Post-1949 Chinese Historiography

Post-1949 Chinese Historiography on the 1911 Revolution
Author(s): Edmund S. K. Fung

Source: Modern China, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 181-214
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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REVIEW OF CHINESE AND JAPANESE SCHOLARSHIP
Post-1949ChineseHistoriography
on the 1911 Revolution
EDMUND S.K. FUNG
University
Griffith
Unlike the orthodox Guomindang historiographyon the

Revolutionof 1911, workspublishedin thePeople's Republicof
China (PRC) have not focusedon theTongmenghuimovement
and the personalityof Sun Yat-sen,despitethe highesteemin
whichSun has alwaysbeen held by thecommuniststhemselves.
Sun has been reportedby Chinesewritersof all politicalcolora-
tions as the leader of the revolutionarymovement.But while
Guomindanghistorianshave portrayedhimas almostflawless,
authors in the PRC tend to be mildlycriticalof his political
weaknesses which stemmedfrom his "bourgeois class back-
ground."
The Marxisthistorianshave givenrelativelylittleattentionto
biographicalwritingssuch as the nianpu (biographicalchron-
icles) and the xianlie zhuan (biographicalwritingson the mar-
tyrs).On theotherhand,farmoreresearchhas beendone intothe
social basis and the consequencesof the revolutionthan is the
case in Taiwanese or Westernscholarship.More class analysisis
made and moreemphasisplaced on thesocial contextoftheideas
of the revolutionary leaders.
This articlereportsvariousChineseMarxistinterpretations of
therevolutionas developedin the 1950sand 1960sand,to a lesser
extent,in the post-CulturalRevolutionperiod.
MODERN CHINA, Vol. 4 No. 2, April 1978
? 1978 Sage Publications,Inc.
[181]

[182] MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978
DOCUMENTAR Y COMPILATIONS
The mostvaluable documentary studyof therevolutionis the
Xinhai geming,compiledand editedby the Chinese Historical
Association(1957). Consistingof eightvolumes,thiscollection
bringstogetherselectionsfrommore than 120 works,some of
whichhad notbeenhitherto published.Mostoftheserelateto the
revolutionaries and the republicanmovement;othersare docu-
mentsof Qing officialsand the Manchu government.Divided
chronologicallyinto fourparts,it beginsby tracingthe origins
of the firstrevolutionary society,Xingzhonghui, and concludes
withthe foundingof the Chinese Republic in 1912. It is note-
worthythatnearlyhalfof volume3 is devotedto the"people's
struggles,"which took the formof antimissionaryand anti-
foreignactivities,as well as riots and disturbancesin protest
against excessivetaxation,corruptofficialdom,rice hoarding
and speculation,bad gentry and merchant exploitation,and lack
of public reliefto famineand flood victims.Some of thestrug-
gles,backed up bytheconservative gentry, weredirectedagainst
the new reformswhichmainlyservedthe interestsof theurban
centersand the upperclasses,butwhichconsiderablyincreased
theeconomicburdenof theruralmasses.The materials,derived
from the Dongfang zazhi (the Eastern Miscellany) and the
ImperialPalace Archives,offermuchinsightintotheconditions
in the countrysideas distinctfromthe newlyemergenturban
centerswherethe new intellectuals operatedwithfewlinkswith
the rural masses. The gap between cityand countrysidewas a
large and serious one. The city-basedrevolutionaryleaders
tendedto ignoreitand wereindeedincapableofaddressingthem-
selvesto the basic problemsfacingthe peasantry.
In reproducing theselectedmaterials,notonlyaretheeditorial
commentskeptto a minimum, butalso theselectionsareallowed
to appear in contrastwith one anotherwherethe authorshave
conflictingviews.Verylittleofthewordingin theoriginaldocu-
ments,irrespective of theirpoliticalstanceand sympathies, has
been altered,exceptforsome glaring"spelling"errors.
This impressiveworkwould have been morethoroughhad it
included more non-Chinesedocumentsthan the incomplete
BritishParliamentary Papers(GreatBritain,1912a, b) whichare

Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PHY [183]
renderedintoChinesewithsome errorsin translation.In fairness

to the editors,however,it would have been extremely difficult,
if not impossible,forthemto gain access to importantforeign
sources in the early 1950s.
Meanwhile,anotherteam of historianswas engaged in col-
lectingadditionalmaterialsto be publishedin the newlyestab-
lished journal, Jindaishiziliao (Source Materials on Modern
Chinese History).The firstfewvolumes contain,among other
things,a numberof Qingdocumentsand reminiscent accountsof
therevolution. In 1961a special issue(No. 25) was devoted to the
revolution.Priorto thisZhangGuo-ganhad publishedtheXinhai
gemingshiliao (1958), whichdeals withthe Wuchanguprising,
the responsesof the provinces,the peace negotiations,and the
abdicationof the Manchu emperor.A revolutionary participant
fromHubei province,Zhang givesmuchattentionto the Hubei
sceneand therevolutionary organizationsthere.The narrativeis
interspersedwith lengthydocuments,which, although their
originsare not alwaysclear,complementtheXinhaigemingand
succeed in arousingmuchinterestin the regionaldimensionsof
the revolutionary movement.
Indeed, the revolutionary activitiesextendedfar beyondthe
confinesoftheTongmenghuiand itsbranchorganizationsto the
provinces.Appreciationof the importanceand contributionof
the Sichuan railwaydisputeto the success of the Wuchangup-
risingled to thepublicationoftheSichuanbaoluyundongshiliao
edited by Dai Zhi-li (1959). This collectionbringstogetheran
aggregate of 457 items,includingmemorials,proclamations,
officialcorrespondence, diaries,and thelike. Arrangedchrono-
logically,it tracesin detailthedevelopmentof therailwayissue
from1903throughtheturbulentyearof 1911to thefoundingof
the Chongqingmilitarygovernment and its dissolutionin May
1912. It contains much evidenceof the imperialgovernment's
attemptsat centralization and theresistanceoftheprovince.The
editordisapprovesof thegovernment's relianceon foreignloans
to buildthetrunkrailways,and sympathizes withtherailwaypro-
tectionmovementwhich,in his opinion,was a patrioticcause
supportedby the peasantryand the workingclass. This move-
mentmightnot have been a "mass movement"as Dai suggests,

but he is rightin assertingthatthe railwayissuedrovea wedge

between the governmentand the constitutionalists, forcing
thelatter to turn against the empire in theend.The Tongmenghui
leaderstook advantageof thedisturbancesin Sichuan,but they
failed to establishclose links withthe masses and to organize
them into a powerfulpolitical force. As soon as the Qing
authorityin Sichuan was overthrown, therevolutionary leader-
to
ship started disintegrate.
Anotherinteresting provincialdocumentary studyis the Yun-
nan Guizhouxinhaigemingziliao (InstituteofModernHistory,
1959). A useful referencework filled with materialsnot in-
cludedin theXinhaigeming,itis a combinationofrevolutionary
documents,telegraphic correspondence, diaries,and memoirs.In
additionto these,it includesbiographicsketchesof "martyrs"
fromthe two provincesof Yunnan and Guizhou. Owing to the
diversesourcesfromwhichthematerialsare drawn,thereare,as
the editorshave pointed out, conflictingaccounts and incon-
sistencieswhichthe readermusttreatwithcare.
The publicationin 1961 of the XinhaigemingJiangsudiqu
shiliao (Yangzhou NormalCollege, 1961)added anotherdimen-
sion to the regionalstudyof the revolution.The editorshave
travelledextensively in the provinceand spokento a varietyof
people who personallyexperiencedtherevolution.The materials
are arrangedin two parts.The firstcontainsmaterialsdealing
with the provinceas a whole, and includesthe officialcor-
respondenceoftheviceroy,proclamationsoftheJiangsumilitary
government,diaries,excerptsfromZhang Qian's nianpu and
Shang Bing-he'sXinren chunqiu (The Spring and Autumn
Annals,1911-1912)whichoriginally was publishedin 1924.There
is also a biographicnote on Zhao Sheng, a notable Jiangsu
revolutionary, and a patrioticsongcomposedbyhim.The second
part, which forms the bulk of the collection,consistsof miscel-
laneous materialson therevolutionary outbreakin variouspre-
fecturesin responseto theWuchanguprising.Whilethisis a fine
workon therevolutioninJiangsu,itprovidesno information on
the pre-1911situation.The peasant riots and disturbancesin
Jiangsu,documentedin volume 3 of the Xinhai geming,are

Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [ 185]
barelysufficient fora fullunderstandingofthesocial conditions

in theprovinceor ofthesocial contextoftherevolutionary move-
mentthere.The presentcollectiondoes littleto improveit.
A numberof journals and books concernedwithaffairsin
China were publishedin the 1900swhichrepresenteddifferent
viewsof the Chineseintellectualson China'sfuture.An effort to
bringtogethertheleadingarticles(pro-and antirevolution alike)
and selectionsfromsome of the major revolutionary worksre-
sultedin the publicationin 1960and 1963of the Xinhaigeming
qianshinianjianshilun xuanji, edited by Zhang Nan and Wan
Ren-shi(1960, 1963).Two parts,each consistingoftwovolumes,
have beenpublished,coveringtheyears1901-1907.The aim ofthe
selectionis to demonstratethe splitwithinthe newlyemergent
Chinese bourgeoisieinto the revolutionaryand the reformist
camps. The editorsbelievethatfromthe
(laterconstitutionalist)
verybeginning theChinesebourgeoisiewas dividedon an economic
level. The upper bourgeoisieconsistedof the compradores,the
"feudalbureaucrats,"big landlords,big merchants, and usurers,
all ofwhomhad close connectionswith"feudalism"(thedynasty)
and "imperialism"(the foreignpowers).The middlebourgeoisie
was made up of handicraftfactoryownersand middleand small
merchantswhose lowersocial statusand smallcapital subjected
themto feudaland imperialist exploitation.Atthelowestreaches
of the hierarchywerethecity-basedpettybourgeoisiewho were
small traders.The social and economic differences among the
varioussegments ofthebourgeoisiewerean important determinant
in thedivisionofthebourgeoisclass on a politicallevel.Withthe
growthof "national capitalism"after 1900, the middle bour-
geoisie had increasedin numbersand influenceand was in tune
with the pettybourgeoisie;togetherthey formedthe revolu-
tionarycamp undertheleadershipofthe"nationalbourgeoisie,"
a termwhichdenotesindigenouscapitalistsas distinctfromcom-
pradoresand bureaucraticcapitalists.
The editorshaveattemptedwithmixedsuccesstoelucidatethe
social ideologyof the bourgeoisrevolutionary leadersas well as
theirpolitical strengthsand weaknesses.They have portrayed
the revolutionariesand the reformists as two diametrically op-
posed camps, but the selectedwritingsshow not onlytheirdif-

ferencesbutalso theirsimilarities,
namely,a commonexperience
oftheonslaughtofforeignimperialism, a commonconcernabout
China's nationalsurvival,and a commonrealizationoftheneed
forchangeforthe country.
Otherdocumentaryworksproducedin thelate 1950sinclude
the Min Bao (The People's Journal)reproduced by photo-
offset,Zou Rong's Gemingiun(1958), originallypublishedin
1903,and theselectedworksofSun Yat-sen(Sun Wen,1959).Be-
sides these,thereare a numberof bibliographicalguides.
ORAL HISTORY
In conjunctionwithdocumentary compilationChinesescho-
lars have undertaken"oral history"projects,the object of
whichis to gatherinformation froma varietyof private,indivi-
dual sources otherthan officialdocumentsalready available.
Nonofficial materialssuchas diaries,memoirs,
reminiscences,and
the like occupy an importantplace in historicalresearch,par-
ticularlyin thestudyofrevolutionwheremanyofficialand semi-
officialdocumentswere destroyedas a resultof the political
turmoil.Theseprojectsinvolveinterviewing, orbringing together
in colloquia, people who had personal experiences of the
revolution.Most were revolutionary participants,otherswere
not; a fewwho wereassociatedwiththe Qing government had
witnessedsome of the catacylsmiceventsof 1911. All wereen-
couragedto exchangeviewsand writememoirsand recollections
of therevolutionin articlesor book form.Those who could not
write because of old age or literaryincompetencyhad their
accountsrecordedby otherson theirbehalf.
Many of thearticlespublishedin thejournal,Jindaishiziliao,
resultfromtheseprojects.The firstbooklet(40 pages) of "oral
history"is probablytheHuiyiSun Zhong-shanhe Liao Zhong-
kai,written bythewifeofLiao Zhong-kai,He Xiang-ning (1957).
A superiorwork publishedabout the same timeis the Xinhai
shouyihuiyilu(Hubei Committee,1957). This is an extremely
usefulworkforthestudyoftheWuchanguprisingand theHubei

Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PH Y [ 187]
revolutionarymovement.It consists of three volumes, with

thirty-oddcontributors.Many of these writerswere common
soldiersin the New Armywhichled the uprisingwithlittleas-
sistancefromtheTongmenghui. The articlesvaryconsiderably in
lengthand style,and explanatorynoteshave been added by the
editors wherevernecessary.Each articleis precededby a bio-
graphicnote on thecontributor. These biographicsketchesfur-
nish usefulinformation on the social backgroundsof the revo-
lutionaryparticipants.Many of themwereeducated in varying
degreesbeforeenlistingin thearmy,and thispointsto a hitherto
neglectedaspect of the revolution:the revolutionary impactof
armyreorganizationthroughthe introduction intotheranksof
men of educationand radicalnationalistsentiment.Indeed,this
workshedslighton therole of the Hubei New Armyinthemili-
tarygenesisof the revolution.
An equally importantand probablymoreexhaustivepiece of
"oral history"is the Xinhai geming huiyilu (Committeeon
WrittenHistorical Materials, 1961). With six substantialvol-
umes, this collectionhas a wide coverage of the revolutionary
movementand therevolutionitselfin different provinces,under
whichthe materialsare arranged.The contributors came from
differentsocial and geographicalbackgroundsand thuswereable
to deal with different social groups and revolutionarybodies
in differentregions.The scope is so wide and the information
so ample thatall studentsoftherevolutionwillfindita valuable
complementto the Xinhai geming.It is a pity,however,that
thereare no biographicnotes on the authors,henceit is some-
times difficultto discern the authors' relationshipswith the
personalitiesand organizationstheydescribe.Second,theeditors
have made no effortto point out, let alone explain, contra-
dictoryaccounts which appear occasionally in the text. This
shows, on the other hand, that all the articleswere faithfully
recordedand reproduced.The contributors simplyreportedwhat
theyrecollected,and it is only naturalthat thereshould have
been errorsand biases. Yet it mustbe appreciatedthatmuchof
theirinformation is not available in officialdocuments,Chinese
and Westernalike.

"Oral history"is intendedto encourage more studyof the

revolutionand to bringthe eventsof 1911 to life.The editors
oftheseveralcollectionsmayhave been obligedto paylipservice
to the officialinterpretations
in the preface,but theideological
contentis at a minimum.
MONOGRAPHIC STUDIES
The monographsreviewedhere were publishedin the 1950s

and theearly 1960s.Some authorsattemptedto analyseevents
froma Marxistclass viewpoint;othersdid not.The factthatvery
fewhistorianswereadequatelytrainedon Marxistlinesresulted
in some worksreflecting an imperfect combinationof Marxist
and traditionalmethodologies. Nevertheless, classanalysis,albeit
sometimessuperficial,representsa basic departurefromthe
earlierGuomindangwritings.
The earliestworkspublishedafterthe foundingof the PRC
werewrittenbya younghistorian,Li Shu (formerly knownas Li
Nai-han).His firstbook, Xinhaigemingyu Yuan Shi-kai(1949),
appears to have been inspiredby Chen Bo-da's earlierwork,
Qieguo dadao Yuan Shi-kai(1945). In a polemicfashion,Chen
satirizedJiangJie-shi[Chiang Kai-shek]formimicking some of
Yuan's "anti-revolutionarytechniques."Li holdsa similarlylow
opinionofYuan. For Li, themainimpetusto revolutionin China
was imperialism.The anti-imperialist struggleof the Chinese
people became widespreadwiththe mountingthreatof foreign
partitionof China and theincreasingcorruptionand impotence
of the Manchugovernment, which,in Li's view,was subservient
to the foreignerswhile it oppressed the Chinese masses and
opposed reform at home(pp. 1-2).Li seestheTongmenghui as an
anti-Manchuunitedfrontorganization(tongyizhenxian).How-
ever,it displayedthreeideologicalweaknesses:(a) lack of effort
to mobilizethepeasantmasses;(b) lack ofan antifeudalthrustin
thesenseof radicallyattackinglandlordand local gentrypower;
program,whichresultedin a
and (c) lack of an anti-imperialist
compromisewith foreignenemies.The revolutionary leaders'
conceptionof democracywas vague, hencetherewas a discre-

Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [189]
pancy betweentheirpoliticalplatfrom(zhenggang),whichwas
revolutionary and democratic,and theirstrategy(fanglue),which
was nonrevolutionary and revolved around a narrow racial
nationalism. Organizationally,the Tongmenghui also had
seriousshortcomings, chiefamongwhichwas itsinabilityto pro-
vide central leadershipto the provinceswhere revolutionary
groups acted with littlecoordination(pp. 7-15). Li cites the
choice of Li Yuan-hongas military governorand Tang Hua-long
as chiefof civiladministrationof Hubei as evidenceoftherevo-
lutionaries'tendencyto compromisewiththe old force. Such
compromiseenabledthefeudalforcesand thebureaucratsto take
over controlof the new government, an outcomewhichwas re-
peatedin otherprovinceswhichdeclaredfortherepublicancause
(pp. 23-40).
Li expands Chen Bo-da's theory that Yuan Shi-kai cal-
culated to thwartthe Manchu dynastywithone strokeand the
revolutionwithanother.Aftermanipulatingthe revolutionary
south and the loyalistnorthinto peace nogotiations,Yuan left
the revolutionariesno alternativeto offeringhimthepresidency
(pp. 57-74). The new presidentprovedto be a "big dictator,"Li
asserts.The Guomindang'sattemptsto establisha responsible
cabinetsystemendedin a fiascoaftersome"hopelessopposition"
(pp. 80-99). Consequently,Yuan virtuallyenjoyedthe powers
of an emperor.But stillnot satisfied,he orchestratedthe"ugly"
monarchicalmovementin 1915.In Li's view,therevolutionwas a
failurebecause of the politicalweaknessesof its leadershipand
Yuan's manipulationand treachery. Fortunately,thepeoplewere
opposed to Yuan and thatwas whyhe also failedin theend. Un-
fortunately, theredid not yetexist in China a progressiveand
strongpolitical partycapable of leading the Chinese people,
hence China's eclipseinto warlordismafter1916 (pp. 107-140).
The Powers' "neutrality"in the Chinese civil war was in
effectfavorableto Yuan because of theirsympathiesand high
regardforhim. Li pointsout thatthePowers,especiallyBritain,
were keen to see Yuan returnto publiclife.Theyrefusedto ad-
vance an internationalloan to the financiallyhard-pressed
Nanjing [Nanking]government, but extendedto Yuan several
crucialloans whenhe became president.Earlyin February1912

Yuan had begunnegotiationswiththe foreignbankingconsor-

tiumfora loan. Shortlyafterhis inaugurationas president,he
obtainedan advance of cash fromtheconsortiumand a promise
of more.The ensuingnegotiationsforthe ReorganizationLoan,
1912-1913,confirmsLi's impressionthat under the veneerof
"neutrality" the Powersentertained muchanimositytowardthe
revolutionaires (pp. 51-55).
Li's secondbook,Xinhaigemingdi Zhongguozhengzhi(1954),
is a revisionof his earlierbook. A new partis added, covering
theperiodbetweenYuan's deathand theMay FourthMovement.
Interpretations of Yuan and oftherevolutionhave remainedun-
changed.
Subsequentstudies(e.g., Chen Xu-lu, 1955;Hu Sheng, 1952;
and Tao Ju-yin,1957)haveinvariablydepictedYuan as thearch
villain,and have ignored(or rejected)theview,popularlyheld
in thediplomaticcorpsin Beijingat thattime,thatYuan was the
foremostprogressive statesmanin theEmpire,thebestand most
capable administrator Qing China had produced,and the only
man in China able to maintainstabilityin thecountry.Chinese
historiansalso take no notice of the fact that, not long after
Yuan's dismissalbythePrinceRegent,a wave ofpopularfeeling
arose in his favorand thatthe GrandCouncilin vain had made
overturesto him to returnto office.It is not good enough to
explain the revolutionaries' gesturesto Yuan beforeand during
thepeace negotiationsas compromises.ErnestYoung'sstudyof
Yuan's rise to the presidencyprovidesa more realisticassess-
mentof the politicaland militarysituationin whichthe revo-
lutionariesthemselves, as wellas theconstitutionalists,turned
to
Yuan in the beliefthathe would make the best nationalleader
afterthedemiseof thedynasty(Young, 1968).In a recently pub-
lishedbook, Young (1977: 52) assertsconvincinglythat"Yuan's
pre-eminence as the Chi'ing[Qing] fellwas foundednot on a
reputationformoralexcellenceor widespreadpopularitybuton
his administrative and politicalachievements as an official-and
on the power accruing from these achievements."Chinese
historiansare rightin describingPresidentYuan as a dictator,
but theyhave neglected,as Young pointsout, "the problemof

Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PH Y [ 191]
understandingthe intended and unintended import of his

policies"(1977: 50).
Marxist historiansare concernedwith the historyof social
change.Wu Yu-zhang,a ChineseCommunistPartyofficial,be-
gins his book, Xinhai geming (1961), which has an English
languageedition,withan introduction thatprovidesa briefbut
interestinganalysis of the socioeconomicconditionsin thelate
Qing. Wu sees theemergenceof a newbourgeoisieat theturnof
thecentury.This new class,dissatisfiedwiththetardygrowthof
Chinese industryand capital, "became increasinglysensitive
to the menaceof foreigncapital,and was moreconcernedabout
politicalreforms"(p. 6). The deteriorating socioeconomiccon-
ditions in China were attributedto foreignimperialism.The
importationof cottoncloth and othercommoditieswas detri-
mentalto the nativehandicraft industry,
affecting,forinstance,
the local manufacturingof silk fabrics and porcelain-ware.
Added to the hardshipsof the peasantryand the handicraft in-
dustrywerethe heavytaxes leviedby theQing government and
theintensifyinglandlordexploitation.Imperialismand feudalism
combinedto cause riotsthroughout theEmpire,themostserious
beingthe Changsha rice riotsof 1910 (pp. 9-10).
Wu pointsalso to thegrowthofa Chineseworkingclasswhich
'graduallybecame stronger"as capitalismdeveloped.As wellas
organizingstrikesin an effortto improvetheirworkingcon-
ditions,the workerstook part in the uprisingsplanned by the
Tongmenghuiin Hunan and in the Sichuan railwayprotection
movement.China was in the throesof "greatupheavals,"and
this was evidenceof a rapidlycollapsingfeudal society.Many
landlordswereaware of thischange.The moreenlightened ones
feltobliged to ally themselveswiththe bourgeoisiein the hope
offindinga solutionto China'sproblemsto theiradvantage.They
thensided eitherwiththereformists or withtherevolutionaries,
the two camps into whichthe bourgeoisiewas split(pp. 10-11).
Wu shares Li Shu's criticismof the Tongmenghui'spolitical
program:that it focusedon racial nationalism,thatit failedto
oppose landlordfeudalism,and thatit failedto realizethatthe
real enemyof the Chinese people was imperialism.The revo-
lutionaryleaders werenot creativein the theoreticrealm."The

seriousweaknessof the Revolutionof 1911was thatitlackedan

ideological revolutionto pave the way" (p. 19). The reasons
forthefailureoftherevolutionwere"thelackofpreparationand
errorsin leadershipwithregardto thefundamental problemsof
revolutionarytheory, revolutionaryorganization,the revo-
lutionaryarmedforcesand revolutionary government" (p. 28).
Wu viewstheprovincialassembliesas forumswherepolitical
reforms weredemanded,butinasmuchas theyweremadeup ofthe
upperand middlebourgeoisieand thelandedgentry, theyhad no
desire for social reform.Paradoxically, however,they con-
tributedto the revolutionary movementthroughdemands for
politicalchangeand throughtheirattackson thecorruption and
incompetence ofthegovernment. Whentherevolutionbrokeout,
theyquicklydeclaredfora republic,but owingto theiralliance
withthe feudalforces,theyactuallyconstitutedan obstacleto
the revolution(pp. 14-16).
Wu's class analysis reflectsthe officialinterpretations of
the revolution.In pointingout the lack of an ideologicalrevo-
lution before1911, Wu seems to have in mindthe intellectual
ferment oftheMay Fourthperiodwhichpreparedthewayforthe
foundingoftheChineseCommunistParty.As a partyofficial, he
is under obligationto clarifythe partyinterpretation before
recountinghis personalexperiencesof the revolution.
The constitutionalmovementis generallyinterpretedby
Chinese historiansas antirevolutionary. Hu Sheng-wuand Jin
Chong-ji (1957) analyze the class backgroundsof the consti-
tutionalistsand show how substantialnumbersoflandlordshad
been transformed intomembersofthenewlyemergent bourgeo-
isie. This new typeof landlordwas a resultof theQing govern-
ment'spolicyafter1903of encouragingindustrialdevelopment,
increasingeconomic imperialism,and an expandingnational
industry.These landlords,investingsuccessivelyin commercial
and industrialenterprises, railways,and mining,played over-
and landlord-merchants
lapping roles, being landlord-officials
at thesame time.Wealthymerchants, too, boughttheirwayinto
officialdomand quickly accumulated land on a large scale.
However, therewere conflictsof interestsbetweenthe land-

lord-bourgeoisieand the Qing government. The former,having

risento prominence, madenewdemandson thegovernment, thus
forcingthe latterto introducepoliticalreforms.The heavytaxes
levied by the governmentaroused resentment.The deepening
national crisismenacedthe livesand propertyof the privileged
as well as the poor. Above all, themountingpressureof revolu-
tion was seriously underminingimperial authorityand the
establishedsocial order.Fearingrevolutionand hopingto thwart
it, the landlord-bourgeoisie resortedto a constitutionalmove-
ment, which theyexpected would expandtheirpoliticalparticipa-
tion, rights,and power. Hu and Jin refutethe view that the
afterfailingin theirdemands for the early
constitutionalists,
openingof Parliament,werepreparedto lendactiveand substan-
tial support to the revolutionarycause. They argue that the
constitutionalists,then seeing revolutionas inevitable,turned
againstthe dynastyin orderto "reap the fruitsof revolution."
These hostile interpretations of the constitutionalists
have
promptedscholarsoutsideChina to reassesstheircontributions
to the demiseof thedynasty.Recentscholarshipin Taiwan and
theUnitedStateshas elucidatedthewaysinwhichtheypositively
contributedto the revolution.There were,of course,divisions
and differenceswithinthe constitutionalgroup. While many
gentrymembersof the provincialassemblieswereundoubtedly
progressive, otherswerestillconservativeand weremotivatedby
privateinterestswhen theysupportedthe revolutionin 1911.
Westernor Western-educated scholarshavefoundmuchthatwas
liberal and modernabout the gentryconstitutionalists. Histor-
ians in the PRC, on the otherhand, tend to be skepticalabout
theirmotivesand adopt a viewcloserto Lu Xun's The TrueStory
of Ah Q.
Apartfromthegeneralworksso fardiscussed,thereare a few
provincialstudies.Zhang Yu-kun'sbook on theWenxuesheand
the Wuchang uprising,firstpublishedin 1944,reappearedin a
revisededitionin 1955.It tracestheoriginsoftheWenxuesheand
its developmentthroughthe revolutionto its ill-fated"persecu-
tion" by the militaryregimeof Li Yuan-hong. In the preface
the author criticizesthe "JiangJie-shiclique" whichhas given
little credit to the relativelyunknown figureswho led the

Wuchanguprising.Yet thebook is entirely a narrativewithlittle

ideologicalovertone.Based on information suppliedby former
membersof the Wenxueshe,this reasonablyreliableaccount
opens a new perspectiveon the resourcefulness of the Hubei
revolutionaries and theirtenuouslinkswiththe Tongmenghui,
as well as thecontributions of the WuhanNew Army.Not only
does itshowthewayin whichthelocal revolutionaries organized
themselves, butitshedslighton the Hubei NewArmy,whichhad
attracteda large numberof educated men who enlistedfor a
varietyof reasons.It was thesemenwho providedleadershipfor
the local revolutionary movement.
Thisthemeis developedintwosubsequentworks.The firstone
is Yang Yu-ru,Xinhaigemingxianzhuji(1958), whichexplains
thesuccessoftherevolutionin achievingitsmostimmediateaim
in termsoftheintenseracialhatredfortheManchus,thecorrup-
tion of the Qing administration, the foreignthreat,and the
changesin Chinesethought.The firstact of therevolutionwas
also the firstsign of the failureof the revolution.The case of
Li Yuan-hongis a lesson:revolutionmustnotbe entrusted to the
hands of a nonrevolutionary. The rule of Yuan Shi-kai in the
earlyyearsoftherepublic,inYang'sview,bearsthisout(pp. 4-5).
Yang's studycenterson the Hubei revolutionary movement.
The immediateevents leading to the revolutionaryoutbreak
demonstrate thestrength of thelocal organizationswhich,inthe
most tryingcircumstances,acted independently of the Tong-
menghuiCentralChina Bureau.The Tongmenghui, throughlack
of understanding of the highlyexplosive situationin Wuhan,
missed the opportunityof providingthe local revolutionary
movementwith the leadershipwhich the men of Hubei had
sought.This has led some historiansoutsideChinato reappraise
the role of the CentralChina Bureau in the Wuchanguprising
(Fung, 1974).
AnotherHubei-centeredwork is Cai Ji-ou's Ezhou xueshi
(1958). rheauthor,a journalistat thetimeoftherevolution, was
an eyewitnessof the Wuchanguprising.His workis veryinfor-
mative,butunfortunately, as some reviewershave criticized,his
fictionalstyleall too ofteninterfereswithhistoricalfacts,despite

his claim to the contrary.Furthermore, Cai tendsto make as-

sumptionsbased on controversialevidence(Feuerwerker, 1961:
133-134). Nevertheless,this posthumouspublicationhas some
remarkablefeatures.The authorgivesa good deal of attention
to the social backgroundsof the revolutionaries,theirliving
conditions,and financialdifficulties. Some of them had been
journalistsand teachersbeforejoining the army.They had to
financethelocal revolutionary organizationsand livedon meager
incomes,displayingthe enduranceand faithfulness whichwere
thehighestcharacteristics ofrevolutionary leadership.However,
as Cai points out, once the Qing authoritywas overthrown,
political intriguesdeveloped among them. The internaldis-
sension in Wuchang was not an isolated incident,but a wide-
spread phenomenonwhichthreatenedthe unityof the Nanjing
provisionalgovernment.Finally,Cai refrainsfromplacingany
particularrevolutionary leaderor revolutionaryorganizationat
the center of his narrative.Althoughhe criticizesthe Tong-
menghuion variousoccasions,he does notexaggeratetheroleof
the local revolutionary groups.
No studyoftheHubei revolutionary movement can be complete
withoutsomeinvestigation intoHunan. Indeed,therewas no lack
of cooperationbetweentherevolutionary groupsin theLianghu
region.In the Wenxueshethe Hunanesepredominated,whilein
the Gongjinhui,another local society,men of Hubei were in
large proportions.A mergerwas achieved shortlybeforethe
revolution,and it was planned,too, thatChangshawas to risein
revoltsimultaneouslywiththe outbreakin Wuhan. The revo-
lutionarymovementin thesetwo provincesformsthesubjectof
Li Shi-yue'sbook, Xinhaigemingshiqi Lianghu diqu di geming
yundong (1957). This study includes a discussion of the dis-
contentof the bourgeoisieand the pettybourgeoisie,as wellas
of the strugglesof the peasantsand workersagainsttheirclass
enemies.The chapteron Hubei concentrates on therevolutionary
soldiersin the Wuhun area, whilethe partdealingwithHunan
revolvesaround the strugglesbetweenthe revolutionariesand
the constitutionalists.The author reaches the conclusion that
"the fruitsof revolution"wereusurpedby theconstitutionalists
and theirbureaucratallies who supportedLi Yuan-hongand

Yuan Shi-kai.This led to the suppressionof thepeasantmove-

mentand "a reignof darkness."The "1913 revolution"unfor-
tunatelyended in a fiasco. In the case of Hubei, Li argues,the
revolutionariesacted "too properly"when they,in the belief
that they lacked the status and expertisenecessaryto run a
newgovernment, allowedthenonrevolutionaries to predominate
in it. In Hunan, the revolutionaries,because of their"mag-
nanimous character,"were ill-fatedin dealing with the con-
stitutionalistswho triedto usurp power. In both Hunan and
Hubei theirtendency to compromisereflectedtheirbasicpolitical
weaknesses(p. 129).
In 1958 an informative account of Hunan appeared: Yang
Shi-ji's Xinhai gemingqianhou Hunan shishi(1958). Covering
theyears 1900-1919,thisworkdeals withtwomainthemes,anti-
imperialism and theusurpationofpowerbytheconstitutionalists.
The firstpartsurveysthestateofaffairsin China and thehistory
of Hunan since the Opium War, withspecial referenceto the
socioeconomicchangesin Hunan as a resultof imperialisten-
croachments.The openingof thetreatyports,Yang states,gave
rise to national capitalismand the emergenceof the national
bourgeoisie.In themeantime, theHunanesepeoplewagedspon-
taneous strugglesagainst foreignersand feudalism.A revo-
lutionarymovementdeveloped,ledbyreturned studentsand sup-
portedby local secretsocieties,the ruralmasses,and some sec-
tionsoftheNew Army.Radicalstudents,notablyChenTian-hua
and Yu Zhi-mo, were primarilyanti-imperialist; it was this
sentiment, accentuated by the government'sweakness in dealing
withthe foreignpowers,thatcaused themto be anti-Manchu.
Yang subscribesto the viewthatthe constitutionalists repre-
sentedtheinterests oftheupperbourgeoisiewhichincludedthose
who had been transformed fromthe landlordclass. Theysup-
portedrevolutionin 1911 merelyto protectand advance their
privateinterests.Only when the dynasticrule was overthrown
could theyriseto a positionof power.Yang concedes,however,
thatregardlessoftheirmotives,theydid contribute to deepening
the revolutionarycrisis(p. 3). Yet, theymust still be seen as
political opportunists, who, like Tan Yen-kai,desireda sortof

"civilized revolution" (wenming geming), which demanded

the speedyrestorationof law and orderfollowingtheoverthrow
of the existingauthority.For them,Yang asserts,revolution
was merely"a changein the[national]flagand the[government]
seal" (p. 186).
The masses of the populationsupportedthe anti-imperialist
and antifeudalrevolutionary cause, but forall this,theygained
littlefromit.Rather,itwas theconstitutionalistswhomadethem-
selves the chiefbeneficiariesof the revolution,thus preparing
theway fortherestorationof reactionary forces.The revolution
in Hunan failedforpreciselythisreason.The obvious lessonto
be learned is: "China's futuredoes not lie in the directionof
capitalism"(p. 256).
The considerable scholarlyattentiongiven to the Hubei-
Hunan region is due not only to the fact that the revolution
eruptedthere,but also to thebeliefthatthecourseofrevolution
in the regionbestillustrates
theweaknessesof therevolutionary
leadershipand thewaysin whichpoliticalpowerpassed intothe
hands of the constitutionalists.Hubei was atypicalbecause of
the extentto whichmembersof the New Armyhad been con-
vertedto revolutionary supportersor sympathizers. On theother
hand, Hunan was typicalofmanyprovinceswhich,oncetheyhad
declaredfortherepublicancause, werecontrolledbymembersof
the provincialassemblies.
Other provincialstudies include Zhou Shan-pei's work on
Sichuan, Xinhai Sichuan zhengluqinliji (1957) and a compre-
hensive account of the revolutionarymovementin northeast
China during the period 1840-1919,Jindai dongbei renmin
gemingyundongshi(Instituteof HistoricalResearch,1960).The
formeris actuallya memoirof Zhou, an "industrialdaotai" in
chargeofrailwayconstruction inthedisputedprovincein 1911.It
is, however,morethana memoirin thatit containssome of his
correspondencewithotherQing officials.Zhou was sympathetic
withthe Railway League and attackedthegovernment's policy.
His account also shows the involvementof otherlocal officials
and membersof the gentryin the disputewhichled to serious
riotingin the province.

The workon the threeeasternprovincesof Manchuriais the

only book-lengthstudyof therevolutionary movementto date.
The authors,whoare membersoftheJilinbranchoftheInstitute
of HistoricalResearch,ChineseAcademyof Science,and ofthe
HistoryDepartmentof JilinNormalUniversity (1960), claimto
have seriouslystudied Marxism-Leninismand the works of
ChairmanMao. Thisevidently has an importantbearingon their
approach and conclusions.In the Marxisttheoreticframework
whichtheyuse, everypartof China duringtheperiod1840-1919
was an objectofforeignimperialism, and Manchuriawas no ex-
ception.Yet,it was in theprocessof China'stransformation into
a semicolonythattheChinesepeople wereengagedin opposing
imperialismand the domestic rulerswho served its interests
("runningdog"). The year1905markeda dividinglineintheanti-
imperialistand antifeudalclass struggle,and on this basis the
book is dividedintotwo parts.Part 1 deals withtherisingtide
of peasantuprisings,and Part 2 withthedevelopmentand ulti-
mate failureof the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary move-
ment. The Taiping movementhad encouragedthe masses to
oppose Qing officialdom,landlords,and usurers.The Boxer
movementprovidedgood cause for fightingimperialismand
traitorousofficialswho capitulated to it. Since 1905 Tong-
menghuiagentshad infiltrated the regionand attemptedsome
uprisingswithpeasantsupport.However,sincetheywerebour-
geois elements,theyfailedto mobilizeand organizethe broad
masses.
The conclusion emergingfromthe study is that while the
spontaneousmass strugglesin the northeastwerebroaderand
morewidespreadthanin therestof thecountry,theweaknesses
of the bourgeoisrevolutionarieswere also more pronounced.
Manchuriawas the scene of threewars:thefirstSino-Japanese
War,theBoxerWar,and theRusso-JapaneseWar.The extentof
imperialism therewas greatand thereactionagainstitwas strong.
Yet, forvariousreasons,therevolutionary leadershiptherewas
particularlyweak. The secretsocieties,the New Army,and the
modernschoolsinthethreeeasternprovinceswerecomparatively
few in number.The Honghuzi, a complex local antidynastic

group,was difficult to organize.The revolutionary leaderswere

fromotherpartsof thecountryand therefore encounteredmore
thanwereexpected.The situationwasfurther
difficulties compli-
cated bythemoreeffective imperialcontroloverManchuriaand
by the rapacious encroachmentsof the Powers, particularly
Russia and Japan. The fearsof thebourgeoisrevolutionaries to
oppose imperialismspecificallycaused themto opt fora "civi-
lized revolution"or "orderlyrevolution'(diezui geming)so as
to avertforeignintervention.The Tongmenghuiprogramof"the
equalization of land rights"was to all intentsand purposes
ignored.The class enemieswerenot dealt withharshlyenough
and the reactionaryforceswerestilldeeplyentrenched.It took
a long timebeforeManchuria respondedto the revolutionary
outbreakin Hubei, and theuprisingtherewas crushedas soon as
it occurred(pp. 296-298).
These historianswho believeinviolentstrugglenaturallyheap
scorn on the idea of "orderly revolution,"which involves
sharingpoliticalpowerwith,even handingitto, thebureaucrats
and survivingforcesof the old society.Some oftheold elements
in 1911mighthave alreadydevelopeda modernand progresssive
outlook,but theywerestillclass enemieswho became counter-
revolutionary once theywerereturned to power.The weaknesses
of the revolutionary leadersin Manchuriawere,in the authors'
opinion,characteristics of the "old democraticrevolution."
As faras provincialstudiesare concerned,no monographson
the Liangguangregionhave appeared,in spiteof theimportant
part Guangdong played in the revolutionarymovement.The
reason for this is not clear, as there is no lack of historical
materialson Guangdongand Guangxi.Nevertheless, what had
been publishedbeforethe CulturalRevolutionwas sufficient in
anticipatinga new researchtrendin Westernscholarshipin the
1960s-provincialstudiesoftherevolution.The worksofRankin
(1971), Rhoads (1972) and Esherick(1977), not to includea few
unpublisheddoctoral dissertations,are good testimonyto this
influence.

SCHOLA RL Y DISCOURSE
IN THE EARLY 1960s
The fiftiethanniversaryof the 1911 Revolutiongenerated
further interestin thesubject.In theearly1960sa good number
of academic papers weredeliveredat symposiaand colloquia.
These papers, which were subsequentlypublishedin various
journals, reflectcertainproblemsand differences of interpre-
tation.The mostimportantbook thatgrewout ofone suchsym-
posium is the Xinhai gemingwushizhounianjinian lunwenji
(Joint Hubei Association, 1962), whichhas been reviewedby
WinstonHsieh (1975: 54-63). It will not be necessaryto repeat
an exercisethathas alreadybeen ably done. However,a couple
of areas neglectedin Hsieh's essay deserveattention.
Hsieh points out that witha bulk of new source materials
now availableto them,Chinesehistorians werehavingdifficulties
reconciling the differences between the Marxist-Leninist neo-
orthodoxframework and thetraditionofChinesehistoriography
whichemphasizestheculturaluniquenessofthingsChinese.This
reflectsthe "incompatibility sentimentfor
of the particularistic
Chinese historyand the universalisticfaith in the Marxist-
Leninistmodel,"as evidencedby thecontroversy over"historic
viewpoints"(lishi zhuyiguandian) versus"class analysis"(lieji
fenxi) duringthe years 1963-1966(Hsieh, 1975: 55).
The ideologicaldisputewiththe Soviet Union after1960con-
tributedto a revivialofinterest in China'sdifferences fromother
socialistsocieties.It was now necessaryto adapt the Marxist-
Leninistmodel to Chineseconditionsin orderto explain what
appear to be distinctively Chinesephenomena.The questionis
how to strikea balance betweenthe historicistviewpointand
class analysis. That this is a difficulttask is indicatedby the
debates on a rangeof issues concernedwiththe revolution.
In accordance withthe analyticalmethodset forthin Mao's
"On Contradiction,"Chinesehistorianshave soughtto identify
the "principalcontradiction"governingdevelopmentsin any
one period. There has been much disagreementover precisely
what this principalcontradictionwas duringthe period of the
1911 Revolution.Proceedingfromthe premisethat the revo-

Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PH Y [201]
lution was directedagainstimperialism,Hu Sheng-wuand Jin

Zhong-jiargue that the principalcontradictionwas a national
one betweenimperialismand the Chinese nation,and thatthis
was inextricablyinterwovenwith the internalcontradiction
betweenfeudalismand the Chinesepeople. Imperialismwas the
mainstayof the Chinese feudal landlord class, which in turn
providedthe social foundationforimperialistcontrolin China.
The Qing governmenthad become a tool of imperialism;hence
oppositionto imperialismwas predicatedon the overthrowof
the traitorousdynasty.This interpretation immediatelyposes
a question: why did the revolutionaryleadeship lack a clear,
slogan but ratherconcentratedon racial
specificanti-imperialist
anti-Manchuism?Hu's and Jin's answer is that althoughthe
periodof the 1911 Revolutionon thewholesaw an accentuation
of the principalcontradiction,imperialismin China in thepost-
Boxer decade had temporarilychanged its policy fromone of
"oppressionthroughwar"to one ofproppingup a puppetregime
through"moderate oppression" by political, economic, and
cultural means. As a result of this change, the real national
issue was obscuredand theinternalcontradictionbecame more
pronounced.The bourgeoisrevolutionaries failedto realizethe
potentialof the people's anti-imperialistand antifeudalstrug-
gle. Furthermore,they dreaded the specter of foreigninter-
vention.Subjectively,theyfailedto comprehendthe aggressive
characterofimperialism becauseoftheEuropo-Americanorigins
of theirrevolutionaryideas. Nor did theyhave a clear under-
standingof therelationships betweenimperialismand thefeudal
rulingclass. Hu and Jinwarnthatthe eventsof 1911 mustnot
be analyzed in termsof contradictionsbetweenChinese and
Maflchus.The revolutionwas nota racial revolution.Anti-Man-
chuismwas whippedup onlybecause thedynastyhad becomea
runningdog of imperialism(Joint Hubei Association, 1962:
645-658).
This interpretationis critizedby Li Shi-yue,who believes
that the principalcontradictionin Chinese societyin the post-
Boxer decade was an internalone. While acknowledgingthat
imperialismwas the primarycause of revolutionin China, Li
points out that the revolutionwas not directedagainst im-

perialismas such. He distinguishes betweenthe nature(xingzi)

and the form (xingshi) of imperialism.While the nature is
constant,the formis subjectto change.After1900 the formof
imperialismin China had become"relatively moderate"through
adoption of peacefulmeans ratherthan war, a change which
affectedthetacticsoftheChinesepeople who werenowdirecting
theirstruggleat the "traitorousand despotic"government.Li
adds, however,thatto overthrowthedynastywas of coursenot
all end in itself,but a firstessentialstep towarddefeatingim-
perialism(JointHubei Association,1962: 659-675).
Anti-Manchuism, Li is convinced,oughtto be relatedto the
question of nationalsalvation.The view thatanti-Manchuism
was merelya reflectionof Chinese-Manchucontradictions is a
narrowone. To driveout the Manchus was a wayof achieving
national salvation. To be more specific,the principalcontra-
dictionin Chinesesocietywas betweenthe Tongmenghuirevo-
lutionaryforceand theQingregime.The revolutionwas different
fromtheWar of Resistancein thelaterdecadesinthattheformer
was an internalarmed struggleaimed at the runningdog of
imperialism.Why,then,can we not simplysay thatthecontra-
dictionbetweenfeudalismand the Chinesepeople was theprin-
ciapl contradiction?There are two reasons, accordingto Li.
First, such an assertionis too broad, and second, it is not
sufficientlyclear to show the "dual character"of the Qing dy-
nasty,whichwas botha feudalregimeand a dynastycontrolled
by foreigners.
Li also findsdifficulty in the view that the revolutionwas
directedagainst a coalition of imperialismand feudalism.This
viewis put forwardby Wu Yan-nan,who sees theprincipalcon-
tradictionas beingbetweentheChinesepeople on theone hand
and imperialismand feudalismon the other.Wu disagreesthat
themorepeacefulpolicyadopted by theimperialists in thepost-
Boxer era meant a relaxation in the contradictionbetween
imperialismand the Chinese people. To say that feudalism
was thechieftargetoftherevolutionis to believethattheChinese
revolutionwas cast in the same mold as theEnglishand French
Revolutions-a mistakenproposition,Li argues.In thecoalition
he describes,imperialismwas theleadingpartner.Yet,therevo-

lutionwas focusedon Manchu rulebecause thedynastyhad be-

come the embodiment(shiti) of imperialismand feudalism.
Seeminglyanxiousto reconciletheHu-Jininterpretation withthe
Li Shi-yuetheory,Wu concludesthatto emphasizethenational
contradictionwould be an oversimplification of a complexsitu-
ation, while to stressthe internalcontradictionwould tend to
ignorethe basic issue of imperialismversusthe Chinese nation
(pp. 676-696).
Anotherissue whichgeneratesmuch debate is the character
and compositionof the secretsocieties(huidang).Some writers
findthatsecretsocietymemberswerein themain peasantsand
smallartisans.Thisis particularly trueofthosein Zhejiang,where
it was not uncommonforthousandsof membersto be mustered
at the call of theirleaders. Migrationfromthe hinterlandhad
also broughtlarge numbersof poor peasants into the secret
societiesin townsand cities.These societieswerea productof
a class society,hencetheirdistinctclass features.Althoughtheir
memberswerefarfromhomogeneous,and althoughtheirleaders
werenot alwaysofpeasantorigin,thesocietiesas a grouphad to
reflecttheconsciousnessand demandsofthepeasantry.The part
theyplayedintheTaipinguprising,theBoxermovement, and the
1911 Revolution,is testimonyto the anti-imperialist and anti-
feudalsentiments of the masses. However,to say thattheywere
peasant organizationsis not to suggestthat theiractivitiesre-
flectedthe will and demandsof the peasantryalone. It mustbe
emphasized,thewriters add, thattheywerenota peasantpolitical
party;nordid theywhollyrepresentthepeasantry(pp. 172-173,
519, 699-700).
A second theorydescribesthe secretsocietiesas comprising
ex-soldiers,vagrants,unemployedindustrialworkers, craftsmen,
coolies, poor citydwellers,and a small proportionof peasants,
merchants,ex-armyofficers,and membersof the gentryclass.
The Gelaohui in Hunan, the Hongjianghuiin Jiangxi,and the
Qinghongbangin Jiangsuare cases in point.It is thusmoreac-
curate to describethem as organizationsof the property-less
vagrantclass. Theirmembersmighthavecomefromthecountry-
side, but once away from home, they had lost theirpeasant
identity.The Gongjinhui,forexample, reliedheavilyon secret

society support, and advocated "the equalization of human

rights" rather than "the equalization of land rights." The
property-less vagrantclass was in factthelumpenproletariat of
the urban centers.
A thirdopinionconcedesthata definitive conclusionon the
class studyof the secretsocietiesis yet to be reached. Secret
societymemberships werecomplex,and as a class instrument of
armed struggle,secret societies sometimesserved the revo-
lutionarieswell, while at othertimestheyallowed themselves
to be used bycounterrevolutionary elements.Theircharacterand
compositionlend themselvesto further inquiry(pp. 700.701).
A controversy also arises overthecharacterand functionsof
the New Army.While it is generallyagreedthattheNew Army
consistedof a good percentageof educated men susceptibleto
revolutionary ideas, opinionsare dividedas to howtheyactually
became "revolutionized"(politicized). Chen Xu-lu and Lao
Shao-hua have arguedthatthiswas largelythe outcomeof the
basic contradictionof a feudalregimeseekingto defenditself
with a bourgeois-typearmy (p. 158). To other writers,this
explanationlacks precision.They believethatthepoliticization
of the New Armyhad littleto do withits organization,equip-
ment,and training.The real causes weretheimpactofa general
revolutionary situationin thecountryand theefforts oftherevo-
lutionariesoperatingwithinthearmyunits(pp. 456-463).
The New Armyand the secretsocietieswere two principal
sources of militarypower to whichthe revolutionaries endea-
voredto gainaccess. In someplaces,likeHubei,thearmywas the
main target of subversion.In others like Hunan, the secret
societies received far more attention.To some writers,this
indicatesa difference in revolutionarylines. In theirview,the
ultimatepolicyshiftfromthesecretsocietiesto thearmiesinmost
provinces reflecteda heightenedawareness of the needs of
the revolutionarysituation. Most other scholars, however,
arguethatthedifference was one oftactics,notofrevolutionary
lines. In neithercase did the revolutionariesevince enough
nerveto mobilizethe masses,and thatwas whytheyhad to use
the societiesand the armywhichwere more readilyavailable
instruments of force(pp. 702-703).

The issue of land, too, is centralto Chinesescholarship.Sun

Yat-sen's idea of "the equalization of land rights"(ping/un
diquan), whichunderpinnedthe principleof the people's liveli-
hood (minshengzhuyi),attractsscholarlyattention.Xia Dong-
yuan, in an articleon the land issue, deals at lengthwiththe
origins and social context of Sun's idea (pp. 299-322). Sun,
sympathetic withthe ruralmasses,soughtto solvetheirproblem
throughadoption of John Stuart Mill's and Henry George's
theoryof singletax: all renton sitevaluesshouldgo to thestate,
which should then abolish all other formsof taxation. The
"unearnedincrement," i.e., the increasein land values resulting
fromsocial progressratherthanfromtheimprovements madeby
the owner,would be used for the welfareof the people. Xia
pointsout thatSun's pingjundiquan,whileacceptedas one ofthe
fourplanks of the Tongmenghuiplatform,was subjectto inter-
pretationsby his partycolleaguescomingfromdifferent socio-
economic backgrounds. Zhang Bing-lin,Tao Cheng-zhang,
Feng Zi-you, Liu Shi-pei,forinstance,all had theirown inter-
pretations,whilesome others neverliked it at all, a factwhich
partlyaccountedfortherevolutionaries' inabilityto formulatea
land policy clearly.Whateverthe interpretations, Xia stresses,
pingjun diquan the
represented interestsof thebourgeoisie,not
the peasantry.It was intendedto promotebourgeoiscapitalism
withthe revenuescomingfromland rent.Whencapitalismwas
accelerated,thedifferences betweentherichand thepoor would
increase, therebysharpeningclass antagonisms.Drawing on
Lenin'sessay,"Democracyand Narodismin China,""Xia argues
that Sun's "economic revolution"" amounted to nothingmore
than the transferof rentto thestates;i.e., land nationalization,
and that there was absolutelynothingelse that was realistic
in what Sun proposed and advocated. As Lenin writes(1963:
XVIII, 168):
Accordingto Marx'stheory, landnationalizationmeansa maxi-

mumelimination ofmedieval monopoliesandmedieval relations
inagriculture,
maximum freedom inbuying andselling land,and
maximum facilities
foragriculture
to adaptitselfto themarket.

[2061 MODERN CHINA / APRIL 1978
Whiletheclass identity ofsome revolutionary leaders,notably

Zhang Bing-lin,is open to debate,thereis no disputethatthe
bourgeoisrevolutionaries werenotbuildingsocialismas some of
themthoughttheyweredoing. In advocatingpingjundiquan, it
was their intentionto establish bourgeois rule with peasant
support,thereby to preventa secondrevolution.The ruralmasses
would not be the chiefbeneficiaries,Xia concludes,since the
idea of "land to the tiller,"of whichSun talked in generalities,
neverreceivedseriousattention.It was not untiltheearly1920s
that,withtheassistanceof theChineseCommunistParty,"land
to the tiller"became centralto Sun's pingjundiquan.
Thereare otherinteresting issuesdiscussedin thebook. A few
articlespublishedseparatelyinthejournal Lishi yanjiu and other
journals join the debates. But, for reasons of space we cannot
includethemhere.
SCHOLARSHIP SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Since the Cultural Revolutionthe issue of "historicalview-

points" versus"class analysis"seems to have lost much of its
significance.Chinese historiography has become more directly
relatedto the politicalneeds of the ChineseCommuinistParty.
Politicsin commandapplies to art and literatureas well. It is
consideredto be unrealisticto argue what is uniquelyChinese
and whatis universally Marxist-Leninist.The twoare notneces-
sarilyincompatible.Whatis importantis forthe Partyto define
the demandsof Chinesesociety;historicaleventsare theninter-
pretedin a way thatwould help to meetthem.In otherwords,
historyis to be writtenor rewritten in broad termsto fulfilits
social and politicalfunctions.
The Revolutionof 1911 has receivedmerelygeneraltreatment
sincetheCulturalRevolution.In late 1972,Wu Yu-zhang'sLun
xinhaigeming(1972) was published,whichis a reproductionof
the introductionto his earlierwork (1961). The appearanceof
thistreatiseiiidicatesthatgenerallyno new interpretations had
been put forward.In the same year,a booklet,Xinhaigeming,
was put out as partoftheHistoryofModernChina series(1972)

Fung / CHINESE HIS TORIOGRA PH Y [207]
intendedforthe generalpublic (laterwithan Englishlanguage

edition publishedin 1976). It reaffirms
the anti-imperialist
and
antifeudalinterpretationin generaltermsand repeatstheargu-
mentthattherevolutionfailedbecause oftheweak leadershipof
thebourgeoisie(pp. 93-94). In 1974a similarbook, entitledXin-
hai geming(Lin, 1974),appeared. Both of themhave titlepages
precededby quotationsfromChairmanMao, whichserveas the
theoreticalframework. Bothemphasizetheincompletenatureof
the revolutionand the importanceof theworkingclass in revo-
lution.ChairmanMao's messageis clear:
The entirehistory of revolution provesthatwithout theleader-

shipof theworking class revolution
failsand thatwithit revo-
lutiontriumphs. In theepochofimperialism, in no countrycan
any otherclass lead anygenuinerevolution to victory.Thisis
clearlyprovedbythefactthatthemanyrevolutions ledbyChina's
pettybourgeoisie all failed[Mao, 1961:IV, 421].
In 1975whentheanti-Confuciancampaignwas in fullswing,
some aspectsofthe 1911 Revolutionwerereappraisedinan effort
to exalt the Legalists.An articlepublishedin the Marchissueof
Wen Wu (Cultural Relics) describes Zang Bing-lin'sview of
historyas beinganti-Confucianand pro-Legalist(Tang, 1975).
The author, Tang Zhi-jun, examines a hithertounpublished
handwritten letterof Zhang's to Wu Jun-sui,whichis now on
depositin theShanghaiLibrary,and pointsout thatZhang once
supportedConfucianismand the Qing dynasty.But after1901
Zhang had brokenwithLiang Qi-chao and Kang You-wei and
taken a revolutionary stand. Tang assertsthatZhang, once he
was convertedto revolution,realizedthe need to criticizeCon-
fucius and Confucianism,and to look upon the progressive
Legalists as a source of inspiration,for he now favoredrevo-
lutionarychangein the Legalistfashion.In 1902ZhangmetSun
Yat-senin Tokyo, an encounterwhichhad a profoundinfluence
on the former,Tang maintains.The issue of land attracted
Zhang's attention,and he was said to have had manyusefuldis-
cussions withSun on a numberof subjects.

In Tang's opinion,Zhang'smainweaknesswas hisinabilityto

analyze the Confucian-Legalist conflictfroma class viewpoint.
By thisTang meansthatZhang,as a "politicalrepresentative of
the weak Chinesebourgeoisie," was divorcedfrom the massesand
ideologicallybehind the revolutionary age. That was why he
movedintotheorbitof Yuan Shi-kaionce thedynastywas over-
thrown,and fellinto disgracewhenhe reversedhis stand and
supportedConfucianismafter1911.
The articleby Tang is obviouslyintendedto be part of the
political movementto criticizeConfucianismratherthan a
scholarlystudy of Zhang's view of history.The author fails
to substantiatetheclaim thatZhangwas a Legalistor pro-Lega-
listbefore1911. Nor does he makeanymentionof Zhang'sdif-
ferenceswithSun Yat-senoverthe land issue and the question
of revolutionary leadership.
In May 1975the Wen Wu publishedan articlewhichsought
to "expose the criminalrecord"of foreignimperialismin late
Qing China (Zhong, 1975). The author,Zhong Jin-shiof the
BeijingNormalCollege,allegesthatforeignimperialists inChina
had formeda political and culturalalliance withthe Chinese
semifeudalrulingclass in orderto carryout thepolicyof"using
theChineseto play offagainsttheChinesethemselves."Foreign
missionaries,notablyRichardTimothyand Young JohnAllen
(the latterwas publisherof the Globe Magazine in Shanghai),
are accused of promotingan admixtureof Confucianismand
Christianityas an ideological instrument of imperialism.The
foreignpowerssupportedthe dynastyand the Confucianideo-
logybecause,theauthormaintains,theywantedChinato remain
as backwardas ever so that she would permanently be under
imperialistcontrol. When Yuan Shi-kaiattempted to restorethe
monarchyin 1915,the imperialists in China are allegedto have
quicklysupportedhim,openlyadvocatingConfucianism and the
suppressionof revolution.This article,like the one by Tang
Zhi-yun,is a political piece of work whichlacks depth in its
analysis.
In September1976Tang Zhi-yunincollaborationwithZhuang
Yuan-he publishedanother article on Zhang Bing-lin(Tang,
1976). It is based on an examinationof fourteenpublished

lettersof Zhang thatare now held by the ChongqingMuseum.

These letterswerewrittenbetweenApriland August 1913,fol-
lowingtheassassinationofSong Jiao-ren, a leadingmemberofthe
newlyconstitutedGuomindang.Accordingto Tang and Zhuang,
Song's deathbroughtZhangto therealizationofYuan's ambition
and treachery, but he had no confidencein Sun Yat-sen'sability
to challengeYuan militarily.So he turnedto Li Yuan-hong,then
vice-presidentof the Republic, but to no avail. He also failed
to see that Yuan intendedto restorethe monarchywhen,as
president,Yuan soughtto restoreConfucianismto therespected
positionwhichit had traditionallyheld. In 1913 Zhang found
himselfunable to trusteitherYuan or Sun,fortheywere"badgers
of the same mold."
Tang adds what he omittedin his previousarticle,namely,
Zhang's differences withSun, whichcan be tracedback to 1907
when the formerwas editorof the Min Bao. While Tang and
Zhuang are critical(very mildly)of Zhang's failureto distin-
guishbetweenfriend(Sun) and enemy(Yuan) and to carryout
thoroughlytheanti-Yuancampaign,theyadvance theviewthat
Zhang was one of the most importantrevolutionary standard-
bearers (qishou) who had had a profoundinfluenceon the
bourgeoisdemocraticrevolutionbefore1911. Butunfortunately,
he still had a tendencyto compromisewith the feudal forces
owingto thefactthathe himselfwas a productofthetraditional
feudalculture.In the finalanalysisof the authors,Zhang went
down in historyas a "half-hero"who epitomizedthe inherent
weaknessesof the bourgeoisrevolutionaries.
Followingthe politicaldemise of the "Gang of Four," there
is obviously a new trendto reviewthe historiography of the
previous years when the "radicals" were in the ascendent.In
February1977an interesting article,("Was the 1911 Revolution
a strugglebetweenLegalismand Confucianism?") entitled"Xin-
hai gemingshirufadouzhengma?"appearedin Lishiyanjiu(Fan,
1977).The author,Fan Bai-chuan,accusesthe"Gang ofFour" of
havingopposed Mao Ze-dong'sinterpretation and betrayedthe
fundamentalMarxist theoryin theirstudyof the revolution.
Duringtheanti-Confucianand anti-LinBiao campaignof 1973-

1974, the "Gang of Four" is alleged to have distortedhistory

throughinterpreting the revolutionas primarilya strugglebe-
tweenLegalismand Confucianism.Fan does not namethehis-
torianswho belongedto the"Gang of Four,"nordoes he referto
any specificarticle. But obviouslyhis criticismis directedat
Tang Zhi-yun'searlierwritingson Zhang Bing-lin.'Fan chal-
lengestheclaimthatZhang,not Sun, was thetruerevolutionary
standard-bearer before1911. ActuallyTang nevermade such a
claim;whathesaid wasthatZhangwas one ofthemostimportant
revolutionary standard-bearers. Nor did Tang everrejecttherole
and leadershipof Sun.
In any case, Fan findsit necessaryto reassertMao's anti-
imperialistand anti-feudaltheme which seems to have been
somewhatneglectedduringthe anti-Confuciancampaign. He
arguesconvincingly thatZhang was neithera trueLegalistnor
a truebourgeoisdemocraticrevolutionary. AlthoughZhangonce
lauded Legalismand attackedConfucianism,he stillhad high
regardfor Confuciusand neverpositivelydenied the role of
Confucianism;in Chinese society. His .ideological stand was
ambivalent;theonlyobviousthingabout himwas hisfrantic anti-
Manchu sentiment whichoverrodeall considerationsofpolitical
and economic changes. He did not understandthat Sun Yat-
sen's "equalization of land rights"was intendedto promote
Chinesecapitalism,and this,among otherthings,explainedhis
disagreements withSun. In short,Fan tellsus thatthe"Gang of
Four" pretendedto be modern Legalists in order to attack
PremierZhou En-lai and otherloyal membersof the Chinese
CommunistParty.
Dissussionof the Confucian-Legalist controversywhichchar-
acterized the anti-Confucian and anti-LinBiao campaignis be-
yondthescope ofthispaper.2Sufficeitto say thatFan is correct
in rejectingtheviewthatthe 1911Revolutionwas a Confucian-
to notethatwhilefollowing
Legaliststruggle.It is also ofinterest
the neo-orthodoxanti-imperialist and antifeudalinterpretation,
Fan assertsthatideologicallythe struggleduringthe periodof
the 1911 Revolution was between "new learning"and "old

Fung / CHINESE HISTORIOGRA PH Y [21 1]
learning,"i.e., betweenthe newlyacquired Westernbourgeois

democraticideas and the Chinesefeudalculture.Sun Yat-senis
seen as the representative
of those bourgeoisintellectualswho
soughtto find"the truth"in the West. This last pointis most
and somewhatintriguing.
interesting None oftheearlierworksI
have reviewedin this paper deals with the new learning-old
learningtheme.
CONCLUSION
In Chinese historiography, the 1911 Revolution was anti-

imperialistand antifeudaland cannot be put in the same cate-
gorywiththeEnglishand FrenchRevolutions.UnlikeitsEnglish
and French counterparts,the Chinese bourgeoisiewas weak
numerically,economically,and politically,and nevergrewin-
dependentand confidentbecauseitwas tiedto and dependenton
thefeudalstatebureaucracyand theimperialist foreigninterests.
It was their political, organizational,and ideological weak-
nesses that preventedthe Chinese bourgeoisdemocraticrevo-
lutionariesfromcompletingthe anti-imperialist and antifeudal
task.
Chinesescholarshipon therevolutionis of interestto anyone
who takes social revolutionseriously.Much of it is inspiredby
Marxist or Leninistideas. The class analysisand Marxistap-
proachaffordan insightintothesocioeconomicbackgroundsof
the revolutionariesand their movement,as well as into the
limitationsof theirachievementsand the consequencesof the
revolution.At the same time,thereare usefulnarrativeswhich
followmore traditionalmethodologies.
Thereare areas in theChinesewritingswhichdeservefurther
research:forexample, the role of the New Armyin provinces
otherthanHubei,theintellectual metamorphosis ofsomeimpor-
tantsectionsof thegentryclass, theself-government movement
in the provinces,the administrativereformsat both the central
and provinciallevels,to mentionbut a few.We look forwardto
additionalscholarlytreatment of thesesubjects.

NOTES
1. I havecheckedall the 1974-1976issuesof Wen Wuand Lishiyanyiu,

and couldnot
findany articlesdealingwithZhang Bing-linor the 1911 Revolutionotherthan those
alreadyreviewedhere.
2. For an account of the anti-Confuciancampaign,see Merle Goldman (1975)
"China's Anti-Confucian Campaign 1973-1974"The China Quarterly,63: 435-462.
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EdmundS. K. Fung is a Senior Lecturerin theSchool of ModernAsian Studies,

GriffithUniversity,
Brisbane. His researchinterestis in the historyof the late
Qing and earlyRepublicanperiods. He has publishedarticleson some aspectsof
the 1911 Revolution.


Post-1949 Chinese Historiography

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Post-1949 Chinese Historiography on the 1911 Revolution

Author(s): Edmund S. K. Fung

This content downloaded from 129.93.16.3 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 19:13:58 PM

Unlike the orthodox Guomindang historiographyon the

This content downloaded from 129.93.16.3 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 19:13:58 PM

This content downloaded from 129.93.16.3 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 19:13:58 PM

renderedintoChinesewithsome errorsin translation.In fairness

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but he is rightin assertingthatthe railwayissuedrovea wedge

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barelysufficient fora fullunderstandingofthesocial conditions

This content downloaded from 129.93.16.3 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 19:13:58 PM

This content downloaded from 129.93.16.3 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 19:13:58 PM

revolutionarymovement.It consists of three volumes, with

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"Oral history"is intendedto encourage more studyof the

The monographsreviewedhere were publishedin the 1950s

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Yuan had begunnegotiationswiththe foreignbankingconsor-

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understandingthe intended and unintended import of his

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seriousweaknessof the Revolutionof 1911was thatitlackedan

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lord-bourgeoisieand the Qing government. The former,having

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Wuchanguprising.Yet thebook is entirely a narrativewithlittle

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his claim to the contrary.Furthermore, Cai tendsto make as-

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Yuan Shi-kai.This led to the suppressionof thepeasantmove-

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"civilized revolution" (wenming geming), which demanded

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The workon the threeeasternprovincesof Manchuriais the

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group,was difficult to organize.The revolutionary leaderswere

This content downloaded from 129.93.16.3 on Wed, 9 Oct 2013 19:13:58 PM

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lution was directedagainstimperialism,Hu Sheng-wuand Jin

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perialismas such. He distinguishes betweenthe nature(xingzi)

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lutionwas focusedon Manchu rulebecause thedynastyhad be-

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society support, and advocated "the equalization of human

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The issue of land, too, is centralto Chinesescholarship.Sun

Accordingto Marx'stheory, landnationalizationmeansa maxi-

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Whiletheclass identity ofsome revolutionary leaders,notably

SCHOLARSHIP SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Since the Cultural Revolutionthe issue of "historicalview-

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intendedforthe generalpublic (laterwithan Englishlanguage

The entirehistory of revolution provesthatwithout theleader-

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In Tang's opinion,Zhang'smainweaknesswas hisinabilityto

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lettersof Zhang thatare now held by the ChongqingMuseum.

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1974, the "Gang of Four" is alleged to have distortedhistory

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