Pak–Saudi Relations: the Rough Road Ahead

Muhammad Azam Khan*

Abstract
(Recent developments in Saudi-US-India relations have put Pakistan’s long held and steely ties
with Riyadh in a flux. Though these could     be marginally reset by the new Biden
administration, the trilateral relationship has emboldened Modi and his controversial policy in
Indian Held Kashmir. This has created a sense of discomfiture in Islamabad. Establishment of
diplomatic ties between UAE, Bahrain and Israel has meanwhile put a question mark on
Pakistan’s ideological stance of not recognizing Tel Aviv. The enduring cold war chapter of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as Pakistan’s strongest economic backer and ally in the Sunni
Muslim world now appears to be coming to a close. With geo-economics overtaking geo-
strategy, the nuclear and conventional military potential and a large Saudi revering population
in Pakistan has become irrelevant to Riyadh. The Kingdom’s economy is showing signs of
fatigue. The windfall profits from oil are fading into history. This comes at a time of strong
geopolitical undercurrents and shocks occurring in the Middle East, South Asia and the
surrounding regions. Israel is now emerging as a dominant player in Middle East politics. The
US’ brokered “Abraham Accord” and reordering of foreign policy by KSA has left Pakistan with
fewer choices. – Author)
Nations, like businesses, seek opportunities for furthering their commercial ends or
profitability. In international relations it is called ‘interest’ and involves much more than
just dollars and cents, friends or foes. Relations amongst states are never permanent.
They are inherently based on interest. The August 5, 2020 statement by Pakistan’s
Foreign Minister (FM)1 followed by a quid pro quo reaction from Riyadh was no small
geopolitical upheaval.2 These two Sunni majority states were in close embrace for
decades. During these years their interests converged. Over time, the world around
them has changed and they too are looking for newer and more lucrative opportunities.
The latest episode happened at a time of unprecedented realignments occurring in the
Middle East (ME) and across Asia Pacific. Such developments extend all the way to
Ladakh and the South China Sea.
A Pak-Saudi realignment was long in the making. Occasional fissures kept surfacing in
the past. Pakistan’s refraining from sending military troops to fight in Yemen was
returned in coin by UAE, Saudi Arabia’s closest ally. As it happened, Abu Dhabi
extended an invitation to India for the “inaugural plenary of the foreign ministers’
conclave” of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in March 2019. 3 It turned out to
be the first time that India was invited to a meeting of the 57 member Saudi led grouping
of Islamic countries. Historically, Pakistan was instrumental in blocking Indian
participation in the OIC or awarding membership status to New Delhi since the
organization’s establishment in 1969. It was, however, different this time. Now it seems
a matter of time before India is conferred an “observer status” in the OIC, if not a full
membership. The deafening silence of OIC over Indian brutalities and Human Rights
violations in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK), despite Pakistan’s exhortation, is perceptible.
The threatening tone adopted by UAE following Pakistan’s refusal to send troops to fight
in Yemen also provided a taste of things to come. 4 
Contextualising
Recent developments in bilateral relations have the potential to become a full blown
diplomatic, economic, and military predicament for Pakistan. The country is already
mired in deep domestic, economic and external security problems. Pakistan and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) are Sunni majority Muslim states with ties that run deep.
Riyadh has been a major foreign donor to Pakistan – some say perhaps the third-
largest after the US and China. 5 Traditionally, Saudi financial support to Islamabad was
not restricted to official channels or oil on deferred payments alone. Thousands
of Deobandi seminaries, formally funded by Riyadh in the past, still receive hand-outs
from Saudi citizens. Some of these seminaries have spawned extremism and provided
foot soldiers to hard-line militant outfits like the Taliban. Lately, however, Pakistan
adopted legislative changes to regulate these seminaries as part of an effort aimed at
the removal of the country’s name from the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF).6
A huge segment of Pakistani society is emotionally tied to KSA. Despite being a closed
authoritarian tribal monarchy, the custodians of the two most holy places for the
Muslims are revered in Pakistan. A profound adoration for the Holy cities
of Makkah and Medinah runs across the spectrum of society. In addition, there are over
two million Pakistani workers (diaspora) in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom is a principal
source of remittances by overseas Pakistanis.

Military ties are also important. Joint military exercises are held occasionally while a
sizeable number of Saudis avail training facilities in military institutes of Pakistan. An
unintended consequence of this relationship has been the deep religo-cultural and
sectarian makeover that has shaped society in Pakistan. This is also the repercussion
of an embrace that began during the cold war with the Pakistani-Saudi-US backed
operations against the Soviet army in Afghanistan.

In the wake of the statements on OIC from Pakistan, the Saudi leadership’s vindictive
response is evident. Reflecting the mind-set of the current leadership, Riyadh swiftly
terminated loan and oil supplies to Pakistan. Islamabad was also asked for the
premature return of $1bn loan besides demand for repayment of another $1bn. This
budgetary support was part of a $6.2 billion package announced by Riyadh towards the
end of 2018. It included a total of $3.2 billion oil credit facility and $3 billion to help the
balance of payment crisis.7

Replacing the Old Guard

ME politics, like elsewhere, are in a state of flux. Pakistan did not appreciate the
changes taking place in its zone of interest. In Saudi Arabia, King Suleman is the last of
the sons of King Abdul Aziz Ibn-e-Saud who would become king. The seven brothers,
starting from King Fahd, were known as Sudairi Seven. Likewise, after the passing
away of Sheikh Zayed bin Nahyan, a new generation of rulers has taken the leading
role in UAE. They are not as connected to ideology or religion as were their
predecessors. To them, what matters most is their own national interest. Gone are the
days when these Arab states were financing large hospitals and airports in remote
areas of Pakistan. Though they still come to Pakistan as hunters of protected Houbara
Bustard8 and a red carpet is laid out for them, they are no longer inclined to mitigate
problems and unending difficulties of Pakistan. They live in the world of real politics.
The new younger leadership replacing the old guard in Saudi Arabia will soon be led by
the 35-year-old mercurial Mohammad bin Salman (MBS). 9 This new leadership has a
different model and priorities for the Kingdom — internally as well as externally. A
paradigm shift and an unsparing bent was on full display during the war against Houthi
rebels as well as naval and air blockade of Yemen by the Saudi led coalition. The
assassination of Saudi journalist, Khashoggi is not forgotten so  far. Convening of a
large-scale international investors’ conference in Riyadh last year too illustrates a new
business plan. It illustrated the new business disposition to market brand Saudi Arabia
by its potential leadership. This approach aims to showcase Saudi Arabia as a new
open market for overseas  investors. The  conference  also  attempted to underline the
country’s geostrategic significance. In displaying its progressive approach, some relief
has been provided to women as  well. A few cinema theatres were also opened. Yet
there has been the rounding up of some of the wealthiest and most powerful men,
including members of the Saud family, without due process. In late 2017, they were
ignominiously locked up in Riyadh Ritz Carlton in what was said to be an attempt to
“crackdown on corruption.”10
Demographically, Saudi Arabia is no longer the same country as it was three decades
back. Out of a population of roughly 34 million, two thirds are below 30 years. This
generation is more interested in jobs, employment, education, while urge for female
empowerment is fairly high. Except for Shia Iran, the issue of Palestine or any other
Arab cause does not stir the interest of young Saudis. The era of black gold and an
ideological bent of mind hasrun its course. The Saudi economy is no longer the same
as it was in the 70s. No attempt was ever made to diversify it either. The country’s “oil
reserves are shrinking, and its GDP growth has declined from 10 per cent in 2011 to 3.5
per cent in 2015 and 1.6 per cent in January 2017.” 11 “Close to 90 per cent of Saudi
revenues currently come from oil.”12

If there was some energy left in the Saudi economy, the hopeless war in Yemen has
sucked the last drop out of it. Interestingly, the once overwhelming dependence of the
US on Saudi oil has come to an end. It too has effects on Saudi Arabia — economically
as well as politically. The US presence in the ME is for reasons other than Saudi oil.
There are ominous signs of internal unrest brewing. The House of Saud knows it all too
well. If the Kingdom is to avert an Arab Spring, it needs to reform and do it fast.

Why India Matters to the Saudis

India has made deep inroads globally, including in the MENA (Middle East and North
Africa) region. The Arab world, in particular, looks at India favourably. It is India’s soft
power and commercial, technological, financial investments on top of defence ties that
are drawing attention. Indian engagement with Gulf countries has seen an
unprecedented surge in PM Modi’s watch. The Arab states find in New Delhi a huge,
commercially diverse market. New Delhi offers a colossal reservoir of technologically
oriented Human Resource (HR) with over 185 million Muslims, strong state institutions
and a relatively stable political order. India is also seen as a country that is gradually
assuming the status of a major stakeholder in international order. Reinforcing the Indian
image is the country’s current strategic ties to the US.

Washington’s deep-seated opposition to Iran, spurred on by policy support from the

Trump administration has reenforced the Saudi led Sunni camp in the Middle East. It
flawlessly mitigates Israel’s security concerns as well. The large Indian diaspora in the
Gulf States and elsewhere in the world cannot be overlooked by the Arab world either.
There are roughly 4 million Indians in UAE and 1.5 million in Saudi Arabia. The only
problem appears to be cultural integration. This may prevent establishing a large
number of Hindu temples in Saudi Arabia if not elsewhere in the Arab world.
Nonetheless, a Hindu temple recently opened its doors to worshippers in the UAE. 13

Turkey and Malaysia

According to a commentary by London based RUSI, the increasing “Turkish and
Malaysian influence on Pakistani Prime Minister” did not go “unnoticed in Riyadh”. PM
Imran Khan has repeatedly stated that his “political heroes are Turkish President
Erdogan and Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahatir.” 14
Ever since the fateful years of the Afghan war, Riyadh cultivated its Wahabbi hard-line
version of Islam to reshape society in Pakistan. In this effort, the military regime of
former military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq kowtowed to the Saudis. Unfortunately, the
previous colonial secular progressive model of liberal Islam is almost history.   A
comprehensive hard-line religious bent, intolerance and disapproval of any liberal
thoughts, is all pervasive. Yet the Saudis may not object to Pakistan-Turkish ties. What
they perhaps find distasteful is Ankara’s “regional meddling in Arab affairs.” 15
During the cold war era, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) between
Iran, Turkey and Pakistan was a natural alliance. Culturally, these nations’ pair
with Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. The language is over seventy per cent a
mix of Turkish and Persian. The poetry of Pakistan’s national poet is mostly in Persian
language, while the Masnavi by Maulana Jalal-ud-Din Rumi, the thirteenth century Muslim
mystic poet and jurist, was popular amongst earlier generations of Pakistanis. 16
The Saudi Kingdom was angered when an attempt was made by Pakistan along with
Turkey and Malaysia to raise an alternate forum of Islamic countries to counter what is
usually termed as“Islamophobia”. The ensuing summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2019, the first
“outside the realm of the OIC”, was taken by Riyadh as an affront to its long-held
leadership position in the Sunni Muslim world. 17 The presence of the Iranian President
and Emir of Qatar,18 the two established former arch enemies of the Saudis at the Kuala
Lumpur summit proved to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. It was the beginning
of the end of  an asymmetrical relationship held on oil and remittances from workers in
return for blanket military reassurance from Pakistan.The Pak-Saudi relationship has
thawed for now. This will remain intact but may never enjoy the vigour it once had in the
70s and 80s.
Damage Repair
Pakistan’s top General, Qamar Bajwa, travelled to Riyadh for damage control. Bajwa
was able to meet the Saudi Chief of General staff and Vice Minister of Defence. But he
was unable to see the Crown Prince. 19 The Indian media was euphoric. It maintained
that Riyadh has not accepted an “apology” from Islamabad and that the Chief of Army
Staff returned empty handed. On August 25, 2020 Pakistan’s FM “rejected the
impression of a breakdown in Pak-Saudi ties, saying they were long-standing and
people centric.”20 Regardless, behind this veneer of diplomatic thaw, it cannot be said
with certainty that all is well or will be possibly glowing in the future. Pakistan has
already returned US$ 2 billion out of a $3 billion loan it secured from the Kingdom. 21

The Interplay of Geography and the Retribution

The geography of Pakistan has both been a blessing and a bane. During the cold war
the foreign policy trade-off for geography was to act as a bulwark against the Soviets. It
later morphed into becoming a “Major Non-NATO ally” during the War on Terror,
following 9/11. The Afghan war of the 80s duly aided and abetted by the CIA, was
lavishly funded by the Saudis. This was also the time when Saudi money and influence
began to corrode the culture and politics of Pakistan. It was to turn Pakistan’s historical
liberal identity on its head. 22 There was some economic relief and military assistance in
return for participation in the so-called Jihad. In reality, this assistance came at a huge
cost to the country, both in blood and treasure. It set about a major societal alteration in
Pakistan. The religious right, previously on the side-lines, became a major stake holder
in mainstream politics. It also gave a phenomenal rise to the culture
of “tableegh” (religious preaching) and “dawah” (invitation to embrace every ritual of
Islam). There was a mushroom growth of seminaries of all strands, Sunnis and Shias.
Such strategic choices also brought the curse of the Saudi-Iranian sectarian war to
Pakistan. Al-Qaeda was born and baptised in Peshawar (KPK) in the 80s. It was to
become a global monster later. As former director of CIA James Woolsey said in
1993, “We have slain a large dragon, but we now live in a jungle filled with a bewildering
variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.” 23 But
for Pakistan perhaps the worst part was to come much later. The belief that a ragtag
of Mujahideen (Islamic warriors) had brought down an empire soon became widespread.
There was little realisation that the demise of the Red army became possible only
throughcopious funding by the Saudis and support in arms, intelligence and recruitment
of footsoldiers by the US-CIA.24 The nature of the Afghan region’s history and its society
were also overlooked.

Lack of Fresh Thinking

Pakistan’s society and, in turn, its strategic culture suffers from a lack of fresh thinking.
The country has barely developed any incubators of thought or innovation. The religious
right has successfully supressed free thinking in Pakistan. Society is largely “status quo”
driven. With the military ruling directly for over three decades and keeping civilian set-
ups on a tight leash, the democratic culture is tenuous at best. Mainstream political
parties have myopic and corrupt leadership. Parties are mostly dynastic and revolve
around families who run their parties as personal fiefdoms. The parties are considered
nests of corruption, totally devoid of any democratic values. There is complete
absence    of issue centric political discourse on subjects like foreign policy. The only
narrative that sells is anti-India and (or) religious blasphemy. The country’s foreign
policy towards the US, India, Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia (including Saudi satellites like
UAE, Bahrain, etc.) is a no-go area for political or public discussion. And unless
something blatant occurs at the international level, like operation “Neptune Spear” that
took out Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, nothing is ever shared or heard in public. The
relationship with the four countries mentioned is truly a province of the military.
Extreme right leaning political parties like, the Jamaat-i-Islami with considerable influence
and ability to shape public opinion are fervently pro-KSA. It applies even to the centre
right wing parties. Top leadership of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), an opposition party
next in Parliament only to the ruling Tehreek-i-Insaf, strongly endorse friendly ties with
the Kingdom. In the acerbic exchange between Islamabad  and reaction by Riyadh last
year, the Nawaz League denounced FM- Qureshi’s remarks as “irresponsible”. It went
on to strongly condemn the sitting government25 of Tehreek-i-Insaf.

On another note, except for sporadic attempts, there has never been any serious
democratic exercise to determine the cost benefit analysis of recognizing Israel. Political
parties and even the military are hesitant to discuss the matter fearing backlash from
reactionary forces. Despite established sympathy for the legitimate Palestinian cause in
Pakistan, there has never been a political debate on why Israel should not be
recognised, even though it is here to stay. The Palestinian cause, which should be
closer to the Arabs, happens to be much dearer to the natives of Pakistan.

Islamabad’s persistent refusal to recognise the Jewish state has caused Israel to align
and close ranks with India. Almost the entire Sunni Arab world’s absolute as well as
constitutional monarchies have formally established diplomatic ties with Israel. Lately,
UAE, Bahrain and Sudan have overtly acknowledged their relationship with
Israel.26 Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait and some others are also considering peace
deals with Israel.27 Saudi Arabia, while fully supporting the process, may officially
withhold formal recognition. But it doesn’t matter; they are still hand in glove.
Accordingly, even without official ties, all these countries have, in a spiritual sense,
ended their hostility with the Jewish state.28
How does Pakistan fit in this entire Saudi led and US backed secret and not so
secret29 realignment? Will Biden’s victory upset the applecart in the ME for KSA and
Israel? Does Pakistan’s standpoint on Palestinian cause remain tenable anymore?
What would Pakistan do once Saudi Arabia accords formal recognition to Israel? 30 What
options might be on the table with Pakistan if India is formally conferred “observer
status”, followed by “permanent membership” status in OIC? Despite looming clues,
there is still a deafening silence on the subject in Pakistan.

Economic Plight and Bilateral Relations

Despite Pakistan’s efforts to raise the Kashmir issue in the international fora and urge
OIC for a voice, success has eluded it. The nuclear and military potential as well as the
geostrategic significance of the country are intrinsically important. But for Pakistan,
these strengths proved of little consequence in furthering national interest. Islamabad
could not elicit any desirable response, internationally or otherwise, not even from OIC.
A sterling lesson of this setback is that “religious bond in international relations will be
relevant only when coupled with strong economy,”31 potency of domestic manpower and
driven by commonality of interests.
According to a recent report in Brookings, bilateral trade between India and Saudi
Arabia is close to $27 billion, whereas Pakistan-Saudi trade is a paltry $3.6 billion.‘The
Saudi Prince MBS has offered to invest a staggering $100 billion in India.’ 32 The
implication is that Saudi Arabia will not want to annoy India by asserting itself on
Kashmir”.33 This being “realpolitik”, must be the starting point if Islamabad seeks
softening of ties with Riyadh. “Between July 2019 and April 2020, overseas Pakistani
workers sent about $18.78 billion back home. Of this amount, $4.4 billion was remitted
from Saudi Arabia alone”, according to a statement issued by the State Bank of
Pakistan.34
With the country’s external debt soaring to a whopping USD 112 Billion and Covid-19
crippling the economy further, Pakistan remains at the mercy of International Financial
Institutions. The government announced its budget for 2020-21 according to which
Rs.1,289 billion have been allotted to the defence sector. Increasing tensions between
India and Pakistan, post-Pulwama and the Kashmir issue, are cited     as reasons
behind the surge in defence spending. 35 “Regardless, the country’s Prime Minister has
stated that the burden of pensions is fast becoming unsustainable”. “An increase of 57
per cent was witnessed in military pensions during five years from 2016-17 to 2020-
21.”36 A frail economy, inability to meet revenue collection targets, low crop yield,
excessive reliance on external borrowings and the much hyped India’s grey-zone hybrid
war against Pakistan may not allow the country to completely detach itself from Saudi
Arabia.

On Military and Bureaucracy

The three military services of Pakistan were at the vanguard of laying the foundation for
the defence forces of Saudi Arabia. Successive generations of Saudi officers acquired
training at the army, navy and air force academies of Pakistan. In middle order ranks,
Command and Staff College, Naval War College, and Air War College have hosted staff
courses and military studies training. The country’s top military academy, the National
Defence University also offers regular courses to Saudi officers in senior cadres. The
number of trainee officers varies each year but has ordinarily grown over the years.
Military to military contacts and field exercises between land, air and naval forces of the
two sides take place every now and then. A large number of Pakistani military officers
are also deputed in Saudi Arabia in key military positions.

KSA and India have fairly advance defence ties too. Manifested through high-level visits
by defense chiefs, training activities, delegation- level interactions, joint military
exercises and expert exchange programs – their defense collaboration is growing. The
areas of mutual interests inter alia include cyber security, regional maritime security,
and joint defense manufacturing. 37 India also signed a defence and technology
agreement during PM Modi’s visit to UAE in 2017. Riyadh has fairly advance military
technology support coming fromTelAviv as Most recently, Israeli Prime Minister and
Defence Minister stated that Israel will not oppose US’ sales of specific weapons
systems to the UAE. This was an apparent reference to the sale of the advanced stealth
jet fighters, F-35 warplanes sought by Abu Dhabi. 38 There is convergence of strategic
military interests when it comes to a common nemesis, Iran. All three, Saudi Arabia,
UAE and Israel with strong ties to India constitute a Quadrilateral nexus. This network
was fully backed by the Jared Kushner in the previous US administration who is said to
have been behind the strategic shifts 39 in the ME that included the“Abraham
Accord”40 and the moving of the US Embassy41 to Jerusalem.

Alongside this, cooperation between the US, Israel, KSA, UAE and India is likely to
grow in the future. This could be detrimental to the internal security and regional
interests of Pakistan.With only China left as a powerful strategic and military backer,
what could Pakistan possibly do in case the gulf with KSA widened? Would Pakistan
stand as the world’s only country refusing to recognise Israel; how would Pakistan avert
India’s entry into OIC?

Vying for a Leadership Role

 The influential thinker of “realist school”, Hans Morgenthau maintains that, “the idea of
interest is indeed of the essence in politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and
place.”42 Thucydides’ statement is born of the experiences of ancient Greece
that, “identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals” 43 could
well be rearticulated as, “the absence of all clashing interests” between states.”44 The
common denominator or so called “interest”  in the case of Pak-Saudi relationship was
the “Sunni sect” of Islam. The two cultures are worlds apart. Pakistan’s previously
predominant Barelvi strand of Islam, a softer (mystic) version had little commonality with
Saudi “Wahabbi, or Salafist”  puritanical  version  which  calls for strict implementation
of “sharia”. This led to a promotion of the related “Deobandi” brand instead in the
country. In addition, a culture of “intolerance”, “religious coercion” and “politicisation of
Islam” for vested interests has continued to expand since the days of the Afghan  Jihad.
And after a series of suicide attacks by the Pakistani Taliban on shrines of saints and
other holy places revered by Barelvis a few years back, the latter took to fighting back
groups of the opposing side. In recent years, under a hate and violence preaching
cleric, Khadim Hussain Rizvi of Tehreek-i-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), the Barelvis have tried
to take power back from Deobandis. TLP now enjoys immense street power. The party
returned with a large following in the 2018 elections.
During the past six years there has been a significant deterioration of Pakistan’s
relations in the Gulf region, especially with UAE and Saudi Arabia”, notes an Indian
columnist.45 Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Tehran have vied for
leadership and control of the Muslim world. This came with a concurrent contest for
geopolitical influence in ME — other states taking sides as dictated by their strategic
interests. But in a purely religious sense, it has been a competition
between Sunni and Shia dominance. The Vanguard role of Sunni Muslim majority
countries or “ummah” was once held by Egypt. This was under President Jamal Nasser.
After Egypt suffered defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, the mantle was taken over by
Saudi Arabia.
A new entry and claimant now seems to be Turkey where the incumbent authoritarian
President has initiated a drive to “Islamise” a modern secular society modelled by the
nation’s founding father, Kemal Ata Turk. Closely following for an important status in the
Muslim world is Malaysia. In one group are Iran, Turkey and Russia. The group is pitted
against US-KSA-UAE and other minor Gulf states. Pakistan lies somewhere in the
middle of the two sides. It’s neither here nor there, more like “running with the hare and
hunting with the hounds”. China remains focused on geo-economics but continues to
develop strong military as well as cyber and space capabilities. Beijing is central to
Pakistan’s foreign policy. China’s political system has proved to be more effective than
western liberal models producing leaders with warped minds. The new political
leadership of China’s Central Party is drawn on merit from the best, highly educated and
erudite reservoir.46
In the first week of September 2020, high-level delegations from Israel and UAE signed
the historic US-brokered peace deal at   the White House. Bahrain’s FM attended the
event and signed its own agreement to normalise relations with Israel. 47 Last October
the FMs  of Israel and UAE visited the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin during their historic
meeting. It was their first face-to-face meeting since their countries set aside decades of
enmity and signed a US backed deal in mid-September. 48

After the end of the Muslim Brotherhood and its short lived flirtation with democracy,
Egypt, under General Sissi, is now firmly in Saudi grip, politically and economically. As
and if asked, Egypt would deliver to KSA what Pakistan could not or has not. If Kashmir
is all important to Pakistan, so is Yemen to Saudi Arabia. If Islamabad declined to
become part of a war in Yemen, so has Saudi Arabia in the case of Kashmir  and for its
own interests and political ends. Nature abhors a vacuum.  A widening Pak-Saudi
chasm will have reverberations going far beyond South Asia and ME. The major
beneficiaries could be India and Israel, if not others. Yet, under pressure Pakistan might
move closer to Turkey, Russia, China and Iran. Additionally, EU could assume greater
importance for Pakistan as a trading partner. However, long before that a Saudi
revering society in Pakistan will have to be primed for the change.

Since centuries, Arabs have been living under the protection of foreign powers and
strategists – Turks, the command of Lawrence of Arabia, the British and French
empires, US and now Israel. The strategic dependence of Arabs on India and Israel
would unfold sooner than later. The Gulf states are not resilient enough to sustain a
long war or battles of attrition as proved in Yemen and the Sunni insurgencies in Iraq
and Syria.49 Middle East is witnessing an alarming rise of Israel. With United States
largely withdrawing, the Gulf monarchies, unable to bear the strategic influence of Iran,
have finally acquiesced to the military strength of their former archrival. 50 Israel will soon
be the dominant power in the Middle East. Combined with Saudi Arabia, India and UAE,
it could bring massive overt and covert influence on Pakistan, militarily, economically
and if required, in destabilizing Pakistan further.
What Must Pakistan Do
Pakistan must take a profound look at its strategic priorities. The country needs to
recognize that foreign policy is a dynamic instrument, not a dogma. It needs to be
examined and discussed with open minds and at highest national fora. Policy changes
to prepare and adjust to a shifting environment are always needed. A shift from
geostrategic to geo-economics has become an indispensable need.

A 2018 study discovered that Islamabad’s Foreign office diplomats were demotivated
because of political appointments in the department at higher ranks. 51 A career diplomat
in Riyadh  was  recently  shown the door before the end of his term and replaced with a
retired three- star, Lieutenant General. 52 It signifies the Pakistan army’s ‘urgency in
bringing the country’s Middle East policy under its control’, says Ayesha Siddiqa, a
London based defence analyst. More importantly, it is about managing relations with the
US via the Middle East.53
Pakistan may have been the only non-Arab country to have participated in real combat
during the Arab-Israeli wars first in 1967 and, later 1973. 54 But that was then. The story
lives only in pages of history and is relatively insignificant to the present day leadership
of the Arab world. “It would be mistake, a mistake often made by the country, to suggest
that the advantage of Pakistan’s location is geo-strategic or geo- political. This, if it
existed is now only peripheral. The true advantage is geo-economic.” 55 A regional
integration and lifting of trade barriers alongside efforts to improve ties with Iran and
Afghanistan is the crying need of the hour. Saudi Arabia is a distant ally and, although
friendly ties are needed, in the new geo-political calculus, financial and oil reliance on
Riyadh must be reduced. Such a relationship must not come at the cost of neighbours.
Iran has shown its resolve. It expelled India from Chabahar port project. Now that China
has signed multibillion dollar economic agreements with Tehran, improved relations with
neighbouring Iran could substantially help advance the cause of Pakistan in the early
maturing of CPEC. Likewise, Pakistan must reconsider its old, recycled and
regurgitated, India-Kashmir centric foreign policy. The result of several wars, both direct
and indirect, unlimited skirmishes and destruction of the Himalayan glacier at Siachin
offer a lot of food for reflection and rethinking.
With a galloping population, (which in demographic terms is nearly 64 per cent below 30
years), improvement in economic governance and reduction in inflation can play a
significant role in internal security. A new all-inclusive political charter to help stabilise
domestic politics    is in order. Trade and commerce with neighbouring countries should 
be prioritised. The EU market must also be explored. Pakistan has a preferential tariff
arrangement with EU. Its extension must be sought. But above all, a public debate on
establishing diplomatic relations with Israel must begin in earnest. The ground realities
today are quite different from Pakistan’s earliest stance that came in the wake of the
creation of Israel.56

To begin the process of reformation, Pakistan needs a hard and profound look at the
state-citizen contract. Citizens must have a stake in the state. If any such covenant
currently exists, it has sorrowfully failed to be visible to the people. Human Resource
Development must be prioritized as a national endeavour. The bulk of Pakistanis
working in Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries are “unskilled labourers”. This trend served
well in the 70s when desert states needed to construct skyscrapers – not anymore. The
Arab market now needs skilled manpower. The Indians have captured key financial,
commercial, science & technology, medical and banking sector positions in Gulf Arab
states.

Early commercial operationalization of Gwadar port must be made top priority. Pakistan
has perennially invested in hard military power cruising on US and Saudi provided
hardware and economic succour. Pakistan has to realign its security and foreign
policies with new global dynamics. This, combined with investment in soft power and
human resources, may provide sustainable solutions to Pakistan’s unending problems.