Pacific Banking Corporation Employees
Organization vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed
under receivership and later was placed under
liquidation.
A Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of
Pacific Banking Corporation was filed by Central
bank and was approved.
Pacific Banking Corporation Employees
Organization (Union for short), filed a complaint-
in-intervention seeking payment due its members as
employees of PaBC. In its order, the court ordered
payment of the principal claims of the Union.
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on
September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed
a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of
the order but in effect was denied by the Court. This
order was received by the Liquidator on December
9, 1991.
The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a
Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time
to Submit Record on Appeal.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge
disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the
ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after
receipt of the decision.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., likewise filed
claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC
allegedly in the form of shares of stocks.
In his order, respondent judge of the RTC directed
the Liquidator to pay private respondents and such
order was received by the Liquidator on September
16, 1992.
On September 30, 1992 he moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
court on October 2, 1992. He received the order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October
5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of
Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and
October 2, 1992.
II.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court
of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court
denying his appeal from the orders granting the
claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors.
The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to
which the cases were separately raffled, rendered
conflicting rulings.
The Fifth Division held in the case of the Union that
the proceeding before the trial court was a special
proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing
from any decision or final order rendered therein is
30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator
was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the
decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was
brought on time.
On the other hand, the Fourteenth Division ruled in
the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a
liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action.
Therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days
and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was
filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order
appealed from, deducting the period during which
his motion for reconsideration was pending, the
notice of appeal was filed late.
Thus, the Union and the Liquidator then separately
filed petitions before this Court.
Ruling:
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
Action is the act by which one sues another in a
court of justice for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while special proceeding is the act by which one
seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from
special proceeding in that the former is a formal
demand of a right by one against another, while the
latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status,
right or fact.
Considering this distinction, a petition for
liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be
classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary
action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement
or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress
of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for
affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's
wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action
that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial
court of the corporation's insolvency so that its
creditors may be able to file their claims in the
settlement of the corporation's debts and
obligations. Put in another way, the petition only
seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of
insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors
and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.

In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the

Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of
appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the
23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims
of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the
Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the
result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already
stated a record on appeal is required under the
Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings
and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed.
The reason for this is that the several claims are
actually separate ones and a decision or final order
with respect to any claim can be appealed.
Necessarily the original record on appeal must
remain in the trial court where other claims may
still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his
appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently.
the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition and
Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different
reason.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the

Labor Union), we find that the Fifth Division
correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for
Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already
noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a
motion for extension to file a record on appeal on
December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his
receipt of the order granting the Union's claim.
Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for
extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the
extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent
judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal
and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension
to file a record on appeal.

The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly

granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should,
therefore, be affirmed.
G.R. No. 192828
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING
PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, v. HON.
JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME
CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA
SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S.
BALAJADIA, Respondents.
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
The respondents filed a Complaint against the
petitioners and Stroghold Insurance Company,
Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank),
Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources
Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and
Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles
from Ramon Ching (Ramon).
The Complaint was captioned as one for
"Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance
of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of
Preliminary Injunction."
In the complaint, the respondents alleged that
(1) they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that
Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonios son
when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth
certificated merely simulated;
(2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime
suspect and prior to the conclusion of the
investigations, Ramon made an inventory of the
formers estate and illegally transferred to his
name the titles to Antonios properties;
(3) Ramon sweet-talked respondent Mercedes into
surrendering to him a Certificate of Time Deposit of
P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and the
TCTs of two condo units registered under Ramons
name;
(4) Ramon illegally transferred to his own name
through a forged document 40,000 shares in Po
Wing Corporation;
(5) Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate adjudicating solely to himself
Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the
respondents; and
(6) Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in
Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic Business
Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was
part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-
defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably
low price.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan
Ching, manages Antonio’s estate and has no intent
to convey to the respondents their shares in the
estate of Antonio.
The respondents thus prayed for the
(1) issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or his
representatives from disposing or selling any
property that belongs to the estate of Antonio; (2)
that Ramon be declared as disqualified from
inheriting from Antonio Ching; and (3) declaring
null the unauthorized transfers made by Ramon.
The RTC
denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and ruled
that the action delves mainly on the question of
ownership of properties described in the complaint
which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil
action.
CA
Ruled that nothing in the said complaint shows that
the action of the private respondents should be
made in special proceedings because it appears that
their allegation were substantially for the
enforcement of their rights against the alleged
fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon
Ching.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the RTC should have granted the
Motion to Dismiss regarding the issues which could
only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in
an ordinary civil action
HELD:
No
There was reversible errors committed by the RTC
and the CA when they both ruled that the denial of
the petitioners' second motion to dismiss was
proper.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is a civil action, where matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased
person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the restrained from taking cognizance of respondents'
Rules of Court. Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues
raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can which need not be threshed out in a special
be effected only through a will wherein the legal proceeding.
cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees
with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents
in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought
the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any
instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of
Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence,
despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, the
case filed does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Even without the necessity of being declared as

heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing
to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the
light of their claims that there was no consideration
for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue
influence and committed fraud against them.

Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the

Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios
estates executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued
upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and
void as well.

Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues

raised shall first require a declaration of the
respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which
is not determinative of which court shall properly
exercise jurisdiction.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the

nullification of the documents subject of the civil
case could be achieved in an ordinary civil action,
which in this specific case was instituted to protect
the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts
of Ramon.

In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant

the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only
consequence will be the reversion of the properties
subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. The
civil case was not instituted to conclusively resolve
the issues relating to the administration, liquidation
and distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the
proper subject of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person under
Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action

before the RTC may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding should thereafter
still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon
the properties alleged to have been illegally
transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC,
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be
Ting vs Lirio
Judge Alfredo Marigomen of CFI granted the
application filed by the spouses Diero Lirio and
Flora Atienza for registration of a lot.
The decision of the judge became final and executor
and eventually, the judge issued an order directing
the land registration commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the
certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
Petitioner Ting filed with RTC of Cebu an
application for registration of title to the same lot.
within a reasonable time makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party.
In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact. In land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel
of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary. Except when
the adverse party had been in possession of the land
and the losing party had been in possession of the
land and the winning party desired to ouse him
therefrom.

The respondents then filed an answer calling the

attention to the decision of LRC no 983 which had
became final and executor and which they argued to
be barred on the ground of res judicata.

Hence the present petition

Issue:

WN the issue raises the sole issue of whether the

decision in the land registration case constitutes res
Judicata.

WN the lower court erred in ordering that the

decision rendered in the land registration has not yet
become final and therefore unenforceable?

Held:

1st issue

NO

After the land registration case has become final

and executor, it shall devolve upon the court to
issue an order to the commissioner for the issuance
of the decree of registration and the corresponding
certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged
entitled to registration.

The judgment of the court confirming the title of the

applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and
ordering its registration in his name constitutes res
judicata against the whole world.

2nd issue

No, the provision of the rules of court refers to civil

actions and is not applicable to special proceeding
such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a
judgment that is secured as against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
FERNANDEZ V. MARAVILLA
10 SCRA 589
FACTS:
Respondent Maravilla filed with the CFI a petition
for probate of his late wife’s will.
The siblings (pedro, asuncion, Regina) filed
opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground
that the will was not signed on each page by the
testatrix in the presence of witnesses.
On motion of respondent Heminio, the court issued
an order appointing him as special administrator of
the estate of the deceased.
The court then eventually rendered a decision
denying the probate of the will, as it was not dul
signed on each page by testatrix in the presence of
witness and of one another.
Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla filed with
court petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez
(who is the son of asuncion maravilla) on the
ground that the will, having been denied probate are
the legal heirs of the decedent.
The petitioners, filed motion for the removal of
respondent as administrator
number of cases where appeal was taken from an
order of a probate court disallowing a will, this
Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value
involved or in controversy therein is that of the
entire estate.
Not having appellate jurisdiction over the
proceedings in probate (CA‐G.R. No. 27478‐R),
considering that the amount involved therein is
more than P200,000.00,the Court of Appeals cannot
also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent
in the instant case, which are merely incidental
thereto.
Note also that the present proceedings under review
were for the annulment of the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co‐administrator and to
restrain the probate court from removing respondent
as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for
the administration of the estate and, consequently,
the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate
is the value in controversy (4C.J.S.204).
Appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is
much more than P200, 000.00, the Court of Appeals
clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs
in question.

RTC
Appointed Elizar Lopez as special co administrator

CA
Rendered a decision granting the writs prayed by
respondents and declaring null and void the
appointment of Elizar Lopez

Hence this appeal by petitioners.

ISSUE:

WN the CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari and prohibition? NO

HELD:

Under Section2,Rule75,of the Rules of Court, the

property to be administered and liquidated intestate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is,
not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to
the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate.

This Court has already held that even if the

deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of
the marriage by the death of the husband or wife,
the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. In a
CUENCO VS. CA
FACTS:
In 1964, Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in
Manila Doctors’ Hospital survived by his widow,
the herein petitioner, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco and
their two (2) minor sons all residing at 69 Piy
Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by
his children of the first marriage, respondents
herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco,
Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco
Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage,
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that
the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of
Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition
with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
last will and testament, where she was named
executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion
to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI
Quezon shall have acted on the probate
proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss
in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction
and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were
denied.
Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
CA ruled:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, covers both testate and intestate
proceedings.
The Special Proceeding of the Cebu CFI having
been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction
was first invoked and which first attached. It is that
court which can properly and exclusively pass upon
the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or
did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the
decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his
death.
Considering that the first proceeding was instituted
in the Cebu CFI, it follows that the said court must
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal
CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by
the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco. The said
respondent should assert her rights within the
framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI,
instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that
the judge of the Cebu CFI, stated that the petition
for appointment of special administrator was "not
yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It
would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it
not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try
this proceeding ..." It is sufficient to state in this
connection that the said judge was certainly not
referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not
to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the
moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise
of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the
proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred
and determined by law and does not depend on the
pronouncements of a trial judge.
ISSUE
Whether or not in Special Proceedings, the
court with whom the estate or intestate petition is
first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. (WN the
Cebu court has jurisdiction over the matter rather
then the CFI quezon city court?)
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found that CA erred
in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its
orders and actions, particularly the admission to
probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts, not the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed. Since the Quezon
City court took cognizance over the probate petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate,
with the consent and deference of the Cebu court,
the Quezon City court should be left now, by the
same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decdent or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. If this were
otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration
of justice. It would be an unfair imposition upon
petitioner as the one named and entitled to be
executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his
estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of
her rights under the rule on venue and the law on
jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time,
money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to
the Cebu court every time she has an important
matter of the estate to take up with the probate
court.
court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in
fact, as already determined by the Quezon City
court on the strength of incontrovertible
documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was
the conjugal residence of the decedent.

In the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take

cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it
and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the
Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon
City court to determine the residence of the
decedent and whether he did leave a last will and
testament upon which would depend the proper
venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon
City.

Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City

court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly
presented for probate by petitioner-widow and
finding that Quezon City was the first choice of
residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal
home and domicile therein — with the deference in
comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not
be contested except by appeal from said court in the
original case. The last paragraph of said Rule
expressly provides:

... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it

depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of

jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably
be properly invoked, had such deference in comity
of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not
appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise
shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of
the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

Finally, venue was properly assumed by and

transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is
the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless
delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent
(with the due deference and consent of the Cebu
court) and its admission to probate of his last will
and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow
as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the
decedent's express will and all its orders and actions
taken in the testate proceedings before it be
approved and authorized rather than to annul all
such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and
duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu
court only to revert once more to the Quezon City
Rufina Lim vs CA, Auto Truck, TBA
Corporation, Sspeed Distributing Inc., Active
Distributors, Alliance Marketing Corporation,
Action Company, Inc. (January 24, 2000)
Tests to Pierce the Veil of Corporate Fiction
Facts:
Rufina Lim is the surviving spouse of Pastor Lim
whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings.
The private respondents are corporations formed,
organized and existing under Philippine Laws and
which own real properties. Pastor Lim died June
1994, Rufina Lim filed for the administration of the
estate. The properties which were owned by the
corporations were included in the inventory of the
estate. They filed for the exclusion of the properties
from said estate and the cancellation of the
annotation of lis pendens in the TCTs of said
properties.
The RTC granted the motions. However Rufina Lim
filed an amended petition which averred that such
corporations were owned by Pastor Lim, and that
such were dummies of Pastor Lim, that those listed
as incorporators are only for the purpose of
registration with the SEC, and that the real
properties, although registered in the name of the
corporations, were actually acquired by Pastor Lim
during his marriage with Rufina Lim.
RTC
The RTC acting on such motion set aside its order
and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the lis
pendens.
The probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
administrator and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald
Lee as co special administrator of the estate of
Pastor Lim.
CA
The respondent filed for certiorari with the CA
which granted its prayer. Rufina Lim disputes such
decision and urges that not only are the properties
of the corporations part of the estate but also the
corporations themselves. She cites that Pastor Lim
during his lifetime organized and wholly owned the
5 corporations.
Issue:
Whether or not a corporation in its universality be
the proper subject of and be included in the
inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
Whether the corporation are mere alter ego or
instrumentalities of Pastor Lim?
Held:
The real properties included in the inventory of the
estate of the late Pastor Lim are in the possession of
and are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a
personality separate and distinct from their
stockholders and in the absence of any cogency to
shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption
of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
respondents should stand.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with
personality separate and distinct from that of
persons composing it. It may not generally be held
liable for that of the persons composing it. It may
not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of
its stockholders or those of the entities connected
with it. A corporation by legal fiction and
convenience is an entity shielded by a protective
mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to
the persons comprising it. But “when the fiction is
urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an
illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an
existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes,
the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or
generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the
veil with which the law covers and isolates the
corporation from…will be lifted to allow for its
consideration merely as an aggregation of
individuals.” First Philippine International Bank vs
CA (252 SCRA 259)
The test in determining the applicability of piercing
the veil of corporation fiction is as follows:
1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock
control but complete domination not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in
respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as of this transaction had at the time
no separate mind, will or existence of its own.
2) Such control must have been used by the
defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate
the violation of a statutory or other positive legal
duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiff’s legal right.
3) The control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury.
The absence of these elements prevent the piercing.
Petitioner failed to adduce evidence that would
justify such piercing. Mere ownership by a single
stockholder or by a corporation of all or nearly all
of the capital stock is not sufficient reason for
disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
personalities

2nd issue

It is true that the RTC acting in a restricted capacity

and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate
court, is competent to issue orders involving
inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the
inventory of the estate of the decedent and to
adjudge the question of title over properties, it is no
less true that such authority conderred upon by law
and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be
exercised judiciously

Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly

registered under the Torrens system in the name of
private respondents, and such were to be afforded
presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate
court opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and
still proceeded to issue the impugned orders

By its denial for the motion for exclusion, the

probate court in effet acted in disregard of the
presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of
private respondents. The probate court through such
brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law
and infringed settled jurisprudence on this matter.
GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned
property in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973,
Virginia G. Fule filed with CFI Laguna a petition
for letters of administration and exparte
appointment as special administratrix over the
estate. Subsequently, the motion was granted. There
was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio
Preciosa B. Garcia, filed a MOR contending that the
appointment of Virginia Fule was wthout
jurisdiction since no notice of the petition for letter
of administration has been served upon all persons
interested estate.
A notice of hearing for the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia Fule with CFI
Calamba was published.
Preciosa Garcia filed a supplemental petitions for
letters of administration raising the issues of
Jurisdiction, Venue, Lack of interest of Virginia
Fule in the estate of Amado Garcia and
disqualification as administrator.
However, Judge Malvar already issued an order
received by Preciosa Garcia denying the motion of
the latter to reconsider the order appointing Fule as
administrator.
During the hearing of various incidents of the case,
Virginia Fule presented the death certificate of
Amado Garcia showing that his residence at the
time of death was Quezon City. And also testified
that Amado Garcia was residing in Calamba at the
time of his death.
Preciosa Garcia commenced an action in the CA to
annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar.
CA
Rendered judgment annulling proceedings before
the CFI in Calamba.
ISSUES:
a.)What is the distinction between venue and
jurisdiction
b.)What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules
of Court Rule 73, Section 1 mean?
RULING:
Rule 73, Section 1.“if the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled at
the CFI in theprovince in which he resides at the
time of his death, And if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the CFI of any province in which
he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceedings, except in an appeal from that court,
inthe original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. ”Fule’s own submitted Death
Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC at
the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna
was improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (Rule 4, Section 4), but
Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse. However, venue is distinct from
“jurisdiction” which is conferred by Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended to bewith CFIs independently
from the place of residence of the deceased.
Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should
show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts such as death, name, last residence,
existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person
who seeks administration as next of kin, creditor or
otherwise to be appointed.
Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”-Elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it
isemployed.-Same meaning as “inhabitant”.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH
QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON,
Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and
in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189121, SECOND DIVISION, July 31,
2013,
PEREZ, J.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary
civil actions and that for special proceedings have
one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the
Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during
his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.
FACTS
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise
Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her Petition, Elise
claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having
been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes
to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the
Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate
of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the
same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real
properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal
properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve
the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of
its value, Elise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was
improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the
letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of
Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in
Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there
are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision dated 11 March 2005, the RTC
directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower
court ruled that the venue of the petition was
properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting
the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.
ISSUE
Whether the venue was properly laid. (YES)
RULING
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of
a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. –
If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province
in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the properties against Amelia before the RTC of
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of went to the extent of taking his marital feud with
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
appears on the record. disproves rather than supports petitioners’
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or record. Factual findings of the trial court, when
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As
thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the

Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas
City. It is evident from the records that during his
lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this
reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate
may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration,

the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death
Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac
where they insist his estate should be settled. While
the recitals in death certificates can be considered
proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his
death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding
on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This
finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985,
URIARTE V. CFI
33 SCRA 252
FACTS:
Upon the death of Don Juan Uriarte, his alleged
natural son filed for intestate proceedings in the
Negros Court. This was opposed to by one of the
nephews, alleging that a will was indeed executed
in Spain and asked for the submission of the said
will. Meanwhile, one of the nephews, who was in
possession of the alleged will, instituted in the
Manila Court petition for probate of the will. He
also sought to intervene in the intestate proceedings
in Negros Court.
HELD:
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding
intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the
law on intestate succession or in accordance with
his will, is a" probate matter" or a proceeding for
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of
deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a
court of first instance it is found it that the decedent
had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of
the latter should replace the intestate proceedings
even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the later being required to render
final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
This, however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be
rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall
continue as intestacy. As already adverted to, this is
a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of
a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Zamacona should have submitted for probate the
will he has on hand with the Negros court.
In the first place, it is not in accord with public
policy and the orderly and inexpensive
administration of justice o unnecessarily multiply
litigation, especially if several courts would be
involved. This, in effect, was the result of the
submission of the will a foresaid to the Manila
Court.
In the second place, when respondent Higinio
Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's
petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
he had already informed the Negros Court that the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in
Spain, of which a copy had been requested for
submission to said court; and when the other
respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his
motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No.6344, he
had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the
alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may
be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew
before filing the petition for probate with the Manila
Court that there was already a special proceeding
pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of
the estate of the same deceased person.
As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems
quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner’s
petition in Special Proceeding No.6344, he had
expressly promised to submit said will for probate
to the Negros Court. But the fact is that instead of
the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the
Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the
petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We
cannot accept petitioner's contention in this regard
that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider
said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong
venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and,
in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such
objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It
is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed
by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December
19,1961whenHiginioUriartefiledhis opposition to
the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344; that petitioner likewise was served with
notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last
will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
August28,1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a
motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding
No.6344.
All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15,
1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No.51396 an Omnibus motion asking
for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to
that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to
appoint an administrator with the will annexed but
also to admit said will to probate more than five
months earlier, or more specifically, on
October31,1962.To allow him now to assail the
exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will
by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special ProceedingNo.51396
would put a premium on his negligence.
Roberts v. Leonidas (April 27, 1984)
PROBLEM:
A will already probated in Utah was filed before
Manila CFI Branch 38 while intestate proceedings
for the same estate were ongoing in Manila CFI
Branch 20. HELD: The two proceedings must be
consolidated and the testate proceeding should be
continued. It would be anomalous to undergo
intestate proceedings when the deceased died with
two wills.
FACTS:
 EDWARD Grimm, an American citizen residing
in the Philippines, was married twice. o FIRST
MARRIAGE (divorced) = Juanita Kegley Grimm
(MRS. GRIMM). Children: JUANITA Grimm
Morris and ETHEL Grimm Morris. o SECOND
MARRIAGE = MAXINE Tate Grimm. Children:
Edward Miller Grimm II (PETE) and LINDA
Grimm.
 Jan. 23, 1959 – Edward executed 2 wills, one for
his Philippine properties (PH WILL) and one for his
properties abroad (FOREIGN WILL). o Edward
described his Philippine properties as conjugal
property of his second marriage. o In the PH will,
Juanita and Ethel were given their legitimes. o They
were not given anything in the foreign will, because
according to Edward he had already given them
their legitimes in the PH will. o The rest of the 2
wills favored Maxine and her children
 Nov. 27, 1977 – Edward died in the Makati
Medical Center.  Jan. 9, 1978 – Ethel instituted
intestate proceedings for Edward’s estate before
Manila CFI Branch 20. o Ethel was named special
administratrix. o Maxine admitted that she was
notified of the proceedings
 March 7, 1978 – Maxine presented the 2 wills for
probate before the 3rd Judicial District Court of
Tooele County, Utah, USA. o Juanita and Ethel
were notified of the proceeding
 March 11, 1978 – Maxine, through ACCRA,
moved to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground that Edward’s wills were being probated in
Utah.
 April 10, 1978 – Utah court admitted the 2 wills
to probate.
 April 25, 1978 – COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE TWO CAMPS o made in Utah
with knowledge of the intestate proceedings before
the Manila CFI o signed by David E. Salisbury and
Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by
Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine
and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita and
Mrs. Grimm
o STIPULATIONS
 Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as
administrators of Edward's Philippine estate
 Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate
should be reserved for her and that would not be
less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and
Sta. Mesa, Manila.
 Computation of the "net distributable estate"
 Recognized that the estate was liable to pay the
fees of the ACCRA law firm  Pete, Linda, Ethel
and Juanita "shall share equally in the Net
Distributable Estate"
 Ethel and Juanita should each receive at least 12-
1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and
marital share.
 Included a supplemental memorandum also dated
April 25, 1978
 May 23 and June 2, 1978 – Pursuant to the
Compromise Agreement, CFI Branch 20 (intestate
court) allowed Maxine to withdraw her opposition.
Maxine, Pete and Ethel were appointed
administrators of the estate. The court ignored the
will already found in the record (I think it was there
because it was submitted together with the
compromise).
 March 21, 1979 – Maxine, Pete and Ethel, acting
as administrators, sold one of Edward’s businesses
(Palawan Pearl Project) for P75,000, to a company
named Makiling Management Co. [whose
incorporators were Ethel, her husband Rex Roberts
and Maxine’s former lawyer William Limqueco] o
The admins also sold 193,267 shares of RFM
Corporation to Joseph Server and others for
P1,546,136.
 July 27, 1979 – Branch 20 Judge Molina
adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the
Edward's Philippine estate and one-eight (1/8) each
to his four children or 12-1/2%. No mention at all
was made of the will in that order. (anlabo mo
judge)
 August 9, 1979 – Maxine, through a new lawyer,
moved to defer approval of the partition (as per the
Utah agreement ata). Court considered it moot
because the shares had already been adjudicated in
the July 27 order.
 April 18, 1980 – Juanita moved for accounting of
the estate’s properties filed a motion for accounting
to facilitate partition and close the present intestate
estate.
 June 10, 1980 – ACCRA filed appearance as
collaborating counsel for Maxine  Sep. 8, 1980 –
Maxine, through Rogelio Vinluan of ACCRA, filed
the assailed petition for probate of the 2 wills
already probated in Utah. The case was heard
before Manila CFI Branch 38

o ALLEGATIONS
 Maxine and her children were defrauded due to
the machinations of the Roberts spouses
 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal
 the intestate proceeding is void because Edward
died testate
 the partition was contrary to Edward's wills o
Petition also asked that:
 the 1979 partition approved by Br. 20 be set aside
and the letters of administration be revoked
 Maxine be appointed executrix
 Ethel and Juanita be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and to return the same
to Maxine

 Ethel moved to dismiss, Judge Leonidas denied.

 Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition

o RELIEFS SOUGHT:
 Dismissal of the testate proceeding, OR
 Consolidation of the two proceedings in Branch
20
 That the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the
petition for probate

ISSUE (HELD):
Can a petition for allowance of wills and annulment
of partition - approved in an intestate proceeding by
one branch of the CFI - be entertained by another
branch (after a probate in the Utah district court)?
(YES)

RATIO:
 A testate proceeding is proper in this case because
Edward died with two wills and "no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed" (NCC 838; ROC 75, Sec. 1).

 The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs.

Guevara and Baluyot vs. Paño).

 It is anomalous that the estate of a person who

died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding.

 The intestate case should be consolidated with the

testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the
testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.

 Ethel may file her answer to the petition anyway.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied, CFI affirmed.