YANNIS STEPHANOU

MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY

ABSTRACT. Take a formula of first-order logic which is a logical consequence of some

other formulae according to model theory, and in all those formulae replace schematic
letters with English expressions. Is the argument resulting from the replacement valid in
the sense that the premisses could not have been true without the conclusion also being
true? Can we reason from the model-theoretic concept of logical consequence to the modal
concept of validity? Yes, if the model theory is the standard one for sentential logic; no, if
it is the standard one for the predicate calculus; and yes, if it is a certain model theory for
free logic. These conclusions rely inter alia on some assumptions about possible worlds,
which are mapped into the models of model theory. Plural quantification is used in the last
section, while part of the reasoning is relegated to an appendix that includes a proof of
completeness for a version of free logic.

If model theory approves an argument, is that argument valid? Consider an

inference which is made up of formulae of logic, and in which the conclu-
sion is a logical consequence of the premisses in a model-theoretic sense
of the term. Suppose that, throughout that inference, we replace schematic
letters with English expressions. This replacement amounts to giving each
schematic letter a definite meaning. Is the inference that results from the
replacement valid?
To call an inference valid is to claim that the conclusion follows from
the premisses. There is not only one concept of validity; ‘following from’
is not always used in the same sense. I shall here concentrate on a sense
that occupies a central position in the tradition of logic. In that sense, ‘The
earth rotates or the sun revolves round the earth’ follows from ‘The earth
rotates’ if and only if it is not possible that the earth should rotate and yet
it should not be the case that the earth rotates or the sun revolves round
the earth. ‘The earth rotates’ follows from ‘The earth rotates or the sun
revolves round the earth’ and ‘The sun does not revolve round the earth’ if
and only if it is impossible that it should be the case that the earth rotates or
the sun revolves round the earth, yet the sun should not revolve round the
earth, and the earth should not rotate. By ‘possible’ I mean what is often
termed ‘broadly logically possible’.1

Synthese 123: 165–193, 2000.

© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
166 YANNIS STEPHANOU

The question whether approval by model theory guarantees validity has

not attracted the attention it deserves. One important exception is J. Et-
chemendy’s book The Concept of Logical Consequence. As Etchemendy
remarks, ‘if we think [that the] extensional adequacy [of the model-
theoretic account of logical truth and logical consequence in the first-order
case] is somehow obvious, even assuming the usual axioms of set theory,
we are simply fooling ourselves’.2 The conclusion of this paper will be
that approval by a model theory guarantees validity if the model theory is
one for free logic.
In Section 1, the question will be made more precise. The other sections
contain attempts at answering it.3

1.

We shall consider a formal language L for first-order logic. The symbols

of L are ¬, ⇒, ∀, brackets, sentential letters (p, p1 , p2 , . . .), predicate let-
ters (F 1 , F11 , F21 , . . ., F 2 , F12 , F22 , . . ., and so forth), individual constants
(a, a1 , a2 , . . .) and variables (x1 , x2 , x3 , . . .).4 As usual, the superscript of
a predicate letter shows its degree; that is, it shows with how many oc-
currences of individual constants or variables the predicate letter must be
construed in order to make up a well-formed formula of L.
When we deal with formal logic because we hope it will shed light on
the logical features of natural languages, we usually construe sentential
letters, individual constants and predicate letters as schematic letters for
appropriate kinds of natural language expressions. Sentential letters are
normally construed as schematic letters for declarative sentences; that is,
we treat each sentential letter like a declarative sentence but we do not give
it the meaning of any specific declarative sentence. Individual constants
are standardly construed as schematic letters for names having a bearer. In
classical logic, as opposed to free logic, we treat individual constants as
we would the names ‘Socrates’ and ‘Napoleon’, not the names ‘Pegasus’
and ‘Hamlet’.
Predicate letters are normally construed as schematic letters for pre-
dicates. By ‘predicates’ I do not here mean what is meant in grammar.
In grammar, a phrase is called ‘a predicate’ just in case some sentence is
made up of that phrase and an expression functioning as the subject of the
sentence. I use the word ‘predicate’ in a sense which, roughly speaking,
extends that of grammar. It is the case for any predicate (in the sense I
am about to explain) that one can get it from a declarative sentence by
abstracting from at least one occurrence of a proper name. One can get
each of ‘. . . ran’, ‘. . . loves - - -’, ‘Peter believes that . . . is a star’ and ‘It is
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 167

false that . . . is the founder of the Academy’ from a declarative sentence

by abstracting from at least one occurrence of a proper name.5 Any such
abstraction P can be thought of as having one or more gaps. It is a predicate
if and only if
(i) its meaning guarantees that if we can get each one of two declarative
sentences A and B from P by filling every gap, and each expression
in A filling a gap refers to the same entity as the expression filling the
same gap in B, then A and B do not differ in truth-value; and
(ii) for every name a having a bearer and for every declarative sentence A
that is made up of P and either a or some names one of which is a, pa
existsq (i.e., pa exists out of time or at some point in timeq ) follows
from A.
By (i), ‘Peter believes that . . . is a star’ is not a predicate. As for clause
(ii), it may be regarded as redundant, but I think it is not. I think that ‘It is
false that . . . is the founder of the Academy’ does not satisfy (ii). ‘Socrates
exists’ (i.e., ‘Socrates exists out of time or at some point in time’) does
not follow from ‘It is false that Socrates is the founder of the Academy’.
Indeed, for all that P. F. Strawson used to say, ‘It is false that Socrates
is the founder of the Academy’ seems to follow from ‘Socrates does not
exist’. On the other hand, ‘It is false that . . . is the founder of the Academy’
satisfies clause (i).6
When in logic we accept, e.g., the inference of F 1 b from F 1 a and a =
b, it becomes clear that we treat predicate letters like predicates in a sense
that excludes phrases such as ‘Peter believes that . . . is a star’. When we
accept, e.g., the inference of (∃x1 )F 1 x1 from F 1 a it becomes clear that,
whatever may be the case with ‘It is false that . . . is the founder of the
Academy’, we treat predicate letters like predicates in a sense that excludes
any phrases that do not satisfy (ii).
Let C be a formula in which at least one schematic letter occurs. It is
wrong or even meaningless to call C true. Any true linguistic expression is
a declarative sentence. C is not a declarative sentence: unless we assign it a
meaning it now lacks, we cannot use it to make a statement. I think that it is
also wrong or meaningless to describe C as following from something or to
describe something as following from C. Any linguistic expression which
follows from something or from which something follows is a declarative
sentence. Saying that p1 follows from p and p ⇒ p1 ought to sound as
absurd as saying that ‘Who loves Mary and who loves Joan?’ follows from
‘Who loves Mary?’ and ‘Who loves Joan?’
168 YANNIS STEPHANOU

I call a sequence of signs ‘a formal inference’ if and only if it has the

form
[A1 , . . ., An ; B]
where n ≥ 0 and each of A1 , . . ., An , B is a well-formed formula of L.
A1 , . . ., An are the premisses of the formal inference, and B is the conclu-
sion. [p, p ⇒ p1 ; p1 ] is a formal inference. [; p1 ] is a formal inference
with zero premisses.
Let A be a well-formed formula of L. Something is an English variant
of A just in case one can get it from A by doing the following:
(i) replacing each sentential letter with an English declarative sentence
which, on at least one of its readings if it is ambiguous, contains no
indexical
(ii) replacing each predicate letter with an English predicate whose gaps
are equal in number to the degree of the predicate letter, and which, on
at least one of its readings if it is ambiguous, contains no indexical
(iii) enclosing each individual constant in brackets wherever it occurs, and
replacing it (keeping the brackets) with an English name that has a
bearer
(iv) choosing one of the meanings of e, for every English expression e
that has more than one meaning and has been substituted at steps (i)–
(iii); for any ambiguous English sentence or predicate substituted at
(i)–(ii), its reading chosen at (iv) must be one on which it contains no
indexical, and for any ambiguous English name substituted at (iii), its
reading chosen at (iv) must be one on which it has a (single) bearer.
Let I be a formal inference. Something is an English variant of I just in
case one can get it from I by doing (i)–(iv). The replacements must be
uniform throughout I.7
Tackling indexicals is beyond the scope of this paper. By ‘indexicals’
I here mean all the expressions whose reference varies with the context in
which they are uttered, while their meaning remains constant. The sentence
‘Plato is the founder of the Academy’, for example, contains no indexical.
I think that when we utter the sentence, ‘is’ does not single out the time
of the utterance: it has the atemporal meaning it also has in mathematics
and in ‘Every human being is capable of thought’. As for clause (iv), it is
needed later on. Because of that clause, two distinct English variants may
contain exactly the same signs and only differ in meaning. Clause (iii)
distinguishes ‘[Plato] is the founder of the Academy’, which is an English
variant of F 1 a, from ‘[Plato] is the founder of [the Academy]’, which is
an English variant of F 2 aa1 ; both variants will mean ‘Plato is the founder
of the Academy’.
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 169

For every variable x from among x1 , x2 , etc., (∀x) will have a fixed
meaning in the English variants of the well-formed formulae of L. It will
mean ‘for everything’ (‘for every being’). As usual, ⇒ will be a sign of
material implication.
Consider a formal inference in which the conclusion is a logical con-
sequence of the premisses in a model-theoretic sense. Is every English
variant of the formal inference valid? That is the question that will occupy
us. It is easier to discuss sentential logic and predicate logic separately.
Section 2, which is simple and paves the way for what follows, concerns
the former, while from Section 3 we shall turn to the latter. Sections 4–6
constitute three, successively better, attempts at establishing an affirmative
answer for the case of predicate logic.

2.

Let P be that part of the language L in which the only schematic letters
are the sentential letters and there are no variables. P is a formal language
for sentential logic.
We can consider that, in sentential logic, any model is a subset of the set
of sentential letters, and any such subset is a model.8 A model of that sort
can be intuitively seen as an assignment of truth to every sentential letter
that belongs to it, and of falsehood to every sentential letter that does not. I
shall presuppose that we have defined in a standard way what it means for
a well-formed formula of P to be true in such a model.
We shall talk about possible worlds. A possible world is something that
could be the world (the universe, the whole reality); i.e., for each possible
world, it is possible that it should be the whole reality. The actual world
is actually the whole reality.9 We also need the notion of truth regarding a
possible world. This notion is an analogue of the concept of truth. Just as,
e.g., the sentence ‘The earth moves’ is true if and only if the earth moves,
so it is true regarding a possible world w if and only if at w the earth
moves. I use ‘at w’ as a sentential operator; by saying that, at a possible
world w, things are such-and-such, I mean that if w were the whole reality,
things would be such-and-such.
We can see that
(1) For every English variant A0 of a well-formed formula of P and
for every possible world w, ¬A0 is true regarding w if and only
if A0 is not true regarding w.
For example, let A0 be ‘Plato is wise’, which is an English variant of p.
‘¬ Plato is wise’ is true regarding a possible world w if and only if, at
170 YANNIS STEPHANOU

w, ¬ Plato is wise. Similarly, ‘Plato is wise’ is not true regarding w if

and only if ¬ [at w, Plato is wise]. If, at w, ¬ Plato is wise, then ¬[at
w, Plato is wise]: otherwise, a contradictory state of affairs obtains at w,
and that is unacceptable for a possible world. Also, if ¬[at w, Plato is
wise], then, at w, ¬ Plato is wise. The reason is that w is a possible world,
and not simply a possible situation. A possible world is characterized by
maximality: whatever fails to be the case at it is inconsistent with it. If ¬
[at w, Plato is wise], then it is inconsistent with w that Plato should be
wise, and thus from what is the case at w it follows that ¬ Plato is wise; if
so, then, at w, ¬ Plato is wise. ‘¬ Plato is wise’ is therefore true regarding
w if and only if ‘Plato is wise’ is not true regarding w.
We can similarly see that
(2) For any English variants A0 and C0 of well-formed formulae of
P and for any possible world w, A0 ⇒ C0 is true regarding
w if and only if either A0 is not true regarding w or C0 is true
regarding w.
For example, let A0 and C0 be ‘Aristotle is wise’ and ‘Plato is wise’ respect-
ively. If it is not the case that, at w, Aristotle is wise, then, at w, ¬Aristotle
is wise; so, at w [Aristotle is wise ⇒ Plato is wise]: whatever follows from
what is the case at a possible world is also the case at that possible world.
Also, if, at w, Plato is wise, then, by the principle just cited, at w [Aristotle
is wise ⇒ Plato is wise]. Thus, if either it is not the case that, at w, Aristotle
is wise or, at w, Plato is wise, then at w [Aristotle is wise ⇒ Plato is wise].
The converse conditional is easy to establish. Hence, ‘Aristotle is wise ⇒
Plato is wise’ is true regarding w if and only if either ‘Aristotle is wise’ is
not true regarding w or ‘Plato is wise’ is true regarding w.
Let A1 , . . ., An , B (n ≥ 0) be well-formed formulae of P . Assume
that B is a logical consequence of A1 , . . ., An in the technical sense of
model theory for sentential logic; in other words, every model in which
A1 , . . ., An are true is a model in which B is true. We can show that every
English variant [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] of the formal inference [A1 , . . ., An ; B] is
valid.10
It is easy to realize that
(3) For every possible world w there is a model M such that, for
every sentential letter s occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B], s belongs
to M if and only if the sentence replacing s in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ]
is true regarding w.
(3) follows from the fact that, for any sentential letters s1 , . . ., sm (m ≥ 0)
from among those occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B], there is a model to which
only s1 , . . ., sm belong.
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 171

We can prove that

(4) For any w, M, A and A0 where w is a possible world, M is a

model related to w in the way described in (3), A is either a
formula from among A1 , . . ., An , B or a well-formed part of at
least one of them, and A0 replaces A in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ]:
A is true in M if and only if A0 is true regarding w.
The proof, which presupposes (1) and (2), is a straightforward induction
on the number of occurrences of connectives in A. Once we have (3) and
(4), it is not difficult to conclude that every possible world regarding which
A01 , . . ., A0n are true is a possible world regarding which B0 is true.
Now, assume that n = 1, that A01 is ‘The earth rotates’, and that B0 is
‘[¬ The earth rotates] ⇒ [The sun revolves round the earth]’. Given the
conclusion we reached at the end of the preceding paragraph and given the
way in which I explained truth regarding a possible world, every possible
world at which the earth rotates is a possible world at which [¬ the earth
rotates] ⇒ [the sun revolves round the earth]. Hence, there is no possible
world w such that, at w, the earth rotates but it is not the case that [[¬
the earth rotates] ⇒ [the sun revolves round the earth]]. It is therefore
impossible that the earth should rotate and yet it should not be the case
that [[¬ the earth rotates] ⇒ [the sun revolves round the earth]]. Thus,
‘[¬ The earth rotates] ⇒ [The sun revolves round the earth]’ follows from
‘The earth rotates’. As similar remarks can be made whatever we assume
A01 , . . ., A0n , B0 to be, we may conclude, without presupposing any such
assumption, that B0 follows from A01 , . . ., A0n .

3.

Turning to the predicate calculus, let Q be a language that differs from L

only in lacking the sentential letters. Q is a formal language for first-order
logic. From now on, whenever I say ‘well-formed formula’, I shall mean
‘well-formed formula of Q’.
I shall make three assumptions which will be presupposed in the rest of
this paper. They are all intuitively very appealing. The first is that

(5) For any possible world and for any entities e1 , e2 , . . . of

that world, some denumerable sequence is the denumerable
sequence of e1 , e2 , . . . in that order.
The expression e1 , e2 , . . . is here meant as an abbreviation of an infinitely
long phrase in which each of the denumerably many symbols e1 , e2 , e3 ,
172 YANNIS STEPHANOU

etc., occurs once: a phrase that consists of those symbols separated by

commas and arranged in order of increasing subscripts. Something is an
entity of a possible world w if and only if, at w, it exists.
(5) is not as trivial as it may look. Indeed, on a plausible supposition it
contradicts one of the standard axiomatizations of set theory. Neumann–
Bernays set theory postulates the existence of proper classes. (A proper
class is a class that belongs to no class.) If there is a proper class, and if
everything is an entity of a possible world, then some proper class 9 is
an entity of a possible world. If (5) is true, then there is a denumerable
sequence s such that, for every positive integer i, si is 9. Then, 9 belongs
to some class: the range of s. This reasoning shows that, on the plausible
supposition that everything is an entity of a possible world, (5) is incom-
patible with the existence of a proper class. For this reason, I shall avoid
any commitment to the existence of a proper class.
The second assumption is the truth of all the instances of the schema

(6) For every possible world w, [it is the case for every entity x
of w that, at w, p] if and only if it is the case at w that, for
everything x, p.

In order to get an instance of (6), we must replace p with a statement in

which x may or may not occur. For example, if every entity of a possible
world w is physical at w, then at w everything is physical, and conversely.
One corollary of (6) is the schema

(7) If, at a possible world w, there is something x such that p, then

there is an entity x of w such that, at w, p.

Assume that, at a possible world w, there is something x such that p. Then,

at w, not everything x is such that ¬p. So it is not the case that, at w,
everything x is such that ¬p. Thus, by (6), it is not the case for every entity
x of w that, at w, ¬p. Hence, there is an entity x of w such that ¬ [at
w, ¬p]. Thus, by the same reasoning as was employed in arguing for (1),
there is an entity x of w such that, at w, ¬¬p.
Now, consider all the things there are, and suppose that, at a possible
world w, there is something other than every one of those things. Then, by
(7), there is something (an entity of w) which, at w, is other than every one
of them. Hence, there is something that, at w, is other than itself. This is
unacceptable, for w is a possible world. So, consider all the things there
are: there is no possible world at which something is other than every one
of them. That is an interesting conclusion we can derive from (6). It is
interesting because one may intuitively find it wrong.
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 173

That conclusion, however, does not by itself imply that each entity of a
possible world is an entity of the actual world, still less that each entity of
the actual world is an entity of every possible world. A philosopher who
believes that some things are not entities of the actual world but are entities
of other possible worlds may still accept that, regarding all the things there
are (including both the entities of the actual world and everything else),
there is no possible world at which something is other than every one of
them.
The third assumption is that
(8) For any possible world w and for any entities e1 and e2 of w
such that e1 is not e2 , it is not the case that, at w, e1 is e2 .
(8) is a version of the principle of the necessity of non-identity.
Equipped with (5), (6) and (8), we can proceed to some definitions.
We can speak of a name’s referent regarding a possible world. A name’s
referent regarding a possible world is an entity of that world. For example,
an entity of a possible world w is a referent of ‘Rome’ regarding w if and
only if at w that entity is Rome. By (8) there is no unambiguous name that,
regarding some possible world, has more than one referent. For example,
if ‘Rome’ has more than one referent regarding a possible world w, then
there are two distinct entities e1 and e2 of w such that, at w, e1 is Rome
and e2 is also Rome; hence, at w, e1 is e2 , which contradicts (8). Thanks to
clause (iv) in the definition of ‘English variant’, no name is ambiguous in
an English variant of a well-formed formula.
We shall also say that a predicate may apply, regarding a possible
world, to entities of that world. For any entity e of a possible world w,
the predicate ‘. . . is mortal’ applies to e regarding w if and only if, at w,
e is mortal. For any entities e1 and e2 of a possible world w, the predicate
‘. . . is larger than - - -’ applies regarding w to e1 and e2 in that order if and
only if, at w, e1 is larger than e2 .
We can now define what it means for a denumerable sequence of entit-
ies of a possible world to satisfy, regarding that world, an English variant
of a well-formed formula. By speaking of English variants of well-formed
formulae, I here refer, in order to avoid paradox, only to those English
variants in which no notion of truth or satisfaction finds expression. Let w
be a possible world, and s be a denumerable sequence of entities of w.
First, for any well-formed formula A and any English variant A0 of A,
∗
we shall define what sA,A 0 (b) will be, where b is an individual constant or
a variable. If b is an individual constant which occurs in A and is replaced
∗
in A0 by a name that has a referent regarding w, sA,A 0 (b) is that referent.
∗
If b is any other individual constant, there is no such thing as sA,A 0 (b). For
∗
each positive integer i, sA,A0 (xi ) is si .
174 YANNIS STEPHANOU

As usual, the definition of satisfaction is recursive:

(i) Consider an English variant A0 of an atomic formula A, and let A
be Fb1 . . .bk . s satisfies A0 regarding w if and only if the predicate
∗ ∗
replacing F in A0 applies regarding w to sA,A 0 (b1 ), . . ., sA,A0 (bk ) in
this order. Of course, if the predicate replacing F in A0 is to apply
∗ ∗
regarding w to sA,A 0 (b1 ), . . ., sA,A0 (bk ), there must be such things as
∗ ∗
sA,A0 (b1 ), . . ., sA,A0 (bk ).
(ii) For any English variant A0 of a well-formed formula, s satisfies ¬A0
regarding w if and only if s does not satisfy A0 regarding w.
(iii) For any A0 and C0 each of which is an English variant of a well-formed
formula, s satisfies A0 ⇒ C0 regarding w if and only if either s does
not satisfy A0 regarding w or s satisfies C0 regarding w.
(iv) For any positive integer i and any English variant A0 of a well-formed
formula, s satisfies (∀xi )A0 regarding w if and only if every denumer-
able sequence of entities of w which differs from s in at most the ith
position satisfies A0 regarding w.
Finally, to say that an English variant A0 of a well-formed formula is true
regarding a possible world w is to say that every denumerable sequence of
entities of w satisfies A0 regarding w.11
Our definitions of satisfaction and truth regarding a possible world are
analogous to Tarskian definitions of satisfaction and truth simpliciter. A
Tarskian definition for a language including, e.g., the sentence ‘(∀x1 ) x1
is perishable’ guarantees that ‘(∀x1 ) x1 is perishable’ is true if and only
if (∀x1 ) x1 is perishable. Similarly, our definition of truth regarding a
possible world guarantees that, for every possible world w, ‘(∀x1 ) x1 is
perishable’ is true regarding w if and only if, at w, (∀x1 ) x1 is perishable.
This remark applies to any English variant of a well-formed formula in
which no variable has a free occurrence.
That we can see by considering a few examples. ‘¬ Plato is wise’ is an
English variant of ¬F 1 a.12 Let w be a possible world. We can reason as
follows:
‘¬ Plato is wise’ is true regarding w
iff, for every denumerable sequence s of entities of w, s satisfies
‘¬ Plato is wise’ regarding w
iff, for every denumerable sequence s of entities of w, ¬[s sat-
isfies ‘Plato is wise’ regarding w]
iff, for every denumerable sequence s of entities of w, ¬[‘. . .
is wise’ applies regarding w to the referent of ‘Plato’ regarding
w]
iff ¬[‘. . . is wise’ applies regarding w to the referent of ‘Plato’
regarding w]
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 175
iff ¬[‘. . . is wise’ applies regarding w to the entity of w that, at
that world, is Plato]
iff ¬[at w, Plato is wise]
iff, at w, ¬ Plato is wise.

The last biconditional was justified in Section 2. At the last biconditional

but one, I make use of (8). Assume that at w Plato is wise. Then, at w,
Plato exists and is wise.13 It is therefore the case about Plato that at w he
exists and is wise. Thus, Plato is an entity of w, and ‘. . . is wise’ applies
to him regarding w. Of course, Plato is an entity of w that, at that world, is
Plato. By (8), he is the only entity of w that, at that world, is Plato. Thus,
‘. . . is wise’ applies regarding w to the entity of w that, at that world, is
Plato.
At the last biconditional but three, I presuppose that there is an entity of
w. If there is, then by (5) there is also a denumerable sequence of entities
of w. Without that presupposition, we ought not to omit the phrase ‘for
every denumerable sequence s of entities of w’, since it may be that the
statement beginning with that phrase is vacuously true and what follows
the phrase is not true. To see that there is an entity of w, assume that at w
there is nothing. Then, if w were the whole reality, there would be nothing.
But there would also be something, since there would be the whole reality,
i.e., w itself. The conclusion, that if the possible world w were the whole
reality, a contradictory state of affairs would obtain, is unacceptable. At
no possible world is there nothing at all.14 Thus, at w, there is something.
Hence, at w, something is identical with itself. There is therefore, by (7),
an entity x of w such that, at w, x is identical with itself. Consequently,
there is an entity of w.
As another example, ‘(∀x1 ) x1 is physical’ is an English variant of (∀x1 )
F 1 x1 . Let w be a possible world. We can think as follows:

‘(∀x1 ) x1 is physical’ is true regarding w,

iff, for every denumerable sequence s of entities of w, s
satisfies ‘(∀x1 ) x1 is physical’ regarding w
iff, for every denumerable sequence s of entities of w and for
every denumerable sequence s 0 of entities of w which differs
from s in at most the first position, s 0 satisfies ‘x1 is physical’
regarding w
iff, for every denumerable sequence s of entities of w and for
every denumerable sequence s 0 of entities of w which differs
from s in at most the first position, ‘. . . is physical’ applies to
s10 regarding w
176 YANNIS STEPHANOU

iff, for every denumerable sequence s of entities of w and for

every entity x1 of w, ‘. . . is physical’ applies to x1 regarding w
iff, for every entity x1 of w, ‘. . . is physical’ applies to x1 re-
garding w
iff, for every entity x1 of w, at w x1 is physical
iff, at w, (∀x1 ) x1 is physical.

Note the importance of (5) at the last biconditional but three, and the
importance of (6) at the last biconditional.
If we consider any English variant A0 of a well-formed formula in which
no variable has a free occurrence, we can reason as we have just done for
‘¬ Plato is wise’ and ‘(∀x1 ) x1 is physical’. We can thus establish that
statement of the form ‘For every possible world w, S is true regarding w
if and only if, at w, p’ in which ‘S’ is replaced by A0 in quotation marks
while ‘p’ is replaced by A0 itself.15

4.

In (standard) model theory for Q, a model M is an ordered pair hDM , IM i.

DM , the domain, is a nonempty set. IM is a function which assigns a mem-
ber of DM to each individual constant and also assigns, for every positive
integer k, a set of ordered k-tuples of elements of DM to each predicate
letter of degree k. Conversely, any such ordered pair is a model. I shall
presuppose that we have defined in the standard way what it means for a
denumerable sequence of elements of a domain to satisfy a well-formed
formula in a model with that domain.16
Let A1 , . . ., An , B (n ≥ 0) be well-formed formulae with these features:

(9) a. No variable has a free occurrence in any one of them;

b. B is a logical consequence of A1 , . . ., An in the technical
sense of model theory; that is, for every model M, every
denumerable sequence of elements of DM which satisfies
A1 , . . ., An in M satisfies B in M.

We shall see whether we can show that every English variant

[A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] of the formal inference [A1 , . . ., An ; B] is valid.
We can speak of a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of
a set and the entities of a possible world. I use the word ‘correspondence’
in an ordinary sense; I have no set-theoretic definition in mind. Suppose
that
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 177

(10) For every possible world w, there are a model M and a one-to-
one correspondence C between DM and w such that
a. for every individual constant a occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B]
and for every element e of DM , e is IM (a) if and only if
C(e) is the referent regarding w of the name replacing a in
[A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ]
b. for every positive integer k, for every predicate letter F
of degree k occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B], and for any ele-
ments e1 , . . ., ek of DM : he1 , . . ., ek i belongs to IM (F) if and
only if the predicate replacing F in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] applies
regarding w to C(e1 ), . . ., C(ek ) in that order.

It can be proved that

(11) For any w, M, C, A, A0 and (s1 , s2 , . . .) where w is a possible

world, M is a model, C is a correspondence that relates DM
to w in the way described in (10), A is either a formula from
among A1 , . . ., An , B or a well-formed part of at least one of
them, A0 replaces A in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ], and (s1 , s2 , . . .) is a
denumerable sequence of elements of DM :
(s1 , s2 , . . .) satisfies A in M if and only if the sequence
(C(s1 ), C(s2 ), . . .) satisfies A0 regarding w.

The proof is a straightforward induction on the number of occurrences of

connectives and quantifiers in A.17
Now, suppose that w is a possible world regarding which A01 , . . ., A0n
are true (in the sense of ‘true regarding w’ which was defined in Section
3). Let M be a model related to w as I described in (10). (11) allows us
to conclude that B0 is also true regarding w. Thus, every possible world
regarding which A01 , . . ., A0n are true is a possible world regarding which
B0 is true.
Assume, for instance, that n = 1, that A01 is ‘Plato is wise’, and that B0
is ‘¬ (∀x1 ) ¬ x1 is wise’. Our definition of truth regarding a possible world
guarantees that, for every possible world w, ‘Plato is wise’ is true regarding
w if and only if at w Plato is wise. It also guarantees that, for every possible
world w, ‘¬ (∀x1 ) ¬ x1 is wise’ is true regarding w if and only if, at w,
¬ (∀x1 ) ¬ x1 is wise. Thus, every possible world at which Plato is wise is
one at which ¬ (∀x1 ) ¬ x1 is wise. Hence,18 ‘¬ (∀x1 ) ¬ x1 is wise’ follows
from ‘Plato is wise’. As similar remarks can be made whatever we assume
A01 , . . ., A0n , B0 to be, we may conclude, without presupposing any such
assumption, that B0 follows from A01 , . . ., A0n .
178 YANNIS STEPHANOU

Assuming (10) we showed that B0 follows from A01 , . . ., A0n . (10),

however, presents a serious problem: it is false for some selections of
A1 , . . ., An , B and A01 , . . ., A0n , B0 . Suppose that the individual constant a
occurs in [A1 , . . ., An ; B] and is replaced in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] by ‘Socrates’.
Consider a possible world w at which nothing is Socrates, and let M be a
model related to w through a correspondence C as I described in (10). By
(10a), for every element e of DM , e is IM (a) if and only if C(e) is the
referent of ‘Socrates’ regarding w. But no entity of w is the referent of
‘Socrates’ regarding that possible world: an entity of w is a referent of
‘Socrates’ regarding that possible world just in case at w that entity is So-
crates. Hence, no element of DM is IM (a). This conclusion is unacceptable
because, in every model, each individual constant is assigned an element
of the domain. (10) is therefore false if a occurs in [A1 , . . ., An ; B] and
is replaced in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] by ‘Socrates’. It is false if any individual
constant occurs in [A1 , . . ., An ; B] and is replaced in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] by a
name that, regarding some possible world, lacks a referent.
Assuming (10) we showed that B0 follows from A01 , . . ., A0n . In fact,
what we showed is false for some selections of A1 , . . ., An , B and
A01 , . . ., A0n , B0 . For instance, F 1 a is a logical consequence of (∀x1 )F 1 x1 in
the technical sense of model theory, and [(∀x1 ) x1 is perishable; Socrates
is perishable] is an English variant of [(∀x1 )F 1 x1 ; F 1 a]. But ‘Socrates
is perishable’ does not follow from ‘(∀x1 ) x1 is perishable’. Consider a
possible world w at which everything is perishable but Socrates does not
exist. It is not the case that at w Socrates is perishable: it would be very odd
if, at any possible world, Socrates did not exist and yet he were perishable.
Hence, at w, it is not the case that Socrates is perishable. It is therefore
possible that everything should be perishable but it should not be the case
that Socrates is perishable.19
The concept of falsehood played no role in this argument to the effect
that ‘Socrates is perishable’ does not follow from ‘Everything is perish-
able’. It may be objected that invoking that concept leads to different
results: ‘Socrates is perishable’ does follow from ‘(∀x1 ) x1 is perishable’
because there is no possible world at which everything is perishable but
it is false that Socrates is perishable. I would reply that there is such a
world: w, a possible world at which everything is perishable but Socrates
does not exist. I think that, just as we accept the statements of the form
‘Necessarily, p iff it is true that p’, so we should accept the statements
of the form ‘Necessarily, ¬p iff it is false that p’. Thus, at every possible
world, ¬ [Socrates is perishable] iff it is false that Socrates is perishable.
So, since at w it is not the case that Socrates is perishable, at w it is false
that Socrates is perishable.
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 179

5.

Let us now turn from standard model theory for Q to a nonstandard theory.
In this theory, a model M is an ordered pair hDM , IM i. DM , the domain, is
a nonempty set. IM is a function that, for every positive integer k, assigns a
set of ordered k-tuples of elements of DM to each predicate letter of degree
k. IM also assigns a member of DM to each individual constant for which
IM is defined. It may be defined for all, some, one or none of the individual
constants. Conversely, any such ordered pair is a model. That will be the
meaning of the term ‘model’ in the rest of this paper.
In our new theory we can give definitions of satisfaction and truth in
a model by imitating the definitions of satisfaction and truth regarding a
possible world.
Let M be a model, and s be a denumerable sequence of elements of DM .
We shall first define a function s ∗ from individual constants and variables
to elements of DM . If a is an individual constant for which IM is defined,
s ∗ (a) is IM (a). If a is an individual constant for which IM is undefined, s ∗
is also undefined for a. For each positive integer i, s ∗ (xi ) is si .
The definition of satisfaction is inductive:

(i) Consider an atomic formula Fb1 . . . bk . s satisfies Fb1 . . . bk in M

if and only if hs ∗ (b1 ), . . ., s ∗ (bk )i belongs to IM (F). Of course, if
hs ∗ (b1 ), . . ., s ∗ (bk )i is to belong to IM (F), s ∗ must be defined for all of
b1 , . . ., bk .
(ii) For any well-formed formula A, s satisfies ¬A in M if and only if s
does not satisfy A in M.
(iii) For any well-formed formulae A and C, s satisfies A ⇒ C in M if and
only if either s does not satisfy A in M or s satisfies C in M.
(iv) For any positive integer i and any well-formed formula A, s satisfies
(∀xi )A in M if and only if every denumerable sequence of elements of
DM which differs from s in at most the ith position satisfies A in M.

A well-formed formula is true in M if and only if it is satisfied in M by

every denumerable sequence of elements of DM . The nonstandard model
theory just presented is a model theory for free logic.20
As in Section 4, A1 , . . ., An , B (n ≥ 0) will be well-formed formulae
satisfying (9). But now the terms ‘model’ and ‘satisfy’ will be under-
stood to have their new senses in (9b); B is assumed to be a logical
consequence of A1 , . . ., An in the technical sense of the new model the-
ory. [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] will be, as before, an arbitrary English variant of
[A1 , . . ., An ; B].
180 YANNIS STEPHANOU

Is (10) true if by ‘model’ we mean the models of the new theory? (10)
can be deduced from these five premisses:
(12) For every possible world w, there is a one-to-one correspond-
ence between a nonempty set S and w.
(13) For every nonempty set S, there is a model whose domain is S.
(14) For every model M and every individual constant a, there is a
model N in which IN (a) is undefined and which otherwise does
not differ from M.
(15) For every model M, every individual constant a and every ele-
ment e of DM , there is a model N in which IN (a) is e and which
otherwise does not differ from M.
(16) For every model M, every positive integer k, every predicate
letter F of degree k, and every set T of k-tuples of elements
of DM : there is a model N in which IN (F) is T and which
otherwise does not differ from M.
Proof. To see how (10) can be deduced from (12)–(16), consider an
arbitrary possible world w. By (12) there is, for some nonempty set S,
a one-to-one correspondence C between that set and w. (13) ensures the
existence of a model M whose domain is S. For each predicate letter F of
degree k occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B], let E(F) be a set such that
(a) every element of E(F) is a k-tuple of elements of S, and
(b) for any elements e1 , . . ., ek of S, he1 , . . ., ek i belongs to E(F) if
and only if the predicate replacing F in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] applies
regarding w to C(e1 ), . . ., C(ek ) in that order.
The existence of such a set is guaranteed by standard set-theoretic ideas.21
Now, let N be a model with the following three features:
(c) N has the same domain as M and does not differ from M in
any individual constant or predicate letter that does not occur in
[A1 , . . ., An ; B].
(d) For every individual constant a occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B]: if
an entity of w is the referent regarding w of the name replacing
a in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] then IN (a) is the element of S that cor-
responds to that entity via C, but otherwise IN is undefined for
a.
(e) For every predicate letter F occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B], IN (F)
is E(F).
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 181

The existence of a model such as N is guaranteed by (14)–(16). For N

has finitely many differences from M and differs from it at most in what
individual constants are defined, what elements of S are assigned to the
individual constants that are defined, and what sets of k-tuples of elements
of S are assigned to the predicate letters. The model N is related to w was
I described in (10). 

We can here reason as in Section 4 and conclude that every English variant
of [A1 , . . ., An ; B] is valid. (13)–(16) express features of the nonstandard
model theory we are discussing. Is (12) true?
(12) carries a commitment to anti-actualism, i.e., to the view that there
are entities which are not actual entities (entities of the actual world). For
if (12) is true, then there is a one-to-one correspondence between a set S
and the actual world. According to standard set theory, the subsets of S
are more numerous than its elements.22 They are therefore more numerous
than the actual entities. Hence, some of those subsets are not actual entities:
if they are all actual, then some actual entities are more numerous than all
actual entities, which is absurd.23
If we ignore that problem, (12) seems plausible. I therefore think that,
if one does not mind about anti-actualism, then one may regard (12) as true
and accept the conclusion that every English variant of [A1 , . . ., An ; B] is
valid. On the other hand, many consider anti-actualism to be almost as
absurd as a contradiction. Thus, in the next section, I shall try to reach the
same conclusion avoiding the commitment to anti-actualism. The idea will
be that many models can jointly represent one possible world.

6.

To overcome the commitment to anti-actualism, I shall use plural

quantification.24 We shall first see what it means for some models to be
acceptable, and what it means for a well-formed formula to be satisfied in
some acceptable models by a denumerable sequence of elements of their
domains. When I say ‘models’, I mean ‘one or more models’.
Some models 8 are acceptable if and only if
(i) for any finitely or denumerably many elements drawn from the do-
mains of the models 8, there is a model from among 8 to whose
domain all those elements belong
(ii) for any individual constant a, for anything e that is IM (a) in some
model M from among 8, and for any model N from among 8: either
e does not belong to DN and IN is undefined for a or IN (a) is e, and
182 YANNIS STEPHANOU

(iii) for any positive integer k, for any predicate letter F of degree k, for
any elements e1 , . . ., ek drawn from the domains of the models 8, and
for any models M and N from among 8 such that each of e1 , . . ., ek
belongs to both DM and DN : he1 , . . ., ek i belongs to IM (F) just in case
it belongs to IN (F).
The letter ‘8’ is used as a device of cross-reference, instead of the phrase
‘those models’. It is important that whenever I say ‘acceptable models’, I
shall not mean ‘models each of which is acceptable’; in that respect, the
phrase ‘acceptable models’ will be like the phrases ‘people married to each
other’ and ‘conflicting interests’.25
Now, let 8 be some acceptable models, and let s be a denumerable
sequence of elements drawn from the domains of the models 8. In other
words, for every i, si is an element of the domain of a model from among
8. The definition of satisfaction will be recursive.
(i) For any atomic formula A, s satisfies A in 8 if and only if, for some
model M from among 8, s is a sequence of elements of DM and
satisfies A in M.
(ii) For any well-formed formula A, s satisfies ¬A in 8 if and only if s
does not satisfy A in 8.
(iii) For any well-formed formulae A and C, s satisfies A ⇒ C in 8 if and
only if s does not satisfy A in 8 or s satisfies C in 8.
(iv) For any positive integer i and any well-formed formula A, s satisfies
(∀xi )A in 8 if and only if every denumerable sequence of elements
drawn from the domains of the models 8 which differs from s in at
most the ith position satisfies A in 8.
To say that a well-formed formula A is true in some acceptable models
8 is to say that every denumerable sequence of elements drawn from the
domains of the models 8 satisfies A in 8.26
Any acceptable models 8 are very similar to a model. The domains of
the models 8 amount between them to an analogue of the domain of a
model. Each individual constant is not correlated in 8 with more than one
element, and each predicate letter of degree k is correlated with zero, one,
or more k-tuples. Yet, for all the similarities between 8 and a model, there
is a crucial difference: the domain of a model is always a set, while there
may be no set (or class or collection or anything) whose members are the
members of the domains of the models 8.
We can connect the notion of truth defined in Section 5 with the notion
of truth just defined by proving that

(17) Each well-formed formula that is true in every model is also

true in any acceptable models.
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 183

A proof of (17) can be found in the appendix.

We can now return to A1 , . . ., An , B and A01 , . . ., A0n , B0 , as these were
selected in Section 5. Consider the formula A1 ⇒ [. . . ⇒ [An ⇒ B]. . .].
For example, that formula is A1 ⇒ [A2 ⇒ [A3 ⇒ [A4 ⇒ B]]] if n = 4.
The selection of A1 , . . ., An , B was such that A1 ⇒ [. . . ⇒ [An ⇒ B]. . .] is
true in every model. Thus, by (17), it is also true in any acceptable models.
Hence,

(18) If, in any acceptable models, A1 , . . ., An are all true, B is also

true in those models.
This conclusion will be useful later on.
(10) will be replaced by the following principle:

(19) For every possible world w, there are some acceptable models
8 and a one-to-one correspondence C which correlates the ele-
ments of the domains of the models 8 with the entities of w in
such a way that
a. for every individual constant a occurring in
[A1 , . . ., An ; B], for every model M from among 8,
and for every element e of DM : e is IM (a) if and only if
C(e) is the referent regarding w of the name replacing a in
[A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ]
b. for every positive integer k, for every predicate letter F of
degree k occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B], for every model M
from among 8, and for any elements e1 , . . ., ek of DM :
he1 , . . ., ek i belongs to IM (F) if and only if the predic-
ate replacing F in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] applies regarding w to
C(e1 ), . . ., C(ek ) in that order.

In (19) we implement the idea that many models can jointly represent one
possible world.
We can prove that

(20) For any w, 8, C, A, A0 and (s1 , s2 , . . .) where w is a possible

world, 8 are acceptable models, C is a correspondence relating
8 and w in the way described in (19), A is either a formula
from among A1 , . . ., An , B or a well-formed part of at least one
of them, A0 replaces A in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ], and (s1 , s2 , . . .) is a
denumerable sequence of elements drawn from the domains of
the models 8:
(s1 , s2 , . . .) satisfies A in 8 if and only if (C(s1 ), C(s2 ), . . .)
satisfies A0 regarding w.
184 YANNIS STEPHANOU

Proof. To prove (20), consider arbitrary w, 8 and C related as I

described in (19), and then proceed by induction on the number of occur-
rences of connectives and quantifiers in A. For example, let A be F 2 x1 a.
Consider any denumerable sequence (s1 , s2 , . . .) of elements drawn from
the domains of the models 8. (s1 , s2 , . . .) satisfies A in 8 if and only if, for
some model M from among 8, (s1 , s2 , . . .) is a sequence of elements of
DM and hs1 , IM (a)i belongs to IM (F 2 ). If that is the case for some model M
from among 8, then by (19) the predicate replacing F 2 in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ]
applies, regarding w and in this order, to C(s1 ) and the referent regarding
w of the name replacing a in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ]. The converse conditional
also holds, by (19) and clause (i) in the definition of ‘acceptable’: con-
sider a model M from among 8 such that DM contains all of s1 , s2 , . . .
and also contains what C correlates with the referent regarding w of the
name replacing a in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ]. Finally, the predicate replacing F 2
in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] applies, regarding w and in this order, to C(s1 ) and
the referent regarding w of the name replacing a in [A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] if
and only if (C(s1 ), C(s2 ), . . .) satisfies A0 regarding w. As similar remarks
apply even if A is an atomic formula other than F 2 x1 a, the basic clause of
the induction has been established. The rest of the proof of (20) is similar
to that of (11). 

Now, suppose that w is a possible world regarding which A01 , . . ., A0n are
true. Let 8 be acceptable models related to w as I described in (19). (20)
and (18) allow us to conclude that B0 is true regarding w. Thus, every
possible world regarding which A01 , . . ., A0n are true is a possible world
regarding which B0 is true. Consequently, by the same reasoning as was
employed at the analogous point in Section 4, B0 follows from A01 , . . ., A0n .
Hence, every English variant of [A1 , . . ., An ; B] is valid.
(19) can be deduced from (15), (16) and the following three premisses:

(21) For every possible world w, there are some (one or more) things
that a one-to-one correspondence correlates with the entities of
w.
(22) For any finitely or denumerably many things, there is a set of
just those things.

(23) For every nonempty set S, there is a model M in which the

domain is S, IM is not defined for any individual constant, and
IM (F) is the empty set for every predicate letter F.

Proof. To see how (19) can be deduced, consider an arbitrary possible

world w. By (21) there are some things that a one-to-one correspondence C
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 185

correlates with the entities of w. Take one or more, finitely or denumerably

many, of the things that C correlates with the entities of w, and let S be
their set. Let M be a model in which the domain is S, IM is not defined
for any individual constant, and IM (F) is the empty set for every predicate
letter F. (22) and (23) ensure that there are such a set and such a model. For
each predicate letter F of degree k occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B], let E(F)
be a set satisfying two conditions exactly similar to (a)–(b) in our proof of
(10) from (12)–(16). Let N be a model with the following three features:
(c0 ) It has the same domain as M and does not differ from M in
any individual constant or predicate letter that does not occur in
[A1 , . . ., An ; B].
(d0 ) For every individual constant a occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B]: if an
entity of w is the referent regarding w of the name replacing a in
[A01 , . . ., A0n ; B0 ] and corresponds to an element of S via C, then IN (a)
is that element, but otherwise IN is undefined for a.
(e0 ) For every predicate letter F occurring in [A1 , . . ., An ; B], IN (F) is
E(F).
The existence of a model such as N is guaranteed by (15) and (16). Now,
the elements of S were chosen arbitrarily among the things that C correl-
ates with the entities of w. It was only stipulated that they be one or more,
and that they be finitely or denumerably many. Hence, for any one or more,
finitely or denumerably many, things from among those that C correlates
with the entities of w, there is a model like N. Consider all those models.
They are acceptable and related to w as I described in (19). 

(15), (16) and (23) express features of the nonstandard model theory we
have been discussing since Section 5. (22) also seems to be correct; indeed,
that, for any finitely many things, there is a set of just those things is part of
a standard axiomatization of set theory: Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with
individuals.27 As for (21), I think it is true, at least if we accept the view,
which was argued for in Section 3, that each possible world has at least
one entity; the things that correspond to the entities of a possible world
may be those entities themselves. We can therefore endorse the conclusion
that every English variant of [A1 , . . ., An ; B] is valid.

To sum up, in Section 2 we saw that if standard model theory for sentential
logic approves a formal inference, every English variant of that formal
inference is valid. In Sections 5–6 we concluded that if a certain model
theory for free logic approves a formal inference, every English variant
of the formal inference is valid. We first drew that conclusion from as-
186 YANNIS STEPHANOU

sumptions that committed us to anti-actualism, but we then avoided that

commitment. At the end of Section 4 we considered a formal inference
approved by standard model theory for the predicate calculus, and saw
that not every English variant of that formal inference is valid.
These conclusions constitute an argument for free logic and against the
classical predicate calculus, assuming we want a model theory on whose
basis we can show that if the conclusion of a formal inference is a logical
consequence of the premisses in a technical, model-theoretic sense, then
every English variant of the formal inference is valid. It is worth pointing
out that we reached those conclusions although, as was explained in Sec-
tion 1, we construed individual constants in a standard way (as schematic
letters for names having a bearer) and not as they are construed in free
logic; we did not at all consider names that lack a bearer, like ‘Pegasus’
and ‘Hamlet’.
This paper also shows how we can represent possible worlds in terms of
models for first-order logic. It was argued that it is possible and preferable
to do so by using plural quantification.

APPENDIX

We shall here see how (17) can be proved:

(17) Each well-formed formula that is true in every model is also

true in any acceptable models.
In order to prove (17), I shall describe an axiomatic system A and show
that each well-formed formula that is true in every model is a theorem of
A, and that each theorem of A is true in any acceptable models. The proof
of the former statement follows Henkin’s method.28
Let A and C be variables ranging over the well-formed formulae; x and
y will range over the variables of the language Q, and a will range over the
individual constants. The axioms of A are given in the schemata:

(A1 ) Every instance of a tautology of P is an axiom.

(A2 ) (∀x)[A ⇒ C] ⇒ [A ⇒ (∀x)C] where x has no free occurrence

in A.
(A3 ) (∀x)A ⇒ Ṡxy A where in A no free occurrence of x is in the
scope of an occurrence of (∀y).

(A4 ) C ⇒ [(∀x)A ⇒ Ṡxa A] where C is an atomic formula in which

a occurs.
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 187

An instance of a tautology of P is a well-formed formula that we can get

from a tautology of the language P by replacing each sentential letter with
a well-formed formula of Q. Ṡxy A is the result of substituting y for every
free occurrence of x in A, and Ṡxa A is the result of substituting a for every
free occurrence of x in A. A has two primitive rules of inference:

(R1 ) From A and A ⇒ C we may infer C.

(R2 ) From A we may infer (∀x)A.

In order to prove that each well-formed formula that is true in every

model is a theorem of A, we first need some terminology about sets of well-
formed formulae. Such a set 0 is consistent if and only if, for every positive
integer k, there are no members B1 , . . ., Bk of 0 such that ¬[B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bk ]
is a theorem of A.29 It is clear that if 0 is consistent, then it is not the case
that A ∈ 0 and ¬A ∈ 0 for any A. Also, a set 0 is maximal just in case,
for every A, A ∈ 0 or ¬A ∈ 0. It has the ∀-property just in case, for every
A and every x, there is a variable y which does not occur in A and is such
that Ṡxy A ⇒ (∀x)A belongs to 0. Finally, S̄xy A is the result of substituting
y for every bound occurrence of x in A.
We also need the following lemmas:

(24) For each maximal consistent set 0 of well-formed formulae:

every theorem of A belongs to 0, and if A ∈ 0 and [A ⇒ C] ∈
0, then C ∈ 0.
(25) For any M, A, x, b, s and s 0 where M is a model; b is either an
individual constant or a variable such that in A no free occur-
rence of x is in the scope of an occurrence of (∀b); s and s 0 are
denumerable sequences of elements of DM ; s ∗ (x) = s 0∗ (b); and
for every positive integer k such that xk has a free occurrence in
A and is other than x, sk = sk0 :
s satisfies A in M if and only if s 0 satisfies Ṡxb A in M.
(26) For every model M, every A, any x and y where y does not
occur in A, and every denumerable sequence s of elements of
DM : s satisfies A in M if and only if s satisfies S̄xy A in M.

(27) For every A and any x and y where y does not occur in A : A ⇒
S̄xy A is a theorem of A.

(28) If, for any A, {A} is consistent, then A belongs to a max-

imal consistent set of well-formed formulae which has the
∀-property.
188 YANNIS STEPHANOU

For a proof of (24) see Hughes and Cresswell (1996, 114). (25) is proved
by induction on the number of occurrences of connectives and quantifiers
in A. (26) is proved by similar induction and with the help of (25). A proof
of (27) can be derived from Church (1956, 187–92). For a proof of (28) see
Hughes and Cresswell (1996, 115–16 and 258–59). It is from that book that
I took the definition of consistency and the concept of ∀-property.
We can now prove that

(29) For each maximal consistent set 0 of well-formed formulae

which has the ∀-property, there are a model M and a denumer-
able sequence s of elements of DM such that s satisfies every
member of 0 in M.
Let 0 be a maximal consistent set that has the ∀-property. Consider that S
is the set of all individual constants a such that, for every x and every A,
(∀x)A ⇒ Ṡxa A belongs to 0. Let M be a model where
(i) DM is the union of S with the set of variables;
(ii) for every a that belongs to S, IM (a) is a, but IM is not defined for any
other individual constant;
(iii) for every positive integer k, every predicate letter F of degree k, and
any elements b1 , . . ., bk of DM : hb1 , . . ., bk i belongs to IM (F) just in
case Fb1 . . .bk belongs to 0.
Consider that s is the denumerable sequence (x1 , x2 , . . .). We can prove
that, for every A, s satisfies A in M if and only if A ∈ 0. The proof
proceeds by induction on the number m of occurrences of connectives and
quantifiers in A.
First suppose that A is atomic (m = 0) and every individual constant
that occurs in A belongs to S. Then, the proof is immediate owing to the
definition of M and s. Suppose that A is atomic, but at least one individual
constant a that occurs in A does not belong to S. Then, IM is undefined for
a, and so s does not satisfy A in M. Assume that A ∈ 0, and let x and C be
an arbitrary variable and an arbitrary well-formed formula respectively.
By (A4 ) and (24), A ⇒ [(∀x)C ⇒ Ṡxa C] belongs to 0. Hence, (∀x)C
⇒ Ṡxa C also belongs to 0. But then, contrary to our hypothesis, a ∈ S.
Consequently, A 6 ∈ 0.
Now suppose that m > 0, and that what we wish to prove applies to
numbers smaller than m. If A has the form ¬C or the form C ⇒ D, the
proof is easy owing to the consistency and maximality of 0. The remaining
case, i.e., that A is (∀xi )C, is more complicated.
Assume that A 6 ∈ 0. Then, ¬A, i.e., ¬(∀xi )C, belongs to 0. By the
∀-property, there is a variable y which does not occur in C and is such that
Ṡxyi C ⇒ (∀xi )C belongs to 0. By (A1 ), [Ṡxyi C ⇒ (∀xi )C] ⇒ [¬(∀xi )C ⇒
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 189

¬Ṡxyi C] also belongs to 0. Hence, ¬Ṡxyi C ∈ 0, and Ṡxyi C 6 ∈ 0. Therefore,

by the inductive hypothesis, s does not satisfy Ṡxyi C in M. Let s 0 be a
denumerable sequence in which si0 = y, but which otherwise is like s.
By (25) s 0 does not satisfy C in M, and hence s does not satisfy (∀xi )C in
M. Thus, if s satisfies A in M, then A ∈ 0.
Now assume that A ∈ 0, and let s 0 be a denumerable sequence of
elements of DM which differs from s in at most the ith position. There
are three cases. (a) si0 is an individual constant a that belongs to S. Then,
(∀xi )C ⇒ Ṡxai C belongs to 0, and hence so does Ṡxai C. Thus, by the induc-
tive hypothesis, s satisfies Ṡxai C in M, and by (25) s 0 satisfies C in M. (b) si0
is a variable x such that in C no free occurrence of xi is in the scope of an
occurrence of (∀x). Then, by (A3 ), (∀xi )C ⇒ Ṡxxi C belongs to 0, and, as
in the previous case, s 0 satisfies C in M. (c) si0 is a variable x such that in C
at least one free occurrence of xi is in the scope of an occurrence of (∀x).
Let y be a variable that does not occur in A. By (27), A ⇒ S̄xy A belongs
to 0. Hence, (∀xi )S̄xy C ∈ 0 because (∀xi )S̄xy C is S̄xy A. But also (∀xi )S̄xy C
⇒ Ṡxxi (S̄xy C) belongs to 0 by (A3 ). Thus, Ṡxxi (S̄xy C) ∈ 0. Therefore, by the
inductive hypothesis, s satisfies Ṡxxi (S̄xy C) in M. By (25) s 0 satisfies S̄xy C in
M, and by (26) s 0 also satisfies C in M. Thus, whichever of the three cases
obtains, the arbitrary sequence s 0 satisfies C in M. Hence, s satisfies A in
M. This completes the induction and the proof of (29).
Let A be true in every model, and suppose it is not a theorem of A. Nor
is ¬¬A, then. {¬A} is therefore consistent. Thus, by (28) and (29), there
are a model M and a denumerable sequence s of elements of DM such that
s satisfies ¬A in M. Hence, s does not satisfy A in M. But s does satisfy
A in M, since A is true in every model. A is therefore a theorem of A.
Consequently,

(30) Each well-formed formula that is true in every model is a

theorem of A.
We must now prove that

(31) Each theorem of A is true in any acceptable models.

We can prove (31) by the standard method: by showing that each axiom of
A is true in any acceptable models, and that the primitive inference rules
of A preserve that feature. The proof is easy with the help of the following
three lemmas:
190 YANNIS STEPHANOU

(32) For any 8, A, i, s and s 0 where 8 are acceptable models, i is a

positive integer such that xi has no free occurrence in A, and s
and s 0 are denumerable sequences of elements drawn from the
domains of the models 8 and differ at most in the ith position:
s satisfies A in 8 if and only if s 0 satisfies A in 8.
(33) For any 8, A, i, k, s and s 0 where 8 are acceptable models, i
and k are positive integers such that in A no free occurrence of
xi is in the scope of an occurrence of (∀xk ), and s and s 0 are
denumerable sequences of elements drawn from the domains
of the models 8, they differ at most in the ith position, and
si = sk0 :
s satisfies A in 8 if and only if s 0 satisfies Ṡxxik A in 8.

(34) For any 8, A, i, a, s and s 0 where 8 are acceptable models,

i is a positive integer, s and s 0 are denumerable sequences of
elements drawn from the domains of the models 8, they differ
at most in the ith position, and si = IM (a) for some model M
from among 8:
s satisfies A in 8 if and only if s 0 satisfies Ṡxai A in 8.
Each of (32)–(34) can be proved by induction on the number of occur-
rences of connectives and quantifiers in A.30

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At the early stages of writing this paper I benefited from Mark Sains-
bury’s remarks, while Timothy Williamson’s comments on a more recent
draft also led to some improvements. I am also indebted to an anonymous
referee for some helpful comments.

NOTES

1 In that sense of ‘possible’, it is not possible that a contradictory state of affairs should
obtain or that a man should be thinner than himself.
We can easily extend our notion of validity to inferences with zero premisses. For ex-
ample, the inference of ‘The earth rotates or does not rotate’ from zero premisses is valid
if and only if it is impossible that it should not be the case that the earth rotates or does
not rotate. In other words, the inference is valid if and only if it is necessary that the earth
rotates or does not rotate.
2 Etchemendy (1990, 131). Also see Cartwright (1987, 247–252); Sainsbury (1991, 95–98
and 213–214).
 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 191
3 I shall use the words ‘every’, ‘each’, etc. in a sense in which if, for example, there is
no book north of latitude 70◦ , it follows that every book north of latitude 70◦ is such-and-
such. This is how ‘every’, ‘each’, etc. are normally used in mathematical contexts. It is
doubtful whether that usage accords with their ordinary sense: see Strawson (1952, 164
and 173–175); Sainsbury (1991, 142–143).
4 In order to make notation lighter, I omit quotation marks when what they would enclose
includes only symbols and no ordinary word. I will also omit quasi-quotation (Quine’s
corners) when what it would enclose includes no ordinary word.
5 See Dummett (1981, ch. 2); Dummett (1991, 196).
6 I take it that the sentence ‘It is false that Socrates is the founder of the Academy’ has no
reading on which either ‘Socrates’ or ‘the founder of the Academy’ has wider scope than
‘it is false that’. ‘It is false that Socrates is the founder of the Academy’ does not mean
‘Socrates is such that it is false that he is the founder of the Academy’: ‘Socrates exists’
follows from the latter sentence, in which ‘Socrates’ has wider scope than ‘it is false that’.
7 What I call a replacement of a predicate letter with a predicate involves, for each oc-
currence o of the predicate letter, an obvious change in the relative position of o and the
occurrences of variables or individual constants with which o makes up an occurrence of an
atomic formula of L. For example, ‘x1 is larger than x2 ’ results from F 2 x1 x2 by replacing
F 2 with ‘. . . is larger than - - -’.
Also, I take it that no variable or logical constant of formal logic (e.g., ¬) occurs in an
English declarative sentence.
8 See Chang and Keisler (1990, 4).
9 Philosophers who deny that the actual world is the whole reality may still accept that
the actual world is actually the whole reality. I take it that that is D. Lewis’s position.
10 Cf. Cartwright (1987, 248); Sainsbury (1991, 95–98).
11 All these definitions are stipulative. Thus, by adopting them, we make no assumptions
about any intuitive semantic notions we may have. But for the same reason we must not
immediately, without argument, accept any connection between the concept just defined of
truth regarding a possible world and our concept of validity, or following from, which we
have taken from philosophical tradition.
12 The brackets around ‘Plato’ are omitted.
13 See clause (ii) in our definition of ‘predicate’.
14 Hence, if one accepts that there might have been nothing, one will have to admit an
exception to the basic schema governing possible worlds:

It is possible that p if and only if, at some possible world, p.

Cf. Lewis (1986, 73–74); Armstrong (1989, 24–25).

15 The reader can test this claim on an English variant of a more complicated well-formed
formula, such as (∀x1 )[¬F 1 x1 ⇒ [(∀x1 )F 3 x1 a1 a ⇒ (∀x2 )F 2 x2 x1 ]].
16 See Mendelson (1987, 47–48).
17 The proof presupposes (5).
18 See the last paragraph in Section 2.
19 See Deutsch (1990, 94–95) and Stephanou (1994, 100–101). The reasoning here does
not presuppose the technical apparatus developed in Section 3, but does presuppose the
argument in Section 2 which allows us to infer from ‘¬[at w, . . .]’ to ‘at w, ¬ . . .’.
20 See Lambert (1991, 11).
192 YANNIS STEPHANOU

21 Specifically, it is here presupposed that, for any elements e , . . ., e of S, there is such

1 k
a thing as the k-tuple he1 , . . ., ek i; that there is a set of the k-tuples of elements of S; and
that, for any set T and any condition, there is a set of the members of T which satisfy that
condition.
22 Indeed, we have made use in our reasoning of a principle which paves the way for the
proof that the subsets of a set are more numerous than its elements: the principle that, for
any set T and any condition, there is a set of the members of T which satisfy that condition.
See the preceding note.
23 The view that there are many possible worlds does not by itself carry a commitment to
anti-actualism. One may accept that there are possible worlds other than the actual one, but
consider them to be abstract entities of the actual world.
24 On plural quantification, see Boolos (1984, 442–443 and 446–449). I take it that, as
Boolos has argued, use of plural quantification over Fs does not commit us to there being
a set or class of Fs, and the existence of some sets that jointly satisfy a condition (e.g.,
they are all the sets there are) does not entail the existence of a set (or class or collection or
anything) whose members are those sets.
25 See Quirk et al. (1985, 953–955).
26 When I use the concepts just defined and speak about satisfaction or truth in some
acceptable models, I shall not mean satisfaction or truth in each one of those models. In
that respect, the sentence ‘s satisfies A in some acceptable models’ will be like the sentence
‘John left the letter among some books’.
27 That is the version of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in which variables range over all
things and are not restricted to sets. It is developed in detail in Suppes (1972).
28 (17) and the reasoning that supports it bear some similarity to a position and an argument
for that position which were advanced in Kreisel (1967, 152–155) and discussed in Etche-
mendy (1990, 145–50). The position is that any formula true in every model (in roughly
the sense of ‘model’ explained in Section 4) is true in every structure. The argument is
that any formula true in every model is a theorem of standard first-order logic, by Gödel’s
proof of completeness, and any such theorem is intuitively true in every structure. Kreisel’s
position differs from (17) in involving singular quantification over structures where (17)
involves plural quantification. A structure is like a model, but its domain and assignments
may be classes which do not conform to the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. The
problem is that accepting the existence of structures that are not models seems to commit
us to the existence of classes which are not governed by those axioms and yet, in contrast
to proper classes as these are usually defined, are members of other classes.
29 Suppose that the symbol ∧ of conjunction has been introduced by some standard abbre-
viatory definition. The clause ‘¬[B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bk ] is a theorem’ means: if k = 1 then ¬B1
is a theorem, and if k > 1 then the well-formed formula abbreviated to ¬[B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bk ]
is a theorem.
30 The proof of (33) presupposes (32).

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 MODEL THEORY AND VALIDITY 193

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Department of Philosophy
King’s College London
Strand
London WC2R 2LS
U.K.
E-mail: yannis.stephanou@kcl.ac.uk