September , 2016

From: Ronald-James: Family of Lyons, beneficiary1, Trustor, and Secured-party to the Social
Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS
Without prejudice
___ ay 160
Newport, Tennessee 37821

To: The Trustees and their principals:

1. M.: Family of Webb and M.: Family of Webb d/b/a Trustee 2 of the Social Security Cestui que
Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS and d/b/a M. WEBB Police officer, badge number 1136,
City of Morristown, Tennessee, a taxpayer2
100 W 1st N Street
Morristown, Tennessee 37814
Certified mail, return receipt requested # 7015 1730 0002 1561 8740

2. Rhonda-F.: Family of Day and Rhonda-F.: Family of Day d/b/a Trustee of the Social Security
Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS and d/b/a RHONDA F DAY Clerk of the Trust
business entity titled “Morristown Municipal Court,” a taxpayer
100 W 1st N Street
Morristown, Tennessee 37814
Certified mail, return receipt requested # 7015 1730 0002 1561 8757

3. Randy: Family of Noe and Randy: Family of Noe d/b/a Trustee of the Social Security Cestui
que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS and d/b/a RANDY NOE Morristown City Attorney, a
taxpayer
100 W 1st N Street
Morristown, Tennessee 37814
Certified mail, return receipt requested # 7015 1730 0002 1561 8764

4. Matthew: Family of Sexton and Matthew: Family of Sexton d/b/a Trustee of the Social
Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS and d/b/a , MATTHEW SEXTON
Officer-of-the-Tribunal titled of MUNICIPAL COURT OF MORRISTOWN, TENNESSEE, a
taxpayer
100 W 1st N Street
Morristown, Tennessee 37814
Certified mail, return receipt requested # 7015 1730 0002 1561 8771

1 Every taxpayer is a cestui que trust having sufficient interest in preventing abuse of the trust to be recognized in the field of this court’s
prerogative jurisdiction as a relator in the proceedings to set sovereign authority in motion by action...” In re Bolens 135 N. W. Rep. 164
(1912) supreme Court of Wisconsin.
2 “A Public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him and ifhe
deliberately conceals material information from them he is guilty of fraud,” U.S. v Holzer 816 F. 2d 304, 307 (1987). Public officials are also
“trusteefs] and servant[s] of the people,” Georgia Department v. Sistrunk 291 S.E. 2d 524, 526 (1982). ‘“Public office’ is a public trust or
agency for the benefit of the people to be administered under legislative control in the interest of the people.” State ex rel Nagle v. Sullivan 40
P. 2d 995, 997, Supreme Court of Montana (1935).

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
Page 1 of 21
 5. Roger-D.: Family of Overholt and Roger-D.: Family of Overholt d/b/a Trustee of the Social
Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS and d/b/a ROGER D OVERHOLT Chief
of Police, City of Morristown, Tennessee, a taxpayer
100 W 1st N Street
Morristown, Tennessee 37814
Certified mail, return receipt requested # 7015 1730 0002 1561 8788

With Completion of Service and designation of Witnesses To:

6. Loretta-E.: Family of Lynch and Loretta-E.: Family of Lynch d/b/a Trustee of the Social Security
Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS d/b/a LORETTA E LYNCH United States
Attorney General
United States D.O.J.
10th& Constitutional Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Certified mail, return receipt requested # 7015 1730 0002 1561 8795

7. Herbert III: Family of Slatery and Herbert III: Family of Slatery d/b/a Trustee of the Social
Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS d/b/a HERBERT SLATERY III,
Tennessee Attorney General, a taxpayer
425 5th Ave N #2
Nashville, Tennessee 37243
Certified mail, return receipt requested # 7015 1730 0002 1561 8801

Re: Your Offer titled STATE OF TENNESSEE UNIFORM CITATION #P 35166, see
Attachment-A, CITY OF MORRISTOWN, TENNESSEE, a Trust business entity v. RONALD
JAMES LYONS, a fiction / Ronald- James: Lyons, a human and beneficiary of the Social
Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS, Accuser v. “THE CITY OF
MORRISTOWN, TENNESSEE,” a Trust business entity; Trustees:
M.: Family of Webb, Rhonda-F.: Family of Day, Randall-T.: Family of Noe, Matthew:
Family of Sexton, Roger-D.: Family of Overholt, Et al. in their human being and Trutee
persons and capacity.

Conditional Acceptance “Under protest, extortion, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, treason,
conspiracy to commit treason, false arrest, false imprisonment” served by hand to me, Ronald-
James: Lyons, the human and the human beneficiary, from the Accused M. Webb
d/b/aTrustee Webb, et al., acting in his and their human being and as human Trustees,
wherein the Trust business entity corporation State of Tennessee security guard touted as
“Law Enforcement Officer” Webb pulled me over where no injured party was established and
forced me to autograph a security-instrument titled CITATION #P
35166 in an attempt to get me to commit myself as the acting Trustee when the people
addressed herein are, in fact, the Trustees, knowing full well that as the beneficiary I have
no authority to make any decision/s for said Trust in this Military (Admiralty)
Jurisdiction Maritime law Tribunal whose standard is the yellow fringed flag3 and
3 You display a military flag as vour jurisdiction, see Title 4 United States Code Services, Lawyers Edition, § 1 INTERPRETIVE NOTES
AND DECISIONS “Placing of fringe on national flag...within discretion of President as Commander- Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the
Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party Page 2 of 21
In-Chief of Army and Navy. (1925) 34 Op Atty Gen 483.” In addition, “Pursuant to U.S.C. Chapter 1,2, and 3; Executive Order No. 10834,
August 21, 1959, 24 F.R. 6865, a military flag is a flag that resembles the regular flag of the United States, except that it has a Yellow Fringe,
bordered on three sides. The President of the United states designates this deviation from the regular flag, by executive order, and in his
 wherein the beneficiary has no fiduciary responsibility for said Trust; Conditional
Acceptance of your Offer to charge me criminally for exercising my Constitutionally secured
rights guaranteed under 11 American Jurisprudence §329 (1940); Conditional Acceptance of
your Offer to unlawfully assume corporation ownership of the public property highways, roads,
streets, etc. and assume an unlawful authority of who or what may travel on these roads in
violation of and opposition to 25 American Jurisprudence §§ 163 and 165 (1940); and,
Conditional Acceptance of your declaration that I must follow your Admiralty Rules of
Procedure to my injury; and, Evidence of Fraud; Conspiracy to commit Fraud; Treason; and
Conspiracy to commit Treason; amongst other crimes willfully and knowingly committed
against me by The Accused [hereinafter Conditional Acceptance].

Webb, Rhonda, Randy, Matthew, Pete, Loretta, Herbert and To Whom It May Concern,

I am Ronald-James: Family of Lyons [hereinafter Ronald-James: Lyons, I, me, my], a freeman,

Sui Juris, Appearing in any Military (Admiralty) Jurisdiction Maritime law tribunal appearing by paper
and Specially, Not Generally Or Voluntarily, and In Propria persona and as human beneficiary of the
Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYONS [hereinafter Trust RONALD J LYONS or
Trust RJL], and never as the Trustee.

I am serving this “Conditional Acceptance” to The Accused and their principals.

The Accused did willfully and knowingly deprive me of my rights and property through the
crimes herein listed while their officer and cohort, one Webb, badge number 1136 and Webb, badge
number 1136 d/b/a Trustee of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD J LYONS and d/b/a
WEBB, Police Officer of the Trust business entity corporation STATE OF TENNESSEE [hereinafter
Webb], was armed with weapons of violence. That the actions against me were and are: treason,
conspiracy to commit treason, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, assault, extortion, peonage, theft,
unjust enrichment and conspiracy to impersonate a peace officer and judge, and embezzlement, amongst
other crimes and tort actions, both against me and the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD J
LYONS, and in support I state the following:

Be It Known: The “Conditional Acceptance” to Your Offer establishes a Common Law-contract 4

between us under the Postal rule, which states
“The postal rule (also known as the mailbox rule or "deposited acceptance rule") is a term of common
law-contracts which determines the timing of acceptance of an offer when mail is contemplated as
the medium of acceptance. The general principle is that a contract is formed when acceptance is
actually communicated to the offeror. The mailbox rule is an exception to the general principle. The
capacity as COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the Armed forces.” Moreover, the Congress willfolly and knowingly overstepped its power, to wit:
in 1845 Congress passed an act saying Admiralty-law could come on land. The bill may be traced in Cong. Globe, 28th Cong., 2d. Sess. 43,
320, 328, 337, 345 (1844-45), no opposition to the Act is reported. Congress held a committee on this subject in 1850 and they said: “The
committee also alluded to ‘the great force’ of ‘the great constitutional question as to the power of Congress to extend maritime jurisdiction
beyond the ground occupied by it at the adoption of the Constitution....’” • H.R. Rep. No. 72 31 st Cong., 1 st Sess. 2 (1850).”
4 Constitution for the United States of America, Article I, Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make anv Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts;
pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. (Emphasis
added by me.) Though if the title Esquire is not a form of a “Title of Nobility” I am at a loss as to what would be.
Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
Page 3 of 21
 mailbox rule provides that the contract is formed when a properly prepaid and properly addressed
letter of acceptance is posted. One rationale given for the rule is that the offeror nominates the post
office as implied agent and thus receipt of the acceptance by the post office is regarded as that of the
offeree. The main effect of the mailbox rule is that the risk of acceptance being delivered late or lost
in the post is placed upon the offeror. If the offeror is reluctant to accept this risk, he can always
require actual receipt before being legally bound.”

Pertinent Law(s):

American Jurisprudence, Volume 11, Commerce to Constitutional Law, Copyright 1940,11

AmJur §329 - Constitutional Law, 2. Liberty, Paragraph 4, “Personal liberty largely consists of
the right of locomotion-to go where and when one pleases-only so far restrained as the rights of
others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. 5 The right of a citizen to travel
upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage,
wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will,
but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 6
Under this constitutional guaranty one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his
inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an
orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s rights, he will be
protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.7” (Emphasis added by me.)

American Jurisprudence, Volume 25, Guardian and Ward to Highways, Copyright 1940, IX. Use
of Way, A. In General, 25 AmJur §163 - Generally; Right to Use-Streets and highways are
established and maintained primarily for purposes of travel and transportation by

the public,8 and uses incidental thereto.9 Such travel may be for either business or pleasure. 10

5 Williams v. Fears. 179 U.S. 270, 45 L.ed. 186,21 S.Ct. 128; Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N. W. 579, 7 L.R.A. 507,
18 Am. St. Rep. 473; Watertown v. Christnacht, 39 S.D. 290, 164 N.W. 62, L.R.A. 1917F. 903.
6 Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co. 229 Ky. 731,17S.W. (2d) 1012,66 A.L.R. 1378; Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E.
579, 71 A.L.R. 604.
7 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579, 7 L.R.A. 507, 18 Am. St. Rep. 473. See St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502,
109 S.W. 30, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 973, 124 Am. St. Rep. 750 (loitering on the street).
8 Sauer v. New York, 206 US 536, 51 Led 1176, 27 S Ct 686; Birmingham R., Light & P. Co. v. Smyer, 181 Ala 121, 61 So. 354,
47 LRA (NS) 597, Ann Cas 1915C 863; Yale University v. New Haven, 104 Conn 610, 134 A 268, 47 ALR 667; Augusta v. Reynolds, 122 Ga
754, 50 SE 998, 69 LRA 564, 106 Am St Rep 147; Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill 619, 2 NE(2d) 905, 105 ALR 1045; Ligare v. Chicago, 139 111
46, 28 NE 934, 32 Am St Rep 179; Lebanon Light, Heat & P. Co. v. Leap, 139 Ind 443, 39 NE
57, 29 LRA 342; Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind 491, 41 Am Rep 618; Smith v. Jefferson, 161 Iowa 245, 142 NW 220, 45 LRA (NS) 792, Ann
Cas 1916A, 97; Com. v. Morrison, 197 Mass 199, 83 NE 415, 14 LRA (NS) 194, 125 Am St Rep 338; Carli v. Stillwater Steet R. & Transfer
Co. 28 Minn 373,10 NW 205,41 Am Rep 290; Sherlock v. Kansas City Belt R. Co. 142 Mo 172, 43 SW 629, 64 Am St Rep 551; Graves v.
Shattuck, 35 NH 257, 69 Am Dec 536; Hudson River Teleph. Co. v. Watervliet Tump. & R. Co. 135 NY 393,32 NE 148, 17 LRA 674, 31 Am
St Rep 838; People ex rel. New York Electric Lines Co. v. Squire, 107 NY 593, 14 NE 820, 1 Am St Rep 893, affirmed in 145 US 175, 36 Led
666, 12 S Ct 880; Callanan v. Gilman, 107 NY 360, 14 NE 264, 1 Am St Rep 831; Donovan v. Allert, 11 ND 289, 91 NW 441, 58 LRA 775, 95
Am St Rep 720; Cincinnati Inclined Plane R. Co. v. City & Suburban Teleg. Asso. 48 Tennessee St 390, 27 NE 890, 12 LRA 534, 29 Am St
Rep 559; Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla 355, 65 P(2d) 1015, citing RCL; Eddy v. Granger, 19 RI 105,31 A 831, 28 LRA 517; Boone v. Clark (Tex
Civ App) 214 SW 607, citing RCL; Radford v. Calhoun, 165 Va24, 181 SE 345, 100 ALR 1378; McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp. 152 Va
1, 145 SE 425, 61 ALR 1033; Ex parte Dickey, 76 W Va 576, 85 SE 781, LRA 1915F, 840; Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum, 184 Wis 182, 199 NW
219, 33 ALR 351; Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. 173 Wis 400, 180 NW 339, 181 NW 821, 13 ALR 802; Krueger v.
Wisconsin Teleph. Co. 106 Wis 96, 81 NW 1041, 50 LRA 298; Marshfield v. Wisconsin Teleph. Co. 102 Wis 604, 78 NW 735, 44 LRA 565,
Anno: 108 Am St Rep 139.
9 Kipp v. Davis-Daly Copper Co. 41 Mont 509, 110 P 237, 36 LRA (NS) 666, 21 Ann Cas 1372; Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum, 184
Wis 182, 199 NW 219, 33 ALR 351
10See infra, § 427.
 Highways may also lawfully be used for purposes other than travel and transportation, which are
conducive to the public convenience, tend to make them of greater utility and convenience to those
who legally have a right to their use, 11 and are not inconsistent and incompatible with the reasonably
free passage over them of whoever has occasion to travel upon them. 12 The extent of the public right
depends, in some degree at least, upon the needs of the public.13
The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a
common and fundamental right,14 of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be
deprived.15 The rights of the public to the use of highways cannot be encroached upon by
private individuals or corporations.16 Moreover, streets and highways are for the use of the public
in general for passage and traffic without distinction,17 and all
persons have an equal right to use them for purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard
for the corresponding rights of others. 18 The whole community have an equal interest and right to all
the privileges and advantages of the highways. 19 The mere fact that the burden of the construction
and maintenance of streets and highways20 and the right to control and manage them 21 rest with the
municipal and quasi-municipal corporations in which they are situated does not give to such
corporations, or to their inhabitants, any peculiar privileges therein. The right of use is not in the
citizens of the corporation alone, even under such circumstances, but remains in the public at
large, and the entire public still has an equality of right therein, 22 subject to such limitations as
11See infra, § 168.
12Cloverdale Homes v. Cloverdale, 182 Ala 419, 62 So 712, 47 LRA (NS) 607.
13 Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 SE 579, 71 ALR 604; McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp. 152 Va 1, 145 SE 425, 61 ALR 1032.
The public right to use the streets legitimately for transporting property is as secure and inviolate as the private rights of an
abutting owner. McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp. 152 Va 1, 145 SE 425, 61 ALR 1033.
14The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by horse- drawn carriage
or wagon or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will, but a common right which he has under his right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va 367, 154 SE 579, 71
15 Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. Chicago, 337 Ill 200, 169 NE 22, 66 ALR 834; Ligare v. Chicago, 139 Ill 46, 28 NE 934, 32 Am St Rep 179;
Boone v. Clark (Tex Civ App) 214 SW 607, citing RCL.
Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the
ordinary course of his business or pleasure, although this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience.
Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. Chicago, 337 III 200, 169 NE 22, 66 ALR 834.
The county court, which has title to the public highways in trust for the public, has no power, without legislative authority, to
exclude any member of the public from reasonable use of the highways. Sumner County v. Interurban Transp. Co.
16 Sears v. Chicago, 247 III 204, 93 NE 158, 139 Am St Rep 319, 20 Ann Cas 539; Huffinan v. State, 21 Ind App 449, 52 NE 713, 69 Am St Rep
368; Stillwater v. Lovell, 159 Okla 214, 15 P(2d) 12, citing RCL; Boone v. Clark (Tex Civ App) 214 SW 607, citing RCL; Anger v. Al. G.
Barnes Amusement Co. 183 Wis 272, 197 NW 707, citing RCL.
17 People v. Eaton, 100 Mich 208, 59 NW 145, 24 LRA 721; Deputy v. Kimmell, 73 WVA 595, 80 SE919, 51 LRA (NS) 989.
18Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co. 199 US 279, 50 L ed 192,26 S Ct91; Harold v. Jones, 86 Ala 274, 5 So 438, 3 LRA 406; State v. Mayo, 106 Me
62, 75 A 295, 26 LRA (NS) 502, 20 Ann Cas 512; Covington County v. Collins, 92 Miss 330, 45 So 854, 14 LRA (NS) 1087, 131 Am St Rep
527, 15 Ann Cas 1072; Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co. v. Omaha, 114 Neb 483, 208 NW 123, citing RCL; Dent v. Oregon City, 106 Or 122, 211
P 909, citing RCL; Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va 367, 154 SE 579, 71 ALR 604.
Anno: 108 Am St Rep 139.
The rights of policemen in this regard are equal to those of other members of the public. Pon v. Wittman, 147 Cal 280, 81 P 984, 2
LRA (NS) 683.
Differences in the nature and importance of the use of a public highway bear only upon the question of reasonable use, and not
upon the fact of the paramount right. Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co. 103 Me 37, 68 A 527, 14 LRA(NS) 1083.
19 Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron Works, 82 Me 391, 19 A 902, 8 LRA 828; \Troy v. Cheshire R. Co. 23 NH 83, 55 Am Dec 177; People v. Ritter,
120 Misc 852, 200 NYS 816, citing RCL.
20Cheney v. Barker, 198 Mass 356, 84 NE 492, 16 LRA(NS) 436.
21Gould v. Topeka, 32 Kan 485, 4 P 822, 49 Am Rep 496; Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron Works, 82 Me 391, 19 A 902, 8 LRA 828.
22 Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal 636, 192 P 422, 21 ALR 1172; Wilmot v. Chicago, 328 Ill 552, 160 NE 206, 62 ALR 394; Chicago v. Union Bldg.
Asso. 102 Ill 379,40 Am Rep 598; People ex rel. Bransom v. Walsh, 96 Ill 232, 36 Am Rep 135; Gould v. Topeka, 32 Kan 485,4 P 822, 49 Am
Rep 496; Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron Works, 82 Me 391, 91 A 902, 8 LRA 828; Cheney v. Barker,
198 Mass 356, 84 NE 492, 16 LRA(NS) 436; New York v. Rice, 198 NY 124, 91 NE 283, 28 LRA(NS) 375; Elizabeth City v. Banks, 150 NC
407, 64 SE 189, 22 LRS(NS) 925; Parker v. Silverton, 109 Or 298, 220 P 139, 31 ALR 589; Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. Norfolk, 115 Va 169,
78 SE 545, Ann Case 1914D, 1067; White Oak Coal Co. v. Manchester, 109 Va 749, 64 SE 944, 132 Am St Rep 943.
Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
Page 5 of 21
 the municipalities are authorized by law to impose. 23 Furthermore, as to the rights of the public, there
is no substantial difference between streets in which the legal title to the fee is in private individuals
and those in which it is in the public.24
The right to make a particular use of a highway, which would otherwise be unlawful or improper,
cannot be conferred by the consent or petition of abutting owners or citizens generally.25
The general rule is that a charge or toll cannot be exacted for the use of a highway for the purpose
of travel or transportation in the ordinary modes, in the absence of legislative authorization.26
25 American Jurisprudence §165 - Mode and Manner of Use.-The public easement includes every
kind of travel and communication for the movement or transportation of persons or property which
is reasonable and proper in the use of a public highway, or of a particular portion thereof, with all
means of conveyance which can be introduced with a reasonable regard for the safety and
convenience of the public, and without inflicting upon the owner of the fee an injury differing in
kind from that imposed by use and improvement for ordinary public travel,27 and embraces all
public travel, not prohibited by law or by dedicatory restriction, on foot, in carriages,
omnibuses, stages, sleighs, or other vehicles, including motor vehicles, as the wants and habits
of the public demand.28 The public is not confined to the use of vehicles in use at the time when
the streets or highways were established, but may use such other reasonable means or
conveyance as may be discovered in the future, provided they do not exclude the proper use of
the highway by other modes or kinds of vehicles, or then to destroy it as a means of passage

Anno: 52 Am Dec 487; Ann Case 1914D 1071.

23 Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal 636, 192 P 422, 21 ALR 1172; Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co. v. Omaha, 114 Neb 483, 208 NW 123, citing RCL;
Dent v. Oregon, 106 Or 122, 211 P 909, citing RCL; White Oak Coal Co. v. Manchester, 109 Va 749, 64 SE 944,
24 Barney v. Keokuk, 94 US 324,24 L ed 224; Montgomery v. Santa Ana Westminster R. Co. 104 Cal 186, 37 P 786,25 LRA 654,
25 Covington County v. Collins, 92 Miss 330, 45 So 854, 14 LRA(NS) 1087, 131 Am St Rep 527, 15 Ann Cas 1072; McClintock v. Richlands
Brick Corp. 152 Va 1, 145 SE 425, 61 ALR 1033.
26Anno: 42 LRA(NS) 837.
As to fees, taxes, and charges for special, permissive, and incidental uses, see infra, § 184.
As to turnpikes and toll roads, see TURNPIKES AND TOLL ROADS [Also 26 RCL P. 1395.]
27Yale University v. New Haven, 104 Conn 610, 134 A 468, 47 A|LR 667; People ex rel. Mather v. Marshall Field & Co. 266 Ill
609, 107 NE 864, LRA 1915F 937, Ann Case 1916B, 743; Taylor v. Portsmouth, K. & Y. Street R. Co. 91 Me 193, 39 A 560,
64 Am St Rep 216; Briggs v. Lewiston & A. Horse R. Co. 79 Me 363, 10 A 47, 1 Am St Rep 316; Cheney v. Barker, 198 Mass
356, 84 NE 492, 16 LRA(NS) 436; Com. v. Morrison, 197 Mass 199, 83 NE 415, 14 LRA(NS) 194, 125 Am St Rep 338; Sears v. Crocker, 184
Mass 586,69 NE 327, 100 Am St Rep 577; Cater v. Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. 60 Minn 539, 63 NW 111,
28 LRA 310, 51 Am St Rep 543; Carli v. Stillwater Street R. & Transfer Co. 28 Minn 373, 10 NW 205,41 Am Rep 290; Jaynes
v. Omaha Street R. Co. 53 Neb 631, 74 NW 67, 39 LRA 751; Sumner County v. Interurban Transp. Co. 141 Tenn 493, 213 SW
412, 5 ALR 765; Frazier v. East Tennessee Teleph. Co. 115 Tenn 416, 90 SW 620, 3 LRA(NS) 323, 112 Am St Rep 856, 5 Ann Cas 838;
McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp. 152 Va 1, 145 SE 425, 61 ALR 1033; Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. 173 Wis 400,
180 NW 339, 181 NW 821, 13 ALR 802.
Anno: 36 LRA(NS) 677.
The servitudes to which the streets of a city are subject are the right of transit by travelers on foot or in vehicles, the right to
transmit intelligence by letter, messages, or any other method suitable for that purpose, such as by telegraph or telephone, the right to transmit
water, gas, or sewage for the benefit of the public, and the right to transport personal effects, either by hand or by any conveyance suitable for
that purpose, because such rights are enjoyed by all in common. Kipp v. Davis- Daly Copper Co. 41 Mont 509, 110 P 237, 36 LRAfNS) 666, 21
Ann Cas 1372.
A citizen has an absolute right to choose his mode of conveyance provided he observes all of the “laws of the road.” Swift v.
Topeka, 43 Kan 671, 23 P 1075, 8 LRA 772.
23
Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. Chicago, 337 Ill 200, 169 NE 22,66 ALR 834; Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind 465, 74 NE 615, 1 LRA(NS)
238, 6 Ann Cas 656; Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co. 229 Ky 731, 17 SW(2d) 1012, 66 ALR 1378; Com. v. Nolan, 189 Ky 34, 224 SW
506, 11 ALR 202; People v. Eaton, 100 Mich 208, 59 NW 145, 24 LRA 721; Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich 212, 22 Am Rep 522; St Paul v.
Twin City Motor Bus Co. 187 Minn 212, 245 NW 33, citing RCL; Carli v. Stillwater Street R. Co. 28 Minn 373, 10 NW 205, 41 Am Rep 290.
One may transport his goods over the highway in wagons, automobiles, or other vehicles, loaded thereon or therein as he may
deem best, provided that in so transporting them he uses the care that a prudent man would use-care commensurate with the dangers created by
his undertaking. Ryder v. Hayward (Sturtevant v. Hayward) 98 Vt 106, 126 A 491, 36 ALR 453.
Travelling by means of roller skates is not necessarily improper. Muller v. Hillenbrand, 227 NY 448, 125 NE 808, 8 ALR 1455.
Specifically as to use by automobiles, see 5 Am Jur 521, AUTOMOBILES, § 10.
 and travel common to all.29 The use of such new and improved means of locomotion must be
deemed to have been contemplated when the highways and streets were laid out or dedicated,
whenever it is found that the general benefit requires it, and such new means of locomotion
cannot be excluded therefrom or be deemed unlawful merely because their use may tend to the
inconvenience or even to the injury of those who continue to use the highways and streets by
former methods.30 Where sidewalks or footways are provided, they are ordinarily intended for the
use of pedestrians, to the exclusion of animal and vehicular traffic, 31 except in the case of certain
small vehicles.32 The rights of the users by any proper mode or means are equal, neither enjoying
any superior rights over another,33 except under regulations governing the movement of traffic, 34 and
if the use of one mode of travel or means of conveyance results in injury to the user of another, the
latter’s right of action will depend on the question of negligence. 35 Any person has a right to
transport over the highway elephants and animals, or machinery, or loads of goods, which, from
their height or appearance, or the noise made in transport, are liable to frighten horses or other
animals.36 But while this right is undoubted, it must be so exercised as not to endanger the lives or
property of others who have equal rights upon the highway,37 and as in other cases of the use of a
dangerous article, that required degree of care increases with the danger to be apprehended from the
use of it and from exposure to it.38 While highways are constructed and intended for ordinary use, in
an ordinary manner,39 necessity may justify the use of a sfreet for the purpose of transporting things
in an unusual manner, or of transporting such things as necessarily obstruct the street for a time, and
such uses are not necessarily illegal.40 Articles of this character may not, however, be unnecessarily
permitted to remain stationary in the street, in an improper and dangerous position, or for a
longer time than is reasonably necessary for the mere purpose of transportation.41 The allocation of

29 Cloverdale Homes v. Cloverdale, 182 Ala 419, 62 So 712, 47 LRA(NS) 607; Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich 212, 22 Am Rep 522; McClintock
v. Richlands Brick Corp. 152 Va 1, 145 SE 425, 61 ALR 1033.
30 McIntyre v. Omer, 166 Ind 57, 76 NE 750, 4 LRA(NS) 1130, 117 Am St Rep 359, 8 Ann Cas 1087; Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind
465, 74 NE 615, 1 LRA(NS) 238, 6 Ann Cas 656; Bogue v. Bennett, 156 Ind 478, 60 NE 143, 83 Am St Rep 212; Thompson v. Dodge, 58
Minn 555, 60 NW 545, 28 LRA 608,49 Am St Rep 533.
Anno: 73 Am Dec 410.
The public, by the establishment of a street, acquires the right to use it for public purposes by every appropriate means, whether
or not those means are customary, or were even known at the time the street was established, and the right to utilize changed methods and new
vehicles of transportation in the handling of local freight and local passengers includes any appropriate means of transportation which may be
used for the public convenience. McClintock v. Richlands Brick Corp. 152
31 Kohlhofv. Chicago, 192 Ill 249, 61 NE 446, 85 Am St Rep 335; Wheeler v. Boone, 108 Iowa 235, 78 NW 909, 44 LRA 821; Webster v.
Vanceburg, 130 Ky 320, 113 SW 140, 19 LRA(NS) 752, 132 Am St Rep 392; Lee v. Port Huron, 128 Mich 533, 87 NW 637, 55 LRA 308.
As to the liability for injury to persons using vehicles on sidewalks, see infra, § 432.
32Wheeler v. Boone, 108 Iowa 235, 78 NW 909,44 LRA 821; Lee v. Port Huron, 128 Mich 533, 87 NW 637, 55 LRA 308.
33 Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn 555, 60 NW 545, 28 LRA 608, 49 Am St Rep 533; Bombard v. Newton, 94 Vt 354, 111 A 510, 11 ALR 1402.
The right to drive an automobile along a public highway is not superior to that to drive cows along the highway. Bombard v.
Newton, 94 Vt 354, 111 A 510, 11 ALR 1402.
Highways and streets are not for the exclusive use of vehicles propelled by animal power, nor are travelers confined to the use of
such power and ordinary carriages upon highways. Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind 465, 74 NE 615, 1 LRA(NS) 238, 6 Ann Cas 656;
Bogue v. Bennett, 156 Ind 478, 60 NE 143, 83 Am St Rep 212; Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn 555, 60 NW 545, 28 LRA 608, 49 Am St Rep
533. Anno: 6 Ann Cas 658.
34The users of horses and other animals have no rights superior to the users of other means of locomotion which are adapted to
and consistent with the proper use of the highway. Holland v. Bartch, 120 Ind 46, 22 NE 83, 16 Am St Rep 307; Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich
212, 22 Am Rep 522.
35Holland v. Bartch, 120 Ind 46, 22 NE 83, 16 Am St Rep 307; Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich 212, 22 Am Rep 522.
36Bennett v. Lowell, 12 RI 166, 34 Am Rep 628.
37Bennett v. Lowell, 12 RI 166, 34 Am Rep 628.
38As to care required and liability for injury generally, see infra, §§ 223 et seq.
39 Packard v. Ban ton, 264 US 140, 68 L ed 596, 44 S Ct 257; Com. v. Allen, 148 Pa 358, 23 A 1115, 16 LRA 148, 33 Am St Rep 830.
40Anno: 30 Am St Rep 206.
41Caimcross v. Pewaukee, 78 Wis 66,47 NW 13, 10 LRA 473.
Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
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 portions of the way to particular uses is discussed in a subsequent section.42” (Emphasis added by
me)

Tennessee-Constitution - Article I. Declaration of Rights, (In regards to the question your officers,
agents, brokers or intermediaries ask as to whether or not I am a sovereign.)
Section 1. Powers of people, “That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the
advancement of those ends they have at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right to
alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper” and,
Section 2. Doctrine of non-resistance, “That government being instituted for the common benefit,
the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.” (Emphasis added by me.) Section 8. That no man
shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled,
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers,
or the law of the land.
Section 20. That no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, shall be made.
Section 24. That the sure and certain defense of a free people, is a well regulated militia; and, as
standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to freedom, they ought to be avoided as far as the
circumstances and safety of the community will admit; and that in all cases the military shall be kept in
strict subordination to the civil authority.
Section 25. That no citizen of this state, except such as are employed in the army of the United
States, or militia in actual service, shall be subjected to punishment under the martial or
military law. That martial law, in the sense of the unrestricted power of military officers, or
others, to dispose of the persons, liberties or property of the citizen, is inconsistent with the
principles of free government, and is not confided to any department of the government of this
state. [Emphasis added by me.]
Section 26. That the citizens of this state have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common
defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to
prevent crime.

That 2010 Tennessee Code, Title 39 - Criminal Offenses, Chapter 11 - General Provisions, Part 1 -
Construction, 39-11-106 - Title definitions, (29) “Public place means a place to which the public
or a group of persons has access and includes, but is not limited to, highways, transportation
facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, places of business, playgrounds and hallways,
lobbies and other portions of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments
designed for actual residence. An act is deemed to occur in a public place if it produces its offensive
or proscribed consequences in a public place”. And, (27) “Person

includes the singular and the plural and means and includes any individual, firm, partnership,
copartnership, association, corporation, governmental subdivision or agency, or other organization or
other legal entity, or any agent or servant thereof’. No place in the definition ofperson is the word
“kuman,” but it does use the operative word ‘includes,9 which word in the definition specifies its
use as identifying fictions of law knowing full well thatyou cannot lump a human with fictions of
law where one, the human, has unalienable rights and the others have contractual rights based on
42See infra, § 265.
 the terms and conditions of the specific contract or agreement.

Definitions:
Liberty - “The word ’’liberty” includes and comprehends all personal rights and their enjoyment.
Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 1 8 1 Misc. 78,42 N.Y. S.2d 626, 630. It embraces freedom from duress;
freedom from governmental interference in exercise of intellect, in formation of opinions, in the
expression of them, and in action or inaction dictated by judgment, Zavillav. Masse, 1 1 2 Colo.
183,147 P.2d 823, 827; freedom from servitude, imprisonment or restraint, Committee for
Industrial Organization v. Hague, D.C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 13 1 ,14 1; People v. Wood, 15 1 Misc.
66, 272 N.Y. S. 258; freedom in enjoyment and use of all of one’s powers, faculties and property,
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 446, 80 L.Ed. 660; City of Mt. Vernon
v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447, 17N.E.2d 52,55; freedom of assembly, Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 18 1 Misc.
78, 42 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630; freedom of citizen from banishment, Committee for Industrial
Organization v. Hague, D.C.N.J., 25 F. Supp. 127, 141 ; freedom of conscience, Gobitis v.
Minersville School Dist., D.C.Pa., 2 1 F.Supp. 58 1 , 584, 587; freedom of contract, State ex rel.
Hamby v. Cummings,
166 Tenn. 460, 63 S.W.2d 5 15; State v. Henry, 37 N.M. 536, 25 P.2d 204; freedom of locomotion
or movement, Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, D.C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 13 1,14 1;
freedom of occupation, Koos v . Saunders, 349 Ill. 442, 1 82 N.E. 4 1 5, 4 1 8; freedom of press,
Commonwealth v. Nichols, 301 Mass. 584, 18 N.E.2d 166, 167; Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 5 1 S.Ct. 625, 628, 7 5 L.Ed. 1357; freedom of religion, Gabrielli v.
Knickerbocker, 12 Cal.2d 85, 82 P.2d 391, 393; Hamilton v. City of Montrose, 1 09 Colo. 228, 1 24
P.2d 757, 759; Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 3 1 0 U.S. 296, 6 0 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 12 13;
freedom of speech, Ghadiali v. Delaware State Medical Soc,, D.C. Del., 28 F. Supp. 84 1 , 844;
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 2 1 3, v. Ritter’s Cafe, 3 1 5 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct.
807, 86 L.Ed. 1
143. It also embraces right of self-defense against unlawful violence; right to acquire and enjoy
property; right to acquire useful knowledge; right to carry on business, Mlle. Reif ； Inc., v.
Randau, 1 66 Misc. 247, 1 N.Y.S.2d 5 1 5,5 1 8; right to earn livelihood in any lawful calling;
right to emigrate, and if a citizen, to return, Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague,
D.C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127,141; right to engage in a lawful business, to determine the price of one’s
labor, and to fix the hours when one’s place of business shall be kept open, State Board of Barber
Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44 N.E.2d 972, 980; right to enjoy to the fullest extent the
privileges and immunities given or assured by law to people
living within the country, McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 6 1 1 ;
right to forswear allegiance and expatriate oneself, Committee for Industrial Organization v.
Hague, D.C.N.J. , 25 F.Supp. 127, 14 1; right to freely buy and sell as others may; right to live
and work where one will, People v. Wood, 1 5 1 Misc. 66, 272 N.Y.S. 258; right to marry and
have a family, Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, D.C. N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 14 1;
Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 1 8 1 Misc. 78, 42 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630; right to pursue chosen calling,
People v. Cohen, 255 App.Div. 485, 8 N.Y.S.2d 70, 72; right to use property according to
owner’s will.” Black’s TLtzw Dictionary, Fifth Edition (Emphasis added by me.) Yet We the People
are forced to attend government operated and controlled schools where throughout our educational

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
Page 9 of 21
 years we are brainwashed into believing that we are required to be licensed for these rights and
freedoms and the corporation government, no longer the Constitutional government, fines and/or
imprisons us if we are not licensed. This is an act of Treason and Conspiracy to Commit Treason
against every American Citizen in this country.

license is: “The permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would
be illegal, a trespass, or a tort.” “Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition.” In addition,
“li.cense,Function: noun , Etymology: Middle English, from Anglo-French licence, from Latin I ice
nt ia, from I ice nt-, licens, present participle of I ice re to be permitted, Date: 14th century, 1 a:
permission to act b: freedom of action 2 a: a permission granted by competent authority to engage in
a business or occupation or in an activity otherwise unlawful b: a document, plate, or tag evidencing
a license granted c: a grant by the holder of a copyright or patent to another of any of the rights
embodied in the copyright or patent short of an assignment of all rights 3 a: freedom that allows or is
used with irresponsibility b: disregard for standards of personal conduct licentiousness 4: deviation
from fact, form, or rule by an artist or writer for the sake of the effect gained.” “ Merriam-Webster
Collegiate Dictionary, Eleventh Edition:’

Public - As a noun, the whole body politic, or the aggregate of the citizens of a state, nation, or
municipality. The community at large, without reference to the geographical limits of any
corporation like a city, town, or county; the people.
As an adjective, open to all; notorious. Open to common use. Belonging to the people at large;
relating to or affecting the whole people of a state, nation, or community; not limited or restricted to
any particular class of the community. The Free Dictionary, Online.
That, as such, the word “Public,” as in public highway is an adjective and it means open to all;
therefore, attempting to use the proper noun “Speed” as an avenue of threat, imprisonment, fines or
other loss of one’s rights is un-Constitutional and an attempt to overthrow the Constitution for the
United States of America’s-Bills of Rights.

Facts:

1. On Tuesday August 2, 2016 I was traveling west on Highway 160 going to work at 7:30 am.

2. That my automobile is not registered with the Trust business entity STATE OF TENNESSEE, and
is, therefore, my private property and not governed by corporation statutes.
3. After passing the school an emergency vehicle pulled behind me.
4. At the time I was behind a school bus.
5. I signaled and moved to left lane to pass bus.
6. After passing bus, I signaled and moved to right lane.
7. The driver of the emergency vehicle followed and got behind me.
8. After a few minutes the occupant of the emergency vehicle turned on the emergency lights.
9. I signaled and moved over to shoulder and came to a stop to allow the occupant of the emergency
an opportunity to carry on to his/her emergency.
10. Instead, the occupant pulled in behind me and exited his vehicle.
11. The occupant had a name tag which read “M. Webb,” [hereinafter Webb] and he came to my
 vehicle and told me, “I shot you with radar and you were speeding.”
12. That Webb produced no injured party in order to initiate an action.
13. That he did not present any evidence of a particular radar beam that allegedly hit and bounced off
me and/or my automobile and back to his radar gun and did not specify if I were the one that was
allegedly “speeding.” or if the automobile was allegedly “speeding,” or if both me and the
automobile were allegedly “speeding.”
14. That radar causes cancer, and him declaring that he shot me with radar Webb intentionally placed
me in danger of contracting cancer in the future.
15. That I demand to see the facts on precisely where the alleged radar beam struck me and/or my
automobile, what the duration of the contact was and what the intensity was per surface area; such
as, was it aimed at my eyes, which could concentrate a contaminate in sensitive tissue, etc.
16. That unless Webb can prove otherwise, such as evidence of the specific spatial path the radar beam
travelled, and said beam did not hit me specifically, then Webb willfully and knowingly committed
criminal negligence against me.
17. That he then asked for license, registration and proof of insurance.
18.1 offered him my certificate of Non US citizen status.
19. He asked what it was for, and I replied “It is public law filed in the public record”.
20.1 suggested that he return to his cruiser and read the document.
21. He refused and said “Can’t you explain it to me?”
22.1 then explained that it stated that statutes do not apply to me.
23. He asked “So you don’t have to follow the law?”
24.1 replied that that was not what I said.
25. Again, I said “Statutes do not apply to me.”
26. That as an alleged ‘law enforcement officer’ and since ignorance of the law is no excuse, Webb
knows the law, see 11 AmJur §329 and 25 AmJur §163 and §165, and that statutes are the
abrogation of the common law, therefore, I can only conclude that he was committing fraud by
deception.
27. That, therefore, Webb knows that Constitutional Law overrides Trust business entity corporation
statutes, which statutes are for fictions of law and not humans.
28. He then asked if I had a Driver’s license.
29.1 said yes I have one.
30. He then asked to see it.
31.1 tlien handed him the Tennessee driver’s license issued to the Trust RJL inasmuch as the Taxpayer
Identification Number was required in order to obtain the license thereby supporting it is issued to
the Trust RJL.
32. That, hence, the driver’s license is issued to a Trust, a piece of paper, that logically cannot drive an
automobile from an alleged competent authority, which alleged competent is also a Trust, a fiction
of law.
33. That, therefore, a driver’s license is an identification of who the beneficiary of the Trust is and is
simply titled driver license as a misnomer, or the Trustees conspired to overthrow Constitutional
Law and commit criminal fraud by deception, knowing full well that the license does not apply to
humans.
34. That, so being, I carry the driver’s license as an identification that I am the beneficiary.

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
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35. He said ok.
36. After approximately ten (10) minutes he returned with a citation.
37. He said he was citing me for speeding in a school zone and for not having proof of insurance.
38. He then explained that I could appear in court on 19 September with the proof of insurance and they
would throw that charge out.
39. Then he said when I appear in court I could show the judge the certificate and he would decide if the
speeding charge would apply as well.
40. Webb then ordered me to sign the citation and I autographed the citation thusly, “Without prejudice”
above my name, “Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary.”
41. Then he said I appreciate your cooperation, please drive safe.
42.1 replied you too.
43. The incident lasted approximately 15 minutes.
44. That Webb is a public official and holds fiduciary responsibility for the Trust RJL.
45. That I autographed the citation ‘without prejudice’ and behind my human name I wrote
‘beneficiary.’
46. That, in other words, Webb did not elaborate as to whether he meant Tennessee as: a) the Trust
business entity STATE OF TENNESSEE; b) the body politic Tennessee in the Tennessee- State; c)
the geographical area known as Tennessee; or any other definition or designation wherein the word
‘Tennessee’ relates to, or is a human, a person, a place or a thing thereby establishing no real party
in interest.
47. That, in other words, the Trustees use menace and duress to force their victims to engage in a
questionable contract to: a) become a pseudo Trustee; b) be liable under a separate contract than that
of the citation; c) report to a court when, in fact, no such court is convened; d) appear before an
Military (Admiralty) jurisdiction and maritime law Tribunal when no action was committed over the
water; e) declare themselves a “VIOLATOR” or “DEFENDANT” thereby establishing an admission
of guilt; f) be fined and/or imprisoned and/or loss of automobile and the property therein if they do
not contract with the Trust business entity corporation STATE
OF TENNESSEE to register their private property automobile, thereby granting ownership to this
Trust business entity; and other crimes and torts written or implied herein.
48. That, therefore, the language on the citation wherein the victim is required to autograph the citation
under the threat of arrest and imprisonment is a fraudulent and treasonous scheme to use extortion
and other menace to force a contract on the victim being a separate contract of imprisonment and/or
fine and an admission of guilt as a violator.
49. That the SSN/TIN is required for the issuance of a driver license.
50. That, additionally, you would use the all capital letter designation, knowing full well that my name
as a human is not designated in all capital letters.
51. That, moreover, you know that the all capital designation is either an acronym or a Trust and not a
living human being; thusly, logic and common sense witnesses that the identification you address as
a ‘driver license’ is, in reality, an identification to identify me as its beneficiary but that you are
implementing a scheme to seduce me into appearing as Trustee so that you can fraudulently funnel
the assets of the Trust RJL into your pockets and the corporation tills.
52. That, therefore, the language on the citation is contradictive at best and downright fraudulent and
treasonous at its worst and intended to create a position of a defendant, a taxpayer, of the one being
forced to autograph said citation.
53. That, moreover, the armed Trustee demanding the human and human beneficiary to ‘sign’ the
citation under threat of further arrest and imprisonment creates a condition of menace with extortion
when one is forced to ‘sign’ the citation, and is a breach of Trust-Law and the Trustee / beneficiary
 relationship.
54. That 11 AmJur §329 clearly declares in part, “...The right of a citizen to travel upon the public
highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse-drawn carriage, wagon, or
automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a
common right which he has under his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness...;”
therefore, insurance is not required anent this Constitutional Law.
55. That I recently began to understand the Constitution for the United States of America and the
Tennessee-Constitution and discovered in the Tennessee-Constitution the mandate, The Tennessee-
Constitution - Article 1. Declaration of Rights, § 22. Perpetuities and monopolies, “That perpetuities
and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State, and shall not be allowed.”
56. That the overthrow of Constitutional Law of 11 AmJur §329 and the common law in 25 AmJur
§§163 and 165 witness only a couple of activities that these Tennessee-Constitution mandates have
been and are being overthrown by the officials herein listed and referenced, and others not
referenced in these Trust business entity corporations touted as government.
57. That Trustees-Matthew and Randy are BAR Association Attorneys and the BAR Association is a
monopoly in the Tennessee-State inasmuch as they profess to have a license to practice and that such
license is required to practice law in Tennessee.
58. That considering that the BAR Association is the only place someone can get this invisible “license”
and the BAR Association is a private Trust business entity corporation, this Constitutional mandate
has been and is being overthrown and a state of Treason and Conspiracy to commit Treason has been
committed and is still being committed by Trustees- Matthew and Randy.
59. That Trustees-Mattliew and Randy support that their being members of the monopolistic private
corporation BAR Association and licensed through it that the Tennessee-State is no longer a “free
government.”
60. That there is nothing in the Constitution for the United States of America or the Tennessee-
Constitution that requires the Judiciary to be licensed and that the word license is defined as, “The
permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal, a
trespass, or a tort.” Black’s Zaw Dictionary, Fifth Edition. That so being, Trustees- Matthew and
Randy declared that they are doing something that is illegal, a trespass or a tort in regards to their
claiming to have a license to practice law and their consequent actions or inactions thereby against
the People of this country.
61. That, furthermore, the BAR Association and its monopolistic control over the judiciary is in violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act,1^ July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7)
and since this act requires the United States Federal government to investigate and pursue trusts,
companies and organizations suspected of violating the Act why is it not prosecuting the BAR
Associations and its Attorney members? It is a Federal statute to limit cartels and monopolies, not
encourage them wherein the judiciary itself is a monopoly.
62. That there is no language in the Constitution for the United States of America or the Tennessee-
Constitution making the judiciary illegal, a trespass or a tort, which would give authority to license
the judiciary, and then there would have to be language designating who or what would be the
competent authority.
63. That, as stated supra, Tennessee-Constitution, Article 1, Bill of Rights, Sec. 26. supports, along with
the Sherman Antitrust Act, an act of Treason to overthrow the Tennessee- Constitution and the
Constitution for the United States of America in the Tennessee-State by Trustees-Matthew and

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
Page 13 of 21
 Randy, et al.
64. That as you know, or should know, there are at least Eighty-seven (87) types of law and at least
thirty-one (31) arenas of jurisdiction, to wit: "1. Absolute law, 2. Adjective law, 3. Administrative
law, 4. Admiralty law, 5. law of Arms, 6. Antitrust laws, 7. Bankruptcy Act, 8. Blue law, 9. Blue-sky
law, 10. Canon law, 11. Case law, 12. Civil law, 13. Commercial law, 14. Common Law, 15.
Conclusion of law, 16. Constitutional law, 17. Consuetudinary law, 18. Conventional law, 19.
Criminal law, 20. Customary law, 21. Divine law, 22. Decree-law, 23. Ecclesiastical law, 24. Edict,
25. Enabling statute, 26. Enacted law, 27. Environmental Law, 28. Equity law, 29. Ex post facto law
(though this type is supposed to be un-Constitutional),
30. Federal law, 31. Forest law, 32. Forfeiture law, 33. Fundamental law, 34. General law, 35.
Higher law, 36. Imperative law, 37. Immigration law, 38. Internal law, 39. International law, 40.
Judicial decree, 41. Judicial opinion, 42. Law arbitrary, 43. law of Citations, 44. law of Evidence, 45.
law of Marque, 46. Law merchant, 47. Law of Mdsheh (Moses)-Torah, 48. laws of Oleron, 49. law of
the Road, 50. Local law, 51. Maritime law, 52. Martial law, 53. Mercantile law, 54. Military law, 55.
Moral law, 56. Municipal law, 57. Natural law, 58. Napoleonic law (in Louisiana), 59. Ordinance, 60.
Organic law, 61. Parliamentary law, 62. Penal law, 63. Permanent law, 64. Positive law, 65. Private
law, 66. Probate, 67. Procedural law, 68. Prospective law, 69. Public law, 70. Remedial law, 71.
Retrospective law, 72. Revenue
law, 73. Roman law, 74. Securities law, 75. Special law, 76. law of the Staple, 77. State law, 78.
Statute law, 79. Substantive law, 80. Sumptuary law, 81. Tacit law, 82. Tax Law, 83. Trust- Law, 84.
United States law, 85. Unwritten law, 86. Usury laws, or 87. Written law, and each one would
require a different approach when addressing issues of their respective disciplines. In addition, there
are many jurisdictions to consider, for instance: 1. Admiralty, 2. American Common Law, 3.
American Equity-Law, 4. Ancillary, 5. Appellate, 6. Concurrent, 7. Contentious, 8. Continuing, 9.
Coordinate, 10. Criminal, 11. Equity, 12. Exclusive, 13. Foreign, 14. General, 15. International, 16.
Legislative, 17. Limited, 18. Jurisdiction in personam, 19. Jurisdiction in rem, 20. Jurisdiction quasi
in rem, 21. Military, 22. Original, 23. Pendent, 24. Plenary, 25. Primary, 26. Probate, 27. Special, 28.
Subject-matter, 29. Summary, 30. Territorial, or 31. Voluntary; hence, as per the Postal rule we are
bound according to the common law.

That, additionally, over 95% of all vehicle incidents are through licensed drivers or drivers who
have been licensed; therefore, the alleged competent authority issuing these licenses is incompetent at
best and willfully, knowingly and maliciously criminally negligent and murderous at worst, yet through
fraud and conspiracy you claim no liability for your actions.

That Statistic Brain Research Institute, http://www.statisticbrain.com/driving-citatioik statistics/.

Statistic Verification, Source: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Date Verified: 7.8.2014,
“Average number of people per day that receive a speeding ticket 112,000; Total annual number of
people who receive speeding tickets 41,000,000; Total percentage of drivers that will get a speeding
ticket this year 20.6%; Average cost of a speeding ticket (including fees) $152; Total paid in speeding
tickets per year $6,232,000,000; Average annual speeding ticket revenue per U.S. police officer
$300,000; Percent speeding tickets that get contested in traffic court 5%; and, Total number of licensed
drivers in America today 196,000,000.” This means that on average 40,376,000 ‘drivers’ (fictions of
law) are given licenses that per year are potentially dangerous to others on the highway and each are
issued a driver’s license from your alleged competent authority. Mind you, this is only speeding
tickets, with all the other tickets issued there are reasonably close to or over a billion traffic citations
issued each year. Now there is more clarity as to why there are so many traffic incidents ranging from
death to property damage per year; hence, your competent authority is criminally negligent or
intentionally placing incompetent ‘drivers’ on the highway to produce revenue for the Trust business
entity corporation STATE and its subsidiaries. Mind you, these are the reported incidents. Additionally,
Fatal Car Crash Statistics has: “Average number of people killed on US roads each day 80; and, Average
number of nonfatal car crashes each year 5,400,000.”

That the report, “Unlicensed to Kill,” sponsored by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety, said
that 8,400 people die on average each year in crashes with unlicensed drivers. It also found that 28
percent of the lawbreaking drivers had received three or more license suspensions or revocations in the
three years before their fatal collision. This means that of the 29,200 fatalities

per year 20,800, or 71.2% are from licensed drivers. Since there are no statistics as to how many people
are exercising their right to drive one cannot accurately compare; however, the facts support that your
method has failed yet you misdirect responsibility away from yourselves.

The law stipulates that I, as the human, have the right to use the public highway. As you know,
or should know, the word license is defined as, “The permission by competent authority to do an act
which, without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition.” Furthermore, since the alleged ‘competent authority’ is a fiction and any humans involved are
licensed I am unable to understand how a competent authority could be found. This being the facts, logic
and common sense dictate that the document you address as a ‘driver license’ is issued by a non-
competent authority and a fiction of law, whatever is meant by the word ‘authority,’ to the fictional
Trusts.

Your citation was issued to the Trust RJL as having committed infractions against your
corporation policies, wherein you know that the Trust RJL is merely a piece of paper and could not
possibly have committed the infractions. I, on the other hand, could not have committed the infractions
inasmuch as I have the right to travel on the public highways and would not require a license. This
means you have no real party in interest in order to pursue your actions lawfully and, therefore, your
actions against me are treasonous, and conspiracy to commit treason, fraudulent, conspiracy to commit
fraud, extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion.
Furthermore, since you have contracted that you are attempting to proceed under Military
(Admiralty) jurisdiction by and through the standard you display, the yellow fringed flag, that you have
no jurisdiction over me, a human, then you are committing Treason and conspiring to commit Treason
against me by your obvious attempt to overthrow the Constitution for the United States of America and
its Bill of Rights.

On the other hand, if you were attempting to fraudulently make me the pseudo Trustee for the
Trust RJL, knowing full well that I cannot be both beneficiary and Trustee of the same Trust at the same
time, in order for you to fraudulently access its corpus/assets and inflict punishment on me fraudulently
making me its fiduciary, knowing full well that all public officials, in other words you, are the Trustees

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
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then this Conditional Acceptance is witness to your fraud? Your scheme would create a Trust with no
beneficiary; thereby you could fraudulently use me to gain access to the corpus/assets of the Trust RJL
and conspire to trick me into an additional payment of your ransom receiving more than twice the
payment. This would appear a logical conclusion in relation to your actions in this matter.

So being, your criminal actions including, but not limited to: Treason; Conspiracy to commit
Treason; Extortion; Conspiracy to commit Extortion; Fraud; and, Conspiracy to commit Fraud, are
conditionally accepted by me with the following conditions:

Conditional Acceptance of Your Offer

Conditions:
As Trustor/Settlor to the Trust RJL I conditionally accept Your Offer Trustees, who are the
living and breathing human People of The Accused if you fulfill the following conditions, to wit:
A. I demand to see the original securities signed by me with the Trust business entities “STATE OF
TENNESSEE” an ๕ or COUNTY OF HAMBLEN, TENNESSEE and/or “CITY OF
MORRISTOWN, TENNESSEE” and/or “STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY
AND HOMELAND SECURITY” wherein the language is written that I was relinquishing my
lawful status as a human and/or as the human beneficiary of the Trust RJL and thereby become the
Trustee of said Trust;
B. Additionally, I need to see if the original securities have, indeed, been filed with the DTC as
securities to support whether or not your businesses net worth has increased through your use of my
credit and the Trust’s-credit;
C. The documentation you present is confusing inasmuch as you relate the alleged defendant to be the
Trust RJL, and not the beneficiary of said trust; therefore, I need written clarification as to precisely
who or what was intended as the contractees, and if difTerent than what is written why have you not
addressed this/these points in the past;
For example: Your documentation clearly designates the contractee as RONALD JAMES LYONS and
that name is connected to the SSN/TIN issued by the Social Security Administration as a Trust
wherein Ronald-James: Lyons is the human that is the beneficiary; hence, you know very well that I
cannot be the Trustee of said Trust with authority to agree to anything in relation of the Trust.
D. Additionally, I cannot understand what is intended as what the alleged real parties in interest are,
therefore, evidence of who or what is intended as the real parties in interest;
E. Evidence to support that you were not creating an action against the Trust RJL which could not
possibly have committed the action so charged because it is a fiction of law;
F. Evidence to support that since the action was allegedly committed by me, the human and beneficiary
of the Trust RJL, since only a human could have managed what you declare, where is your authority
to enforce punitive actions against me in a Military (Admiralty) tribunal, and precisely where this
authority comes from in the form of a written and autographed contract or agreement wherein my
autograph is affixed thereto by me and witnessing that this action was over water;
G. Evidence that you, the Accused, did not fraudulently collect from both me and the Trust RJL and
that you are not attempting to collect from me and the Trust RJL;
H. Evidence that I as the beneficiary of the Trust RJL can give any plea for the Trust RJL, based on the
fact that I have no authority to act for the Trust;
I. Evidence that you, or your officers, agents, brokers and/or intermediaries have not collected
considerable amount of monies from the Trust RJL through merchant Trustee Matthew having
fraudulently created three (3) plus bonds on the case;

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
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 Conditional Acceptance of Your Offer
Conditions:
As Trustor/Settlor to the Trust RJL I conditionally accept Your Offer Trustees, who are the
living and breathing human People of The Accused if you fulfill the following conditions, to wit:
A. I demand to see the original securities signed by me with the Trust business entities “STATE OF
TENNESSEE” and/or COUNTY OF HAMBLEN, TENNESSEE and/or “CITY OF
MORRISTOWN, TENNESSEE” and/or “STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY
AND HOMELAND SECURITY” wherein the language is written that I was relinquishing my
lawful status as a human and/or as the human beneficiary of the Trust RJL and thereby become the
Trustee of said Trust;
B. Additionally, I need to see if the original securities have, indeed, been filed with the DTC as
securities to support whether or not your businesses net worth has increased through your use of my
credit and the Trust’s-credit;
C. The documentation you present is confusing inasmuch as you relate the alleged defendant to be the
Trust RJL, and not the beneficiary of said trust; therefore, I need written clarification as to precisely
who or what was intended as the contractees, and if different than what is written why have you not
addressed this/these points in the past;
For example: Your documentation clearly designates the contractee as RONALD JAMES LYONS and
that name is connected to the SSN/TIN issued by the Social Security Administration as a Trust
wherein Ronald-James: Lyons is the human that is the beneficiary; hence, you know very well that I
cannot be the Trustee of said Trust with authority to agree to anything in relation of the Trust.
D. Additionally, I cannot understand what is intended as what the alleged real parties in interest are,
therefore, evidence of who or what is intended as the real parties in interest;
E. Evidence to support that you were not creating an action against the Trust RJL which could not
possibly have committed the action so charged because it is a fiction of law;
F. Evidence to support that since the action was allegedly committed by me, the human and beneficiary
of the Trust RJL, since only a human could have managed what you declare, where is your authority
to enforce punitive actions against me in a Military (Admiralty) tribunal, and precisely where this
authority comes from in the form of a written and autographed contract or agreement wherein my
autograph is affixed thereto by me and witnessing that this action was over water;
G. Evidence that you, the Accused, did not fraudulently collect from both me and the Trust RJL and
that you are not attempting to collect from me and the Trust RJL;
H. Evidence that I as the beneficiary of the Trust RJL can give any plea for the Trust RJL, based on the
fact that I have no authority to act for the Trust;
I. Evidence that you, or your officers, agents, brokers and/or intermediaries have not collected
considerable amount of monies from the Trust RJL through merchant Trustee Matthew having
fraudulently created three (3) plus bonds on the case;
J. Explain why neither me nor the Trust RJL was paid the royalties from these bonds created by
Trustee Matthew;
K. Evidence to support why I do not have the right to locomotion and movement and have personally
made a contract as a human, and/or beneficiary, to give up such right;
L. Produce evidence that the driver’s license would not have been issued to the Trust RJL, and that, in
fact, it merely has the picture of the human who is thereby identified as the beneficiary of this Trust
witnessed by the picture thereon displayed;

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
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M. Evidence to support how the Trust RJL was “driving” the automobile which allegedly committed the
infraction and why no proof was introduced as to precisely how a piece of paper (the Trust RJL)
could possibly have operated an automobile in order to have been regulated by the Accused;
N. Produce evidence as to how the Trust RJL could be responsible for the beneficiary’s actions or how
the human who is the beneficiary could be responsible for the Trust RJL’s actions and how they both
are charged in this action;
O. Produce evidence as to why I, the human who is the beneficiary, under threat of arrest could be
required to appear at the Military (Admiralty) tribunal when the Trust RJL is the alleged defendant,
which would be extortion;
P. Or, produce evidence how the Trust RJL could be required under threat of arrest, if a piece of paper
can be arrested, to appear at the Military (Admiralty) tribunal when I, the human who is the
beneficiary, was the alleged defendant, which would be extortion;
Q. Official verification as to precisely what is to be used as “payment;”
R. As the Trustees, which you volunteered to be the Trustees, send me a full accounting of all activity
in the Trust RJL from its inception so that I may have this for my records.
S. Produce evidence that the BAR Association owned and operated judicially is not a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act,^ July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. $ 1-7); and.
T. Show cause why you should not be charged with Treason and Conspiracy to Commit Treason for
overthrowing the Constitution for the United States of America Article III Judiciary.
U. The Trust business entity “STATE OF TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND
HOMELAND SECURITY” wrote as its Department’s Mission the following language, “To serve,
secure, and protect the people of Tennessee,” therefore, since Constitutional Law, see 11 AmJur
§329 the right of locomotion and movement Show Cause why you are not enforcing those rights and
prosecuting the Trust corporations unlawfully prosecuting those people exercising said rights.

Again, since, logic and common sense dictate that you would not have committed these acts
without already having this information supra readily available; you have ten (10) days from the date
herein to have the information presented to me. Moreover, you moved in the name of a corporation in
your principal’s Military (Admiralty) tribunal and not in a “Court of Law” involving an issue on land
and not on the high seas. You, the Accused, thereof hold responsibility for these actions you executed for
the Trust corporations along with the Trusts involved. This Conditional
Acceptance gives witness to your crimes. As physical witnesses I also served the following: Loretta-E.:
Family of Lynch and Loretta-E.: Family of Lynch d/b/a Trustee of the Trust RJL d/b/a LORETTA E
LYNCH United States Attorney General; Herbert-H. Ill: Family of Slatery and Herbert-H. Ill: Family of
Slatery d/b/a Trustee of the Trust RJL and d/b/a Herbert H Slatery III, Tennessee Attorney General in
their freeman status and d/b/a status as witnesses to these facts.

If, on the other hand, you, the Accused, cannot produce these documents and verifications in the time
allotted, allowing for a reasonable extension if requested in- writing stating the specific time needed, and
since your documentation witnesses, amongst other facts addressed in this Conditional Acceptance of
Your Offer that you, the Accused, did willfully and knowingly were seeking to deprive me of my rights
and property through the crimes of treason, conspiracy to commit treason, fraud, conspiracy to commit
fraud, extortion, conspiracy to commit extortion, theft, unjust enrichment and conspiracy to impersonate
a peace officer and judge, and embezzlement, amongst other crimes and tort actions, both against me and
Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
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the Trust RJL, you hereby contract to the following:

1. That for the injuries to me, the beneficiary, the Trustees and their principals are presently indebted to
me for Six Million and no cents ($6,000,000.00) Dollars jointly or severally in the money of
account of the United States of America, Article I, Section 10 [1], wherein it states, “No State
shall... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.” If you have no
gold and silver Coin then I will “receive without prejudice” Federal Reserve- Notes, a Bank-draft,
or the like in lieu of the gold and silver Coin for the sum total. Furthermore, witnessed through this
Conditional Acceptance you willfully and knowingly injured me so I have authority to create a
Claim of Lien43 against you each and file a financing statement against you each supporting my lien
as I deem necessary to protect me, my property and my rights if needed at any time. Additionally, in
order to facilitate my rights under this Conditional Acceptance and Security-Agreement you agree
that I have your Power of Authority/Attorney to file anything to bring about the “payment” of this
debt and protect me, my property and my rights and that you have no right of action or recourse in
any action at law, action in equity or Admiralty or any other law herein written or implied against
me or my filings. Additionally, you agree that you grant your Power of Authority/Attorney to me,
Ronald-James: Lyons, so that I am able to collect the damages through a lien, UCC-1, UCC- 3,
Treasury forms 1040-V and 1040, 1099-A and 1099-OID. Additionally, you agree that every year
an additional set of liens can be filed with the Treasury if such injury to me persists on a yearly
basis. It is understood that even though a Treasury Form 1040 is for a Tax Class 2 and the 1099-A
and 1099-OID are a Tax Class 5,1 do not know any other way of filing this debt for collection other
than to use these forms, so I use them “without prejudice.”

2. If at any time or place I need the identification identifying me as the beneficiary of the Trust RJL
after you have Suspended said identification you are liable to me jointly or severally for Six Million
and no cents ($6,000,000.00) Dollars in the money of account of the United States of America;

3. If or when I go to get an updated identification you title ‘driver license’ and I receive any difficulty
obtaining this identification I use ‘without prejudice’ designating that I, Ronald- James: Lyons, am
the beneficiary of the Trust RJL you are liable to me jointly or severally for Six Million and no cents
($6,000,000.00) Dollars in the money of account of the United States of America; and,

4. If I receive any injury in relation to travelling in my automobile or any other automobile or any other
conveyance you describe as a motor vehicle or otherwise wherein your corporation security guards
identified as ‘law enforcement officers’ demand of me the identification herein addressed under
threat of or actual assault, under threat of or actual arrest, and/or under threat of or actual
imprisonment or you commit any tort action against my rights anywhere including seizing my
automobile or any other conveyance you describe as a motor vehicle in this country you agree hence
forth that you are liable to me jointly or severally for Six Million and no cents ($6,000,000.00)
Dollars in the money of account of the United States of America.

43 "The ability to place a lien upon a man’s property, such as to temporarily deprive him of its beneficial use, without any judicial
determination of probable cause dates back not only to medieval England but also to Roman times.” United States Supreme Court, 1969,
Sniaiiach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 349.

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
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 Avouchment
I, Ronald-James: Lyons, do hereby avow that based upon my firsthand knowledge and
information relayed to me from research, this “Conditional Acceptance,” is true, accurate and correct to
the best of my knowledge, information and belief and conveys the conditions set forth under this
“Conditional Acceptance” as intended by me the man and by me the human Trustor/Settlor to and
human beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RJL, as herein designated.

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary

Tennessee-State :
:av.
Hamblen-County :

Ronald-James: Lyons, beneficiary of the Social Security Cestui que Trust RONALD JAMES LYON, and Secured-party
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