Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). This
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of
Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and
of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro Homeland

According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is vested to
the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first nation with defined
territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by the MOA-AD the authority and
jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated
that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal waters.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples’ right to information on matters of public concern.

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING
itself.

6. cralawWhether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga,

Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the
projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

7. cralawWhether MOA-AD is constitutional

Held:

Issue 1:

The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and
academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional
character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.

Issue 2:

Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for judicial
review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under E.O. No. 3 and the fact that
the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.

Issue 3:

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal
framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in
the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a
state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people
would give their imprimatur to their solution.

Issue 4:

Yes, there is a violation of the people’s right to information.An essential element of this right is to
keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest
in the highest order.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information
or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of
executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally
disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public
scrutiny.

Issue 5:

No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It would
have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the
Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.

Issue 6:

Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato,
Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. These petitions afford a proper venue for
the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of
landmark cases.

Issue 7:

Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present constitution.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The associative relationship
between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

The court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening petitions.

Magallona Vs Ermita Case Digest

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline
regime of nearby territories.

Facts
Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 in March 2009 demarcating the maritime baseline of
the Philippine archipelago. The former is a rectangular baseline based on the Treaty of Paris and
UNCLOS I while the latter followed a straight baseline method prescribed by UNCLOS III.
Measurement of maritime zones will begin from these baselines.

Issue
Whether RA 9522 violated Article 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Ruling
No.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is just a codified norm that
regulates the .conduct of states.

The RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting
points. Also, RA 9522 includes provisions that enforce our claims to the KIG, SS, and Sabbah.

RA 9522 is not unconstitutional, the Petition was dismissed.

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to
pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’
reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to
this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an
UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental
shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around
our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over
Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent
areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of
the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the
part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.

People vs. Sobrepeña, Sr., et al. Case Digest

People of the Philippines vs. Dr. David A. Sobrepeña, Sr., et al.
G.R. No. 204063. December 5, 2016

Facts
Respondents are officers and employees of Union College of Laguna, an educational institution in
Santa Cruz, Laguna. They were charged in several informations for allegedly committing Estafa and
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. By
reason thereof, respondents were incarcerated. Invoking the provisions of Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and in their belief that the evidence of their
guilt is not strong, respondents filed a Petition for Bail.

In opposition to the Petition, the prosecution presented Adelfo Carandang who testified that:
x xx [S]ometime in June 2008, he saw an advertisement with the phrase "Work, Earn and Live in
Canada" printed on a tarpaulin placed on the walls of Union College. Thereafter .. after consulting with
his wife, he visited the said institution and inquired about the said advertisement. He met private-
respondent Deobela Fortes who introduced herself as the Director for Career and Placement of Union
College. The latter told him that Union College is engaged in Careers and Enhancement Progran1 and
it is offering; seminars, trainings and workshops and that through its Canadian partner known as
Jnfoskills Learning Incorporated of British Columbia (INFOSKILLS) it is offering high-quality certification
classes endorsed by the British Columbia Ministry of Health and Tourism, Worksafe British Columbia
and the Canadian Red Cross. INFOSKILLS is delivery partner of British Columbia Ministry of Health
and Tourism, Canadian Red Cross, Construction Safety Network, Enforrn and it is the training agency
of Worksafe British Columbia. Also, he was informed that GDX Visa and Immigration Incorporated of
British Columbia will be providing work and immigration assessment program for all participants. Fortes
allegedly assured him that the graduates of the program will be hired as restaurant host, hostess, food
and beverage service banquet server and a host of other jobs in food and beverage industry in Canada
with a monthly fee of 1,500.00 Canadian Dollars; that he can soon become an immigrant of Canada
and be able to bring his family with him after becoming such; that the program is on a first come first
served basis. Thus, enticed with this promise of a bright future, he immediately paid the fees and
enrolled himself for the first batch. These include the $2,500 USD for visa and placement fees plus
Php15,000.00 for English Language Proficiency (ELP) fee. Carandang also testified that the other
private-respondents were also very much active in luring him to join the program. In fact, Dr. Dabao
and Dr. David Sobrepeña told him to wait for his employment contract. But none was forthcoming,
hence the filing of Estafa and Large Scale Illegal Recruitment cases against the herein petitioners.

Upon cross-examination, Carandang testified that he is a college graduate, having finished Bachelor of
Science in Marketing and Commerce. He confirmed that he knew Union College to be a school in
Santa Cruz for a long time and that its officers and employees never had cases for illegal recruitment.
He further attested that in the particular flyer that he got the actual statement was not quoted in full.
The complete statement in the flyer being that: "INVEST IN YOUR FUTURE GET THE SKILLS YOU
NEED TO WORK EARN AND LIVE IN CANADA." xx x

With respect to the registration form that he signed, Carandang admitted that although in his judicial
affidavit he stated that the $2,500 USD he paid was for visa processing fees or job placement fees,
however, the registration form that he actually signed does not contain words of such import. In fact,
the $2,500 USD, as stated in the registration form was for the courses in entry level in food and
hospitality which he admitted to have actually attended under the tutelage of two Canadian instructors
who served as their professors. Furthermore, Carandang testified on cross that while he mentioned in
his judicial affidavit that the alleged victims paid 12 Million pesos, such conclusion is his mere estimate
and he has no personal knowledge of the actual amount.

RTC Ruling
The RTC denied the Petition to Bail finding that there is evident proof against all the accused. This
Court holds that the evidence of guilt for all the accused is STRONG.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents was denied in an Order dated October 18,
2010.

CA Ruling
The CA was convinced that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed Orders. According to the CA, there is doubt as to
whether there is strong evidence against respondents for the charge of estafa or large scale illegal
recruitment; that the evidence available on record merely showed that Union College provided the
venue and the English language training course; that the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the
prosecution purposely took out of context the statement appearing in the flyer i.e., "INVEST IN YOUR
FUTURE GET THE SKILLS YOU NEED TO WORK, EARN, AND LIVE IN CANADA"; that there were
no statements to the effect that Union College is acting as a job placement agency; that there is no
direct evidence to show that Carandang was illegally enticed by respondents to enroll at Union College;
that there is no direct evidence showing that respondents overtly represented that they have the power
to send the trainees abroad for employment; and finally, there is no evidence that respondents are
flight risk.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied per Resolution dated October 3, 2012. Thus,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari for the reversal and setting aside of the January 31,
2012 CA Decision and its October 3, 2012 Resolution and likewise prayed that the impugned Orders of
the RTC be reinstated.

Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error when it nullified and set aside the Orders of the
RTC.

SC Ruling
We rule in favor of the petitioner. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also states that no person charged with a capital offense or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

Thus from the above-cited provisions and in cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling
is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter of judicial discretion that
remains with the judge. The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it
against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented
by the parties. xxx xxx On such hearing, the Court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice
inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted.
The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving
such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross-
examination."
In the present case, the CA gave due course to the Petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in denying bail to respondents. The CA held that based on the evidence thus far
presented by the prosecution in the bail hearing, the evidence of guilt is not strong against Union
College particularly its employees and officers with respect to the charges filed against them.
From a perspective of the CA Decision, the issue therein resolved is not so much on the bail
application but already on the merits of the case. The matters dealt therein involved the evaluation of
evidence which is not within the jurisdiction of the CA to resolve in a Petition for Certiorari. The findings
and assessment of the trial court during the bail hearing were only a preliminary appraisal of the
strength of the prosecution's evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether respondents are
entitled to be released on bail during the pendency of the trial.
We would like to stress that "a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. It does not include correction of the trial court's evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings thereon. It does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to
weigh the probative value thereof"

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.

CASE DIGEST: MIAA V. COA

G.R. No. 194710 : February 14, 2012
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
Respondent.
REYES, J.:

FACTS:

On July 30, 2003, the Board of Directors of MIAA issued Resolution No. 2003-067, which approved the
Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) between MIAA and Samahang Manggagawa sa Paliparan ng
Pilipinas (SMPP) and authorized the grant of P30,000.00 to all MIAA officials and employees as
"contract signing bonus".

On post-audit, Mr. Ireneo B. Manalo, the then Corporate Auditor, issued Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. JPA 03-35 stating that the payment of the said contract-signing bonus had
been previously declared improper by this Court in Social Security System v. Commission on Audit.
The payment of signing bonus made by MIAA, therefore, was improper and has no legal basis.

In a Notice of Disallowance dated August 31, 2006, Director IV Janet D. Nacion disallowed the subject
disbursement in the total amount of P44,790,000.00 for being contrary to Section 1 of Public Sector
Labor Management Council (PSLMC) Resolution No. 2, Series of 2003 and the May 2, 2002 letter of
Emilia T. Boncodin (Boncodin), the former Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), to Guillermo N. Carague (Carague), the former Chairman of the COA.

MIAA, through its Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration, Herminia D. Castillo
appealed N.D. No. MIAA-2006-01 stating that: (a) the CNA Incentive was granted to all officers and
employees of MIAA, including those who do not occupy rank-and-file positions, since the
achievement of MIAA performance targets and the success of its fiscal reforms is a collaborative
effort; and (b) MIAA performance in 2003 justified the grant of the CNA Incentive.
In its Decision dated February 18, 2008, the LAO-Corporate, thru Director Nacion, denied MIAA
appeal.

According to Director Nacion, the President decision to disallow the grant of signing bonus is clear
from former DBM Secretary Boncodin May 15, 2002 letter to former COA Chairman Carague. Contrary
to MIAA claim, the grant is actually a signing bonus and cannot be considered a CNA Incentive since it
was released on August and October, or immediately after the approval of the CNA between MIAA
and SMPP and before MIAA had determined its savings from Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses (MOOE). Under DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-01 dated February 1, 2006, the CNA
Incentive is a one-time benefit, the payment of which is subject to the successful implementation of
projects and achievement of performance targets, and should be exclusively sourced from the MOOE
based on the cost-cutting measures specified in the CNA.

Consequently, the MIAA filed with the COA a petition for review, which was denied on the following
grounds: (a) the subject grant is not a CNA Incentive but a signing bonus as it was paid on August 1,
2003 or immediately after the CNA between MIAA and SMPP was approved on July 30, 2003 and it
was paid before any savings from MOOE could be generated from the programs, projects and
activities under the CNA; (b) the signing bonus is prohibited under Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
135 and Section 5.6.2 of DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1; (c) assuming that the grant is a CNA
Incentive, still, it is invalid as it was paid upon renewal of the CNA, which is contrary to the provisions
of Section 1 of PSLMC Resolution No. 2; (d) payment of the CNA Incentive to MIAA officers, Board of
Directors, Board Secretariat and Executive Committee (ExeCom) violated PSLMC Resolution No. 2,
Section 2 of A.O. No. 135 and DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-01; and (e) the grant was without the
prior approval of the OP and/or the DBM.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA was correct in holding the beneficiaries of this disallowed benefit
liable for a refund and for attributing bad faith on the part of the members of MIAA Board of Director
who authorized the same?

HELD:

There is no dispute that the grant of a signing bonus had been previously disallowed by the express
mandate of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Shortly thereafter, on July 22, 2002, this Court declared in SSS v. COA that Social Services Commission
authority to fix the compensation of its employees under its charter, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161 as
amended, is subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, which provides for the consolidation of
allowances and compensation in the prescribed standardized salary rates. While there are exceptions
provided under Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. No. 6758 in observance of the policy on non-diminution of
pay, the signing bonus is not one of the benefits contemplated. This Court also ruled that the signing
bonus is "not a truly reasonable compensation" since conduct of peaceful collective negotiations
"should not come with a price tag".

We have no doubt that RA 6758 modified, if not repealed, Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA 1161 as amended, at
least insofar as it concerned the authority of SSC to fix the compensation of SSS employees and
officers. This means that whatever salaries and other financial and non-financial inducements that the
SSC was minded to fix for them, the compensation must comply with the terms of RA 6758.
Consequently, only the remuneration which was being offered as of 1 July 1989, and which was then
being enjoyed by incumbent SSS employees and officers, could be availed of exclusively by the same
employees and officers separate from and independent of the prescribed standardized salary rates.
Unfortunately, however, the signing bonus in question did not qualify under Secs. 12 and 17 of RA
6758. It was non-existent as of 1 July 1989 as it accrued only in 1996 when the CNA was entered into
by and between SSC and ACCESS. The signing bonus could not have been included in the salutary
provisions of the statute nor would it be legal to disburse to the intended recipients.

xxxx

On the basis of the foregoing pronouncement, the signing bonus is found to be a truly reasonable
compensation. The gratuity was of course the SSC gesture of good will and benevolence for the
conclusion of collective negotiations between SSC and ACCESS, as the CNA would itself state, but for
what objective? Agitation and propaganda which are so commonly practiced in private sector labor-
management relations have no place in the bureaucracy and that only a peaceful collective
negotiation which is concluded within a reasonable time must be the standard for interaction in the
public sector. This desired conduct among civil servants should not come, we must stress, with a price
tag which is what the signing bonus appears to be.

With the abolition of the signing bonus, the PSLMC issued Resolution No. 2, Series of 2003,
authorizing the grant of the CNA Incentive, the primary purpose of which is to recognize the joint
efforts of labor and management in the achievement of planned targets, programs and services
approved in the budgets of government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government
financial institutions (GFIs) at lesser cost. The clear objective is to encourage, promote and reward
productivity, efficiency and use of austerity measures as specified in the CNA.

Case Digest: Velasco vs Belmonte

ISSUE: Does HRET have the jurisdiction over BB.

FACTS: COMELEC has cancelled BB’s CoC, acting upon the petition of AA, for alleged
misrepresentations in BB’s CoC. While the motion for reconsideration field by BB was pending, the
election was held and BB was proclaimed as winner by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. CC filed an
Election Protest in the HRET. COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality on its cancellation of BB’s CoC.
Despite it, Speaker DD administered the oath of office to BB. BB challenged COMELEC’s action and the
Supreme Court upheld that there was no grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC. AA filed for an
immediate execution of COMELEC’s previous resolution and to declare CC as winner. COMELEC
declared the proclamation of BB as null and void. CC filed a petition for the Court to issue a writ of
mandamus to compel Speaker DD to proclaim him as winner, despite notice given to him by
COMELEC.

DECISION: Granted

RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives. BB is not a bona fide member of the House of
Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation.. When BB took her oath of office before respondent
Speaker DD in open session, BB had no valid COC NOR a valid proclamation. In view of the foregoing,
BB has absolutely no legal basis to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives, and therefore,
she has no legal personality to be recognized as a party-respondent at a proceeding before the HRET.
 PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No L-32052
JULY 25, 1975
FACTS:

Private respondents filed with the CIR a petition, alleging their employment relationship, the overtime
services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the
differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denied the allegations. The then Presiding Judge Arsenio T.
Martinez of respondent Court sustained the claims of private respondents for overtime services from
December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing
petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. Petitioner claims that the matter is
beyond the jurisdiction of the CIR as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from
the operation of C.A. 444, invoking the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration decision, and the distinction between constituent and
ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation.

ISSUE:

WON the traditional classification of function of government as ministrant and constituent applicable
in the case at bar.

HELD:

No. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of the times was clearly pointed out by
the present Chief Justice. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised
by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people – these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on
the part of the government.”

Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: “The growing complexities of modern society, however,

have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to
say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only ‘because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,’ continue to
lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here
as almost everywhere else, the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.”

Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, based on the Wilsonian
classification of the tasks incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance
with the laissez faire principle.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court, denying
a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed.

Government of the Philippine Islands vs El Monte de Piedad Y Caja De Ahorras De Manila

G.R. No. L-9959 – 35 Phil. 728 – Political Law – Basic Concepts – Elements of a State – Government –
Parens Patriae

In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the
said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which
in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw
the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint.
The bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to
institute a complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the
said amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank.

HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this
is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights
of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public
interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as parent of the people, the
government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil

G.R. No. L-25843 – 58 SCRA 94 – Political Law – Basic Concepts – Elements of a State – Government
– Parens Patriae – Strengthening the Family

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his
beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his
benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age
when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the
benefit of the child.

On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery
of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted
the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be
binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the
insurance policy.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and
that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be
affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best
interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was
the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care
towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this
country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother)
is observed.

Gonzales vs. Marcos

GONZALES vs. MARCOS
65 SCRA 624
GR No. L-31685 July 31, 1975

"With the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest owing from the public, a taxpayer may not
have the right to question the legality of an issuance creating a trust for the benefit of the people but
purely funded by charity."

FACTS: The petitioner questioned the validity of EO No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines, having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as donations
received, financial commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming
in the future. It was likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept donations from the private
sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the
National Investment & Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from President
Johnson of the United States in the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the construction of
the Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48 million. The petition was denied by the trial court
arguing that with not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the absence of any pecuniary or
monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the general
public.

ISSUE: Has a taxpayer the capacity to question the validity of the issuance in this case?

HELD: No. It was therein pointed out as "one more valid reason" why such an outcome was
unavoidable that "the funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations
[and] contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary
or monetary interest." The stand of the lower court finds support in judicial precedents. This is not to
retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by
People v. Vera, where the doctrine of standing was first fully discussed. It is only to make clear that
petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning, has not satisfied the elemental requisite for a taxpayer's
suit. Moreover, even on the assumption that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does
not necessarily follow that such kind of an action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act
has to be passed upon. This Court, as held in the recent case of Tan v. Macapagal, "is not devoid of
discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained." The lower court thus did not err in so
viewing the situation.
 G.R. No. 164785 | April 29, 2009
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner,
v.
CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, et al., respondents.
Ponente: Velasco, J.R., J.

Doctrine: ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: It has been established that unprotected speech or low-
value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, insulting or “fighting words”, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security. A
compelling state interest in regulating the petitioner’s obscene utterances are deemed valid
supported by the fact that the State has the obligation and responsibility to provide protection of the
youth against improper activities that may prejudice their general well-being.

Narrative:
On August 10, 2004, the petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37 the
following remarks: “Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka
pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol
pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.” To which the MTRCB
found the petitioner liable for his utterances, thereby imposing a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from his program.

The issue now at hand is whether Eliseo’s freedom of speech, as guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of
the Constitution has been violated, and that his suspension was valid.

The Supreme Court held that his rights were not violated. It was explained that the statement of
Eliseo can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to an average child. The Court also ruled that
Eliseo cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech, especially when said
statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds,
said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

Eliseo’s freedom of speech was weighed against the duty of the government to protect the
development and welfare of the youth. The State has the obligation and responsibility to provide
protection to the youth against improper activities that may prejudice their general well-being. The
statements were uttered in a TV program that is for general viewership, and in a timeslot that would
likely reach the eyes and ears of the children. The statements were then deemed to be unprotected
speech as it could corrupt the young minds of the children. This constitutes a compelling state
interest in regulating the petitioner’s utterances as provided for by PD 1986.

The Supreme Court also held that the three-month suspension is not a prior restraint on speech
which is illegal and presumed to be unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The
suspension is in the form of a permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the
offensive and obscene remarks he uttered in his television program. Moreover, the petitioner is
deemed to have yielded his right to the full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation under
PD 1986 as it has impliedly accepted the power of the MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry
when it acquired a permit or license to show a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program pursuant
to the same decree.

The imposition of a penalty of THREE (3) months suspension on the television program was imposed.

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, GR L-5 (Case Digest)

Focus Topics: De Facto Governemnt; Government; Elements; State

FACTS

Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the CFI of Manila.
After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, respondent Judge Dizon refused to
continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines.

ISSUES

I. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the American occupation.

II. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul
and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines
during the Japanese military occupation.

III. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now the
proceedings in actions pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or
liberated by the American and Filipino forces

HELD

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AFFIRMATIVE. [A]ll acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de
facto government are good and valid. If [the governments established in these Islands under the
names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation or regime were de facto governments], the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in
international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by
the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

II

NEGATIVE. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the
judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the
Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the
Japanese occupation.

[I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.

[T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own
territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the restoration of the
civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and
occupation, it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a
representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander
in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations
asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by
the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907.

III

AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in
practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined,
unless absolutely prevented, to respect.

[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in practice, they (the
municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered
by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice
is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.”

From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to
substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial.
From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of
nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity
will permit.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 -
May 22, 1986)
FACTS:
1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted
by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court
further held that: 1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country;

2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government;
and

3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new

government.

[CASE DIGEST] In re: Saturnino Bermudez (G.R. No. 76180)

October 24, 1986 | G.R. No. 76180

Saturnino Bermudez, petitioner

FACTS:

Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the SC, asking the same Court to clarify
exactly who were being referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution. Said
provision reads in part: "The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for the purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended
to noon of June 30, 1992."

ISSUE:

Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution pertain to incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or to elected President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice-
President Arturo Tolentino?

HELD:

Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following reasons:
 • petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SC;
• petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue;
• although no respondent is impleaded, the instant petition amounts to a suit against
incumbent President Corazon Aquino, who is immune from suits during her incumbency;
• it should be fairly obvious -- mutatis mutandis, there should be no question -- that
the aforecited provision pertains to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador Laurel. The Aquino administration is legitimately recognized by other nations, and
all eleven members of the SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the land under
her government; and
• the people of the Philippines have accepted her government as the one in effective
control of the country, such that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a
de jure government.
___

De facto means "actual" or "in reality." Therefore, a de facto government is one that exercises
power as if legally constituted even though it is not formally recognized. De jure means "by right"
or something that is based on laws or actions of the State.

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO, et.al.

G.R. No. 146710-15, 02 March 2001
Puno, J.

DOCTRINE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – In a resignation, there must be an intent to resign, and that intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirements as to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as the
resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Presidential immunity was granted only during the term of the President in
order to prevent delay in actions on important matters by the Chief Executive due to litigations that
may be lodged against him. The said immunity does not apply beyond the term of the President.

FACTS

After the people’s clamor in EDSA for him to resign from his position, Petitioner Joseph Estrada issued
a statement that he will be leaving the Malacañang Palace in order to have a peaceful transition of
power and start the healing of the nation warped by confusion due to his impeachment trial.
Nevertheless, he sent a letter to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House stating that he is
temporarily unable to perform the duties of the office of the President and let then Vice-President
Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assume the position of Acting President.

Later, the Office of the Ombudsman filed plunder and perjury charges against the Petitioner. A special
panel of prosecutors were assigned to investigate the charges against the Petitioner. Thus, the
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court. He alleged that he cannot be
criminally charged by the Ombudsman on the ground of immunity from suit. He claimed that he is still
the President of the Philippines, and that Respondent is merely holding the position in an acting
capacity. Further, he claimed that he cannot be considered as to have resigned because he is
prohibited by law from resigning since he was under an investigation, i.e. an impeachment trial.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as President.

2. Whether or not the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of exercising the Presidency.
3. Whether or not the Petitioner is immune from suit, and if so, up to what extent.

RULING

1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there must be an intent to resign, and that
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirements as to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as
the resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.

In the present case, it was established the Petitioner resigned from his position as President of the
Philippines. According to the Angara Diary, which serialized the final days of the Petitioner in
Malacañang Palace, the Petitioner made pronouncements which was interpreted as intention of
giving up the position such as when he proposed a snap election where he would not be a candidate;
non-defiance to the request of a peaceful and orderly transfer of power; prior agreement to the
transfer of power with conditions as to the state of the Petitioner and his family; and the issuance of a
statement wherein the Petitioner leaves the palace, the seat of the Presidency, for the sake and
peace and order. Hence, the resignation of the Petitioner was implied by his actions to leave the
Presidency.

2. NO. The Court ruled that it is not within its jurisdiction to review whether the Petitioner was
temporarily incapable of exercising the Presidency for being political in nature, and addressed solely
to Congress, as provided in the Constitution. Even if the Petitioner can prove that he did not resign,
the Petitioner cannot successfully claim that he was merely on leave because Congress recognized the
Respondent as the de jure president, which cannot be reviewed by the Court without violating the
principle of separation of powers.

In the present case, both Houses of Congress recognized the Respondent as the President when they
issued Resolutions to the said effect. Further, both Houses issued a Resolution approving the
selection and appoint of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President. Further, finally, both Houses
started sending bills to be signed into law by the Respondent. Hence, the Petitioner was not
temporarily incapable to exercise the Presidency because he resigned as President, and Houses of
Congress already recognized the legitimacy of the Respondent.

3. NO. The Court held that presidential immunity was granted only during the term of the President in
order to prevent delay in actions on important matters by the Chief Executive due to litigations that
may be lodged against him. The said immunity does not apply beyond the term of the President.

In the present case, the Petitioner cannot claim that he cannot be sued before the Ombudsman
because he was immune from suit. In fact, the Petitioner cannot cite any decision that the President
has post-tenure immunity from liability. Further, the Petitioner cannot claim that he is immune from
suit because he was not convicted by the Impeachment Court. To allow such situation will put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution, which were criminal in nature. Hence, the Petitioner is not
immune from suit.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Petitions are DISMISSED.

MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77

Posted by kaye lee on 7:44 AM
Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack
of an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition
of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated
as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of
certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold
a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn
Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President
and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the
corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a
Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from
Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot
on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8,
1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property
was no longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to
have been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the
former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the
New Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold
their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case
filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First
Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12,
1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes against Canon 25.

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents.

75 PHIL 875
AUGUST 20, 1946

FACTS:

During the Japanese occupation, herein petitioner, Ramon Ruffy, a Provincial Commander of the
Philippine Constabulary, retreated in the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy. He
organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area. The said Bolo Area was
a contingent of the 6th Military District, which has been recognized and placed under the operational
control of the US Army in the South Pacific. Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of
command in the Bolo Area. Major Ruffy who was then acting as Commanding Officer for the Bolo
Area was relieved of his position. Later on or on October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col Jurado was slain
allegedly by the petitioners. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner‘s trial.

The trial court convicted petitioner and he now filed this instant petition with the contention that he
was not subject to military law at the time the offense for which he had been placed on trial was
committed. Petitioners contended that by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National
Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the existence of the Philippine Army
including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent occupation. He
also assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War which provides that ―any person subject to
military law who commits murder in the time of war should suffer death or imprisonment for life, as
the court martial may direct. Petitioner argued that the said law was in violation of Article VII, section
2 of the Constitution since 93d of Article of War fails to allow a review by the Supreme Court of
judgments of courts martial imposing death or life imprisonment.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed.
Whether 93d of Articles of War was constitutional.

HELD:

YES, petitioner was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense was committed. The rule
that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance
during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied
territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms.

By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine army
did not cease to be fully in the service, though, in a measure, only in measure, they were not subject
to the military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers
on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of breach of the
discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty x x x; but for an act unbecoming of a gentleman or
an act which constitutes an offense of the class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in
general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial.

Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the
General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army
amenable to the Articles of War. x x x As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the
petitioners operated under the orders of a duly established and duly appointed commanders of the
United States Army and thus covered by Article 2 of the Articles of War which provides for persons
subject to military law.

YES, 93d of the Articles of War was constitutional. It does not violate Article VII, section 2 of the
Constitution, which provides that ―the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
Court Martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities ―for ordering of courts
martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander
in Chief, independently of legislation. Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary.

x x x court martial are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress
for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives.

CASE DIGEST: Laurel v Misa GR No. L-409 January 30, 1947

Laurel v Misa
GR No. L-409
January 30, 1947
Facts:
Acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended.

Issue: W/N Philippine government sovereignty was suspended and hence, Misa cannot be prosecuted
for treason.

Held:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier, and if its is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme
power which governs a body politic or society constituting a State).

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government
of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in
abeyance during military occupation. The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the
change of form of government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign people.

In RE Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago, GR 82544 (Case Digest)

Focus Topics: Acts of the State; Sovereignty; Elements; State

FACTS:
American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, and Adriaan Van
Elshout, 58, a Dutch citizen, are all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences.

The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard
Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission
Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed
being live-in for some time now.

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected
child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and
other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.

Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended
after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only the three
petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and
46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.Tthe Board of Special
Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which the CID
denied.

Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had “finally agreed to a self-deportation”
and praying that he be “provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of
Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country.” However, it appears that on the same date
that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed
the present petition.

Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the
Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the
Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Philippine Immigration Act clothed the Commissioner with any authority to arrest
and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.

HELD
AFFIRMATIVE. [The Court] reject petitioners’ contentions and uphold respondent’s official acts ably
defended by the Solicitor General. The Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby
denied.

There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by
the Constitution is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. One of
the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based
upon probable cause.

In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance
for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable
cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without
warrant. [The fact that] petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal.

The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code. The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.”

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested
and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the
charge be substantiated by competent evidence.

The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail, also challenged by them, was
in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of
discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. As deportation
proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail
may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds
as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act
of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has
expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development
(Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting
deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.

V. DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

[CASE DIGEST] Department of Agriculture v. NLRC (G.R. No. 104269)

November 11, 1993 | G.R. No. 104269

Department of Agriculture, petitioner

National Labor Relations Commission, et al., respondents

FACTS:

On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) office in Cagayan de Oro and Sultan Security
Agency (SSA) entered into a contract where the latter was to provide security services to the former.
On September 13, 1990, several guards from SSA filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, as well as
for damages, against DoA and SSA. Both the DoA and SSA were subsequently found guilty by the
Executive Labor Arbiter, which also held both of them liable for the payment of money claims
amounting to P266,483.91.

On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. As a response, the DoA filed a petition
for injunction, prohibition, and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction, before the
NLRC. The DoA's petition was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of its petition before the NLRC, DoA filed a petition before the SC arguing that:
(a) it was COA, not NLRC, that was supposed to have jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445; and (b) that NLRC
had disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not it was COA that has exclusive jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government.
2. Whether or not DoA, as an agency of the State, is covered by the principle of the non-suability of
the State.

HELD:

1. Yes, the Court ruled that money claims against the Government should be filed before the
Commission on Audit pursuant to CA Act No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445. In the instant case,
underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay, and other similar items arising from the Contract
for Service clearly constitute money claims. As such, the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter
and the resolution issued by NLRC were reversed by the Court in favor of DoA.

2. No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as an excuse not to be sued.

Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may not be sued without its
consent." This principle reflects a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts. As per
Justice Holmes, a sovereign State is exempt from suits "not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends."

However, this privilege is not absolute; with its consent, the State can be sued.

The Court clarifies that there are two kinds of consent: (1) express consent, which may be made
either through a general law or a special law; and (2) implied consent, which is conceded when the
State either commences litigation or enters into a contract.

But entering into a contract does not automatically mean the State can be sued. Once again, the
Court clarifies that contracts or agreements that constitute sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) cannot be the subject of any lawsuit, while private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure
gestionisis) can be made the subject of litigation.

In the instant case, express consent was provided for by Act No. 3083, which states that "the
Philippine government consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties." And as cited earlier, money claims against the Government should be filed before the
Commission on Audit.

At the same time, it is inarguable that DoA's contract with SSA was clearly a proprietary act, which
essentially means that DoA cannot invoke the principle of the non-suability of the State.

CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION (Art. XVI sec. 3)

THE CITY OF BACOLOD, HON. MAYOR EVELIO R. LEONARDIA, ATTY. ALLAN L. ZAMORA AND ARCH.
LEMUEL D. REYNALDO, IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS OFFICIALS OF
THE CITY OF BACOLOD, PETITIONERS, v. PHUTURE VISIONS CO., INC., RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 190289 ; January 17, 2018 ; Third Division ; Velasco, Jr.
Subject:
 Political and International Law ; State Immunity from Suit
Civil Law ; Damages

Principle:
No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can thus be implied from the mere conferment and
exercise of the power to issue business permits and licences. Accordingly, there is merit in petitioners’
argument that they cannot be sued by respondent since the City’s consent had not been secured for
this purpose.
Injury alone does not give respondent the right to recover damages, but it must also have a right of
action for the legal wrong inflicted by petitioners. In order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
Considering that respondent had no legal right to operate the bingo operations at the outset, then it
is not entitled to the damages which it is demanding from petitioners.

FACTS:
The instant case stems from the Petition for Mandamus and Damages filed by respondent Phuture
Visions Co., Inc. (Phuture) on March 5, 2007 against petitioners City of Bacolod, Hon. Mayor Evelio R.
Leonardia, Atty. Allan L. Zamora (now deceased) and Arch. Lemuel D. Reynaldo.

On January 10, 2007, Phuture applied for the renewal of its mayor’s permit with “professional
services, band/entertainment services” as its declared line of business, providing the address of the
business as “RH Building, 26 Lacson Street, Barangay 5” instead of SM Bacolod where respondent’s
bingo operations was located.

Upon submission of the requirements on February 19,2007 and while the application was being
processed, Phuture was issued a “claim slip” for it to claim the actual mayor’s permit on March 16,
2007 if the requirements were found to be in order. However, petitioners found discrepancies in
Phuture’s submitted requirements, wherein the application form was notarized earlier than the
amendment of its Articles of Incorporation (AOI) to reflect the company’s primary purpose for bingo
operations. Aside from this, respondent failed to pay the necessary permit fee/assessment fee under
the applicable tax ordinances of the City of Bacolod.

Without waiting for the release of the mayor’s permit, respondent started the operation of its bingo
outlet at SM Bacolod. This prompted the former City Legal Officer, Atty. Allan Zamora, to issue a
Closure Order dated March 2, 2007, pursuant to City Tax Ordinance No. 93-001, Series of 1993, which
declares unlawful for any person to operate any business in the City of Bacolod without first obtaining
a permit therefor from the City Mayor and paying the necessary permit fee and other charges to the
City Treasurer.

The Closure Order was presented by petitioners’ representative to respondent’s lawyers to negotiate
a possible peaceful solution before its implementation. However, respondent simply ignored the
information relayed to them and thus, at around 6:00 a.m. on March 3, 2007, the Composite
Enforcement Unit under the Office of the City Legal Officer implemented the Closure Order.

In a Decision dated March 20, 2007, the RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
mandatory order and dismissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA partially granted the
appeal by affirming the trial court’s denial of the application for a temporary mandatory order but
reversing the dismissal of the suit for damages and ordering the case to be reinstated and remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners’ argued that hearing the action for damages effectively violates the City’s immunity from
suit since respondent had not yet obtained the consent of the City Government of Bacolod to be
included in the claim for damages. They also argue that the other petitioners, the City Mayor and
other officials impleaded, are similarly immune from suit since the acts they performed were within
their lawful duty and functions. Moreover, petitioners maintain that they were merely performing
governmental or sovereign acts and exercised their legal rights and duties to implement the
provisions of the City Ordinance. Finally, petitioners contend that the assailed Decision contained
inconsistencies such that the CA declared mandamus to be an inappropriate remedy, yet allowed the
case for damages to prosper.

In its Comment, respondent Phuture argues that the grounds raised by petitioners should not be
considered since these were only invoked for the first time on appeal. Aside from this, respondent
asserts that the case for damages should proceed since petitioners allegedly caused the illegal closure
of its bingo outlet without proper notice and hearing and with obvious discrimination.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have given their consent to be sued. (NO)

2. Whether petitioners can be made liable to pay respondent damages. (NO)

RULING:
1. Petitioners have not given their consent to be sued

The principle of immunity from suit is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which states that “the State cannot be sued without its consent.” The purpose behind
this principle is to prevent the loss of governmental efficiency as a result of the time and energy it
would require to defend itself against lawsuits. The State and its political subdivisions are open to suit
only when they consent to it.

Consent may be express or implied, such as when the government exercises its proprietary functions,
or where such is embodied in a general or special law.

In the present case, respondent sued petitioners for the latter’s refusal to issue a mayor’s permit for
bingo operations and for closing its business on account of the lack of such permit. However, while
the authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is granted by the Local
Government Code (LGC), which also vests local government units with corporate powers, one of
which is the power to sue and be sued, this Court has held that the power to issue or grant licenses
and business permits is not an exercise of the government’s proprietary function. Instead, it is in an
exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a governmental act.

No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can thus be implied from the mere conferment and
exercise of the power to issue business permits and licences.

Accordingly, there is merit in petitioners’ argument that they cannot be sued by respondent since the
City’s consent had not been secured for this purpose. This is notwithstanding petitioners’ failure to
raise this exculpatory defense at the first instance before the trial court or even before the appellate
court.

As this Court has repeatedly held, waiver of immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty,
will not be lightly inferred. Moreover, it deserves mentioning that the City of Bacolod as a
government agency or instrumentality cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents.

Estoppel does not also lie against the government or any of its agencies arising from unauthorized or
illegal acts of public officers.

Hence, the SC cannot hold petitioners estopped from invoking their immunity from suit on account of
having raised it only for the first time on appeal.

2. Petitioners are not liable for damages

Based on the observations made by the trial court, it appears that respondent had no clear and
unmistakable legal right to operate its bingo operations at the onset. Respondent failed to establish
that it had duly applied for the proper permit for bingo operations with the Office of the Mayor and,
instead, merely relied on the questionable claim stub to support its claim. The trial court also found
that the application form submitted by respondent pertained to a renewal of respondent’s business
for “Professional Services, Band/Entertainment Services” located at “RH Bldg., 26th Lacson St.” and
not at SM Bacolod. These factual findings by the trial court belie respondent’s claim that it had the
right to operate its bingo operations at SM Bacolod.

Certainly, respondent’s claim that it had applied for a license for bingo operations is questionable
since, as it had admitted in its Petition for Mandamus and Damages, the primary purpose in its AOI
was only amended to reflect bingo operations on February 14, 2007 or more than a month after it
had supposedly applied for a license for bingo operations with the Office of the Mayor. It is settled
that a judicial admission is binding on the person who makes it, and absent any showing that it was
made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset such admission. This
admission clearly casts doubt on respondent’s so-called right to operate its business of bingo
operations.

Petitioners, in ordering the closure of respondent’s bingo operations, were exercising their duty to
implement laws and ordinances which include the local government’s authority to issue licenses and
permits for business operations in the city. This authority is granted to them as a delegated exercise
of the police power of the State. It must be emphasized that the nature of bingo operations is a form
of gambling; thus, its operation is a mere privilege which could not only be regulated, but may also
very well be revoked or closed down when public interests so require.

In this jurisdiction, the SC adheres to the principle that injury alone does not give respondent the right
to recover damages, but it must also have a right of action for the legal wrong inflicted by petitioners.
In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria
that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.

Considering that respondent had no legal right to operate the bingo operations at the outset, then it
is not entitled to the damages which it is demanding from petitioners.
WHAT IS A SUIT AGAINST A STATE?

Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate
Court, respondents-appellants.
March 12, 1987
Yap, J:

Facts:
Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the
rest of the property reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the
decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for
more than 20 years under claim of ownership.
The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of
presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter,
the case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow
them to present their evidence.
Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be
sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Held:
No
Ratio:
A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be
sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted.
The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the
government is not being divested of any of its properties.

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. vs LICHAUCO

G.R. No. 142362 (2006)
Tinga, J.
Immunity from Suit

The doctrine of the state’s immunity from suit will not apply if the government official
invoking it is being sued in a personal capacity and if the decision will not result to any
pecuniary liability against the State.
FACTS:

In 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of

private telecommunications carriers and the DOTC relative to the launching, ownership,
operation and management of a Philippine satellite by a Filipino-owned or controlled private
consortium or corporation. Pursuant to the MOU, the consortium formed a corporation and
adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI).

In 1996, PASI requested the DOTC for official government confirmation of the assignment of
Philippine orbital slots 161 E (E is short for East Longitude) and 153 E to PASI for its AGILA
satellites. DOTC Secretary Lagdameo confirmed the assignment. PASI then undertook
preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites.

However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly

“embarked on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman (PASI’s President and
Chief Executive Officer) and sabotage the business of PASI.”

• In a meeting with the members of the PASI BOD, she uttered disparaging and
defamatory comments against de Guzman.
• De Guzman informed Jesli Lapuz (President of Landbank) that PASI will apply for a
loan, Lapuz then wrote Lichauco for confirmation. She falsely asserted that only orbital
slot 161 E was assigned to plaintiff, orbital slot 153 E was not.
• She made defamatory remarks against plaintiffs during a telecommunications forum
held in the presence of public officials and business executives.
• She said that plaintiff corporation will never pay its contractors.
• Coup de’ grace: she offered and awarded orbital slot 153 E to other parties despite the
prior assignment to PASI of the said slot.

RTC:
In 1998 a civil complaint (Injunction of the award, declaration of nullity of award, and
damages) was filed against Lichauco and the “Unknown Awardee” who was to be the recipient
of orbital slot 153E.

Lichauco prayed for the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds:

• The suit is a suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent;
• The complaint stated no cause of action;
• The petitioners had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to seek
recourse with the Office of the President.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The allegations in the complaint regarding the ultimate
facts sufficiently presented an ultra vires act of Lichauco, and that she was being sued in her
personal capacity.
COURT OF APPEALS:
The CA sustained the contention that the complaint is a suit against the State:
The notice of offer signed by herein petitioner allegedly tainted with bad faith was done in the
exercise of and in pursuance of an official duty. Since the petitioner is directly under and
answerable to the DOTC Secretary, we can conclude that her official acts such as the said
“notice of offer” was with the blessing and prior approval of the DOTC Secretary himself.
Being an official act, it is also protected by the presumption that the same was performed in
good faith and in the regular performance of official duty.

ISSUES:

Whether or not USEC Lichauco is immune from suit?

RULING:

No.

Sometimes, it is obvious that a suit is one against the State. The suit is directly initiated
against the Republic of the Philippines, any foreign government, or an unincorporated
government agency.

The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the unknown awardee. Lichauco
was identified in the complaint as “acting Secretary of the DOTC”.

General rule:
A suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the
government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial
liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has
not been formally impleaded.

Exception:
(1) If the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit;
(2) If the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in
the performance of his/her duties.

The Court of Appeal’s rationale is pure sophistry and must be rejected outright. The
presumption of regular performance of duty is disputable.

On the prayer for injunction of the award and declaration of nullity of the award:
The defense of state immunity from suit do not apply, these causes of action do not seek to
impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state
action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice
of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that
petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would
have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself,
an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State.

On the prayer for Damages:

The complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered several disparaging and defamatory remarks
against petitioners and Land Bank President.

The rule is that if the judgment against government officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the
state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. The rationale for this ruling is that
the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.”

If the complaints are proven, they would establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not
shielded by the doctrine of state immunity from suit. To establish such assertions as facts, a
full-blown trial on the merits would be necessary.

Petition is granted. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to try and decide the case on the
merits with deliberate dispatch.

OTHER NOTES:

The case was decided by the Court of appeals in 1998, the case was revived and elevated to
the Supreme Court in 2005 or seven years later. By then, Lichauco is one of the leading critics
of GMA especially in the issue of the credibility of the 2004 election. This case was seen as a
political move to harass Lichauco.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE
GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
136 SCRA 487
G.R. No. L-35645
May 22, 1985

FACTS:
Petitioner invited the submission of bids for repair of its wharves and shoreline in the Subic Bay Area.
Eligion and Co. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Said company was requested by
telegram to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company, and from which it
complied.

Later, the United States, through its agents, informed said company that it was not qualified to
receive an award at the project for the poorly completed projects it awarded to third parties. The
company sued petitioner for specific performance and if no longer possible, for damages. It also asked
for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with
others.

The United States entered a special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of the defendants, the subject
matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of the
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given its consent to this suit or
any other suit for the cause of action asserted in the complaint.

US filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the writ. The trial court denied the motion and issued a
writ.

ISSUE:
Whether the US may be sued?

HELD:
No. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
are constantly developing and evolving. In addition, because the activities of states have multiplied, it
has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the
United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-
Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can be thus
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when the contract relates to the exercise of
its sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, undisputed a function of the government
of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case, the plaintiffs
leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials.
The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases
had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.
 Sayson v. Singson,G.R. No. L-30044, 19 December 1973
Second Division

[FERNANDO, J.]

FACTS: Petitioner Sayson was the Highway Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways who found
overpricing in the procurement of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. Singson as sole
proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, filed a complaint in the lower court against the Auditor claiming
for the payment of the balance, amounting to P8,706, which was withheld due to alleged overpricing.
The lower court adjudged Singson as entitled to collect the balance. Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Is the lower court correct in taking cognizance of the case filed by Singson for contractual
money claims against the government?

HELD: NO.
Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for
payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with
the consent of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General
Auditing Office, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under
which money claim against the government may be filed.

It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State,
however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be
exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal
would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had
there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower
court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious
then that it does not have the imprint of validity.

Republic v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-36084, 31 August 1977

Second Division

[FERNANDO, Acting C.J.]

FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of
respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known
and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit
without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money
claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball
Freight Lines, Inc.

ISSUE: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?
HELD: NO.
The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any
agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was
misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and
defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of
contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective
though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice
Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had
no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

TORTS COMMITTED BY SPECIAL AGENTS

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.

G.R. NO. L-11154

MARCH 21, 1916

FACTS:
Merritt, while riding his motorcycle, was hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine General
Hospital. A driver employed by the hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to sue the Philippine
government, Act No. 2457 was enacted by the Philippine Legislature authorizing Merritt to sue the
Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear
in said suit. A suit was then filed before the CFI of Manila, which fixed the responsibility for the
collision solely on the ambulance driver and determined the amount of damages to be awarded to
Merritt. Both parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and
defendant in rendering the amount against the government.

ISSUE:
WON defendant, Government of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit as well as conceded
its liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act No. 2457.

HELD:
NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to the plaintiff, create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and
submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

The Government of the Philippines Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. The
special agent acts in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions
which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to
the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. The chauffeur of
the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

INCORPORATED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL. VS. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 171182 | August 23, 2012 | Justice Bersamin
Political and International Law | Constitutional Law | State Immunity

All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of
such funds in any banking institution, constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which
should always be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing
by the COA. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s
writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it
had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

FACTS:
UP failed to pay in a contract it entered with Stern Builders Corporation. The RTC ruled in favour of
Stern Builders Corporation. Consequently, the RTC authorized eventually the release of the garnished
funds of the UP directing DBP to release the funds. While UP brought a petition for certiorari in the CA
to challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the order averring that the UP funds, being
government funds and properties, could not be seized by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment.

ISSUE:
Whether UP funds are subject to garnishment.

RULING:
NO. The UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of
promoting quality and accessible education.

Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a “trust fund” as a fund that officially comes in the possession of
an agency of the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is
received for the fulfillment of some obligation. A trust fund may be utilized only for the “specific
purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.” The funds of the UP are government
funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property
ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the
funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or
garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the
State did not necessarily mean its liability. A marked distinction exists between suability of the State
and its liability.

As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should
first be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The CA and the RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the trust funds of
the Government and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes
for which the trusts were created or for which the funds were received except upon express
authorization by Congress or by the head of a government agency in control of the funds, and subject
to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations.Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required
before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual damages (including attorney’s
fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the
“appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

BUISAN v. COA
Madag Buisan, et al. v. Commission of Audit and Department of Public Works and Highways
G.R. No. 212376
January 31, 2017

FACTS:

In 1989, the DPWH undertook the construction of the Liguasan Cut-off Channel (Project) in Tunggol,
Pagalungan, Maguindanao, to minimize the perennial problem of flooding in the area. In April 2001,
the DPWH received various claims from land owners for damages allegedly caused to their properties,
crops and improvements by the premature opening of the Project. Hence, the Regional Director (RD),
DPWH Regional Office (R.O.) No. XII, Cotabato City, investigated the claims. The DPWH R.O. No. XII
and the Technical Working Group (TWG) recommended in 2004 to pay just compensation to the
claimants. The TWG, however, noted that since the event occurred in 1989, it could not account
physically the actual quantity of the damaged crops and properties. In 2006, an ad hoc committee
was created to determine the legality and propriety of the claims. However, due to the considerable
lapse of time and the insufficiency of evidence, no final resolution was made by the DPWH. The claims
were forwarded to the RD of the DPWH R.O. No. XII to be returned to the claimants, as such are
considered to be under the jurisdiction of the COA pursuant to Rule VIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the COA.
On April 14, 2010, the petitioners, represented by Mayor Bai Annie C. Montawal (Montawal), filed a
petition with the COA, praying that the DPWH be ordered to• pay the petitioners the sum of P122,
051,850.00 as compensation for their damaged crops, properties and improvements. On September
16, 2010, Buisan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition alleging that Montawal was not authorized to
represent them. In fact, Buisan and the other claimants filed a separate petition with the COA based
on that same money claim.
In its Answer, the DPWH averred that the petitioners failed to establish that they are the owners of
crops and properties allegedly damaged, and that the damage was caused by the construction of the
Project. Moreover, the DPWH asserted that the petitioners' cause of action had already prescribed.
The COA denied the money claims of the petitioners. The COA held that for the petitioners' failure to
file their money claims within a reasonable time, they are deemed to have committed laches.
Furthermore, the petitioners' cause of action had already prescribed in view of Article 1146 of the
Civil Code. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the COA for
lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM
WAS BARRED BY LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court denies the petition.

ART. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights
of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict.
Undeniably, the petitioners' money claims which were only filed with the DPWH in 2004 or even in
2001 had already prescribed. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "it will be
the height of injustice for respondent DPWH to be confronted with stale claims, where verification on
the plausibility of the allegations remains difficult, either because the condition of the alleged
inundation of crops has changed, or the physical impossibility of accounting for the lost and damaged
crops due to the considerable lapse of time.
On the other hand, "laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier.
In the case at bar, laches has set in as the elements24 thereof are present. Firstly, the premature
opening by the DPWH of the Project allegedly causing flash floods, and damaging the petitioners'
properties took place in 1989 or even in 1992. Secondly, the petitioners took 15 years to assert their
rights when they formally filed a complaint in 2004 against the DPWH. Thirdly, as the petitioners
failed to file a formal suit for their claims before the COA, there is an apparent lack of notice that
would give the DPWH the opportunity to defend itself.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, 25 as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, 26
which were the applicable laws at the time the cause of action arose, the COA has primary jurisdiction
over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, Rule II, Section 1
(b) of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA27 specifically enumerated those matters falling
under COA's exclusive jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or owing to any
government agency." Rule VIII, Section l (a) further provides that COA shall have original jurisdiction
over money claims against the Government, among others. Therefore, the petitioners' money claims
have prescribed and are barred by laches for their failure to timely file the petition.

STATE ITESELF FILES A COMPLAINT

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Ponente: LEONEN, J.
Decision Date: 2016-10-05
GR Number: G.R. No. 195295
Summary:
A complaint has been filed by PCGG against the Bong Bong and Imelda Marcos for recovery of several
properties allegedly ill-gotten by the former President, Ferdinand Marcos. However, one property was
not included in the complaint prompting the respondent to file a motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens on such property. PCGG filed several amendments, until the fourth amended complaint. The
said amended complaint included the property sought to be released through the motion.
Sandiganbayan denied admission of the said amended complaint. PCGG assails the order of the
Sandiganbayan in denying admission of its fourth amended complaint. The SC ruled that
Sandiganbayan should have been more lenient in application of rules.

Doctrine:
1) Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of
Former President Marcos and his family, associates, dummies, agents, and nominees, specifically
states that the technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to the civil cases
filed under it. Thus, this Court has emphasized this provision and pointed out that strict adherence to
technical rules will hamper the efforts of the Presidential Commission on Good Government:

We note that the law governing the issues raised in this petition calls for the setting aside of technical
rules when necessary to achieve the purposes behind the PCGG's creation.

It is to be reiterated that paragraph 2 of Section 3, of Executive Order No. 14 reads:

"The technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to the civil cases filed
hereunder."

Section 7 thereof also provides:

"SECTION 7. The provisions of this Executive Order shall prevail over any and all laws, or parts thereof,
as regards the investigation, prosecution, and trial of cases for violations of laws involving the
acquisition and accumulation of ill-gotten wealth as mentioned in Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2."

2) RULE13; SEC. 14. Notice of Lis Pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of
real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province hi which the property is situated a notice
of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the
time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected
thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its
pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of Lis Pendens hereinabove mentioned may he cancelled only upon order of the court,
after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Facts:
Respondents Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr. (Marcos, Jr.), Maria Imelda R. Marcos (Imee), and
Irene Marcos Araneta (Irene) appear to be the registered owners of a parcel of land located in the
Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna (Cabuyao property) and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-85026.

The petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, filed before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting, and damages against Former President Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, their children, Marcos,
Jr., Imee, and Irene, and their sons-in-law, Tomas Manotoc and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III.

Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion praying for the cancellation of the notice of Lis Pendens and pointing out
that the Cabuyao property was not specifically mentioned in the original and amended Complaints.

Therafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint. The Fourth
Amended Complaint was substantially identical to the admitted Complaint, but with the amended
annex List of Assets and Other Properties of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and Immediate
Family. The list specifically mentioned the Cabuyao property as one among the assets of the
Marcoses.

The Sandiganbayan did not admit the Fourth Amended Complaint and ordered the cancellation of
the annotation of Lis Pendens. It held that because the admitted (original)Complaint did not
specifically mention the Cabuyao property, the Cabuyao property was not involved in the Civil Case;
therefore, petitioner has over the property no actionable claim that needs to be protected via a
notice ofLis Pendens.

Petitioner filed a review before the SC seeking reversal of the order of the Sandiganbayan.

Issues Ratio:
Whether or not, the Fourth Amended Complaint should have been admitted and notice of lis pendens
of the question property should have been granted.

The Sandiganbayan should have admitted the fourth amended complaint. According to the SC,
Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of
Former President Marcos and his family, associates, dummies, agents, and nominees, specifically
states that the technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to the civil cases
filed under it. Thus, the Court has emphasized this provision and pointed out that strict adherence to
technical rules will hamper the efforts of the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

In other words, Sandiganbayan should have relaxed the rules in admitting the amended complaint.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated January 11, 2010
and December 1, 2010, insofar as they direct the cancellation of the notice of Lis Pendens, are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds of Cabuyao, Laguna is ORDERED to re-annotate the
notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. T-85026.
 Froilan vs. Pan Oriental
G.R. No. L-11897
October 31, 1964
Plaintiff-Appellee FERNANDO A. FROILAN
Defendant-appellant PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING COMPANY
Intervenors-appellees REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and COMPANIA MARITIMA

Facts:
On March 7, 1947, Fernando A. Froilan purchased from the Shipping Administration a boat
described as MV/FS 197 for the sum of P200,000.00, with a down payment of P50,000,00. To
secure payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price, a mortgage was constituted on
the vessel in favor of the Shipping Administration in a contractduly approved by the President of the
Philippines.For various reasons, among them is the non-payment of installments, Shipping
Administration cancelled its contract of sale with the plaintiff-appellee, took possession of the
vessel in question to defendant-appellant. The Republic of the Philippines, having been allowed to
intervene in the proceeding, also prayed for the possession of the vessel in order that the
chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed. Defendant Pan Oriental resisted said
intervention, claiming to have a better right to the possession of the vessel by reason of a valid and
subsisting contract in its favor, and of its right of retention, in view of the expenses it had incurred for
the repair of the said vessel. As counterclaim, defendant demanded of the intervenor to comply with
the latter's obligation to deliver the vessel pursuant to the provisions of the charter
contract.Subsequently, Compañia Maritima, as purchaser of the vessel from Froilan, was allowed to
intervene in the proceedings (in the lower court), said intervenor taking common cause with the
plaintiff Froilan.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground of alleged
lack of jurisdiction over the intervenor Republic of the Philippines?

Held: Neither Froilan nor the Pan Oriental holds a valid contract over the vessel. However,
since the intervenor Shipping Administration, representing the government practically ratified its
proposed contract with Froilan by receiving the full consideration of the sale to the latter, for which
reason the complaint in intervention was dismissed as to Froilan, and since Pan Oriental has no
capacity to question this actuation of the Shipping Administration because it had no valid
contract in its favor, the decision of the lower court adjudicating the vessel to FroiIan and its
successor Compañia Maritima, must be sustained
WHEN INEQUITABLE FOR GOVERNMENT TO CLAIM IMMUNITY

Santiago vs. Republic (Consti1)

Ildefonso Santiago, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alfredo T. Santiago, petitioner, vs. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Director, Bureau of Plant Industry, and
the Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, repondent.

December 19, 1978

Fernando, J:
Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms
that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot.
When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case pleading for
the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is
a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the government.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:

The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of
donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with
such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the
donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. The
Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case.

Amigable v. Cuenca (G.R. No. L-26400) Case Digest

February 29, 1972
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways
and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees

Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. She had a
transfer certificate title issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in
favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, 6,167 square meters of land was used for the
construction the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
On March 27, 1958, AMigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting the
payment for her lot. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General and was disallowed it in his
9thIndorsement dated December 9, 1958.
Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca in his capacity
as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of the portion of the lot used. In answer, the
defendants interposed the following defenses:
1. The action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the office of the Auditor
General
2. The right of action for the recovery of the any amount which might be due to Amigable had
already prescribed.
3. The action being a suit to the government, the claim for moral damages and other costs have no
valid basis since the government did not give its consent to be sued.
4. Since it was only the province of Cebu who had misappropriated the lot, Amigable has no cause
of action against the defendants.
Issue:
Can Amigable properly sue the government?
Ruling:
Yes. In its decision, the Court cited Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, which also involved a
claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu
City. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.

PRINCIPLE OF PAR IN PAREM NON HABET IMPERIUM

HOLY SEE VS. ROSARIO

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises,
Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located
in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with
two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as
to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating
the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila
for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An
opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that
petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question”
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of
sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal
Nuncio.

ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a
private entity

RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy
See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the
Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner
has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed
that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was
made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place
of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is
recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose
off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it
for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot,
and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its
complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both
Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign
sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its
claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the
Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young,
Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of
Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the
claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against
petitioner is DISMISSED.

US vs. Guinto
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO
T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 76607
 FEBRUARY 26, 1990

FACTS:

In the first case, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in
the base.

In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against private petitioners for
his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.

In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was
arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S.
Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He then filed a complaint
for damages against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was
removed.

In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the private
petitioners, for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on
them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the
denial of its motions by the respondent judges.

ISSUE:

WON the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable thereby making the State liable.

HELD:

NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages
cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence, which have been carefully examined.

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. In addition, because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them – between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only
to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States,
the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case, the
projects are an integral part of the naval base, which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity,
as in the cases at bar. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that
no such waiver may be implied. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts.

The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which holds the government liable if it
acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the
officers are designated “special agents,” the United States government should be liable for their torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a misconception that the
two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can,
that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under
this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so
denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the
relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government
and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON

G.R. No. 154705
June 26, 2003
act jure imperii, diplomatic mission, International Law, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, Sovereign
Immunity From Suit, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
OCTOBER 6, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James
Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The agreement stated that respondent shall, for
a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building
and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments
covered by the agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters, and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will
renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice
from the date of expiry.

Petitioners claim that prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, they informed respondent
that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration,
who allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the
standards set in the Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement.
Petitioners claim that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the
agreement.

On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful.

Hence, respondent filed a complaint in the (RTC) of Makati. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit
and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity.

In turn, respondent filed an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has
expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the
Maintenance Agreement:

Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of
the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines.

Respondents Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.

The trial court denied herein petitioners Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration subsequently filed.

The trial courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss was brought up to the CA in a petition for certiorari
and prohibition alleging that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the Republic of
Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of
Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived
their immunity from suit.

The CA rendered its assailed decision denying the petition for lack of merit. It denied herein
petitioners MR.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision that petitioners have waived their
immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance
Agreement.

RULING:

The petition is impressed with merit.

International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity, independence, and
equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution.

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, the practical
justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States,
as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of
nations.

The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The
increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected
with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign
immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized
only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis.

In United States v. Ruiz, for instance, we held that the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a
wharf at a United States Naval Station is an act jure imperii. On the other hand, we considered as an
act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center catering to American servicemen and
the general public at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, as well as the bidding for the operation
of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City.

Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party
cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis.
Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a
business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this
case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by
its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii.

Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the
agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the
Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision
contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such
provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or
otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be
deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign
immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to
dismiss it.

Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given
explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case.

Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function. On the
other hand, he argues that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the diplomatic mission,
such as the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State.

We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii.
A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State
may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of
the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner
Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with
respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air con units, generator sets, electrical facilities,
water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the
Indonesian ambassador.

The Solicitor General submits that, the Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have
waived its immunity from suit. As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, the
Solicitor General states that it was not a waiver of their immunity from suit but a mere stipulation
that in the event they do waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal
action arising out of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be the agreed venue
thereof.

On the matter of whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
may be sued herein in their private capacities, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides:

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He
shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:

(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State,
unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving State outside his official functions.

The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in terminating the
Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned provision.

The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision
clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or
commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.

The petition was GRANTED.

Case Digest- CNMEG vs. Hon. Santamaria

G.R. No. 185572
February 7, 2012
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, et al., Respondents

Facts

On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG),
represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the
conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the
Northrail Project).

On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of
the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China
agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail
Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine
government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year
grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.

On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a
letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s designation as
the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.

On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of
Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the
Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.

On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan
Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD
400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the construction of Phase I of
the Northrail Project.

On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with
Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying
the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against
CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management,
the National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued an Order dated 17
March 2006 setting the case for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs. On 29 March 2006,
CNMEG filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br. 145 could rule
thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the Chinese government, making it immune
from suit, and (b) the subject matter, as the Northrail Project was a product of an executive
agreement.

On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to Dismiss and
setting the case for summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should
be issued. CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an
Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.

In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the appellate court dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated 5 December 2008.

Issue

Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.

Ruling

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the
act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.

It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility Study
was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign functions by the
Chinese government but was plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to securing
this commercial enterprise.

The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a
government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did
not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign functions.
To imply otherwise would result in an absurd situation, in which all Chinese corporations owned by
the state would be automatically considered as performing governmental activities, even if they are
clearly engaged in commercial or proprietary pursuits.

Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not
automatically vest it with immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philippine National Railways,
in which this Court held that “immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized.”

In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it
contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not
automatically grant it immunity, just as the term “implementing agency” has no precise definition for
purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a
government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued
under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled
corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued under
Section 36 of the Corporation Code.

An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an implicit waiver of

immunity from suit.

In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by
implication of state immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in a
foreign country is construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no similar
law in the Philippines, there is a reason to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et.al. v. SCOTT H. SWIFT, et.al.

G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014
Villarama, J.

DOCTRINE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – If the judgement against such officials will require the state itself to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded.

FACTS

In January 2013, the USS Guardian ran aground the South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reef in Palawan.
Thereafter, the US Navy-led salvage team proceeded in salvaging the ship around the reef. In April
2013, the Petitioners filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan before the Supreme Court.
They impleaded Respondent Scott Swift, who was the 7th US Fleet Commander, and some others in
the Petition.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging, and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage in different provinces surrounded by the Sulu
Sea, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also
sought a directive for the institution of civil, criminal and administrative suits for acts committed in
violation of environmental laws in connection with the grounding incident. Ultimately, they wanted
particular provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) be declared unconstitutional.

On the other hand, the Respondents asserted that the issuance of a Writ of Kalikisan has become fait
accompli because the salvaging operations on the USS Guardian has been completed. Further, the
petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the US Respondents.

RULING

NO. The Supreme Court held that while the doctrine of state immunity prohibits only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgement against
such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded.

In the present case, the US Respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of
the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian. The grounding incident took
place while they were performing official military duties. Considering the satisfaction of a judgement
against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriations of funds by the US Government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Therefore, the principle of state immunity bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the US Respondents.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Petition is DENIED.

STATE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

WHO vs Aquino Case Digest

Diplomatic Immunity, Political Question, Suits against International Agencies
Facts:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director
of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry from
duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain
large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of
the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal
effects of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to
immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic
missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The
Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent
judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent
judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of
the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked
for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar,
it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under
his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to
embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131,
November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)
SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR no. 125865
January 28, 2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before
the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue
of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody
of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the
DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB
in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion
for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion
for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation
was held before the criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect
in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject
to the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could
not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of
a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this
case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

SUITABILITY VS. LIABILITY

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL. VS. HON. AGUSTIN S. DIZON, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 171182 | August 23, 2012 | Justice Bersamin
Political and International Law | Constitutional Law | State Immunity

All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of
such funds in any banking institution, constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which
should always be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing
by the COA. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s
writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it
had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.

FACTS:
UP failed to pay in a contract it entered with Stern Builders Corporation. The RTC ruled in favour of
Stern Builders Corporation. Consequently, the RTC authorized eventually the release of the garnished
funds of the UP directing DBP to release the funds. While UP brought a petition for certiorari in the CA
to challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the order averring that the UP funds, being
government funds and properties, could not be seized by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment.

ISSUE:
Whether UP funds are subject to garnishment.

RULING:
NO. The UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of
promoting quality and accessible education.

Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a “trust fund” as a fund that officially comes in the possession of
an agency of the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is
received for the fulfillment of some obligation. A trust fund may be utilized only for the “specific
purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.” The funds of the UP are government
funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property
ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the
funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or
garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the
State did not necessarily mean its liability. A marked distinction exists between suability of the State
and its liability.

As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should
first be made between suability and liability. “Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The CA and the RTC thereby unjustifiably ignored the legal restriction imposed on the trust funds of
the Government and its agencies and instrumentalities to be used exclusively to fulfill the purposes
for which the trusts were created or for which the funds were received except upon express
authorization by Congress or by the head of a government agency in control of the funds, and subject
to pertinent budgetary laws, rules and regulations.Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required
before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual damages (including attorney’s
fees) would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the
“appropriations earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”