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MA Philosophy
Phenomenology
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as
sweet?” is a lapidary line from William’s Shakepspeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Juliet, who
is a member of the house of Capulet, utters these words to her lover, Romeo, who was
from the Capulet’s rival house, Montague. The line suggests that names of objects,
persons and events do not affect what they really are. Juliet does not mind the name of
the house where Romeo belongs to and in doing so, goes against the rule that they are
prohibited to love each other. I am reminded of the doctrine of Nominalism, one
interpretation of which is that it espouses that universal or general ideas are mere
names without any corresponding reality and that only particular objects exist.
Apparently, for Juliet and even for Romeo, names are only names, what is important is
their genuine love for one another. The lovers do not mind that they are from opposing
worlds, what is important is that they have each other.
Can Nominalism answer what’s in a name? It only answers what’s not in a name.
In Nominalism, names can only be names without corresponding to reality. The search
goes on. Paul Ricoeur might offer another kind of discourse. In Ricoeur’s work
Interpretation Theory he says, “In the Cratylus, Plato had already shown that the
problem of the "truth" of isolated words or names must remain undecided because
naming does not exhaust the power or the function of speaking.” (Ricoeur, 1976).
Ricoeur suggests that there is more to names than what they represent. Names need
something for them to be intelligible. Grammatically speaking, names are nouns. Nouns
in themselves cannot provide a context. Romeo and Juliet are names of persons, but it
does not give us any idea who they are. If we formulate it by adding a verb, as in the
case of the sentence: Romeo and Juliet love each other. We are able to at least have a
clue of who Romeo and Juliet are, at least we now know that they are lovers. Ricoeur
puts it this way, “The logos of language requires at least a name and a verb, and it is
the intertwining of these two words which constitutes the first unit of language and
thought. Even this unit only raises a claim to truth; the question must still be decided in
each instance.” (Ricoeur, 1976). Names have meanings in themselves, for if we will go
against pure nominalism, names have the capacity to represent things in the world.
However, a name in itself cannot be a basis of meaningful discourse. As Paul Ricoeur
notes, “A noun has a meaning and a verb has, in addition to its meaning, an indication
of time. only their conjunction brings forth a predicative link,.which can be called logos,
discourse.” (Ricoeur, 1976) In discourse we are able to communicate through linguistic
expressions.
The question of “What is in a name?” is a concern of language and interpretation.
The query further leads us to the one who is representing, the one who is speaking. The
concern lies in the one representing and in the one speaking, that is the human subject.
How does meaningful discourse come to the subject? Does he always need to speak
and to interact with others using meaningful linguistic expressions? Does the search for
truth and meaning need always to be in the context of dialogue?