FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Vessel: Malaysian-registered cargo ship, TAI HUAN, No. 919422; built in 1963; 1,975 gross
tons; 1080 by 68 by 30.4 feet
Accident Type: Fire
Location: North Atlantic Ocean near Port of Nouadhibou, Mauritania, Latitude 20°54'00.5"N,
Longitude 17°02'33.1"W
Date and Time: February 13, 2006, at
14.36
Owner: International Shipping Co.,
Ltd.
Damage: Estimate of $2500,953
Injuries: No injuries
Complement: 35 crew members

Situation
At around 14:36 on February 13, 2006, as the cargo ship TAI HUAN, with a master and thirty
four other crew members on board, was waiting to begin maneuvering procedure , a fire broke out in
engine room.
Initial Action

All the engine crew members were able to get out of the engine room with no injuries without
knowing why the fire started. Second officer initially detected the fire via the fire detection panel’s
visual and audible alarms located on the navigation bridge . The Master arrived shortly thereafter to
the bridge upon hearing the alarms and ordered the Second officer to sound the general alarm. After
that he made an announcement on the public address calling the crew to their fire stations. Efforts
were made to enter the machinery spaces to determine the location of the fire but they were
unsuccessful due to the presence of heavy smoke. Flames were seen on the starboard side of the
engine room. The main engine stopped resulting in a blackout as electrical power was being supplied
by the shaft generator.
Tactical Fire Fighting Procedures

At 14.:41 the general alarm by order of The Master has been given. At 14:56 the whole crew all
wearing life jackets gathered at their designated muster stations from both sides of the ship, three in total,
one on the port side, the other on the starboard side, and the third on the stern port side. At 14:59 each
crew member began to be counted by each leader of the muster stations separately. At 15: 05 The Master
receives a report from each muster station leader that each crew member is present at the muster station
and no one is missing. At 15:07 , all of the crew were accounted for. At 15:10 all the engine room
openings were closed on the Master's order and at the 15: 12 the Master instructed the Chief and Second
Engineers to activate the halon fixed fire-fighting system, which initially appeared to suppress the fire.
At 16:08 the fire appeared to be largely extinguished. At 16:13 , the master ordered the fire fighting
team , consisting of four people and one team leader to go and check the condition and situation of the
fire , and the second team consisting of four people and a team leader as well being in stand by.
At 16:19 the first fire fighting team reported that it was prepared with fire protection equipment,
fire extinguishing hoses and oxygen masks all reporting a pressure of 290 bars in the each cylinders ,
while the second team was to prepare as well and wait until the master's order. At 16:25 The master
ordered the chief engineer and the second engineer to close the halon fixed fire-fighting system , at 16:30
a quantity of 50 kg of halon was reported as consumed and released. At 16:45 The doors of the engine
room are carefully opened, noticing that the fire was no longer of such an intense nature being almost
extinguished, however, heavy smoke continues to appear and the first team descended one by one into the
engine room. At 17:35 the fire team reports to the team leader that most of the remaining fire has been
extinguished by them and that they have not been able to find the cause of the fire. At 17:50 the first team
reported to the team leader and he reported to the master that there was still one intensive fire left in the
steering room. At 17:52 The Master communicates to the second team through the team leader to come in
the aid of the first team with CO2 extinguishers of 9kg each. At 17:55 the second team is ready and enters
the engine room coming to the aid of the first , all reporting a pressure of 270 bar in the cylinders, each .
At 18:25 the fire from the steering room was hardly extinguished by the two fire fighting teams. At 18:30
the entire fire was reported by team leaders to the master to have been extinguished consuming also 36 kg
of CO2. At 18:35 from the order of the team leader by the order of the master, the second team, remained
to check if the fire did not start again while the first team went outside, reporting a pressure remaining in
cylinders of 130 bars each. At 18:55 the leader of the second team reported to the master that the fire had
ceased, thus allowing the second team to go outside, also reporting in the cylinders a pressure of 170 bar
each.
Damage and Personal Injuries

The main switchboard which was as fitted during the building of the ship is located on a raised
platform at the aft end of the main engine. The switchboard was extensively damaged in the fire
although it was not possible to identify the cause of the fire. The vessel was almost completely burnt
out with the exception of the forecastle store. The vessel was partially flooded in the engine room
and in the cargo hold. No crew members were injured, each crew member who did not participate in
the firefighting waited at the muster station in front of the lifeboats prepared for a possible
abandonment of the ship.

Possible Causes of Fire

It is considered that due to poor cleaning in the engine room and due to a minimum temperature
to cause a flashpoint due to high temperature on used oils and rags , being also fed by air drawn in by
the chimney effect of the open funnel fire dampers.
Remedial Action Taken by the Company

The SMC (SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM) was issued on 09 April 2006 with validity until
19 April 2011 and is subject to an inspection and a verification between the second and third
anniversary of its issue date and to an annual verification by the Company through an internal audit.
The Designated Person (DP) for TAI HUAN, who is the link between the ship and the the company’s
Fleet Manager. The SMS is written in the Malay language which was the working language on
board.
Conclusions

Two fire dampers, one at the upper extremity of each funnel on the top level were left open when
the engine room was being closed down in preparation for the operation of the HALON fixed fire-
fighting system. This is thought to have contributed to the development of the fire in the early stages
of the event by allowing air to be drawn into the engine room.
Housekeeping issues resulting in oil drums, oily rags and other garbage in the engine room may
have contributed to the development of the fire based on the history of housekeeping issues during
inspections as well as evidence observed in areas of the engine room unaffected by fire during the
post fire inspection.