Six Sigma FMEA

Revision 5 05/02/03
Module 3.4 Design Failure Mode &

Effects Analysis
2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material.
Agenda
Duration Topics
10 min. Class Introductions
10 min. FMEA Introduction / Types of FMEA
10 min. What and Why DFMEA
30 min. DFMEA Teams and Facilitation
10 min. Break
30 min. Defining the Design
15 min. Functional Block Diagram Exercise
45 min. DFMEA Creation
10 min. Break
30 min. Taking Action
30 min. DFMEA Creation Exercise
15 min. Discussion and Wrap-up
2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 2

DFSS Tool
Application Roadmap
TRIZ
Requirements DFMEA
QFD Experience &
Program Brainstorming Concept & DFM/A
identified Whats/Hows Design Specifications
Benchmarking DFR
(LL, T, UL)
Process data, Supplier data,and Reliability Data Trade-Off
*
[GR&R and Test Effectiveness must be performed]
* * * *
Historical Data Prototypes Simulation/Computer Models Analytical Models
Regression Descriptive Design of Monte Carlo

Analysis Statistics Experiments Analysis
Equations µy, σy, PNC Equations µy, σy, PNC Equations
B Product Model
Tolerance Sensitivity Monte Multi-Objective
(equation, σx Allocation Analysis Carlo Optimization µ x , σx
C simulation,
workbook,
D
hardware, etc.)
E Y PNC
µy, σy, PNC
LL T UL
Scorecard
Revision 5 05/02/03
Introduction to FMEA / DFMEA

Learning Objectives
At the end of this module, participants will understand . . .
R The general history of the FMEA
R The origins of Risk
R What we mean by “Murphy's Law”
R The different types of FMEA and their outputs
R Standards that apply to FMEA
Introduction to FMEA
R Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
– A procedure and tools that help to identify every possible failure
mode of a process or product, to determine its effect on other
sub-items and on the required function of the product or process
R History
– First used in the late 1940's with the introduction of
used for Aerospace and rocket development
– Widely used in the 1960’s during the Apollo missions
– In 1974 the Navy developed MIL-STD-1629 regarding the use of

FMEA
– In the early to mid 1970’s, use in automotive applications was

driven by liability costs Reference: http://www.quality-one.com/services/fmea.cfm

Origins of Risk
Potential
Poor control plans
Safety Hazards
Unclear Customer & SOP’s
Expectations Poor Process
Capability
Job Assignment
Variation
Cumulative
Risk
Raw Material
Vague Variation
Workmanship
Standards
Poorly developed
Machine
Measurement Variation Specification
Reliability Limits
(Online and QC)
D. H. Stamatis, FMEA:FMEA from Theory to Practice, Quality Press, 1995

Murphy’s Law
R If anything can go wrong, it will

R If there is a possibility of several things going wrong, the one
that will cause the most damage will be the one to go wrong
– Corollary> If there is a worse time for something to go wrong, it
will happen exactly at that time
R If anything just cannot go wrong, it will anyway
R If you perceive that there are four possible ways in which
something can go wrong, and circumvent these, then a fifth
way, unprepared for, will promptly develop
R Left to themselves, things tend to go from bad to worse
R If everything seems to be going well, you have obviously
overlooked something
R Nature always sides with the hidden flaw
Reference: http://murphys-laws.com/murphy/murphy-laws.html
O’Toole’s Corollary
MURPHY WAS AN OPTIMIST
Use DFMEA to identify and minimize the things that can go wrong,
because they will go wrong
Types of FMEA’s
R System
– Analyzes systems and sub-systems in the early concept and
design stages
X Focuses on functions and interactions among systems
R Design
– Analyzes product designs before they are released for production
– A DFMEA should always be completed well in advance of a
prototype build
– Focuses on potential failure modes of products due to design
deficiencies or errors
R Process
– Analyzes production or administrative processes
– Focuses on potential failure modes of the output caused by
process deficiencies
R Machine
– Analyzes a piece of manufacturing equipment prior to its
construction
– Focuses on potential failure modes of the manufacturing
equipment due to design deficiencies or errors
Types of FMEA’s
R Equipment
– Analyzes production or administrative process
– Focuses on potential failure modes of the output caused by
process deficiencies of the manufacturing equipment only
R Change
– When a part change occurs the original DFMEA should be
updated
R Containment
– Analyzes a containment screen
FMEA Outputs
SYSTEM DESIGN PROCESS
Specific controls
for top priority
Design actions Design failures
to eliminate functions to
Cause(s), To eliminate Process steps
reduce the rate Cause(s) of to eliminate
of occurrence, product failure Cause(s), of
and effects of modes, reduce output failure,
the cause occurrence and reduce the rate
effects of the of occurrence,
cause and effects of
the cause
Standards for FMEA’s
R These standards are available on the Lear Net

– Link to IHS on the Lear Net
R MIL-STD-1629A (24 NOV 80) is at

– http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/risk/e-guidelines/html/vol4/Volume4/Tool-
spec_Rec/Failure%20Modes%20and%20Effects%20Analysis%20%28FMEA%29/MIL-STD-
1629A.pdf
– Here is the link

USCG site
Summary
R FMEA is a tool to help identify failure modes of processes or
products and to determine the effect on other item functions
of product or process
R First used in the late 40’s in Aerospace and the mid 70’s in
automotive
R There are many “Origins of Risk”
R If anything can go wrong, it will
R There are 7 main Types of FMEA

– System
– Design
– Process
– Machine
– Equipment
– Change
– Containment
Revision 5 05/02/03
What and Why DFMEA?
What is a DFMEA ?
R Design Failure Mode Effect Analysis (DFMEA) is…
– An analytical, systematic approach that aids engineers to identify

and prevent potential failures and their effects
– A vehicle used to focus the design team to analyze all aspects of

the new part design
– A tool to help influence the exchange of ideas between team

members and departments
R A DFMEA prevents the duplication of inadequate designs of

the past while meeting the customer’s current needs

Why Perform a DFMEA?
R Improves quality, productivity, reliability and safety
R Improves image and competitiveness
R Increases customer satisfaction
R Reduces recalls
R Reduces product development timing and cost
R Reduces the probability of failures occurring
Why Perform a DFMEA?
R Forces team members to think about potential causes of

failure
R Documents the risk of each potential failure after every design

change
– Legal document showing due care
R It is required by the customer and LPMP gate reviews

– QS 9000 & ISO 9000
– Production Part Approval Process (AIAG)
– VDA 6.1 (German Requirement)
– ISO/TS 16949

Revision 5 05/02/03
DFMEA Teams and Facilitation
Learning Objectives
R Who should be included in the team
R How to approach the DFMEA
R The role of team leader
R The role of facilitator

DFMEA Team Members
R DFMEA should be done by an Engineering team and should

include people from
– Design
– Manufacturing
– Materials
– Quality
– Service
Team Approach to DFMEA
R Working as a team can accomplish more than working

individually
R The team should be interdisciplinary and from all affected

areas
R The team approach requires trust, resources, authority, and

support
R People on the team make decisions around common goals

Team Actions for DFMEA
R Establish goals
R Understand roles and responsibilities
R Determine failures and problems
R Rank priorities
R Get the experts’ opinions
R Get the authority to act
R Get management support
DFMEA - Team Leader
R The team leader is focused on the project

– Key project timing
– Technical solutions
– DFMEA application
R The different team roles are defined by the team leader

– Facilitator
– Timekeeper
– Secretary
REFERENCE : http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/download/PhilipsFMEAEnglish.ppt
DFMEA – Facilitator
Representitives
Facilitator from:
• Development
• Manufacturing
Support • Quality
team
• Purchasing
Design- • Test/Validation
Engineer Core-
Production/ team
process-engineer
R Tasks of the facilitator

– Helps preparing the DFMEA session
X Arrange date and time
X Reserve meeting room
X Send meeting notice
X Ensure equipment availability
– Supports the team leader
– Makes sure that the DFMEA metholodgy is correctly used
– Makes observations of the team and process

R Supporting the team leader of the DFMEA session
– Helps prepare the DFMEA session with the team leader
– Defines the agenda for the meeting
– Helps define the team participants
X 3-8 participants for a DFMEA meeting
R Ensures all team members participate in discussions
R Prevents long discussions between 2 participants

– Don’t look for immediate solutions
– Discuss difficult items in a small group separately
R Maintains an ‘open-climate’ during the meeting

– Don’t look for ‘guilty parties’
– Try to understand the real problems
DFMEA - Facilitator
R Ensuring the use of DFMEA methodology
– Functions correctly written down (verb-noun)
– All failure modes mentioned or listed
– Effects of the failure modes are correct
X no confusion between causes and effects
– Severity, occurance and detection defined for each item
– RPN defined for each item
– Completely fill-in the DFMEA-worksheet
X actions
X responsible people
X dates
Summary
R Team Composition
– Make sure the team is Cross-functional
– Multilevel support
– Design and process knowledgeable
– The team has the power to act
– 3 to 8 members typically
– GET THE EXPERTS!
R Suggested meeting duration 1 to 2 hours
R The Team leader and Facilitator work together planning the

DFMEA
– Helps to prepare the DFMEA session
– Makes sure that the DFMEA-metholodgy is correctly used

Revision 5 05/02/03
• Functional Block Diagrams

• Internal customers
• Functional Block Diagram
Exercise
Defining the Design
Learning Objectives
R The use of Functional Block Diagrams in DFMEA
R The concept of internal customers
R How to develop a Functional Block Diagram

Functional Block
Diagrams
R Functional Block Diagrams detail all the
major functional parts of the design, as
well as, the interrelationships and
Functional
interdependencies Block Diagram
R Functional Block Diagrams show, in

sequence, the elements which must
function for successful operation
(functional flow sequence)
R Flow diagrams use different connectors

and lines to indicate what kind of
interrelationship or interdependency
exists between functional blocks
Reference: MRI 2002

Defining the Design
R Functional Block Diagrams provide an overview of the design

at a glance
R Functional Block Diagrams also assist in
– Identifying system inputs and outputs

– Diagramming interrelationships among functional blocks
– Providing the ability to trace failure modes and effects throughout

all levels of the design
– Precisely defining the system, subsystem, or component's

functional configuration and boundaries
– Determining the need for redundancy of functions
– Highlighting design inefficiencies
– Promoting teamwork, understanding and decision making
Overhead Projector
Functional Block Diagram
Electrical Interface
User Interface
Light Interface User
Mechanical Interface
Screen
Reflection Focus
Assembly Mechanism
Case Assembly
Glass Support
Plate Arm
Table
Top
User
On/Off
Switch Light
Cooling
Bulb
Fan
Assembly
Outlet
Wall
Power Power
Cord Supply
© MRI 2002
Defining the
Internal Customers
Function Potential
R Internal Customers A Cause
– Internal customers are
functional blocks
downstream from the Functional
function block under study Block Function Failure
Under B Mode
– The Functional Block Study
Diagram is very useful
when identifying Effects of
a Failure Mode Function Potential
C Effect
– When a Failure Mode is Internal
being studied at a block on Customers
the Functional Block Potential
Function
Diagram, Effects may occur D Effect
at any of the internal
customers Note- Effects are how the Failure Mode is
observed or experienced by the customer,
and that customer may be internal or external
Defining the Design
R Do not be too vague,
or too in depth
Macro Micro
Produce
Tuner Case
Sound
Mounting
Analog to
Screws
R The level of the Digital
Functional Block Converter
Diagram will Stand-offs
determine the level
of the analysis IF Filter Printed Circuit
Board
AM/FM 3k Ohm
Demodulator Resistor
Team Exercise
R Select a product you are working with or with which you are
familiar
– examples
X deck
X pen
X clock
X flip chart stand
R Create a Functional Block Diagram for the product selected

– Show system inputs and outputs
– If it’s a complicated product, diagram a segment of it
R Take 15 minutes to perform this exercise

Summary
R The DFMEA team should develop the Functional Block
Diagram
R Each block on the functional diagram will be a separate

section on the DFMEA
R Team consensus as to the Functional Block Diagram content

should be reached
R Functional Block Diagram should cover the entire design
R Customers may be internal or external
R Try not to be too vague (little valuable info), or have so much

content it looks like a Bill of Materials (BOM)
Revision 5 05/02/03
DFMEA Creation

Learning Objectives
R The process steps for DFMEA Creation

R The DFMEA form and its’ components
R Failure Modes and Attributes
R Effects
R Severity
R Classifications
R Causes
R Occurrence
R Design Controls
R Detection
R RPN Values and Interpretation
R Where to find the LPMP DFMEA checklist
DFMEA Process Steps

1) Identify a part to be designed
2) Select the members of the DFMEA team
3) Create a Functional Block Diagram
4) List potential Failure Modes
5) List potential Effects of failure
6) Assign a Severity Ranking on a scale from 1 to 10
7) List potential Causes for mechanism failure

DFMEA Process Steps
8) Give an Occurrence number on a scale from 1 to 10
9) List Current Design Controls
10) List current tools used for Design Detection
11) Assign a Detection Number to the failure on a scale from 1

to 10
12) List Recommended Actions to reduce occurrences of

failure
13) List responsible personnel that will correct design and

completion date
14) Write down what action results

DFMEA Standard Form

POTENTIAL
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Print # NUMBER Rev. ECL (DESIGN FMEA) FMEA Number: FILE.XLS
System/Subsystem/Component: Design Responsibility: SUPPLIER Prepared by:
Model Year(s)/Vehicle(s) APPLICATION Key Date Page: of
Team: FMEA Date (Orig.) (Rev.)

SEVERITY SCALE OCCURENCE SCALE DETECTION SCALE
C Potential O Current Current D
Item Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R. Recommended Responsibility Action Results
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P. Actions & Target Actions S O D R.
Mode Failure v s of Failure u - Prevention - Detection e N. Date Taken e c e P.
Function s r c v c t N.
The latest form is found at http://165.207.71.104/pmc/Lpmp/DFMEA/DFMEA.htm

DFMEA Standard Form
POTENTIAL

POTENTIAL
Top
TopSection
Sectionisisfor
forinformation
informationpurposes
purposes
ItItisisself-explanatory
self-explanatory
The DFMEA form
POTENTIAL
IDENTIFICATION
ACTION
& ANALYSIS
SIDE
SIDE

Walk-through Example
R BASED ON
– Front Row Seat Structures
GMX 295
– Example provided by Core
Engineering

Armrest
Headrest
Front Seat SAHR

FSB FSB FSB
Back (self aligning
Trim Foam Suspension
Frame headrest)
Occupant
Lumbar
Recliner
DFMEA
Front Seat area of
FSC FSC FSC interest
Cushion
Trim Foam Suspension
Frame
Adjuster
Required Function
R Cushion Frame
– Supports occupant at proper
location
– Provides Trim Attachments
R Enter the item name and other – Provides Recliner Attachment
identification information – Ensures Comfort
– Provides Suspension System
R Enter the function of the item Attachment
being analyzed – Ensures Safety
– …etc
R Express as VERB-NOUN R Back Frame

– Supports occupant
– Transfers load
R If the item has more than 1
– Provides attachments...
function, list all functions
separately
List Potential Failure Modes
R Potential Failure Mode (PFM) is the manner that the

component or subsystem could potentially fail to perform the
function
R PFM could be caused by a lower or higher sub-system
R Some failure modes may be

– Deformation, Leaking
– Cracking, Loosening
– Sticking, Fracturing
– Oxidation, No signal
– Drift, Intermittent signal
– Engagement, no torque transmitted
Failure Mode Attributes
R Assume all System/Item inputs are to design specifications

and assembled correctly
R CTC’S (Critical to Customer) requirements

– Use QFD to ensure they are not overlooked
R Be specific about the characteristics
R Failure mode identification often comes from product history

(e.g. warranty data) or team experience
R Failure modes can be the causes of other failure modes
R Different failure modes can result in the same effect

Failure Modes
Item Function
Express as verb-noun
Failure Mode(s)
“Absolute Failure” “Partial Failure”

DOES NOT FUNCTION DOES NOT FUNCTION,
ADEQUATELY OR
COMPLETELY

Failure Modes
R Item Function Verb-Noun

– Example: Recline, Seat Back
R Absolute Failure
– Does not recline seat back
R Partial Failure
– Does not recline to the design specification
Failure Modes Example
R FUNCTION R FAILURE MODES

– Cushion Frame – Does not support occupant
X Supports occupant at proper under impact conditions
location – Does not support occupant at
X Provides Trim Attachments the proper location
X Provides Recliner Attachment
X Ensures Comfort
…
X Provides Suspension System
Attachment – BSR between trim attachment
X Ensures Safety and frame
X …etc… – Does not allow for occupant
comfort through foam
...

List Potential
Effects of Failure
R Potential effects of failure are what the customer would

perceive subsequent to the failure mode occurring
R Always state effects in specific terms to the subsystem

– A fracture could cause the assembly to vibrate
R Some failure effects may be

– Noise, Poor Operation
– Unstable, Leaks
– Rough, Inoperative
– Odor, Heat
– Erratic Operation
Sentencing Technique
R Getting an Effect from the Failure Mode using this sentencing

technique
Could result in Effect

Effect
Failure
Failure
Mode
Mode Due to
Cause
Cause

Effects Example
R FAILURE MODES R Potential EFFECTS

– Does not support occupant – Non-compliance with
under impact conditions government regulations
– Does not support occupant at – Decrease comfort
the proper location.. – Fails H-point requirement
….
– BSR between trim attachment – Customer Dissatisfaction
and frame
– Does not allow for occupant – Trim damage
– Customer Dissatisfaction
…..
Assigning Severity
R Severity is the risk associated with the most serious effect for
a given failure mode
– The Severity Scale is used to assess the severity of each Effect of
a Failure Mode
R The Severity is based on a scale from 1 to 10

– 9 and 10 should be reserved for safety and government
regulatory issues
– 8 is used for complete loss of primary function
R Don’t lose time with long discussions about ratings

– When in doubt, take the ‘worst case’
R Severity should be estimated using the following table

Severity Table
Effect Criteria: Severity of Effect Ranking
Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode effects safe vehicle 10
without operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
warning warning.
Hazardous Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode effects safe vehicle 9
with operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation with
warning warning.
Very High Vehicle/item inoperable. (loss of primary function) 8
High Vehicle/item operable, but at reduced level of performance. Customer very 7
dissatisfied.
Moderate Vehicle/item operable, but comfort & convenience item(s) inoperable. 6
Customer dissatisfied.
Low Vehicle/item operable, but comfort & convenience item(s) operate at a 5
reduced level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied.
Very Low Fit, finish, squeak, and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 4
more that %75 of customers.
Minor Fit, finish, squeak, and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 3
more that %50 of customers.
Very Minor Fit, finish, squeak, and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 2
less that %25 of customers.
None No detectable effect. 1
Assigning Severity
Example
Noncompliance
Noncompliance
without warning = 10
without warning = 10
R FAILURE MODES R Potential EFFECTS

– Does not support occupant – Non-compliance with 10
under impact conditions government regulations
– Does not support occupant at – Decrease comfort 5
the proper location.. – Fails H-point requirement 9
….
– BSR between trim attachment – Customer Dissatisfaction
and frame 2
– Does not allow for occupant – Trim damage ?
….. ?
What do you say ?

Classification
R This column should be used to classify any special product

characteristic
R Classification can be used to trigger engineering investigation

for high-priority failure modes
R The following chart exhibits the Classification symbols for

Ford, General Motors, and Daimler-Chrysler
Special Characteristics
Classification Symbols
Critical Significant
(Safety Related) (Important)
SC or *
ISO/TS
16949 §
Classification Symbols
Example
R Potential EFFECTS
– Non-compliance with 10
government regulations
5
Safety Issue
– Decrease comfort 9
– Fails H-point requirement
2
3
– Trim damage 3
Potential Causes for Failures
R Indication of design weakness
R Typical causes of some failures are

– Incorrect Material Specification, Insufficient lubrication,
– Inadequate maintenance instructions, Incorrect specification (i.e.
surface, software, travel), excessive heat, Improper tolerances...
R Typical mechanisms of some failures are

– Yield, Fatigue, Creep, Wear, Corrosion and material instability...

Sentencing Technique
R Getting a Cause from the Failure Mode using this sentencing

technique
Could result in Effect

Effect
Failure
Failure
Mode
Mode Due to
Cause
Cause
Potential Causes Example
R FAILURE MODES R Potential CAUSES

– Does not support occupant – Wrong Material, wrong shape
under impact conditions – Weld specification inadequate
– Does not support occupant at – Design packaging failure
the proper location..
….
– BSR between trim attachment – Poor interface between frame
and frame and trim attachment feature
– Does not allow for occupant – Not enough meat to metal
comfort through foam clearance
…..
Failure modes can have multiple causes

Occurrence
R The Occurrence is based on a scale from 1 to 10

– Occurrence should be estimated using this table
Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates Ranking

Very High: Persistent failures ≥ 100 per thousand vehicles/items 10
50 per thousand vehicles/items 9
High: Frequent failures 20 per thousand vehicles/items 8
Moderate: Occasional failures 5 per thousand vehicles/items 6
Low: Relatively few failures 0.5 per thousand vehicles/items 3
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely ≤ 0.010 per thousand vehicles/items 1
Occurrence
Example
Extremely Rare Occurrence
R FAILURE MODES R Potential CAUSES

– Does not support occupant – Wrong Material, wrong shape 1
under impact conditions – Weld specification inadequate 2
– Does not support occupant – Packaging failure
at the proper location.. 2
….
– BSR between trim – Poor interface between frame
attachment and frame 2
and trim attachment feature
– Does not allow for – Not enough meat to metal
occupant comfort through
?
clearance
foam
…..
What do you say ?

Current Design Controls
R List current design controls

– Prevention - A mechanism to reduce the rate of occurrence
– Examples of a P-Type control
X Design Standards
X Finite Element Analysis (FEA) or computer simulations
X Preliminary design review
– Detection - A mechanism to detect (detection) the failure before
item is released to production
X The mechanism can be analytical or physical
X Examples of a D-Type control
– Identify as a Key Product Characteristic on the drawing
– Design Validation, Testing, and Reliability
– Prototype build
R The preferred method is to use prevention controls

Design Controls Example
R Potential CAUSES R Design CONTROLS

– Prevention – Detection
– Wrong Material, wrong X FEA X FMVSS
shape 207/210
Design Standards FMVSS
– Weld specification X X
207/210
inadequate
Comfort Criteria Std. X H-point
– Packaging failure X
testing
– Poor interface between X Shaker Table

X Design Standards
frame and trim attachment
feature X Comfort Ride
X Design Review
– Not enough meat to metal X Durability
X Comfort Criteria Std.
clearance Testing
Each
EachCAUSE
CAUSEneeds
needsaaCONTROL
CONTROL
Failure Detection Ranking
R Detection is a relative ranking from 1-10 associated with the

listed design control
R Between the Prevention and Detection Controls, use the

Detection Control to calculate the PRN
– per AIAG 3rd Edition
R The team should agree on consistent evaluation criteria and

use the following table
Detection Ranking Table
Detection Criteria: Likelihood of Detection by Design Control Ranking

Absolute Desgn control will not and/or can not detect a potential cause/mechanism and 10
Uncertaintysubsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control.
Very Very remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism 9
Remote and subsequent failure mode.
Remote Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and 8
subsequent failure mode.
Very Low Very low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and 7
Low Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and 6
Moderate Moderately chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism 5
and subsequent failure mode.
Moderately Moderately high chance the Design Control will detect a potential 4
High cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
High High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and 3
Very High Very high chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism 2
and subsequent failure mode.
Almost Design Control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and 1
Certain subsequent failure mode.

Detection Rating Example
R Potential CAUSES R Design CONTROLS

– Prevention – Detection
– Wrong Material, wrong X FEA (2) X FMVSS 3
shape 207/210 (3)
Design Standards (3) X FMVSS 3
– Weld specification X
207/210 (3)
inadequate
Comfort Criteria Std. X H-point 1
– Packaging failure X
testing (1)
(2)
– Poor interface between X Design Standards (3) X Shaker Table ?

frame and trim attachment (1)
feature
– Not enough meat to metal X Comfort Ride ?
X Design Review (2)
clearance (2)
X Comfort Criteria Std.
X Durability
(2)
Testing (1)
Use the DETECTION Control

Risk Priority Number (RPN)
R The RPN is the product of the Severity (S), Occurrence (O),

and Detection (D) rankings
(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN
Effects Causes Controls
R The RPN is a value that can be used to rank the order of the
design concerns
R A higher RPN indicates that preventive/corrective action

should be done first
R Calculated automatically by the Lear FMEA form

Interpreting the RPN
R When is an RPN “high”?
– What if we said, ”Action must be taken on all RPN’s greater than

150”?
R Discussion
– What are the problems with defining an exact RPN on which
action must be taken?
Results of a DFMEA
R Giving an objective evaluation of design requirements and
alternatives
R Bringing up design concerns for manufacturing and assembly

requirements
R Identifying the impact of potential failures and their effects on

the design & the development process
R Developing a list of potential failure modes that are ranked

according to their effect on the customers wants
– Use the QFD
R Providing a future reference that will assist evaluation of

design changes and future designs

Summary
R Follow the DFMEA Process Steps to ensure correct DFMEA form
usage
R The form is split into two basic sections, Identification/Analysis

side and the Action Side
R Assume that all Item/Functions are to design and assembly

specifications
R Item Function is expressed as Verb - Noun

– Recline, Seat Back
R Potential Failure Modes (PFM) is the manner that the component

or subsystem could potentially fail
R “RPN” is a value that can be used to rank the order of the design
concerns
Summary
R Potential Effects of failure are based on failure that the
customer perceives
R Severity is the risk associated with the most serious effect for
a given failure mode
R Severity, Occurrence and Detection are given a ranking from

1 to 10 with 10 being the highest
R Design Controls fall into two categories

– Prevention
X Design standards
X FEA analysis
– Detection (USE FOR RPN)
X SPC / KPC point identification
X Validation, Testing
X Prototypes
Revision 5 05/02/03
Taking Action in DFMEA
Learning Objectives

R How to prioritize the Item/Functions on which to focus
R The “Action” side of the form
R The intent of recommended actions
R Where to place responsibilities
R Action Results
R Follow-up Actions
R The use of, and the types of, Control Plans

The DFMEA form
POTENTIAL
IDENTIFICATION
ACTION
& ANALYSIS
SIDE
SIDE
Taking Action
R Use a Pareto chart of the RPN’s to prioritize the efforts, then
go after the vital few
– As a rule of thumb, the top 20% should be addressed
We
We should
should also
also look
look at
at Pareto
Pareto charts
charts of
600
of
500
Just the SEVERITY numbers
Just the SEVERITY numbers and and
The
The SEVERITY
SEVERITY xx OCCURRENCE
OCCURRENCE (SO) (SO)
400
RP N
300
200
100
0
S pring not Term inal tipped 11482 ins ulator E pox y on A ir bubble in Ins ulator tipped Crac k s in Dam aged S eal in c over S eals in Lam p leads
s traight falls out term inals epox y or brok en hous ing from wires rolled over bus hing or are pinc hed
s iz e lever

Recommended Actions
R The intent of any recommended action is to reduce the the RPN by

reducing the rating of Severity, Occurrence, and Detection
R Design changes cannot reduce Severity rankings
R Possible methods to reduce RPN are as follows
– Revise design
X Geometry and/or design tolerances
X Material selection
– Occurrence is reduced
X Use Design of Experiments (DOE) when interactive causes are present
– Prevention is improved
– Update test plan
X Detection is improved
R Regardless of RPN, when Severity is 9 or higher, design controls or
preventive/corrective action must be taken to ensure that the risk
has been reduced
Taking Action
Example

Item Potential Potential S l Cause(s)/ c Design Design e R.
Failure Effect(s) of e a Mechanism(s) c Controls Controls t P.
Mode Failure v s of Failure u - Prevention - Detection e N.
Function s r c
Supports Does not support Non-Compliance 10 Weld specification 2 Design Standards 3 60
Occupant occupant under with government inadequate
at proper impact conditions Regulations
Location
R Is there some action we can or should take?

– The severity is greater than 9
– Our SO (severity x occurrence) is going to be relatively high
– Our RPN will be relatively high

X We would look at our Pareto of the RPN's
R If no action is required enter the word “None” in the
recommended actions

Recommended Actions
Example
R Add a Key Product

Characteristic to our drawing
Recommended
Actions
– Requires that the supplier
prove capability on the welding
Add KPC to
R What does this do weld on the
– A: Change the Severity?
drawing
– B: Reduce the Occurrence?
– C: Prevent the Cause?
– D: Improve the Detection?
Responsibility & Target Date
R This area is to assign responsibility
R By each item that is being addressed, enter the following:

– Name of the organization
– Name of the individual that is responsible for the recommended
action
R Enter the agreed upon completion date

Recommended Actions
Example
Responsibility
Recommended & Target
Actions Date
Add KPC to Johnny Cad

weld on the 2/32/03
drawing
Actions Taken
R After implementation of recommended actions, a brief

description of what was accomplished should be explained in
this column
R The effective date should accompany any verbiage in this

column

Actions Taken
Example
Actions
Taken
Added KPC 2/30/03

Supplier to add
to PFMEA
Action Results
R Once, the Preventive or Corrective Action has been

implemented, the latest Severity, Occurrence, and Detection
rankings should be recorded
– Consequently, the resulting RPN will be updated
R If nothing was done, leave the column blank

Action Results
Example
Responsibility Action Results

Recommended S
& Target Actions O D R.
Actions e c e P.
Date Taken v c t N.
Add KPC to weld Added KPC 10 2 2 40

Johnny Cad 2/30/03
on the drawing 2/32/03 Supplier to
add
to PFMEA
Remember
Rememberthatthatyou
youcan
cannot
notchange
changethe
theSeverity
Severityrating
rating
unless
unless the EFFECT of the Failure modeisischanged
the EFFECT of the Failure mode changed
LPMP DFMEA Checklist

A-1 DESIGN FMEA CHECKLIST
Customer or Internal Part No. NUMBER
Person Due
Question Yes No Comment / Action Required
Responsible Date
1 Was the SFMEA and/or DFMEA prepared using
the DaimlerChrysler, Ford, and General Motors
Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) reference manual?
2 Have historical campaign and warranty data
been reviewed?
3 Have similar part DFMEAs been considered?
4 Does the SFMEA and/or DFMEA identify
Special Characteristics?
5 Have design characteristics that affect high risk
priority failure modes been identified?
6 Have appropriate corrective actions been
assigned to high risk priority numbers?
7 Have appropriate corrective actions been
assigned to high severity numbers?
8 Have risk priorities been revised when corrective
actions have been completed and verified?
Revision Date
This form is available through LPMP at
http://165.207.71.104/pmc/Lpmp/DFMEA/DFMEA.htm
Prepared By:

Follow-Up Action
R The responsible engineer makes sure that all recommended

actions have been implemented or addressed
R The DFMEA is a living document and should always reflect the

latest design level
R To ensure that the recommended actions have been

implemented the responsible engineer should check the
following:
– Design drawings and specifications
– Design requirements are achieved
– Manufacturing implementation
– PFMEAs and control plans
Flowing into the Next Steps
DFMEA
PFMEA
CONTROL
PLAN

Control Plan Form
CONTROL PLAN
Prototype Pre-Launch Production
Control Plan Number Key Contact/Phone Date (Orig.) Date (Rev.)
FILE.XLS 555-555-5555 1/1/96 1/1/96
Part Number/Latest Change Level Core Team Customer Engineering Approval/Date (If Req'd.)
NUMBER ECL
Part Name/Description Supplier/Plant Approval/Date Customer Quality Approval/Date (If Req'd.)
NAME
Supplier/Plant Supplier Code Other Approval/Date (If Req'd.) Other Approval/Date (If Req'd.)
SUPPLIER CODE
MACHINE,
CHARACTERISTICS METHODS
PART/ PROCESS NAME/ DEVICE, SPECIAL
PROCESS OPERATION JIG,TOOLS, CHAR. PRODUCT/PROCESS EVALUATION/ SAMPLE REACTION
NUMBER DESCRIPTION FOR MFG. NO. PRODUCT PROCESS CLASS SPECIFICATION/ MEASUREMENT SIZE FREQ. CONTROL PLAN
TOLERANCE TECHNIQUE METHOD
The web link below will take you to Lear’s LPMP control plan
form and information location
http://165.207.71.104/pmc/Lpmp/Control%20Plan%20-%20Prototype/Control%20Plan%20-%20Prototype.htm
Summary
R Focus on the top 20% from the RPN pareto

R Review pareto charts of the Severity and Severity x
Occurrence (SO)
R Design changes cannot reduce severity rankings
R RPN Reduction Methods
– Revise Design
– Update Test plan
R Assign responsibility to the team members
R Agree on completion dates and adhere to them
R Implement the Preventative or Corrective action and update
“RPN” numbers
R Refer to LPMP/AIAG manuals for control plan usage

DFMEA Exercise
R Using the block diagram from the previous exercise create a

basic DFMEA through the Recommended Action portion of the
form.
Revision 5 05/02/03
Wrap-up and Discussion

The Future
Flow
Flowof
of Design
Engineering Purchasing
Information
Information Quality Manufacturing
Six Sigma
with
with
DFMEA
DFMEA "POOL"
Software
Software of remarks
DFMEA
Maintain the DFMEA Library Maintenance
team
Filter the remarks
NEW
REMARKS
DFMEA Library
DFMEA Consult the Library
Designer
Tool Follow-up actions
Search for solutions
Fill Consult
DFMEA Reports
in
DFMEA
Facilitator
DFMEA Session
Glossary
R Detection (of failure cause or failure mode, scale of 1 - 10)

– An assessment of the likelihood (or probability) that your current
controls will detect
X 1) when the X fails or
X 2) when the failure mode occurs
R Failure Effect
– The effect a particular failure mode will have on the customer as
a result of the failure
R Failure Cause
– The root cause of a failure
– Why the failure occurred
R Failure Mode
– see Potential Failure Mode

Glossary cont.
R Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

– a tool to help identify failure modes of processes or products
and to determine the effect on other item functions of
product or process
R Functional Block Diagrams

– Details all the major functional parts of the design, as well
as, the interrelationships and interdependencies graphically
with square blocks
R Occurrence (of failure cause, scale of 1 - 10)

– An assessment of the frequency with which the failure cause
occurs
X “How often does this fail in a specific way”?
Glossary cont.
R Potential Failure Mode (PFM)

– The manner that the component or subsystem could
potentially fail to perform its function
R Prevention
– A mechanism to reduce the rate of occurrence of a failure
R Risk Priority Number (RPN)

– The product of the Severity X Occurrence X Detection ratings
– It is used to prioritize recommended actions
X Special consideration should be given to high Severity ratings
regardless of the RPN
R Severity (of failure effect, scale of 1 to 10)

– An assessment of the seriousness of the failure effect on the
customer
X The customer can be the end customer and/or the next process
operation

References
R Lastufka, Michael (May 2000). Design Failure Mode Effect

Analysis. URL:http://fieldworks.sil.org/test/fmea.htm
R Daimler-Chrysler, Ford, General Motors (2001). Design FMEA.

In: Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 3rd Ed. By
AIAG USA, p.1-31.
R Management Resources International (2001) © . Design

Failure Mode & Effects Analysis.
R www.fmeainfocentre.com/download/PhilipsFMEAEnglish.ppt
Reference Manuals
R ISO/16949 (Automotive Quality System Requirements,

International)
R QS-9000 (Automotive Quality System Requirements, North

America)
R PPAP (Production Part Approval Process)
R APQP (Advance Product Quality Planning) & Control Plans

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Revision 5 05/02/03

Module 3.4 Design Failure Mode &

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 2

[GR&R and Test Effectiveness must be performed]

Regression Descriptive Design of Monte Carlo

Equations µy, σy, PNC Equations µy, σy, PNC Equations

Introduction to FMEA / DFMEA

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material.

At the end of this module, participants will understand . . .

R The general history of the FMEA

R The origins of Risk

R What we mean by “Murphy's Law”

R The different types of FMEA and their outputs

R Standards that apply to FMEA

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 5

– Widely used in the 1960’s during the Apollo missions

– In 1974 the Navy developed MIL-STD-1629 regarding the use of

– In the early to mid 1970’s, use in automotive applications was

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 6

D. H. Stamatis, FMEA:FMEA from Theory to Practice, Quality Press, 1995

R If anything can go wrong, it will

MURPHY WAS AN OPTIMIST

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 9

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 11

SYSTEM DESIGN PROCESS

R These standards are available on the Lear Net

R MIL-STD-1629A (24 NOV 80) is at

– Here is the link

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 13

R There are many “Origins of Risk”

R If anything can go wrong, it will

R There are 7 main Types of FMEA

What and Why DFMEA?

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material.

R Design Failure Mode Effect Analysis (DFMEA) is…

– An analytical, systematic approach that aids engineers to identify

– A vehicle used to focus the design team to analyze all aspects of

– A tool to help influence the exchange of ideas between team

R A DFMEA prevents the duplication of inadequate designs of

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 16

R Improves quality, productivity, reliability and safety

R Improves image and competitiveness

R Increases customer satisfaction

R Reduces product development timing and cost

R Reduces the probability of failures occurring

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 17

Why Perform a DFMEA?

R Forces team members to think about potential causes of

R Documents the risk of each potential failure after every design

R It is required by the customer and LPMP gate reviews

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 18

DFMEA Teams and Facilitation

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material.

At the end of this module, participants will understand . . .

R Who should be included in the team

R How to approach the DFMEA

R The role of team leader

R The role of facilitator

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 20

R DFMEA should be done by an Engineering team and should

2002 Lear Corporation. Unpublished Material. DFMEA - 21

Team Approach to DFMEA

R Working as a team can accomplish more than working

R The team should be interdisciplinary and from all affected