HAZOP Study of LBDP

HAZOP Study of LBDP at Niko Resources Ltd.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

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1.1 INDIA

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India is the world‟s largest democracy with more than one billion people. Driven by a middle
class exceeding 300 million people, India‟s economy is the fourth largest in the world in
terms of purchasing power parity. English is the language of business and the country has a
modern banking system and a well developed legal system. India is the world‟s fifth-largest
importer of oil while its per capita consumption of petroleum products is only 12 percent of
the world average.
Recent growth in India‟s economy and corresponding growth in demand for energy provides
a unique marketing and sale opportunity for the Company‟s oil and natural gas reserves –
including the new discoveries in the D6 Block.
Prices for the Company‟s natural gas production are expected to continue to strengthen.
Thirty-two percent of India‟s sedimentary basins are unexplored and a further 50 percent are
either poorly explored or in a preliminary stage of exploration activity. Ninety blocks have
been awarded under the bid rounds since 1999, compared to 24 blocks awarded in the 10
years before 1999. A further 55 blocks are currently being offered as part of the NELP-VI
bidding round scheduled in 2006, and the Company is actively pursuing bidding on several
blocks offered.
Niko signed separate PSCs in 1994 for five fields: Hazira, Bhandut, Cambay, Matar and
Sabarmati, all located in Gujarat State in western India. During the quarter ended March 31,
2006, the Company entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the sale of its interest in
the Bhandut, Cambay and Sabarmati oil fields located onshore India. The aggregate sale price
for these fields is US$5.5 million. The completion of the sale is subject to approval from the
Government of India.

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The Company was active in India‟s first international bid round in 1999 and was awarded a
10 percent interest in the D6 and NEC-25 offshore blocks. In the second international bid
round in 2001, the Company was awarded 100 percent of the Surat Block.
During 2005, the Company was awarded two new blocks under the NELP-V bidding round
and signed new PSCs for the Cauvery Block in southern Tamil Nadu (100 percent working
interest) and another deepwater block with Reliance – the D4 Block offshore India‟s east
coast (15 percent working interest). The Cauvery Block has mainly oil potential while the D4
Block encompasses more than 17,000 square kilometers and contains similar play types to the
natural gas discoveries made by Reliance and Niko in the D6 and NEC-25 blocks. In India,
the Company has more than 5,227 net square kilometers of undeveloped land.
The terms of the PSCs vary on a field-by-field basis. The Company undertakes a work
commitment, provides a formula for profit sharing with the federal government and agrees to
abide by certain conditions. The government‟s share of profit is based on a sliding scale
starting from 0 to 10 percent and rising to 40 to 85 percent as the Company recovers 3.5
times its cumulative investment. The government‟s percentage interest is applied to the free
cash flow from the field, namely operating cash flow net of capital expenditures and allocated
G&A costs. Starting in 1999 the PSCs have provided for a seven-year tax holiday, which
starts on commencement of commercial production of a discovery.
As at March 31, 2006 the Company has recovered between 150 and 200 percent of its
investment in the Hazira field and the government is entitled to 20 percent of the free cash
flow from the field in fiscal 2007.
At the Surat Block, the government is entitled to an initial 20 percent of the profit, but until
such time as all costs are recovered, no profit petroleum is assessed. For the offshore India
blocks, the government is entitled to an initial 10 percent of the profit. These offshore blocks
remain in the exploration stage, and as yet no profit has been generated.

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1.2 ONSHORE WESTERN INDIA
Production in Surat averaged 10 million cubic feet per day. The Company expects production
for fiscal 2007 to average between 10 and 11 million cubic feet per day.
During the year, NS-A8 was drilled and completed as a natural gas well in the Bheema sand
section.
The Company was awarded a 100 percent interest in the Surat Block in July 2001. The initial
block covered 419 square kilometers. After completion of the exploratory phase, a
development area of 24 square kilometers, containing the Bheema and NSA shallow natural
gas fields, was retained. The remaining acreage was relinquished.

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1 .3 H A ZI R A , I ND I A
1.3.1 HAZIRA – ONSHORE/OFFSHORE WEST COAST INDIA
At Hazira, production from the offshore platform continued with two new natural gas wells
being drilled and placed on production. Also, two wells that had been drilled in the previous
fiscal year were placed on production during fiscal 2006. A further three oil development
wells were drilled, one of which was designated as an injector well, as part of the oil
development plan for the oil zones discovered in calendar 2005. Oil production, which
commenced at the end of March 2006, is currently at more than 1,250 (413 net) barrels per
day. Year-end natural gas production from the field exceeded 40 million cubic feet per day
(net).

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A Gas Balancing Agreement (GBA), designed to allocate natural gas in reservoirs known to
be continuous across the Hazira/Gauri block boundary, went into effect on February 17,
2006. Reserves within these reservoirs will now be shared equitably between the Gauri and
Hazira interest-holders, rather than resorting to unitization.
The Company is the operator of and holds a 33.33 percent working interest in the Hazira
field. The field, which covers an area of 50 square kilometers, lies adjacent to a large
industrial corridor about 25 kilometers southwest of the city of Surat. Gas production during
fiscal 2006 averaged 134 (45 net) million cubic feet per day, compared to 129 (43 net)
million cubic feet per day in fiscal 2005. The field is currently producing approximately 116
(39 net) million cubic feet per day. N2-83 Hazira 05.

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CHAPTERII
HAZARD AND
OPERABILITY ANALYSIS
(HAZOP)

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2.1 INTRODUCTION
The complexities of the process plant as a result of continuous new development in
technology, expansion or debottlenecking, advanced control systems etc. is increasingly
becoming common .This has resulted in a need to check design for errors and omissions, a
task which has traditionally becomes carried out on an individual basis. This approach no
doubt improves the design but ignores the detection of hazards that may arise out of
interaction among different functional units.
HAZOP study is carried out by the multidisciplinary team who reviews the process to
discover the potential hazards and operability problems using a set of guide words approach.
The basic concept of HAZOP study is to take full description of the process and to question
every part of it to discover what deviations from the intention of the design can occur and
what consequences of the deviation may be. This is systematically by applying suitable guide
words. The list of words and their meanings are:
Table 2.1 Guide Words and Their Meaning

GUIDE MEANING COMMENT
WORDS
NO/NONE The complete No part of the intention is achieved but nothing else
negation of these happened
intentions
MORE/LESS Quantitative These refers to quantitative and properties such as flow
increase or rates, temperature as well as activities like heat
decrease reaction
AS WELL A qualitative All the design and the operating intentions are
AS increase achieved together with some additionally activity
PART OF A qualitative Only some of the intentions are achieved, some are not
decrease
REVERSE The logical This is mostly applicable to activities, for eg. Reverse
opposite of the flow or chemical reactions. It can also be applied to
intention substance, example “poison instead of “antidote”‟
OTHER Complete No part of the original intention is achieved ,
THAN substitution of something quite different happened
intention

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2.2 HAZOP AND ITS RELEVANCE

An accident is invariably followed by an investigation into the cause or causes. A review of
the existing system can result in faults in design or operating method becoming obvious.
A retrospective „synthetic experience‟ makes the visualizing of prospective problems easier.
HAZOP studies are a method of providing a form of such Synthetic experience. They are a
review of operational safety and hazard prevention, a rigorous systematic process oriented
examination which is simple, widely acceptable and comprehensive. It is an ideal
examination method which helps detect any predictable desirable event by using the
imagination of members to visualize the ways of conceivable mal-operation.
The purpose of the examination is to identify all possible deviations from the actual working
of the design and all the hazards associated with these deviations. It is therefore an
implementation of safety policy.
2.3 PROGRAMMING OF HAZOP

HAZOP can be used in the various stages of the plant design, operation and maintenance.
HAZOP study at the design freeze phase is the most ideal. The drawings are more or less
accurate and questions regarding the design in a particular way are answered readily. At this
it is possible to carry out the study of sections of plant, the designs of which are established
and should be taken to review these later to ensure that interactions have not introduced new
hazards. It is also possible to change the plant design without incurring additional expenses.
HAZOP before finalization of result will be a failure because of lack of sufficient detail. At
such a stage checklist approach is to be used.
HAZOP can be carried out before start up of plant in order to check operating instruction.
Correction of fault will however be expensive and will delay operation. Studies on existing
plant improve operating method, operational safety, deficiencies in available, system and can
show potholes responsible for an accident or a disaster.
2.4 USE OF HAZOP

This Qualitative technique has other uses in addition to checking the existing safety
measures:
 Contributes to plant safety study
 Provides instructions and study material training of personnel

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 Provides the basis for the preparation of operating procedure and plant emergency
plan
 Provide elaborate documentation as evidence while dealing with concerned persons
(insurance etc.)
 Provides cause consequences relationship and with minor additions helps detect
malfunction which may lead to plant shutdown, reducing availability
 Helps in building fault tress
 Helps in improvisation of exiting plant design
2.4.1 Necessary information

In carrying out a Hazard and Operability Study, the following information may be useful
 A list of process material with relevant data
 Results of the process safety analysis
 A process description with material and heat balances and associated process flow
sheets
 A plot plan of the installation showing the location of the various components or a
back up or both
 The process and instrumentation diagram along with following data:
o The volume pressure and temperature of the material present under normal
process conditions
o The piping including pitting and tracing showing diameters, material design
pressure and design temperatures.
o Pressure relief devices – type (spacing, weight, balance, bursting disc etc), set
pressure, capacity, temperature, method and location of discharge.
o The process control equipment, signal transmission lines (piping and
electrical) capacities alarm systems and action upon loss of signal.
 Piping schemes
 Data utilities e.g. Steam, cooling water, inert gas, electricity
 Description of operating instructions & procedures
 Description of emergency system

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2.5 METHODOLOGY OF HAZOP

The procedure of study consists of the following steps:
1) Define objective and scope
2) Select the team
3) Prepare for the study
4) Carry out the examination
5) Follow up
6) Record the results
Fig 2.1 HAZOP method flow diagram
2.5.1 Definition of objectives

The objectives and scope of study should be made explicit as soon as possible. Some
examples for reasons of study are:
 To check the design
 To decide whether and where to built
 To decide whether to buy a piece of equipment

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 To obtain a list of question to put to a supplier

 To check running instructions
 To improve the safety of existing facilities
It is also necessary to decide the types of hazard to be considered for eg :

 To people working in the plant
 To plant and equipment
 To the general public
 To the environment
The general objectives for a study are normally set by the person responsible for the project
or the plant for e.g. the project manager, project engineer etc.
2.5.2 Team Composition

HAZOP are normally carried out by multi disciplinary teams. There are two types of team
members, namely those who will make a technical contribution and those who play
supporting and structuring role.
2.5.2.1 Technical team member

The examination requires the team to have a detailed knowledge of the way the plant is
intended to work. This means a blend of those concerned with the design of the plant and
those concerned with is operation. These techniques of using guide words generate a very
large no of questions. For most purposes it is essential that the team contains enough people
with sufficient knowledge and experience to answer the majority of those questions without
resources to further expertise.
The team usually consists of mechanical engineer, chemical engineer R & D chemist,
production manager, project manager responsible for the project as a whole. The blend of
discipline will vary with the type of project. Some project will require instrument and
electrical engineers, civil engineers, pharmacist etc.
The team should not be too large, ideally between 3 and 5 technical members. If study seems
to require a large number of people it is worthwhile trying to break it down into several
desperate parts with some variation of team composition for each part

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2.5.2.2 Supporting team member

As examination sessions are highly structured and very systematic, it is necessary to have
someone to control the discussion. This is the duty leader.
The study leader has a role to play throughout the study. He should help whoever has
commissioned the study the scope. He may help with the selection and training of the team.
He will advice on the assembly of the necessary data and may help convert this into a suitable
form. However, this most obvious role emerges during the examination sessions where he
guides the systematic questioning and he must be throughout trained for this job.
2.5.3 Preparative work

The amount of preparative work required depends on the size and complexity of the plant.
The preparative work consists of four stages.
1) Obtain the data
2) Convert the data into a suitable form
3) Plan the sequence for the study.
4) Arrange the necessary meetings.
The data consists of various drawing in the form of line diagrams, flows sheets, plant
layouts, isometrics and fabrication and drawings. Additionally there can be operating
instructions. Instrument sequence control charts, logic diagrams and computer programs.
There are plant manuals and equipment manufacture‟s manuals.
The data must be inspected to make sure it is sufficient comprehensive to cover the defined
area of study and discrepancies in the data must be resolved. The amount of work required to
convert the type of the plant.
With continuous plant the preparative work is minimal. The existing flow sheets or P & I
diagram contain sufficient information for the study. The sequence for the study is straight
forward. The study team starts at the beginning of the process and progressively works
downstream.
With the batch plant the preparative work is usually more extensive in additional to drawing
which describes the plant itself it is necessary to know the sequence of plant operation for e.g.
Running instructions, indicating the status of each vessel on a time basis.
With some kinds of complicated, proprietary items of equipment, the preparative work can be
expensive and occupy more man days than the examination itself.

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Once the data has been assembled and the model made (if necessary) the steady leader is in
position to start to arrange meeting. The first requirement is to estimate the team hour needed
for the study. This can be built up in a number of ways. As a general rule each individual part
to be studied will take an average of 15 minutes team time. Thus an estimate can be made by
considering the number of pipelines and half hour for each vessel. Ideally the duration of
examination sections should be restricted to three hours.
2.5.4 The examination in practice

The examination sessions are highly structured with the study leader controlling the
discussion by following his predetermined plan. If the approach is based on the flow sheet he
selects the first vessel and asks the team to explain its broad functions. He selects the pipeline
or other element to the design and asks the team to make it purpose explicit. The study leader
then applies the first guide word and team discussion starts. It is sometime necessary
particularly with an in experienced team for the study leader to stimulate team discussion by
asking further questions such as „Can the flow stop?‟ or „Does it matter if it stop?‟ as far as
possible only probing questions should be asked by the study leader the team should not only
provide the technical answers but be encouraged to be creative and think of all the deviations
and hazards themselves.
As hazards are detected the study leader should make sure that everyone understands them.
As mentioned earlier the degree of problem solving during the examination sections can vary.
There are two extreme positions:
 A solution is found for each hazard as it is detected before looking for the next hazard.
 No search for solutions is started until all hazards have been detected. In practice there is
compromise. If a question is noted for future evaluation, a note is also made of the person
nominated to follow it up.
2.5.4 Follow-up work

The follow-up to the examination section is generally straight forward. If decision have been
taken concerning changes in design or operating methods these must be communicated to
those responsible.
Once a hazard has been identified, the kind of action needed to provide a safe system will be
agreed quiet quickly. Actions to contain hazards are generally of four kinds.
• A change in the process (recipe, materials etc).
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• A change in the process conditions (pressure, temperature etc).

• An alteration to the physical design.
• A change of operating method.
When choosing between a numbers of possible actions it may be useful to out them in two
categories;
• Those actions which remove the cause of the hazard.
• Those actions which reduce the consequences.
In general it is better and more effective to remove the hazard and provided the study isb
carried out at the design state. If there is no reasonable prospect of removing the hazard the
team will have to consider what can be done to protect people and plant if the accident takes
place.
2.5.5 Record the results

An important activity of the study team is to record the results of the study. One useful form
of record is a „Hazard file‟. This contains:
• A copy of the data (flow sheets, running instructions models etc.)
• A copy of all the working papers, questions, recommendations, redesign etc.
The file should be retained on the plant so that it is a source of information. Reports can also
be written for the guidance of the managers or other practitioners if a study has some
interesting or unique features.
The formal recording of the study may in future have further implications. For examples the
insurance premium may be affected or planning permission may be assisted by evidence of a
well conducted study.
Finally the information generated by studies can be used to improve future designs.

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Fig no.2.2 Sample of HAZOP worksheet
2.6 OTHER APPLICATION OF HAZOP STUDY

1. Plant modification
2. Plant commissioning
3. Plant maintenance
4. Emergency shutdown and emergency systems
5. Mechanical handling
6. Tanker loading and unloading
7. Works traffic
8. Construction and demolition
9. Buildings and building services

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2.7 LIMITATIONS OF HAZOP STUDY

There are two limitations. The first type arises from the assumption underlying the method
and is an intended limitation of scope. In its original form the method assumes that the design
has been carried out in accordance with the appropriate codes. Thus for e.g. it is assumed that
the design caters for the pressure at normal operating conditions and intended relief
conditions. It is then the function of HAZOP to identify pressure deviations which may not
have been for seen. The other type of limitations is that which is not intended, but is simply
inherent in the method. HAZOP is not particularly well suited to deal with plant layout and
their resultant effects.
The HAZOP was carried out for the Land Base Drilling Platform (LBDP). In this HAZOP I
have consider different Nodes for different locations. The table depicts the HAZOP done for
LBDP using applicable guide words.

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2.8 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION BY HAZOP

2.8.1 Node-I: Gas flowing from well 11 to Header at LBDP.
Identical Nodes: Well 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23.
Table no: 2.2 HAZOP study of well 11 to header

Guide Deviation Causes Consequence Available Recomme
words s safety ndations
provision
LESS Pressure Heavy leakage Substantial Pressure alarm Check and
in piping due release of (PALL-110), confirm that
to decrease in hydrocarbons to all shut
thickness or atmosphere, Close down
rupture in pipe, UV-110, valves are
Poor well fire safe,
Naturally less management, Manual valves,
pressure Gas
coming from Chances of fire. Thickness detector
well, testing is done should be
in after four provided at
Excessive years. Header
withdrawal. region.
MORE Pressure Flow line Pressure risk in Pressure relief Environmen

blockage or no the pipe, valve, t should be
flow can be monitored
cause of more Pressure rise in High pressure time to
pressure, pipe leading to alarm time,
blowing of relief (PAHH),
Temperature valve and Audible
increasing release of ESDV-002. high/low
leading to natural gas, pressure
pressure alarm can

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increasing, Over be provided

pressurization of in control
External fire, pipe leading to room.
leakage/rupture
of pipeline and
vapour cloud
formation of
natural gas.
MORE Temperature Due to higher Pressure rise in TE-110, High

water cut in pipes, temperature
the gas flow, TT-110. alarm can
Leakage leading be provided
High flow rate, to vapour cloud at Header
formation. region.
Temperature
of the
surrounding
increased,
External fire.
LESS Temperatur Temperature Pipe line TE-110,

e of surrounding subjected to
decreased, temperature TT-110.
lower than
Drop in design,
pressure across
chock valve. Likely failure.

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NO Flow ESDV-002 is Wellhead Wellhead of Colour

shutdown, pressure rises to UV-110 is coding
reservoir shut-in designed for should be
Line plugged pressure of 1500 5000 psig- done
due to sand, psig and likely which is higher properly,
loss of than maximum
UV-110 containment, reservoir shut- P&ID to be
closed, in pressure corrected
Pressure in which is 1500 and updated
NRV header rises, psig presently, as per plant
malfunction, layout.
Loss of NRV provided
Manual valve production, on line from
closed, well before
No hazard, joining header.
No gas flowing
from one well Possibility of
due to pressure reverse flow to
imbalance the well having
amongst wells. low pressure.
LESS Flow Less flow Chances of fire, Control valve,

coming from
the well, Less production, UV-110,
Leakage in Vapour cloud Thickness is

pipeline due to formation of tested in every
decrease in natural gas due four year,
thickness, to leakage,
NRV provided.
Control valve Chances of
not holding. reverse flow.

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MORE Flow Increase water Increase water Flow control

cut due to production valve,
depletion of along with gas,
well, Piping is
High velocity designed for
Naturally more leading to two phase
flow coming vibration, flow,
from the well.
Sand production For sand
resulting in production
erosion and sand probe is
pitting in piping. provided,
If continues for
long durations Well health is
will result in monitored
loss of using test
containment, facilities.
Chances of
abrasive flow,
Two phase flow.

REVE Flow Due to Possibility of NRV provided
RSE pressure reverse flow to on line from
imbalance the well having well before
amongst wells, low pressure, joining header,
No gas flow Reverse flow Designing

from one well, from HP header conditions of
to LP header LP and HP
Operator error, resulting in headers and
process upset, separators are
Inadvertent same and

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line-up to both No hazard adequate for

the headers. envisaged. worst case.
2.8.2 Node-II: Gas flowing from well 21 to Header.
Table no. 2.3 HAZOP study of well 21 to header

provision
MORE Flow Naturally more Increase water Piping is Flow
flow coming production designed for control
from the well, along with gas, two phase valve
flow, should be
Increase water Sand production provided on
cut due to resulting in Well health is pipeline of
depletion of erosion and monitor using the well
well. pitting in piping. test facilities. before
If continues for joining to
long durations header,
will result in
loss of Sand probe
containment should be
provided to
Two phase flow. avoid sand
production.
MORE Pressure High pressure Pressure risk in Pressure relief

coming from the pipe, valve,
the well,
Pressure rise in ESDV-002.
Flow line pipe leading to
blockage, blowing of relief
valve and

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This can occur release of

because of no natural gas,
flow,
Over
Temperature pressurization of
increasing pipe leading to
leading to leakage/rupture
pressure of pipeline and
increasing. vapour cloud
formation of
natural gas.
2.8.3 Node-III: Gas flowing from well 8 to Header at LBDP.
Table no. 2.4 HAZOP study of well 8 to header

words s safety ndation
provision
LESS Pressure Heavy leakage Chances of fire, UV-080, Pressure
in piping due indicator
to decrease in Substantial Thickness should be
thickness, release of testing is done provided on
hydrocarbons to in every four pipeline of
Naturally less atmosphere, year. the well
pressure before
coming from Poor well joining to
well, management. Header.
Excessive
withdrawal.

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MORE Pressure Flow line Pressure risk in ESDV-002, P&ID

blockage, the pipe, should be
Pressure relief corrected
This can occur Pressure rise in valve. and updated
because of no pipe leading to time to
flow, blowing of relief time.
valve and
Temperature release of
increasing natural gas,
leading to
pressure Over
increasing, pressurization of
pipe leading to
External fire, leakage/rupture
of pipeline and
vapour cloud
formation of
natural gas.
NO Flow ESDV-002 is Wellhead Wellhead of Flow
shutdown, pressure rises to UV-080 is indicator
reservoir shut-in designed for should be
Manual valve pressure of 1500 5000 psig- there,
closed, psig and likely which is higher
loss of than maximum Colour
Line plugged containment, reservoir shut- coding
due to sand, in pressure should be
Pressure in which is 1500 done
UV- 080 header rises, psig presently, properly.
closed,
Loss of NRV provided
NRV production, on line from
malfunction, well before
No hazard, joining header,

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Chock valve
malfunction Possibility of
(CVA-080), reverse flow to
the well having
No gas flow low pressure.
from one well
due to pressure
imbalance
amongst wells.
LESS Flow Less flow Less production, UV-080,
coming from
the well, Vapour cloud Pipeline
formation of thickness
Leakage in natural gas, tested is done
pipelines due in every four
to decrease in Chances of fire. year.
thickness,
MORE Flow Increase water Increase water Piping is Flow

cut due to production designed for control
depletion of along with gas, two phase valve
well, flow, should be
Sand production provided,
More flow resulting in Well health is
coming from erosion and monitor using To avoid
the well. pitting in piping. test facilities. sand
If continues for production
long durations sand probe
will result in should be
loss of provided.
containment
Two phase flow.

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2.8.4 Node-IV: Gas flowing from Header to compressor suction at LBDP.
Table no. 2.6 HAZOP study of compressor suction

provisions
LESS Pressure Less pressure Compressor will PI-157, Environmen

coming from trip, t should be
the header, Pipeline monitored
Vapour cloud thickness time to
Due to sand, formation of testing is done time,
cement etc. natural gas, in every four
valve chock- years. P&ID
up, Chances of fire. should be
corrected
Valve kept and updated
closed, time to
time.
Leakage in
pipeline due to
decrease in
thickness,
Operational
error.

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MORE Pressure High pressure System upset, PSV-103,

coming from
the header, Due to high PCV-157,
pressure PSV-
PI-157,
High 103 is used and
temperature release of
NRV is
leads to high natural gas,
provided.
pressure,
Vapour cloud
Line blockage formation of
or no flow natural gas.
leads to
increase in
pressure.
MORE Level Control valve Liquid carry For no gas
stuck, over, flow Unit
valve is
Instrument Compressor provided,
malfunctioning damaged due to
, liquid carry LG-132,
over, LG-157,
Instrument gas LC-157,
supply failure.
High level
alarms
(LSHH-100,
LAHH-100).
LESS Level Controller Sheet damage Flow control

failure, due to sand, valve is
provided,
Failure of gas Valve stuck
supply. open, NRV is

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provided.
Valve passing.
NO Flow Gas is not Compressor will

flowing from trip,
header,
Gas releases in
Valve is kept atmosphere.
closed,
Heavy
blockage in
pipeline,
Leakage in
pipe line.
LESS Flow Less flow Due to rupture Flow control
coming from or leakage valve is
the header, vapour cloud provided,
formation of
Rupture or natural gas, NRV is
leakage in provided,
pipes, Chances of
reverse flow, Isolation
valve-
Less production. 1”BCN1,
MORE Flow More flow Due to more Flow control

coming from flow liquid carry valve is
the header, over, provided or
flow
Flow control High velocity measuring

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valve leading to device is

malfunction. vibration, provided,
And due to KOD is

liquid carry over provided to
compressor can knock out the
damage. liquid.
2.8.5 Node-V: Gas flowing From HP Header (LBDP) to trunk line.
Fig no. 2.6 HAZOP study of Trunk line

provision
NO Flow Gas is not Gas released in Pipeline Environmen
flowing from atmosphere and thickness t
header, vapour cloud testing is monitoring,
formation, conducted in
Pinhole every four Gas
leakage or Pressure rise in year. detector
flange leakage pipes, should be
in pipeline, provided.
No production.
Heavy
blockage in
pipeline.
LESS Flow Less flow Due to rupture UV-80 to 150,
coming from or leakage
the header, vapour cloud UV-1016 to
1023,
formation of
Due to natural gas,
Manual valves,
decrease in

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thickness Less amount of Pipeline

rupture or gas production. thickness tested
leakage in in every four

years.
pipeline.
MORE Flow More flow High velocity Pipeline

coming from leading designed for
the header. vibration, two phase
flow.
More water cut
with gas,
Two phase flow,
Chances of
rupture and
leakage
resulting vapour
cloud formation.
LESS Pressure Rupture or Due to leakage PALL-2025,

leakage in natural gas
pipeline, released, ESDV-002,
UV-80 to 150,
Less pressure Chances of fire.
coming from
UV-1016 to
the header,
1023,
Operational Manual valves

error.

Page31
MORE Pressure Because of High pressure in PAHH-2025, Audible

chock valve of the headers up high
the well is to 1500 psig this ESDV-002, pressure
opened more is limited by alarm can
UV-80 to 150,
than required shut-in pressure be provided
high pressure of wells, in control
UV-1016 to
coming from room.
1023.
the header, Pressurize
.
network,
Sudden
reduction in Over pressure
demand. leading to
rupture and
leakage of gas,
Temperature
increases.
MORE Temperatur Temperature Pressure rise in High
e of the pipes, temperature
surrounding alarm can
increases, Chances of be provided.
leakage,
External fire
Leakage leading
to vapour cloud
formation
NOTE 1: Wells no 9, 12, 14, 19, 20, and 24 are not producing gas so from some flow lines of
these wells control valves, measuring indicators, sand probe etc. have removed. I have not
considered these wells in my HAZOP study but there may be chance to sudden flow of gas in
these wells, at that time hazard may take place. But probability of sudden flow is very less or
almost negligible so as far as I consider there is no need to do any changes in these wells.

Page32
NOTE 2: The instruments like control valve, flow measuring device, temperature measuring
device etc. are deliberated to remove from the pipelines due to less pressure.
Fig no 2.3 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram of Well no 8 to 15 (Phase-I) to Header

Page33
Fig no 2.3 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram of Well no 16 to 24 (Phase-II) to Header
2.9 INFERENCE
A detailed HAZOP study was carried out for Land Base Drilling Platform (LBDP) alone. The
various deviations possible, their direct causes and consequences were systematically traced
and the adequacy of the available safety systems was analyzed. The systems provided where
found to be adequate on their own and hence only few small changes are suggested.

Page34
2.10 RECOMMENDATIONS
1. In P&ID flow control valves are not showing in well no. 10, 15 and 21 while in site flow
control valves are not present in well no. 8, 14, 19, 20 and 21 so P&ID should be updated
time to time.
2. It would be appropriate to provide audible high/low pressure alarm in control room.
3. Pipelines, joints etc. should be painted properly to avoid any type of rusting rusting.
4. Check and make sure that all shut down valves are fire safe.
5. Colour coding should be done properly.
6. It would be appropriate to provide high temperature alarm at the Header region.
7. Cooling fire fighting systems should be arranged at LBDP.

Page35
REFRENCES
1. HAZOP manual of Niko Resources Ltd.

2. Piping and instrumentation diagram, LBDP
3. Center for Chemical Process Safety, (1995), Guidelines for Chemical Process
Quantitative Risk Analysis, (Second Edition) CCPS, AICE, New York

Page36

HAZOP Study of LBDP

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HAZOP Study of LBDP at Niko Resources Ltd.

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

1.2 ONSHORE WESTERN INDIA

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

1.3.1 HAZIRA – ONSHORE/OFFSHORE WEST COAST INDIA

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT

Table 2.1 Guide Words and Their Meaning

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2.2 HAZOP AND ITS RELEVANCE

2.3 PROGRAMMING OF HAZOP

2.4 USE OF HAZOP

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2.4.1 Necessary information

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2.5 METHODOLOGY OF HAZOP

Fig 2.1 HAZOP method flow diagram

2.5.1 Definition of objectives

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 To obtain a list of question to put to a supplier

It is also necessary to decide the types of hazard to be considered for eg :

2.5.2 Team Composition

2.5.2.1 Technical team member

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2.5.2.2 Supporting team member

2.5.3 Preparative work

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2.5.4 The examination in practice

2.5.4 Follow-up work

• A change in the process conditions (pressure, temperature etc).

2.5.5 Record the results

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Fig no.2.2 Sample of HAZOP worksheet

2.6 OTHER APPLICATION OF HAZOP STUDY

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2.7 LIMITATIONS OF HAZOP STUDY

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2.8 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION BY HAZOP

Table no: 2.2 HAZOP study of well 11 to header

MORE Pressure Flow line Pressure risk in Pressure relief Environmen

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increasing, Over be provided

MORE Temperature Due to higher Pressure rise in TE-110, High

LESS Temperatur Temperature Pipe line TE-110,

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NO Flow ESDV-002 is Wellhead Wellhead of Colour

LESS Flow Less flow Chances of fire, Control valve,

Leakage in Vapour cloud Thickness is

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MORE Flow Increase water Increase water Flow control

Two phase flow.

No gas flow Reverse flow Designing

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line-up to both No hazard adequate for

2.8.2 Node-II: Gas flowing from well 21 to Header.

Table no. 2.3 HAZOP study of well 21 to header

MORE Pressure High pressure Pressure risk in Pressure relief

Division of Safety and Fire Engineering, SOE, CUSAT