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Social Unrest and Rebellion in Jiangnan during the Six Dynasties
Author(s): William G. Crowell

Source: Modern China, Vol. 9, No. 3, Symposium: Peasant Rebellions in China (Jul., 1983),
pp. 319-354
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Social Unrest and Rebellion
in Jiangnan
During the Six Dynasties
WILLIAM G. CROWELL
United States Information Agency
In an effort to make China's history conform to the Marxian

model, historians in the People's Republic of China for many
years have resorted to seeing peasant rebellion as the embodiment
of class struggle, which in the Marxist view is the motivating force
of history. As a consequence, what seems to many non-Marxist
historians to be an inordinate amount of attention has been
devoted to "peasant rebellions" and "peasant wars." The number
of articles and books that has been devoted to the subject is
probably greater than that for any other topic, with the possible
exception of the problem of periodization. As with the periodiza-
tion question, many of these pieces strike the non-Marxist reader
as strained attempts to force the data into a Marxian mold, and
many Western historians have tended to view these efforts with
bemusement or even contempt.'
Granting that the level of analysis in some of the Chinese
writings on peasant rebellions borders on the sophomoric, to
dismiss these writings as simply ideological hackwork would be
unwise. While the Chinese Marxian interpretation is fraught with
weaknesses, it has drawn the attention of historians-non-
Marxist as well as Marxist-to a striking aspect of China's his-
tory, namely, the almost constant problem of social unrest and
Modern China, Vol. 9 No. 3, July 1983 319-354

? 1983 Sage Publications, Inc.
319
320 MODERN CHINA / JULY 1983
rebellion throughout the 2000 year existence of the Chinese

empire. The problem is of such magnitude that probably it is no
exaggeration to say that not a single year had passed without riot
or rebellion somewhere in the Chinese empire. A recently pub-
lished collection of material concerning uprisings during the Six
Dynasties period compiled by Zhang Zexin and Zhu Dawei
(Zhang and Zhu, 1980) lists 537 episodes between A.D. 196 and
578, and this compilation is not complete. This was, of course, a
time of extraordinary upheaval and is therefore somewhat atypi-
cal. Even so, China has passed through a number of such periods,
and uprisings were not uncommon even during periods of relative
dynastic stability. Failure to recognize this fact is failure to take
into account one of the most important constants of the social
history of imperial China.
The problem then is not so much whether or not rebellion and
social protest were important factors in the history of imperial
China, but rather to ascertain what historical function they
served. To understand this, it is necessary to determine the causes
of these rebellions and to assess what they reveal about the
tensions existing in the Chinese empire at a given time. Important
to such an understanding is an adequate taxonomy of these
uprisings that will enable us to understand more clearly the forces
and tensions that gave rise to them.
Historians in contemporary China have offered typologies of
rebellions, but Zhang and Zhu (1980) admit in their introduction
that the problem of classification is complex. They divide their
materials into three categories:
(1) Peasant wars, including Han Chinese peasant uprisings, as

well as uprisings of allied Han and minority peoples.
(2) Struggles of resistance by minority peoples against feudal
government.
(3) [The category that] includes bandits killing commandery
administrators, slaves killing their masters, unregistered plun-
derers [i.e., those who were not registered on the population
registers], mutinies, and miscellaneous incidents of class
struggle [Zhang and Zhu, 1980: Preface, 2].
Crowell / SIX DYNASTIES 321
This typology leaves much to be desired if we wish to under-

stand social unrest and rebellion during the Six Dynasties. Zhu
and Zhang are interested only in incidents that are manifestations
of "class struggle," and so they would omit all others. Even so,
their collection is very inclusive, and they expect that further
research will demonstrate that some of the cases they have
included are not in fact examples of class struggle (Zhang and
Zhu, 1980: Preface 2).
There is a need then for a typology that will permit inclusion of
all cases of social unrest and rebellion, not just manifestations of
"class struggle." This, however, is the problem: What should we
use as the basis for establishing these categories? Discussions by
historians in China have usually focussed upon such things as the
class background and sympathies of the rebel leadership, the
ideology and slogans of the rebels, the degree to which a rebellion
contributed to historical evolutionary development, and so forth
(Harrison, 1969). Such criteria, however, are often difficult to
apply to Six Dynasties rebellions. In a period of such turmoil and
change it would be difficult to determine with certainty the extent
to which a particular rebellion might have contributed to long
term change; however, we shall argue that rebellion in fact did not
lead to such change in imperial China but rather contributed to
the durability of the empire. Often it is impossible to know
precisely the class background of the rebel leadership. The cases
for which we do have such knowledge are so few as to make this
criterion useless.
As for rebellions during the Six Dynasties, it is hard to deter-
mine the intentions or the motives of many of the rebels. The
sources record rebel slogans only infrequently; letters and state-
ments of purpose such as the graphic pieces included by E. J.
Hobsbawm in the appendices to his Primitive Rebels (1959) are
not to be found in the official histories for this period. It is,
therefore, difficult to ascertain whether a particular bandit might
have been a "social bandit" intent upon robbing from the rich and
giving to the poor, or whether he was simply a run-of-the-mill
plunderer.
Despite these difficulties, it is possible to formulate a typology

of rebellions using a number of different criteria. In order to
examine social unrest and rebellion during the Six Dynasties, we
propose to establish six categories: (1) rebellions resulting from
natural disaster and famine; (2) rebellions against government
exploitation-specifically, excessive taxation and conscription;
(3) rebellions in which religion was the dominant element; (4)
localist or separatist rebellions; (5) ethnic disturbances; and (6)
ordinary banditry and piracy Political rebellions, such as those
led by Wang Dun and Su Jun, are omitted because they were
primarily concerned with factional struggle in the higher levels of
government. In other words, they were conflicts among members
of'the ruling elite instead of attacks upon the rulers by the ruled.2
For the purposes of this article, the sample has been limited to
Jiangnan, specifically to the region known throughout most of
the Six Dynasties period as Yangzhou. This has been done prim-
arily to keep the subject manageable. To include all cases from all
parts of China during this period would require a study of enor-
mous proportions. Moreover, the types of disturbances found in
the Jiangnan region are typical of those found throughout the
Chinese empire (including the North) at this time, although the
proportions of the different types might have varied from region
to region. Finally, the economic and political importance of the
region-both during the Six Dynasties and subsequently-makes
it particularly interesting.
REBELLIONS CA USED BY NA TURAL DISASTER

AND FAMINE
Natural disaster and famine were constants in the lives of the

Chinese peasantry. During the Han, the central government had
tried to maintain mechanisms for providing relief-ever-normal
granaries, tax rescissions, relocation, and so on. In the chaos of
the post-Han period, however, many of these mechanisms broke
down or at least did not function as efficiently as they once had.3
The result was that starving peasants resorted to methods that
occurred under the Han mainly during periods of turmoil and
administrative breakdown. These might include eating grass,

bark, and leaves, selling one's goods or perhaps one's wife and
children, and banditry.
The connection between famine and banditry has long been
noted. Predation has always been an important survival tech-
nique during famine,4 so it should be no surprise that during the
Six Dynasties banditry and plundering often followed closely on
the heels of flood, famine, and drought. The History of the Wei
Dynasty records that in 464-465 "in the San Wu region [i.e., Wu
commandery, Wuxing commandery, and Guiji commandery]
there was great famine... Plunderers swarmed up and the dead
were innumerable" (Wei Shou, 1974: 97/2145; Zhang and Zhu,
1980: 172). During the Zhong datong period (529-535) of the
Liang dynasty, we are told that Wu commandery suffered a bad
harvest and that bandits acted openly (Yao and Yao, 1973:
36/525; Li Yanshou, 1975: 60/1476; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: no.
264). At about the same time (in 530) the heir apparent submitted
a memorial concerning the problem of famine resulting from
flood in Wuxing commandery He noted that in the eastern
regions if the price of grain were high, frequently bandits would
appear (Yao and Yao, 1973: 8/168; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: no.
260).
The number of such cases could be multiplied for all of China.
These, however, suffice to demonstrate what might be reasonably
expected: During periods of famine, banditry increased markedly.
Presumably after the famine passed, most of the peasants cum
bandits returned to their fields, although some may have decided
to remain full-time bandits of the sort we will discuss later. The
solution to this kind of social unrest was obvious: prevent famine.
Effecting this solution, however, was rarely easy.
PROTESTAGAINST GO VERNMENT OPPRESSION
During most periods of China's history, including the Six

Dynasties, popular reaction to government oppression-that is,
to excessive taxation and conscription-was an important factor
324 MODERN CHINA / JUL Y 1983
in many uprisings. As an element of social unrest, it operated in

two situations.
The first involved those who, in order to escape taxation and
conscription had managed to keep their names off the house-
hold registers-frequently referred to as "the nameless" (wang
ming). These people often took refuge in the mountains and other
uninhabited areas where they frequently drifted into banditry. At
times, the numbers of the nameless bandits could grow to several
thousand-enough to pose a serious threat to local government
control. During the Daming reign period (457-465) for example,
several thousand of these nameless types ranged over Yi and Xi
prefectures of Xinan commandery in western Yangzhou destroy-
ing towns and killing prefectural officials (Shen Yue, 1959:
83/2114, 2116; Sima Guang, 1957: 133/4163; Zhang and Zhu,
1980: 193). In another case at the end of the Eastern Jin, a bandit
leader assembled many of "the nameless" into a gang with which
he terrorized Wukang prefecture in Wuxing commandery. His
band was so strong that neither prefectural nor commandery
officials were willing to try to bring him to heel (Shen Yue, 1959:
48/1422; Li Yanshou, 1975: 16/457; Wang Qinrou, 1960: 705/
8401; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: n. 164). Bandits of this sort can be
considered to be professional and properly belong to our fifth
category. In contrast to this type, there were peasants who were
normally law-abiding, but who felt driven to rebel, or allowed
themselves to become the manpower of rebel leaders because of
the extraordinary demands that were being made upon the pea-
sants. The connection between the burdens of government service
and rebellion was understood by Zheng Xianzhi, the Chamber-
lain for Ceremonials during the final years of the Eastern Jin. In
418 when Liu Yu (future founding emperor of the Liu Song
dynasty) was planning a campaign against the north, Zheng
advised against making additional demands on the populace,
noting that "The San Wu are among the loyal areas. The reason
various prefectures there have been frequently overrun is because
of excessive conscription" (Shen Yue, 1959: 64/1697; Sima
Guang, 1957: 118/3722; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: n. 172). In other
words, the peasants had been driven to attack the seats of prefec-
tural government.
The most important popular protest against conscription dur-

ing the Six Dynasties occurred as part of the rebellion of Tang
Yuzhi in 484-485. Because of the relative wealth of information
about Tang's rebellion, it might be useful to describe it briefly.
As is well known, throughout the Eastern Jin and Southern
Dynasties household registration was a shambles. There were
problems associated with registering those who had become the
dependents of powerful nobles and those who had absconded in
order to escape corvee. Emigres who had fled the nomadic in-
vaders of the north also posed a problem in registration. Finally,
there was the difficulty of registering those who had perpetrated
census fraud in order to remain exempt from tax and corvee. To
cope with the problems of census fraud and dependents, the
government ordered a series of census audits to ferret out those
who were incorrectly registered. Falsified registers were "re-
turned"-presumably to the local officials who had been respon-
sible for compiling them in the first place. Between 467-474 a total
of 71,000 registers were said to have been "returned" (Xiao Zi-
xian, 1971: 34/609). Acording to one estimate, this constituted
38% of the taxable households (Zhu, 1978: 197-180). In 480-
following the founding of the Southern Qi-a special office was
established to handle these audits, and the audits were conducted
with a vengeance (Li Yanshou, 1975: 47/1178-1179; 77/1928;
Xiao Zixian, 1971: 44/776-777; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: n. 229).
The primary purpose of all this, of course, was to tighten up
household registration in order to make conscription and taxa-
tion more efficient.
As might be expected, the census audit created a large body of
disaffected peasantry who had become liable for taxation and
corvee. They were a ripe source of manpower for any rebel leader
who could gather them. When Tang (for reasons of his own that
are discussed below) began his rebellion, some 30,000 persons
whose registers had been returned for correction joined him. The
result was a rebellion that spread throughout the Guiji region and
withstood suppression for nearly a year.
Whether an outgrowth of natural disaster or of governmental
oppression, rebellion was a reaction to threats to the peasants'
livelihood. Natural disaster took from the peasant household the
very food by which it sustained itself. Conscription-even when

there was no famine-drained away able-bodied labor power and
thus increased the threat of hunger. Officials of the time recog-
nized this fact (Shen Yue, 1959: 64/ 1697). Thus, for peasants
facing ruin, rebellion became a means of self-preservation. Yet in
the process, violent resistance to conscription and tax officers
brought destruction to government offices, commercial estab-
lishments, and entire villages. Often rebellion among the poor
became inner directed: peasant preyed upon peasant. In short,
rebellion generally disturbed the social order, and this prompted
the government to undertake a series of measures to forestall
social unrest (as discussed below).
RELIGIOUS REBELLION
In the third type of rebellion, religion played a significant

role-either as cause or as organizing principle. Although
religion-especially Daoism-was important in rebellions through-
out China (Seidel, 1969-1970) it seems to have been especially
significant in Yangzhou. Chen Yinke very early pointed out the
close association between Daoism and the coastal region encom-
passed by San Wu, as well as the connection between Daoism and
rebellion in the area (Chen Yinke, 1971: 271-298).
History knows of many rebellions spurred on by the vision of a
better world to come, of attempts to overthrow the existing order
in preparation for an impending millenium. By the Six Dynasties,
China had already experienced several of these-perhaps the best
known being the Yellow Turban Rebellion of the mid-second
century (Michaud, 1958; Levy, 1956, 1960-1961; Eichhorn,
1954a: 325-332). The typical religious rebellion developed from a
visionary leader who generally claimed to have communicated
directly with the gods and who would enthrall ("delude" is the
term used by the official historians) the impoverished peasantry
with promises of a better life. Having gathered a following, he
would then lead them in attacking the symbols of the estab-
lishment-such as governmental offices-and often supplanted
these with a new administrative structure, sometimes one that had
theocratic aspects. Some of these uprisings had the support of
factions within the government (as was the case with the eunuchs
who were in collusion with the Yellow Turbans). All of these
elements were present in three rebellions of the fifth century.
The best known and the largest of the religious rebellions in the
Yangzhou region during this period was the rebellion of Sun En.
It has been described in detail elsewhere (Eichhorn, 1954a,
1954b); a brief review here will suffice to point out some of the
salient elements of religious rebellion during this period.
Sun En was the nephew of a Daoist adept, Sun Tai, who had
close ties with members of the imperial family and who held a
number of posts in the local government of the San Wu region.
Thinking, with good reason, that the Jin was on the point of
collapse, Sun Tai had plotted its overthrow but had been found
out and executed (Fang Xuanling, 1974: 100/2632; Eichhorn,
1954a: 336). In A.D. 399, Sun En gathered together a following,
launched an attack against Guiji, and captured it. His army
slaughtered many officials, and he is said to have developed a
following of several hundred thousand strong from a disaffected
populace quite soon. He established his base in Guiji, and
adopted the title of "General Subduing the East." His followers
were called "the long-lived" (changsheng ren); those who did not
join him-including children and infants-were massacred.
Imperial armies led by Liu Laozhi and Xie Yan were dis-
patched to subjugate Sun. Sun's army began to plunder the
region, burning granaries, filling in wells, chopping down trees,
and looting. His followers put children who were unable to keep
up with the moving army into sacks and tossed them into the
water, saying, "We congratulate you on first ascending to the Hall
of Immortals! We shall follow you shortly."
Initially, Sun planned to attack the capital at Jiankang, but
when he learned of the army being sent against him, he reconsi-
dered and decided to set up a separatist regime in the Guiji area.
As the imperial army drew near, however, he reconsidered once
more and decided to flee by sea-presumably to some offshore
islands. In A.D. 400, he launched another attack against the Guiji
region and defeated the imperial armies that had been stationed
there to guard against his return. Once more, however, he was
eventually driven back into the sea. Sun continued to raid towns
along the coast, and then in 401 he moved up the Yangzi toward
the capital. But, in the eighth month he was decisively defeated by
imperial forces. Sun's support melted away, and he repaired to his
island redoubt off the coast. In 402, he launched a valedictory
foray against the mainland at Linhai, southeast of Guiji. Accord-
ing to one account, he was captured and beheaded, and his head
was sent to the capital (Fang Xuanling, 1974: 10/155; Eichhorn,
1954a: 351 n. 94). But, according to his biography, hejumped into
the ocean to drown himself, and his followers-declaring that
Sun had become a water sprite-jumped in after him (Fang
Xuanling, 1974: 100/2634).
There can be no doubt that religion played a major role in the
launching of Sun's rebellion. Obviously religion also was impor-
tant to his followers, who may have considered themselves to be
the "chosen." The large-scale massacre of nonbelievers would
certainly suggest that this was SO.6 But with most uprisings,
people joined for a variety of reasons. Dissatisfaction with an
oppressive government, a desire to stay alive, and the prospect of
booty were all probably important. Since we know virtually
nothing about the way Sun's forces were organized, it is difficult
to know whether they were structured like the Yellow Turbans
and the Five Pecks of Rice groups, or whether they borrowed
their organizational framework from the imperial government.
Sun's adoption of the title of "General Subduing the East'"7
suggests that the latter was the case, while the use of terms such as
"the long-lived" suggests that there may have been a mixture.
Another rebellion inspired by religion was led by Gao Du, a
resident of Fan prefecture in South Pengcheng commandery.
Gao, with a pair of Buddhist monks, claimed to have received
"dragon and phoenix signs" from the spirits. The trio also said
that they often heard the sounds of flutes and drums, and with
these signs they enticed others into following them. The plotted
rebellion with a certain Lan Hongqui of Moling-a prefecture
just south of the Southern Dynasties capital at Jiankang (present-
day Nanjing). They also establishd contacts with a number of
officials in the central government including Miao Yun (General
Within The Palace), Yan Xinzhi (Auxiliary Gentleman Mounted
Attendant), Yan Qianzuan (Administrator in the Bureau of the
Minister of Public Works), and Cheng Nong, Wang Dian, and

others (who were Commandants in the Bureau of the Grand
Preceptor). Despite their high-sounding titles, none of these posi-
tions was particularly powerful although they all were strategi-
cally located within the palace. On the night of the first day of the
eighth lunar month of the second year of the Daming reign period
(458/8/25), the rebels attacked the palace gates and seized the
Grand Preceptor Wang Yigong. They divided up their men and
attacked a number of high officials, following which they pro-
claimed Gao Du to be emperor. His reign was extremely short-
lived however, and many people in his party were executed. As a
result of this abortive attempt, the emperor declared a series of
restrictions on the activities of Buddhist clergy, and those who did
not observe their vows were to be defrocked (Shen Yue, 1959:
G/ 122, 75/1957, 97/2386; Li Yanshou, 1975: 21/575; Zhang and
Zhu, 1980: n. 192).
It is impossible to know to what extent Gao and the others
actually believed that they were divinely ordained to establish a
new regime. In the absence of more detailed knowledge of their
thoughts, it is possible only to conclude that they were simply
using religious trappings to delude the populace into supporting a
bid to establish a new dynasty with the aid of some low-ranking
officials at court. Yet, their uprising has many of the earmarks of
a chiliastic rebellion, such as divine communication with the
leaders, apparent confidence of success in the face of overwhelm-
ing odds (the rebels' numbers do not seem to have been very great,
considering that they were assaulting the imperial palace), and it
seems likely that they truly believed in the sacredness of their
cause. Furthermore, measures taken by the government suggest
that it considered religion to be the dominant element of the
rebellion. This, however, does not seem to have been the case in
the third rebellion in which religion played a role-the rebellion
of Tang Yuzhi that was described in the preceding section.
Very little is known about Tang. The History of the Southern
Qu (Xiao Zixian, 1971)-our major source on the rebellion-
mentions him only in passing. From these references we can glean
the following: He was from Guiji commandery, and like his father
and grandfather before him, he was a grave diviner. In this
capacity, he was probably consulted concerning the proper loca-

tions for gravesites and he was able to divine about people by
observing their family graves. He may have been a member of the
Heavenly Master Sect of Daoism-the use of the character zhi in
his given name and that of his brother suggests this.8 He was
probably literate and may have actually come from a lower elite
family. In any case, his occupation probably brought him into
frequent contact with local elites.
It was Tang's ability to divine that led him to conclude that he
was destined for greater things. He had observed that his family
gravesite had a "royal aura" (wang qu) about it, and he had found
a gold seal in the nearby mountains-also a sure sign of divine
favor. These, according to the compiler of the History, he used to
"delude" the populace. As described earlier, in 484 Tang assem-
bled 400 followers and began his rebellion. In the spring of the
following year he declared formation of the state of Wu at Qian-
tang and adopted the reign title of "Flourishing Equality" (xing-
ping), a term with possible Daoist connotations of a millenium.
The religious elements in Tang's movement and the official
characterization of him as a "heterodox bandit" (yao zei) not-
withstanding, it is difficult to classify his rebellion as religious.
For, following these initial trappings, Tang's rebellion became
simply an attempt to cast a new regime in the imperial mold. He
declared himself to be king, set up an heir-apparent, and
appointed officials whose titles were the same as those in the
imperial bureaucracy. There was no attempt to create a new order
with titles of religious import such as had been done by the Yellow
Turbans and the Five Pecks of Rice group. Tang seems simply to
have used magical or religious devices to gather a cadre of
devoted followers with which to begin his effort, then to have
taken advantage of a disgruntled populace to swell the ranks of
his armies, and finally to have set about making himself ruler of
southeastern China.
These three rebellions exemplify some of the different ways in
which religious elements might influence rebellion. In Sun En's
rebellion, religious belief was the primary motivating force, and
religious ideas may have influenced the rebels' organizational
framework as well. With Gao Du's uprising as well, religious
belief seems to have been the major impetus to rebel, but it is
Crowell / SIX D YNASTIES 331
impossible to know to what extent it may have influenced the

rebels' organization (if indeed they had any at all). Finally,
although religious thinking may have been important in the early
years of Tang Yuzhi's uprising, it appears that it ceased to be
significant very quickly, and may have only been used as device to
attract a following.
LOCALISTAND SEPARATIST REBELLION
Portions of the Yangzhou region-particularly the area south

of Guiji-were integrated into the empire relatively late (Bielen-
stein, 1959; DeCrespigny, 1968: 140-141), and control over some
areas was still tenuous during the Six Dynasties.
The local populace resisted efforts to bring them under the
effective control of the central government. The desire of various
levels of society to be free from interference from the center is
understandable. The peasantry wanted to escape the burdens of
taxation and conscription, as we have seen in Tang Yuzhi's
attempt to form a separatist state in the Southeast. Powerful and
wealthy local magnates also sought to be free of the restrictions
that the central government might impose on their efforts to
increase their holdings (Crowell, 1979: 235ff.).
Resistance to the centralizing efforts of the southern regimes
frequently resulted in violence. This seems to have been true
particularly during the Three Kingdoms period (A.D. 222-281)
when the state of Wu was seeking to establish hegemony over the
Jiangnan region. While the government might have been able to
establish its control over the lowlands, it ran into difficulty in
trying to extend control to more inaccessible areas (Chen Shou,
1962: 64/1431). The problem was exacerbated by a large non-
Chinese population that fought Han Chinese expansion-a point
that will be discussed below. There was resistance by Han Chinese
settlers as well, many of whom presumably had migrated south-
ward to escape the government in the first place. Thus when Sun
Hao moved his capital up the Yangzi to Wuchang, rebellion
broke out near the former capital of Jianye (later Jiankang, now
Nanjing). A certain Shi Dan assembled several thousand people
who had been chafing under government exactions and led them
in capturing Sun Hao's half-brother, the Marquis of Yongan, Sun
Qian. Shi took Jianye and attempted to issue orders in Qian's

name. These orders were ignored, however, and because Shi's
soldiers had no armor, they were easily defeated. Shi's family was
slaughtered (what happened to Shi is not known), and the hapless
Qian was executed (Chen Shou, 1962: 48/1166, 51/1216; Xu
Song, 1975: 4/6b; Sima Guang, 1957- 79/2500; Zhang and Zhu,
1980: n. 66).
Wu experienced other uprisings in the same region that may
have also been motivated by localist sentiments (Chen Shou,
1962: 48/1154, 60/1393). Under the Western Jin, similar senti-
ments may have contributed to the kidnapping of Sun Chong, a
scion of the then fallen ruling house of Wu, by one Qian Hui of
Wuxing commandery, who tried to set Sun up as king of Wu in
310. The attempt failed miserably. The unfortunate Sun was
dispatched by Qlan, who in turn was decapitated by the imperial
armies, and Qian's head was sent to the emperor in Jiankang
(Fang Xuanling, 1974: 5/20,58/ 1573; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: 95).
A large-scale separatist uprising occurred during the Liu Song
dynasty in 423, and again descendants of the ruling house of the
Three Kingdoms state of Wu may have played a role (Miao, 1963:
2-3; Tang, 1955: 19 no. 2). The rebellion was led by Sun Faguang,
who coincidently came from Fuyang prefecture, the home of
Tang Yuzhi. Little is known about Sun, but he must have come
from a fairly powerful and well-respected family, for in plotting
his rebellion, he was able to rely on kinship ties that appear to
have extended over several neighboring prefectures. Moreover,
when the prefect of Yongxing uncovered the plot and reported it
to the commandery administrator, the latter did not believe the
accusation and charged the administrator with calumny. Sun and
several of his relatives assumed the titles of generals, attacked and
captured Yongxing and Fuyang, and then moved on to attack
Shanyin. The commandery administrator marshalled his forces,
some of which were commanded by members of the elite families
of the region.'0 Despite an initial victory, the rebel forces were
defeated and fell back to their bases at Yongxing. As a result,
some of Sun's supporters, including his relatives, began to desert
him, and his rebellion quickly fell apart (Shen Yue, 1959: 4/64,
52/ 1503-1504; Xiao Zixian, 1971: 30/555, Xu Song 1975: 11/39b;
Wang Qinrou, 1960: 705/8397; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: n. 220).
Separatist elements may have played a role in the rebellion of

Tang Yuzhi as well. Some of his supporters seem to have come
from a wealthy subelite; given the rigid social stratification of the
period which linked the selection of officials to social status, they
may have felt that the only path to high office for them was
through a rebel regime. On the other hand, the established system
greatly benefitted the higher elite families of the region-such as
the Chenjun Xie, the Langye Wang, and the Shanyin Kong-and
when rebellion threatened, they were prepared to rally against the
rebels.
The separatist sentiment that troubled the central government
in the Yangzhou region occurred in three forms. The first and
earliest stemmed from the desire of persons in inaccessible
areas to remain beyond central control. Many of these people
had probably migrated to such places in order to escape the
government and therefore were unreceptive to efforts of the
center to bring them under its authority. Disturbances resulting
from separatism of this sort declined as the southeast was settled.
The second form of separatist sentiment was associated with Wu
loyalism, real or putative, and usually involved members of the
Sun family. Finally, the third type of separatist sentiment may
have been directed at overthrowing the control of a national
superelite and opening up the paths of advancement for a wealthy
local subelite. Although separatist sentiment might be strong, in
the end all attempts to create separatist regimes failed.
ETHNIC DISTURBANCES
As the Han Chinese expanded to the south, they sought to

subjugate the indigenous peoples of southern China. The techno-
logical superiority of the Chinese made such subjugation inevita-
ble. Historians in the People's Republic refer to this period as one
of a "melding" (ronghe) of the different "minorities" with the Han
Chinese (e.g., Wang, 1979: 468). The main group of non-Chinese
in the Jiangnan region were the Yue, and they had little desire to
be assimilated by the Chinese. They had a reputation for being
fractious, and the successive governments of the south were
forced to launch repeated pacilfication expeditions against them.
Disturbances involving the Yue seem to have been especially

common during the late Han - Three Kingdoms period. During
the civil wars that attended the collapse of the later Han, Cao Cao
delegated one Fei Zhan to stir up the Yue in order to create
difficulties for his rival, Sun Quan, who was later to found the
state of Wu. However, Fei appears to have been unsuccessful in
his mission. He and his Yue followers were defeated by a smaller
force dispatched by Sun, and the stronger of his followers were
impressed into Sun's armies, while the weaker were organized
into registered households (Chen Shou 1962: 58/1344; Sima
Guang, 1957: 68/2153; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: n. 72). In this way,
Sun is supposed to have obtained thousands of crack troops and
to have pacified the populace.
Not all of the Yue were pacified: A mere decade later, the Yue
were again creating disturbances in the very same region-the
area covered by Danyang, Wu, and Guiji commanderies (Chen
Shou 1962: 47/ 1133,60/ 1382; Sima Guang, 1957: 70/ 2230; Zhang
and Zhu, 1980: n. 74). In 234 a major campaign led by Zhuge Ke
against the Yue in the Danyang-Wu-Xindu-Poyang-Guiji region
succeeded in dislodging the Yue from their mountain lairs and
resettling them in the lowlands where they could be controlled
more easily (Chen Shou, 1962: 47/1140, 52/1231, 55/1290,
64/ 1431; Sima Guang, 1957: 72/ 2301, 73/3221; Zhang and Zhu,
1980: n. 76).
Following Zhuge Ke's campaign, apparently the Yue ceased to
be a serious problem in Yangzhou, for there is little subsequent
mention of them.11 This does not mean, however, that ethnic
rebellion no longer troubled the Southern Dynasties. In different
parts of China, the Man, the Li, the Liao, and others continued to
provoke disturbances. Furthermore, non-Chinese could play key
roles in nonethnic rebellions-as in the uprising led by Gao Du
who was of Qiang descent. Nevertheless, ethnic rebellion seems to
have become insignificant in Yangzhou after the middle of the
third century. Though "mountain bandits" (shan zei) may have
included many Yue, these too had "melded" in that they were
probably just members of predominantly Chinese bandit gangs
(see Tang, 1955: 7-14).
BANDITS AND PIRA TES
A large number-perhaps the majority-of the disturbances in

the Yangzhou region on which we have information are simply
attributed to "bandits" (zei, dao) or to "pirates" (hai zei) (Chen
Shou, 1962: 48/ 1161, 55/1286-1288, 55/1290-1291, 58/ 1343,
60/ 1379,60/ 1384-1385,60/ 1387; Fang Xuanling, 1974: 64/ 1697,
67/1800; Shen Yue, 1959: 83/2114, 2116; Xiao Zixian, 1971:
26/480; Yao Silian, 1973: 3/74, 15/265, 39/558,42/601,44/616,
53/770-771; Yao and Yao, 1972: 3/45, 10/171, 34/457; Wei
Zheng, 1973: 23/664). The data for these incidents are, for the
most part, meager, and information on the bandits' motives is
nonexistent. Perhaps some of them were the "social bandits"
described by Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm, 1959, 1980). That is, they
may have been driven to banditry by injustice, and may have been
considered by the local population as "righters of wrongs." Cer-
tainly by this time the knight-errant tradition was well established
in China (J.J.Y. Liu, 1967), and though it may have differed
somewhat from the sort of Robin Hood ideal that Hobsbawm
discusses, there are enough similarities to suggest that the knight-
errant tradition could have legitimated (at least in the popular
mind) behavior associated with the Robin Hood ideal. Such
ideas, however, were a threat to orthodoxy and stability, and so
were an anathema to the officials-including official historians.
Thus the sources omit anything that might appear to sanction the
actions of the bandits. With this in mind, we should be careful
about concluding that all bandits were simply freebooters and
robbers.
Even so, it is probably safe to assume that most were mere
plunderers concerned only with booty. The topography and geo-
graphy of Jiangnan were certainly favorable to banditry. The
region is mountainous, or at least hilly, crisscrossed with streams
and rivers, and bordered along the east by the Pacific Ocean: All
of this would have provided bandits with easy escape and places
to hide. Moreover, the region was relatively prosperous, rich in
natural resources, and had been spared the depredations of the
nomadic invaders of the north. In a word, a veritable bandits'
paradise.
The influence of the topography is reflected in references to

mountain bandits. Mountains are the natural refuge of fugitives.
Gathered in the mountains were those who sought to escape
taxation and conscription (the "nameless" types discussed earlier)
(e.g., Shen Yue, 1959: 48/1422), probably many Yue men who
resisted pacification and assimilation, and criminals fleeing cap-
ture and punishment. Finally, there were probably those who had
lost everything through natural disaster or warfare, and thus were
forced to turn to banditry permanently as a means of survival.
Unlike peasants who became bandits only temporarily in order to
get through a period of hardship, for these people the turn to
banditry was a fundamental transformation since they had no
intention of returning to the plow even if that were to become
possible.
The pirates were probably all professionals, rather than per-
sons who had taken to sea during a time of hardship. Possibly
they were fishermen who turned to raiding during hard times, but
we cannot be certain of this since virtually nothing is known
about ocean fishing in early medieval China. The references to
pirates say nothing about their backgrounds; we know only that
they took advantage of the mobility afforded by the ocean to raid
towns along the coast (Chen Shou, 1962: 48/1161; Fang Xuan-
liang, 1974: 67/1800). Like Sun En, they no doubt established
bases on the many off shore islands found along the southeastern
coast of China. The government seems to have made no attempt
to patrol these islands, and the activities of these pirates are
further evidence that the prevalence of banditry is a function of
the inability of the political authority to enforce its laws.
While the social unrest and rebellions of the Jiangnan region
during the third through the sixth centuries can be encompassed
within the typology just discussed, it should be obvious that
particular incidents did not necessarily fall neatly into one cate-
gory or the other. An obvious example is the rebellion of Tang
Yuzhi: In its early stages religion played a crucial part in this
uprising, while in its middle stages popular reaction to conscrip-
tion and taxation by the central government became important.
At various points, separatism or localism may also have been
influential. Despite this mixture of elements, Tang Yuzhi's rebel-
lion should be classified as a protest against the government's
efforts to make conscription more efficient since this is what

drove the majority of the rebels to join Tang. Similarly, ethnic
differences may have been instrumental in the uprising led by Gao
Du, but religion was clearly primary. Such cases serve to remind
us that the causes of rebellion are often complex and that we
should be chary of facile, monocausal explanations.
GOVERNMENT MEASURES
TO DEAL WITH REBELLION
Simply put, during most of China's history measures to cope

with rebellion and social unrest may be divided into the preven-
tive and the curative. The former were meant to remove or
obviate the causes of rebellion, while the latter sought to eliminate
rebellion once it had broken out.
Several different sorts of preventive measures were employed
by the southern governments. One of the most common ap-
proaches was the initiation of strict laws and severe punishments
designed to intimidate people into being law-abiding. Despite the
professed Confucian distaste for such measures, they had been a
common feature of state control since the founding of the empire,
and remained so throughout the early medieval period. The pur-
pose was to deter, and the method was to execute, bandits as an
object lesson (Yao and Yao, 1973: 39/ 558)-"killing the chickens
in order to scare the monkeys" as the Chinese aphorism has it.
According to laws adopted in 468 under Emperor Ming of the
Song, stealing government weapons, assaulting government
patrols, attacking government offices, and injuring the populace
or officials were capital crimes. The sentence could be commuted,
but this was of dubious advantage since the commutation
involved having one's cheeks branded, being hamstrung, and then
being exiled to one of the southern or western frontier provinces
(Shen Yue, 1959: 8/ 163; Li Yanshou, 1975: 3/81; Zhang and Zhu,
1980: 199). The problem with such harsh measures is that they
may not be an effective deterrent; usually rebellion is not an
action lightly undertaken, so when someone chooses to rebel it is
normally because is confident of success based on a belief that he
enjoys some sort of supernatural protection, or because he is so
desperate that he simply does not care. In such cases any punish-
ment from the government seems irrelevant.
Less brutal and more general preventive measures included the
establishment of garrisons and administrative seats in areas that
were thought to be prone to rebellion. This course seems to have
been especially common under the state of Wu during the Three
Kingdoms period when control was being extended over the
region. Part of the reason for establishing the capital at Jianye
was probably to strengthen central control over the Yangzhou
region. Following disturbances caused by the Yue in 226, Dongan
("Eastern Peace") commandery was newly created out of parts of
Danyang, Wu, and Guiji commanderies in order to facilitate the
establishment of administrative control. Once control had been
accomplished, the new commandery was abolished and jurisdic-
tion reverted to the original three commanderies (Chen Shou,
1962: 47/ 1133, 60/ 1382; Sima Guang, 1957: 70/ 2230; Zhang and
Zhu, 1980: 74). The formation of Dongyang commandery out of
part of Guiji commandery, and the creation of Wuxing com-
mandery from portions of Wu and Danyang commanderies fol-
lowing the rebellion of Shi Dan in 266 may have occurred for
similar reasons (Chen Shou, 1962: 48/1166; Zhang and Zhu,
1980: n. /66).
The organization and registration of the populace were related
to the establishment of new administrative units in order to
reinforce government control over particular areas. This policy
was obviously important in subjugating the Yue; the Wu made a
concerted effort to force them out of the more inaccessible moun-
tains and down onto the flatlands where they could be organized
into villages and mutual responsibility groups (wu) (Chen Shou,
1962: 64/ 1431). As mentioned previously, people who had ab-
sconded to escape household registration (and thereby taxation
and conscription) formed a pool of potential rebel manpower. It
was decidedly in the best interests of the government to register
these people and reestablish government control over them.
Throughout the Six Dynasties efforts were made to improve and
strengthen registration, although often with limited or even the
opposite effect.
In order to prevent rebellions arising from famine caused by
natural disaster, the regimes of the south adopted various relief
measures. This policy has a long and venerable history in imperial
China. Under the Han dynasty relief in the form of tax remission
permitted migration from areas of want to those of plenty, and
assistance in the form of grain, farming implements, and land was
often granted (Crowell, 1979: 112-114, 268). The Han also estab-
lished the ever-normal granary system to stabilize grain prices by
buying grain in years of good harvest and selling it during fam-
ines. Government granaries also distributed relief grain to victims
of famine (Hsu, 1980: 79-80, 174-175). Similar policies were adopted
in the south in the post-Han period, and the "Annals" of the
dynastic histories frequently mention the distribution of relief
grain (Fang Xuanling, 1974: 9/226; Shen Yue, 1959: 5/83,92,95,
6/120-121, 133, 8/160, 9/184; Xiao Zixian, 1971: 3/45, 46, 61).
How effective these efforts were is not known, and sometimes the
demands were so great that the granaries were exhausted (Xiao
Zixian, 1971: 3/61). Private individuals also distributed relief
grain (Shen Yue, 1959: 5/ 92). No doubt farsighted men of wealth
found it to their advantage to do so in hopes of avoiding having
starving mobs breaking into their private granaries when govern-
ment relief had run out.
The curative responses to rebellion quite naturally involved
suppression and pacification of the rebels once an uprising had
occurred. An interesting feature of these efforts is that once a
rebellion had been put down, the sort of punishment that was
meted out to the rebels varied according to the type of uprising.
While the punishment might not always fit the crime, the correla-
tion between particular types of uprisings and specific forms of
government action is consistent enough that it is often possible to
have some clue of the causes of a rebellion from the way in which
the government dealt with the rebels.
Generally speaking, official reaction to uprisings resulting
from famine or natural disaster was milder than for any other
type. As a rule, in dealing with such incidents the emphasis of
government policy was on pacification and relief (Shen Yue,
1959: 6/ 134; Yao and Yao, 1973: 36/525). The government seems
to have recognized that sometimes people had been forced into
banditry by circumstances and that therefore the state should not
deal with them too harshly (Yao and Yao, 1973: 8/ 168).
Sometimes there was a similar attitude toward rebellions
resulting from the excessive burdens imposed by taxation and,
especially, corvee. In 418, when Liu Yu (the future Emperor Wu
of the Liu Song) was making plans for an expedition against the
north, the Chamberlain for Ceremonials, Zheng Xianzhi, submit-
ted a memorial pointing to a direct connection between conscrip-
tion and banditry. In particular, he said that the reason that the
prefectural administrative seats in the San Wu region were so
frequently overrun by bandits was because of the hardships
brought on by government conscription (Shen Yue 1959:64/ 1697;
Sima Guang, 1957: 118/ 3722; Zhang and Zhu, 1980:172). Zheng
was able to prevail upon Liu to abandon his plans.
A striking example of governmental leniency is to be found in
the aftermath of the rebellion of Tang Yuzhi. As we have seen,
after Tang began his uprising he was joined by some 30,000
people who were dissatisfied because an audit of the household
registration records had uncovered widespread census fraud and
had made a large number of people who had sought to evade
government levies liable for taxation and corvee. When the
emperor dispatched the imperial armies to suppress the rebellion,
he also sent an official, Liu Xizong, to accompany the armies and
to take charge of the relief and pacification of the areas covered by
the uprising. Liu allowed people to return to their homes without
inquiring into whether or not they had participated in the upris-
ing. The only punishment that was inflicted on those who had
followed Tang (aside from the unauthorized plundering by impe-
rial troops) came later when the emperor wished to restore Baixia,
an important fortification near the capital. The project was ham-
pered by a shortage of labor, and Liu proposed that those taxable
adults who had joined Tang be called up to perform the work-a
suggestion that was adopted by the emperor (Xiao Zixian, 1971:
56/975).
Rebellions of other types were dealt with more severely and in
such a manner as to try to remove the root causes of the rebellion.
Following rebellions in which religion was an important factor,
for example, we find prohibitions issued against certain types of
religious activity. A case in point is the uprising led by Gao Du. It
will be recalled that Buddhist monks played crucial roles in this
rebellion. Following suppression of the uprising, the emperor
issued a decree deploring the disgusting state of the sangha, which
he said had become a haven for fugitives. A series of prohibitions
required those who did not observe their Buddhist vows to be
defrocked in order to purify the priesthood (Shen Yue, 1959:

2386-2387). A number of such attempts were made during the Six
Dynasties, but for the most part they were unsuccessful (Ch'en,
1954: 264-265).
Popular religion was not necessarily antigovernment. Although
when religion is discussed in connection with popular uprisings it
is usually as a motivating force or an organizing principle, it could
also serve the state as a means of suppressing rebellion. How it
might be used for this purpose is revealed in an incident that
occurred about midway through the Liu Song dynasty:
[Wang Jingze] was appointed prefect of Jiyang. . In the prefec-

ture there was a group of bandits who had taken refuge at Purple
Mountain and who were a scourge on the local population. Jingze
sent someone to inform the bandit leader that they could all come
out of hiding to hold face-to-face discussions. The god of the
temple in the administrative seat was very harsh, and the pQpulace
believed in him. Jingze swore an oath on the god that he would not
go back on [his guarantee of safe conduct for the bandits]. When
the bandit leader appeared, Jingze held a banquet in the temple.
When they were seated, Jingze had all the bandits tied up, and he
declared, "I have told the god that if I were to go back on my oath
[of safe conduct] I would repay him with ten oxen. Now, I will not
violate that oath." He immediately slaughtered ten oxen to the god
and simultaneously decapitated all the bandits [Xiao Zixian, 1971.
26/ 480; Li Yanshou, 1975: 45/ 1128; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: n. 197].
Obviously this was not a strategem that would bear frequent

repetition.
Not all officials were so cynical about the power of the spirits to
intervene. When Sun En first attacked Guiji, Wang Ningzhi (the
Administrator of the commandery) was advised by his subordi-
nates to make defence preparations. Instead, he retired to a
"chamber of quiescence" to pray. When he emerged, he informed
his officers, "I have petitioned the Great Way to permit spirit
soldiers (guibing) to assist us. The bandits will be destroyed." The
spirit soldiers must have "gotten their signals crossed," for Sun's
armies overran the city and Wang was killed (Fang Xuanling,
1974.: 80/2102-2103; Zhang and Zhu, 1980: 161; Eichhorn, 1954a:
338-339).
If Wang's erstwhile supernatural allies failed him, that did not

discourage other officials from relying upon the spirits for assis-
tance in suppressing banditry.'2 During the Liang dynasty, a
regional inspector (ceshi) named Xiao Zhi, Marquis of Ding-
xiang, was reported to have received spiritual aid in suppressing a
gang of bandits that had terrorized Eastern Yangzhou. In this
case, the god was supposed to have initiated the contact. The
spirit appeared and informed Xiao through a shaman that it was
willing to assist him in attacking bandits. It told him that the
bandits could be defeated on the thirteenth day of the eighth lunar
month. On that day, the bandits appeared at Yuyao and their
boats became stuck in the river. The bandits themselves became
mired in the mud and scattered as though they were drunk allow-
ing imperial troops to capture them quite handily (Zhang and
Zhu, 1980: n. 158).
Separatist rebellion was dealt with in several ways. One
method of preventing such rebellions was to bring localities with
separatist tendencies under the closer control of the center. This
might be done either by making the central government more
effective in an area or by moving the local seat of government.
Once there had been a separatist uprising, the imperial authorities
might seek to prevent a reoccurrence by relocating those who
were responsible. This is what happened after the rebellion of Sun
Faguang. After Sun had been defeated, several hundred families
of his followers were removed to Pengcheng, Shouyang, and
Qingzhou-all of which were located along the northern frontiers
of the Liu Song realm (Shen Yue, 1959: 52/ 1503-1504). The move
had the dual advantage of removing the troublemakers from their
base area and of repopulating a region that had just been recap-
tured from the non-Chinese invaders of the north.
Relocation in a sense was also the solution for ethnic rebellion.
Zhuge Ke forced the bothersome Yue out of their mountain
strongholds, and resettled them in areas where they could be
administered in the same way as the Chinese population (Chen
Shou, 1962: 64/1431). The goal was to sinify the Yue-a policy
that was used in dealing with ethnic groups elsewhere in southern
China (Miyakawa, 1960). The policy must have been successful,
since the Yue ceased to be mentioned as a serious source of
trouble in Yangzhou after Zhuge's campaign.
Finally, there were the freebooters, men who lived by violence.

Appropriately, the state's solution for them was a violent one. For
the bulk of the professional brigands, the government's response
was solely military. The troops were ordered out, the bandits
smashed, and order restored. In some instances the bandit leader
was decapitated and his head sent to the imperial capital. Rarely
was there any attempt to make these people once again produc-
tive members of the empire. They were simply exterminated, a
fact that should help us in distinguishing simple brigands from
peasants who turned to predation as a technique of survival.
CONCLUSION
Social unrest and rebellion were serious problems for Six

Dynasties rulers. The causes and characteristics of such distur-
bances were manifold; we have tried to suggest a set of classifica-
tions that will clarify the more important forces that were at work.
Of these classifications, the first (rebellions as a survival tech-
nique in response to natural diaster) and the second (rebellions in
reaction to excessive government exactions) constitute what is
usually meant by "peasant rebellion." These were rebellions
through which the peasantry can be said to be seeking redress,
either from a cruel natural world or from a government that had
ceased to perform its heaven-mandated task of caring for the
people, and instead had begun to oppress them.
The "redress" aspect of these rebellions was recognized by the
state, and its response to such rebellions was usually not punitive.
There is in this an implicit realization that such rebellions were the
result of the state's failure to fulfill its obligations. Natural disas-
ters might be caused by forces beyond its control, but the obliga-
tion of the government to provide for relief and assistance in the
event of such disaster was an important parameter of early Chi-
nese political thought. If the people suffered as a result of natural
disaster, it was because the state had failed to make adequate
preparations. Similarly, the duty of the state not to make exces-
sive and untimely demands on the peasantry had been recognized
since preimperial times. When demands-often in the form of
taxation and conscription-did become too oppressive, then
implicit in the idea of the Mandate of Heaven was the "right" of

the people to rise up. This right, which found expression in the
Mencius and elsewhere as well, was part and parcel of the intellec-
tual baggage of nearly every Chinese official. Therefore, when
such an uprising did occur, the rulers understood (unconsciously
if not consciously) that the blame fell on them and not on the
rebels.
Viewed in this light, rebellion of the first two types should not
be seen as attempts to destroy or replace the entire bureaucratic
imperial system. Given the authoritarianism (at least from the
peasant's vantage) of the system, and the lack of institutionalized
means of bringing about change from below, it can be argued that
such rebellions were a necessary component of the Chinese
empire. Indeed, it might not be too extreme to argue that such
rebellions were necessary to the survival of the empire in the same
way that fevers are necessary for good health. They were symp-
toms of breakdown and tensions in the imperial system and a
warning that corrective action was needed. Without them, it is
conceivable that the breakdown and tension would have escal-
ated to such a point that the resulting explosion (revolution)
would have destroyed the imperial system altogether.
Likewise, the other types of rebellion and unrest that we have
discussed could also be indicators of failure of the system. There is
an important difference, however, in that the first two types of
rebellion occurred only when there was a breakdown in the
proper functioning of the imperial system, meaning that they
were symptomatic of fundamental problems. In contrast, the
other types could occur even when the imperial system was oper-
ating quite smoothly Religious rebellion could be brought on by
impulses from a realm that was well beyond the control of the
state, and separatist revolt may in fact have been a reaction to the
growing strength of the center. The same is true of ethnic rebel-
lions; in any case, the racial tensions that lead to such rebellions
are to be found under every sort of political regime imaginable.
And there will always be brigands. The point is that none of these
four types is the clear sign of fundamental dysfunction in the
political system that the first two are.
This leaves us, then, with a paradox. Although popular rebel-
lion could be a force for change, it was not a force for historical
development in the Marxian sense. Rather than weakening the

imperial system (as opposed to an individual dynasty) the ulti-
mate effect of such rebellion was to forestall the sort of revolu-
tionary change that would have irrevocably altered the political
and social institutions of imperial China. Such change could not
come until alien economic and political forces had drastically
changed the environment in which the Chinese imperial polity
operated. Rather than a struggle by the ruled class to overthrow
the ruling class and the system dominated by them, rebellion was
the means by which the ruled brought pressure to bear on the
rulers to do their job properly. There was no desire, conscious or
otherwise, to replace the (perhaps feudal) imperial structure with
a new social and political form. The goal was simply to make the
empire operate as it was meant to.
AFTER WORD
After the foregoing was completed, my attention was drawn to

an interesting article by a Wenzhou high school teacher, Dong
Chuping, who has reached a similar conclusion-although with a
different emphasis-about the historical function of peasant
rebellions. In an article entitled "On the Merits of Egalitarianism
and the Achievements of Peasant Wars" (1980) Dong says that at
the beginning of many peasant rebellions there were appeals to
"equality" implying a desire to destroy the feudal order and that
this was effective in gaining popular support for the rebellion.
But, he argues, once the rebellion had reached its zenith, if equal-
ity were to be the basis for attempting to resolve problems of
production, the result would be more harmful than feudalism
itself. Egalitarianism violated the requirements for the develop-
ment of production as well as the laws of economics, and any
attempt to enforce it could only result in increased suffering for
the people. Successful rebellions, therefore, abandoned "egalitar-
ianism"' and instead of seeking the complete destruction of fedual-
ism, limited their goals to replacing corrupt dynasties with
"enlightened" ones. The historical function thus performed by
such rebellions was the sweeping away of obstacles preventing the
development of production and the progress of society. As an
example, Dong cites the success of Zhu Yuanzhang who aban-

doned the egalitarian ideas of White Lotus thought and sought to
win over Confucian scholars. Zhu's success was in marked con-
trast to the fate of another late Yuan rebel, Liu Futong, who
refused to abandon those ideas.
Dong's assertion that the historical function of peasant rebel-
lions was not to destroy feudalism but to overthrow corrupt
dynasties that were hindering the smooth development of the
feudal stage of history and replace them with "enlightened" new
dynasties did not go unchallenged. A strong attack was mounted
by two members of the Institute of Modern History of the
Academy of Social Science, Zhou Liangxiao and Zhang Dexin,
in a piece published in Lishi yanjiu (Zhou and Zhang, 1980).
Significantly, their refutation relies on the classics of Marxism
rather than on historical data, and the quality of the arguments
leaves much to be desired. Zhou and Zhang question Dong's
credentials as a Marxist and contend that his ideas contradict
those of Mao who said that peasant rebellions were taken advan-
tage of by the landlord class to bring about a change in the
reigning dynasty. Thus, contrary to Dong, they believe that the
establishment of a new dynasty marks a defeat for a peasant
uprising, because it results in the "re-establishment of feudalism."
Considered in this light, the accomplishments of Liu Futong far
exceeded those of Zhu because he remained true to the original
goals of peasant rebellion.
In a thoughtful rebuttal, Dong has clarified his ideas on the
historical function of peasant rebellions (Dong, 1981). Dong
criticizes the sloppy methodology of Zhou and Zhang and accuses
them of arguing from a preconceived model. He contends that
peasant rebellions could not be considered revolutions in the
narrow sense because they were not aimed at bringing about a
complete transformation of the social and economic systems. It is
absurd to criticize him, says Dong, for believing that peasant
rebellions were successful only when they resulted in the reestab-
lishment of feudalism, because peasant rebels in China never
sought to overthrow feudalism. Indeed, in many cases-for
example, the Yellow Turban and the Fang La rebellions-from

the beginning the rebel leaders intended the establishment of a
new dynasty, albeit one that would be more equitable. Peasant
rebellions did not unconditionally oppose feudal exploitation,
only excessive exploitation; rebellions occurred not because, in
Marxian terms, feudalism was no longer appropriate to the pre-
vailing mode of production, but because the feudal system had
ceased to function properly. Being unable to develop, the system
exploded. The feudal "machinery" had not yet outlived its useful-
ness, says Dong; certain obstacles had simply prevented it from
functioning as it should. To restore it, "parts" had to be replaced,
and peasant rebellions were the "repair tool" required for fixing
the feudal mechanism.
Dong's rebuttal and elaboration elicited a quick reaction, this
time from Duan Jingxuan (whose affiliation is unclear). Like
Zhou and Zhang, Duan relies heavily on appeals to Marxist
authority in trying to disprove Dong. He especially takes excep-
tion to Dong's mechanical analogy, since, following Lenin, he
views feudal society as a "living organism" rather than a lifeless
machine (Duan, 1982). While he is able to raise questions about
some of Dong's examples, he is unable to undermine Dong's
interpretation in any meaningful way.
It seems unlikely that Dong will be content to let the debate end
on this note; he has argued his viewpoint too often and too hotly
to let the matter rest. 13 Furthermore, the issue is an important one
for Chinese historians, important enough that Guangming ribao
saw fit to summarize Dong's and Duan's articles (which had
appeared in a provincial academic journal) in its history section
(Guangming ribao, 1982).
Dong's views are not unique among Chinese historians. Rong
Sheng in a 1979 article held that peasant rebellions overturned
corrupt rulers and that the new ones usually demanded less in
taxes and corvee. This meant that the people were able to engage
peacefully in agriculture and spend less of their time on unpro-
ductive government construction work. In fact, many times the
destruction wrought by rebellions resulted in the long-term arrest
of economic development. As examples, Rong cites such hal-

lowed uprisings as the Yellow Turbans, Huang Chao, the White
Lotus, the Taipings, and the Boxers (Rong, 1979).
Rong's view has been taken to its extreme conclusion by Liu
Chang in an article published originally in the Shanghai shiyuan
xuebao and reprinted in abridged form in Lishi yanjiu (Liu,
1980). Liu's view is expressed in the following:
Everytime there was a large peasant uprising, it broke the progress

of feudalization (fengiianhua), thereby ruining the fruits that had
been attained by feudalization and causing the society to regress to
the starting point of feudalization. Therefore, from the point of
view of long-term historical development, peasant rebellion not
only did not promote the forward development of history, but to a
certain extent even impeded it [Liu, 1980: 23-24].
Surely this is enough to induce apoplexy in many of the more

doctrinaire historians in the PRC.
Exception has indeed been taken to interpretations such as
Rong's and Liu's. Shen Dingping, for example, has objected that
Rong's views are tantamount to saying that if in the period of
development from slave society to capitalist society-that is,
during the feudal period-the peasants had only been obedient
and peacefully looked after themselves, then historical progress
would have proceeded even faster, and material production
would have flourished. But, Shen retorts, if that had been the
case, not only would social production (shehui shengchan) not
have improved any more rapidly, it is questionable whether or not
mankind could have progressed at all (Shen, 1979).
A more sophisticated attempt to resolve the problem of
explaining how peasant rebellions could at once be a force for the
destruction of feudalism and at the same time contribute to the
prolongations of the feudal stage of history is that of Wang
Cuncai. Wang believes that while peasant rebellions struck at
feudal rule, they also preserved the small-scale, self-sufficient
peasant economy that prevented the "buds of capitalism" from
achieving their proper degree of development in Chinese feudal
society. The peasant's hope in rebelling was that an enlightened
new dynasty would be established, and that under the new dy-
nasty life would be more secure and each peasant could have some
land to cultivate. Following a successful rebellion, the peasantry
would begin with small-scale production on their own or on a
landlord's fields. As production increased, the social wealth
would increase leading to periods of prosperity such as those
under Emperors Wen and Jing of the Han or during the Zhen-
guan period of the Tang. The peasant economy would become
stable, and feudal rule would achieve a corresponding stability.
Thus, in the short-term, the rebellions could overthrow a feudal
dynasty, but ultimately, they contributed to the longevity of the
feudal period. In a somewhat convoluted effort to preserve the
historical reputation of the peasantry, however, Wang says that
the blame for this rests with the landlords rather than with the
peasants, for it was the landlords' cruel economic exploitation
that caused the peasants to rebel. He still believes that peasant
warfare was the motivating force for the development of the
feudal period. But, because it also preserved the peasant econ-
omy, it simultaneously acted as a brake on that development-a
process Wang likens to an old ox pulling a broken cart: It moves,
but very slowly (Wang, 1981).
The quality of this debate represents a marked improvement
over that of a decade or so ago. Moreover, the authors of these
articles are attempting to grapple with overarching historical
concerns, and their contributions are thus a welcome antidote to
the penchant of Western historians in recent years to immerse
themselves in research on narrow and limited topics. One can
only hope that some future intellectual rebellion, while perhaps
contributing a momentary amelioration of contradictions, will
not occur to retard these efforts at understanding the develop-
ment of Chinese history.
NOTES
1. For a general discussion see Harrison (1969). The number of articles on this topic
is overwhelming, and the similarities of interpretation among various authors make it
unnecessary for any but an aficionado to attempt reading all or even the majority of them.
Samplings of early views can be found in Zhao and Gao (1955), and in Li et al. (1958),
which includes some material previously published elsewhere. Cuncui xueshe (1978a)
contains articles published 1962-1966 that are concerned with theoretical considerations
pertaining to the nature of peasant rebellions. Cuncui xueshe (1978b) is a collection of
articles on specific rebellions published from the early fifties to the mid-seventies. In the
past four years or so a number of Chinese scholars have begun to reexamine seriously the
historical function of peasant rebellions, particularly in the context of the question of why
the feudal stage lasted so long in China. Li (1982) provides a useful historical overview of
the changes in interpretation that have occurred over the past thirty-odd years, and Tian
(1982) contains synopses of several recent articles focussing on the feudalism question,
some of which touch on the problem of peasant rebellions.
2. "Social rebellion" and "social disturbances" are used here in contradistinction to
"political rebellion, "which is understood as referring to violent attempts by an individual
or faction within the ruling class to overthrow and replace other members of the ruling
class who currently hold power. By contrast, "social rebellion" refers to violent protest or
attacks by the "ruled" strata of the polity against the "rulers. "This protest may be against
the failure of the rulers to govern in the interests of all (types I and 2), or against
impingement by the rulers upon the locally accepted way of life (types 2, 4, and 5). An
attack upon the rulers may be an attempt to establish a new order (type 3), or it may be
simply violent parasitism (type 6). Admixtures of these are also possible. In no case,
however, is there the conscious effort to take over the existing political structure that is
found in political rebellion. Rather, the goal is either to force that structure to perform
better or to make it cease imposing itself on the rebels. In religious rebellion there may
have been a desire to destroy the existing political structure, but this was not motivated by
the hope of political revolution.
3. When Emperor Ming of the Later Han (r. A.D. 58-76) was considenng reestablish-
ing the ever-normal granaries (they had been abolished in 44 B.C.), an official pointed out
that while the granaries were ostensibly intended to help the peasantry in fact they had
become a means of gouging them in that the local magnates used their connections with
officials to engage in corrupt practices which perverted the intended normalizing effects of
the granaries (Fan Ye, 1963: 39/1305).
4. See the discussion of predatory strategies of survival in Perry (1980: 59-80).
5. We have discussed some of these problems in "Northern Emigres and the Prob-
lems of Census Registration under the Eastern Jin and Southern Dynasties" (forthcom-
ing). See also Xiao Zixian (1971) and Ochi Shigeaki (1960: 940-968).
6. History knows many examples of religious fanatics setting out systematically to
kill "evil" nonbelievers, the Crusades being perhaps the example best known to Wes-
terners. During the Reformation, the Anabaptists led by Thomas Munster asserted that
the sword was the instrument of God's might and it had been given to the common people
for the destruction of the godless (Stayer, 1972: 73-90).
7 This title had been part of the military hierarchy since the end of the Later Han
(Shen Yue, 1959: 39/ 1225). Similar titles were adopted by other rebel leaders, presumably
to lend an aura of legitimacy to their activities (Fang Xuanling, 1974: 15/120, 9/231).
8. The inclusion of the graph "zhi" in a person's given name usually can reliably
indicate that the person belonged to the Heavenly Master sect. It was not subject to the
taboo against being used in the names of members of succeeding generations of the same
family. Its presence, however, was not a necessary indication of a potential rebel. The
general charged with putting down the rebellion of Sun En was Liu Laozhi, and one of the
officials killed in the uprising led by Tang Yuzhi was Xiao Chongzhi. I am grateful to
Dennis Grafflin for guidance in matters pertaining to onamastics during the Six
Dynasties.
9. See Pokora (1961), Shih (1956: 166 n. 2), and Balazs (1964: 192) on the related
concept of taiping ("great equality," "great peace") and the significance of the term "ping"
("equality," "peace").
10. These included members of the Shanyin Kong, the Langye Wang, and perhaps the
Chenjun Xie, all of which were part of a national superelite that dominated political affairs
during the Eastern Jin and the Early Southern Dynasties. On this elite see Grafflin (1980),
Frankel (1961), and Wang Yitong (1978).
11. A very revealing list of references to incidents involving the "Mountain Yue" and
mountain bandits has been compiled by Wang Zhongluo. Although pnor to Zhuge's
campaign both types of incidents are to be found, after the campaign there are only
references to mountain bandits (Wang Zhongluo, 1979: 116-120).
12. The use of magico-religious techniques against bandits was by no means limited to
this period. Susan Naquin in her study of the 18th century rebellion of Wang Lun describes
a bizarre example of the use of prostitutes against Wang's forces. The prostitutes were
placed on top of the walls of a city that was being beseiged by rebel forces. Some of them
partially disrobed, and they were encouraged to urinate over the wall. The putative power
of the thus engendered yin force was augmented by killing chickens and black dogs and
pouring the blood, which simulated polluting menstrual blood, over the side of the wall.
Dog excrement and urine were also thrown at the enemy. The yin power generated by
these actions was so strong that it supposedly overcame the magic of the rebels and forced
them to withdraw (Naquin, 1981: 100-101).
13. Duan cites six articles published by Dong plus one published under the name Lin
Zhi, which he deduces to be a pen name used by Dong, all of which argue Dong's
interpretation (Duan Jingxuan, 1982).
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William G. Crowell received his Ph.D. in Chinese historyfrom the University of

Washington. He has taught at the University of Washington, the University of
Puget Sound, and Loyola Marymount University. He has been a Fullbright Fellow
to Taiwan (1974), and a CSCPRCresearch grant recipient in the People's Republic
of China (1979-1980). Currently, he is a member of the Foreign Service in Tokyo.
Mr. Crowell is now working on a study of financial administration under the
Southern Dynasties.

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Social Unrest and Rebellion in Jiangnan during the Six Dynasties

Author(s): William G. Crowell

In an effort to make China's history conform to the Marxian

Modern China, Vol. 9 No. 3, July 1983 319-354

rebellion throughout the 2000 year existence of the Chinese

(1) Peasant wars, including Han Chinese peasant uprisings, as

This typology leaves much to be desired if we wish to under-

Despite these difficulties, it is possible to formulate a typology

REBELLIONS CA USED BY NA TURAL DISASTER

Natural disaster and famine were constants in the lives of the

administrative breakdown. These might include eating grass,

PROTESTAGAINST GO VERNMENT OPPRESSION

During most periods of China's history, including the Six

in many uprisings. As an element of social unrest, it operated in

The most important popular protest against conscription dur-

very food by which it sustained itself. Conscription-even when

In the third type of rebellion, religion played a significant

Minister of Public Works), and Cheng Nong, Wang Dian, and

capacity, he was probably consulted concerning the proper loca-

impossible to know to what extent it may have influenced the

LOCALISTAND SEPARATIST REBELLION

Portions of the Yangzhou region-particularly the area south

Qian. Shi took Jianye and attempted to issue orders in Qian's

Separatist elements may have played a role in the rebellion of

As the Han Chinese expanded to the south, they sought to

Disturbances involving the Yue seem to have been especially

BANDITS AND PIRA TES

A large number-perhaps the majority-of the disturbances in

The influence of the topography is reflected in references to

efforts to make conscription more efficient since this is what

Simply put, during most of China's history measures to cope

defrocked in order to purify the priesthood (Shen Yue, 1959:

[Wang Jingze] was appointed prefect of Jiyang. . In the prefec-

Obviously this was not a strategem that would bear frequent

If Wang's erstwhile supernatural allies failed him, that did not

Finally, there were the freebooters, men who lived by violence.

Social unrest and rebellion were serious problems for Six

implicit in the idea of the Mandate of Heaven was the "right" of

development in the Marxian sense. Rather than weakening the

After the foregoing was completed, my attention was drawn to

example, Dong cites the success of Zhu Yuanzhang who aban-

example, the Yellow Turban and the Fang La rebellions-from

of economic development. As examples, Rong cites such hal-

Everytime there was a large peasant uprising, it broke the progress

Surely this is enough to induce apoplexy in many of the more

William G. Crowell received his Ph.D. in Chinese historyfrom the University of

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