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The evolution of language: A primate perspective

Linda F. Wiener

To cite this article: Linda F. Wiener (1984) The evolution of language: A primate perspective,
Word, 35:3, 255-269, DOI: 10.1080/00437956.1984.11435760

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LINDA F. WJENER - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The evolution of language:

A primate perspective

I. Introduction Language has long been considered one of the most

unique human features, one that clearly separates humans from any
other animals. Speculation about the origin or evolution of language
has been voluminous. Recent views in the linguistic community fall into
two major groups. The first deny all connection between human lan-
guage and other animal communication systems. Thus, Chomsky (1968)
states that the development of human language from other primate
communication systems would be like the development of breathing
from walking, completely different processes and principles are in-
volved. Bickerton (1981) states that a call and a sentence may both
constitute communication but in the ways in which they work they are
more at odds than chalk and cheese .... This viewpoint has been well
criticized by Givon (1979).
The second group try to find some sort of evolutionary explanation
for various language features. Thus, Pulleyblank (1983) deals with dual-
ity of patteming, Hattiangadi ( 1973) suggests that the play of children
is the key to the switch from an emotional to a syntactic system. Wescott
(1974), Hewes (1974), Lieberman (1975), and McNeil (1979) argue that
syntactic language has a gestura( origin. Hockett ( 1960) and Hockett
and Ascher (1964), in the earliest serious efforts to look at language in
an evolutionary perspective, give design features of human language,
discuss the occurrence of these features in other animals, and give a
scenario for the evolution of human language in a framework which
encompasses other human evolutionary advances as well. More re-
cently Givon (1979, 1982) has looked at this problem from the point of
view of pragmatics, using an evolutionary perspective. His speculations
have the virtue of being empirically testable.
Many of these viewpoints are variously flawed by misunderstand-
ing or disregard of evolutionary theory, and superficial consideration of
the intricate communication systems of non-human primates. During
the past ten years there has been a great deal of high quality research

255
256 WORD. VOLUME 35. NUMBER 3 (DECEMBER 19H4l

on non-human primate behavior, social organization, and communica-

tion. As a result, our understanding of these animals has greatly in-
creased. Experiments on teaching language-like systems to apes, and
description and experimentation with the natural communication sys-
tems of non-human primates have been especially illuminating. Our
understanding of evolutionary processes and principles has increased
as well during the past ten years. It is time for a new evaluation of the
evolution of human language taking this new information into account.
This paper is an overview of the current literature, indicating areas
in which current research on primate communication and behavior
suggest new ways of evaluating the evolution of language. I will discuss
the evolution of the physical requisites of human language (brain, vocal
tract. etc.), linguistic structures, and the functions of language within a
communication system, concentrating on the natural communication
systems of non-human primates. Data from .. ape language" experi-
ments has been discussed extensively in the literature and will be men-
tioned only if they are especially relevant to the topics of this paper.
2. Physical structures The production and comprehension of language
requires a suitably structured and musculated vocal tract, perceptual
apparatus, and decoding mechanisms in the brain. Lieberman and Cre-
tin (1971) suggested that Neanderthal Man (who lived from about 1.5
million to 35,000 years ago, and is our closest relative) could not have
had a spoken language because he did not have a vowel triangle. This
hypothesis is based on a model of the Neanderthal vocal tract made
from measurements of a Neanderthal skull. From this prediction, Lie-
berman (1975), Hewes (1974), and McNeil (1979) developed the theory
of the gestural origin of speech. They argue that I) Neanderthal man
did not have oral speech, 2) chimpanzees can learn gestural, but not
spoken language, and that 3) human beings today use gestures exten-
sively and have even developed entirely gesturallanguages. They con-
clude that gesture must have preceded speech as the mode of language
expression.
This hypothesis has been variously criticized because a vowel
triangle is probably not a necessity for spoken language (Fremlen, 1975)
and there are human beings alive today with perfectly normal speech
and a vocal tract similar to the one Lieberman predicted for Neanderthal
Man (Le May 1975). Also, they fail to explain why and how we switched
from a gestural to a vocal auditory system and fail to explain how Homo
sapiens, a species which is only 40,000 years old, could have evolved
the necessary vocal and perceptual abilities for oral speech so quickly.
 WIENER. EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 257

The production of temporally labial, continuously variable speech-

like streams is a feature which has, in fact, been noted in non-human
primates. Non-human primate vocalizations are often said to consist of
only emotionally mediated, open-mouth calls which refer to food, dan-
ger, or other stimuli in the immediate environment (Bickerton, 1981).
While many primate vocalizations do fit this description, there are
certain calls termed gurneys in macaques (Green, 1975a) and chucks in
squirrel monkeys (Smith et al., 1982) which may be precursors of the
human speech stream. In contrast to the loud danger and alarm calls,
these vocalizations are quiet and are exchanged between two or a very
few individuals. The tongue and lips are used to form these sounds,
they have considerable temporallability, and are structurally complex.
These vocalizations function to define affiliative relationships between
individuals (macaques) or to reduce aggression and allow individuals to
approach one another for grooming, huddling, and other activities
(squirrel monkeys). Reynolds (1981) and Green (1975a) speculate on
the adaptive use of this behavior and the evolution of human speech.
It is important to note the very real differences between the human
vocal tract and that of other living primates. Despite various efforts,
nobody has been able to teach a chimpanzee to say more than a few
barely intelligible words (Kellogg, 1968). The lack of precise muscular
control of their tongues, lips and larynxes is responsible for this failure
(Noback, 1982). Broca's area, which controls facial movements in pri-
mates, is 3.5X larger in humans than would be expected based on its
relative size in other primates (Deacon, personal communication). An-
other critical difference is the separation of the larynx and glottis in
humans, a feature which is not present in other primates. The evolution
of upright posture in Hominids was responsible for this separation which
allows humans to produce a greater variety of speech sounds than any
other primate (Fink and Frederickson, 1978, Sutton, 1979).
Speech comprehension requires certain perceptual abilities. Sounds
must be accurately sorted and de-coded in order to be interpreted.
Categorical perception of phonemes has long been considered to be an
essential and unique characteristic of human speech. Hockett and Ascher
( 1964) give a scenario for the gradual evolution of categorical perception
in proto-sapiens. Kuhl and Miller ( 1975) showed that the chinchilla had
categorical perception of V OT, an ability which was surprising in an
animal so evolutionarily remote from humans. However, studies of
macaques and other primates also revealed categorical perception of
phonetic information including VOT and place of articulation. (Morse
and Snowdon, 1975, Waters and Wilson, 1976, Sinnot et al., 1976, Zoloth
258 WORD, VOLUME 35. NUMBER 3 (DECEMBER 1984)

et al., 1979). This result is not so surprising when studies of non-human

primate perception of their own vocalizations is considered. Studies of
pygmy marmoset (Snowdon and Pola, 1978, Snowdon, 1982) and Jap-
anese macaque (Petersen, 1982) clearly show that these animals have
categorical perception for their own vocal signals. When recordings of
these signals were played to other primates (including humans) cate-
gorical perception was hampered or absent (Beecher et al., 1979). In
macaques, as in humans, peak rather than pitch was the critical feature
(Snowdon and Pola, 1978, Zoloth et al., 1979).
These data suggest that humans or proto-humans did not develop
categorical perception in order to have complex language, as Hockett
suggests. Such a feature very likely is not even essential for a complex
language. Rather, primates, and perhaps other mammals as well, al-
ready had such a feature in their communication systems. Evolution
tends to be very conservative. and entirely new features are rare.
Existing features are generally modified or augmented for new uses.
Categorical perception may well be an evolutionarily old feature used
in many primate systems. rather than a new feature evolved to facilitate
the comprehension of human language.
Human brains have evolved to facilitate the production and com-
prehension of speech, among other functions. Human brains are signif-
icantly larger than would be expected for a primate of our size (Pilbeam
and Gould. 1974). Although no unique structures have been found in
human brains, Broca's and Wernicke's areas which are involved in
speech production and de-coding are disproportionately enlarged.
Chomsky ( 1981) claims that language processing is categorically differ-
ent from communication processing in other primates and that language
functions are distinct from other cognitive processes. thus implying that
our brains are in many ways quite different from the brains of other
primates. This is mere speculation and we have no evidence which
supports this opinion. Primates. and especially the great apes. have
been found to be very much like humans in anatomy, physiology, and
various aspects of brain and behavior. It would be most surprising if
language turns out to be as unique as Chomsky claims. However,
comparison of the design features of human language and other primate
systems may help to answer some of these questions, particularly if
both the structure and function of these communication systems are
considered.
3. Linguistic Structures Hockett ( 1960) suggested 13 design features
which describe human language. Many of these features. such as rapid
fading of signal and the ability to both broadcast and receive, are
 WIENER, EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 259

common to most animal communication systems. Hockett thought dual-

ity of patteming, openness, and displacement to be unique to humans,
and questioned whether traditional transmission existed in other pri-
mates. Other linguists, such as Chomsky and Bickerton, have stressed
the absolute uniqueness of syntax. Altmann (l%7) discusses Hockett's
list of features in relation to non-human primate communication sys-
tems. Since this article appeared, evidence for many complex features
not previously documented in non-human primates has emerged, and
it is worthwhile to review this subject again.
In human language, arbitrary association between sound and mean-
ing allows us to store and retrieve large numbers of semantic represen-
tations. On a simpler level, primate danger or food calls are arbitrary
associations between sound and meaning as well, even though they are
largely or totally innate and have traditionally been thought to have no
external semantic reference. However, we now have evidence of more
sophisticated behaviour concerning semantic representation from a
number of primates.
One example comes from vervet monkeys. These monkeys use
three alarm calls, one for eagles, one for snakes, and one for leopards
(Seyfarth et al., 1980, Seyfarth and Cheney, 1982). These animals are
reported to be the only predators vervet monkeys normally contend
with. Note that the calls could also designate predator position (in the
air, on the ground, or in the trees) rather than a specific predator. Infant
monkeys do not use these calls appropriately, but may give e.g., the
snake call to long, thin items such as sticks. Infants also do not react
to these calls appropriately, e.g., run up a tree in reaction to a leopard
call, but must watch adults and gradually learn the proper associations.
Thus, even if the form of the calls is innate, the specific associations
must be learned. Chimp "language" experiments offer another example
of a primate's ability to manipulate symbols. The Premacks devised a
language using colored plastic shapes. The symbol for apple was a blue
triangle. When their chimpanzee Sarah was asked, in this language, to
describe an apple by selecting pictures, she indicated that it was round
and red and had a stem, not that it was blue and triangular (Premack
and Premack, 1983 ). It is obvious from this experiment and others
(Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980a and b) that chimpanzees have the
ability to mentally manipulate symbols, though the extent to which this
ability is used in the wild is unknown.
Hockett ( 1960) thought that duality of patterning was a feature
unique to humans and proposed a scenario for its evolution in which
animals that had previously perceived their calls as gestalts started
260 WORD, VOLUME 35. NUMBER 3 (DECEMBER 19K4)

breaking them down into meaningful elements. This was seen as the
last step in the evolution of true language, coming after the opening up
of a closed call system. Pulleyblank ( 1983) suggests that originally, single
consonants carried meaning. and that these consonants were later com-
bined in various ways to create new sounds and meanings.
Evidence from the vocal system of cotten-top tamarins suggests a
rather different scenario. These animals combine various components
of their call systems to produce different meanings. The individual calls
(chirps. whistles. etc.) each have complex structure. Repetition of a
particular call, combinations of chirps + whistles. intensity of calls, and
different rates of repetition all contribute to the semantic interpretation
of a signal. If cotton-top tamarins are a good model. duality of patterning
is not a Hominid innovation. and its use by the cotton-top tamarin
suggests that neither Hockett's nor Pulleyblank's scenario is accurate.
Duality of patterning would precede openness. rather than following it,
and phonologically simple elements which carry meaning are not com-
bined to form complex elements with more complex meanings. Rather,
already complex elements are combined in various rule-governed ways
to produce a range of meanings.
Syntax is thought to be the element of human language which most
clearly separates it from other animal systems. The origins of syntax
are far from clear. and speculation about its nature abounds. Chomsky
( 1981) speaks of an inherited universal grammar which sets limits on
possible human languages. and Bickerton ( 1981) speaks of a very spe-
cific syntactic system which humans inherit. It is true that nothing quite
like human syntax has been found in any animal communication system,
yet animal communication is clearly rule governed.
Marler ( 1977) distinguishes two types of syntax in animal commu-
nication systems. His "phonological syntax" is equivalent to duality of
patterning, his ''lexical syntax" involves the ordering of phrases. Both
types have been demonstrated in non-human primates. Phonological
syntax was discussed previously, and lexical syntax has been demon-
strated in the cotton-top tamarin (Cleveland and Snowdon, 1982) and
the titi monkey (Robinson, 1979). Syntactic structure is important for
the correct interpretation of certain titi monkey vocalizations. When
these monkeys were played sequences of their calls in which the normal
sequence of phrases had been disturbed, they did not react appropri-
ately and showed a significant increase in moaning, a response which
indicates a disturbing circumstance (Robinson, 1979).
The highly ritualized and complex duets of mated gibbon pairs are
also highly rule governed. Deputte (1982) studied duetting in white-
 WIENER, EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 261

checked gibbons which broadcast complex songs each morning, and

found rules of conversational syntax. Robinson (1981) discovered such
rules in the duetting of titi monkeys. He found that the transition prob-
abilities between phrases in the male's call were altered in predictable
ways when a female joined him in calling. These findings may be of
interest in studying the origin of both syntax and discourse rules.
The openness of human language allows us to talk about anything,
to constantly create new combinations with new meanings. Hockett
and Ascher ( 1964) speculate that openness originated when an animal
encountered two stimuli, such as food and danger, simultaneously. The
animal would then utter a blend of the two calls, producing a new call
with a new meaning.
Nothing approaching the openness of human languages has been
documented in any natural primate system. However, Green ( 1975a)
reported the origin of new vocalizations in Japanese macaques. The
new vocalizations were associated with a new situation, provisioning
with food by humans. Green believes that the new vocalizations are an
example of openness in the Japanese macaque communication system.
He compares this innovation with other cultural innovations which have
been studied in macaques such as sweet potato washing (Miyadi, 1959)
and caramel unwrapping (ltani. 1958).
In addition, chimpanzee language experiments have demonstrated
that these animals are capable of generating meaningful new sequences
using the vocabulary and rule systems of their experimental languages
(Premack and Premack, 1983, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980b). Chimps
have occasionally combined familiar elements to produce new meanings
such as calling a watermelon "candy-fruit" or "drink-fruit" and calling
a radish "cry-hurt-food" (Fouts and Rigby, 1980). We do not know if
or how these abilities are utilized in the wild, however.
Chimps in language experiments have not shown themselves to be
especially adept or creative linguistically. They do not actively seek to
acquire new vocabulary or constantly repeat (Premack and Premack,
1983), nor do they comment on the actions of themselves and others or
on the properties of food or tools (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980a) as
human children do.
Hockett ( 1960) questioned whether traditional transmission was
present in non-human primate communication systems. It has long been
realized that traditional transmission is important in many song birds
(Nottebohm, 1975). Recent evidence suggests that certain aspects of
communication in non-human primates also are at least partially tradi-
tionally transmitted. This has been noted in squirrel monkeys (Newman
262 WORD, VOLUME 35. NUMBER 3 <DECEMBER 1984)

and Symmes, 1982) in which the two subspecies have different dialects,
in cotton-top tamarins (Hodun et al., 1981 ), in which it appears that the
long call, which is produced by males only after puberty, is at least
partly traditionally transmitted, and in Japanese macaques (Green,
1975b), in which three separate troops each developed its own variant
of a tonal theme in response to provisioning by humans.
A further parallel between human language and other primate sys-
tems is the ontogeny of the mature vocal system. Primate infants are
not born with the mature communication system, but gradually develop
it. The alarm calls of vervet monkeys are an instructive case. Vervet
monkey infants babble, i.e., they produce various components of the
adult system at random and non-referentially (Seyfarth and Cheney,
1982). Babbling has also been noted in pygmy marmosets and cotton-
top tamarins (Snowdon, 1982) and probably functions to give infants
practice in producing the range of sounds necessary for communication
in their societies. As the infant vervet monkey matures it begins to use
the alarm calls, but in a semantically generalized manner. The leopard
call will be given for any mammal, the snake call to long, thin things
such as branches, and the eagle call to falling leaves and other birds.
This may be akin to the semantic generalization of human children.
Eventually the young monkey learns the correct referents and both uses
and reacts to the different calls appropriately. This suggests that human
and non-human primates may be using some of the same developmental
pathways in terms of both motor control of vocalizations and semantic
development to arrive at their mature communication system.
I have been reviewing evidence which suggests that human and
non-human primate communication systems have more in common than
has generally been realized. However, major difficulties are encoun-
tered when we try to determine exactly where the meaning is in a
primate vocalization. It is relatively easy to show that particular vocal-
izations are associated with particular behaviors, and that these systems
are rule-governed: grammars have even been written for cotton-top
tamarin (Cleveland and Snowdon. 1982) and titi monkey (Robinson,
1981 ). It can be shown that experimentally altering the order of phrases
causes a disturbed reaction. But, we do not know exactly how to
interpret these results. Does each part of a vocalization contain mean-
ingful elements which, when combined in accordance with grammatical
rules, produce interpretable strings? Or, is each call perceived as a
gestalt, with any alteration in form simply producing a vocalization
which is not part of a known repertoire? For the moment, these very
important questions remain unanswered in any natural non-human pri-
 WIENER. EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 263

mate system. However, chimpanzee "language" experiments show that

these animals certainly have the capacity to understand and use systems
in which individual elements containing meaning are combined in lawful
ways to form unique strings. How, or even if, these skills are used in
the wild is still a very much open question.
4. Function of language Let us turn our attention to the functions of
language in the context of a broadly defined communication system. I
use the term communication system to include syntactic information,
intonation, exclamations, gestures, facial expression, eye contact, body
posture, etc. A communication system functions to facilitate living in
social groups and interacting with con-specifics. In this context, the
human communication system has a variety of functions including in-
formation transfer, the expression of emotions, warning, recruiting,
requesting, ritual greetings, lying, planning, etc. All but the last two are
functions common to all primate communication systems. The last two
items are known to be present in humans and chimpanzees. It is now
known that chimpanzees are socially and politically sophisticated ani-
mals, who learn to lie. manipulate others, and seemingly even plan for
the future (Premack and Premack, 1983, Waal, 1982). Thus, they have
displacement, the third design feature which Hockett (1960) thought to
be unique in humans. It is evident that although the exact form of
the signals vary from species to species, the communication systems of
humans and other primates encompass the same basic functions.
In humans, the linguistic channel has become very specialized, but
research has shown that non-linguistic information is often of primary
importance for interpreting the meaning of a signal (e.g., Friedman,
1982). We must realize that, despite the undoubted importance of lan-
guage to humans, our languages still function as only one component
of an integrated communication system.
A nice example of the interaction between the structure of a vocal
signal and its function in the social environment comes from studies of
monkey dialects. Squirrel monkeys use dialect information in much the
same way that humans do, i.e., they use this information to distinguish
members of their own troop from members of different troops. In
playback experiments, they acted aggressively towards recordings of
vocalizations that originated in a different dialect area (Newman and
Symmes, 1982). Humans also use dialect information to distinguish
members of their social or geographical area from non-members. Thus.
in both humans and squirrel monkeys, vocal systems diverge naturally
and differences in the systems are used as social cues.
264 WORD, VOLUME 35. NUMBER 3 (DECEMBER 1984)

Patterns of dialect transmission across generations in Japanese

macaques may be similar to those in humans. Green ( 1975b) found that
the older members of a troop, who were adults before provisioning by
humans began, did not develop the site specific vocalizations that the
younger members used. Thus, there is evidence of age differences in
the use of vocal systems which may be similar to patterns observed
in humans.
5. Taxonomic approach I have been giving evidence from primate com-
munication research suggesting that non-human primate communica-
tion systems are more complex than has previously been realized, and
I have suggested that the precursors of some seemingly unique features
of human language may be found in non-human primates. It is important
to ask how we can test these hypotheses.
Marantz (1983) states that only advances in neurophysiology can
bring us closer to understanding language functions and their origins.
Undoubtedly this line of experimentation would be most fruitful, but it
is difficult, as brain function is rather poorly understood from a neu-
rophysiological viewpoint, and experimentation with human subjects is
often ethically constrained.
A behavioral approach in which we look at specific behaviors over
a broad taxonomic range of primates may give us some answers. We
must ask if feature "X" is a primitive primate or even mammalian
feature (i.e., appearing throughout the primates or mammals), or if it
appears in only one or a few specialized lineages. Do we see trends as
we move from taxonomically remote groups such as monkeys to our
closest relatives, the gorilla and chimpanzees? Are certain features
correlated with habitat (forest vs. savannah) or with mating system
(monogamous vs. polygamous) rather than with taxonomic relation-
ship? Have certain features evolved many times in different groups?
Are similar features homologous (inherited from a common ancestor)
or analogous (independently converging on a similar form)?
Indeed, a puzzling aspect of the data discussed thus far is that such
characters as complex vocal systems, babbling, and speech-like vocal
streams have been observed in Old and New World monkeys, but not
in the great apes who are our closest relatives. On the other hand,
memory, complex problem solving, and mastery of artificial "lan-
guages" has been demonstrated to be more developed in the great apes
than in monkeys. Human language seems to involve all these traits.
Have the great apes lost some of these complex vocal characters or
have humans and monkeys evolved them separately to meet some
common communicative need?
 WIENER. EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 265

At present, we do not have the necessary data from enough pri-

mates to be confident that any of the features discussed in this paper
are evolutionarily continuous with similar features in humans. These
questions can be answered by studying a variety of primates from many
different taxa. A character which is present in all primates studied is
very likely to be homologous with the corresponding character in hu-
mans. However, a character which is found only in e.g., humans and
two species of New World monkeys is almost certain to be indepen-
dently evolved in the two groups. Complex distribution patterns are
more difficult to interpret. A character may have evolved many times
or been selectively lost in different lineages resulting in a seemingly
haphazard distribution pattern. Study of the ontogeny or finer structure
of the trait may help to determine which alternative is correct.
If it turns out that a particular feature has evolved several times in
a number of different lineages, we can then ask what environmental or
social factors are likely to have influenced the evolution of the trait. Do
the species which have evolved the trait share similar habitats, social
organization, or mating patterns? Though we may not learn the phyla-
genetic history of a particular feature, we can still get valuable infor-
mation about selective factors that are likely to have been important in
the communication systems of our remote ancestors. Thus, a taxonomic
survey of primate communication systems should lead to a better un-
derstanding of primate communication (including human) in general and
will point us towards the most promising areas of study for understand-
ing the evolution of human language in particular.
Based on current data, it seems likely that human language, though
it functions as an integrated whole, is a result of mosaic evolution. The
various design features of human languages very likely have different
evolutionary origins. It is likely that many of these features originally
had different functions than they do today. As the cognitive and lin-
guistic abilities of our hominid ancestors advanced, various features
would have acquired new uses and become more refined. For this
reason, we should not talk about the origin of language as something
that can be located in time and reduced to one essential mutation or
innovation. Rather, we should think of language as a constantly evolving
behavior, shaped by the environmental and social requirements of the
animals who use it. It involves the integration of a large number of
subsystems, each with its own evolutionary history.
This viewpoint may help clear up some of the controversy con-
cerning the "ape language" experiments. Many claims have been made
for and against the linguistic abilities of these apes (see Sebeok and
266 WORD, VOLUME 35, NUMBER 3 (DECEMBER 1984)

U miker-Sebeok, 1980 and Terrace, 1979 for two accounts of the contro-
versy). Do they or don't they have language? Can they make a sentence?
At this point we can say that they cannot fully acquire a human language
and do not use language in all the ways that a normal human would,
although they do possess many of the design features and cognitive
abilities that characterize human language. If we view language as a
mosaic of different features which have evolved and integrated over
time to produce what we call human language, we need not draw any
lines between language and non-language. Both the ape language ex-
periments and investigations into the natural communication systems
of non-human primates have shown that these animals have abilities
which were not even suspected twenty years ago. It is probable that
many features of their communication systems became the building
blocks for certain features that later evolved in human language. It is
important to remember that each species has a communication system
which is uniquely suited to the needs of its environment and social
organization. We would not expect to teach vervet monkey communi-
cative abilities to orangutans and we should not expect to find human
language among chimpanzees. However, we should expect to find that
the communication systems of all these animals share certain features
in common, since they all belong to the primate order. Further study
and comparison of these features should teach us much about the
evolution of primate communication and the conditions under which
human language may have evolved.
6. Conclusion I have argued that human language can be studied as an
evolved behavior which functions as part of an integrated communi-
cation system. Recent studies of non-human primate vocalizations sug-
gest that their vocal systems are more complex than has previously
been realized, containing syntactic rules, duality of patteming, and
traditionally transmitted components. It is necessary to study these
features in a broad range of primates before we can confidently label
them as precursors of such features in human language. Studies of
chimpanzee cognition and "language" learning indicate that these ani-
mals are quite sophisticated and have mental processes very much like
those of humans. These facts make hypotheses about the absolute
uniqueness of human language and cognition seem much less attractive.
It is reasonable to view human language as a system which has
evolved in accordance with normal processes. Speculations about mi-
raculous mutations or denials of any relationship between human and
non-human primate communication systems are generally unenlight-
ening. Human language has been shaped by evolution from many dif-
ferent features with diverse evolutionary origins. Certain features, e.g.,
 WIENER, EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 267

most of those mentioned in Hockett ( 1960) probably are necessary to

any communication system as complex as human language. However,
we must realize that the present form of human language is not the
result of any necessity for a particular logical structure (indeed, it is not
all that logical). Rather, human language is a peculiarly primate system
which has evolved from a conglomerate of primate and mammalian
features which include such characters as categorical perception, in-
tonation, ontogenetic learning patterns, and cognitive strategies. Even
if we were to admit a mutation which gave us openness or duality of
patterning, this mutation would still have to operate in a system which
was critically based on a previous primate pattern. Thus, further studies
of the communication systems of non-human primates is sure to give
us insights into the origins and form of human language today.

Science Center 223

Han·ard Uni1·ersity
Cambrid~:e. MA 02138

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