P-4 CHEMICAL & PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Q a. Explain the importance of Trade secrets PSM

Ans
Q b. Explain Management of Change
Ans Managing changes to processes over the life of a facility is one of nine elements in the RBPS
pillar of managing risk. This chapter describes the management practices involving (1) the
recognition of change situations, (2) the evaluation of hazards, (3) the decision on whether to
allow a change to be made, and (4) necessary risk control and follow-up measures. Section 15.2
describes the key principles and essential features of a management system for the MOC element.
Section 15.3 lists work activities that support these essential features and presents a range of
approaches that might be appropriate for each work activity, depending on perceived risk,
resources, and organizational culture. Sections 15.4 through 15.6 include (1) ideas for improving
the effectiveness of management systems and specific programs that support this element, (2)
metrics that could be used to monitor this element, and (3) management review issues that may be
appropriate for MOC.
The MOC element helps ensure that changes to a process do not inadvertently introduce new
hazards or unknowingly increase risk of existing hazards (Refs. 15.1 and 15.2). The MOC element
includes a review and authorization process for evaluating proposed adjustments to facility design,
operations, organization, or activities prior to implementation to make certain that no unforeseen
new hazards are introduced and that the risk of existing hazards to employees, the public, or the
environment is not unknowingly increased. It also includes steps to help ensure that potentially
affected personnel are notified of the change and those pertinent documents, such as procedures,
process safety knowledge, and so forth, are kept up–to-date.
If a proposed modification is made to a hazardous process without appropriate review, the risk of a
process safety accident could increase significantly.
MOC reviews are conventionally done in operating plants and increasingly done throughout the
process life cycle at company offices that are involved with capital project design and planning.
MOC reviews should be done for bona fide “changes” – not for replacements-in-kind (RIKs).
An individual originates a change request. Qualified personnel, normally independent of the MOC
originator, review the request to determine if any potentially adverse risk impacts could result
from the change, and may suggest additional measures to manage risk. Based on the review, the
change is either authorized for execution, amended, or rejected. Often, final approval for
implementing the change comes from another designated individual, independent of the review
team. A wide variety of personnel are normally involved in making the change, notifying or
training potentially affected employees, and updating documents affected by the change.
Organizations usually have written procedures detailing how MOC will be implemented. Such
procedures apply to all work that is not determined to be RIK. The results of the review process
are typically documented on an MOC Review form. Supplemental information provided by
system designers to aid in the review process is often attached to the MOC review form. Once the
change is approved, it can be implemented. Potentially affected personnel are either informed of
the change or provided more detailed training, as necessary, prior to startup of the change.
Followon
activities, such as updates to affected process safety information and to other RBPS elements,
are assessed to identify which are required before startup, and which may be deferred until after
startup. All such activities are tracked until completed.
Higher risk situations usually dictate a greater need for formality and thoroughness in the
implementation of an MOC protocol, for example, a detailed written program that specifies
exactly how changes are identified, reviewed, and managed. Companies having lower risk
situations may appropriately decide to manage changes in a less rigorous fashion, for example,
 through a general policy about managing changes that is implemented via informal practices by
trained key employees. Facilities that exhibit a high demand rate for managing changes may need
greater specificity in the MOC procedure and a larger allocation of personnel resources to fulfill
the defined roles and responsibilities. Lower demand situations can allow facilities to operate an
MOC protocol with greater flexibility. Facilities with a sound process safety culture may choose
to have more performance-based MOC procedures, allowing trained employees to use good
judgment in managing changes in an agile system. Facilities with an evolving or uncertain process
safety culture may require more prescriptive MOC procedures, more frequent training, and greater
command and control management system features to ensure good MOC implementation
discipline.
Q c. Explain importance of MSDS
Ans
Q d. Define Dust & necessary condition for Dust explosion to occur
Ans A dust explosion is the rapid combustion of fine particles suspended in the air within an enclosed location. Dust
explosions can occur where any dispersed powdered combustible material is present in high-enough
concentrations in the atmosphere or other oxidizing gaseous medium, such as pure oxygen. In cases when fuel
plays the role of a combustible material, the explosion is known as a fuel-air explosion.
Dust explosions are a frequent hazard in coal mines, grain elevators, and other industrial environments. They are
also commonly used by special effects artists, filmmakers, and pyrotechnicians, given their spectacular
appearance and ability to be safely contained under certain carefully controlled conditions.
There are five necessary conditions for a dust explosion:
A combustible dust
The dust is dispersed in the air at a sufficiently high concentration
There is an oxidant (typically atmospheric oxygen)
There is an ignition source
The area is confined—a building can be an enclosure
Dusts have a very large surface area compared to their mass. Since burning can only occur at the surface of a
solid or liquid, where it can react with oxygen, this causes dusts to be much more flammable than bulk materials.
For example, a 1 kilogram (2.2 lb) sphere of a combustible material with a density of 1 g/cm3 would be about
12.4 centimetres (4.9 in) in diameter, and have a surface area of 0.048 square metres (0.52 sq ft). However, if it
were broken up into spherical dust particles 50 µm in diameter (about the size of flour particles) it would have a
surface area of 120 square metres (1,300 sq ft). This greatly-increased surface area allows the material to burn
much faster, and the extremely small mass of each particle allows them to catch on fire with much less energy
than the bulk material, as there is no heat loss to conduction within the material.
 When this mixture of fuel and air is ignited, especially in a confined space such as a warehouse or silo, a
significant increase in pressure is created, often more than sufficient to demolish the structure. Even materials
that are traditionally thought of as nonflammable (such as aluminum), or slow burning (such as wood), can
produce a powerful explosion when finely divided, and can be ignited by even a small spark.

Q a. Explain BLEVE & UVCE

Ans A boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) is an explosion caused by the rupture of a vessel
containing a pressurized liquid that has reached temperature above its boiling point. Because the boiling point of
a liquid rises with pressure, the contents of the pressurized vessel can remain liquid as long as the vessel is intact.
If the vessel's integrity is compromised, the loss of pressure and dropping boiling point can cause the liquid to
rapidly convert to a gas and expand rapidly. If the gas is combustible, as is the case with hydrocarbons and
alcohols, further damage can be caused by an ensuing fire.
here are three key elements causing a BLEVE:[3]
A substance in liquid form at a temperature above its normal atmospheric pressure boiling point.
A containment vessel maintaining the pressure that keeps the substance in liquid form.
A sudden loss of containment that rapidly drops the pressure.
Typically, a BLEVE starts with a container of liquid which is held above its normal, atmospheric-pressure boiling
temperature. Many substances normally stored as liquids, such as CO2, propane, and other similar industrial
gases have boiling temperatures far below room temperature when at atmospheric pressure. In the case of water,
a BLEVE could occur if a pressurized chamber of water is heated far beyond the standard 100 °C (212 °F). That
container, because the boiling water pressurizes it, must be capable of holding liquid water at very high
temperatures.
If the pressurized vessel, containing liquid at high temperature (which may be room temperature, depending on
the substance) ruptures, the pressure which prevents the liquid from boiling is lost. If the rupture is catastrophic,
where the vessel is immediately incapable of holding any pressure at all, then there suddenly exists a large mass
of liquid which is at very high temperature and very low pressure. This causes a portion of the liquid to
"instantaneously" boil, which in turn causes an extremely rapid expansion. Depending on temperatures, pressures
and the substance involved, that expansion may be so rapid that it can be classified as an explosion, fully capable
of inflicting severe damage on its surroundings.
Water example[edit]
For example, a tank of pressurized liquid water held at 204.4 °C (400 °F) might be pressurized to 1.7 MPa (250
psi) above atmospheric ("gauge") pressure. If the tank containing the water were to rupture, there would for a
brief moment exist a volume of liquid water which would be at:
Atmospheric pressure
Temperature of 204.4 °C (400 °F).
At atmospheric pressure the boiling point of water is 100 °C (212 °F) - liquid water at atmospheric pressure does
not exist at temperatures higher than 100 °C (212 °F). At that moment, the water would boil and turn to vapor
explosively, and the 204.4 °C (400 °F) liquid water turned to gas would take up significantly more volume
(≈1,600-fold) than it did as liquid, causing a vapor explosion. Such explosions can happen when the superheated
water of a boiler escapes through a crack in a boiler, causing a boiler explosion.
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosions
While a BLEVE is an explosion resulting from the sudden vaporization of a liquid, a VCE is an explosion
resulting from the ignition of a flammable vapor cloud. Neither water nor nitrogen can be in a VCE. LNG, LPG,
propane, butane, and any other flammable material that can form a flammable mixture with air have the potential
to be involved in a VCE.
This is why OSHA and the USEPA insist that VCEs be considered the worst-case release for flammable materials
in their process safety management regulations, even though VCEs are rare.
For a flammable material to be involved in a VCE, it must satisfy the five requirements of the explosion
pentagon: fuel, oxidizer, ignition source, dispersion, and confinement. Fuel is easy enough—the flammable
material is the fuel. If the material is released into the atmosphere, then air serves as the oxidizer. Ignition can
come from many sources. It is the lack of dispersion and confinement that keeps most releases of flammable
materials from exploding in VCEs.
Flammable materials don’t explode as liquids. They must be dispersed as vapors or as finely divided aerosols.
Otherwise, they will only burn. Burning is not trivial, but it is not an explosion with a shock wave. Even when
dispersed as vapors and aerosols, flammable materials will not result in a VCE if they are not contained.
Congested process equipment and piping is sufficient to create the confinement necessary for a VCE, but a vapor
cloud in the open will ignite as a vapor cloud fire—a fireball—without the accompanying shock wave of an
explosion.
Q b. Describe the incident & learning's of Flixborough Tragedy Incident
Ans The Flixborough disaster was an explosion at a chemical plant close to the village of Flixborough, North
Lincolnshire, England on Saturday, 1 June 1974. It killed 28 people and seriously injured 36 out of a total of 72
people on site at the time. The casualty figures could have been much higher if the explosion had occurred on a
weekday, when the main office area would have been occupied.[1][2] A contemporary campaigner on process
safety wrote "the shock waves rattled the confidence of every chemical engineer in the country".[3][A]
The disaster involved (and may well have been caused by) a hasty equipment modification. Although virtually all
of the plant management personnel had chemical engineering qualifications, there was no on-site senior manager
with mechanical engineering expertise. Mechanical engineering issues with the modification were overlooked by
the managers who approved it, and the severity of potential consequences due to its failure were not taken into
account.
Flixborough led to a widespread public outcry over process safety. Together with the passage of the UK Health
and Safety at Work Act in the same year, it led to (and is often quoted in justification of) a more systematic
approach to process safety in UK process industries. UK government regulation of plant processing or storing
large inventories of hazardous materials is currently under the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations
1999 (COMAH). In Europe, the Flixborough disaster and the Seveso disaster in 1976 led to development of the
Seveso Directive in 1982 (currently Directive 2012/18/EU issued in 2012).

Q c. Explain Non destructive testing. Eddy's Current Testing in detail

Ans Nondestructive Testing (NDT) plays an important role in assuring that structural and
mechanical components perform their function in a safe, reliable, and cost-effective manner.
NDT technicians perform the necessary tests to locate the indicators and discontinuities that
may cause failures or shut downs in such systems. These tests are performed in a manner that
does not affect the future usefulness of the object or material – hence, the name
“nondestructive.” NDT allows for careful and thorough materials evaluation without the need
for deconstruction or damage. NDT is typically used at various points in a part’s life cycle.
NDT can be used prior to the use of a component for the sake of quality control. NDT is also
employed while components are in use to detect service related conditions caused by wear,
fatigue, corrosion, stress, or other factors which affect reliability.

In its most basic form — the

single-element ECT probe — a
coil of conductive wire is
excited with an alternating
electrical current. This wire
coil produces an alternating
magnetic field around itself.
The magnetic field oscillates at
the same frequency as the
current running through the coil. When the coil approaches a conductive material, currents opposite to the ones in
the coil are induced in the material — eddy currents.
Variations in the electrical conductivity and magnetic permeability of the test object, and the presence of defects
causes a change in eddy current and a corresponding change in phase and amplitude that can be detected by
measuring the impedance changes in the coil, which is a telltale sign of the presence of defects.This is the basis
of standard (pancake coil) ECT. NDT kits can be used in the eddy current testing process.
ECT has a very wide range of applications. Since ECT is electrical in nature, it is limited to conductive material.
There are also physical limits to generating eddy currents and depth of penetration
Q a. Write a brief note on Bhopal Gas Tragedy
Ans
Q b. Enlist safety operations of hazardous installations
Ans
Q c. Explain in detail PSM concept
Ans Process Safety Management( PSM):
Purpose:
The major objective of process safety management (PSM) of highly hazardous chemicals is to
prevent unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals especially into locations that could expose
employees and others to serious hazards. An effective process safety management program
requires a systematic approach to evaluating the whole chemical process. Using this approach, the
process design, process technology, process changes, operational and maintenance activities and
procedures, Non routine activities and procedures, emergency preparedness plans and procedures,
training programs, and other elements that affect the process are all considered in the evaluation.
Application:
The various lines of defense that have been incorporated into the design and operation of the
process to prevent or mitigate the release of hazardous chemicals need to be evaluated and
strengthened to ensure their effectiveness at each level. Process safety management is the
proactive identification, evaluation and mitigation or prevention of chemical releases that could
occur as a result of failures in processes, procedures, or equipment.The process safety
management standard targets highly hazardous chemicals that have the potential to cause a
catastrophic incident. The purpose of the standard as a whole is to aid employers in their efforts to
prevent or mitigate episodic chemical releases that could lead to a catastrophe in the workplace
and possibly in the surrounding community.To control these types of hazards, employers need to
develop the necessary expertise, experience, judgment, and initiative within their work force to
properly implement and maintain an effective process safety management program as envisioned
in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard.The OSHA standard is
required by the Clean Air Act Amendments, as is the Environmental Protection Agency's Risk
Management Plan, which will be proposed in 1992. Employers who merge the two sets of
requirements into their process safety management program will better assure full compliance
with each as well as enhance their relationship with the local community.Although OSHA
believes process safety management will have a positive effect on the safety of employees and will
offer other potential benefits to employers, such as increased productivity, smaller businesses that
may have limited resources to them at this time, might consider alternative avenues of decreasing
the risks associated with highly hazardous chemicals at their workplaces. One method that might
be considered is reducing inventory of the highly hazardous chemical. This reduction in inventory
will result in reducing the risk or potential for a catastrophic incident. Also, employers, including
small employers, may establish more efficient inventory control by reducing, to below the
established threshold, the quantities of highly hazardous chemicals onsite. This reduction can be
accomplished by ordering smaller shipments and maintaining the minimum inventory necessary
for efficient and safe operation. When reduced inventory is not feasible, the employer might
consider dispersing inventory to several locations onsite. Dispersing storage into locations so that
a release in one location will not cause a release in another location is also a practical way to
reduce the risk or potential for catastrophic incidents.