Metode of Failure Analysis

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

 A systematic approach for analyzing the causes and
effects of product or service failures.
 Proactive Quality Strategy Focus on:
 Failure prevention
 Virtual elimination of the possibility of premature failure
 Mistake proofing
 Many tools exist for the analysis performance
failure, consequence and risk.
 These tools are used in both proactive and reactive
modes.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(Cont.)
FMEA focuses on:
 Failure mode (ex. Fatigue, leakage,
buckling, binding, or excessive force
required, broken, too salty, eraser smears
pencil marks)
 Mechanism
 Effects
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(Cont.)
 In a proactive application, FMEA can be
adapted to focus on failure prevention.
 We usually think of a failure mode as a
physical description (result) of a failure,
whereas a failure mechanism refers to
the process that create the failure.
 FMEA (Cont.)
 FMEA seeks to identify possible failure modes
and mechanism, the effects or consequences
that failure modes may have on performance,
methods of detecting the identified failure
modes, and possible means for prevention.
 The net results from effective FMEA work are
product and process action plans for elimination,
or at least mitigation, of the failure modes.
 FMEA (Cont.)
FMEA encourages:
1. The systematic evaluation of a product or
process at specified levels of system
complexity.
2. The postulation of single point failures, the
identification of possible failure mechanism,
and the examination of the associated
effects, likelihood of occurrence, and
preventive measures.
3. The systematic documentation of potential
product or process nonperformance.
 Development Base Format for
Proactive FMEA
1. Functional or equipment identification
2. Functional or equipment purpose
3. Failure mode
4. Failure mechanism: Connections between
failure mechanisms and the environment, the
application, and the operating method are
important in assuring product integrity.
5. Failure detection
6. Failure compensation
7. Failure effects
8. Preventive measures
Example:

FIGURE 12.1
TABLE 12.3 FIREPLACE FMEA (Cont.)

10
 Criticality Analysis
 A method whereby unique failure effects are
ranked relative to one another, thus ranking
the criticality of the systems, subsystems, or
hardware components analyzed.
 Once ranked, the systems, subsystems, or
components designated as most severe, in
terms of failure effect, are provided analysis
resources in a graded fashion.
TABLE 12.4 RISK LEVEL DEFINITIONS (Cont.)
TABLE 12.5 FIREPLACE FMECA (Cont.)
 Logic Tree Analysis
 Logic Tree Models are hierarchical models which
play an important role in performance analysis.
 It is often helpful in describing and understanding
the system to construct visual aids which depict
the logic required to establish and accomplish
system performance goals and objectives.
 The primary purpose of the tree structure is to
illustrate causal relationships between basic
human, hardware, and environmental events.
Fault Tree Analysis
 The purpose of FTA is to identify failure
pathways, both physical and human, that
could lead to an identified fault event
 The fault tree includes only the fault events
and logical inter-relationship that contribute
to the top event
 A fault tree does not contain all possible
componenet failure modes or all possible fault
events that could cause system failure
 Fault Tree Analysis Procedure
Development of an FTA consists of the following
steps:
 Identify the top event
 Identify the second-level events
 Develop the tree logic (use the AND, OR, or other
gate logic structure)
 Identify lower level events
 Proceed to the desired level of detail
 Quatify the tree logic (compute the probability of
failures and top event probability)
Selected FTA Logic Symbols

20
 FTA (Cont.)
Example: Develop a fault tree diagram and analysis
for the gas valve.
Solution: The first step is to identify the top event on
the fault tree: “the gas valve fails to prevent gas
flow (when closed).” For example, the handle may
inappropriately indicate that the valve is in the
closed position; or the valve may actually be
closed, as indicated by the handle, however the
interior seals may be faulty, thus allowing
continued gas flow; or the valve may not be
properly installed to the gas feed and allows gas to
escape at the connection, upstream from the valve.
FTA (Cont.)
Note the use of the word “or” in the
previous sentence. This word naturally
indicates the use of an OR gate in the
fault tree construction. In short, this
example assumes that three conditions
could lead to the top event. Figure 13.2
shows the top event and the three
conditions previously listed as the top
two layers of the FTA diagram.
FIGURE 13.2 Gas valve fault tree
FTA (Cont.)