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    Chapter 2 Market Globalism

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    Arjay Flores

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    - Stege Paul Battersby and Joseph M. Siracus ~ Market Globalism INTRODUCTION: THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION rom its beginnings in the early 1990s, the Aeifling feld of global studies was domi, nated by acyounts focusing primarily on the evoniom cal. ing of globalization but ie equal en ‘ant 10_aVbid the trap of technological nod le Fedctionism. As Malcolm Waters enV, the increasingly symboli- Becoming. more, activated and-energatc Akt ye, deplete argeoning recet lic cratute, on omucial culturland political aspects. of, globalization, researchers, have Paid insufficient attention to the global ei ulation of-ideas and thei. impact on. the rapid extension ‘of social interactions and interdependencies across time and. space. Manfred 8 Steger Save for a few notable exceptions (Rupen, 2000; Sklair, 2002; Mittelman, 2004; Steger, 2008, 2008), globalization scholars have been surprisingly. reluctant to enter the ruisty realm of ideology. Bucking the trend, this chapter explores the ideological dimension of globalization with. particular, attention to its important discursive. features, Aer a. general overs view of the role: and funetion of political ‘ideologies, within an. overarching ‘global imaginary’, I suggest that the dominant ide. ology of our. time — market globalism — consists ofa set of fiye core claims that play crucial semantic and political roles. With regard to semantics, I, argue that these Claims absorb and reatrange bits and pieces of several established ideologies and inte. grate them, with new:concepts into a new global political belief system: whose: role Consists chiefly of preferving and enhancing asymmetrical power structures that benefit “particular social groups wedded to the ten. 8 of noo-liberalism (Steger, 2010). I end the chapter-with short discussion of how, during the years'of President George 2 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION ‘W, Bush's administration (2001-9) market slobalism was ‘toughened up’ into what I call “imperial globalism’ only to return its original economistic articulation in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (2008-9) and the ongoing European Debt Crisis. POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES AND THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY Following Michael Freeden's (1996, 2003) and Lyman Tower Sargent: (2009) suggestion ‘hat politcal belief systems serve as cognitive ‘maps that chart crucial dimensions of the politeal world, I define ‘ideology" as a system of widely shared ideas, patterned belies, uid ing corms and values, and ideals accepted as tnuth by some groups. Ideologies offer indi- viduals a more or less coherent picture of the Sword not only as itis, but also as it ought to be. In doing so, they help organize the zemen- ous complexity of human experience into fairly simple, but frequently distorted, imagés and slog that serve as guide and compass for social and political action. Each ideology is structured around core claims ‘ich set it pac from other ideologies and eadaw it with «8 specific ednceptual form or ‘morphology’. As Freeden (1996:'77) puts it, “Central to * ‘ny analysis of ideologies isthe proposition that they are charactetized by a morphology that displays core, adjacent, and’ perpen concepts.” “political is that its claims select, petvilege, and Come strict social matings related fo the excise of power in society, Ideolo 5 aiiences in’ stories whose Clences_in_stories arid narratives whose oisins puede, prose, ale cameo contra se cis als om "ais: 1d Hologie emis one oa “SBIR esr ceaeatonso nce Ae tctions by binding them toa pate ten fete addon: "The term ‘ideology was fit -oined by Aasoine Dehide Tos centuy. Tae Enightemnent tina sears ESabithapesitvistc scence ofan eae Inge empire! ol ofnancal dence map systems of thought. In the Napoleonic era, how ever, ideology’ aoqured the pejorative meaning of ‘falsehood? or ‘deliberate distortion’ that it ‘has retained in public discourse until our time (Steger, 2008). French philosopher Paul (1986) identified the historical efeaents and functions of ideology. Drawing on the insights of the Marxist tradition, he cbaract e fis distortion, that is, the production of contorted social reality. Most importantly, the process of distortion hides the contrast between things as they may be envisioned in theory and things as they play themselves out om the plane of mate- tial reality. Indeed, all ideologies assemble a picture ofthe world based on a peculiar mix- tare that both represents and distorts social processes. Yet, Ricoeur disagreed with Kari Mam's notion that distortion expos al there is to ideology. For the French philosopter, dis ‘orton was merely one af the three main func. tions of ideology representing the surface level of «phenomenon tht contains two more fsne- tions at prgresabsty ddepenbig! | Inspired by the Writings Mak Weber (Gerth and Mills, 1946) Magaheim (1936), Ricoeur identific the second {unetionl level oF ideology. Two main fac- tors ivere involved ere: the clint to legit. macy made'by the ruling anchorty, and the’ belief in the authority's legitimacy granted by its ‘subjects, Accepting large parts ‘of’ ‘Weber's explanation ‘of social action, Ricoeur highlighted idcology’s finiction of t Whe gap ‘Between beet ab lig "For Sainte Toa au Ao Ege sia capable’of tising bavi tet ‘class and bistorieal context t provide objective expla- nitions of the discrepancy between the popu. lar belief in the legitimacy of the ‘ruling class ‘and the authority's claim to the Fight t9 rule. Ricoeur’ 28! completed in his description the third fanetional level of ideo! fing on the writings of the American anthropologist Clifford Geerwz (1973), Whi emiphasized the symbolie'stri- turé of social action, Ricoeur claimed thet on theideepest level, ideology plays'a mediating or-integrative role, It provides society: with Fonchsnoy Hey Distovhire Tlegh mfg 3 Tukcrmfoy MARKET GLOBALISM 23 ‘Tigid “forms of ‘resis to anda wi getse OF their legitimacy, octamer eS Of haw ‘we'~ the aiembers of a particu: ‘pictues, Suggesting thal sabortinaic pots community ~ ft together how things ae cn cos gic Satinecte onsen he ean 8 ekpeciations we have of caer is apes a secs. pe uggs we toe fe siete ly tena Sate depts ecient The phitesopher Gramsei (1971), ioo, background Understanding is both normati imohasid iho ttegiave role of osen, He‘ noted: that: vera Obbitives: In ‘thet words, lke al eat 4Patas Social. piccesses, globalization contai Based.on. mental images that are seldom cubital tensa filed wits tange of consis Usually they are merely presuy ms, Claims " Poted in everyday reasoning and debe the ph it After all, it is chiefly Social imaginaries consist of a SoFmatig susston of whether pos ‘roe occa ERE const Psa tio OUBRE to be eotisidered a ‘good’ ora ‘bad’ ent marTatives, visual prototypes, netsphors, enomenod th has peviad nse sant concepnat tangy Danie tar De ae pattiooms aiden tic soees, aariaaae ee 1 te ie ial ‘ou about re auile the Sense.of enabling comn- "THD. practices and. deep-seated. comment atachnents. Though capable oF acnanne "collective fantasies -and speculative reflec. tions, they. should not be: dismissed ag Phantasms or mental fabrications Ta amy. previous work on. the: subjece (Steger, 2008), Thave suggested tha deer clic tanslate and arse ese ASIN and ticulate the large the world, 26 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION pre-reflexive This means that the’ grand ideologies of modernity that were désply_colored, by a valional_ feamenat of-community gave explicit political expiession to the inpplicit nigronat—iGaginary.’ Indeed, We ought to treat the national not as a separate ideology but asthe backgroiind to our communal exist ‘ence that emerged in the nothem hemisphere with the American and French Revolutions The national gave the modem social imagi- nary its distnet flavor inthe form of various factual and normative assumptions thet po ‘cal cominnitiés, in order to cous a “egiti- mate’, had to be nationtates To be sure, each ideology deployed ad assembled its core concepts ~ Ibeity, pro- gress, race, class, rationality, edition, com- smonity, welfare, security, and so on,— in specific and unique Ways. But the elite codi— fiers of: these “idedtibnal ‘systéins” pursued jinar ‘IB the" GeCades “Folldving’ World’ Wat 1, however, new'ideas, theories Wid sbatetial Practices ‘produced ih the ptiblic ‘ednscious- ness a similar sebséibf nipnitéwith'the past that-had occutted dtthertihie"6f thd ‘Freneh ‘Revolution. For example; ttovel techholdgies’ ‘ciliated the sped atd itensty with which these’ ideas and: practices itfiited thé? national ‘immagitiaiy:" Imiiges, —péoplé, ‘and materials -circulatéd ‘mor’ freely "across rational. boudaries, This new Sense of “tle slobal” thats erupted witht’ tad ofito tie ational began to-undermine the sense of nor! imaley and self-contained coziness associated! ‘with the medem nation-state: dentites’based ‘national membership becaine destabilized: By the mid-1990s,-a growing chorus of slobal social elites was fastening onto: the sew bused lobia’ be ancl jor _ for de political /agenda —the Se eae Seer ee the spread of constimérise-vat ‘world: Most ieportantly, they translated the Sing’ social imaginary into, largely ccono- ‘istic claims laced with references to. glo- bali g_and financial markets, worldwide Hows of goods, ‘services, and ‘abor,_transpat rations, ‘across national borders, Rather, it constitutes ‘a imultidimensional set of .in whic bol, and-spatial arrangements, of globality ist.as important as.economic.and.tech- nological dyoamics, The objective aceslers. tion and multiplication of global. material rietworks oceurs hand in band with the inten- sifying subjective recognition of a shrinking ‘world. Such heightened awareness of the ‘compression of time and space influences the ditection and material instantiations of global flows. As, Roland Robertson. (1992). has cmphasized time” ithe compression Of the world into a single place increasingly make: ‘the global’ the frame of reference inom Hee ai, Th ie tion involves, Both, the macro-stracures of Commudity end the’ micro.structures of ‘and Lemett,, ‘Lik the Conceptual eariha eee Yeats’ ago, today's destabiliza atid imaginary Ths sesloper concen fey ae Ho lodger exchisively a natidrial’ imagitiary/ Bu tional systems? that‘ ‘ratislations'o? he bee Hence, F-gnggeiv' ~ some. ‘hing ‘new abot tea ERBHLER beliet sys. tems: a new global imiphiary erp with pe ManKer GLOsALisna ar ‘nereasing frequency within and onto the ‘amiliar framework of the national, spewing its Sery'lava across flattening geographical soils. Stoked, among other things, by tech- nological change’and cultural innovations, this global-imaginary destabilizes the grand political ideologies codified by social elites during: the last two centuries. Thus, our changing-ideational landscape is intimately ‘elated to the forces of globalization, defined ‘sre.as the expansion and intensification of ‘AS the national: and the global rub up against each other in myriad setings and on ‘multiple levels, they. produce ‘new, tensions and compromises. Putting the anzlytic spot. light on the changing ideatioial structures aot ‘nly yields a’better understanding of current elobalizetion dynamics; but it also: helps us make setse of ‘the shifting conceptual and ‘geographical ‘boundaries ‘that (re)shape indi- ‘vidual and collective identities, Although glo- balizavion unfolds toward an ture, Sine to translate the rising global a litical agendas are currently undertaken by new ‘globalsms i undertaken by new ‘globalisms THE FIVE. CORE CLAIMS OF MARKET GLOBALISM. ‘The tenn ‘globalization’ gained in currency in the date 1980s. In:par, its con sauieldess ams fom he Eta loa ows occut in different physical and mental dimensions, usefully di up Appia (1996) into “etnoscapesy as >a ences eee ‘idoseapen. The. peristnsy Sh eotlonns vient She edger tote ae term was:essocated with specie ia public discourse duig te 19900, oe, the collapse of Sovietstyle communion Easter Europe, loosely affiliated. power elites concenteated inthe global nant seonca up their ongoing efforts fo sell her vecron of ‘slobalzation’ tothe publi inthe ise logical form of ‘market ‘globalism’, of Sar Unie These power elites consisted chiefly of corporate managers, executives of lenge ‘tansnational corporations, Corporate lobby- ists, high-level military officers, prominent Journalists and publie-relations” specials intellectuals waiting to a large public audi. nce, state bureaucrats and influential polit cians, By the mid-1990s, large segments of the po Elobal Howth ana sou had aceped globalism’ car ci, ‘his interttiag age par of ‘Parts of its overarch- ing neo-liberal Framework that advocated the deregulation o the liberalization Of Be qualiney's ‘under US lead exsbip, Indeed, the comprehensive Universi oPMiafyland Poll (2004) conducted in 19 ountries on four continents found that even sic five years of massive, worldwide dean, onstations against neo-liberal globalization, 55 per cent of the respondents believed that a for tem dnd the: fails, while only 28 por outa te Seeking Make a pefsuasive case for « new global order based on their belicfs sad vals, these:neo-ibera power elites com structed and disseminaied. narratives acd images that assocjated. the concept of ge balization with inexorably expanding fice markets. Their efforts at de-contesting the He_of-marker_globalsm, tions crucial pro: cess in the Tormation of thought systems becaueit ixes tis meanIMgS” OF he core concepts by arranging them ina ‘patter or configuring that links them with omer con cepts it & me iL way. AS Michael Freedan (2003: 54-5) puts it: ‘An ideology ateripts t8 end the inevitable con- tention over'concepts by dacontesting them, by femoving their meanings from contest. “This + iat justice means, announces one ideology, and ‘thats what democracy ental By trying to com vince us thet they are sight dnd that they speek the truth, ideologies become devices for caning With the interdstermingcy of meating.-. That & in Carfos: 28 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION ‘heir semantic woe. (But fldeolagles ago need to decontest the concepts they use Because they are instruments for faShioning collective decisions. That is their pftical rote, vey authoritative. meanings that facilitate collective decision “making. hei interconnected semantic and political roles suggest hat confol versaiteat ae guage translates directly into political power, that is, the power of desiding “who sget8 what, wen, and how” (Laswell, 1958), Subjecting to critical discourse dnalysis the utterances, speeches, and weldags, of influential advocates of market globaist in the 1990s and 2000s, my previous woce on the subject suggests that ‘glohalization” and ‘market’ constitute two crucial core concey ]E0TORy OF OW global age Gieger, 2009). Claim One: Globalization is about * the Liberalizationi,and Global Integration of Markets This frst claim of ‘market. globalism. ie sachoned,-in~the. neo-liberal ideal of the ‘elfregulating market as the normative basis for'8 future global order. According 10 this Perspective, the vital fimetions\ of the free ‘market — its rationality and efficieney, as well. @s its alleged ability to bring about greater social integration and material progress ~ ean only be realized in a democratic society that \alues and protects individual freedom Market’, of course, also plays aa impor. ‘ant role in two established ideologies: a Iib- ectarian variant of liberalism (often refered 10 as ‘neo-liberalism’) inspired by the ideas of Herbert Spencer, Friedrich Hayek, and Mitton Fridman, and the late-twentith century brand of Anglo-American conservatisin Cneb-conservatism’)"associated with the views of Keith Joseph, Margaret Thatcher, and'Ronald Reagan, While matket globalism» borrows heavily from both ‘ideologies, it would be a mistake to-reduce it.to either Meo eat = should not Bs Sea ilopal eooeien fra Salicier omnes Se, aes Sees with neo-lit on ttié importance ‘of ‘free Soe sade’, but Hey are mach kai eit ta ‘hands-off. attinide toward big “business* with intrusive govemment action’ forthe ‘regulation cof the ordinaty citizenry in the tame’ Of public security and traditional values: I foteign affiirs, ‘Deo-conservatives advocate amore aséettive and. expansive: use ‘of "both econothié and thea! Heal of promoting. eatin sea rca) areal as ied come et tee seli ti e- ‘One Seeks to Halt Geyod dpc “what gisonianten "apc at oa nition_of- globalization’ designed for broad Dl connmin TFdoes sv by Stsiccs Sg itso, core concepts and then inking them to the adjecent ideas of ‘liberty’ and “integration”. A passage in a Business¥veck Bivrial (13 Déeeniber 1999) impliily coh. veys this’ neo-liberal! guspicicin of" patitical Power in defining globalization in market terms: ‘Globalization is about the ‘markets dver goveraments..Both proponents and of 08 tomagree that the diving fonevtoday is: mate; whic ae" ing-the role of goverment: The:trath is thet thesize “of, government has been shrinking, relative: to the econorny almost everywhere.’ The same claim’is made over ‘and over again by Thomas Friedman:(1959) ‘whose. seminal book.‘on: globalization’ pro- vided the dominant perspective.oh glotializa- tion in the United Statets Ait bite Noint in’ his narrative, the award “MARKET GLOBALISM (gt more eflicieat your economy will be. ssGlobolization means the spread of free- caret capitalism to.virtually.every.country the world? wend _By forging « close semantic kimkebetyeen slobalization’sand ‘market, lobalists like iman seek ta. create: the: impressiqn| that balization represents. lyizatec0- «pote pbetometn: ahs cbardpned iy tc ouplexity of its. additional monseconemic cimensions, ‘globalization’ acquires the Becessary simplicity and focus touconv ra angnaiVe Westie contd In a 58 semantic connections to the adjacent 2atepis. ‘Wbetalization”” and” “integration ze ‘Uberation” of markets. fom stafe.control 2 good thing,, Conversely, the notion of Jegrating markets! is draped inthe. mgntle of all-embrasing liberty, hence she ffequent Soamulation of Claim One as aglapaliompera- aye anchored in universal xeasopy Hug de ‘ontested as.an economic project sdvancing, numan feedom.in .genefal,.globalization must be applied to all. countries, regardless of he political. and. cultural preferences expressed by. local. citizens. As. President ‘George W. Busk notes in the.NationalSecurity Serategy of the United States. of-Amériea (2002), "Policies: that further. uae, emerging markets, andthe dgvel- oping world,” ve = “ short, Gatket. globalist voioes present slobalizatiot asa —Tatual ceconganie noimenon whose essential qualities are cSe liberalization and integration of global suarkets and the reduetion of, governmental interference in the: economy, Privatization, dee trade, and: unfetteued capital mover ‘ents are portrayed: as-the besbiand juost aatural way for realizing indivignalditenty and. material, progress, a os oe ideological claim that globalization is about the lbgralization.end global tatpgraticn of anarkers sen 0,50 et wt is Sally contest eat ae ve. set, globalists, have been SUSEpGSFsl “ausethey have:persuaded the publicithat 29 their neo-liberal account of globalization represents an objective oF at least neutral diagnosis rather than a direct contribution to the emergence of the very conditions it purports to analyze. To be sure,-neo-iberals may indeed be able to offer some “enipirical evidence’. for the “liberalization” of markets, But does the Spread. of market principl&:Yally “happen because there exists andntrinsie,nictanhysi- «al connection between globalization andthe expansion af markets? ‘Or does it occur because globalists have the political and dis- eursive power to. shape ths: ‘world largely according to their ideological formulas? ‘Their_economistic-objectivist Tepiesentation 3 tbe_multidi- chavacter. of the_phenoaienn, Ecological cultwal, and poliial dimensions of globalization are discussed only as cubor- dinate, processes; dependent .on the move- ‘ments of global markets. _ Claim Two: Globalization is Inevitable and Irreversible The second mode of de-contesting “glob zation’ tums on’ the adjacent concepT—oF “inevitability, At frt'glaice; the belie in tbe historical inevitability of globalization seems to be © poor fit for'sglobalist ideo! ogy-based on neo-liberal panciples. after all, tuoughoutthe bv liber als and conservatives have connate ert cized Marxisin fo ts deteminist claims that devalue human free. agency and downplay the ability of noneconomic factors to shape socal realty. In particular, neo-liberal have attacked the Marxist notion of history as a teleological process that unfolde according fo-tingsorable lawe' that haston the demise of capitalism, ultimately leading to the emer. gence of a ‘classless society on a global Scale, By focusing om the ‘logic’ often. ogy and markets, market globaliss mini snize the role offuman agency and individual sboice ~ the centerpiece of liberal thovgit fom John Locke and John, Start Mill 9 Milton Friedman, 30 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION According to the marketglobalist per spective, globalization reflects the spread of imreversible market forces driven by techno- logical innovations: that make the global ‘integration of national economies inevitable In fact, am is almost always intertwined with the deep belief in the ability of markets to use new technologies to solve Social problems far better than any, altema- tive course. When, in the early 1980s, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously Pronounced that “there: no altemative', she ‘meant that there no longer existed a theoreti- cal and practical altemative to the expansion. ist logic of the market. In fact, she: accused ‘hose nonconformists who still dated to pose altematives.as foolishly relying on anachro- Nistic, socialist fantasies, that betrayed their inability to cope. with empitical reality Govemments, political parties, and social: lobalization. Theit sole remaining task was 09 GLI he integra: mn of national economies in the new global market, States and iat therefore, serve fo ensure the smooth work ing of market logic, « A close study of the utterances of infiuen- ‘lal market globalistsreveals their reliance on such a monocausal, economist narative of historical inevitability. Weile-disagresing ‘with Marxists: on the final goal of historical development, they: nonetheless sharé with their ideological opponents a: fondness for such terinsas.‘iresistible'; “inevitable, and ‘nreversible"to:desoribe the projected path ofvglobalization. For example, in z imajor speech on US foreign policy, President Bill Clinton(1999) told his audience: “Today. we ‘ust embrace the inexorable logic of globali- zation 1 Grobaltzation is: irreversible Protectionism will only make things worse.” Fr mith (1999), chairman end CEO of FedEx. Corporation, ‘proclaimed: that ‘Globalization i 'itievitable and inexorable ‘eisaceeleratings, Globalization is hap- ening i'gbinigto happen. It does not mat. {er Whether You lik itor no, it’s happening, 4's going to happen.” Neo-liberal power lites in the global south often faithful echoed the determinist language of balism. For éxample, Manuel ‘Villar (1998), the Philippines Speaker of the ‘House of Represestatives, insted that, ‘We cannot simply wish away the process of globaliza- on. Foie Te er World. The “proce neveribte sae “The neo-liberal portrayal of globalization natural force, like the weather or gravity, makes it easier for market glo. balists‘to convince: people'that they must ‘lat tothe discipline of the Yaurket if ey ae to suivive and’prosper. Hence, the tian of inevitability:serves a number of ‘important politcal functions, For ote, it neutralizes tao challenges of alterglobalist opponents” by depiinng Be poet tems alton: neo-Uberat polices ae above sa ites, Because they simply cary out what is ordained by nature. This view implies that, instead of acting according ta set of choices people neely Ff wend marker laws tha emai the linia nt con- twols-‘There'is nothing that can be done abcut safural movement of economic and tech. nological. forces; ‘political groupe ought to acquiesce and male the best of en unatersbie situation Since the emergence af a world basedon the primacy of market vals reflects the dltates of history, resistance would be mnaturdl tional, anid dangerove, Claim Three: Nobody is in Charge of Globalization, The third mode of dé-contesting globalize. tion hinges onthe classical liberal concept of the “selPregulating) market. The semantic link:between ‘globalization-mnarket” and the adjdcemtiden of ‘Ieaderlestness"is simple: if fhe""undisturbed workings of the market indeed preordain a certain écusse 6f history, thea globalization dies not reflect the arhi- trary agitida of partictlac Social elise or stOup’ I othe wotds, globalists ate aoe “in chatge? ih the Sense Of IMpaRIAE thelr oun political agenda’ on people! “Rather they’ aétely camry’ Gut the unaketablectiperatives Sof a transcendental force uch larger than : narrow partisan interests, , For example, Robert Homats (1998), vice sbauman, of Goldman Sachs. Intemational, emphasized that, “The great beauty of glo- | Palization is that no one is in control! The reat beauty of globalization is tha itis not controlled by any individual, any. govern- iy sen any nga Mee pay (yo Friedman (1999:,112-3) alleged ‘tht “the i apost basic truth about globalization is tis: ‘i No-one is in charge. ... But the global imar- “) ketplace today is an Electronic Herd af often. snonymous stock, bond andl currency trade's and multinational investors, connected by screens and netwotks.” Of, course, Friedman 's Nght in formal sense. There je 30 con: » scious. conspiracy orchestisted by a single » evil forest disempower Asian ngage) But does this mean that nobody ig in.clarge of lobaliaaion? I it really true, that the bbe, lization end integration. of global, rparkets proceeds outside the realmof uma choice? Does ‘globalization, therefore, absolve busi- nesses and corporations from Sgeial xespon sibility? A eritical discourse analysis of Friedman's statement reveals how he utilizes « realist narrative to, sell 10 bisjeuience a liberal version of globalizatian) He implie that anyone bo disks at global zation involves human choice is either hope ‘essly naive or outright dangerous," ‘The. idea that nobody isn chaige,serves t tao ope eal aaeots tect snd expanding global capjalisnl Litt te marketglobalist shetori of historical inevi- ‘ability, the portrayal of globalization es « leaders process seeks to both depoliticize “Be public debate on the subject and demobi- ize global justice movements, the deters ‘ainistic language of a technological progress Sciven by uncontollgble market jaws taras political issues: into,sciewtfic. problems of ‘Sdministration, Once, large, segments of the population have, accepted the, globslist 752 of self-directed jyggemana that im- ins it courge, it becomes extessely ficult to challenge what Antonio Gramsci sails the ‘power of the hegesnonic Bloc’. As MARKET GLOBALISM, 3” i ordinary people cease to believe inthe pos sibility of choosing” alternative social arrangements, market’ globalism gains strength in its ability't8eonstruct passive ‘consumer identities. Thi tendency is fur- ther enhanced by assuiranées that globaliza- tion will bring prosperity 0 all pats of the world. e ae rE nlite Claim Four: Globalization Benefits Everyone (...:in the tong Run) This de-contsttion chi ies atthe heart of ‘market. globalisisbecalise. it provides an affirmative answer to the crucial normative question of whetlier globalization represents 4 “good” phenoméngn, Tie'adjacent idea of “benefits for everyone? i isually unpacked sn material terms such f ‘ezonomic growth’ and ‘prosperity’. However, when linked to globalism’s peripheral concept, ‘progress’, the ides of "benefits for everyone” taps not only into liberalism’s progressive worldview, but also draws''on ‘the powerful socilisé vision of establishing an economic paradise on earth ~ albeit in the capitalist form of @ worldwide consusierist utopia. Ts, Claim Four represents" abddiee*¥old'exaniple of combining elements fromeeeiningly inconm- patible ideologies under the master concept ‘globalization’. be At the 1996 G-7 Suinmit ih Lyons, France, the heads of stated ‘governmiént of the ‘world’s seven moct’ powerful iddustialized ations issued joint Beononiic Communiqué (1996) that exemplifies the principal mem- ings of this claim: Economic growth and progres in today’s inter. dependent world Is bound up with the process of globalization. Globalization provides great ‘Opportunities forthes future not nly. for our counts, ut fr all others op, Is many rosie aspects include an unpretedentéd expansion of Investment and wade; the opening Up to inter National tate of the-worle's mest. populous regions and’ opportunites for more developing counties to improve thei standards of living, the increasingly rapid dsseminstion of informstion ‘technological innovation, andthe proliferation of Skilled jobs ‘common, sense, 2 Even those market globalists whio concede the strong possibility of unequal global dis- ‘uibution pattems nonetheless insist that the market itself will eventually correct these “ircegularites'.As John Meshan (1997), chair- ‘man of the US Public Securities Asscciation, Duts it, “episodic dislocations’ sich as mass ‘unemployment and reduced social services might be ‘necessary in the short run’, bu, in the lon htthey. wll give way toquantum leaps in produdtivity:. ‘Thus,-market glo: Dalits like Meehan justify the real human ‘sts of globalization as the short-terin price ‘of economic Iiberalizatin. Such ideological statements ote disseminated to large auci- ‘ences by what Beajathiin Barber (1996) calls the profit-oriénted “infotainment telesector" Television, radio, and the Internet frequently place existing econémic, politcal, and social realities within a neo-libetal framework, sus- taining the claim that globalization benefit everyone thotigh “emniprésent affirmative jmages,, websites, baiiner advertisements, ~ Claim Five: Globalization Furthers the Spread.of Democracy in the World: ‘The’ finh' de:eéntettition ehain~ links ‘globalization’ and ‘market 'to the'edjacent ‘concept of democracy’ ‘whiich'also plays a significant role in Hbetalisu, ‘conséivatisin, and socal, democracy thong is proxi to “mare ‘et and the making of esonomic choices ~ 2 tbeme developed through the 19808 in the peculiar variant of conservatiom. Freeden (1996; 382); calls ‘Thatcherism’'. Indeed, careful discourse analysis of relevant texts reveal that globalists tend to eat freedom, red, mari, Pee trade end democracy 2 synonymous, fens, Persistently’ affirmed as the compatibilit i of these ones often goes unchallenged in the pub- | Tie discouitse. 7 The mast abou fHstely by which neo- liberals generate popular support for the equation of democracy and the merket is by Gtobatisys typically Ge-contest ‘THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION iscrediting traditionalism’ and cocilism. ‘After al, the contlst with both precapitalise and aaticaptalist forms Of traditionalism, such As feudélia, hae been'won rather easily Ybeeaise the politcal principles of popular sovereignty and individual rights have been enshrined as th etucial catalyst for the tech- nological and’ scientific achievements of modern miarket economies. The bate wit sovilismtumed oat to be a much toughed casé. As late as thé'19706, socialism provi a powerful critique ofthe elitist, class-bas chatatte'f literal democtagy, which, ia i view, revealed that a substantive form demoiracy had not beta achieved in capital ist sdeléties: Since the eollipes of comm: nism’ in “Eastem “Euiope,. however, ideological edge has shifted decisively to thd defenders of neo-liberal perspective whd emphasize the ‘lationship berweon eco! nomic liberalization andthe: emergence of emndctatic political regimes. j Finis Fukiyaiti (2000); for exampl sibetto that thre eis a ‘lear corel betivdan a cclutty'é level of economic devel ojingat’ an “Sacctsefal democracy. Whi alobétizaion aid Gapital development co n auibnmaticlly ‘piddvee” democracies, th level “of ecordmit?'development resuiting ‘roth glovalization’is conducive tothe cr. "tion 6f complex civil societies with a powe: fal milddle'ctisk Tei this clasé ahd societ strubtnie that facilitates demoetacy’, Preis ‘Bastetn, Butope’s “econtimic transitio towaid ‘thet Bs Lady Hilla Rodham Clinton (1959) thie/HetPotish aud ienéé that the emerence of new business ‘and shopping"centers in former communi cotintries siiculd be seen asthe “backbone of democracy j ‘But Fokuyama’s ‘arguinent ‘hinges on united definition Of demberacy-that | ‘si2es fot procedtires sich a8 voting at th explige of the ditelt ptitieiation of bro molt i polieal tt eon derisig "This “his” denitibn of demacrac “is part of what Williém’£ "Robinson (19: 56-62) has identified asthe Aiglo-Americs! neo-libéral project of ‘pronioting pobil aL MARKET GLOBaLism 33 osits democracy as both a process and a'means to an‘end a tool for devolving political aid ‘economic power Som the’ hands of-elite minorities ‘to the ‘masses, Polyarehy, oi he other hand, repre. sent aw elitist iid regimented model of ‘low intensity\or “formal market deitbericy Polyarehies tot oly tii dembcratc par. ticipation’ to’ Votiig in ‘elections, ‘bit’ also eqhire tat thee ‘clected be insulated fhdm popular pressures, 30 that they may “effec. Lively govern? This focus on the act of voting — in which equality prevails only in the formal sense — helps to obscure thie conditions of inequality reflected ‘ia existing asymmetrical power relati procedural Understanding of ‘democcacy" Neo-liberal 8conomic:globalization and the stategic Promotion of polyatthic regimes in the Third World are, therefore, two sides of the same ideological coin. They represent the systemic prerequisites for the legitima- tion of full-blown world: market The Promotion “of” polyarchy ‘provides market slobalists‘with the ideological opportunity to svance tei neoliberal projects bf economic, sestucturing ina language that cstenibly Svpporte the ‘democratization’ of the world FROM MARKET GLOBALISM 70 IMPERIAL GLOBALISM ... AND BACK ‘The five ‘claithg discussed in’ this show thet maket globalism i suficienty systematic fo ad Sp 10a computes political ideology. In the harsh political cli- tuee following the attacks of 11 Sepemibes howeves, neo-conservative players in oe Bush administation drew on the existing climate of fear to promote their vision of benign American Empire leading a coalition Cf ‘allies’ in the open-ended War on Terror. President Geoige W. Bush abandoned the aildly isolationist position he espoused dun, ing the 2000 election campaign and instond Adopted the bellicese views of inveterate hard-povier advocate like Diek Cheney and Déliald Rilsfeld. As ‘many tnerket glo- Dalits struggled to maintain the viability of their ideological project focused on open ‘iackets, the’ unilateralist Bush adminis, tion supported the compromise of toughen. ing up the ideological claims of market slobalism to fit the neo-conservative visien Of a benign US empire relying on over whelming military power, ‘AG 4 resul, market“globalism morphed into ‘imperial globalism’. Claims One (glo- balization is about the liberalization and slobal integration of markets) and Four (glo balization benefits everyone) — the backbone of market globalism — remained largely intact but the other claims had to undergo hard-power facelifs. The deferminist iss. guage of Claim Two, however, carne under Sustained criticism by commentatars who read the al-Qaeda atlacks as exposing the “dark. side of globalization’. Some pro claimed the imminent “collapse of glo. balismn’, worrying that the terrorist attacks ‘would usher in a new age of cultural partion. larism and economic protectionism, For example, noted neo-liberal economists like Robert J. Samuelson (2003) argued that pr vious globalization processes had been stopped by similar eataclysmic events like the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdingad in Sarajevo in 1914 And yet, the unfolding War on Tecroc allowed for the semantic intemningling of miliary and’ economic inevitability — the alleged ‘inevitability’ of America’s military ‘tiumph over its terrorist nemesis. For exam, ple, Christopher- Shays (2003), Republican Congressman from Connecticut and at the time Chair of the House Subcommittee on National Security, argued that the ‘toxic zeal" 34 "THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION of the tecrorsts woilld eventually be defeated by the combination of military and market forces ~ “the relentless inevitability of free peoples pursuing their own enlightened self intevest i common cause’. Thus, market globalism’s ability to adapt to the new reali- ties ofthe post-9/11 world gives ample proof of its responsiveness to a broad range of political issues. After 9/11, it also bétame increasingly difficalt for globalisté.to maintain Claim Three (nobody isin charge of globalization). While a number of corporate leaders still reflexively referred to the ‘self-regulating market’, it became obvious thatthe survival of globalization ~ conceived as the liberali- ation and global integration of markets — depended on the US goverment wielding its power. Having concealed their country’s imperial ambitions behind the soft language cof market globatism during the 1990s, many American globalists took off” their gloves after 9/11, exposing the iron fists of an irate siant. The attacks cHianged the terms of the dominant discourse in that it enabled certain «groups within the globalist eamp fo put their geopolitical ambitions explicitly before. a Public shocked by ‘terrorism’, Indeed, their open advocacy of American global leader- ship spawned raging debates around the world over whether of not the United States actually constituted an ‘empire’. ‘The replacement of Claim Thise with a ‘more aggressive pronotiécemeat of global Anglo-Ametican leadership’ should aot be read asa sign Of lobaliém’s ideological weakness. Rather, it reflected its’ ideational flexibility and growing ability 0 respond to 4 new set of political issues. Tndeed, i all full-fledged political belief systems, glo- balism is broad tnough to" coatain the inore cconomistic variant of the’ 1990s'as well a8 its more militaristic post-9/11. Claim Five «(globalization fitiers thé spread of demcracy in the world) ascended ‘o new heights With the hatd:power iission of “building.” démocracy"” in’ Ting ard ‘Afghanistan. This, this beeame firmly linked to the Bush aduinistration’s neo-conservative security agenda. President Bush (2002). did aot mince his word in his New. York Times op-ed piece a year affer the attacks: ‘As we preserve the peace, America also\has, an opportunity to extend the benefits offreedom and progress to nations that.lack-them. We seek a peace where repression, resentment and poverty are replaced, with:the hope of democracy, development, free markets and fee trade.”A year later, the President (2003) reaffirmed. his. goyernment’s unwavering ‘commitment 0 the, global. expansion of democracy’ as the “Third Pillar’ of the United States’ ‘peace and security, vision for the world ee ‘This idea of securing global economic inte- gration. through an American-led military drive for ‘democratization’ around the globe ‘became especially prominent in the corporate scramble for Iraq, following the official ‘end ‘of major combat operations’ on 1 May 2008 ‘Alteady daring the frst days ofthe Iraq war, in Jate March 2003, elobalists had suggested that iraq be, subjected to a radical economic treatment. For, example, Robert McFarlane (2008), former National, Security Adviser to President Reagen and current chairman of the Washington DC-based corporation Energy &: Communication Solutions, LLC, together with Michael Bleyzer, CEO and president of SigmaBieyzer, ‘an intemational equity fund management company, co-authored, a promi- ent plese ia The Wall Sree Journal beating i See ie Tg gat Calling, on ‘major U8, corporations, jointly ‘with other multinationals’, to ‘lead the ‘ ot create captal-fiendly environmen in devel oping countries’, the globalist duo praised the nlitary opemfions i: lagseganindispenible {ool in.establishiig. the jpoliteal, genomic and Social stability’ necessary for “building the basic institutions that male democeacy possi. be thetbobenlta ee oe ‘their readets that “the TS! md that iti Ht ty 'the most pera power it pines 4 more prosperous and stable fare’. MARKET GLORALisM 35 ‘Jn what amounted to another cleat demon- stration of their political resonance, these Gimerican busines ‘executives, Secretary of State "Colisi" Powell” (Olivas, 2002) fnsouneed the developinent of US-Middle Bast Free Trade Area (MEFTA) within a dec, ade.’ Linked’ to’'the “admiistration’s 2002 US“ Midale East Partaeiship Initiative’, the new project also included programs to cena Arab college’ stidents'to' work as interns in American compoiaticins, Finally, the neo-conSérvative commitment to ‘Americas values’ of freon, security sed See markets made itnecessary to add a Clans Six: ‘Globalization requires 2 War on Tarror to market globelism’s disturtive are Robert Kaplat (2008) pits ‘o have military and éeonodhié power béhivg bines the idea of économie Blobalization with Openly ‘millitaristié and ‘hationalistic ideas ‘associated with the American-led global War on Terror: At'the ‘same time, however, Claim ‘ix poSsesies a somewhat paradoxical chance, ter If global tétor were'no longer a major issue, H would diseppear without causing ‘market globalism to collapse. In tha case. st Seems that Claim Six is a contingent one gad thas less important than the previous five. On the other hand, ifthe global War on Terror tums ut to bea lengthy and intense engagement ag suggested by the cument American political Jeadership ~ then it would Become actually ‘more important over time. No wondes, thst Commentators like Richard Falk (2003) Tobe sure, throughout the 1990s there had been sinister warnings on the part of prom, nentcultural and social theerss that globalioa, Mion was actually ‘Amnericanization’(Laouche, 1996) or “MeDonaldization’ (Ritzer, 1993) in universalist disguise: But US unilaterism aoa belligerence in the wake of 9/11 appenred to be Buatket globalism’s shift toward imperial glo- global Wat on Terror contradicted globaliva. tion's alleged universalism, Instructive examples of the logical incon- sistencies inherent in Claim Six abound ‘Take, for instance, Thomas. Bamet's best, selling book, The Pentagon's New Map (2008). The author, a professor of military strategy al the US Naval War Colleve, alcg Served asthe assistant for strategic futures in the Pentagon's. Office of Force ‘Transform. ations. In this capacity, Bamett gave his bref. ings regularly tothe US Secretary of Defense, the inteligedce. community, and to ‘igh, ‘anking officers from all branches of the US armed forces, into three distinct regions. The first is charsc ‘ered by ‘globalization thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal ‘media ows, and collective security’, yielding ations featuring stable: democratic govern. iments, transparency, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than by murder (North America, most of Europe, Australis, New Zealand, and a small part of Latin 36 ‘THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBALIZATION Americ). He calls these regions of the world the ‘Functioning Core’ or ‘Core’. Conversely, areas where ‘globalization is thinning or just plain absent” constitute a region plagued by repressive political repimies, regulated mar- eis, mass murder, and widespread poverty and disease (the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Afica, the Balkans the Caucasus, Cental Asia, China, the Middle Eest, and much of Southeast Asia). The breeding, ground of global terrorists’, Bamert refers to this region as the ‘Non-lategrating Gap’, of ‘Gap’. Between these two regions, due finds “seam states’ that ‘lie along the Gap's bloody bound- aries’ (Mexico, Brazil, South Aftca, Moroces, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia). For Bamet, the importance of 9/11 is that the attacks forced the United States and its allies to make @ long-term military commit ‘ment to “deal with the entire Gap a a strategic threat environment’. In other words, the desired spread_of globalization seqtires a War on ‘error. Is tree main objectives aré:“I)Tnerease the Core's imme: system capebilites for responding to September like system pertur bbanons; 2) Work on the seam states to revlall the Core from the Gap's worst export, sueh 35 teror, drugs, and pandenies; and, most impor tent, 3) Shrink the Gap .:. The Middle East is the perfect place to start’ Bameit (2004) ‘emphasizes that“Weignore the Gap's existence 21 our own pes, beesuse it will nt go away until weas a nation zespond to the challenge of snakiog globalization rly global’ This celebration. of globalization. in American impevalisti temninology invites the kad of conceptual contradiction that could heve been fatal to mazket globalism. By 2008, however, the global War on Teror had taken a backzest to the unfolding Global Financial iiss, the most severe economic challenge since the Great Depression in the 1930s, The incoming administation of President Barack (Cbaraa found tel forced. to support strong _govemmental ation to save mazket globalism ‘fom the consequences of own detegulatory loge by backing the largest bank Balout in history wile atthe same time signing of on uaprecedented ‘stitniius packages’ designed 1o acest the surging uneinployrment rate, Ironically, precisely at time when the legiti- macy ofmatke globalism was seriously shaken, ‘his new wave of, 'Reo-Keynesiaa? measures sweeping across the entire world. did litle to displace the dominance of neo-liberalism, The ‘popularity of stimulus. spending bills in the, slobal north proved to. be short lived as neo- {Wberal imperatives made; swift. comebeck as “budget cuts, ‘austerity packages’, andthe ‘reduction -of, welfare, begefits', As Joseph Stiglitz 2010) shows convincingly, the Obama administration's, interventionist. policies quickly gave way to. the market globalist forces that had led the world tothe brink of another Great, Depression. In. addition,.the withdrawal of US forees from Iraq in 20)1 and the impending troop reductions in Afghanistan faciliaed: the tansformation of imperialism beck into its orginal form —market globalism To argue, however, that market globalism has shifted fom 2 soft- power nazative,to a bard-power discourge,of empire and then back again does not mean that it enjoys undisputed ideological dominance. In fact, there exists a multiplicity of altemative stories about, glo- balization thet also aim to provide authorita- tive accouats.of what the: phenomenon is.ail about. As a result, market, globalism’s ideo logical, claims have been contested both. by what [call ‘justice globalism’ on the political et (sieges, Gooden, and Wisea, 2013) and ‘religious globelism’ on, the political ‘Right (Steger, 2008). But i i the task of other chapters featired’ int this Handbook of Globalization to eximite the counterargu- meats advanced by the challengers of the

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