
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully
convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after
the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an
action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely
of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually
resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to
comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of
Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp.
304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73,
of the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R. No. L-
42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited
cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of
his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex
vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or
domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute
or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules -
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the
representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it
states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels
to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower
house."
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was
correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the
said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district which he
was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election
law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The
term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of
election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile."
Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore,
the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the
particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of
"residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the
district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term
is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to
have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal
actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner
Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular
57
sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced.
Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of the present case are not similar to the
facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance
in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident
of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement,
plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein at
the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his
domicile therein because although he manifested the intent to go back there
after retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was lacking.
To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms,
imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo.
Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the
qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein.
And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election
law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte,
but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in
Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a
resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of
a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino).
Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can
exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention
to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would
have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation
purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his
business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places
(Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212,
1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his
actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he
stays there with intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose
of exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political
purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually
then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be
preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr.
as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required
by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at
Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be
considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a
residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one
domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone
district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was
admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held
that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he
was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo
cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, 31
including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice
has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the
community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known
to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though
usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the
country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the
local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner
Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time
could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being
a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits.
58
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be
properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that,
under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or
representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the
district in which he shall be elected.

In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo
cannot be characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his
part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.

Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not
properly verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or

rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on

"information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states

that he has "read the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same
are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the
basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial
compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in
Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

59