Attribute Conflict in Consumer Decision Making: The Roie of Tasi< Compatibility

ANISH NAGPAL PARTHASARATHY KRISHNAMURTHY*

Past research holds that a decision between two unattractive alternatives is nfiore difficult than one between two attractive alternatives. We argue that this conclusion may rest on the the task of "choosing" adopted in the past research. A task of choosing requires an attractiveness judgment that is compatible with attractive alternatives but incompatible with unattractive alternatives. We test this thesis by reversing the compatibility using a reject task that requires judgment of unattractiveness. Two studies find that compatibility between alternative valence and task influences decision time, decision difficulty, attribute recall, and effort, underscoring the role of the task in the study of attribute conflict.

eople often find themselves having to decide between two products that are similar in many regards but differentiated by their attractive featuresfor instance, deciding between a car with superior styling versus one with superior reliability. At other times, the products they face may be differentiated by unattractive featuresfor instance, deciding between a car with poor resale value versus one with poor gas mileage. How does this difference in the nature of the decision set influence the decision process? The attribute conflict literature addresses this question and suggests that a decision involving unattractive alternatives creates greater conflict and is therefore more difficult and takes longer to resolve than a decision involving two attractive alternatives (Chatterjee and Heath 1996; Dhar and Nowlis 1999; Houston and Sherman 1995; Houston, Sherman, and Baker 1991). The above relationship between the valence of the alternatives and decision difficulty is relevant not just for research in decision making but also for consumer research
*Anish Nagpal is lecturer. Department of Management and Marketing, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia (anagpal@unimelb .edu.au). Partha Krishnamurthy is associate professor of marketing and Bauer Faculty Fellow at the C. T. Bauer College of Business Administration, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77204 (partha@uh.edu). This research is based on the first author's dissertation. Correspondence: Anish Nagpal. The authors are grateful to Ed Blair for comments at various stages of the writing of the article. The authors also thank Adwait Khare and participants at the University of Houston Doctoral Symposium for their comments. The authors sincerely appreciate and thank the editor, associate editor, and the four reviewers for their insightful guidance at every stage of the review process. John Deighton served as editor and Mary Frances Luce served as associate editor for this article. Flectronically published August 17, 2007

because decision difficulty can affect whether or not a person continues or terminates the consumption process; the greater the decision difficulty, the greater the likelihood of abandoning/suspending the decision (Dhar and Nowlis 1999; Dhar and Sherman 1996; Huber and Pinnell 1994; Tversky and Shafir 1992; Zhang and Mittal 2005). If this is the case, then a consumer facing unattractive options would be more likely to abandon the consumption process. There are many consumption situations in which such decision avoidance or deferral would be harmful to the consumer. Imagine a consumer facing a choice of insurance alternatives for a car and finding one option with a high deductible and another with poor coverage. In this example, if the choice between the two unattractive options increases decision difficulty and causes the consumer to defer the decision, it may turn out to be suboptimal because deferral effectively increases risk exposure and defeats the original goal of protecting one's investment. Thus, to the extent that decision deferral is influenced by the valence of the alternatives, it is important to examine whether unattractive alternatives necessarily induce greater decision difficulty or whether there may be boundary conditions within the control of the consumer or marketer that alter perceived decision difficulty. In this research, we argue that the conflict experienced by the decision makers does not result solely from the valence of the attributes; rather, it is the result of the valence and a common feature of prior investigationsthe nature of the task. All the studies in the literature either implicitly or explicitly employ the task of "choosing" for judging the effects of conflict (see table 1 for a list of some of the prominent exemplars in research on conflict). We argue that rather than being incidental to the investigation, the task of choosing may in fact be theoretically consequential. Prior research shows that the task of "choosing" orients
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TABLE 1 AN ILLUSTRATIVE SET OF STUDIES ON ATTRIBUTE CONFLICT AND TASK EMPLOYED Article Arkoff (1957) Nature of study Choice between superior and inferior personality traits Choice between unpleasant and pleasant drinks Attribute conflict is manipulated by referring to an unavailable superior or inferior alternative Choice between pairs of options with unique good versus bad attributes Level of conflict, type of conflict Choice between pairs of options with unique good attributes versus bad attributes Dependent variable Time to make decision; number of conflicts of each type judged to be easier to resolve Time to make decision Self-reported decision difficulty Time to make decision Choice or defer the decision Choice or defer the decision Task frame Explicit choose Findings

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Decision between unattractive alternatives takes more time and is less easy Decision between unattractive alternatives takes more time Decision between unattractive alternatives is harder Decision between unattractive alternatives takes longer Choice deferral is higher under high conflict and for unattractive alternatives Choice deferral greater for unattractive alternatives

Barker (1942) Chatterjee and Heath (1996) Houston etal. (1991) Dhar and Nowlis (1999) Dhar and Sherman (1996)

Explicit choose Explicit choose

Explicit choose Explicit choose Explicit choose

the decision maker to look for reasons to choose, that is, advantages of selecting the option, thus requiring a relative attractiveness judgment (Ganzach 1995; Shafir 1993; Wedell 1997). If both the alternatives are attractive, then both provide reasons to choose and are therefore compatible with the task of choosing. If both the alternatives are unattractive, neither one provides reasons to choose; therefore, they are incompatible with the task of choosing. We argue that it is the incompatibility between the task and the valence of the alternatives that leads to greater experienced conflict, leading to greater decision difficulty and longer decision time. To assess support for this thesis, we reverse the compatibility by shifting the task to one of "rejecting" one of the two options, which orients the decision maker to look for reasons to reject, that is, what is unattractive about the options, thus requiring a judgment of relative unattractiveness. Thus, a reject task is compatible with the unattractive alternatives but incompatible with the attractive alternatives. Hence, in a reject task, attractive alternatives should lead to greater conflict and increase decision difficulty and decision time. Reversing the compatibility allows us to test whether decision conflict arises due to the valence of the alternatives per se or to its combination with the task. In two studies, we show that (a) decision difficulty and decision time are affected by the combination of task and the valence of the alternatives, {b) this effect is robust to different operationalizations of the alternatives, and (c) the combined effect of the valence of the alternatives and task has implications for decision effort and processing motivation. Before we get into the specifics of the present research, it is worth situating our research in the broader literature. There is a rich variety of approaches in the consumer behavior and decision-making literatures on the topic of

conflict. For instance, early research in consumer behavior examined conflict among the goals of the stakeholders in a group decision-making context (Davis 1976). Other researchers focused on the effect of within-alternative conflict (attractive and unattractive features in the same option) on decision time and difficulty (Fischer, Luce, and Jia 2000; Luce, Payne, and Bettman 1999). In a related vein, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) examined alternatives that vary on the type of conflict induced within the decision set, for example, one that appeals to the emotions and another that appeals to the reason. Our research focuses on conflict instantiated by two attractive or unattractive decision options, as was done in Chatterjee and Heath (1996) and Dhar and Nowlis (1999), and aims to reveal a hidden contingency. The remainder of this article is structured as follows: we first review the literature on the relationship between attribute conflict and decision times and difficulty. We then present our argumentation and hypotheses concerning the impact of task and valence of the alternatives on previously examined variables, such as time, difficulty, and variables hitherto not considered, such as decision effort and processing motivation. We then present two studies that examine these hypotheses.

CONFLICT AND TASK COMPATffiBLITY

In this section, we present arguments outlining why the effects previously attributed to the valence of the alternatives should be credited to the conflict arising from the compatibility between the valence of the alternatives and the task adopted by the decision makers.

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Prior Literature on the Effects of Attribute Conflict on Decision Time and Difficulty
Research suggests that a decision involving attractive alternatives creates lower conflict and is thus faster and easier to resolve than a decision between unattractive alternatives. The explanation for this finding is that attractive alternatives represent an unstable equilibrium whereas unattractive alternatives induce a stable equilibrium (Houston et al. 1991; Hull 1938; Hunt 1944; Lewin 1931). According to this view, as one begins to process the information about an alternative, the desire to approach or avoid it increases depending on whether the information is attractive or unattractive, respectively. When faced with attractive alternatives, as one begins considering the attributes of one of the alternatives, its attractiveness increases, the tendency to approach it becomes stronger, and an affirmative decision is made. By contrast, when faced with unattractive attributes, as one begins considering the attributes of one of the alternatives, the intensity of dislike for it increases and the tendency to move away from it gets stronger. Repelled by the first unattractive altemative, the decision maker moves to the second one and experiences the same tendency to move away. Thus, unattractive alternatives induce greater conflict, leading to longer decision times and greater perceived decision difficulty (Anderson 2003; Barker 1942; Chatterjee and Heath 1996; Dhar and Nowlis 1999; Houston et al. 1991; Hovland and Sears 1938; Sears and Hovland 1941).

and perceived as more difficult, as compared with situations in which there is no such inconsistency in the first place. Thus, there are reasons to expect that compatibility arising from the ready availability of task-consistent information should influence decision time and difficulty.

Hypotheses: Task Compatibility Effects on Decision Time, Difficulty, and Effort

If compatibility between task and valence of attributes is the underlying reason for decision time and difficulty effects, then reversing the compatibility should modify the traditionally observed effects credited to attribute valence. One way to vary compatibility is to instruct the decision makers to "reject" one of the alternatives because, in a reject task, decision makers will look for reasons to reject (Ganzach 1995; Shafir 1993; Wedell 1997). Each of the unattractive alternatives readily provides information to generate an unattractiveness judgment implied in a reject task. By contrast, neither altemative in the attractive decision set facilitates an unattractiveness judgment. Incompatibility should not just increase decision time and difficulty; it should also influence the amount of effort people put into processing the attributes. Since the task of choosing requires a judgment of relative attractiveness, generating such a judgment should be more effortful if the options are differentiated by what is unattractive about them. The above predictions concerning decision time, difficulty, and effort are described in hypotheses 1-3 below. HI: Under a task of choosing, decisions involving attractive alternatives will lead to shorter decision times than will decisions involving unattractive alternatives (Hla). In a reject task, the reverse will be tme (Hlb).

Attribute Conflict and the Role of the Task

We noted earlier that previous investigations on attribute conflict have employed the task of choosing, either explicitly through instruction ("which option will you choose") or implicitly through the framing of the response scale ("which option do you favor"; e.g., Arkoff 1957; Chatterjee and Heath 1996; Houston and Sherman 1995). Research suggests that when people are given two alternatives and asked to choose between them, they tend to look for reasons to choose; consequently, they focus on attractive features of the alternatives (Shafir 1993). If both alternatives are attractive, each of them readily provides reasons to generate such an attractiveness judgment. Thus, attractive options are compatible with the task of choosing. Following a similar reasoning, if both alternatives are unattractive, neither one gives the decision maker reasons to generate an attractiveness judgment. Hence, unattractive options are incompatible with the task of choosing. Findings from the behavior decision research literature (Shafir 1993; Simonson 1989) suggest that the availability of reasons facilitates decision making and the lack thereof impedes it. Separately, cognitive consistency theories such as balance theory (Heider 1946, 1958), incongruity theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955), and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) also suggest that, when people encounter aspects of their decision environment that are incompatible with each other, they attempt to try to reduce the inconsistency that is likely to be more time consuming

H2: Under a task of choosing, decisions involving attractive altematives will be rated as less difficult than decisions involving unattractive altematives (H2a). In a reject task, the reverse will be tme (H2b). H3: Under a task of choosing, decisions involving attractive altematives will be associated with lower decision effort than will decisions involving unattractive altematives (H3a). In a reject task, the reverse will be tme (H3b).

EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Study 1 examines hypotheses 1-3, which describe the effects of compatibility between the task and valence of the altematives on decision times, decision difficulty, and effort. Study 2 employs a different operationalization of the decision altematives by using positive versus negative attribute framing of the same set of attributes to create conflict rather than using different attributes, as is commonly done in the

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699 Order. The description of the two automobiles was provided on separate pages, one on each page. Half the participants first read the description of automobile A followed by automobile B. This order was reversed for the other half of the participants.

literature. In addition, study 2 examines the effect of compatibility on processing motivation and eliminates a possible factor in the stimulus that might contaminate the behavioral measure of effort. We also measured memory for the option attributes as an exploratory indicator of elaboration and effort.

Dependent Variables STUDY 1: EFFECTS OF COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN TASK AND VALENCE OF THE ALTERNATIVES Participants, Design, and Procedure
One hundred and forty-four undergraduate college students participated in study 1 in exchange for partial course credit. The design was a 2 (task: choose/reject) x 2 (alternative valence: attractive/unattractive) x 2 (order: automobile A and then automobile B/automobile B and then automobile A) between-subjects design. This study was conducted online. Participants logged onto the Web site at their own convenience and were assigned to one of the eight conditions based on their arrival sequence. The first page described the nature of the study. They were told tbat they would be given descriptions of products and then asked about their responses. The second page asked for their consent to participate in tbe study. After the consent page, the participants proceeded to a four-page sequence in which the manipulations were instantiated and critical dependent measures were collected. In the first of the three pages, they were informed that they will be seeing descriptions of two automobiles and that they will be asked to choose or reject one of them. The second page described the first option, and the third page described the second option. The response of choosing/rejecting was elicited on the fourth page. The participants were allowed to go back and forth between pages containing the description of the altematives prior to making the decision. Time. The time spent on pages containing the option attributes was recorded. This included time spent on repeat views of the page since the Web site allowed the participants to go back and forth between the pages. Decision Difficulty. The participants responded to two seven-point rating scales (anchored by not at all difficult/ very difficult and not at all simple/very simple) relating to how easy or difficult they found the task of choosing or rejecting (Chatterjee and Heath 1996). The simplicity item was reverse coded. The correlation between the two items was significant (0.55, p < .0001). These two items were averaged to yield an index of decision difficulty (higher numbers indicate greater difficulty). Effort. We measured the number of times people visited each of the pages describing the two alternatives as a behavioral measure of effort. We also measured memory for attributes as an exploratory indicator of both level of effort and distribution of effort across the two options in the choice set (see table 2).

Results
The continuous variables of time, difficulty, and effort were analyzed via a two-way ANOVA with two levels of task and two levels of valence. Since there were no significant order effects, the data were collapsed across the two orders. Tests of mean differences were based on two-tail tests using the error terms from the respective overall ANOVAs. Time of Processing (Hypothesis 1). We observed a significant task x altemative valence interaction on time of processing {F{l,l40) = 12.49, p < .0001). In the task of choosing, decisions were quicker for attractive altematives {M 49.41 seconds) than for unattractive altematives {M 63.60 seconds; F(l, 140) = 7.64, p < .01). The reverse was true in the reject task; decisions were quicker for unattractive alternatives (M = 50.37 seconds) than for attractive alternatives (M = 61.32 seconds; F(l, 140) = 4.95, p<.05). No other effects were significant. Thus hypotheses la and Ib received support. Decision Difficulty (Hypothesis 2). We observed a significant task X altemative valence interaction on decision difficulty (F(l,140) = 12.17, p < .0001). In the task of choosing, decisions were easier for attractive altematives (M 3.41) than for unattractive altematives {M = 4.10; F{1,140) = 4.14, p < .05). The reverse was true in the reject task; decisions involving unattractive altematives were easier

Independent Variables
Task. The decision task was manipulated between subjects. All participants were informed that they would be shown two altematives; in the choose condition, they were instructed to choose one of the options, and in the reject condition, they were instructed to reject one. Furthermore, the response scale was framed as "I will choose option: A/B" or "I will reject option: A/B." Altemative Valence. Valence was manipulated between subjects; participants were exposed to either two attractive or two unattractive altematives by using options differentiated by attractive versus unattractive attributes. The stimuli were patterned after Houston et al. (1991) with one difference. We had six attributes (three unique and three common) for each altemative compared to the 8-10 attributes per alternative in Houston et al. (1991). Please see the tabulations in the appendix for a sample of the stimuli.

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TABLE 2 CELL MEANS FOR STUDIES 1 AND 2 Choose Attractive Study 1: Decision time (seconds) Decision difficulty Recall (common) Visits Recall (unique) Study 2: Time taken Decision difficulty Visits Motivation Effort
NOTE.Standard deviations are in parentheses. *p<.1 (two-tailed test). *p<.05 (two-tailed test). **p< .01 (two-tailed test).

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

Reject. Unattractive Attractive Unattractive

49.41 (16.90) 3.41 (1.32) 3.11 (2.08) 3.47 (1.79) 2.65 (1.80) 70.09 (26.44) 3.17 (1.37) 3.22 (1.54) 4.24 (1.22) 4.02 (1.52)

63.60" (23.97) 4.10* (1.47) 2.45 (2.03) 4.17 (2.02) 3.71* (1.65) 86.93* (34.13) 4.07* (1.54) 4.00* (1.85) 5.24* (1.80) 5.14** (1.48)

61.32* (24.35) 4.46* (1.54) 2.46 (2.11) 3.41 (1.99) 3.32* (2.16) 88.57* (30.77) 4.33* (1.38) 4.05* (1.56) 4.93* (1.37) 5.05* (1.29)

50.37 (18.97) 3.51 (1.26) 2.58 (1.90) 3.37 (1.74) 2.37 (1.86) 69.50 (26.01) 3.56 (1.50) 3.13 (1.94) 4.23 (1.94) 4.40 (1.85)

(M = 3.51) than those involving attractive altematives (M = 4.46; F(l,]40) = 8.51, p < .01). No other effects were significant. Thus hypotheses 2a and 2b received support. Effort (Hypothesis 3). We measured effort by counting the number of times participants visited the two pages containing the description about the two automobiles. In a task of choosing, the number of page visits was directionally greater for decisions involving unattractive altematives {M 4.17) than those involving attractive alternatives (M = 3.47; F(l, 140) ^ 2.31, p < .12). In the reject task, there was no difference in the number of page visits between decision involving unattractive (M = 3.37) versus attractive altematives (M = 3.41; F(l,140)< 1, NS). Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Discussion
In study 1, we investigated how compatibility between the task and valence of the altematives instantiates conflict that affects decision time, decision difficulty, and effort. We found that decision conflict is a function of both valence of the altematives and task, such that incompatibility between the two increases decision time and decision difficulty as hypothesized. In regard to decision effort, measured by the number of visits to the pages containing the descriptions of the product options, we observed only a directional effect of compatibility. We believe that the lack of statistical significance is

in part due to the options containing both common and unique attributes. While we included both common and unique attributes to keep the stimuli consistent with the previous literature, part of the processing effort has to be expended for discerning which is which. Thus, the page-visit number reflects two types of processing: (a) an effort to determine the common versus unique attributes, which is unrelated to the hypotheses, and {b) an effort to process the information as dictated by the compatibility between the task and valence. Thus, the number of page visits in study 1 is a somewhat limited indicator of processing effort. An altemate indicator of effort is recall. As noted earlier, we had asked respondents to indicate their recall of the option attributes as an exploratory indicator of decision effort and elaboration. We discuss some of the patterns that emerged in the recall data below. Prior to analyzing the recall data, we created two separate indices: one for the recall of unique attributes and another for the recall of common attributes. We observed a significant task X alternative valence interaction on unique attributes recalled {F{1,140) = 10.42, p < .01). In a task of choosing, the number of unique attributes recalled was greater for decisions involving unattractive alternatives (M 3.71) than for those involving attractive altematives (M = 2.65; F(l,140) = 5.57, p < .05). The reverse was true in the reject task; the number of unique attributes recalled was greater for attractive {M 3.32) than for unattractive alternatives (M = 2.37; F(l,140) = 4.86, p<

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701 more common attributes than unique attributes were recalled. However, under incompatibility (reject-attractive and choose-unattractive), the opposite was true; 1.08 more unique attributes than common attributes were recalled. Thus, our preliminary exploration of the patterns in recall suggest that both the cancel-and-focus mechanism and the structure mapping mechanism may be in operation, depending on the level of compatibility between the attribute valence and the task. In study 2, we address a couple of limitations from study 1. We noted earlier that the number of page visits may not be a clean indicator of compatibility-induced effort if the options contain both common and unique attributes. To address this limitation, in study 2, we employ only unique attributes. Another limitation of study 1 is that the attractive alternatives are described using attributes that are different from those used to describe the unattractive set. Consider the stimuli used to create the attractive set. Option A has unique attractive attributes, such as "powerful engine," "very reliable," and so on, and option B has unique attractive attributes such as "good financing available," "air-conditioning included," and so on. Now consider the stimuli for the unattractive set. Option A has unique unattractive attributes such as "hard to find service outlets," "poor warranty," and so on, whereas Option B has unique unattractive attributes, such as "high insurance costs," "has had a lot of factory recalls," and so on. Thus, the attributes describing each set are different. Although counterbalancing the order of presentation removes option-specific effects within each type of decision set, it does not remove the possibility of optionspecific effects across the two types of decision sets. To address this, in study 2, we employed positive versus negative attribute framing of the same attributes to describe the altematives in both the attractive and unattractive decision sets. In addition, we assessed self-reported processing effort. In study 2, we also include a self-reported measure of processing motivation. Cognitive consistency theories such as balance theory (Heider 1946, 1958), incongruity theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955), and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) suggest that when people encounter aspects of their decision environment that are incompatible with each other, they are motivated to restore consistency by transforming some of the incompatible elements. Thus, incompatibility between the task and valence of the alternatives should lead to greater processing motivation than when there is compatibility. Hypothesis 4 below represents this idea. H4: In a task of choosing, processing motivation will be higher for decisions involving unattractive alternatives than for those involving attractive altematives (H4a). In a reject task, processing motivation will be higher for decisions involving attractive altematives than for those involving unattractive alternatives (H4b).

.05). For the common attributes recalled, we did not observe any significant effects of task, alternative valence, or their interaction. Thus, incompatibility appears to enhance recall of the unique, but not the common, attributes, indicating that higher conflict induces a focus on unique rather than common attributes. This pattem is consistent with the cancel-and-focus hypothesis (Houston and Sherman 1995), which notes that common attributes of decision options cancel out and are not processed nearly as much as unique attributes. It is also consistent with the broader view that incompatibility enhances elaboration. For instance, incongruity between the stimulus and response, a type of incompatibility, has been thought to increase elaboration and recall (Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). Likewise, Houston, Childers, and Heckler (1987) report that picture-copy incongmence in advertisements increases elaboration and recall of elements of the advertisement. Sujan, Bettman, and Sujan (1986) report that incompatibility between expectations and what is encountered increases recall. Although the above research does not specify what aspect of the information environment will receive elaboration, it does take a specific position that incongruity induces elaboration. The absence of differences in recall of common attributes does not necessarily mean that they play no role in the decision. In fact, there is at least one theoretical perspective that suggests that common attributes receive focus. The structure mapping literature suggests that when making comparisons across options, people first focus on common attributes, then on alignable differences, and last on nonalignable differences (Markman and Gentner 1997). On first glance, the structure mapping principle and the cancel-andfocus principle seem to be at odds with each other. However, if we take into account the progressive shift in focus from common to unique as the decision process becomes more deliberative, the predictions under structure mapping and cancel-and-focus hypothesis can, in fact, be reconciled. If there is a shift from common to unique attributes as elaboration increases, then, under lower elaboration, that is, lower conflict arising from high task-valence compatibility, there should be greater focus on the common attributes. The reverse should be true under higher elaboration, that is, higher conflict arising from low task-valence compatibility. In other words, compatibility between valence and task may modify the relative recall of unique versus common attributes. We explored the viability of this reconciled view by taking the difference between common and unique attributes recalled and predicting it using compatibility. If there is a shift in focus from common to unique attributes as elaboration increases, then we should see a shift in the recall of common versus unique attributes as a function of compatibility. Specifically, more common attributes must be recalled under compatibility, shifting to a greater recall of unique attributes under incompatibility. The difference in the recall of common versus unique attributes was significantly influenced by compatibility (F(l, 141) = 11.12, />< .01). In the compatibility conditions (reject-unattractive and choose-attractive), consistent with the structure mapping predictions, 0.44

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STUDY 2: ATTRIBUTE-INDEPENDENT DESCRIPTION OF THE ALTERNATIVES

The purpose of study 2 is twofold. The first is to test hypotheses 1-4 using an attribute-independent operationalization of the altematives. The second purpose was to collect self-reported measures of effort (hypothesis 3) and processing motivation (hypothesis 4).

Results
Time of Processing (Hypothesis 1). We observed a
significant task x altemative valence interaction on time of processing (F(l, 138) = 12.88, p<.0\). In the task of choosing, decisions were quicker for attractive alternatives (M 70.09 seconds) than for unattractive alternatives (M = 86.93 seconds; F(l,138) = 5.58, p<.05). The reverse was true in the reject task; decisions involving unattractive altematives were quicker {M = 69.50 seconds) than those involving attractive altematives {M 88.57 seconds; F(l,138) = 7.38, p<.05). No other effects were significant. Thus hypotheses la and Ib received support.

Participants, Design, and Procedure

One hundred and forty-two undergraduate college students participated in study 2 in exchange for partial course credit. The design, procedure, and measures for study 2 were similar to study 1. There were, however, a few differences. First, we assessed motivation and effort through self-report measures. Second, the altematives were described by framing the same attributes positively versus negatively. Third, the manipulation of the valence was "pure" in the sense that there were only unique attractive (unattractive) attributes for each option; there were no common attributes of the opposing valence, unlike study 1. These changes are described below. The independent variables, task and order, remained the same as in study 1 and are not described below.

Decision Difficulty (Hypothesis 2). We observed a

significant task x altemative valence interaction on decision difficulty (F(l,138) = 11.51, p<.OOl). In the task of choosing, decisions were easier for attractive {M = 3.17) than for unattractive alternatives {M = 4.07; F(l, 138) = 6.60, p < .05). The reverse was tme in the reject task; decisions involving unattractive alternatives were easier (M 3.56) than those involving attractive alternatives (M = 4.33; F(l,138) = 4.96, p < .05). No other effects were significant. Thus hypotheses 2a and 2b received support. Effort (Hypothesis 3). We observed a significant task X altemative valence interaction on self-reported effort to process information (F(l,138) = 11.47, p < .001). In the task of choosing, decision effort was greater when they were described using negative framing {M = 5.14) than when they were described using positive framing {M = 4.02; F(], 138) = 9.04, p < .01). The reverse was tme in the reject task; effort put in to evaluate the automobiles was marginally greater when they were described using positive framing (M = 5.05) than when they were described using negative framing (M = 4.40; F(], 138) = 3.15, p < .10). For the behavioral index of effort (number of views of the descriptions of the two altematives), we observed a significant task X altemative valence interaction (F(l,138) = 8.53, p < .01). In the task of choosing, the effort was marginally greater for negatively framed alternatives (M = 4.00) than for positively framed alternatives {M = 3.22; F(l, 138) = 3.57, p < .10). The reverse was true in the reject task; the effort was greater for positively framed altematives {M = 4.05) than for negatively framed alternatives (M = 3.13; F(l,138) = 5.04, p<.05). No other effects were significant. Thus hypothesis 3 received support.

Independent Variables
Altemative Valence. Valence was manipulated between subjects; participants were exposed to either attractive or unattractive alternatives using positive versus negative attribute framing. The literature in attribute framing finds that an object is evaluated more favorably when its attributes are framed positively than when they are framed negatively (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998, 2002). Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998, 164) suggest that "positive labeling of an attribute leads to an encoding of the information that tends to evoke favorable associations in memory, whereas the negative labeling of the same attribute is likely to cause an encoding that evokes unfavorable associations." Hence, we used positive versus negative attribute framing to manipulate valence. For instance, the reliability of the car was framed as follows in the attractive valence condition: "The car has a 90% chance of not needing repairs in the first 100,000 miles." In the unattractive valence condition, the same attribute was framed negatively as follows, "The car has a 10% chance of needing repairs in the first 100,000 miles." Please refer to the tabulations in the appendix for a sample of the stimuli.

Processing Motivation (Hypothesis 4). We observed

a significant task x altemative valence interaction on motivation to process information (F(l,138) = 10.51, p< .01). In the task of choosing, motivation to process information was greater for decisions involving unattractive altematives (M = 5.24) than for those involving attractive altematives (M = 4.24; F(l, 138) = 6.92,p< .05). The re= verse was true in the reject task; motivation was marginally greater for decisions involving attractive alternatives {M = 4.93) than for those involving unattractive alterna-

Additional Dependent Variable

Motivation and Effort. Two measures, one each for motivation and effort, were adapted from Pham (1996); they were "I was very motivated to reach an accurate evaluation of the automobiles" and "I did not put much effort into the evaluation of the automobiles," respectively (the latter was reverse coded).

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tives (A/ = 4.23; F(l, 138) = 4.96, p < .10). No other effects were significant. Thus, hypothesis 4 received support.

Discussion
Study 2 aimed to provide a stronger test for hypotheses 1-4 by (a) using the same rather than different attributes to describe the altematives, {b) employing only unique attributes, and (c) measuring processing motivation and effort through self-rated items. Study 2 replicates the findings from study 1 and finds that the effects of task-valence compatibility on decision times and decision difficulty are observed even if we use the same attributes for describing the alternatives. More important, study 2 shows that incompatibility increases motivation and effort to process information. Study 2 also suggests that it is the perception of the valence that creates attractive or unattractive altematives. In addition, the framing of the same attributes can shift the perception of valence by emphasizing the presence versus absence of positive/negative attributes. We conducted a post-test of the stimuli used in this study, which indicated that the positively framed options were perceived as being more attractive, likable, and appealing {a = 0.78) compared to negatively framed options (5.65 versus 3.62; f(75) = 3.96,/?<.O1).

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Past research holds that the valence of the altematives, attractive versus unattractive, creates conflict and influences decision difficulty and decision time. In this research, we argue that it is not the valence of the attributes per se that create these effects but its combination with the task. Our central argument was that the valence of the alternatives may interact with the task of choosing versus rejecting, resulting in decision situations characterized by compatibility or incompatibility. We further argued that recognizing the role of the task might modify what is currently known about the effects of attribute conflict. To test our thesis, we varied compatibility by orthogonally varying the valence of the altematives (attractive/unattractive)

and nature of the task (choose/reject); choosing one of two attractive altematives and rejecting one of two unattractive altematives yields task-valence compatibility, whereas choosing one of two unattractive altematives or rejecting one of two attractive ones leads to incompatibility. In study 1, we found that under the task of choosing, deciding between attractive altematives was easier and faster than deciding between unattractive altematives, thus replicating the prior findings. However, the reverse was tme under the reject task. This suggests that consumers can control the level of difficulty that they experience by changing their decision task. We also found that recall of unique attributes increases, with conflict arising from task and valence incompatibility. In study 2, we replicated the findings from study 1 without varying the attributes used in describing the alternative, thus addressing a limitation from study 1. Furthermore, we found that task-valence compatibility affects motivation and effort to process information. Our research raises several issues for future research. Consumers shopping online often encounter recommendation agents that provide the degree of match between product choices and consumer preferences (Haubl and Trifts 2000). Such agents can either sort from the most liked to the least liked or the other way around. Thus, shoppers are likely to experience compatibility in the best-to-worst sorting and incompatibility in the worst-to-best sorting. Our research suggests that shoppers seeking to choose might experience greater ease of decision and faster decision times in the bestto-worst sort. On a different note, conflict can arise from inconsistencies in one's own goal stmcture or from the differences between one's own goal stmcture and that of others in group decision contexts. It will be interesting to probe the role of task as both an independent moderator as well as a dependent variable in such situations involving different sources of decision conflict. Another potential area for research is: How does task-valence compatibility influence the choice of the altematives? This research did not focus on choice per se, but we believe that it is an open question as to how compatibility will modify choices under conflict.

APPENDIX ALTERNATIVESSTUDY 1

Automobile A Poor mileage Poor warranty Hard to find service outlets

Automobile B Poor mileage Poor warranty Hard to find service outlets Good financing available Air conditioning included Your friend recommended this model

Very reliable
Powerful engine Good ratings from a consumer guide

704

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVESSTUDY 1

Automobile A Doesn't need repairs often Stereo included Prestigious model Hard to find service outlets Poor warranty Bad ratings from a consumer guide

Automobile B Doesn't need repairs often Stereo included Prestigious model High insurance costs Air conditioning not included Has had a lot of factory recalls

ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVESSTUDY 2
Automobile A Repairs: It has a 90% chance of not needing major repairs during the first 100,000 miles Tinted Windows: The tint successfully blocks 80% of harmful rays from the sun Braking System: The ABS/Traction Control System successfully prevents skidding 80% of the time Anti-theft System: It has a 95% success rate in tracing stolen cars within 2 hours Automobile B Warranty: This warranty covers 90% of the parts in case of failure or accidents Side Air Bags: These air bags are effective in saving lives 85 out of 100 times during accidents Recommendation: Nine out of 10 people who bought this car recommend it Factory Recaiis: 97% of the cars rolling out of the manufacturing plant are defect free

UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVESSTUDY 2
Automobile A Repairs: It has a 10% chance of needing major repairs during the first 100,000 miles Tinted Windows: The tint fails to block 20% of harmful rays from the sun Braking System: The ABS/Traction Control System fails to prevent skidding 20% of the time Anti-theft System: It has a 5% failure rate in tracing stolen cars within 2 hours Automobile B Warranty: This warranty does not cover 10% of the parts in case of failure or accidents Side Air Bags: These air bags are not effective in saving lives 15 out of 100 times during accidents Recommendation: One out of 10 people who bought this car do not recommend it Factory Recaiis: 3% of the cars rolling out of the manufacturing plant are defective

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