Repression, Opportunity, and Protest

Repression, Opportunity, and Protest: Explaining the Takeoff of Brazil's Landless
Movement
Author(s): Gabriel Ondetti
Source: Latin American Politics and Society , Summer, 2006, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Summer,
2006), pp. 61-94
Published by: Distributed by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Center for
Latin American Studies at the University of Miami
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Repression, Opportunity, and Protest:
Explaining the Takeoff of
Brazil's Landless Movement
Gabriel Ondetti
ABSTRACT
During the mid-1990s, Brazil experienced a rapid intensification of

protest for land reform. Official land reform efforts also accelerated,
and the issue became a central topic of public concern and debate.
This article seeks to account for the abrupt intensification of collec-
tive action and to explain its relationship to the other changes,
focusing on the political impact of two massacres of landless pro-
testers in 1995 and 1996. These incidents forced authorities to accel-
erate land reform and to exercise somewhat greater caution in
repressing the movement. The shifts in state behavior then helped
to accelerate collective action. This argument lends weight to the
idea that state repression against a social movement can sometimes
serve to engender even greater protest. It also identifies a previ-
ously undescribed causal mechanism, political opportunity, linking
repression to protest.
During the mid-1990s, Brazil experienced a rapid intensificat

grassroots protest for agrarian reform. Land occupations had
growing gradually for several years, led by an organization calle
Movement of Landless Rural Workers (Movimento dos Trabalbadores
Rurais Sem Terra, MST). In late 1995 and 1996, however, occupations
increased dramatically. The total number of occupations in 1996 was
close to three times that of 1995. After this abrupt leap they continued
to increase at a more gradual pace through 1999. By early 2000, some
60,000 families were camped on occupied properties or at the margins
of public roads waiting to be settled on small plots of farmland. The
landless movement had become arguably the largest rural movement in
Brazilian history and one of the most influential social movements in
contemporary Brazil, rural or urban. During this period, moreover, two
other major shifts occurred in Brazil related to land reform. The issue
itself emerged from relative obscurity to become a central topic of
public concern and debate, and official agrarian reform efforts acceler-
ated markedly relative to earlier periods in Brazilian history.
The rise of the land issue was particularly surprising, given the
events of the previous decade. The issue of rural land distribution,
which had contributed to the implantation of a military dictatorship in
1964, reemerged in 1985 with the announcement of a major new reform
61

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62 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 48: 2
plan by the first civilian president follo

Sarney's plan, however, was buried by
landholding structure, one of the most
remained untouched. By the early 1990s, agrarian reform seemed
largely forgotten as a national political issue.
The abrupt intensification of collective action for land reform and
its relationship to the two other changes are the focus of this article. The
empirical case sheds light on an interesting theoretical puzzle: why state
repression intended to squelch protest for change sometimes ends up
inflaming it instead. More specifically, this study identifies a particular
causal mechanism through which repression can trigger greater protest,
and suggests some conditions under which it is likely to operate. The
article thus answers the recent call in the literature to devote more effort
to understanding the causal mechanisms and processes that shape
episodes of "contentious politics" (McAdam et al. 2001; McAdam 2003).
This study argues that two changes that took place in Brazil during
the first half of the 1990s provided a moderately more favorable social
and political context for movement expansion. These changes were the
neoliberal restructuring of the agricultural sector and a move toward less
conservative and more urban-based national governments. Collective
protest for land would probably have grown much more gradually in
the mid-1990s, however, had it not been for a third factor: the powerful
political impact of two brutal massacres of landless protestors by official
security forces, at Corumbiara in August 1995 and Eldorado do Carajais
in April 1996. These two episodes outraged domestic and international
public opinion, mobilized civil society, and focused attention and con-
cern on the land issue; they thereby obligated Brazilian authorities to
accelerate the pace of reform and exercise greater caution in repressing
the movement. These changes provoked, in turn, a major intensification
of land occupations by people who wished to be included in the reform
process and were determined to force authorities to make good on their
policy commitments.
This interpretation of the landless movement's growth during this
period lends additional weight to the idea that repression, though
intended to discourage protest, can, at times, serve to engender more of
it. This idea is fairly well established in the literature on social move-
ments and political conflict (Gurr 1970; Lichbach 1987; Goldstone and
Tilly 2001). Existing analyses in this vein have emphasized the impact of
repression on the perceptions of actual or potential activists about the
legitimacy of established authorities and the efficacy of using protest as
a means to bring about change. When repressive actions provoke even
greater outbursts of collective action, these analyses suggest, it is because
such tactics exacerbate discontent, goading activists into intensifying
their efforts and drawing previously passive observers into active dissent.

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ONDETTI: BRAZIL'S LANDLESS MOVEMENT 63
This analysis, however, suggests that official repr

foment protest more indirectly. By currying addition
social movement in question among politically influen
acts of repression may end up forcing state authori
responsive to the movement's demands for change.
greater accommodation may, in turn, prompt broad
mined attempts by the movement to pressure the st
In other words, instances of repression can serve to s
movement not only by galvanizing actual or potential
ing theory suggests, but by improving the broader "p
structure" and thereby creating new incentives for ac
their pressure on the state.
THE REPRESSION-PROTEST NEXUS
The relationship between state repression and protest activity is a puzzle

that has intrigued social scientists and defied easy explanation. At an
empirical level, we can find numerous examples of instances in which
repression did its job, discouraging committed activists and intimidating
other potential "troublemakers." Unfortunately for constituted authori-
ties, however, we can probably also find in the history of just about any
country episodes in which repression had precisely the opposite effect,
inflaming protest action and diffusing it more broadly. As one scholar
put it, "deterrence works. And then again, deterrence doesn't work"
(Lichbach 1987, 266).
This empirical puzzle is matched by a theoretical dilemma. Each of
these reactions to repression can be explained by one of the major the-
oretical perspectives on contentious collective action. For example,
resource mobilization theory, which has tended to stress the calculated,
strategic character of social movement activity, can readily account for
why repression might reduce protest, since it raises the costs of protest
and thus diminishes its desirability in the eyes of activists. Deprivation-
oriented theories can explain why repression might cause greater protest,
since repressive actions might deepen the sense of grievance against the
government or regime among actual or potential dissidents. Neither of
these perspectives by itself, however, at least in a pure version, can
explain both outcomes (Lichbach 1987; Khawaja 1993). Over the years,
a significant amount of scholarly effort has been devoted to developing
a model that can bring both outcomes under one theoretical roof.
A number of authors have focused on the overall intensity of repres-
sive action applied by the state. Early on, the discussion centered on
whether the repression-protest relationship resembled a U-curve or an
inverted U. Proponents of the latter view argued that rising levels of
repression initially provoke greater anger among dissidents, accelerating

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protest (Gurr 1970). At some point in the pr

"anger gives way to fear," and protest dies
the opposite conclusion: repression initially
organization and recruitment, but beyond
counterproductive, underscoring the regim
dissident groups to attract new supporters
A more recent approach to solving the p
the degree of consistency with which repre
Rasler 1996; Francisco and Lichbach 2001). A
cies of straight repression are likely to inti
mission, while sweeping concessions will te
by granting dissidents much of what they
repression and concessions, however, are likely to inflame protest
because they both provoke anger and signal authorities' vulnerability to
pressure without satisfying demands for change.
Some authors focus on more contextual factors. Gupta et al. (1993),
for example, stress political regime type. They make the case that
authoritarian regimes are more successful in using repression against
protest. Democratically elected governments cannot easily muster the
intensity of repressive action needed to intimidate activists into submis-
sion, so repression only ends up provoking greater anger and resist-
ance. Opp and Roehl (1990) focus on more micro-level factors. They
argue that two variables affect whether repression will provoke protest:
whether repression is perceived as unjustified or illegitimate by those
directly affected in their social environment, and whether those affected
are integrated into social networks that generally encourage protest
activity. Other theoretical approaches have also been developed. The
primary interest here, however, is to identify the exact character of the
causal connection they posit between repression and increased protest
activity. When official repression does aggravate protest, why does it do
so? What are the causal mechanisms involved?
As a rule, scholars who have addressed this issue see state repres-
sion as provoking protest through its impact on the perceptions o
actual and potential activists about the character of state authority and
the legitimacy of using protest to bring about a desired change. Violen
repression against protestors may prompt anger and moral outrage
among its direct victims, their friends and relatives, and the broader
society (Lichbach 1987; Opp and Roehl 1990; Khawaja 1993; Rasler
1996). It can thus lead not only to a desire on the part of activists to
strike back, perhaps with more forceful methods, but to a more funda-
mental questioning of the legitimacy or desirability of the governmen
or political regime by the broader society. As a result, "the apathetic
become politicized, the reformers become radicalized, and the revolu-
tionaries redouble their efforts" (Lichbach 1987, 269). Protest intensifie

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and spreads outward to previously uninvolved social

graphical areas. This basic causal chain is what most
when they refer to a "backlash" from repression.
Some scholars have also stressed the grassroots so
repression may give rise to, which may provide addit
engaging in collective protest. For example, the diffu
sentiments as a result of repression may generate s
individuals to get involved in activism, as a result of
involvement may bring in the individual's social cir
1990, 524). Repression directed against a particul
Khawaja (1993) points out in his case study of protest
West Bank, may also end up strengthening that group's
ating as a symbolic reminder of a group's shared circ
authorities and their agents of control." As a result, repr
foster an environment conducive to further collecti
coming social cleavages and rearranging previously f
into a unitary whole" (Khawaja 1993, 66). Thus, altho
sion and violence may impose high direct costs on pr
families, it may also set in motion "micromobilization
have a positive impact on protest (Opp and Roehl 19
These arguments focus on the relatively direct
repression on the perceptions of actual and potential
article will argue, however, is that these theoretical t
in themselves rather convincing, do not capture the f
mechanisms through which state repression can p
protest. In particular, they omit any discussion of how
may affect the broader political environment of a par
ment. It can be argued that instances of excessive or
ceived repression can also end up provoking greater p
authorities on the defensive politically and forcing
more responsive to a movement's demands for polic
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LANDLESS

MOVEMENT, 1970-2002
Brazil's rural land tenure structure is among the most concentrated in
the world.' Although a major land reform has never been carried out,
the issue has surfaced repeatedly as a source of conflict. In the early
1960s, Brazil experienced its first episode of widespread agrarian
activism, concentrated principally in the poor northeast. That move-
ment, however, was repressed by the military regime that took power
in 1964. Early signs that military authorities might implant their own
reform quickly gave way to an agricultural policy based on moderniza-
tion and frontier expansion. The gradual opening of the regime in the

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second half of the 1970s was accompan

protest in both urban and rural areas (Sa
1992; Doimo 1995; Navarro 1996; Pereira 1
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, activis
of southern Brazil began organizing larg
side camps. Catholic activists inspired by
cial in organizing the movement, which b
movement.2 In early 1984 the organization
ation of the MST, which aspired to be a
initially a southern entity (Wagner 1988;
Hammond 1999; Branford and Rocha 200
The return to civilian rule in 1985 b
prospects for land reform, but this was ulti
taking office, President Jose Sarney ann
reform plan, promising to settle 1.4 mill
nately for land reform proponents, the a
landowner countermobilization, led by t
Rural Union (Unido Democrctica Ruralist
tive northeasterner leading a heterogene
backed down.3 The landowners virtually
their lobbying efforts helped impose a
reform forces in the constitutional convention of 1987-88. The inten-
tional vagueness of the new constitution made it difficult for federal
authorities to expropriate privately owned land.4 By the end of Sarney's
term, the government had settled fewer than 90,000 families.5
Despite the narrowing of the political space, the landless movement
grew significantly during the second half of the 1980s. The driving force
was mainly the MST, which expanded geographically and strengthened
its internal organization. In addition to consolidating itself in the South,
the MST gained a foothold in every other major region. By the end of the
decade, it had some representation in 18 of Brazil's 26 states. The MST's
basic characteristics, established during the 1980s, did not change greatly
in subsequent years (Ondetti 2002). The organization combines national-
level leadership with substantial state autonomy. Its leadership includes
many who have gained land through the struggle; others have joined
purely out of ideological commitment. Although the MST has never advo-
cated armed struggle, its leaders hold a deep conviction that confronta-
tional tactics are essential for achieving social reform under capitalism. At
least in its internal communications, the MST advocates socialism.
From the beginning, the MST adopted as its central tactic the mas-
sive land invasion, or occupation.6 In planning an occupation, MST
activists spend weeks or months recruiting families in the countryside
and smaller cities. They target a diverse social base, including small-
holders and sharecroppers who have lost access to land, rural wage

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laborers, and even the urban unemployed.7 Typically

leads to the identification of a large property believe
tive or otherwise eligible for agrarian reform.8 Late at n
and their recruits, using cars, trucks, and buses, de
erty. Occupations range in size from 50 to several t
Once on the land, the families set up a large encamp
wooden huts covered with black plastic sheeting or
Policing of mass protest, including land occupatio
the responsibility of "military police" forces, which are
government of each state. When forced by police or
sion to leave an occupied property, the landless gene
camp to the margin of a public road, where it is
passersby and the news media. The idea is to stay tog
won and to exert a maximum amount of pressure on
hard times for land reform, families have sometim
more occupations, spread out over three to five yea
the landless create an internal camp organization an
ety of other pressure tactics, such as marches, road b
occupation of government buildings.
The objective of all these tactics is usually to force
to implement the constitutional clause mandating th
large, unproductive properties for agrarian reform.
acampados receive family-sized parcels of land in go
sored settlements. Non-MST groups use similar tacti
pations tend to be smaller, their camps less discipline
ers less militant. Some are linked to rural workers' unions or smaller
"landless" organizations, while others are autonomous.
Initially highly dependent on the Catholic Church, the MST becam
more independent in the second half of the 1980s. From the beginnin
the MST leadership has had close ties to the two major organizations o
the Brazilian left, the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT
and the militant Unified Workers' Central labor confederation (Central
Unica dos Trabalbadores, CUT), both formed in the early 1980s. How-
ever, its leadership has often been critical of the official rural union con-
federation, CONTAG, which it considers excessively submissive to
authorities. In terms of funding, the MST has relied mainly on foreign
nongovernmental organizations and contributions from its settlers.
As the late 1980s and early 1990s wore on, the prospects for land
reform seemed increasingly bleak. Sarney's plan had helped make land
reform a major issue of public debate, but as it became clear that this
plan would not go forward, interest tended to wear off. Public debate
focused increasingly on a mounting economic crisis. Sarney attempted
a number of stabilization plans, but none was successful. His tentative
fiscal adjustment, however, had a significant impact on agriculture. The

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military regime's generous credit progra

early 1980s, suffered new cuts. Other pr
ports and government marketing system
2001; Dias and Amaral 2000).
Both neglect of land reform and efforts t
deepened under the next president, Fern
in late 1989. A conservative populist from
in the more backward regions and amon
and elite sectors (Moises 1993). Elected to
ruption, he had little patience for social
campaign promise to settle five hundred
priations were virtually halted. The feder
usually not involved in land conflicts, w
Since the late 1980s, the MST had respond
political context by adopting a more radic
mination not to abandon occupied land, e
Nevertheless, facing an even more hostile
more emphasis on internal issues, includi
promotion of collective agricultural prod
ority (Medeiros et al. 1994; Brenneisen 20
Land occupations dropped significantly i
then began to climb again slowly (CPT 1
Collor implemented harsh stabilization
gram of liberalizing reforms. Agriculture w
iffs were slashed, price supports weakene
of important products deregulated. Subs
ther (Coelho 2001). These measures helped
farm sector. They had mixed effects on m
were hurt by subsidy cuts but who be
imported inputs, enabling them to incre
competitive pressures. For poorer produce
ers, the effects were more uniformly negat
of agriculture (Dias and Amaral 2000).
Collor's efforts failed to overcome Bra
his political support deteriorated. In 199
erupted, leading to Collor's impeachment
late December. He was replaced by his
Itamar Franco. A moderate with populist
more progressive coalition and promis
Although settlement results were very m
were made in terms of land reform legislati
passed a bill needed to fill the gaps in the
expropriations. Franco also named a mode
National Institute for Colonization and R

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with the MST, the first president to do so. He announce

80,000 families, but, like many other aspects of his g
actual results were disappointing, totaling about 20,000
theless, landless activists experienced the Franco perio
ment after Collor's belligerence (Stedile 2000). Land oc
to show signs of accelerating, especially in 1994 (see f
Desperate to slow Brazil's persistent high inflation, F
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, his prestigious foreign m
finance ministry. A prominent progressive intellectua
entered politics during the dictatorship and, in 1988, ha
a new party, the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Pa
Democracia Brasileira, PSDB), which promised an ethic
tics and moderate social reform. In early 1994, Card
new stabilization plan, known as the Real Plan. At this
tives were deeply concerned about the overwhelming
candidate Luiz Inaicio Lula da Silva in polls for the Octo
election. They were therefore more than happy to supp
ate Cardoso when, based on the anticipated success of
plan, he resigned his post and launched his candidacy
The candidate formed an explicit alliance with the pow
servative Party of the Liberal Front (Partido da Frente
a smaller conservative party, the Brazilian Labor Party
hista Brasileiro, PTB).
Cardoso laid out a broad platform with liberalizing ec
at its center. In terms of land reform, the campaign lit
to settle 280,000 families, beginning with 40,000 in th
building up to 100,000 in the last. While this program,
would represent a major change relative to past govern
reform was far from a central element of the campaign
little media attention. When agrarian reform was menti
ally in reference to the PT's bold proposal to settle 800,
ilies. The MST, noting Cardoso's conservative allies and
ect, did not take his land reform program seriously. It
Jornal Sem Terra, warned that, if elected, Cardoso wou
ian reform (Jornal Sem Terra 1994). The Real Plan wor
electoral magic. As inflation declined in the months bef
Cardoso's support quickly rose, and Lula's dwindled. Ca
ing first-round victory was achieved with the backin
same sectors that Collor had won over in 1989, plus a b
the urban middle class, giving Cardoso an ample base o
In office, Cardoso's priorities were to maintain macr
bility and to push forward market reforms. Despite h
during the campaign that reducing social inequality wou
Cardoso introduced no major social programs. Altho

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officially launch his program in late March

ernment's intentions were generally unpro
PTB president Jose Eduardo de Andrade Vi
Agriculture, to which the INCRA was subord
Vieira, a wealthy banker and landowner, told
straints would keep the INCRA from rea
goals. To make matters worse, in May And
gressive INCRA president with a large land
Neto, reportedly with ties to the UDR. By the
had made little progress toward the goal of
year (Jornal do DIAP 1995).
In July the MST held its third five-year
ership's pessimism about the new governmen
optimistic (Stedile 2000). The MST had weat
years and had become a truly national entity
key to further progress lay in activating t
reform in Brazilian society by taking the strug
bulk of the population resided. Their belief
sympathy for the land reform cause was no
1960s, public opinion polls in Brazil have reg
ties (generally 60 to 70 percent) in favor of
early 1970s, when the military dictatorship
ularity, 68.8 percent of respondents in a n
"completely in favor" of agrarian reform (C
Before the MST's strategy could be put in
land reform unexpectedly surged as a topic
event in bringing about this change occurre
municipio of Corumbiara, in the state of Ro
converged on a landless encampment locate
In the ensuing conflict, 11 occupiers, includ
policemen were killed. Three of the landles
and several were tortured and humiliated.
organized by militants who had earlier split
As details of the incident were gradually r
to occupy headlines all over Brazil. Survi
being awakened by a barrage of gunfire bef
being forced by police to eat the spilt brai
ion, of a militant being taken away by pol
In response to these accounts, editorials and
the government's responsibility to halt the
with land struggles. Many also stressed the
long-delayed reform of Brazil's agrarian st
weeks after the killings, the influential Nat
Bishops (CNBB) issued a statement cond

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Figure 1. Coverage of the Land Issue in Folh

1200
1000
800
o 600
400
200
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1994 1995 1996 1997 1988 1999
Quarter
Source: Folha99 CD-Rom Archive
Corumbiara and calling for agrarian reform. The PT began organizing a

campaign in Brasilia to press for land reform, culminating in the deliv-
ery of a proreform document to the president in mid-September. Cov-
erage of the massacre and the reactions to it by society and the state
was responsible for the first significant surge in media attention to the
land question under Cardoso, as can be seen in figure 1, which depicts
the total volume of coverage of this issue in the Folha de Sao Paulo,
Brazil's largest daily newspaper.9
The weeks following Corumbiara brought an increase in land occu-
pation activity, particularly in the crucial state of Slo Paulo, where the
MST intensified its offensive in the Pontal do Paranapanema region.10
These events put pressure on Cardoso to take firm measures. The Octo-
ber edition of the Jornal Sem Terra reflected the MST's surprise at the
abrupt rise of the land question in recent months.
Newspapers that until then had been fierce adversaries of our strug-
gle began to publish editorials criticizing the timidity and slowness
of the government in addressing this question. Space multiplied in
newspapers and magazines to inform society about the absurdity of
the concentration of the Brazilian landholding structure. If someone
were to arrive in Brazil during these days, he would certainly get
the impression that the necessity of agrarian reform had just been
discovered at this moment. (Jornal Sem Terra 1995a)

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Subsequent editorials argued that with the

ion, landowners were now isolated and Car
address the demands of pro-land reform fo
At the end of September, Cardoso replac
own personal adviser, Francisco Graziano
interpreted this as a sign that the presiden
of land reform (Jornal Sem Terra 1995b).
ate the pace of settlement efforts and quick
doing so. In late November, however, a s
reform) erupted, resulting in Graziano's re
a little-known career INCRA functionary. I
the pace of settlement seemed to bog dow
The government was shaken out of its l
later. On April 17, 1996, another massacre of l
this one even more violent and shocking th
in the municipio Eldorado do Carajis in s
known for deadly land conflicts. Military poli
1,200 MST demonstrators blocking a highw
more than 60. As with Corumbiara, forensic
eral landless had been executed. Unlike Coru
film footage, shot by a local television n
largest single incident of land-related violence
The media furor generated by Eldorado
and far exceeded the reaction to Corumbia
and its product, a truckload of mangled cor
weeks. The story dominated domestic co
major foreign news outlets, including CNN
rado set off the largest spike in coverage
Folha de Sdo Paulo through 1999. Articles,
ed pieces on the incident came out in drov
commentary were indignation about the k
government's failure to address the land i
Criticism of the MST was initially muted. E
generally pro-Cardoso and not a particular
land reform, chided the president for neg
social justice and asserted that "all of the c
or are developing-from the United Stat
have done some kind of agrarian reform"
Only three days after the massacre, Card
the heads of the three branches of governm
it, "remove the obstacles in the way of ag
impunity" (Folha de Sdo Paulo 1996b). A fe
gave in to an old demand of progressive
INCRA from the historically conservative Min

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ated a new ministry, the Extraordinary Ministry for

it. Cardoso met with MST leaders and reaffirmed his commitment to his
original settlement objectives. He also pledged to push forward legisla
tion to speed the process of reform and restrain police violence.
The president's reaction did nothing to slow the growing interest in
and concern about the land issue in Brazil and among foreign observers
Media coverage continued intensely through the end of 1996 and
beyond. Veja, Brazil's largest weekly newsmagazine, published more
stories on this issue in 1996 than in the previous five years combined
The content of domestic coverage was somewhat mixed but, on th
whole, beneficial for the movement. On the negative side, following the
initial reaction to Eldorado, criticism of the MST's tactics and radical ide
ology grew (Veja 1996). In addition, some publications raised doubt
about the efficacy of land reform, suggesting that previous attempts had
produced mediocre results. However, much of the coverage was at least
implicitly positive. Articles examined the problems of farm workers and
smallholders and profiled the movement's social base (Folba de Sao
Paulo 1996c). Progressive columnists argued that land reform could
contribute to resolving many of Brazil's problems, including socia
inequality and urban violence."1 Even pieces that expressed reservations
about land reform usually refrained from sweeping rejections of this
policy, pointing instead mainly to problems of implementation, such as
high costs, political obstacles, official corruption, and the need for a
wide array of ongoing support programs to assist settlers.
Just as important, the media also helped convey to the larger public
expressions of support for land reform and the MST from civic leaders,
human rights activists, union leaders, politicians, and artists, reflecting
the impressive mobilization of domestic and international civil society
around this issue. In Brazil, support came not only from the traditiona
left but from a diverse array of other groups and individuals. The Insti
tute of Brazilian Architects, for example, gave the MST its 1996 "person
of the year" award (Jornal Sem Terra 1997). World-famous photographe
Sebastido Salgado published a striking book of photographs on the
struggle for land and donated the profits to the MST. Pop singer Chico
Buarque launched a CD dedicated to the movement, and renowned
architect Oscar Niemeyer designed a monument to commemorate Eldo-
rado. Internationally, the MST received support from human rights and
development organizations. As Cadji notes, Corumbiara and Eldorado
were fundamentally important in the formation of an international advo-
cacy network surrounding the struggle for land in Brazil (Cadji 2000).
Even Pope John Paul II, not generally a champion of progressive causes,
urged Cardoso to devote more attention to the land issue.
That Brazilian society had awakened to this issue was also evident
from other indicators. Polling firms began to devote questions and sur-

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Figure 2. Land Occupations in Brazil,
700 . - _ .... ..
599
600 581
500 463
398 393
4001
z 300
200 195 184

146
100 81 81 89
Source: CPT
o -- - .I ..I I
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
veys to land reform, which had been largely ignored since the
The results consistently demonstrated that at least 80 percent of
Brazilians supported land reform (IBOPE 1998). Public support f
MST was less pronounced but also substantial.12 In August 19
struggle for land received perhaps the ultimate form of cultural
nition in Brazil when it became a central theme of one of the most suc-
cessful telenovelas of recent years, The King of Cattle. The series por
trayed landless militants in a sympathetic light, which was striking
considering that the station that produced the program, TV Globo, wa
notorious for its conservative outlook.
As these events were unfolding, land occupation activity was
increasing rapidly in the countryside. The change began in late 1995 and
was initially spearheaded mainly by the MST. It was concentrated prin-
cipally in a few states, especially Sdo Paulo. A much more striking
increase came in 1996 (figure 2). The number of occupations increased
by 173 percent, and the bulk of them took place between May and
October. The upsurge was not concentrated in any particular state or
region but generalized across the country (table 1). In terms of the
number of families participating in occupations, only the Southeast
showed a slight decline in 1996. This was due mainly to the MST's mas-
sive occupations in the Pontal do Paranapanema the previous year.
Another notable change in 1996 was the growth of occupations organ-

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Table 1. Land Occupations and Families Partici

1995-1996
1995 1996 % Change

Region Occupations Families Occupations Families Occupations Families
South 15 3,134 52 13,823 247 341

Southeast 37 10,512 68 8,947 84 -15
Center-West 26 3,771 68 10,321 162 174
Northeast 57 11,057 157 23,091 175 109
North 11 2,002 53 6,898 382 245
Brazil 146 30,476 398 63,080 173 107
Source: CPT
ized by groups other than the MST. Although MST occupations

erally made up about two-thirds of the total since the late 19
proportion fell to only 44 percent in 1996. 13
Large landowners and their allies, though now on the defe
were not passive. One of their complaints was that in the wak
Eldorado do Carajas incident, some state governments had become
reluctant to use their military police forces to expel land occupiers
(Xavier 1999). In a few states, landowners revitalized the UDR or formed
new organizations to defend properties and push for official repression.
In general, though, landowners preferred to use their institutional polit-
ical weight to pressure the government to try to limit occupations and
to block or water down legislative initiatives in Congress. Leaders of the
powerful congressional agricultural caucus warned the president that
his agrarian reform initiatives and his government's failure to crack
down on land occupations could cause problems for the rest of his leg-
islative program (Folba de Sdo Paulo 1996d).
Apart from land reform, important changes were occurring in Brazil-
ian agriculture. The government's macroeconomic policies provoked a
debt crisis in the farm sector, undermining output, especially in 1996.
Following a debt renegotiation, however, commercial agriculture
rebounded strongly (Coelho 2001; Malin 2002). Trade liberalization con-
tinued, and commercial producers responded by increasing productiv-
ity. Output grew rapidly without a significant expansion in cultivated
land. Agricultural exports boomed.
Small family farmers and wage laborers-the rural poor-generally
did not do as well. Increased agricultural imports depressed food prices,
and productivity gains on large farms reduced the demand for wage
labor. Between 1995 and 1997, both family farmers and wage laborers
suffered declines in income (Del Grossi and Graziano da Silva 2000,

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Figure 3. Brazil's Agricultural Workfor

16
14.... . .
12
10
2 ---.. ..................... . ...
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Year
Source: Helfand and Castro de Resende 2001
table 1).14 The total agricultural workforce shrank by 8.4 percen

between 1992 and 1997 (Laurenti and Del Grossi 2000, table 1).15 The
decline was national in scope, but the Southeast and South, the most
uniformly modern agricultural regions, suffered the largest losses (Lau-
renti and Del Grossi 2000, table 3). These were spread fairly evenly
between family and wage labor (Carneiro 2000). Most of the decline
occurred in 1996, when production stagnated, but employment did not
rebound when output growth accelerated in later years (see figure 3).
Rural unemployment rose at an average rate of 7.4 percent per year
between 1992 and 1997, and rural nonfarm employment also grew rap-
idly (Graziano da Silva and Del Grossi 2001).16 Urban job growth might
have helped to offset the decline of farm employment, but urban unem-
ployment, following a brief decline in 1994, began to climb again in
1995. It accelerated in 1997 and more sharply in 1998, with the onset of
recession (Neri et al. 2000).
Following Eldorado, the Cardoso government sought to give the
impression that it was proceeding rapidly with agrarian reform, using
a combination of concrete measures and advertising. Authorities
sought to isolate the MST politically, denouncing its tactics as unde-
mocratic and politically motivated. The MST, for its part, continued to
exert pressure and accused the government of inflating settlement fig-
ures and ruining small farmers with its neoliberal policies. In early

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1997, the MST organized a national march, w

April 17, the first anniversary of the Eldora
served as a blow to the government's isolatio
little evident effect on policy.
Land occupations continued to grow, albeit
and 1998. The proportion of occupations link
to decline, but the MST's role in politicizing t
ity to coordinate its actions nationally, and
meant that for the public, it was almost syn
ment. At the end of 1998, federal officials b
their goals by settling more than 287,000 fam
claimed, exceeded the combined totals of all
ernments. They also pointed to resources inve
and a number of legislative victories related
argued that the government was padding its s
number of tactics (Pereira 2003, 51-52).
Cardoso's second term, beginning in 199
changes in both land reform-related policies a
ment. Spending on land reform was cut sharp
nical assistance programs for settlers wer
responded by intensifying protest and, in M
back with unprecedented force. Most import
making all occupied rural properties ineligible
least two years. Authorities also began an inve
of federal settler credits to fund its operation
been known and tolerated. At the end of 200
leave office, the INCRA published a report clai
six hundred thousand families in eight years
body of evidence suggests, however, that the
inflated (Sparovek 2003).
Land occupations declined after Cardoso's 2
that continued through 2002. Other types of p
road blockages and occupations of state IN
increase, but not enough to offset the decline
upsurge in media attention to the land questio
MST initiatives and Cardoso's counterattack.
1997, coverage was reduced. The tone of cove
to grow more aggressively anti-MST. Cardoso'
was unabashedly celebrated by Veja, the Folh
outlets. Available public opinion data tentativ
support for the MST and its tactics beginning
In the face of such negative trends, MST activ
cally in the 2002 national election campaign an
tory, though they worried about the party's g

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EXPLAINING THE UPSURGE OF

COLLECTIVE ACTION
How did the abrupt mid-1990s increase in grassroots collective action

for land reform relate to the acceleration of agrarian reform and the
apparent intensification of public interest in the agrarian question during
roughly the same period? Surprisingly, there have been almost no sys-
tematic attempts to explain these developments. Apparently the only
other scholar who has addressed this question explicitly, and then only
in passing, has underscored the impact of an employment crisis in both
the rural and urban sectors (Fernandes 1998, 2000). Contemporary
media reports sometimes pointed to the effects of Cardoso's land distri-
bution program in encouraging workers to stake claims to underused
land (Veja 1998). Each of these arguments is partially correct, but misses
crucial elements of the story. The rapid upsurge of protest for land
reform actually responded to three basic factors: the social impact of
agricultural restructuring, a progressive change in the character of
national governments, and most important, the jarring political impact
of the major landless massacres of 1995 and 1996.
The evidence regarding the impact of agricultural restructuring is
mixed. On the one hand, the difficulties facing poorer agricultural fam-
ilies during the early and mid-1990s, reflected in the data on employ-
ment and incomes presented above, could reasonably be expected to
generate pressure for land reform. For unemployed wage workers or
sharecroppers rendered landless by increasing mechanization, land
reform might have been seen as a source of food and income. Small-
holders who had lost their land to creditors as a result of falling food
prices might have seen land reform as a way to start over, with access
to grants, infrastructure, and subsidized credit unavailable to them
before. Although some poor rural families undoubtedly responded to
poor economic conditions by leaving agricultural regions for urban
areas, the urban sector was not in a very good position to absorb addi-
tional labor during the mid-1990s, since unemployment was on the
rise.'" Actually, a good many families involved in MST occupations
during the 1990s were attempting to move in the opposite direction,
from city to countryside.
On the other hand, the regional distribution of the reduction in the
agricultural labor force does not match the distribution of the increase in
land occupations.19 For example, comparing the data for 1992 and 1997,
the South, which saw the second-largest reduction in its agricultural work
force (13.4 percent), had the second-smallest increase in occupations
(204 percent). In contrast, the Northeast, which experienced the smallest
reduction in its labor force (3.7 percent), saw easily the largest increase
in land occupations, a stunning 911 percent. Paradoxically, the situation

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almost reverses itself if we compare 1995 to 1996

surged most powerfully. The South had the second
labor force (5.3 percent) and the second-largest
pations (247 percent), while the Northeast saw th
labor force (10.2 percent), but only the third-la
occupations (174 percent). Substituting the numb
lies for the number of occupations does not help
patterns of change in the two variables are simila
There are explanations for this lack of corres
involve abandoning the link between agricultura
protest entirely. In particular, the internal diversity
may hide the impact of agricultural change on pr
tain areas.21 One of these is undoubtedly the co
of the Northeast. It is well established that suga
major restructuring as a result of the neoliberal refo
and early 1990s, which sharply reduced federal
(Carvalho 2000; Wolford 2004). The impact was p
northeastern producers, who were highly depen
support. One of the consequences of this change
for wage labor. It is certainly not coincidental that t
pations in the Northeast during the second half
centrated in the coastal sugarcane regions of the
ducing states, especially Pernambuco.
Even if we accept that agricultural change pla
movement's upsurge, however, we must keep in m
the number of people employed in agriculture wa
to the explosive increase in grassroots protest fo
1990s. Moreover, when the movement took off,
was growing only gradually, and the economy w
land occupations declined sharply in 2000, in
employment situation was worse. Given the ver
would seem wise to offer the cautious conclus
restructuring and the social problems it caused
latent potential for a rapid increase in land oc
1990s, but did not play a decisive role in provok
Another factor in improving the context for m
the shift toward less conservative and somewhat more urban-based
national governments after the fall of President Collor in late 199
Although subsequent coalitions, especially under Cardoso, have
included the major conservative parties, they have been broader a
have had a somewhat more democratic and socially oriented image
live up to. Their ability to resist pressures for land reform was therefo
arguably weaker than that of the civilian governments that immedi
preceded them. Since the later Sarney years, Brazil had been gover

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by frankly conservative coalitions. The

drive out Collor represented not only a
a broader rejection of "traditional" clien
teristic of the less developed and more c
a desire for cleaner and, to some extent
ership. Itamar Franco responded to this
gressive coalition. Later, Cardoso and his PSDB were able to appeal
effectively to the climate of the period by combining control over infla-
tion with a reputation for honesty and sensitivity to social issues.
Cardoso's coalition included virtually all of the conservative sectors
that had supported Collor and Sarney. In addition, Cardoso, perhaps
more than any other postwar president, had a mandate for restricting
state spending. The MST and other leftist groups therefore viewed his
election as a defeat, and were pessimistic about the prospects for land
reform. Tellingly, there was no significant increase in land occupations
during the first several months of Cardoso's presidency. Nevertheless,
his government also had the backing of moderately progressive sectors.
These valued the president's progressive background and the PSDB's
tepid social reformism, and were uneasy about the alliance with the
clientelistic PFL. Foreign observers believed even more strongly in Car-
doso's progressive, modernizing credentials. Thus, although the gov-
ernment initially gave few signs of strong commitment to land reform,
it was arguably somewhat more vulnerable to pressure for this policy
than either Sarney or Collor.
As this discussion suggests, both the political and social conditions
for the struggle for land appear to have been at least moderately more
favorable by the mid-1990s than they had been in Brazil for a number
of years. In this context, and with the MST working earnestly to expand
the movement, it would have been logical to expect, under Cardoso, at
least a continuation of the gradual rise in land occupations, and proba-
bly some acceleration. That collective action actually grew explosively
in late 1995 and especially 1996 was mainly the indirect result of the
Corumbiara and Eldorado do Caraj is massacres. By outraging domestic
and international public opinion and focusing attention and concern on
the agrarian question, these incidents applied pressure on Cardoso to
accelerate land reform. The clear signs that the government was being
forced to redistribute more land incited the MST and other actors to
intensify or initiate land occupations. The decline in repression on
part of state governments intimidated by the political fallout from
rado facilitated this growth.
Broad public support for land reform, as noted, existed well bef
the 1990s. However, the massacres served to increase sharply the p
ceived urgency of the land problem and, perhaps, to introduce it
generation of Brazilians too young to remember earlier episode

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agrarian conflict. A variety of the indicator

seem to support this view, including the dram
erage of the issue after the massacres and the
of Cattle. That the surge in coverage was sust
generalized across much (if not all) of the ma
gests that editors were acting on what they
for information on the subject from their re
Folba de Sao Paulo and Veja at times seeme
public enthusiasm for land reform, but thei
rather carefully qualified, presumably out o
public sympathy for the cause.
The massacres had this effect because their extreme violence and
drama gave them tremendous news appeal. Their occurrence in the
text of a struggle for land, furthermore, made it natural for them
seen as symptomatic of a highly unequal landholding structure. Nev
theless, the process was by no means altogether spontaneous. Progre
actors, including newspaper columnists, movement activists, relig
leaders, and politicians, did much to underscore the gravity of these
of violence and to frame them as symbols of the urgent need for l
reform. These actors responded out of indignation, but also out of
desire to take advantage of the impact of the massacres to advance
cause of land reform. PT leaders probably also viewed the rise of the
reform issue as an opportunity to recover from the party's 1994 elector
defeat by attacking Cardoso's claim to represent progressive change.
The broader political context helped to strengthen the reaction
the massacres. Cardoso's appeal was tied not only to low inflation
to the promise of social reform and a general modernization of soci
The massacres called attention not only to the seriousness of the l
problem but to the lack of major new social initiatives. They pointed
other words, to the expectations Cardoso's election had created bu
failed to fulfill. At a deeper level, they contradicted an emerging c
ception of Brazil as a modern, urban, and democratic society-a
ception that the Cardoso government, with its enlightened, technoc
image, promised to bring to full fruition. The massacres were, as
result, deeply disturbing to sectors of the population, especially e
cated urbanites, who embraced this optimistic vision.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to reduce the impact of th
events to a product of contextual circumstances. Eldorado, in particu
was highly unusual, both because it was so large and because, un
so many other instances of rural violence, it was caught on video,
its grisly product, a truck laden with corpses, became the subject
many powerful photographic images.
Society's response to the massacres exerted pressure on Cardoso
speed iup agrarian reform, because it posed the threat of undermin

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his government's popularity and ele

Eldorado, for example, the presiden
almost 20 percentage points (Veja 1997
two main changes in control over land
naming of Graziano as INCRA preside
new land reform ministry in 1996,
between the impact of these events an
tribution is widely accepted by analys
(Teixeira 1999; Cadji 2000). High-level
this study, including a former preside
also argued that the impact of the ma
sented a powerful impetus to intensify
Journalists often said that Cardoso's
jis was also motivated by a desire to lim
cause to Brazil's international image, p
oriented economic policy. In support
noted (not without some irony) that t
ments on Eldorado was initially rathe
that it was being reported internation
Although it is indeed quite plausible t
international opinion, domestic politic
influencing his reaction.
Unfortunately, from the authoritie
dence that the government was being
bution promoted an increase in land oc
tion of the media and civil society to each incident suggested that
pressure for land reform was mounting rapidly, and the subsequent
pledges by federal authorities to push reform more aggressively vali-
dated this impression. The promise of greater land redistribution, when
combined with the preference given by the INCRA to people already
camped, sent a strong message: that those willing to occupy farmland
would have a good chance of being rewarded with a plot of land
instead of repression. It thus inspired activists to redouble their efforts
to recruit landless families and made it easier for them to convince the
landless that their efforts would be rewarded.
The MST, as the most organized and militant actor in the move-
ment, was the first to react, in late 1995. The effect widened in 1996
particularly after Eldorado, as many other groups entered the move-
ment or intensified their participation. These groups sought not only to
capitalize on the state's anticipated largesse but to keep the MST from
monopolizing the available land. If landowners' complaints are to b
believed, the reticence of some state governments to repress occupa-
tions after Eldorado also contributed to the upsurge, reducing the risk
of arrest or injury.

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MST documents and interview data support th

state's actual or anticipated response to the massa
That the MST saw the impact of Corumbiara as an opportunity is
reflected in the almost euphoric tone of the editorials in its newspaper
in late 1995, one of which was quoted earlier. These clearly portrayed
the period as one of political opening, which had to be exploited by
intensifying pressure. When asked why occupations had grown in the
mid-1990s, MST leaders followed the "party line," stressing the impact
of neoliberal reforms on popular welfare. When questioned directly
about the effect of the massacres, they argued that these had contributed
greatly to the movement's growth by raising public consciousness about
the land problem, but they did not elaborate on the exact causal con-
nection (Mauro 2000).
Rural unionists were usually more willing to admit explicitly that the
actual or anticipated changes in land reform policy had contributed to
the growth of occupations. A rural union leader in southeastern Pars,
for example, explained that federal initiatives to speed up land reform
in the region after Eldorado had directly provoked a sharp revival in
land occupations (Da Costa 1999).
Just as the upsurge of land occupations was due partly to the polit-
ical impact of the massacres, so their downswing, beginning in 2000,
was related to the gradual fading of the effect these incidents pro-
voked.22 As the massacres receded into the past and media and public
attention shifted to other issues, the government felt freer to implement
policies opposed by proreform forces and to crack down on MST
actions that it had once felt obliged to tolerate for fear of a political
backlash. Cardoso's second-term cuts in land reform spending and his
offensive against the MST reflected this change. The slowdown in occu-
pations responded to the perception that the government was growing
increasingly resistant to grassroots pressure for land redistribution.
Other factors also contributed to the harder line. The media's growing
emphasis on the MST's tactical "radicalization" and the broad scope of
its radical political goals helped the government to justify a tougher
stance.23 In addition, the acceleration of land reform and the publicity
surrounding it arguably gave Cardoso greater political cover to confront
both the MST and land occupations in general.24
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
State repression clearly played a major role in the acceleration of protest

for land reform in Brazil in the mid-1990s, although it was by no means
the only factor involved. The empirical account thus underscores the
idea that repressive actions intended to quell protest activity can some-
times provoke a backlash, giving rise to more protest rather than less.

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However, the nature of the causal mecha

actions of legal authorities to the intensi
the ones identified by the existing litera
gests a need to develop further our und
can spur protest. In particular, the case
ment shows how instances of repression
escalate protest by increasing support fo
politically influential third parties and f
conciliatory policy.
In elucidating the causal links between
study follows the research program rece
(2001). While this program has many fac
existing theories of "contentious politics
sis on causal variables and have not devo
character of the mechanisms that link cause and effect. McAdam et al.
propose a program of inquiry that focuses on identifying particular
causal mechanisms and longer causal processes that recur across differ-
ent types of contention and cultural contexts. Taken as a whole, this is
an ambitious research agenda, which is beyond the modest theoretical
pretensions of this article. However, this study follows McAdam et al.'s
basic emphasis on "getting causal connections right" by identifying a
particular causal link, which, although not in itself new to scholars of
collective action, has not previously been seen as part of the causa
process linking repression to greater protest action. In addition, this
study offers some hypotheses about the conditions under which this
causal link, rather than the others discussed in the literature, is likely t
operate. These pertain to both the nature of the movement involved and
the character of the state.
How well do the theories outlined in this article explain the causal
connection between repression and protest in the case of the takeoff of
the Brazilian landless movement? To be sure, the effects of repression
predicted by the literature were not altogether absent. The massacres at
Corumbiara and Eldorado do Carajis undoubtedly generated moral out-
rage and anger among land reform activists. There is also some evi-
dence that the Eldorado incident helped to strengthen the MST's group
identity, engendering a greater sense that the group was representing an
oppressed social category. April 17, the date of the incident, for exam-
ple, has been consecrated as a kind of internal holiday for the organi-
zation, commemorated with demonstrations, ceremonies, and protest
events. The massacres also outraged many people not directly involved
in the movement, sullying the image of the Cardoso government and
state authorities in Rond6nia and Para.
These effects, however, were not the main reason the massacres
contributed to intensifying protest for land reform. The nature of the

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struggle for land in Brazil itself militates against thi

pation in the movement is usually a long-term in
als and families seeking a better economic future. The core tactic,
acampar, often requires abandoning home and employment and living
in a crude hut for months or years at a time. It is unlikely that tens of
thousands of Brazilian families, many with several children in tow,
would have undertaken such a venture to express their anger about the
killings in Rond6nia and Pard. The accounts of activists also discourage
such a conclusion. For example, movement leaders in southeastern Pard
said the initial reaction to the Eldorado killings among local landless
people was fear and a desire to avoid conflict with the police. Only
when it became clear that the federal government would intervene ener-
getically to accelerate reform did land occupations begin to multiply.
The key causal link between repression and protest, rather, is more
indirect, operating through its impact on what has been called the
"structure of political opportunities" facing the movement. This concept,
well established in the literature, is based on the idea that protest activ-
ity rises and falls in response to the vulnerability or receptivity of gov-
erning elites to pressure for change (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow
1983, 1994; McAdam 1996). When people with a demand to make on
the state expect authorities to react to pressure with concessions, rather
than repression or indifference, they become willing to invest heavily in
protest, believing that it will pay dividends. When the opposite is true,
protest tends to languish, because the expected costs are seen as out-
weighing the probable benefits. Authorities' disposition to respond to
protest positively or negatively, in turn, is seen by political opportunity
theorists as a function of a variety of political factors. Changes in the
structure of political opportunities can be quite narrow, affecting a par-
ticular group or movement; or very broad, in exceptional cases giving
rise to revolutionary mobilization.
Political opportunity theory provides a more accurate depiction of
the causal link between state repression and the expansion of the land-
less movement in Brazil in the mid-1990s. At least for a time, the mas-
sacres of 1995 and 1996 helped make Brazilians, along with foreign
observers of the country, more acutely aware of the land problem in the
countryside and the government's failure to address it adequately. Rising
concern about and interest in this issue pushed authorities to accelerate
land redistribution, making it easier for landless families to obtain land
by engaging in occupations and camps. In addition, at least in some
states, the fear of triggering a new Eldorado seems to have made state
governments more cautious about using their police forces to repress
land occupations, thereby reducing, if only slightly, the risks involved in
the struggle for land. With these changes in state behavior, the expected
benefits of protesting for land rose and the prospective costs declined,

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generating stronger incentives for potent

pressure the state. Partly as a result, land
The case of the landless movement's gr
illustrates how repression can give rise t
impact on the political opportunity struc
Under what circumstances is this partic
than the ones identified in extant theor
difficult question to answer without iden
number of episodes in which state repres
protest activity, a task that is beyond the
based on the analysis of the landless mov
ditions can be tentatively identified in whic
ticularly likely to be the link joining state r
The first two have to do with characteris
the others with characteristics of the state.
The opportunity-driven connection is more likely to operate, first of
all, when the movement involved seeks relatively limited reforms, rather
than broader system change. One of the reasons the literature on the
repression-protest nexus has ignored this causal link is that much of it
focuses on cases in which a movement seeks a basic restructuring of the
political system, such as revolution, secession, or decolonization. For
example, some of the more frequently cited case studies examine the
antiapartheid movement in South Africa (Olivier 1991), protest against
the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (Khawaja 1993), or the Iranian
revolution (Rasler 1996). In such cases, significant concessions to the
movement may be extremely costly to authorities and are therefore less
likely to occur simply from public disapproval of the overzealous use of
repression. The political situation is simply too polarized to permit
much flexibility.
The opportunity-driven link is also more likely to be significant
when the movement does not itself employ violent tactics. The use of
violence may well be seen as legitimate by the movement itself and the
group whose interests it purports to represent, but, other things being
equal, movements that employ violent forms of struggle are less likely
to be viewed sympathetically by outside observers. The adage "live by
the sword, die by the sword" will often be seen as a sufficient defense
of the use of harsh official repression in such cases. Consequently,
repression employed against overtly violent groups will tend not to
create the kind of public backlash and political opening seen following
the massacres at Corumbiara and Eldorado.
The third condition involves political systems in which responsibil-
ity for concessions and repression lie in separate, relatively autonomou
spheres of government. These systems would seem to favor the kind o
opportunity-driven process outlined in this study. In this setting, it i

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more likely that acts of extreme repression aga

occur even though the state as a whole is not v
the movement's objectives, and may thus be
ground under pressure. Of course, the need
episode of politically damaging repression may re
calculation by a centralized authority. However
more likely to arise where responsibility for acc
sion is institutionally separate, so that the two m
cross-purposes. This is the situation in Brazil w
over land because land reform policy is domina
ernment, while responsibility for maintaining p
states. However, a separation between accommo
functions need not be based on federalism. At l
could also be rooted in a horizontal distribution
ple, in a parliamentary system with strong ministe
The fourth condition in which the political opp
likely to arise is that of more democratic politic
tarian regimes, the institutions and mechanism
public of a repressive event and to transmit the
authorities are, by definition, less well developed
of speech, and of assembly are more limited, an
from office through routine electoral proc
Arguably, the decentralization of responsibilities
less likely to be present under authoritarianism.
of most studies of the repression-protest nexus
ties is therefore another factor that may help ex
lar causal mechanism has not been highlighted in
CONCLUSIONS
In the mid-1990s, agrarian reform made a surprisingly abrupt and force-

ful return to the Brazilian political stage, as collective action for land,
public concern about the issue, and official land reform policies all
underwent a substantial intensification. This study has focused on
explaining the first of these changes while also trying to understand the
relationship between it and the other two. It has also attempted to use
this empirical case to enrich the theoretical debate on the relationship
between state repression and protest.
The account of the intensified protest for land reform is broad-based.
It has argued that two shifts that occurred in Brazil during the early and
mid-1990s, the neoliberal restructuring of agriculture and the move
toward less conservative national governments, provided a moderately
favorable social and political context for the landless movement's expan-
sion. The explosive growth of collective action for land, however, did not

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arise spontaneously from this context. I

potent political impact of the two major
that occurred during this period. Becau
raised concerns about the land issue bot
massacres forced authorities to accelerate land redistribution and to exer-
cise greater care in the repression of land occupiers. These shifts created
a more favorable political context for pressure for land reform and, as a
consequence, helped set off a major increase in land occupations.
The empirical analysis adds weight to the idea that state repression
can backfire, giving rise to even greater pressure for change. However, this
is not simply a case to confirm existing theory. It also illustrates a causal
mechanism that has been absent from previous analyses. Repression can
provoke greater movement activity not only by galvanizing actual and
potential movement members into action but by transforming the broader
political context in which the movement functions. Specifically, instances
of excessive or ill-conceived repression can end up stimulating greater
support for the movement from other sectors of society and, as a conse-
quence, forcing state authorities to be more receptive to the movement's
demands. This change, in turn, may create incentives for activists to
increase their pressure on the state. This study tentatively points to some
conditions in which this causal process may be particularly likely to arise,
but confirming them is clearly a question for further research.
NOTES
I would like to thank the Social Science Research Council, the Fulbright-
Hays program of the U.S. Department of Education, and the Institute for the
Study of World Politics for supporting my two-and-a-half years of field research
in Brazil. I also thank Evelyne Huber, Indira Palacios, Anthony Pereira, Kurt
Weyland, and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. I would
also like to express my deep gratitude to the countless people who aided my
research efforts in Brazil.
1. According to the 1995-96 agricultural census, properties of more than

one thousand hectares make up 1 percent of the total but cover 45 percent of
the total agricultural land (Malin 2002, 180). The government of Fernando Hen-
rique Cardoso claimed to have brought about a significant reduction in land
inequality between 1995 and 2002, but this claim is disputed (Sparovek 2003).
2. The name was derived from an earlier movement organization in the
state of Rio Grande do Sul called the Movimento dos Agricultores Sent Terra
(Movement of Landless Farmers, or MASTER), which arose in the early 1960s
and was extinguished by the military regime.
3. The president was selected in early 1985 by a special electoral college.
Former president of the progovernment party during the dictatorship, Sarney
had been vice president on the ticket headed by Tancredo Neves, a leader of
the moderate opposition party. Ironically, Neves died before he could take
office, and Sarney became the first postdictatorship president.

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4. Constitutionally, only the federal government

land, and this is mainly limited to large properties no
dards of agricultural productivity. The 1988 Constituti
framework to regulate the expropriation process, leavi
5. The data on settlements are from the federal g
Institute for Colonization and Reform, or INCRA. Thei
into question, especially in recent years. See Teixeira 2
6. The term invasion is used by opponents of the
of the press. Landless movement activists and sympat
because it has less connotation of illegitimacy or illega
7. The latter have become more numerous in recent
focused its recruiting in towns and smaller cities. This s
of factors, especially the growing urbanization of th
increasing presence in agricultural regions dominated
wageworkers often live in urban areas), and the orga
conducting recruitment in towns and cities, where w
graphically concentrated and landowner vigilance is li
8. In addition to large private properties suspected t
movement also targets properties that belong to the stat
In some cases, these are illegitimately occupied by priv
9. These data were compiled using a CD-ROM arch
It was searched using the terms agrarian reform, MST,
results indicate the total number of items containing at
including articles, editorials, letters to the editor, and
10. The Pontal do Paranapanema is known for havi
large landholdings, fruit of a land-grabbing process
teenth century (Fernandes 2000). This characteristic ma
able to land reform.
11. In the Folba de Sdo Paulo, for example, columnists Carlos Heitor Cony,
Marcelo Beraba, and Janio de Freitas all wrote in favor of land reform. Veja con-
tained fewer unambiguous endorsements of land reform, but for an exception,
see the feature interview with renowned intellectual Celso Furtado (Veja 1997a).
12. For example, a study by the polling firm Vox Populi, conducted in May
1996 in eight major state capitals, showed that 59 percent of respondents
approved of the MST, compared to only 24 percent who disapproved (Jornal
Sem Terra 1996).
13. The data on total occupations reported in figure 2 can be compared to
the data on MST occupations reported in Petras 1998.
14 In contrast, agricultural employers, and particularly large employers,
increased their incomes during this period. However, these changes were not
statistically significant.
15. These data come from the federal government's annual household
survey, known as PNAD. Unfortunately, PNAD does not include the North
region, which consists mainly of the Amazon basin. In terms of evaluating
national trends in agricultural labor, this is not very problematic, since this region
contains only a small percentage of the total workforce. The government's agri-
cultural census data cannot safely be used to measure the evolution of the agri-
cultural labor force in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The census was not con-

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ducted in 1990, and in 1995-96 it was done dur

making a comparison with earlier censuses risky
16. The rapid growth of rural nonfarm employ
1990s is often seen in relatively benign terms
yield higher incomes than agriculture (Grazian
trend is at least partly symptomatic of declinin
people to make ends meet in agriculture.
17. A report in Veja (1999), for example, refer
decline in public approval of the MST from clo
percent in 1998 and 28 percent in August 1999.
18. A comparison of the 1995-96 and 2000 cen
population shrank by 6.3 percent during this pe
19. Of course, the lack of agricultural labor fo
promises this analysis somewhat.
20. With regard to 1995-96, the regional bre
change in families occupying can be seen in tab
the percentages are: Center-West 542 percent, N
262 percent, South 137 percent, and North 96 pe
21. A statistical analysis using smaller geogra
municipio) might help shed additional light on t
22. Occupations have intensified since the PT
dency. Expectations of increased land redistrib
ernment's nonenforcement of Cardoso's antioccu
change (Mauro 2003).
23. Beginning in 1998, frequent references a
MST's "radicalization." Significant tactical shifts di
in looting and increased use of occupations of f
responded to the leadership's frustration with w
quacies of Cardoso's land reform program. Howe
coverage also resulted from the major media's di
bution of land seemed only to fuel the movemen
24. This argument is tempered because opinio
people did not believe the government's claim t
restructuring of the landholding system. A poll
early May 2000 in So Paulo, for example, showed that only 12 percent of
respondents viewed the government's land reform program as "good or excel-
lent"; 52 percent felt that it was "bad or terrible" (Folba de Sdo Paulo 2000).
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Repression, Opportunity, and Protest

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Repression, Opportunity, and Protest: Explaining the Takeoff of Brazil's Landless

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4490464

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During the mid-1990s, Brazil experienced a rapid intensification of

During the mid-1990s, Brazil experienced a rapid intensificat

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plan by the first civilian president follo

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This analysis, however, suggests that official repr

THE REPRESSION-PROTEST NEXUS

The relationship between state repression and protest activity is a puzzle

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protest (Gurr 1970). At some point in the pr

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and spreads outward to previously uninvolved social

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LANDLESS

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second half of the 1970s was accompan

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laborers, and even the urban unemployed.7 Typically

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military regime's generous credit progra

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with the MST, the first president to do so. He announce

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officially launch his program in late March

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Figure 1. Coverage of the Land Issue in Folh

Source: Folha99 CD-Rom Archive

Corumbiara and calling for agrarian reform. The PT began organizing a

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Subsequent editorials argued that with the

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ated a new ministry, the Extraordinary Ministry for

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Figure 2. Land Occupations in Brazil,

200 195 184

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Table 1. Land Occupations and Families Partici

1995 1996 % Change

South 15 3,134 52 13,823 247 341

ized by groups other than the MST. Although MST occupations

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Figure 3. Brazil's Agricultural Workfor

2 ---.. ..................... . ...

Source: Helfand and Castro de Resende 2001

table 1).14 The total agricultural workforce shrank by 8.4 percen

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1997, the MST organized a national march, w

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EXPLAINING THE UPSURGE OF

How did the abrupt mid-1990s increase in grassroots collective action

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almost reverses itself if we compare 1995 to 1996

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by frankly conservative coalitions. The

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agrarian conflict. A variety of the indicator

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his government's popularity and ele

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MST documents and interview data support th

State repression clearly played a major role in the acceleration of protest