·

66 Dual and Triple Alliances

Dual and Triple Alliances 67

The Dual Alliance The moment that gave rise to the alliance was one in which the threat
from Russia precluded tethering with Austria. The first League of the Three
The Dual Alliance was one of the most important alliances in the post- Emperors unraveled; the second could not yet be forged. Austria believed
unification pre-World War I period. And yet the dramatic events in 1877- 78- war with Russia to be imminent. Germany considered Russia ungrateful for
the Russo-Turkish War and Russian victory over the Ottoman Empire, the German support at the Congress of Berlin and believed Russia to be no Ion-
Treaty of San Stefano, the Congress of Berlin and resulting treaty curtailing gerreliable.4 Germany was frustrated with Russia's failure to cooperate with
Russian gains, the growing animosity between Russia and other European the great powers of Europe, as shown by its intervening in the Ottoman Em-
powers-nearly overshadowed its formation. While other alliances concluded in
pire, fighting on to Constantinople in the Russo-Turkish War, and imposing
the decades preceding the First World War resulted from sometimes agonizing
the harsh terms of the Treaty of San Stefano.
negotiations, fundamental strategic aims, and coherent longterm goals, the Dual
The urgency of the moment for Germany was exacerbated by the im-
Alliance came to life rather abruptly. Nonetheless, it became th~ comei:stone of
pending retirement of Count Julius Andrassy, Bismarck thought that the
Austro-Hungarian and German policy; it endured to figh~ m the First World
War and only collapsed some forty years after its formation. It foundered only departure of the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister might culminate in a
in defeat of its member states in World War I. It is striking, when examining change in the direction of Austrian foreign policy and pressed for an alliance
the historical record how such a durable comb~nat~on could have emerged before Andrassy stepped down. 5
when it was concluded at a unique moment m time. ~tria-Hungary and Germany had a strong ideological and cultural af-
. N?ne of the diplomats-not even Bismarck-could have anticipated or fintty. Despite the fresh memories of the war of I 866, there were no strong
imagmed_th_e conse~uences of their alliance negotiations in the period 1873- differences between the two. They both maintained a commitment to m~-
r9o7. This is especially clear in the case of the Dual Alliance-an alliance that narchical conservatism. They shared language and culture. Their interests.di-
~ndured far longer than anyone could possibly have imagined in I 879. Russia verged generally only on issues of central importance to one and ~f ~argmal
and Germany were traditional friends. In fact, in the years that followed the unportance to the other. This facilitated the coordination of their aims, al-
co~cl~sion of the Dual Alliance, Germany would continue its attempts to though it inhibited their joint military planning. After 1908, when Austria
mamtam good relations with Russia. It initiated the reconstitution annexed Bosnia and war with Serbia seemed imminent, the two states began
of the Three Empero ' L · 88 d· . to more intimately plan their strategy in the event that such a war would
rs eague in r I an signed the Remsurance Treaty
~th Russi~ after the second League foundered in 1887.2 Yet in 1879, teth- come.6
ering Russia was impossible for Austria-Hungary: the threat from Russia was The Dual Alliance became the cornerstone of Austro-Hungarian an~
~oo gr~at. The Dual Alliance became both member states' insurance policy
agai~st the threats they faced and repeated tethering failures. 3 As I argue Ger-
later this alliance did t d h · · · ·l lllan poli · . .· A the moment
' 1
no ren er t e Franco-Russian alliance inevitab e; it was
rather, the catalyst for that alli h fl" ··· · d cy m the decades that followed its signmg. t
ance was t e trt anglo-trrpl1c1en JUSt over a e-
cade later. Yet the Dual All. d kh . . ne~otiated, threats to both member states made this course a natural one,
ranee oes mar t e onset of an era m which Ger-
ma~y and ~~stria both profoundly altered the direction of their foreign albeit one that definitively altered the landscape of European politics.
poli_cy. Tradmonal friendship between Germany and Russia became sub- Germany
ordmate to a relationship th h d il
. . at a , unt recently, been characterized by Germ . . d to
animosity. The antagon · sm th h d kd .
. i at a mar e Austro-German relations for
some tune began ~o abate with the signing of the alliance. The Dual Alliance Russia's war with
served very effecttvely to h al A G .
. . e ustro- erman relations which as discussed
in ~e previous chapter, had only begun to improve in 'the afte~ath of the
any was terribly frustrated with Russia in regar d
war m 1866. e Otto E .
fi · d · ttempted to men
r. . man mpire. Yet as a long-standmg nen , it a fB 1·
"l1Ss1an I . h Congress o er in.
with the great powers of Europe at t e re
. . ations
tll!any t . d t Russia for its inter-
ne to soothe the great powers' outrage a .
Vention . . G rman attempts to
tnto an area in which several had key mterests. e . .
.O fb yal This gave nse
--·••R-,,uu culminated in Russian feehngs etra · d in
"'"',.,...~-- to concerns that relations with Russia would be hazar ous
As Bismarck's son, Herbert, wrote in the aftermath:
·

th

G
 70 68
Dual andand
Dual Triple Alliances
Triple Alliances
There has never been such an example at a Congress of a Great Power so
unreservedly placing itself at the disposal of another. The result has been, not
even a friendly acknowledgment, but an attitude adopted by Russia towards us,
which forces us to think of the future and of how to avoid rousing the enmity of
other nations on questions in which Germany is not interested .... But the
present attitude of Russia forces me to reckon thus anxiously with the future. 7
The newly unified Germany was preoccupied with its position on the Continent.
The last thing that Germany wanted was to inspire hostility from other European
states with an interest in Ottoman holdings. Germany wanted to consolidate its
position in the region; it was not interested in expanding into the areas of the
Ottoman Empire. It certainly did not want to risk the wrath of others over issues in
which it had no interest.
Germany sought an alliance with Austria for several reasons. Above all,
Germany wanted to safeguard against the possibility that a coalition including
Austria and some other combination of great powers-particularly France and Great
Britain-might emerge, an alliance that excluded Germany and, even worse, one that
could ultimately be directed against it. 8 The Germans hoped to secure a formal
relationship while Andrassy was still foreign minister. The rumors that Russia was
courting France made Germany all the more interested in securing Austria as an
ally.
In a report of his account of conversations with Bismarck in the summer of I 879
at Kissingen, Saburov describes Russian relations with Germany as going from one
serious crisis to the next, such that one could not bear thinking about it. Germany
appeared convinced that Russia was searching for new allies and t_hat given the
vehemence that Bismarck displayed, Germany would not delay Its own search for
new allies. 9 The tension between Germany and Russia was also expressed by the
tsar in a conversation with Hans Lothal von Schweinitz, the German ambassador in
St. Petersburg, in which he expressed his irritation and dissatisfaction with
Germany; he further wrote a letter to the German emperor reiterating his
grievances. 10
From the German standpoint, the alliance with Austria had become absolute
necessity, no~ only for her own protection against Russia, but also for the
purpose of preventing Austria from drifting into the arms of France. The
Austro-German combination would in th I t · I F -
. , e as count, serve even as a barn er to an eventua ranco
Ru~sian alliance, because, in the first place, Russia would hesitate before
taking
action against a united central Europe, and because, secondly, the
combination :a ~e~any and "':'ustria. would be so strong that England would
join it, thus
ki~g it11almost 1mposs1ble for France to take the side of Russia in a future
conflict.
T~ere were a couple of illlportant factors that exacerbated German-
Russian tension. One was th bkf 1 · ··
88
.. , • e out rea o a p ague in Russia m late I 7 ·
·
Dual and Triple Alliances 7 I
Dual and Triple Alliances 69
The news reached Berlin and Vienna in January 1879 (the very moment at which
fatalities were ending). Germany and Austria took coordinated and inflammatory
measures-embargoing certain Russian goods, inspecting Russian ships, disinfecting
certain articles before crossing the borders, certifying that Russian travelers had not
been in contaminated areas for at least twenty days, and planning for the dispatch of
medical personnel into the areas in question. According to the German ambassador
in St. Petersburg, these measures, above all, inspired Russian fury and turned public
opinion in Russia against Germany especially. 12
A second complicating factor was the heightened Russian threat to Germany.
This was manifest in the expansion and changing composition of the Russian army
and the extensive railway construction that would ultimately serve to expedite
Russian mobilization in the event of war with Germany. On March 21, 1 879, a
report by the German ambassador in St. Petersburg ": garding the augmenting of the
Russian army reached Bismarck. Schweinitz reported that the wartime capability of
the Russian army had increased by some 400,000 men; 58,000 in peacetime. This
concern was coupled by the extensive railway construction not far from the German
frontier. 1_3 If these developments did not serve to inspire suspicion in Berlin, the
Russian troop movements in Russian Poland certainly did. 14 Bismarck himself was
not unduly alarmed by the military developments, but this sentiment ":as not shared
by his military colleagues. Saburov reported that, in a conversation about the
disposition of troops in early 18 80, Bismarck said:
It is true that you have much cavalry on the frontier, and that our Staff are
pass.sleepless
mg . . Th fi ·nights
h t Moltke spoke
because to me about
of this. e irst time t a .
it was, I think, in 1875. I told him that in the history of our prev10us wars, our
was.oo · t r,far from our frontiers and taff often complained that the Russian army
. enough. During t e war in · h · the East the
quickly .'didcavalry was
not come up
S withdrawn. We hoped that it would not come back again. But It has come
back, and the Staff has again become uneasy. Moltke spoke about it to the King,
and
that ifidahisimilar isposmon· · a ta endi · · h d k place on the Austnan or French.sai to im
di
frontier, it would have been necessary to mobiliI rse a par t0 f the army irnme !-
ately. For the moment the matter was left at that. 15
f · · d b s b ov and Bismarck. Sa-
A
revisite Yewa ur
months later, the matter was
burov asked Bismarck ifhe thought the issue was an important one between the
two countries. Bismarck replied:
A
Th .. . · t The danger to us is not great.
1
military matter I attach no importance to 1 · .s .a
' . fi · th pening of a campaign ts
e advantage which you would denve rom it at e O a h
con . hf I sider it important rat er small .... For me the question does not re t ere.
as a symptom of the psychological attitude of which this particular regrouping 0
eziments on the fron-
troops as been the result. Whatever one may say, cav ry r ,,.
·

72 Dual and Triple Alliances

siantierambassador
have the appearance
to Germany, of a that
threat. The very
resulted menReinsurance
in the who conceived this disposi-
Treaty. As de- and repeated failures, Bismarck sought more policy independence. Alliance with
tion sounded
scribed in the nextour chapter,
adversaries last summer
Bismarck used theat Paris
text ofon the
the Dual
subject of an alliance
Alliance to shock...
Austria would grant that freedom. Austria-Hungary would be a more malleable and
the·Russians
Your cavalry, I grant you,with
into compliance is nohisreal danger
terms to us;
in their but those 26
agreement. who put it there as -
controllable ally.21
suredly did not mean to give us a token of confidence. You come to say to us,
German motivations for an alliance with Austria, then, were principally balancing Getting the emperor to agree to a defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary,
"Let us be friends and allies", and behind you stands your War Minister with a
and pistol
hedging ones. at
levelled Important tactical
us. I believe your sidewords,
benefits stoodrepresent
which to be gained as well: to
your Sovereign's ostensibly to counter the Russians, was no mean feat on Bismarck's part. Bismarck
control Austria-Hungary and make sure that it
mind; but the unpleasant sight of the pistol makes me hesitate. would remain 16faithfully within
emphasized the danger of a Franco-Russian coalition. He even sought to enlist the
Berlin's sphere of influence; to ensure British cooperation; to balance against emperor's son, Lewis, the king of Bavaria. Hoping to get Lewis to intercede on
In contrast
France; and totoleverage
Bismarck, the back
Russia responseinto inthemilitary
fold once circles
tensionswasabated.
to seekThe alternative
urgency Bismarck's behalf, Bismarck wrote him a letter exaggerating the Russian menace.
paths to security. General Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke ("The Elder")
of the moment was a consequence of the fact that Andrassy would be retiring, and He complained of the augmentations of the Russian military, the demands the
pressed for alliance with Austria-Hungary. After Bismarck sent Moltke the
there was no guarantee that his successor would be favorably disposed to such an Russians had placed on the Germans, the threatening nature of their policies. "I
estimates of Russian troop increases, Moltke advocated increases in Germany's
agreement. One could make the argument that the level of threat between Russia cannot resist the conviction," Bismarck wrote, "that in the future, perhaps in the
peacetime army, given the differential between the French and Russian army sizes
and Germany precluded tethering-that Russian unreliability, the fears in Germany of near future, peace is threatened by Russia, and perhaps only by Russia." 22
in both peacetime and wartime.!? AustriaHungary was viewed as the most reliable
a Franco-Russian alliance, and the consequent need to contemplate the possibility of Bismarck, however, was less interested in balancing Russia than he was in
choice of alliance partner and appropriate for strategic reasons as well. Moltke
a two-front war dictated such a course. Bismarck, in fact, invoked such a threat in balancing France. He was also concerned with maintaining good relations with
believed the Dual Monarchy to be the most advantageous ally in the event of a two-
seeking agreement from the emperor for the alliance. It appears, however, that Britain, managing Austria, and leveraging Russia. That Bismarck was
front war. A mobilization by Austria-Hungary at the same time as one by Germany
Bismarck exaggerated the Russian threat to elicit Wilhelm's support for alliance simultaneously negotiating with Russia via Saburov on the topic of reconstituting
would lure enemy troops away from the northeastern German frontier. Russia
with Austria-Hungary. After all, Bismarck never did cease his efforts at this time to the League of the Three Emperors supports this view. Since he is the architect of
wou_ld likely engage in a first offensive against Austria-Hungary, allowing for a
reconstitute the League of the Three Emperors with Russia and Austria-Hungary.27 the alliance it is fundamental to examine Bismarck's per-
quick defeat in the east as Russia would be slow to mobilize. Germany would then
The Dual Alliance did ultimately serve to provide Germany with the necessary '
be able to move its troops quickly to the western front to counter the French before ceptions of the threat Russia posed. Quite revealing is his explanation in his
leverage to bring Russia back into line. This highlights how Bismarck was really memoirs that he was certainly aware of the complexities involved with the Dual
the Russians could rally. is
seeking to hedge his bets as well as balance by forming the Dual Alliance with Alliance.
The strategic advantages inherent in the choice of Austria as alliance partner were
Austria-Hungary.
political as well as military. Bismarck believed that alliance with Austria would
serve as leverage to bring Russia in line, prevent a RussoFrench combination, and
I regarded it as no less enjoined upon us to cultivate neighbourly relations with
ensure Austria did not seek a coalition that excluded Germany. Such an alliance
Austria-Hungary Russia after, than before, our defensive alliance with Austria; for perfect security
would also have the tremendous advanta~e ?f allowing Germany to maintain a against the disruption of the chosen combination is not to be had by Germany,
solid understanding as
A~stria-Hungary, with Great Bntai_n,
described in the given
previousthe strength
chapter, of hadthea Anglo-Austrian
fairly volatile while it is possible for her to hold in check the anti-German fits and starts of
relauo~ship with Germany for many years, during their war and itswrote
relationship and the common interests of the two states. As Bismarck to the
19
aftermath. Austro-Hungarian feeling as long as German policy maintains the bridge which
Following the Russo-Turkish War, however, the Russian threat eclipsed1880,
German ambass~dor i~ Vi~nna, Prince Henry Reuss VII, on January 29, the leads to St. Petersburg, and allows no chasm to intervene between us and Russia
"An opposite which cannot be spanned. Given no such irremediable breach Vienna will be
German_ threat~olicy
in a is rendered impossible
significant way. The threat for us level
owingemanating
to the needfrom of nursing
Russiaourto
~ela~IOns with great
England, a need increased by the fact thatdefeat
Austrian andOttoman
British able to bridle the forces hostile or alien to the German alliance .... In the interest
Austria reached intensity in the aftermath of Russia's of the
interests lie near together."20 of the European political equilibrium the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and the failure of the tethering attempt embodied in the Three Emperors' monarchy as a strong independent Great Power is for Germany an object f~r
For Bismarck,
League. Russianthe mostinimportant
gains the war factor
and the wasterms
to ensure
of thethatTreaty
German of influe~ce
San Stefanowas which she might in case of need stake her own peace with a good conscience. - 3
not diluted by Russia. Because of the towering strength
generated acute Austrian animosity. Austro-Russian relations were already strained of the Russi~ army,
Bismarck
over was perpetually
competing aims in theconcerned with how
Balkans. Russian to ensure
victory and Ger-
plans Bismarck continued on to say that the rivalry between Russ_ia an~ Austria-
for "bi1 Bul · " from Rus · Whil G ·
mana independence . . ~ungary actually worked to Germany's advantage, making it easier to cultivate
~ . sia. e erman-Russ1an
garia outraged Austria-Hungary. Alliance with relations
Germany were gen-
erallyultimately
would good, Bismarck
serve as prized
a "dampolicy independence
against the progress above
of Pan all.Slavism"
He wanted as to good relations with them both. 24
well 2 Sin A
8
·H h Bismarck wanted to be able to use the alliance with Austria-Hungary as leverage
. • . ce ustna- ungary ad a largeeat
1
Slavic population,
the center of all fomenting
dee· · na-. h did
ls . • . istons;
tionalist sentiment want to
e not made thebeDual
pressured
Monarchy'sby anyone
control over its population all the with Russia. The numerous hints Bismarck dropped to Saburov during their
more
b e e. tenuous.
After repeated
29 attempts to smooth the path of Russia at the Congress, negotiations during this period suggest he viewed this as an imPDrtant reason for
Enduring Italian animosity also contributed to Austrian insecurity. If the the alliance.2s This was even more vividly demonstrated later, in 1887, during the
negotiations with Count Paul Shuvalov, the Rus-
 Dual and Triple Alliances 73

Russian threat were not confronted, a Russo-Italian combination could over-

whelm Austria-Hungary. As Bismarck reported to Reuss, "For me there is no doubt,
that for Austria a break with Russia would mean a break with Italy, who would
seize that opportunity for an attempt to annex Austrian territory." 30 In short,
Austria needed to secure a balancing alliance. Germany offered the best opportunity
for partnership.
Andrassy's reaction to the threats confronting the Dual Monarchy was to favor
alliance with Germany. The combination of enemies to the south and east
compelled Austria-Hungary to find a solution-certainly any lingering animosity
with Germany had to be put to rest. He was most preoccupied with Russia and
considered it Austria-Hungary's principal enemy. 31 As his son recounts in his
memoirs, "Andrassy's first thought always was to guard against the Russian
danger." 32 Once the threat level was ratcheted up by the events of 1877-78, the
increases in the size of the Russian army, and troop movements in the area of the
Austrian frontier, Austria had to secure itself somehow. As early as the beginning of
r 878 Andrassy approached Bismarck with a proposal to conclude a defensive
alliance.33
The Dual Alliance was thus highly desirable to Austria. The one stipulation
Andrassy insisted on was that Austria not be obligated to fight a FrancoGennan
war. He wanted the language of the treaty to counter Russia. His difference with
Bismarck stemmed from the fact that Bismarck wanted a general alliance, not one
that would specifically call for joint action in the event of war with Russia. In
addition to believing it would be better to have a general alliance for strategic
reasons, Bismarck knew that it would be hard t~ sell a defensive alliance directed
against Russia to his emperor. Yet he ultimately had to capitulate to his
counterpart's desires; Andrassy prevailed in the negotiations over the language of
the treaty.

Bismarck made one last attempt to coerce the Austrians into a general .alliance. At
one point in their negotiations, Bismarck suddenly sprang up from his couch and
loomed menacingly over Andrassv, "Consider carefully wha_t you are domg. For the
last time I advise you to give way." He continued now with a raised v~, 1ce and a
threatening guise: "Accept my proposal, I advise you well, for otherwise - and seeing
that his threat had no visible effect in shaking Andrassy's resolution, he suddenly
changed his demeanor-"otherwise I'll have to accept yours." "But," he added with a
laugh, "it will cause me a hell of a lot of trouble." 34

In sum, Austria-Hungary sought alliance with Germany for balancing purposes.

Austria needed to secure itself in the face of heightened threat ~om Russia.
Germany was by far the most attractive ally-France and Brit~ Were both more
remote geographically and did not share t~e s~me comlll!.ttnent to monarchical
conservatism that Germany and Austria did. Before
 74
76 Dual
Dual and
and Triple
Triple Alliances
Dual and Triple Alliances 75
Dual and Triple Alliances 77
TABLE
TABLE4.4.2
I
Member States'
Threats to Motivations for of
Member States Joining the Alliance,
the Dual Dual Alliance,
1879 1879 an unbreachable gap between Russia and Austria-Hungary. France's isolation
had relatively warm relations with Russia -Austria-Hungary's primary rival.
and the French threat were far more salient to Berlin. Austria-Hungary had no
Count Emperor Wilhelm of Germany and the Tsar Alexander were in fact closely
ry Motivation for allying real quarrel with France; this was a threat felt primarily by its ally. Yet the high
related (Wilhelm was Alexander's uncle) and quite fond of each other. Yet
Austria- Balance Russia level of cohesion characterizing the Dual Alliance was able to exist and persist
during the course of the alliance between Germany and Austria, incrementally
Hungary
Leverage Russia; prevent Austria-Hungary from allying with
because the threat facing each state did not emanate from the other. In the later
each power took on the other's enemies and interests. German policy choices
Germany France or Britain against Russia; maintain good relations with years of the alliance, as the threat from the FrancoRussian Alliance and the
Britain; preserve German autonomy; control Austria-Hungary. The ensured tensiongrew,
Triple Entente with Russia, and Austria's
the cohesion of the Dual relations
Alliance with France
grew deteriorated as
as well.
Dual Alliance was a hedging and balancing alliance for Germany. well. 47 The institutional aspects of the alliance in this case served to deepen the
The threat internal to the alliance was48 low. Austro-Hungarian animosity
threat within the alliance was low. Table 4.2 provides a summary of threats member states' cooperation over time.
facing the Dual Alliance member states. toward Germany dimmed considerably in the mid r 870s. Instead, a nexus of
This convergence happened slowly. During the first years of the alliance,
common interests had emerged. The alliance was able to serve a dual purpose
Andrassy's retirement, the Dual Alliance was signed; r 879 offered an oppor- Germany was unwilling to commit to becoming embroiled in a war over
for Germany and Austria-Hungary. In addition to providing a dam against pan-
tunity for a lasting security arrangement for Austria. The moment did not pass
COHESION Austria's aspirations in the Balkans. It was not until the end of the I 88os that
Slavism, the alliance was heralded as a natural alliance, bringing all Germans
unexploited. German and Austrian motivations for forming the Dual Alliance Wilhelm II assured Franz Joseph that Austrian partnership.
mobilization, Thefor whatever
are summarized in Table 4. r , together into an intimate relationship, an enduring alliance
reason, would be immediately followed by German
functioned as an institution for the two states-it incorporated both formal and mobilization. 49
This
promise
informal did rulesnot wholly
that resolveeach
constrained the other's
conflictactivity
between andthe two states
behavior overasAus-
as well
EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL THREAT tria's Balkan policy, although it facilitated allegiance
shaped their expectations. Cooperation between them did grow over time. to the alliance andThe co-
ordination of policy regarding threats
alliance proved to be a very popular policy choice. to each other's36 security interests.
50

The external threat facing the Dual Alliance was different for each member In addition, Bismarck did not believe that the tension that characterized
The signingrelations of the alliance wasthatgreeted warmly wasinsigned
state. For Germany, the principal preoccupation was that France would both would
Germany and
Russo-German at the time the alliance be long
Austria Yetbecause of lifetime
the common of thehistorical
alliance, ties
ultimately launch a war of revenge to regain Alsace and Lorraine. While war the countries shared. Austria-
term. over the Germany could not sustain good
did not seem imminent, the need for Germany to prevent France from finding Hungary and Germany maintained close cultural ties and a commitment ~o
relations with Russia and simultaneously maintain its alliance with Austria.
allies was a guiding strategic principle for Bismarck in this period. Russia, as monarchical conservatism. The Germans in Germany and those of Austna had
Consequently, Austria's conflict with Russia became Germany's, just as
"for a thousand years
with... France
been inbecame
the same empire, and their present
described in the previous section, posed less of a threat. Bismarck did not seem Germany's quarrel Austria's. In the early years37po-
of the ~1-
very troubled by the Russian threat, although others in military circles were a · dd" IG
liance, it was clear that Germany had no intention of supporting Austna-
bit more concerned. 3 5
tical severance from
Hungary as aone another dated back scarcely a eca e. n er-
l many, militarily consequence of Austria's Balkan
there was the sentimental belief that the fates of Germany and Austria
policy, and Austna-
Austria-Hungary, by contrast, was competing fiercely with Russia in the Hungary did not intend38to get embroiled in a war between Germany an~
Balkans. The Russians posed a threat to Austria-Hungary in regard to pan- :ere inextricably
France. Yet over timebound. as theBismarck,
tension betweenin talking theabout the alliance,
two blocs increased,s_pok~
this of
Slavism and conflicting goals in the Balkans and the Straits. Tethering Russia the ties of blood, the possession
changed as well. of a common
' language, and of historical
in the Three Emperors' League had failed; Austria-Hungary had been gravely memories-the same general considerations which had earlier been the strength
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the League of the Three Emperors was
threatened by Russia's war with the Ottoman Empire. The desire for an alliance of the great German movement and which were still largely responsible for the
reconstituted from 1881 to 1887. In I 887, when relations between Austria and
with Germany stemmed from these concerns. pro-German tendencies of German opinion." 39_
Russia disintegrated to the point where the League cou_ld no longer operate,
The external threat to the Central Powers did not, therefore, emanate from the Germany In Austria,
maintained similar feelings existed.
its commitment to th~"Austro-Germans,
Dual Alliance. Although especially those
Germany
same source. Nor was the threat to the member states equal. The treaty of · h · 1kd
signed the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia followmg the end of the League, the
alliance addressed the event of a Russian attack on either party. Yet Germany ":t
the Pan-German leanings, and the Magyar rulmg caste oo e upon .
Treaty did not abrogate the Dual Alliance. ~s one scholar notes, "much has
diplomatic bond with Germany as something natural and altog~the_r desir-
at this time had not laid to rest its wishes for an alliance that would include been made of Bismarck's dishonesty in making t~e Reinsurance treaty. There
Austria and Russia (the League was successfully reconstituted in ~ 88r), whereas able." 4o Germany was the perfect ally for Austria's desire to mamta1~ Ger man
was
hegemonycertainlyinno dishonesty
Austria. 41
Such towards
commonalitythe ~ustnans. Be had always
in background prov_ide~insisted thatfor
a basis
fo~ Austr!a-Hungary, countering the Russian threat in the he could not support them in Bulgana nor at the Straits." 51
In spite of the
strong relations between the states. To this end, too, contmumg cons: b bl · 42
~ans was the primary issue at hand. Russia was a far graver threat to Austria Reinsurance Treaty,
and Au~trian interests than it was to Germany. The popularity
..... uct of itthe
etween
is clear that the cohesion of the Dual Alliance increased
two states
from Iecision890 on. notThe subsequent
to renew Gerwould be
· ..pro
lllan d · Treaty
the Reinsurance ilitemanc,
ttac
d closer Ausrro-
a e cultural
Pan-Slavtsm was an immediate and significant threat to Austria-Hungary, the alliance and the nexus of common historical and ties also. reveal
Gern-.~-
that b 8 1 ·1·· nd the level of Y I 79 Austro-German
·
·«= re ations. By 1 890, Germany believe t at a u · d h " R ssian
relations solution
were quite ofpositive
a

Member state Source of threat Degree

Austria-Hungary Russia Very high

Italy High
Germany France Very high
·
 The Dual Alliance was an agreement to uphold the "imperative duty as
Monarchs to provide for the security of Their Empires and the peace of Their
subjects, under all circumstances." 43 It stated that if either country were
attacked by Russia, the other was obligated to assist "with the whole war
strength of their Empires, and accordingly only to conclude peace together and
upon mutual agreement." 44 In the event of an attack by another power, the allies
were obliged to observe benevolent neutrality, unless that other power was
assisted by Russia. In that case, the states would be required to assist with their
whole fighting force until a mutual peace agreement was signed. 45 The alliance
was concluded for a period of five years. It was renewed in 1883 and 1902,
when it was agreed that the treaty would automatically be prolonged, providing
no negotiation to the contrary took place. 46 The alliance had a moderate
commitment level, as it specified the conditions for intervention. As it turned
out, the Dual Alliance remained in effect until the two powers were defeated at
the end of World War I in 1918.
The text of the treaty presents the primary goals of the alliance as countering
the Russians. As seen in the previous section, however, that is a little
misleading. German goals were to prevent Austria from allying with France.
For Austria-Hungary, the principal goal was security vis a vis Russia. Mutual
~oal~ Were harder to distill at least initially, although subsequently there was
significant convergence in the Central Powers' aims.
Over time, the two states' goals and interests became increasingly inter-
twined; they continually adopted the other's interests as their own. At the ti~e
of the initial conclusion of the alliance, Austria-Hungary had no significant
quarrel with France, Germany's primary foe. In fact, they shared the comm.on
interest of supporting the papacy and Catholic interests throughout Europe.
Germany, despite intermittent periods of significant tension,
·

78 Dual and Triple Alliances

the Straits question was 'absolutely impossible' and that no changes could be
allowed in the Near East without a previous agreement between Germany and
Austria-Hungary."52
The level of cohesion of the Dual Alliance during its peacetime years was
therefore quite high. The two powers, during the course of their alliance, mana~ed
to coordinate their aims and effectively implement policy intended to attain them.
This was particularly true during the crises that peppered the pre-World War I
period. The member states successfully coordinated their mutual goals as expressed
in the treaty of alliance as well as strategy to attain those goals. The cohesion of the
alliance actually precluded a resolution of the growing conflict between the
members of the Dual Alliance and Russia an? France. The heightened antagonism,
in part a consequence of the cohesion of the Dual Alliance, became more acute in
the latter half of the 1890s.
The two states' close coordination of strategy during crises had some effect ~n
the military planning of the two as well. From 1879 to 1908 there ~as httle
discussion between the two states about their military strategy, nor ~Id t~e states'
war planning change. There was virtually no revision at this tii:ue in the German
plans for a two-front war. Moltke hoped that alliance with Austria would make the
probability of victory in the east more likely, but the allocati~n of troops to the east
and west did not change. 53
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908 and the
e~suing crisis led to a tightening of ties between Austria and Germany. Ultimately,
Germany gave Austria its support, and in early 1909 the
Germans and Austria td· · · mil
. ns en ere mto a correspondence concerning their -
itary cooperation in the event of war between Austria and Serbia. 54 German!
a~sured Austria that if Russia intervened in a war between Austria and Serbia, It
would constitute casus foederis. 5 From this time on the cohesion
5
Dual and Triple Alliances 79
and strategies to attain them. Convergence over time in the two states' aims
was a manifestation of their alliance's cohesion.
The alliance also became increasingly institutionalized over time. Ultimately,
despite the fact that the Dual Alliance was intended by Germany to leverage Russia
back into the fold, it had the opposite effect of driving Russia into the arms of
France. 56 The low level of threat within the alliance provided permissive
conditions for a durable combination to emerge. This longest-lived alliance of the
period altered the course of European history in a very profound way.
The Triple Alliance
The Triple Alliance between Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy was formed
in 1882. It is puzzling at first glance to understand why or how in 1915 Italy could
abandon this alliance of thirty-three years and less than a month later join a major
war against its former allies. Yet an examination of the relations among the states
of the Triple Alliance turns the puzzle into a question of why Italy joined the
alliance in the first place and remained a member of it for so long. In other words,
the puzzle is not Italy's defection but rather its cooperation. The Triple Alliance is
yet another case of allied ad~ersaries: Italy and Austria-Hungary were historic
enemies. The Triple ~a~ce was a tethering alli_ance, designed to keep the
hostil~ties between
us_tna-Hungary and Italy in check. It successfully served this purposeu~til
1
915. The alliance was never terribly cohesive, and the threat level WJ.thin the
alliance was always high. But the member states managed to renew it five times
over the course of four decades and thereby keep the peace among them.

of the Dual Allian · d fu . '

. ce increase as a nctron of the growing threat of the
Triple Entente.
FORMATION

Italy
SUMMARY

_Following the Congress of Vienna in 1814, Austria gained Trento and

The
Trieste. From that time Austria dominated nearly the whole of the Italian
alliance between Au t · H h Peninsula d all , . . . b all d 57 In
. s rra- ungary and Germany was a fairly co e- ' an revolts agamst its authority were rut y suppresse ·
srve one. In its early years th als f h . .
.d • e go o t e alliance were defensive and lim- the ~uest for the unification of Italy in the late 18 50s and 186os, much of the
ite . Not much effort · d fu territory 11 · h · Th Dual
hil was require to Ifill them. The interests of the states, Mona contra ed
wTh ebnot wholly consistent, were not in direct conflict with each other. by Austria came under Italian a~t onty. _e.
h fa . rchy, however, had yet to relinquish Trento and Trieste. In addition to
e a sence of a uniform xt al th di I
S did d
e em reat id not inhibit cohesion: nor i tali.a bi · f I ali
k b n Itterness toward Austria for its brutality durmg the years O t an
t e ct that Austria-Hun '
subord · · r h
·
gary was more threatened than its alliance partner. tnation, the popular irredentist movement clamored tor t e cession
tresses an strains did · of Trento and Trieste.
. appear, particularly over Austrian policy in the Bai-
ns, ut
nevertheless the Ce tral p · al
n owers managed to coordinate their go s
 80 Dual and Triple Alliances
The Triple Alliance was formed at a time when Italy was seeking to enhance its
prestige. The Congress of Berlin was a political and diplomatic disaster for Italy. It
had hoped to press for territorial compensation for Austrian gains in the Balkans.
Italy, unrealistically, especially hoped that Austria would cede Trento and Trieste.
The failure of Count Corti, minister of Foreign Affairs, to secure any significant
gain, coupled with the rumors that Tunisia, an important Italian interest, had been
promised by the attending powers to France, was a terrible blow to Italian
aspirations.58
Further, irredentist pressures culminatedjn a series of crises between 1878 and
1880. On May 29, 1881, in the wake of the bey of Tunis acknowledging the
supremacy of France, Sidney Sonnino, a member of Parliament at the time and later
prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a very influential article in
the Rassegna settimanale. 59 In the article, Sonnino argued that Italy should resolve
the question of irredentism and seek closer r~lations with Austria. 60 "This friendship
represents for us the free disposition of all of our land and sea forces; it represents,
it is useless to delude ourse!ves, the authority of our words in the concert of
Europe .... Friendship Wtth Austria is for us an indispensable condition for a conclusive
and industrious pol-
. " I al h
61
icy. t Y, t reatened by France and by Austria, needed to contain the level
o~ ~xt~ma~ threat it faced. As Sonnino continued, "Lwlation is equivalent to an-
nihil~t,on,
It would be more dangerous than the search for foreign alliances,
provided this search for alliances was conducted with clear, constant and shrewd
purpose."62
~hy_Italy chose to ally with its "hereditary" enemy can only be explained by
viewmg alliances as mechanisms for conflict management. As Edoardo de
Lau.nay,. the Italian ambassador in Berlin, wrote to Italian prime minister An-
tonic di R di · "w· h A · d
. , ~ mi, It ustna-Hungary we have contracted a 'mariage e
63
raison, which rests on a certain foundation of suspicion." The "mariage
de raison" ldd·
was cone u e m order to keep the peace between them.
It~y sought an alliance with the Central Powers to prevent isolation and contain
the level of threat it was experiencing from France and Austria simultaneously.
Those threats echoed from within the country; the Italian government urgently
needed to consolidat·e its control over the population.
Irredentism and the th ts hi al .
rea to monarc ic interests from France were very
~ave. T~e tactical side benefits of the alliance for Italy were significant. Al-
lia~ce with Austria, with a diminution of irredentist fervor, would allow the
Italian monarchy to solidify its grip. Further, alliance with the Central Pow ~rs
would ~arantee for Italy enhanced prestige in Europe. The alliance was in fact. a
diplomatic coup. Italy was allied with one of the most powerful ~ountnes. on the
Continent and at the same time confronted a diminished
ear of being attacked by the stronger Austria-Hungary.64
Dual and Triple Alliances 8 1
Other side benefits of the alliance would be gained in the Balkans where Austria-
Hungary's and Italy's competing aspirations were manifest. In the words of Luigi
Salvatorelli, "Italy wanted to transform the Austro-Russian duet in the Balkans into
an Austrian-Russian-Italian trio."65 The alliance offered an opportunity for Italy to
anticipate gains in the Balkans, to be acquired as a consequence of Italy's guarantee
to maintain neutrality in the event of an Austrian war with Russia.
The tethering motivations that underpinned the alliance became even clearer over
time. This is most vividly portrayed in the successive renewals. By the r 891
negotiations regarding the third renewal, relations were fraught with tension and
suspicion. In a letter from Launay to Rudini, Launay described the mutual threat
between Italy and Austria and suggested that Germany inspired more confidence
and exercised influence over Austria. 66 As animosity between the two rivals grew,
tethering became more essential; Germany became instrumental to Italy as a means
of influencing Austria. Indeed, Italy required German pressure on Austria-Hungary
in order to obtain the modifications to the separate treaty with Austria-Hungary that
Italy desired. The separate treaty manifested the tethering motivations on the part
ofltaly and Austria-Hungary. 67
By the time of the fourth renewal, in 1902, the alliance itself was fundamental to
maintaining the peace between Italy and Austria-Hungary. Rumors were rife among
diplomatic circles that the hostility of the Italian public and irredentist sentiments
would create a rupture in the Triple Alliance. 68 Renewing the treaty of alliance
became essential to ensuring that the distrust and suspicion between Italy and
Austria did not escalate. 69 The renewal of the alliance in July 1902 stemmed the
immediate threat; it did not do so for long, however. By 1904, the threat between
Italy and Austria reached new heights.70 The Italians were gravely concerned by an
augmentation of Austrian troops along the Italian frontier. The Triple Alliance was
seen as the last best hope to manage the hostility between the two states. 71
The alliance did not serve to decrease the level of threat Italy faced. It was that
very threat from Austria that impelled Italy to maintain its commitment to the
alliance,72 despite the fact that the "extraordinary Austrian armaments" along the
border did not exactly give rise to feelings of being "completely and securely
tranquil." 73 A report in March r 90 5 gave an overview of the Austrian forces on or
near the Italian frontier and addressed the increases of these forces between 1887
and 1905.74 In passing along the findings of the report, Due d' Avarna the Italian
ambassador in Vienna, wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomaso Tittoni that
there were "voices circulating in
every center of Vienna speaking of war with Italy as 1 rt'fts ·mevita
· · · e.bl "1s
The tenuous peace, due in no small part to the Triple Alliance itself, con-
 84Dual
82 Dualand
andTriple
TripleAlliances
Alliances
Dual and
DualTriple Alliances
and Triple 83 85
Alliances
tinued,
war withthough
Russiathe threatthat
meant didAustria
not diminish.
needed toThe very motivation
continue on theItaly
to contain Italy. parthad
of
pronounced
where, andwith successive
by balancing renewals.
France. As seen
Germany's in theincase
motivations of the the
concluding twoTriple
Italy for maintaining the alliance was to stave off the possibility
grown stronger militarily and financially in the years since the initial treaty. This, of armed
Leagues of were
Alliance the Three Emperors,
to tether the Triple
and to balance. Alliance
The threat that is an alone
Italy example
posedofwas
a not
conflict
coupled between it andthreat
with the graver Austria.
from76
The alliance
Russia, meant served to constrain
that it was all the morestates' be-
essential
peacetime alliance concluded for conflict resolution, an alliance to ensure
great, but nevertheless Germany needed to forestall growing antipathy between the the
havior and activity
for Austria to tether as wellByasastoearly
Italy. shapeas their
1884,expectations.
Austrian plans The
fordesire to keep
war had the
changed.
peace
twobetween
countries.two adversaries.
Further, Sotoprofound
were Italy ally with were
France, thethedifferences between
resulting alliance would
peace
The newcarried
planItaly through
called the fifth
for more troops renewal
to be of the treaty
deployed in 1912.
to the east, As
withAvarua
fewer
Austria anda Italy,
present serioussothreat
ingrained theGermany
indeed. sources was
of their hostility,
completely that the only
uninterested way
in capability
wrote to Antonio,
divisions solely for Marquis
defensivedipurposes
Sangiuliano,
on thethesouthern
Italian frontier.
minister Theof Foreign
need to
the aggregation;
two could keep the German
rather, peace was to become
diplomats allies.
sought to 84tether Italy so as to contain and
Affairs
maintainfrom
such1905 to 1906 and
a deployment roro tocontaining
required 1914, Italian hostility through a tethering
manage the level of threat it faced. The very possibility of adversarial relations
alliance.??
If we are very persistent in the wish for us to detach from the Triple Alliance Austria-Hungary
made Germany receptive to alliance with Italy. Certainly the Germans were not
Th~ third
without renewal
taking in 1891
into careful was motivated
consideration our by tethering objectives
convenience, as well.
we will find ourselves enamored of the Italians, nor was there the sense that Italy and Germany shared
alone m
Early onthetheyear,
Austro-Hungarian front and
the Triple Alliance in that casea any
experienced incident that
threatening were to excite
developm~nt. The The motivations
common behind Austrian adhesion to the Triple Alliance were quite
interests.
our public opinionof radically hostile to ardent
Austria-Hungary would sour the fell.
reciprocal straightforward. Italy was regarded
Italian government Francesco Crispi, supporter of the allian~e,
relations in a way as to render inevitable in time an armed conflict be tween the two
Crispi Germany's fundamental mistrustbyofAustria
Italy wasasarticulated
a threat-not so great that
by Bismarck it In
himself
was replaced by Rudini, a francophile. Germany and Austria both viewed this could not be managed in the context of an alliance, but great
conversation with Hayrnerle regarding policy toward Rome, Bismarck called enough so as to
states. 77
development with trepidation. Rumors from trustworth~ sources to the effect that render the alliance with Italy an important way of reducing Austrian
Italian foreign policy "jackal policy." "Insatiable Italy," said Bismarck, "with
Italy was being and
The continued seriously courted
heightened by France
threat betweenwere picked
Austria andupItaly
by perpetually
the Austro- insecurity.
furtive glance, roves restlessly hither and thither, instinctively drawn on by the odor
Hungarian
gave rise toambassador at Rome,
the fear that Baronnot
Italy would Bruck.
renew the alliance. It simultaneously The principal reason
of corruption Austria was ready
and calamity-always interested in alliance
to attack anybodywith
from Italy wasand
the rear tomake
gave added vigor to the tethering motivations that underpinned the alliance ensure
off "that
with aherbitally would not94 attack
of plunder." her inrestraining,
Controlling, the rear inandcase she shoul~
tethering Italy were
These disquieting
78 tidings were in contradiction to the official declarations
from the beginning.
ofRudini, who repeatedly gave assurances of'his loyalty to the Triple Alliance; become involved in a war with Russia." 85
It was to thecome
veryatthreat of Italy s
infinitely preferable to allowing its "jackal policy" Germany's expense.
Thebutalliance,
Kalnokyas and Caprivibyboth
suggested lacked faith
the German in the trustworthiness
newspapers, also offered "theof op-
his involvement in a war against Austria that made it an attractive a?y for
The Italian threat to Germany derived not from its military capabilities but from the
protestations.
portunity The the
to dissipate latter particularly
clouds considered
over Italy." 79 it most
In fact, important
the press under the
in all countries Austro-Hungarian Empire. GivenPowers
that Austria had an twoadditional
threatenmg
circumstances to bmd the unreliable ally to the Central Powers by still another the possibility that the Central would have frontad".'er-
in the event
wastie.
filled with speculation regarding the alliance's fate. On December 9, 1912,
The drive grew month by month more urgent. 91 saries
of on
waritswith
borders-Russia and or
France, Russia, Italy-tethering
both. As Busch those threats
wrote was anon1~portant
to Reuss February 28,
for example, the German paper Vossiche Zeitung ran an article stating: "The motivation
1882: underpinning Austrian alliance policy. Should tethenng Russia
oscillations
The urgencyof Italian
derivedpolitics derives [sic]threat
from heightened from that
its antagonis'.11
Italy would joinwithFrance
Austriaand
in fail, Austria needed to be able to secure Italian neutrality in the event
Russia
the as they
Adriatic andproceeded to negotiate their
of the preponderant alliance,
strength discussed
of England ~ninthe
theMediterranean.
next chapter. I admit that Italy's military weakness and her limited ability to act outside of her
This has frontiers
War with Russia. make
86 the comparative strength and the hoped for mutual services
. very
Theaggravated theofattitude
final renewal of Austria
the treaty in 1912 against
was alsoitsmotivated by Austria out unequal. But it would be an advantage not to be despised, if, supposing France
Italian subjects and of
of a desire to tether wr the irredentist
1 · ·A agitation· din
· Italy."
80
· d . Therein were keywith
alliance tactical
Russiaside benefits ainvolved.
undertook war, ItalyAbove all,our
were on it was
side,crucial for it
even though
.. · war P anrung m ustna urmg 1910-11 mclude sce-
The Italians
narios in thewere
eventneither
of warunaware nor unmoved
with Russia (War CasebyR),
Austrian animosity
in the event of war toward
with AustriaWere
to prevent Italy from
but nominally seekingher
and without to doing
securemuch.
itselfWe
elsewhere,
should thusespeci~y
be free if
to em-
them. As Avarua
Italy (War reflected
Case I), and in the in a letter
event of wartowith
Sangiuliano
Serbia andon December(War
Montenegro
28
, 1911,
Case that elsewhere were France, Russia, or both. The challenge for Austna, then, near
ploy elsewhere the troops, which we should otherwise have to place in or
"there
B?. TheisAustrians'
always a worst
certainnightmare
mistrust was
and War
a certain R + I antipathy
Case latent + B; they did
thatnot
willbe~ieve
never Was tothemake
Alps.95
concessions with Italy for the sole purpose of ~reventing Italy
be
theyfully
hadeliminated, but it does
sufficient strength not aand
to fight will not war.
three-front impede
92
the maintenance
"[T]hus of an
the chief Austro- from attacking its southern frontier in the event of war with Ru~sia t I I uld
While Germany sought alliances in this period to secure itself against France,
Hung · diin1 ·the
alliance b · hsupreme interests of the two states." 81 This only served to not seek alli-
guarantee Italian neutrality, andmotivations
to ensure taforY wo
arran ip omatn- goal ecame the avoidance of sue 82 , this
0
does not cover all of its concluding the Triple .Alliance.
highlight to the Italians
a constellation "93 Theythe
d"dneed
b for and · the· ·purpose
h of the Triple Alliance.· 1 ance With Russia. "By restraining our ally we should alienate
so Y mamtammg t eir commitment to their a - nught Germany
d · · · fiwanted to ensure that in the event of war, Italy would her, and
not be an opponent.
0r expannve her into the opposite camp there to seek
. . · I
liance with
While Italy to ali hTriple
I ali Alliance benefited from the alliance . opportunines
.member, states of theneutr ze t e t an threat. In other words, the Austri- Germany wanted to tether Italy, to guarantee at the least its neutrality in the case of
precisely because their
ans ~ontmued of their conflicts
tethering of interest,totheItaly;
relationship alliance
the itself
Triplenever mitigated
Alliance, and sio
n.war."87 H
aymerle Italian
acknowledged ' contammg .· Yw Ioverwhelming
I as important to
Although military that
capabilities weretanot to Germany or
particularly
the. .existingthedistrust
Aust Itali 1 · hi ·the
between · · adversaries.
d In fact, each renewal of the Austrian interests. 88
ro- an re ations p within it, was generated an to Austria, Italy did have the third most powerful fleet at the time the initial treaty
mamtamed
agreement as a consequence
brought of motivations
the tethering conflicting, notto common, interests.
the fore once again. As Avama Althof oug hAustria
alliance was was hopeful96 that alliance. wit
concluded. · h Ital Ywould mean that Id
wrote to Tittoni: "The continuing and reciprocal mistrust that exists in Italy troo h
ps t at Would
Germany otherwise
wanted tohave
come toto
defend
terms an attac
with k f m the south
. couof .
ro too, as consequence
Italy,
againstGermany
Austria-Hungary, and in Austria-Hungary against Italy, sleeps for some bed 1ep Italoyed
' h A
to the east to fight the Russians, t e ustro- Hunganan ·hA
Empire .
conflict with Austria. If Italy became embroiled in war wit Y s
ustna,
time and then returns periodically in certain seasons of the year." 83 Italy and continued its preparations in the event of war with Italy. 89 Subsequent re-
Austria were never able to eliminate the threat thatGermany emanated frommost
derived one be
to fit
thef newal ill . . · d ally,
a ~erman Italy itaswould
an enemy
involves uminate
Germany evenby more
default.starkly
German Austnacer tainly
thatleaders
viewe
other and vice versa. The threat became all the more thought in these terms. When Count Launay approached Bismarck about the
and sought to tether it. d A troR. By the second renewal in 1887 the situation
all" . . possibility of an alliance, he was told that "the key to the situation
in the Balkans an .b~s f Ussian hostility were even more ,dangerous. The
. . ne ram ranee with Italy by avertmg an es-
calation m hostility b · Ital heightened poss1 ty o
, Y preventmg y from seeking to secure itself else-