120 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 29/No.

2/2007

segregation is minor. Since GCs are included in the larger category of planned developments, the
results relate to GCs only by association.
Also in California, Le Goix (2003, 2005b) studies 219 GCs in the Los Angeles region, based
on Census 2000 data (Summary Files 1 and 3). His research shows that: first, the combined
effects of property values and socio-economic structure create more segregation between gated
developments’ block groups and abutting areas than in nongated neighborhoods; second, GCs
are twice as likely to be separated by age characteristics as other neighborhoods; third, findings
surprisingly show that GCs are less likely to be segregated by race or ethnicity than other neigh-
borhoods at a local scale. This is explained by developers’ strategies: concerned that diversity
may deter potential buyers, they intentionally locate GCs within neighborhoods that are already
ethnically homogeneous, which serve as buffer zones. Le Goix concludes that GCs constitute
more homogeneous and differentiated territories, which lead to an increase in segregation at the
local scale based on age and economic characteristics of the residents.
Although the empirical evidence collected so far is inconclusive, it seems that GCs are mostly
homogeneous enclaves, which will continue to contribute to the permanent fragmentation of urban
space. Therefore, based on this aspect of considering GCs from the point of view of spatialized
sociology of inequality, we derive the following hypotheses: H3: GCs have a detrimental impact
on the property values in the nearby nongated neighborhoods; H4: GCs proliferate equally in
metropolitan areas with higher crime rates and with lower crime rates; H5: GCs are significantly
more homogeneous places compared to the surrounding neighborhoods.

Meaning, Construction, and Control

The third aspect of incorporating space into the analysis of inequality is to study the question:
who controls the natural and built environments? The political economy of place approach (Logan
& Molotch, 1987) discusses questions of power and control most successfully, therefore we draw
on it here.

Political Economy of Place Approach

The political economy of place focuses on the underlying current of urban economic growth,
achieved through the interplay of interests and institutions. The urban economy in the United
States is based on the principles of capital accumulation and profit (Harvey, 1973). An array of
urban scholars after Harvey have shown and explained the extreme commodification of place
in American cities (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1988; Fainstein, Gordon, & Harloe, 1992; Logan &
Swanstrom, 1990).
As a relevant framework for examining the rapid expansion of GCs, Logan and Molotch (1987)
explicate the role of the “growth coalitions” in promoting economic growth. The reasons for the
broad participation in the coalitions not only by the rentiers (the real estate developers) but also by
politicians, the local media, and other related institutions are predominantly fiscal. American cities
are in charge of their own budgets, and they have to navigate between collecting taxes and providing
services (Peterson, 1981). They are predominantly interested in economic growth and bringing
in investments, because that increases the value of the local property base. Therefore, American
cities have long made the choice in favor of economic growth or of “municipal mercantilism” as
Fainstein and Fainstein (1988) succinctly term the process.
Groups living in cities have different stakes in economic growth, and have different interests.
Some groups contest the growth at various times, and those who possess more resources are quite
successful in preserving their neighborhoods from investors. The rentiers in the city influence