Sino-US Unease and the Evolving Strategic

Chessboard
Shall the Titans Clash or Reconcile?
Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal TI(M)*

Abstract
(There is a calm sense of steadiness in global affairs now with President Joe Biden at the helm 1.
Battling multiple crises, Biden probably knows he has no time for divisive politics at home or
threatening retaliations abroad. The World had been waiting with bated breath to see whether
President Biden’s China approach would be different from his predecessor. His articulations
and actions thus far indicate a shift in nuances while retaining the substance. The US has
invested heavily in its anti-China campaign. It’s a bipartisan policy in the political sense; the
two major parties fiercely compete to appear more anti-China. Most of the mainstream
newspapers make it a point to frequently carry articles negatively projecting China.
 American foreign policy is slowly being recalibrated away from the Trump era 2. With China,
Biden is trying to be assertive about US security and economic interests without risking the kind
of confrontation that defined the Trump era. The immediate diplomatic test  of  the  new
administration is to shake hands with China, in order to forge cooperation on countering the
ongoing pandemic and resolving what Biden calls “the shared challenges of global health
security, climate change, and preventing weapons proliferation”3.
President Biden chose to make his first telephonic contact with  the Chinese President two days
after he had spoken to Indian Prime Minister and discussed the ways and means of bolstering the
anti-China alliance—“Quad”. America, in an urgency, is cobbling together a global anti-China
politico-military conglomerate.
Though China is now a global economic power, militarily it is years behind the US. Fearing loss
of a military edge as well, America’s ‘contain China’ strategy seems to entail India’s
involvement in efforts to impede China’s military up-gradations. Despite India’s setbacks in the
recent Doklam and Ladakh crises with China, the US has not lost hope.
 Russia is keeping its cards close to its chest, however, soon it will have to choose sides. India
has embarked upon an economically bleeding journey of replacing its legacy Russian war
fighting systems with better performing American systems. This would, however, result in an
Indian state devoid of worthwhile strategic autonomy.
China is cautious and tempered with its traditional leadership traits of patience and
perseverance. It has displayed prudence in allowing India a domestic face saving by making a
symbolic pull back of its military while retaining vast swaths of strategically important
landscapes.
China’s sagacity will be tested. If it can avoid a major military conflict for 7-10 years, it could
ascent the pedestal of the most powerful country without firing a bullet.
Pakistan has to endure a rough patch. Pakistan’s economy would be on an upward trajectory
once China Pakistan Economic Corridor and its allied projects become operational in 5-10
years from  now;  till then it needs to strengthen its politico-diplomatic hedge to ward  off any
misadventure from the East. In the meanwhile, any Sino-US rapprochement would also ease out
Indo-Pakistan tensions.
This paper examines such evolving scenarios out of a wobbly World Order. – Author)
The Ice Breaker: Biden-Xi Jingping Chat
President Xi Jingping got his turn two days after Biden had  spoken to the Indian Prime
Minister, Narendra Modi. During their   first telephonic conversation since President Joe
Biden’s assumption  of Presidency on February 11, the leaders exchanged Lunar New
Year greetings in a goodwill call aimed at reshaping US-China relations. President Xi
Jinping told Biden that a US-China confrontation would be a ‘disaster’. Biden raised the
issues of trade, human rights and      the Indo-Pacific region.4 A White House statement
said Biden raised “fundamental concerns about Beijing’s coercive and unfair economic
practices,” along with human rights issues  and  “preserving  a  free and open Indo-
Pacific” region. “I told him I will work with China when it benefits the American people,”
Biden tweeted. White House spokeswoman, Jen Pskai, said that part of the
administration’s strategy for confronting China “includes ensuring that we are
strengthening our own approach at home,” and among allies. “In all of the conversations
with Europeans, with allies in the region, China and the relationship with China has
been a pivotal part of those conversations. So that’s also part of our strategy.” Beijing
vowed to work with its neighbours after the US Navy’s latest South China Sea transits.
The call revealed the gulf of tensions lingering between the major powers, as Biden
pressed Xi on issues of trade, human rights and the Indo-Pacific region. Xi pushed
back, describing Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang as China’s “internal affairs”, and
called for the resumption of dialogue between the countries, according to statements
from both sides. Xi was quoted as saying by state-run news agency Xinhua,
“Cooperation is the only correct choice for the two nations. Cooperation can help the
two nations and the world to accomplish big things, while confrontation is definitely a
disaster.”5 He added, “China and the US will have different views on certain issues, and
it is important for them to treat each other with respect and equally, and properly
manage the differences in constructive manner.” 6
Xi said a resumption of dialogue was needed to avoid misjudgements and to
differentiate those disputes which could be contained 7. He called on Washington to be
cautious in its handling of issues related to China’s sovereignty. “China and the US
have different views on various issues, but the key is mutual respect, equal treatment
and properly managing and handling them in a constructive manner,” he said. “Our
foreign ministries can have in-depth communication on a wide range of bilateral,
international and regional issues, and the two sides’ economic, financial, law
enforcement and military departments can also increase their exchanges.” 8
Beijing has repeatedly called on the Biden administration to mend relations which were
impaired during the tumultuous era of former president Donald Trump. The US
president raised issues that divide the two countries but also held open the possibility of
working together on common concerns. 9
The White House statement said Biden shared his greetings and well wishes with the
Chinese people on the occasion of the Lunar New Year. He also “affirmed his priorities
of protecting the American people’s security, prosperity, health and way of life, and
preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific”. The White House said Biden had
“underscored his fundamental concerns about Beijing’s coercive and unfair economic
practices, crackdown in Hong Kong, human rights abuses in Xinjiang and increasingly
assertive actions in the region, including toward Taiwan”. The two leaders exchanged
views on countering the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the shared challenges of global
health security and climate change. Biden also brought up cooperation on preventing
the proliferation of weapons, an issue left off the Chinese read-out of the call and a
likely reference to the US’ seeking Chinese cooperation on constraining North Korea’s
nuclear weapons programme.10 According to the White House, Biden committed to
pursuing “practical, results- oriented engagements when it advances the interests of the
American people and those of our allies.” 11

Analysts concluded that the phone call could not unravel the series of prickly issues that
had plunged relations between the two countries to their lowest level in decades.

Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Renmin University, said that the US
had touched on all of the areas that China considered its “bottom lines”, and that he
expected Biden to continue to respond to bipartisan calls in Congress against China.
“Of course, a resumption of exchanges is definitely good, but the majority of the
conversation was sharp confrontation [contrast], albeit more polite and civil now that
Trump is no longer in office,” he said. “There is space for cooperation, such as on
climate change, and while that is positive, compared to the confrontation and fighting
between the countries, it is far from being significant. How can one phone call resolve
any of these problems?”

Cui Lei, an associate research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies,
pointed out that the conversation evidently did not signal a strengthening of relations. “In
the early days of Trump’s tenure, he also had close interactions with Xi during the Lunar
New Year and his granddaughter even offered New Year’s greetings in Chinese over
video, which gave people high hopes for bilateral relations, but in the end, they were still
people going their separate ways,” he said. “Without the support of common interests
and ideas, the relationships between heads of states can only be a tree without a root,
water without a source.”

In an interview with CBS that aired on February 07, Biden said there was no reason not
to hold a phone call with Xi. The two countries “need not have a conflict, but there’s
going to be extreme competition”, he said. In his first foreign policy address last week,
Biden called China “the most serious competitor” for the US and pledged to “confront
China’s economic abuses, counter its aggressive, coercive actions, and push back on
China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property and global governance”.

Just days after the new president was inaugurated, the US expressed support for 
Taiwan  without  mentioning  ‘one  China’  but a later announcement confirmed the
position.12 A State Department spokesman said that the Biden administration would be
adhering to the one-China policy in relation to Taiwan. State Department spokesman,
Ned Price, said there was no change in the United States’ one-China policy, when
asked if the new US administration supported that policy. “Yes … our policy has not
changed.” Price said on February 03 that the Biden administration’s dealings with cross-
strait issues were still guided by the one-China policy. In a statement on January 23,
just days after the inauguration, the administration of US President Joe Biden had
expressed strong support for the self-ruled island in the face of military pressure from
Beijing but stopped short of mentioning the one-China policy. The comments were
aimed at easing concerns both from Beijing and Taipei.
Li Da-jung, a professor of international relations and strategic studies at Tamkang
University in Taipei, said that for Beijing, the one- China policy – adopted since
Washington switched official recognition to Beijing from Taipei in 1979 – laid out that
Beijing was the legitimate government of China. Li said that for Taipei, the policy
underpinned the island’s substantive ties with the US via the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act
and the “Six Assurances” endorsed since 1982. He said that this meant the US would
continue supporting Taiwan despite a lack of diplomatic relations. Li said that this had
been a long-held US policy and Price’s comments meant that the Biden administration
would continue to observe it in dealing with both Taiwan and the mainland. He added,
“Under such a policy, the US holds the position that Taiwan and the mainland should
resolve their disputes through peaceful dialogue.”

Beijing considers Taiwan a wayward province that must return to the mainland control,
by force if necessary. ‘Independence means war’ China’s defence ministry warned
Biden regarding Taiwan.

Xi and Biden broke the ice with a phone call, however, can they dial down tensions? 13

Posturing
While pledging to hold the Chinese government to  account,  Biden said the US also
stood ready to “work with Beijing when it’s in America’s interest to do so”, alluding to his
administration’s ambition to cooperate on the climate crisis. Biden said in his first foreign
policy speech,“We’ll confront China’s economic abuses, counter its aggressive, coercive
actions, and push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property and
global governance”. He called China the ‘most serious competitor’ to the US. 14 Biden
pledged to “take on directly the challenges posed [to] our prosperity, security and
democratic values” raised by Beijing. Relations with China are fraught with Washington
making critical statements about actions in Xinjiang and offering early signs of support
to Taiwan,15 including an unprecedented invitation for the self-ruled island’s
representative to attend Biden’s inauguration. 16 Drawing a contrast with the “America
first” ideology that underpinned much of the foreign policy pursued by Donald Trump’s
administration, Biden added, “We’ll compete from a position of strength, by building
back better at home, working with our allies and partners, renewing our role in
international institutions and reclaiming our credibility and moral authority, much of
which has been lost.”17
The head of the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign affairs office and Politburo
member, Yang Jiechi, is the highest-ranking official to comment on US-China relations
since President Joe Biden’s inauguration.He told the US “not to follow ‘misguided’
Trump policies.”18

Beijing has appealed to Washington to reverse Trump’s “misguided policies”, but

Biden’s picks for two top diplomatic posts – Antony Blinken as secretary of state and
Linda Thomas-Greenfield as ambassador to the United Nations – have signalled that
the new administration will pursue a hard line and multilateral approach to challenge
China’s actions.
During her confirmation testimony, Thomas-Greenfield vowed to combat China’s
“authoritarian agenda” at the UN.19 Speaking to reporters before Biden’s speech,
National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said the administration’s priority for its China
trade policy was not to get access for multinational investment firms, but to “deal with
China’s trade abuses that are harming American jobs and American workers in the
United States”. On human rights, Blinken has expressed his agreement with the Trump
administration’s determination that the Chinese government is committing acts of
genocide in its treatment of Uygurs and other ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang, thus
angering Beijing.20 An agency representative said in a statement that China had
committed crimes against humanity in the region, including imprisonment, torture,
enforced sterilisation and persecution. “These atrocities shock the conscience and must
be met with serious consequences,” the statement continued, adding that the
administration would “consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those
responsible, and deter future abuses.”21
Amid concerns from Republicans that the administration might soften its policies
towards China in return for commitments on climate change, Biden’s special envoy for
climate, John Kerry, said that US grievances with China, including intellectual property
theft, market access and Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea, would “never be
traded for anything that has to do with climate.” 22
Beijing said there were inevitably differences between China and the US, but their
common interests “outweigh their divergences.” Foreign ministry spokesman, Wang
Wenbin, said, “China hopes that the US will conform to the opinions of people of the two
countries as well as the trend of the times, treating China and China-US relations
objectively and rationally, adopting a positive and constructive policy towards China.”
He added, “We hope the US can meet China halfway and focus on cooperation while
managing divergences.”23
Zhang Jiadong, an international relations professor at Fudan University, said Biden’s
speech showed he would not substantially change policies from the Trump era,
although he did not describe Beijing as a strategic rival as officials from the Trump
administration had done. “No matter if he agrees with Trump or not, he has to come up
with a new word first. But the core has not changed, that is, China is the biggest
challenge facing the US,” Zhang said.24 “Biden basically talked about problems,
competition and conflict whenever he mentioned China in his speech. When it comes to
cooperation, China was barely mentioned.” Zhang also referred to Biden’s mention of
the return of manufacturing to the US, and intellectual property – issues also stressed
by Trump. “They are actually the same thing. In a sense, Biden’s position on these
issues is inherited from Trump,” he said. 25
The Biden administration faces a conundrum as it rethinks the positioning of military
forces around the world: How to focus more on China and Russia without retreating
from longstanding Mideast threats and to make this shift with potentially leaner
Pentagon 26 Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered a monthlong “global posture”
review just days after taking office. It will assess how the United States can best
arrange and support its far-flung network of troops, weapons, bases and alliances to
buttress President Joe Biden’s foreign policy. 27 That could lead to significant shifts in the
US military “footprint” in the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, although such
changes have been tried before with limited success. It might also mean a Biden
embrace of recent efforts by military commanders to seek innovative ways to deploy
forces, untethered from permanent bases that carry political, financial and security
costs. A recent example was a U.S. aircraft carrier’s visit to a Vietnamese port.
Commanders see value in deploying forces in smaller groups on less predictable cycles
to keep China off balance.28
In December 2020, General Mark Milley, chairman of  the  Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke of
his own view that technological and geopolitical change argue for rethinking old ways of
organizing  and positioning forces. Milley said that the very survival of US forces will
depend on adapting to the rise of China, the spread       of technologies like artificial
intelligence and robotics, and the emergence of unconventional threats like pandemics
and climate change. “A small force that is nearly invisible and undetectable, that’s  in  a 
constant state of  movement, and is  widely   distributed that would be a force that is
survivable,” he told a Washington “You’re not going to accomplish any objective if you’re
dead.” Austin made a similar, narrower point in January about the positioning of U.S.
forces in Asia and the Pacific. Austin wrote in response to Senate questions posed in
advance of his confirmation hearing, “There’s no question that we need a more resilient
and distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific in response to China’s counter-
intervention capabilities and approaches, supported by new operational
concepts.”Austin also noted his concern about competing with Russia in the
Arctic.29 This doesn’t mean abandoning the US military’s large hubs overseas. However,
it suggests more emphasis on deployments of smaller groups of troops on shorter
rotations to non-traditional destinations. 30 The Army, for example, is developing what it
calls an “Arctic-capable brigade” of soldiers as part of an increased focus on the High
North.
China considers itself an Arctic nation, but the main US concern with Beijing is its
growing assertiveness in Asia and the Pacific. In the US view, China aims to build the
military strength to deter or block any US effort to intervene in Taiwan. A Council on
Foreign Relations report this month called Taiwan the most likely spark for a US-China
war. “Millions of Americans could die in the first war in human history between two
nuclear weapons states,” the report said.31
The US also cites concern about China’s efforts to modernize and potentially expand its
nuclear arsenal while it declines to participate   in any international nuclear arms control
negotiations. The sharpened focus on China began during the Obama administration.
The Trump administration went further by formally declaring that China and Russia, not
global terrorism, were the top threats to US national security. 32

Biden’s Power Employment Concept

The US military under President Joe Biden will use force as a “tool of last resort” as he
aims to bring a responsible end to ongoing wars, although he told Defence Department
employees during his first Pentagon visit, on February 10, that he will never hesitate to
use force if needed.33 “Our country is safer and stronger when we lead not just with the
example of our power, but with the power of our example,” Biden said. Biden told
service members and DOD civilians the military’s “central mission is to deter aggression
from our enemies and, if required, fight and win wars to keep Americans safe.” 34
Biden said the US needs to “rethink and reprioritize our security to meet the challenges
of this century, not the last.” This means embracing emerging technology and
enhancing cyber capabilities to ensure that the US will lead the “new era of competition
from deep space to outer space,” he said while calling out China, in particular, as a
growing threat.35
According to Dan Grazier, President Joe Biden’s creation  of  a task force to assess
existing policies regarding China and develop recommendations for addressing the
“pacing threat” the  country  poses could mark a change in direction for the United
States. The task force could also risk falling into the same pattern of past blue-ribbon
panels: provide cover for elected officials to back unpopular policy recommendations
that will end up fulfilling the wish list of the defence industry. 36 And Congress will be
happy to rubber-stamp increased military spending to address the threat of China.
Lawmakers, Pentagon leaders and the defence industry-funded think tanks have been
ramping up the “great power competition” rhetoric for years as a ploy to justify greater
military spending. This spectre of an imminent military threat fits within a pattern that
emerged after the Korean War, nearly 70 years ago. When spending levels threaten to
dip, discussions of new national security threats come up to coax defence spending
safely upward. Warnings of a supposed missile gap filled newspaper columns at the
beginning of the Kennedy administration, and President Ronald Reagan pushed for a
massive military build-up to flesh out the post-Vietnam War “hollow force” to confront
the Soviets.37 China is an obvious competitor in the 21st century, but does it make sense
to build a military to fight beyond the shores of the Asian mainland? 38
It’s virtually impossible to see how such a war could be fought without one side resorting
to nuclear weapons. That has been demonstrated in war games conducted by U.S.
Strategic Command. Even if such a war could be limited to conventional weapons, any   
US invasion force put on the ground in China would be quickly overwhelmed. China
possesses a decided advantage on its  own turf,  as Pentagon leaders have seen
repeatedly during simulations in which ships are sunk and air bases obliterated from a
distance. With its integrated air defence network, anti-ship missiles and vast number    
of soldiers, any attempt to attack China within its security perimeter would be a disaster.
But the Chinese military advantage evaporates as you move beyond its shores. The
Chinese defences are almost all based on land and meant to keep invaders at a safe
distance rather than project its own military power forward. 39 Rather than heavily
investing in weapons such as the Ford-class aircraft carriers and stealth aircrafts
designed to penetrate territory claimed by China, the United States could build a force
capable of stopping any moves China might make within the region. 40

Show of Power: American Elbow in the Chinese Ribs

A task force of four B-52H Stratofortress bombers arrived at Andersen Air Force Base,
Guam, on January 26 as part of an ongoing demonstration by the US Air Force of its
ability to move strategic assets around the globe. 41 According to an Air Force statement,
the B-52s were sent to “reinforce the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific
region” through “strategic deterrence.” Guam, at the eastern edge of the Philippine Sea,
is within easy range of the South China Sea, where the United States and China are
engaged  in global rivalry. The 96th Bomber Squadron last deployed a task force there
in December 2018.42 It did not specify how long the squadron would remain in Guam.
“Deploying as a Bomber Task Force exercises our ability to produce agile, combat
power in any location we are needed,” squadron commander Lt. Col. Christopher Duff
said in the statement.43 Last year the Air Force had ended its 15-year practice of
keeping a continuous bomber presence in Guam in favour of a less-predictable
deployment system using bomber task forces. The change aligned with the 2018
National Defence Strategy’s call for strategic unpredictability. 44 Bombers in the Indo-
Pacific project US airpower in a region ripe with tension. To the west, the US and
Chinese forces crisscross the South China Sea, conducting exercises and
demonstrating resolve — on the US part to maintain open seas, and by China to defend
territorial claims, or test those of Japan and The State Department had in July formally
rejected China’s claims to islands and reefs in the South China Sea, which China, just
as forcefully, maintains as historic rights.

China gets more Assertive with its Sea Territory claims

China has become more assertive with regard to its sea territory claims. 45 Beijing on
February 01 authorized its coast guard to fire  on foreign vessels and destroy “illegal
structures” in waters where Chinese territorial claims are disputed by neighbours and, in
one case, rejected by an international court. The Philippines Foreign Secretary,
Teodoro Locsin Jr., characterized the move, in a  tweet,  as “a verbal threat of war to
any country that defies the law.” According to Ian Chong, an associate professor of
political science at the National University of Singapore, China won’t likely attempt overt
military action in the maritime territorial disputes, but it may employ more aggressive
tactics short of that.“The Chinese might feel they are in a stronger position now relative
to the other claimants and the US so they might as well try to move the needle,” he said
in a telephone interview.46 The South China Sea and its vast natural resources are the
subject of territorial disputes involving China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei,
Malaysia and Indonesia. China also has overlapping claims with Japan and Taiwan in
the East China Sea. “It’s interesting that there hasn’t been a stronger reaction from
Vietnam or Indonesia,” Chong said. He added that many governments are focused on
fighting the coronavirus and don’t have the resources to open other fronts. Carlyle
Thayer, an emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales and lecturer at the
Australian Defence Force Academy, said that China has moved away from the “nine-
dash line” — based on an old map used to justify sea territory claims since the 1940s —
and now promotes a “four-sha” claim to the Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Spratly
Islands, and  the Macclesfield Bank area, he said of the features whose Chinese names
all end in “sha.” “They have done it by drawing straight base lines around all these
disputed features,” Thayer said. “They claim all the water inside as territorial waters.”
The vast majority of those features are occupied by Vietnam, which has installed
structures that China could seek to remove under its new law, he said. “They have been
trying to establish in the public mindset that this is Chinese,” Thayer said of the sea
territory claims.47

China’s ownership of American debt

Many worry that China’s ownership of American debt affords Chinese economic
leverage over the United States. 48 This apprehension, however, stems from a
misunderstanding of sovereign debt and of how states derive power from their
economic relations. The purchasing of sovereign debt by foreign countries is a normal
transaction that helps maintain openness in the global economy. Consequently, China’s
stake in America’s debt has more of a binding than dividing effect on bilateral relations
between the two countries. Even if China wished to “call in” its loans, the use of credit
as a coercive measure is complicated and often heavily constrained. A creditor can only
dictate terms for the debtor country if that debtor has no other options. 49 In the case of
the United States, American debt is a widely held and extremely desirable asset in the
global economy. Whatever debt China does sell is simply purchased by other countries.
For instance, in August 2015 China reduced its holdings of US Treasuries by
approximately $180 billion. Despite the scale, this selloff did not significantly affect the
U.S. economy, thereby limiting the impact that such an action may have on U.S.
decision- making.50 In China, there is a perception [and rightly so] that America is trying
to curb its rise as a global economic power.

Trade War
The world’s two largest economies have been locked in a bitter trade battle. 51 The
dispute has seen the US and China impose tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars
worth of each other’s goods. Former  US President Donald Trump had long accused
China of unfair trading practices and intellectual property theft. Negotiations are ongoing
but have proven difficult. In January 2020, the two sides signed a preliminary deal but
some of the thorniest issues remain unresolved. Uncertainties around the trade war
have hurt businesses and weighed on the global economy. Trump’s tariffs policy
focused on encouraging consumers to buy American products by making imported
goods more expensive.52 The US had imposed tariffs on more than $360bn of Chinese
goods, and China retaliated with tariffs on more than $110bn of US products.
Washington delivered three rounds of tariffs in 2018, and a fourth one in September
2019. The most recent round targeted Chinese imports, from meat to musical
instruments, with a 15 percent duty. Beijing hit back with tariffs ranging from 5 to 25
percent on US goods.53
Under the so-called “phase one” deal signed in January 2020, China pledged to boost
US imports by $200bn above 2017 levels and strengthen intellectual property rules. The
US agreed to halve some of the new tariffs it had imposed on China. The White House
said it will tackle additional issues in a “phase two” deal but analysts said they didn’t
expect anything concrete anytime soon.54
Former US president Donald Trump and China’s Vice-Premier Liu signed the phase one
trade deal on January 15, 2020, with the conditions of the agreement beginning one
month later. A large part of the phase one trade deal between China and the United
States that entered into force almost one year ago was a “failure”, according to a new
report, although “several elements are worth keeping and building upon.” 55 As part of it,
China committed to buying US$200 billion additional goods and services over 2020-21
on top of 2017’s levels. But, according to a report released by the Peterson Institute for
International Economics on Monday, US exports of phase one goods to China in 2020
fell more than 40 per cent short of the target, and 2021 is not expected to yield more
success.56
Even bumper sales of soybeans, pork and beef, plus market access for a range of other
products, could not get China close to purchase targets. Analysts point to unrealistic
goals in the original deal with United States, and overall trade goals may continue to
remain elusive this year.57
White House press secretary, Jen Psaki, said on February 01 that the Biden
administration plans to review the phase one US-China trade deal. Based on publicly
available data, it’s hard to imagine they’ll find anything other than a debacle. 58
The trade war was billed as a plan to rein in the US trade deficit, boost American
exports and slow China’s rise as a global superpower by choking off the all-important
American market with 25 percent tariffs on many imports. A recent study commissioned
by the U.S.- China Business Council argues, “The trade war with China hurt the US
economy and failed to achieve major policy goals,” and, in addition, it reduced economic
growth and cost the US 245,000 jobs.59
During 2019, the US trade deficit widened to its largest on record. In the fourth quarter,
the US goods trade deficit hit its highest share   of GDP since 2012 and the US current
account deficit jumped to its highest level in more than 12 years in the third quarter.
Foreign direct investment to the US fell 49 percent in 2020 — outpacing the overall
global decrease of 42 percent. These trends had all been moving in this direction since
2017 and were accelerated by the coronavirus pandemic as Trump refused to remove
tariffs despite their strain on businesses. 60

The big picture was: “The tariffs forced American companies to accept lower profit
margins, cut wages and jobs for US workers, defer potential wage hikes or expansions,
and raise prices for American consumers or companies,” analysts at Brookings noted in
August.

China’s trade surplus last year hit a record $535 billion, up 27 percent from 2019.
Exports rose 21.1 percent in dollar terms in November year over year and 18.1 percent
in December from a year earlier, touching an all-time high. For the full year, the trade
surplus with the US was $317 billion, 7 percent higher than in 2019. 61 Foreign direct
investment to China rose 4 percent to $163 billion. Most economists agree that trade
deficits don’t actually hurt an economy. And while the US trade deficit with China did
decrease somewhat during Trump’s time in office, the deficit increased with other
countries and overall. Meanwhile, China’s trade surplus and its trade with other
countries increased.62 In addition to hurting US businesses and workers, tariffs also
drive-up prices, and inflation expectations are starting to rise. Economists say that the
US current account deficit is also helping further weigh down the value of the dollar and
is another factor that could boost inflation.
A recent report by the US Chamber of Commerce’s China Centre and New York-based
research firm Rhodium Group suggests that US and China are on a path to ‘inevitable’
economic decoupling and the White House needs to urgently work out the costs of
separation.63 Researchers say that disengagement must be targeted and based on
facts, and not gratuitous. A fall in trade between China and the United States is one sign
that decoupling is already under way. The world’s biggest two economies are headed
towards an inevitable divorce, but the US needs to manage it in a targeted way,
according to an American study on economic ties with China. 64 “Decoupling is likely to
continue in one form or another, even if it does evolve in a more measured, targeted
way,” said the joint report released on February 15. “In both Washington and Beijing,
political trust is at a nadir, and a return to the cooperative engagement policy that
dominated the relationship since 1972 is difficult to imagine absent a sea change in both
capitals,” it said.65

Technology Competition
During his first visit to the Pentagon, Biden launched Pentagon’s new “China Task
Force”. The task force isn’t looking to make sweeping policy changes. It will continue
the work already being done at the Pentagon by taking a hard look at the defence
industry’s supply chain, and potential backdoor ties to China in funding and
supply.66 “What    is clear is that this issue of technology competition is of increasing
importance in the US-China relationship.” It’s  “a huge priority for   the
administration.”67 The objective is to try and stamp out backdoor Chinese financing in
the defence industry supply chain. “We’re going to go out and survey the department
and get a sense of where the biggest challenges are, and where might there be an
opportunity for secretary- level and leadership-level intention to move some of these
challenges forward,” Ratner [the prospective head of the task force] said. 68
The Trump administration began trying to stomp out Chinese hardware in systems used
by the US military, most specifically in small drones and other niche technologies, and
the Biden team appears ready to redouble those efforts. “Many of the issues related to
technology have to do with defensive security issues, and we have to make sure that
DoD is adequately organized to be able to answer the kind of questions that the
interagency is asking, and also as it relates to both innovation and supply chain and
technology protection issues,” Ratner said. 69 Pentagon officials worried for much of last
year that supply chain disruptions and the economic fallout from COVID shutdowns
could lead to electronic firms casting a wide net looking for new capital, allowing Beijing
to take advantage of the situation. One major concern is the microelectronics market,
where Chinese companies control 75 percent of the manufacturing base, while 98
percent of packaging takes place in Asia. 70 The Pentagon needs budget agility to
compete with China.71 The Pentagon’s funding process is notoriously inflexible.
Spending plans are built two years in advance to account for internal haggling and
Congressional deliberation; and if appropriation delays require continuing resolutions,
the gap between planning and execution grows even longer. 72
Unlike the Pentagon’s attempt to predict specific needs years in advance, the Chinese
budget process rolls continuously from one year into the next and allocates money to
services and bureaus in blocks that can pay for multiple functions or programmes. As
noted by Andrew Marshall and others who guided America’s Cold War  effort  against
the Soviets, long-term security competition is about organization and process as much
as hard military capabilities.73 Biden emphasised that the US needs a major
infrastructure plan to keep pace with China. He met with senators in the Oval Office of
the White House on February 11 to discuss an infrastructure spending plan. 74
Chinese drone and chip makers have been added to the US banned list. Drone maker
DJI and chipmaker SMIC are the latest Chinese firms to be added to a US trade
blacklist. In total, 77 firms were added to the list – most of them Chinese. 75 The Entity
List is drawn up by the US Department of Commerce, and already includes more than
275 China- based firms, including telecom giant Huawei. The move was seen as a
defiant final strike by the outgoing US president, Donald Trump, who had taken a hard
line on China. The US administration said that it had imposed export controls on SMIC
to restrict its access to US technology because of alleged ties to the Chinese
military.76 “We’re adding SMIC to the Entity List mostly because we need to make sure
US intellectual property and manufacturing capabilities are not being used by SMIC’s
clients to continue to support the military-civil fusion efforts within China,” a senior
official in the US Commerce Department said. The Chinese government has responded
by introducing its own laws which restrict the export of military technologies. 77
In its latest move to address national security threats posed by Chinese-made drones,
the US federal government’s purchasing agency no longer will purchase drones from
Chinese manufacturers.78 China currently dominates the drone-manufacturing market.
According  to the German drone research organization, Droneii, the world’s largest
drone maker, the Shenzhen-based SZ Dà-Jiāng Innovations Science and Technology
Co., Ltd., or DJI, has a 76.8 percent share of the US market. 79 The world’s second-
largest drone company is also Chinese, according to Droneii. Yuneec International,
based in Suzhou, China, produces more than 1 million drones annually, with operations
around the world, including the US, according to its website. 80

To  develop  alternatives  to  Chinese-made  small   drones,   the US Defence

Department established a program in 2018 to support non-Chinese companies
identified as trustworthy  drone  makers  by the Defence Innovation Unit (DIU), a DoD
entity that accelerates commercial technology for national defence.

Trump signed the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal year 2020 on
December 20, 2019, and the American Security Drone Act was reintroduced on January
27. The proposed law would prohibit government purchase of drones manufactured in
countries identified as national security threats, like China. The act has bipartisan
support.

America’s Witch Hunt of Chinese Scientists and Students

In what is becoming a familiar scene in American higher education, a Chinese-born
scientist at a high-profile university was recently arrested for his ties to the Chinese
government.81 About a month ago, Gang Chen, a naturalized American citizen and
highly respected professor of mechanical engineering at MIT, was indicted by a grand
jury for “failing to disclose contracts, appointments and awards from various entities in
the People’s Republic of China.” Authorities say  that Chen, who received US
Department of Energy grants for his research in nanotechnology, did not properly inform
the agency about contracts entitling him to “hundreds of thousands of dollars in direct
payments” from entities in China. Chen’s lawyers have responded aggressively,
accusing US Attorney Andrew Lelling of making “false, highly inflammatory” comments
that questioned Chen’s “character and reputation.” MIT has agreed to fund Chen’s
defence, and hundreds of his colleagues have signed an open letter testifying to his
character82.
Chen’s case is  part  of  a  broader  US  government  crackdown  on scientists that has
targeted both Chinese citizens and Chinese Americans—and has challenged the
leading role American research institutions play in global science. 83 Trade battles,
human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, and the militarization of the South China Sea are what
usually come to mind when Americans think about the growing friction with China. But in
many ways, US universities are a more immediate battleground. They are centres of
basic research—studies about the underlying foundations of natural phenomena
conducted without specific commercial or military applications in mind. According to
existing US government policy, such research is meant to be kept as open as possible.
The concern of many US policy makers is that Beijing is using so-called non-traditional
intelligence collectors—students, faculty, and other researchers—to steal secrets from
American labs and gain a competitive edge. 84

Gang Chen’s case, like the others that have come before it, bring about a set of
questions regarding the nature of American science. Should US universities foster
global collaboration and import foreign talent, or should they be more overtly American
in their orientation? Should they forge strong relationships in China, or should they try to
“decouple” from it? How can research funded by American taxpayers be protected from
bad actors in a setting that is fundamentally open?

The Trump administration had easy answers to such questions: stop Chinese students
from coming to the US in the first place, and crack down on individuals with illicit ties to
China.85 The new administration is widely expected to show more flexibility on
immigration matters than its immediate predecessor, but Joe Biden too has often been
sharply critical of China.
The United States can address past and future conflicts of interest while also welcoming
scientists of all backgrounds. A good first step would be a public review of the China
Initiative, to allow Congress and the scientific community to understand more about how
the initiative  is being conducted and how much hard evidence it has collected of
espionage and illicit activity on Beijing’s part. Lawmakers should also assess whether
the Justice Department’s work includes protection against discriminatory investigation
and prosecution. Such  a  review  would be consistent with the Biden administration’s
recent rebuke of racism directed at Asian Americans and would signal to Chinese
researchers that they are valued members of the American scientific community. 86

Coercive Diplomacy
White House officials told reporters in a background call on Feb 10 that Biden intends to
go ahead with carrying out Trump era planned naval exercises in the South China Sea
and keep dispatching ships to the Taiwan Strait in the months and years to come. 87
The USS Theodore Rooseveltand USS Nimitz carrier strike groups (Strike Groups 9 &
11 respectively)operated in the South China Sea. 88
Soon after, according to a tweet by France’s defence minister, the French nuclear
attack submarine, Émeraude, and naval support ship, Seine, also sailed through the
South China Sea.89 France is stepping up its military presence in the South China Sea
by planning two voyages through the disputed waters. 90
The French navy said an amphibious assault ship, the Tonnere, and the frigate,
Surcouf, had left their home port Toulon on Thursday and would travel to the Pacific on
a three-month mission. The website, Naval News, reported that the ships would cross
the South China Sea twice and take part in a combined exercise with the Japanese and
US militaries in May.91 Captain Arnaud Tranchant, commanding officer of the Tonnerre,
told Naval News that the French navy would “work to strengthen” France’s partnership
with the US, Japan, India and Australia – the so-called Quad. 92 The French Minster of
Armed Forces said, “France has exclusive economic zones in the Indo-Pacific that it
intends to protect.” “Manoeuvre by submarine and support ship is proof French navy
can deploy with allies for long periods far from home,” Florence Parly added. 93
CSG 9 and CSG 11 last conducted dual carrier operations on June 21, 2020, in the
Philippine Sea. The last time the US conducted dual carrier operations in the South
China Sea was in July 2020, when the Ronald Reagan and Nimitz carrier strike groups
operated together twice.94
The two US Navy Carrier Strike Groups teamed-up for dual-carrier drills during the
second week of February in the South China Sea,  they did not see any abnormal
responses from China. “We didn’t see anything significantly out of the norm with our two
carriers coming together for this rendezvous,” Rear Admiral Doug Verissimo, who
commands Carrier Strike Group 9, told reporters. 95 Carrier Strike Group 11 commander,
Rear Admiral Jim Kirk, said the drills provide the Navy the chance to enhance readiness
in the Indo-Pacific region. Both admirals said their respective CSG’s interactions with
Chinese vessels in the South China Sea have been professional. The Nimitz  and
Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Groups performed dual-carrier drills last June in the
Philippine Sea. In the midst of the series of dual- carrier exercises last summer, the
Chinese Navy participated in its own drills near the Paracel Islands. 96
China’s Global Times published an article on February 09 that described the dual-carrier
exercises as “symbolic” and having “more political than military meaning.” Verissimo,
when asked about the article, disagreed. “Well, from my view at the tactical level, it’s not
symbolic,” Verissimo said. “You don’t often get to see the mirror image of yourself as a
carrier sailor,” Verissimo said. “So it was wonderful to see our running mates out there
at another Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, working side-by-side.” Verissimo said that the
dual-carrier drills help them work on command and control as the two strike groups
operate together. “It allows us to explore our experience as leaders at the flag level and
it allows many of our sailors at the tactical level and our aviators at the tactical level to
work with other units,” he said.97

Analysts expect more such efforts to challenge China’s activities  in the region, but they
do not see an increased risk of conflict breaking out. Beijing vows to work with its
neighbours after the US [and French] Navies’ latest South China Sea transits. The
European Union’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, stressed the bloc’s strong ties with
the US in his first conversation with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, since US
President Joe Biden’s election. Beijing is facing more pressure from the United States
and its NATO allies over its activities in the South China Sea, and no relenting is in
sight. Washington’s hardened position on Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea
heightens US-China tensions. The Biden administration has said that China would be
central to its foreign policy, and that Washington would work with its partners on a
strategy for its rivalry with Beijing.
Hu Bo, director of Beijing-based think tank South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing
Initiative, said that the US and French activities in the waterway were an attempt to add
pressure on China. “After [President Joe] Biden took office, US allies are more confident
that America will assume its international obligations in terms of checks and balances
with China,” Hu said.

According to Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International

Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, the US Navy was sending a
message that it could operate “wherever they wish and where international law allows,
notwithstanding the threat from Beijing.” He said France, meanwhile, wanted “to show
the flag for Paris’ Indo-Pacific interests.” “It considers itself an autonomous player in the
region, often positing itself as the ‘alternative partner’ of choice for regional countries
that don’t wish to align too closely with either China or the US,” Koh added.

Observers expect more such patrols by the US and its allies, including Britain, as they
push back against Beijing’s activities and militarisation in the region. Later this year, the
Royal Navy plans to send an aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, through the
South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait to the East China Sea, where it will join a naval
exercise with the US and Japan. Germany has also said it would send a frigate to patrol
the Indo-Pacific this year.

Beijing’s claims in the resource-rich South China Sea overlap with those of several
neighbours, including the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. In September 2020,
Britain, France and Germany, all NATO members, issued a joint statement to the United
Nations in favour of the 2016 international tribunal ruling against most of Beijing’s claims
in the South China Sea. They said Beijing’s claims to “historic rights” in the waters did
not comply with international law. “This is also a sort of enlargement of NATO, and it will
increase military pressure on China,” said military commentator Song Zhongping, a
former PLA instructor. “But some [US allies] have come to the region because of
common values like freedom of navigation and overflight, rather than their national
interests, so they’re unlikely to go all out to confront China,” he added.

Zhu Feng, executive director of the China Centre for Collaborative Studies of the South
China Sea at Nanjing University, said more naval operations in the region like the ones
in February could raise the risk of collision. “There is the possibility of an accidental sea
or air collision, but it’s unlikely [that] a war will break out,” Zhu said. He noted that the
US had rejected Beijing’s maritime claims in the South China Sea last year, and said
France was reinforcing its opposition to China’s claims with its patrol this week.

Russian Factor—Wild Card?

 Slowly but surely, Russia is becoming a relevant Indo-Pacific power, contrary to US’
expectations expressed in its recently declassified 2017 “Strategic Framework for the
Indo-Pacific” which described Moscow as a “marginal player”. India is its primary anchor
in this trans-oceanic space, but New Delhi hopes to create conditions whereby Tokyo
could play a supportive role alongside Moscow’s traditional partners in Hanoi. The
grand strategic vision that’s starting to take shape is that Russia’s mainland influence in
Asia is concentrated in China while its maritime counterpart is spread between India,
Japan, and Vietnam. Amid the rupture between Russia and the West, Moscow
continues to drift toward closer relations with Beijing. Their partnership is becoming
deeper and more comprehensive, encompassing security, economics, technology, and
global governance.98 The proportion of Chinese trade in Russia’s overall trade turnover
has nearly doubled in less than a decade. Military cooperation has also reached a new
level: Russia sells its latest hardware to China, and the two countries hold joint military
exercises on an increasingly large scale and over an ever-expanding geographical area,
from the Baltic to the South China Sea.
Russia will seek to “balance” China in the future and arguably already is. Andrew
Korybko argues that structural realism has its limitations because it importantly doesn’t
account for the Chinese leadership’s neoliberal-influenced official outlook on
International Relations, nor for why many Asia-Pacific states joined the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) instead of a US-led “balancing coalition”
against China, among other examples. 99 It is a wrong assumption that Russia will
“switch sides” and “ally” with the US “against China”, as these two Great Powers’ close
economic, military, and institutional (BRICS/SCO) cooperation contradicts such a
conclusion.100 The Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership is one of the primary axes of
contemporary geopolitics. And this is well known in Europe. “The deepening of Eurasian
integration and its interface with other regional integration associations remain a priority
goal.” Remembering that China is a key member of BRICS and the SCO, it’s clear that
Russia has no publicly stated intent of gradually disengaging from China. This doesn’t
mean that Russia isn’t also creatively “balancing” China, though in as “friendly” a
manner as Moscow realistically can in order to avoid triggering a security dilemma with
Beijing.101
Russian-Indian relations became unexpectedly complicated during late 2020, after the
Indians overreacted to Foreign Minister Lavrov’s condemnation of creeping American
anti-Chinese influence over New Delhi, but the resulting scandal has since died down
and everything seems to be back on track. Russia’s concerns about US-Indian relations
relate to Moscow’s grand strategic goal of “balancing” Beijing in a “friendly” way through
their joint institutional partner in New Delhi. The more the US-Indian ties take on a
distinctly anti-Chinese nature (arguably driven to a large degree by shared threat
assessments inspired by the structural realist school), the less Russia can rely on its
own relations with India     to this “balancing” end without risking the scenario that
Chinese suspicions could be provoked. 102

Moscow is literally arming potential foes on Beijing’s doorstep with whom it has
territorial disputes. Nevertheless, Russian-Chinese ties remain solid because neither
Moscow nor Beijing want to provoke a security dilemma along their vast shared border
that would distract them from the existing US-driven conventional military threats along
their western and southern peripheries, respectively. Apart from this shared interest,
both aspire to complete the gradual pairing of the Russian-led Eurasian Union with
China’s BRI through the SCO. Russia and China also rely on one another as natural
resource suppliers and customers respectively, as well as cooperate closely on trans-
Eurasian connectivity corridors.

Russia already arms India to the teeth despite military exports relatively declining in
recent years. Russia has announced that it plans to sell jointly produced BrahMos
supersonic missiles to the US’ mutual defence ally in the Philippines. Both arms
relationships pose conventional threats to Chinese national interests. These sales are
arguably more threatening to China. Russia and China still compete with one another,
but it’s mostly in the diplomatic realm.

Russia needs to avoid the worst-case scenario of a security crisis erupting with China
that could then be exploited by the US to divide the two. In the event that India is
somehow courted back to the American side and contributes more actively to the
aggressive containment of China (perhaps by Washington declining to sanction New
Delhi for the S-400s) then Russia and China would move closer together to “balance”
the US and India instead.

Russia and India are opening an air travel bubble between their countries. New Delhi is
reaching an agreement with Beijing for the “synchronised disengagement” of their
forces all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and America is threatening to sanction
India  for its decision to go through with its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defence
systems.103 India seeks to put the India-Japan-Russia trilateral on a firmer footing with
the unstated purpose of reducing the need for Moscow to seek China’s participation in
the development of the vast Russian Far East—rich in minerals and hydrocarbons. The
Vladivostok- Chennai sea corridor could be another development. India will seek to
bring Russia into the Indo-Pacific, something that Moscow has wanted to do for a while
but has been hesitant due to concerns that it might   be negatively interpreted by China.
Recently changed international context might alleviate some of those concerns. The
latest Sino-Indo deal along the LAC will reduce tensions  between Russia’s BRICS  and
SCO partners. In parallel, the US’ likely sanctioning of India will worsen relations
between those two. These dynamics combine to create the opportunity for Russian-
Indian ties to strengthen in the Indo-Pacific direction without drawing China’s suspicions
as much as they might have done had they occurred earlier.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A game-changer

 The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is expected to further enhance the
lucrative economic cooperation between  China and Pakistan.104 The project will
strengthen the  bond  between  the  two countries who share a history of good strategic
relations. CPEC, presently under construction at a cost of $46 billion, aims to improve
Pakistani infrastructure and deepen economic and political ties between China and
Pakistan. CPEC is advantageous to Pakistan, it also carries substantial economic and
strategic benefits for China. Its importance for China is evident from the fact that it is
part of China’s 13th five-year development plan. 105
China is Pakistan’s largest trading partner in imports and exports. CPEC is going to
further enhance the economic cooperation between the two countries. Once realized,
the plan will be China’s biggest display of economic development in another country to
date.106 It aims to create, over 15 years, an economic corridor between Gwadar Port and
China’s north-western region of Xinjiang through a 2,700 km long highway from
Kashgar to Gwadar, railway links for freight trains, oil and gas pipelines and an optical
fibre link. The project will create nearly 700,000 new jobs and add up to 2.5 percent to
Pakistan’s annual growth rate. CPEC has undeniable economic and strategic
importance for Pakistan and China. It has been called a game-changer for Pakistan and
China because it will link China with markets in Central Asia and South Asia 107 through
Pakistan.

While using the existing maritime supply route, China is about 13,000 km away from the
Arabian Gulf, with a shipping time of about 45 days. CPEC will shrink this distance to
merely 2,500 km (an 80 percent reduction). The shipping time will be reduced to 10
days (a 78 percent reduction).

The bulk of China’s trade is through the narrow sea channel of the Strait of Malacca that
is vulnerable to severance by counties hostile    to China—like India, the US, etc. Top
security analysts say that in the event of a future war in Asia, the US Navy could block
the Strait of Malacca, which would suffocate China’s trade route. CPEC, besides
providing an alternate route, will reduce the shipping time from China to Europe.

A part of the project would provide electricity to energy-thirsty Pakistan, badly affected
by hours of daily scheduled power cuts because of electricity-shortages, by building
new coal-fired power plants. Already completed power plants have added 10,400
megawatts of electricity at a cost of $15.5 billion. Completion of another 6,600
megawatts plant, at an additional cost of $18.3 billion, is in progress. 108
CPEC brings many benefits for China and Pakistan.The project completion is
endangered by security-related and political threats. A major source of threat is Indian
involvement through India sponsored separatist rebellion in Baluchistan where the port
of Gwadar is situated;109 and disruptive attacks by terrorists, underwritten by India
alongside     a few other regional countries which feel business reduction of their
ports.110 Nevertheless, Pakistan is well-equipped, with adequate security and
infrastructure support to effectively deal with such challenges.
CPEC has the potential to carry huge economic benefits for the people of Pakistan,
China and the region. According to a recent estimate, CPEC will serve three billion
people, nearly half of the global population. Thus, a huge economic bloc is about to
emerge from this region. On completion of the CPEC, Pakistan will become a
connecting bridge to three engines of growth: China, Central Asia, and South Asia. 111
It would elevate Pakistan to high growth rates, which will ensure Pakistan’s stability.
China would have an alternative supply route through the Arabian Sea, hence
bypassing the vulnerability of a blockade of supplies through the Strait of Malacca. 112

The project has not gone down well with India and the US, though they keep forwarding
the reason that it passes through Azad Kashmir, but the underlying reasons is that they
feel threatened that it could undercut their “contain China” plan being executed in the
so-called Indo-Pacific region.

Summary of Analysis and Conclusion

These are interesting times. World political order is in a flux. America’s Sino-phobia is
here to stay. Though China is now a global economic power, militarily it is years behind
the US. Fearing loss of a military edge as well, America’s ‘contain China’ strategy
seems to entail India’s involvement in efforts to impede China’s military up-gradations.
Despite India’s setbacks in the recent Doklam and Ladakh crises with China, the US
has not lost hope.

Biden administration officials have tried to project a tough line on China in their first
weeks in office; depicting China as an economic and security challenge to the United
States that requires a far more strategic and calculated approach than that of the Trump
administration.113 They have also tried to send a message: While the administration will
be staffed by many familiar faces from the Obama administration, the China policy will
not revert to what it was a decade ago. 114

President Biden chose to make his first telephonic contact with the Chinese President
two days after he had spoken to the Indian Prime Minister and discussed the ways and
means of bolstering, an anti-China alliance — “Quad”. America, in an urgency, is
cobbling together a global anti-China politico-military conglomerate.

President Biden missed out on an opportunity of creating tremendous goodwill towards

China and establishing himself as a statesman par excellence, by not stopping or at
least postponing the Trump planned drill by the two US Navy Carrier Groups in South
China Sea only three weeks after being sworn in as the President.

While one could safely bet that President Biden will not go into an outright conflict with
China, he carries the burden of reducing the trust deficit and pulling the US-China
relationship out of the current zero- sum pattern.“The Biden administration is going to be
on a very short leash with respect to doing anything that is perceived as giving China a
break,” said Wendy Cutler, a vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute and a
former US trade negotiator.115
Biden faces an enormous challenge in trying to formulate a prudent strategy to deal with
China at a time when much of the US establishment and society views any relations
with Beijing as toxic. Political adversaries, including Republican lawmakers, have
already begun scrutinizing the statements of Biden’s advisers, ready to pounce on any
effort to roll back Trump’s punishments meted out to China, including tariffs and bans on
exporting technology.116
Biden’s plan to engage more closely with US allies to put pressure on China may also
be easier said than done. In an interview in January, shortly before he left office, Robert
Lighthizer, Trump’s top trade official, pointed to a recent investment agreement the
European Union signed with China, against the wishes of the Biden administration, as
“the first piece of evidence” that such multilateral cooperation would be difficult. 117 Biden
said that the two countries “need not have a conflict. But there’s going to be extreme
competition.” “I’m not going to do it the way Trump did,” Biden added. “We’re going to
focus on international rules of the road.”118

Russia is keeping its cards close to its chest, however, soon it will have to choose sides.
India has embarked upon an economically bleeding journey of replacing its legacy
Russian war fighting systems with better performing American systems. This would,
however, result in an Indian state devoid of worthwhile strategic autonomy.

China is cautious and tempered with its traditional leadership traits of patience and
perseverance. It has displayed prudence in allowing India a domestic face saving by
making a symbolic pull back of its military while retaining vast swaths of strategically
important landscapes.

China’s sagacity will be tested. If it can avoid a major military conflict for 7-10 years, it
could ascent the pedestal of the most powerful country without firing a bullet.

Pakistan has to endure a rough patch. Pakistan’s economy would be on an upward

trajectory once China Pakistan Economic Corridor and its allied projects become
operational in 5-10 years from now; till then it needs to strengthen its politico-diplomatic
hedge to wardoff  any misadventure from the East. In the meanwhile, any Sino-US
rapprochement would also ease out Indo-Pakistan tensions.