Professional Documents
Culture Documents
8 Sector
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this topic, you should be able to:
1. Describe the evolution of the financial sector;
2. Identify the role of the Securities Commission (SC);
3. Explain BAFIA 1989;
4. Discuss the restructuring process of the banking sector in the 1990s;
5. Describe the impact of financial liberalisation on the banking sector;
6. Identify four key principles for BASEL II; and
7. Disucss Islamic finance disclosure and transparency.
X INTRODUCTION
Before the crisis, more than three decades ago, Malaysia was characterised by
stable economic growth with relative price stability. This follows its profound
structural changes, evolving from a primary commodity producer into an
increasingly broad-based economy with an expanding industrial base. However,
the Asian financial crisis worsened in 1997 to 1998 and spilled over into the
Malaysian financial system amid the external environmentÊs volatility. A
comprehensive restructuring plan was implemented during the second half of
1998. One of the policies pursued by the government to promote economic
recovery was the major consolidation of the banking system to resolve weaker
banking institutions. The Government acts as a regulator that would include
making and revising banking laws and regulations as well as monitoring,
educating, mediating and arbitrating in case of disputes.
LetÊs start this topic by looking at an overview of the financial sector and the
development of Malaysian banking institutions in past decades. We will learn the
role of the Securities Commission (SC) and discuss the role of the International
Offshore Financial Centre (IOFC) and the performance of Malaysian banking
institutions.
The 1980s period posed great challenges in the financial system due to the
contractionary impact on domestic liquidity from the external sector. An
expansionary monetary policy was pursued to encourage private productive
capacity to counter the dampening effects of severe global recession of 1985 and
1986. The financial authorities adopted a stance of fostering greater financial
discipline among financial institutions, manipulate savings interest rates to
stimulate domestic savings, attract capital inflows and stimulate private
investments. This was done while ensuring adequate bank credit was made
available to private investors at a reasonable cost. Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM)
managed the domestic currency to reduce a large deficit of the balance of
payments and avoid speculation against the ringgit. As for the spirit of
developing Islamic finance, the first Islamic banking system in Malaysia was set
up in 1983 under Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad.
In the 1990s, there was a deregulation of the interest rate. Until 1978, Malaysia
had adopted a flexible interest rate regime, under which the BNM determined
the minimum lending rate and put a ceiling on deposits rates. In 1978, banks
were permitted to determine their own interest rates on deposits and the
minimum lending rate charged to their customers, which resulted in
asymmetrical interest rates for borrowers. Therefore, BNM introduced the base-
lending rate (BLR) in November 1983 that required banks to peg their lending
rates to the BLR. However, since 1 February 1991, the framework of BLR started
to become free from the administrative control of BNM. In other words, the
banking institutions were free to quote their own BLR at any level based on their
cost of fund, subject to the maximum spread of four per cent between the actual
lending rate and BLR. Subsequently, the framework of BLR was further
liberalised on 1 November 1995, whereby the maximum BLR was fixed based on
the three months interbank rate and administrative margins were capped at 2.5
per cent. Effective from 1 September 1998 the computation of BLR was further
revised and based on the three months BNM intervention rate and the
administrative margin was cut by 25 points from the previous 2.5 per cent to 2.25
per cent. With this, it permitted greater flexibility for banking institutions to
respond rapidly to changes in market liquidity situations and encourage greater
efficiency.
Did you know that the Malaysian financial system can be structured into two
broad groups? They are the banking system and non-banking financial
intermediaries
(a) The baanking system is the largest financial institution. The banking system
attributed 70 per cent and 68 per cent of the total assets in 1990 and 2000
respectively compared to 30 per cent and 32 per cent from non-bank
financial intermediaries. Anyway, proliferation of non-bank financial
intermediaries should be promoted to better cater to the needs of the
economy with respect to venture capital and financing other types of
lending companies. Commercial banks are the largest banking system in
terms of total assets, total loans and total pre-tax profits. The marginal
increase of non-bank financial intermediaries implies the growing
importance of the funds as a financial intermediary in the economy. The
downturn in 1998 adversely affected the performance of the Malaysian
banking system. The banking system recorded a pre-tax loss of RM2.3
billion in 1998 compared to a pre-tax profit of RM7.7 billion in 1997. Loan
loss provisions, which rose from RM6 billion in 1997 to RM19 billion in
1998, were the main contributory factor for the poor performance in 1998.
At the end of 2002, there were one Central Bank, 26 commercial banks, 11
finance companies, 10 merchant banks, seven discount houses and 50
offshore banks operating in Labuan (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2002; and
Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority, 2002).
The banking system remained healthy with improvements in asset quality. Look
at financing form bank loans from 1990 to 1995. Here, bank lending grew more
than double. However, the growth rate slowed from 2000 to 2005, especially for
financial companies and merchant banks. The asset quality of the banking system
improved further, following the reclassification of some non-performing loans
(NPLs) to performing loans, write-offs and lower incidence of new NPLs. The net
NPLs ratio based on three months declined 16.6 per cent from RM64.2 billion to
RM53.5 billion from 2000 to 2005. Financing small and medium scale enterprises
is prone to problems, especially in repayments. SME financing is largely based on
loans where control and monitoring are minimal. In 2004, SME non-performing
loans (NPL) accounted for 30.6 per cent of the total NPLs for the business sector.
The Malaysian Banking Law (BAFIA, 1989), to some extent, serves to protect
depositors. To prevent bank failure, it does not allow commercial banks to use
deposits to buy real assets and stocks for profit. BAFIA allows commercial banks
to own shares arising from debt restructuring activities. Moreover, loan
approvals for financing businesses show a rising trend.
SELF-CHECK 8.1
8.2 BARRIERS
The Malaysian government limits foreign participation in financial services to
encourage the development of domestic financial services providers. The
government policies are guided by the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of
1989 (BAFIA) and the 10-year Financial Sector Masterplan unveiled in 2001. The
plan focuses on building competitive domestic banks through banking
consolidation and defers the introduction of new foreign competition until after
2007. No new licences are being granted to either local or foreign banks; foreign
banks must operate as locally controlled subsidiaries, except for Islamic banking
licences to foreign banks. On 1 April 2003, the government removed the
restriction that foreign-controlled companies were required to obtain 50 per cent
of their local credit from Malaysian banks. The Federal Territory of Labuan was
established as an International Offshore Financial Centre in October 1990.
Foreign investors receive preferential tax treatment for offshore banking
activities, trust and fund management, offshore insurance and offshore
insurance-related businesses, and offshore investment holding business (USTR,
2005).
BNM announced the specific proposal for the bank merger programme for the
domestic banking sector on 29 July 1999. At the time, the country had 55 banking
institutions, which were made up of 20 commercial banks, 23 finance companies
and 12 merchant banks. An MOU was signed among the six anchor banks and
their related groups by the stipulated deadline of 30 September 1999.
Nevertheless, there have been some objections especially pertaining to the
number and composition of the banking groups and the time frame. However,
due to certain problems, the government responded by letting the banks decide
on organising them into 10 big banking groups. Flexibility was given to the
banking institutions to form their own merger groups. A total of 10 banks
submitted the proposal for reviewing to BNM. Finally, all 10 were accepted as
anchor banks by BNM in February 2000. Next, the banks have to complete the
due diligence process by 15 November and sign the sales and purchase
agreements by the end of 1999. Early April 2000, all the anchor banks started
their operation as new merged entities.
Time Description
1990 Initial merger occurred with the takeover of the United Asian Bank
by the Bank of Commerce.
October 1st, 1999 Subsequently, Bank of Commerce was merged with Bank
Bumiputra to form Bank Bumiputra Commerce.
RHB Bank was the anchor bank for RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers
Berhad, Delta Finance Berhad, and Interfinance Berhad.
1998 Sime Bank was taken over by the RHB Group.
See Poon (2008) for other merging activities. The new phase of banking
consolidation would be market driven and operating in a more competitive
environment in both financial and non-financial institutions.
ACTIVITY 8.1
SELF-CHECK 8.2
8.4 MERGING
The deteriorating economic conditions seriously affected the asset portfolio of
banking institutions. The financial crisis in mid-1997 led to insolvency and
liquidity problems in the aftermath of excessive lending, insufficient collateral to
the property sector and reckless exposure to share-based lending during the
boom, leaving them saddled with bad debts with a growing level of NPLs. The
NPLs were absorbed by Danaharta to maintain the integrity of public savings
and to sustain the stability of financial system functions more efficiently. The IMF
prescription of closing down problematic banks was not supported by the
government as the social cost involved in terms of dislocation of resources was
high. In conjunction with the crisis, BNM implemented a rescue scheme by
acquiring shares in some of the ailing commercial banks and absorbing assets
and liabilities of the insolvent finance companies by stronger finance companies
with the purpose of restoring stability, capital and expertise and strengthening
the efficiency of finance institutions.
Ten banking institutions have been receiving the injection of RM6.2 billion from
Danaharta as at the end of June 1999. This brought around an improvement of
the average risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) from 9.8 per cent at the end of
August 1998 to 13.9 per cent at the end of May 1999. This provided a stronger
ground for banking institutions to support the recovery of the Malaysian
economy. However, the sale of NPLs to Danaharta resulted in banking
institutions incurring losses as Danaharta purchased NPLs at fair market value.
In recognition of this, Danamodal was established to address capital erosion and
recapitalise weak banking institutions to promote systemic stability. The total
amount of capital injected by Danamodal Nasional Bhd into the banks during the
economic crisis dropped to RM4.6bil on 7 October 1999 from the original RM6.4
billion after some banks repaid their loans (The Star, October 23, 1999). On the
other hand, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) served as a
platform for voluntary debt restructuring.
BNM had several requirements, such as that each merged banking group should
have an asset base of at least RM25 billion and minimum shareholdersÊ funds of
RM2 billion. BNM also intensified supervision of banking institutions through
on-site examinations conducted on a consolidated basis at least once a year with
the examination. This approach would detect potential areas of vulnerabilities
and therefore facilitate the implementation of corrective actions. Other
requirements are as shown below:
ACTIVITY 8.2
There are a few issues which have arisen due to the merging process. Initially, a
bank or finance institution faced difficulty in finding an appropriate partner for a
bank consolidation programme. The merger partners should understand their
position and be clear about with whom to merge to produce an optimum level of
management restructuring. There might be internal conflicts among the members
of the merged companies in determining the domain name for the newly
developed banking system. In addition, there is difficulty for the management of
the new company to integrate the culture of employees of both companies.
ACTIVITY 8.3
With your group members, get some banking data for the past 10 years
and describe the pre-merger and post-merger situations.
ACTIVITY 8.4
(a) The first phase began in January 2008 whereby all banks adopted the
standardised approach for credit risks and basic indicator approach for
operational risks. In phase one, BNM might allow banking institutions to
maintain their current accord if they adopted the Foundation Internal
Rating Based (FIRB) approach instead of the standardised approach.
However, banking institutions would require submission of business case
justification and a blueprint for implementation that has been approved by
the board of directors of the banking institutions concerned.
Credit risk is the most serious risk faced by financial institutions. It could emerge
from the inability of a debtor to settle debts on time that may cause liquidity
crisis and affect the quality of the bankÊs asset. Liquidity risk arises when there is
a sharp decline in the bankÊs net cash flow and the bank is unable to raise
resources at a reasonable cost in a ShariÊah compatible manner (Alam and
Shanmugam, 2008). This makes it difficult for banks to fund new profitable
businesses. There are two common conditions that may lead to liquidity risks or
a liquidity crunch for the banks:
(a) If banks are unable to sell the debts due to a fiqh restriction on the sale of
debts; and
(b) When there is slow development of Islamic financial instruments that delay
the fund-raising procedure.
SELF-CHECK 8.4
x Malaysia was affected by the currency crisis and financial crisis which
involved attacks by currency speculators, starting with the descent of the
Thai Baht in July 1997, making a deep impact of recession in Malaysia.
x There might have been internal conflicts among the members of the merged
companies in determining the domain name for the newly developed
banking system. There was difficulty for the management of the new
company to integrate the culture of employees of both companies. Strategy
integration of IT systems and streamlining of operating processes made up
another key area that determined efficiency.
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2001). Bank Negara Malaysia annual report, Kuala
Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia.
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2002). Economic and financial data for Malaysia, June 16,
[Online] available: http://www.bnm.gov.my.
The Star. (1999). Bank Negara explains rationale for bank mergers, 11 August.
USTR Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2005). 2005 National
trade estimate report, Retrieved June 5, 2007 from http://www.ustr.gov.
Zeti, A. A. (2004). Enhancing the soundness of the banking sector The new
capital accord. Ekonomika, April-June, pp. 10-12.