Severino M. Manotok IV, Froilan M. Manotoc, Fernando M. Manotok, et. Al.

,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok vs. Heirs of Homer L.
Barque, represented by Teresita Barque Hernandez [G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605.
December 12, 2005.]
Facts:
Respondent’s as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition
with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177
issued in the name of Homer Barque which was destroyed in a fire. In support of the
petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, tax
receipts, and tax declarations and the Plan covering the property. Upon being notified of
the petition,petitioners filed their opposition claiming that the lot under the title of Barque
forms part of their land and that the TCT in the name of Barque was spurious. Atty.
Benjamin Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the petition on the grounds that: a.
The lots covered by TCT No. 210177 appear to duplicate the Lot of Piedad Estate
covered by TCT No. 372302 registered under the name of Severino Manotok b. The
submitted plan is a spurious document Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was
denied hence they appealed to the LRA. The LRA ruled that Atty. Bustos should not
have required the submission of other documents other than the owner’s duplicate copy
as bass in denying the petition and that based on the documents presented, petitioners
established that their TCT was, at the time of the destruction, was valid, genuine,
authentic, and effective. It is also noteworthy that the technical description covered by
TCT No. 210177 conforms to the description of the lot covered by TCT No. 372302. It
therefore becomes evident that the existence of TCT No. 210177 was established
irrefutably by the petitioners and that the recounstruction must be given due course. The
LRA ruled that the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 be given due course upon the
cancellation of the TCT of Manotok upon order of the RTC. Petitioner’s filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the respondents. Bother their motions were
denied. Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA praying that the LRA be
directed immediately to reconstitute their TCT. Petitioners also filed a petition for review
with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition of respondents. Respondents moved for
reconsideration which was reconsidered by the CA. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for
reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents'
title. From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed separate
petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No.
162335, respectively. Both petitions were consolidated.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the LRA has no authority to annul their title
2. Whether or not the reconstituition of Respondent’s Title would be a collateral attack
on petitioner’s existing title

3. Whether or not they were not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the
chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no
jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners' title
Ruling:
The petitions must be denied. The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting
officer should have confined himself to the owner's duplicate certificate of title prior to
the reconstitution. When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted
in support thereof the owner's duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and
tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the
reconstitution. Since respondents' source of reconstitution is the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission
of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted plan appears
to be spurious. The factual finding of the LRA that respondents' title is authentic,
genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners' title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by
the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should
remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners
were deprived of "their property" without due process of law when the Court of Appeals
ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the
RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-
determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and petitioners as the same has
been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By
opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively
reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the
reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority
to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these
tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners' claim that they were deprived of their
right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process. The
reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners' title which was
irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. In this case, petitioner anchors her
arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because
of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is
overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report that TCT No. T-
320601 was issued without legal basis Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility
of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or
vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it
may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over
parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule
applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the
certificate.