e ‘ONLINE True Print’ SCC Online Web Eaton, © 2022 EAC Puniehing PV. Ltd Page 1 Saturéay, July 20, 2022 Printod For Saksham Gaikwad, National Law University SCC Ontine Web Eaton pw: secantine cm ‘TruePrnt™ source: Rajasian Law Weekly, @ 2022 EBC Publishing Pvt, Lucknow. RLAW 1953 Bahadur Singh V Shri Jaswant Raj Mehta (Sharma J.) a7 Jawala Singh vs. Tara Singh and another [A1R. 1920 Lahore 94 (2)], in which it was decided that “a man is not debarred from pre-empting by ‘the mere fact that he is oaly a malik makbuja and owns no share in the) village shamilat.” The Alwar State Pre-emption Act is almost a copy of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, and sec. 15 of both the Acts is exactly, in the same words. The contention of the learned counsel for’ the appellant, therefore, that the plaintiff being a malik makbuja,cannot be said to be owner of the estate has no force, and was rightly répelled by the lower courts: Another ruling of the same High Court reported in Chanan Din vs. Chanan Din and others [ALR. 1933 Lahore 213] niay also be quoted in support of the finding that the plaintiff canbe said to be an owner of the estate within the meaning of sec. 15 (c), thirdly, af the Pre-emption Act. In that case, it was decided that— y “In deciding whether s person is an owner of an estate within ‘the meaning of 15 (©) thirdly, the etecmining factor ie, whether the aret in question igor is not assessed to land revenue. Its extent, situation and the purpose for whith ifs bought br to which it may be devoted are absolutely immaterial, In the present case, as has been said above, the property’of the plaintiff on the basis of which the right of pre-emption has,beert claimed, forms part of village Rajgarh, and the property in dispute also fotms a part of it. The property of the plaintift is assessed to land teyenne, as will be found from the copy of the jamabandi referred to above. The’ plaintiff's claim was, therefore, rightly decreed. a hes 8. The appeal has no force, and it is digmitsed with costs"to the contesting respondent. Nig 4 Ranawat J.—T agree. % Jaipur Belch. gt RANAWAT & SHARMA JJ. Bahadur Singh yersus.,,Shri Jaswant Raj-Mehta D.B. Writ Petition No. V’of 1952 decided on Js¢ May'1952. Matzya Customs Ordinance, 1948, 450. 48-—Deruty Commissioner Capon Rxcise Jaipur not Deputy Commissioner, Gustiims & Excise: Jaipir Division can not be considered to he the Superintendent of Cunomarithin: the meantog of the Matsya Ordinance to exercise the powers under see, 48. of the Ordinance and deal with the offendersdepattmentally. (para 4) Gonstiution of India, Art. 14—Clasiification to be on xeat wid substantial basis Matsva Gitstoms Ordinance, 1248, sec! 49 ultya vitesse ‘Matssa Customs Ordinaye-2948, sc 48—Scction jitea Vices “While reasonable clissification ia permissible, such hyped upon some rent and subatanciab diucietion bearint «fen a Felation #0'the object sought to be attained, tnd the classification cannot be nade arbitrarily aud without any substartial basis. (para ®) . Sec. 48 of the Mataya Customs Ordinance, 1948 gives to the Superinten- dent Cusiomdunatrcted power ojenany cage heen to court of lay snd Setain apy cate Of the same type ta be dealt jarementally at his, Hon by hiswelt.” ‘There is absolutely no classification worth the name.” Conse. quently sec. 48 offends aguinae che fundamental. rights of cqual protection of Afges and equality before the laws enshrined fa Art, 14 of the Constitution and ia"therefore void under Are. 13, (pera 12) Ganstituticnof India, Art, 226— Alternative remedy-—tmoutned order clearly without juris- ‘Gcion and Yeade under ave found vitra vites-High Court wil issue wrt. ‘Where it has been found that the impugned order is clearly without “jurisdiction ant the provisions under which i sntade clearly offends againet ‘tutional provicions of Are. 14 relating to fundamental rights of equal Protection of daw and equality before ‘the laws, the High Court will not be Justified in dismissing the application om the ground that the applicant had an “ Adequate and alternative remedy by way of « tegular suit. (para 14)© SCC Online Web Eaton, ©2022 EAC Publishing Pvt. Lid SCG Page Saturday, duly 30, 2022 Pnted For: Saksham Gaikwad, National Law University SCC Online Web Eston: tps sceanine com Tue Print’ TPsini™ source: Rajesinan Law Weeky, © 2022 EBC Publishing Pvt, Lucknow 52 Bahadur Singh V Shri Jaswant Raj Mehta (Sharma J.) RLW 1953 person is entitled for redress in the higher courts have been cut down. Even if it be SSid° that the statute on the face of te i not discriminatory, itis so in its effect and operation inasmuch as ie vesth in the executive government unregulated offigial Giscretion and, therefore, bas to be adjudged unconstitutional ee Tewar suggested thet good faith and knowledge of existing conditions on the. pact of legisitore as to be prewymed.’ Thar ino: yet co crey eine presuming fhe extent of always holding thet there must be some undisclosed intention of teagan {ge subjecting certain individuals tos hostile and discriminatory legiiation isco make, the protection clause of Are. 14, in the words of an American decision, mete TODS of sand, in no manner restraining state action. The protection aifonded. byte “Ari Sle ie not a mere eye wach but iis @ cl upless a just cause for dissemination fon the basis of « reasonable clasification is to put forth as a defence, the sat tobe declared unconstitutional. No just cause has been shown in the presedy instagce 7. His Lordship Mukherjea J. observed as follows af page 9:= e “In the case before us, the language of sec. 5 (1) is perfectlyéclearjand free from any ambiguity. It vests an unrestricted discretion in the State Govefnment t0 direct ‘any cares Or classes of cases t0 be tried by the Special Coure in acggfdance*with the Drocedre laid down in the Ack a 8. His Lordship S.R. Das J. says on page 93— y “eis now well established that while Art, 14 is desigiti.to prevent a person class of persone from being singled out from others sie ted forthe’ purpos cephalus enact Te iceeboeet stale dis Sore itdoes not ins iinaton eng suse nly andor. eat ey fom he Safaaie frre Elasaify persona for the purpose of legisla feation may bpeh insta.” Temay be geographical or according ty ¢ characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the Object of the legjslation.” 9. His Lordship Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. rentiitked as follows on page 101: ° ene f the legislation ice i gfe attack on the groulad. of iccrimination, the cua talent gf charac ue eam acenar Nites che tification: dlpapedh oc ele lige the gloat ek we Bue tthenace semaine, the validity ofthe #VjcsSlon or order qe. ln impugned. may have to. be Considered independents. eee His Lordship further gbserves on the gime’pade -— {the statutepalléa ndglssification sag classification purported to be made ts not reasonie Se entonal bat ifiueory, ao in this eases Se, ‘5 would be void as conttavendng Art. 14. It x ‘true that totally different con- siderations mighwiitiee ifapecified olfenced or fopups of offences in a particular. ares ge apne OBE sipartclae vent srfngldll were tobe ed by «Special Couee, Beth poe hy curre "Nap Soe egen owt he Act mer powces tae @ Gost alge lpinee auction nedon eculd be avottes, tegen tues thet eet ration “feastnableness wouldi, still xemain to be satisfied. If the Act does not Sounclgte any princrne om ee ets Qf which. the State Government. could waleee ead asl ae tiga me eg gig0, His Lordship Bose’ gpierves at page 104 as follow: E _ @*Coming now to he concrete cases with which we have to deal here, Tam far ‘(from gusgesting that the departure made from the proceduce prescribed. by the Crimi= 5, nal Procedure’ Code. are bad or undesirable in themaclves. "Some tay be good in the ‘hy senae that they will better promote the ends of Justice and would ebus form welcome Madditions to. the law of tbe land. Bor I am mot here to consider thas, That is gg Pate of a Judge's province What I have to determine is whether the differentiation ‘Rade offends what Tay call the social conscience of a sovereign democratic republic. &: Thlae is nota question which canbe answered in the sbaeeace, but, viewed in the J. in his interesting and forceful judgment