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CLIMATE REFUGEES, INSECURITY AND UNCERTAINTY - A

LITERATURE REVIEW 

Anagha L

ABSTRACT 

The threat of Climate change is looming large before us. The displacement of millions of people
broadly referred to as 'Climate Refugees’ due to these extreme environmental risks still lack
concrete recognition in the global parlance. The present literature review aims to peruse some of the
most pertinent debates around Climate-induced Displacement and the status of Climate Refugees.
At the outset, we look at the need to clearly define ‘Climate Refugees’ and how the lack of
definition impacts vulnerable communities living on smaller islands like Maldives, Kiribati, Tuvalu,
and Marshall. Further, the paper delves into the impact of climate-related migration in developing
countries and its non-conclusive link to instability and conflict. Probing the Feasibility and
Appropriateness of an International Treaty to tackle Climate Displacement, the paper finally mulls
over ‘Who should take responsibility for Climate Refugees’.

INTRODUCTION 

“If you were faced with the threat of the disappearance of your nation, what would you do?”

-Enele Sopoaga, PM of Tuvalu, at the United Nations Climate Summit in Peru, 2014

The visible extreme climatic events like wildfires, super cyclones and rising sea levels have kept
the ordeal of more than a billion people permanently displaced due to them shrouded in silence
(Christian Aid, 2007). Though the body of literature on climate change and refugees has been
growing, it is still fragmented, understudied, and in dire need of robust evidence (Piguet et al., 2011,
United Nations Task Team on Social Dimensions of Climate Change, 2011). Lester Brown of the
Worldwatch Institute in the 1970s first introduced the concept of ‘Climate Refugees’ (White, 2011),
which ironically still finds no place in the domain of international law for it is denounced to be
“scientifically and legally problematic” (IPCC, 2014). An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report recently stated that there will be an estimated 200 million climate migrants
by 2050, this alarming estimate has been accepted widely, calling for timely action and aid to
prevent displacements triggered by climate change (Brown, 2008).
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Methods

The variety of methods and techniques used across the literature offer different insights into a
web of complex variables surrounding Climate Change, Displacement and Human Societies.
McAdam (2011) majorly relies on her vast fieldwork in Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Bangladesh to refute
the much-suggested international treaty for climate refugees. She also uses direct interviews with
Government officials to bring out practical on-ground ideas into action. Whereas Wennersten and
Robbins (2017) analyse the existing literature and involve their personal experiences and
observations to let the audience know the situation of these climate refugees. 

Ahmed (2017) uses a combination of evidence-based research and case example led approach
where he leverages Bangladesh to suggest some nations are getting disproportionately impacted
than others. He also uses numerical methods to quantify the exact quantum of responsibility for the
top 20 countries. Bates (2002) and Salehyan (2005) primarily use ex post facto research and
published research reports. Bates (2002) leverages existing research to create a theoretical
framework for the classification of refugees based on migration causes. Salehyan (2005) on the
other hand examines pathways to migration and potential conflict in receiving regions.

Defining Climate Refugees: Starting the Conversation

The incessant floods in July 2021 and consequent landslides saw many people displaced in
Chiplun, a small coastal town of Maharashtra. August 2021 saw extensive destruction of property
and evacuation of villages in Southern Greece. And most recently, hurricane Ida forced evacuations
of hundreds from parts of the United States. Some moved out voluntarily, but many mandatorily
evacuated. But how does one define these mass movements of people driven by extreme climate
events? Is the term climate refugees apt for them? The causality between environmental factors
affecting human mobility and population flows is well-established. But the 'newness' due to the
underlying anthropogenic causes and its relative speed (McAdam, 2011) lacks the classification that
Bates (2002) addresses in her research paper titled ‘Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human
Migrations Caused by Environmental Change’. 

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a refugee as someone
forced to flee their country because of persecution, war, or violence. It does not mention
displacement caused due to climate factors. United National Environmental Programme (UNEP)
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researcher Essam El-Hinnawi (1985) first suggested environmental refugees as those people forced
to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental
disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously
affected the quality of their life [sic]. However, El-Hinnawi (1985) failed to distinguish
environmental refugees from other types of migrants. Neither did he differentiate between the types
of environmental refugees, according to Bates (2002). For instance, El-Hinnawi (1985) makes no
distinction between those who flee due to volcanic eruptions or due to declining soil quality.

Bates (2002) instead proposes a classification scheme with three broad categories- disasters,
expropriations, and deteriorations. She also asserts that such classifications will allow researchers
and policymakers to specify similarities and differences between these population flows. This
method will help identify the underlying causes and offer more helpful ideas to prevent and relieve
the growing numbers of people displaced by environmental change. McAdam (2011) voices her
doubt over the use of the term ‘Survival Migration’ and calls for moving away from causal focus to
include multiple stressors as it may render it conceptually indistinct and practically unworkable.
Defining ‘Climate Refugees’ may also harden the distinctions without according to dynamics of
time effect, geography, differential impact and own needs of the people. 

Losing Ground: Vulnerable communities on smaller islands 

The undefined legal status of environmental migrants severely impacts the vulnerable
communities, mainly those living on the edges of the coast or smaller islands. For instance, one in
ten people living on the tiny pacific island countries of Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu has migrated over
the past decade but cannot be classified as refugees. Those left behind live in looming fear of being
gulped by the sea. In Chapter 3, What Happens When Your Country Drowns? In the book, Rising
Tides: Climate Refugees in the 21st Century, authors John Wennersten and Dennis Robbins (2017)
put a face to this phenomenon by focusing on how individuals suffer due to the lack of recognition
of the term ‘climate refugees’ internationally. 

The authors describe the case study of Teitiota, a resident of Kiribati island in the central Pacific
Ocean who was denied permanent residence by New Zealand because the term climate change
refugees didn’t fit into the half-century-old definition of refugees. In addition to Kiribati, the
authors share the case studies of islands like Maldives, Tuvalu and many others which drown
silently in the rising sea. With every inch of rising sea level, the people decide to migrate but can’t,
because the “climate refugees” fall outside the purview of refugees. The conceptual and empirical
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flaw of the simplistic cause and effect relationship between climate change and migration has been
warned about by many authors. Citing a Kiribati Government official, the author highlights how
climate change compounds the pre-existing pressures of poverty, overcrowding, unemployment,
etc. and may provide a ‘tipping point’ that would not have reached in its absence. Left with no
option but to see their motherland, their homes drown in the ocean of selfishness and greediness of
some carbon-emitting nations. 

Wennersten and Robbins (2017) try to use exposition as a form of narration and secondary
sources by stating already acknowledged facts and comprehensively researched analysis-making it
highly accessible for non-expert readers. To be fair, one of the critiques of the book is that neither
writer is a migration scholar (Robbins is a journalist and Wennersten is an environmental historian),
which lacks the book in its scientific rigour. As a result, the analysis of the book is greatly
dependent on the news media and grey literature minimally dealing with peer-reviewed academic
research. Interestingly, it is like an evident mirror image that is awaiting the attention that is
significantly required. The authors still manage to trigger an urgent wake-up call demanding
sustainable solutions to the millions living on islands whose future is bleak.

Impact on developing nations 

Maria W. (2015) in her research paper titled ‘The Effects of Climate Change on Internal and
International Migration: Implications for Developing Countries’ has taken an in-depth look into the
migration patterns of concerned people which include the causes of migration, differentiating
between the terminologies ‘refugees’, the role of Governments as well as economic impacts.
McAdam (2011) studies the socio-economic factors underlying migration movements, thus
identifies regular and lawful movement as an option exercised by wealthier and low skilled but
financially stable demographics. At the same time, internal circular migration provides people
alternative livelihoods and a way to send back remittances. McAdam (2011) also highlights innate
human attachment to land and culture as an inhibiting factor to movement. Reliance on traditional
knowledge and physical adaptation like raising houses on the plinth and adjusted farming
techniques prevails in these conditions.

Maria W. (2015) extensively focuses on developing countries that are more affected by climate
change compared to the developed countries. Although as per experts, developing countries at
present are indeed at greater risk of climate change, it also poses a threat to developed countries. It
is so because most developed countries are dependent on developing countries such as India as well
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as others in Asia for food supply so if any climatic calamity takes place the developed countries are
also affected. As a result, it will still be an overstatement to say that developed countries will be any
better in the long run than the developing countries. Another point of contention is the statement
made by the author regarding international migration, where it was stated that international
migration is more useful than internal migration. In this scenario, it can be said that in the case of
international migration the author does not consider the political restraints where sections of
citizens are opposed to migration. So, unless those sections too accept the idea of climate change-
based migration, this process will not be sustainable as it might lead to conflicts between the local
population and migrants. As a result, due to a lack of political will and coordinated efforts renders
these millions of refugees in limbo (McAdam, 2011).

Conflict and instability 

The empirical record on this aspect of climate displacement is still inconclusive and sometimes
considered controversial. But there have been some anecdotal case studies linking such
displacement with conflict. In the paper ‘Refugees, Climate Change and Instability’, author Idean
Salehyan (2005) analyses the link of climate-related migration with sporadic violence such as
assault, property damage and organised violence such as rebellion and insurgency. Salehyan (2005)
discerns the causes of both migration and its conflicts. Instability after migration mainly occurs over
competition for limited resources among people when they see a visible decline in their living
conditions. Future climate changes are touted to amplify stresses which are dangerous than violence
after migration. Migration has fewer negative impacts, but the conflicts created by migration and
classic refugees are very dangerous. The relationship between the sending and receiving areas or
countries are often strained in the process of human movements.

Salehyan (2005) highlights the positive impacts of migration and how it contributes to the
development of the receiving areas. The influx of migrants adds to the labour strength offsetting the
resource consumption and helping the local economy. Violence is the exception and not the norm,
however, conflict is certainly possible if receiving areas and the Government do not take proactive
steps to reduce tensions. Salehyan (2005) suggests that revision of citizenship laws, facilitation of
language acquisition and public education programs among migrants can be helpful. But, by
performing only these programs, there will not be a perfect solution for all problems. Climate
changes occur mainly due to human activities. Industrialization, greed, and mass consumption of
resources are the few main reasons. Ahmed (2017) refers to the Refugee and Migratory Movements
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Research Unit (RMMRU) at the University of Dhaka that has suggested that migration should not
be treated with fear rather as a survival strategy.

McAdam (2011), however, voices her doubt over the use of the term ‘survival migration’
moving away from causal focus to include multiple stressors as it may render it conceptually
indistinct and practically unworkable. She points out the regional efforts already in place to manage
Climate Displacement. Kiribati has family migration options to secure merits-based access to
neighbouring countries like Australia and New Zealand. In a way, state support intends to create
pockets of Kiribati culture and tradition to enable gradual resettlement and helping the rest to stay
back in the country. Such movement reinforces historical migration patterns. Bangladesh intends to
export trained labour to benefit from remittances but those who migrate may not be climate-affected
but just wealthy enough to leave the country. 

Global Collaboration, a Sine Qua Non but who takes the responsibility?

Extreme Climate Change events globally have always brought in calls for an international treaty
to deal with Climate displacement on the lines of the international Refugee Convention. McAdam
(2011) identifies inspiration for treaty calls to the Refugee Convention, UNFCCC Copenhagen
2009 and initiatives by Maldives, Bangladesh and Australia which aimed to define ‘climate change
refugees’, ‘guarantees of assistance’, ‘shared responsibility’, etc with an underlying ‘rights-based
framework’. Climate refugees because of climate change is an unfortunate but real outcome facing
the world and the absence of any international convention these refugees end up in refugee camps
with an uncertain future. 

In this context, Ahmed (2017) attempts an ambitious task to suggest a potential solution to the
question: ‘Who should take the responsibility of climate refugees?’. According to this paper, the
liable countries (i.e., the most polluting countries in the world) are to take the responsibility of
accommodating climate refugees arising from the ‘victim’ countries (which are suffering the most).
The author runs a model and concludes that 20 most industrialized countries that account for almost
82% of the total carbon emissions in the world should take maximum responsibility for the overall
share of climate refugees in the proportion of the parameters as shown in the following table.
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Table 1: Scaling the parameters for Climate Refugee distribution (Ahmed 2017)

Ahmed (2017) has used Bangladesh as a case study to explain that certain countries (defined as
‘victims’) are significantly impacted without contributing in the same proportion to pollution and
carbon emissions. He also argues that many victim countries are in a state of vulnerability and have
low DRR (disaster risk reduction) strategies because of their history of oppression caused by wars,
economic instability, geopolitics, public administration, and cultural aspects. (Wisner et al., 2004)

However, there are few elements to consider in further detail:

 While the logic of proportionate impact makes intuitive sense, low DRR given historical past can
only be justified on a case-to-case basis with significant subjectivity involved. One can argue
that countries that are as vulnerable as Bangladesh (given the topography) should have
accelerated investment in better DRR (with help from developmental organizations that have
been generous with them). Several local factors inhibit better investments in DRR than just the
troubled past and hence unclear how much accountability for the same should be taken up by
other countries. The potential solution is an accelerated investment in DRR through current
international grants etc.
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 Second, while calculating the responsibility, it is not clear whether the author considers net or
gross effect. Prima facie it appears that the responsibility of the top 20 countries is based on the
total pollution and carbon emission they are contributing. However, many of these countries
themselves are facing several climate-related challenges (e.g., flash floods, hurricanes in the US)
and hence the responsibility of climate refugees from other countries should potentially be the
basis net effect of the challenges that they are themselves facing. For example, if more than 10%
of the impacted population resides in the US, their responsibility will potentially only be towards
their populations. 

 Third, there is an everlasting debate of stock vs flow. Several industrialized nations have high
total carbon emissions but low incremental emissions while several industrializing countries
have significantly higher incremental emissions. While it is difficult to argue one vs the other, it
will be interesting to see if the responsibilities shift significantly if the flow effect is taken into
consideration. 

 Lastly, the concept of few taking responsibilities sounds like a great suggestion, it seems quite
far-fetched in its practical approach. Also, there is no mention of how the execution will be
carried out in absence of any mutually agreed global convention. The author has narrated the
example of how the USA suddenly opted out of the 2015 Paris Agreement in June 2017 which
proves that all-inclusive international concurrence to fight climate change seems missing at this
stage in the absence of which this approach may not work. Support to accelerate DRR
improvement in vulnerable countries can be the immediate priority instead of pinning the blame
on a few and asking them to take responsibility.

McAdam (2011) in her support of DRR writes that treaty negotiations get bogged down by
linguistic detail, it becomes an excuse for inaction rather than immediate measures-which could
allow people to stay within their homes. Migration may mostly be internal, gradual, short-term
rather than spontaneous flight and thus may not necessitate an international response as seen in the
disaster-response of Bangladeshis. The disciplinary constraints of the International Law regime that
raise the ‘particular’ to ‘universal’ impede global common treaties. There is a need for dispassionate
empirical research that discerns between a rights-based framework to a needs-based approach

Gaps and Opportunities 

The literature in the domain of Climate Displacement is still under development and consolidation
and has its own limitations.
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1. There is an extensive focus on smaller/developing nations implying that the developing nations
seem to be the only ones bearing the brunt while the developed ones are the guilty parties.
Potentially the developed nations are equally if not more impacted, an idea that is less
researched and focused on. 

2. Defining Climate Refugees has only seen lackadaisical attempts - Neither has there been a
complete rejection of the need for a term nor an attempt to creating space for a newer and more
comprehensive definition which has led the concept to be shrouded in vagueness and causing
inconsistencies in decision-making especially when it comes to global collaboration e.g.,
Canada has been granting Climate-visas, but other countries do not recognise such idea
politically.

3. Limited evidence-based research leaves a door open to conjectures. Multicausality of Climate

Displacement has been shrouded in debates. Establishing Climate as the reason behind
Displacement is not a simple exercise. Many variables like socio-economic factors act
simultaneously. The dearth of quantitative research also delays the attempts to quantify
responsibility.

4. Lack of consensus on some topics especially on the efficacy of international treaty tends to
create more hurdles than solutions. Given most of the movements are internal migrations within
the country, there is a difference in opinion whether too much focus on international treaties
takes away attention and focus from the immediate needs that can be addressed locally.

5. While there is adequate focus on social and economic impact, there is not enough focus on
cultural aspects of migration and long-term implications on the culture of the receiving
geography.

6. Limited clarity on execution framework - how either locally or internationally the challenge of
climate refugees will be solved in an accelerated manner limits the efforts. Citizenship and
borders play an important role and there is a limited understanding on how to blur the same.
New Zealand in 2014 recognised a few Tuvalu refugees for residency but many countries push
them back creating stateless entities. International Law falls short on intellectualising these
situations.

7. Focus on post-facto rather than pre-emptive actions - We also noted that most literature
extensively studies the “Refugees”- that is after they have become refugees. Leaving out the
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pre-migration causes, mitigation, and adaptation efforts already in place especially in the
backdrop of slow-onset phenomena like rising sea level.

The gaps are not just limitations but guiding light for further research which can be investigated
and worked upon based on the following questions.

Q1: What would a comprehensive definition of “Climate Refugees” be like?

Q2. What Legal frameworks can be put in place for the rights and safety of Climate Refugees?

Q3. How can a global consensus be brought in international conventions to agree on norms for
Climate Displacement Migrants? How can hyper nationalism impact the decision-making
process?

Q4: Where will the finance come in for the climate refugees recovery? What economic impacts will
be faced by different countries?

Q5: What is the impact of climate displacement on human civilisations and urbanisation?

Q6: Who are the different actors and their roles in dealing with climate displacement at domestic and
international levels?

Q7: What are the geopolitical and socio-cultural impacts around the theme of climate refugees? 

Q8: What will be the future of the climate refugees after forced displacement from their hometowns
in context to shelter, health, education, livelihoods, and citizenship?

CONCLUSION

The literature and research on Climate Displacement are relatively new and dynamic intending to
influence global and local initiatives that would aid the visibility of the silent plight of Climate
refugees. While the debates surrounding the Definition of Climate Refugees are still inconclusive,
Climate refugees are struggling for reasons beyond their control and have no door to seek help
(Bates, 2002). The direct causality between Climate Change and Displacement is also shrouded in
debates, various factors ranging from environmental stress and socio-economic causes play a part in
inducing people to move (Salehyan, 2005). This complex interplay has guided the discussion to a
nuanced exploration wherein traditional methods and guided migrations at bilateral and regional
levels seek to achieve human security (McAdam, 2011). The slow onset of climate events like sea-
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level rise provides a rare opportunity to plan, rather than resorting to remedial measures of flight.
Thus, caution must be exercised against squeezing all forms of ‘forced’ movement into a protection
paradigm. The dire need for evidence-based research remains the need of the hour which can bring
in better understanding and promote action. Ahmed (2017) reiterates that climate migrants be
treated with respect and has cited that climate refugees “be entitled to democratic accountability,
ecological sustainability and social justice (CorpWatch, 2002)”. Climate change knows no borders
and hence climate change policies and even migration policies greatly rely on the international
community and collaboration (Maria W.,2015). Thus, without completely rejecting an international
solution or waiting for it, adaptation and mitigation frameworks centred on the needs of the people
will pave a path to robust response without getting trapped over inconclusive debates.

They (climate refugees) watch….

             With every inch of sea-level rise, their homeland, their country, their ethnicity drowns!
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REFERENCES: SELECTED LITERATURE

1. Bates, Diane C. 2002. Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by

Environmental Change, Sam Houston State University.

2. Ahmed, Bayes. 2017. “Who takes responsibility for the climate refugees?” International Journal of
Climate Change Strategies and Management Vol. 10 No. 1, 2018 pp. 5-26. Emerald Publishing
Limited 1756-8692, 2017.

3. McAdam, J. 2011. “Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty Is
Not the Answer.” International Journal of Refugee Law 23 (1): 2–27. 

4. Salehyan, I. 2005. "Refugees, Climate changes and Instability. "

5. Maria W. 2015. The effect of climate change on internal and international migration: implications
for developing countries. Center for Climate Change Economics and Policy.

6. Wennersten, John R, and Denise Robbins. 2017. “Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the 21st
Century.” New York: Oxford University Press.

OTHER REFERENCES 

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19. Faber, Daniel, and Christina Schlegel. 2017. “Give Me Shelter from the Storm: Framing the
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