Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. LEARNING OBJECTIVEs
2. INTRODUCTION
3. DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES
RELATIONS
9. SUMMARY
1. LEARNING OBJECTIVES
Upon completion of the module the students should be able to understand:
The importance of Government in maintaining the fabric of industrial relations setup.
The divergent perspectives of state interventions in IR
The ways and means of state intervention in IR
Problems concerning the role of the government in industrial relations.
Future of states’ intervention in maintaining the sound industrial relations.
2. INTRODUCTION
The role of the state in industrial relations is
determined by its political, ideological, and
socio-economic orientation. This has a direct
impact on the model it adopts for economic
development. After a brief overview of
divergent perspectives on the role of the
state, the chapter discusses the types of
interventions the government may make in
the sphere of industrial relations, the means
of action by the state in different aspects of
industrial relations, the relationship between
multinational companies and the state, and
the role of the state in industrial relations.
3. DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES
The role of the government in industrial relations depends on its ideological (socialist, communist,
capitalist, neo-capitalist persuasion), political (neo-colonial, democratic, dictatorship or military
regime), and socio-economic (protectionist or neo- liberal, export-oriented policies) orientation.
The role of the state varies depending on the (early, middle, or late) state of
development/industrialization and the level (international, national, industry, enterprise, or shop-floor)
of interactions.
In the early stages of the industrial revolution, the state was hostile to workers and the
emerging labour movement and the state's role became one of legally-sanctioned suppressor (Bellace
1993). After World War II, the drive for political independence of countries under colonial rule, the
Universal Human Rights Declaration the influence of the Philadelphia Declaration, and the
enunciation of the international labour standards concerning freedom of association and right to
collective bargaining prevented the state from formally opposing the workers' right to organize and to
collective bargaining. In both communist and fascist countries, the state's posture towards workers
and 'unions' was operationally similar. Unions were viewed as an instrument of the state and, as such,
were brought under the control of the party and the state. Although called 'unions', labour unions in
such countries served to organize and control the 'workers' and, consequently, were incapable of
performing the role accorded to unions under a system of free collective bargaining. It became clear
that unions could exist and collective agreements could be signed without the state losing control of
labour unions. After World War II, in several newly independent countries, the state emphasized the
welfare of the workers and trade unions became adjuncts of the state. In some countries the state
curbed trade unions and collective bargaining in order to pursue the declared economic plans/goals,
while in others, unions were too weak and fragmented to effectively represent and protect the interests
of the workers without the support of the state. Most of the newly independent countries had a
politically controlled economic system, which required politically-oriented economic action by
workers (Sufrin 1964). In the early 1950s, in some countries like India, the unions tacitiy endorsed the
state's preference for adjudication, rather than articulating the need for collective bargaining.
In the middle phases of industrialization, the state became more tolerant of unions and
pluralist values. The south Asian countries, particularly India, had a large industrial base and a strong
trade union movement by the time they became independent. The leaders who fought for the
independence of these countries were also at the forefront of organizing the labour movement.
Therefore, the state in India has been tolerant of the unions and has recognized the value of labour-
management cooperation in the context of planned economic development. Unfortunately, the spirit
of non- cooperation, which was the hallmark of the freedom struggle, was reinforced after
independence and led to antagonistic union-management relations. In India the mesmeric effect of
leaders like Gulzari Lai Nanda, who strove hard to promote voluntarism and codes of discipline in the
1950s did not last long. In areas where the state encouraged protection of domestic entrepreneurship
with the public sector at the forfront, it guaranteed unviable jobs by nationalizing sick private sector
units. In areas where the state followed export-oriented policies, it played a key role in co-opting the
workers and the unions in the economic development process.
4. TYPES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS
Table 5.1 presents the various types of interventions by the state in industrial relations.
In the latest phase of industrialization, the state is adopting a neo-liberal policy. The dominant model
is that of a market economy where the state will let the market forces take charge. Macroeconomic
development models that emphasize investment and export-oriented growth strategies in the success
of newly industrializing countries jn Asia did not initially support the principles of basic labour
standards, freedom of association, and collective bargaining (Kochan 1996).
Standards. For instance, in matters concerning freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining, legislation should be such that there is no undue interference in the
formation, registration, or functioning of trade unions and no limitations are put on the right
to collective bargaining.
C. Institutions:
The institutions dealing with industrial relations could be classified into facilitative,
executive, and judicial.
i. Facilitative: The facilitative institutions can be of several kinds. They
include, for instance, institutional mechanisms for the provision of skills.
Institutions for developing and operationalizing proactive labour market
policies will include a national employment service that doesn't merely
register job seekers and play a mechanical role, but one that identifies the gap
between required and acquired skills, provides opportunities for bridging the
gap and matching job seekers with job providers. In terms of minimum wage
setting, it could include tripartite institutions for setting up and enforcing
minimum wages. In terms of workplace democracy, it could include statutory
and voluntary institutional mechanisms for worker
involvement/representation/say/stake. In terms of grievance redressal, etc., it
could include systems and procedures for grievance redressal, handling of
discipline, and dispute settlement.
ii. Executive: The laws enacted by the state come into effect only upon gazette
notification for the purpose. The executive is also responsible for enforcing
the laws through the labour administrative machinery appointed by the
central and state governments. The executive's role can be visualized as a
source of authority or service. If it is perceived as a service function, its
effectiveness can be judged in terms of knowledge, accessibility, and attitude
of the incumbents. Are they knowledgeable? Are they accessible? Are they
helpful?
iii. Judicial: The authorities described in the Industrial Disputes Act to interpret
and adjudicate disputes are part of the judicial machinery. The key question
here is whether or not these institutions are specialized, independent, and
autonomous. Judicial independence and autonomy of the kind envisaged by
the first and the second national commissions on labour will adversely
impinge upon the discretionary power of the state. Discretionary power can
be subjective and susceptible to abuse.
6. LIBERALIZATION AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
In the wake of structural changes in the region, as elsewhere, dominant shifts in macro-
economic policy are discernible:
a) from a centrally planned to a decentralized market economy;
b) liberalization and export-oriented policies;
c) relative stagnation in employment in the organized sector, expansion in the informal sector,
and growth in unemployment and poverty;
d) privatization and/or private sector as an engine of growth;
e) emphasis on productivity and profitability in economic and industrial enterprises in the state
sector;
f) increase in the incidence of industrial sickness;
g) decline in job and income security;
h) growth of atypical, non-standard employment; and
i) adverse effects on employment opportunity for women.
These shifts call for a reassessment of the role of the state in social and labour matters. In
many countries these developments have further strained the relations between governments and
social partners, particularly on issues such as privatization and the increasing incidence of
redundancies and atypical forms of employment (ILO 1997). It will require the redeployment of
labour from unviable sectors to expanding sectors and coping with sharp, transitory drops in
the/demand for labour nationwide. How labour fares during these periods of major change depends on
how successfully countries manage these two tasks. Although initial conditions matter in easing the
adjustment process, so do policy choices about the timing and sequencing of reform (World Bank).
The following observations can be made about the nature and consequences of the changing
role of the state in a liberalizing economy:
Is the state withdrawing from a more active role in the management of industrial relations,
either or both in the public and private sectors? Privatization apart, there is no evidence of
the withdrawal of the state from industrial relations management in India. In developing
countries the role of the state is expected to grow due to the unfinished agenda of labour law
reform, growing poverty and unemployment, and the presence of a vast, unorganized, and
unprotected informal sector. In such situations the government cannot afford to sit back and
be content with the role of an umpire in a bipartite process. They must take initiative in the
field of labour administration, public enterprises, and the promotion of sound labour relations.
The recent policy shifts do not warrant that the state be dormant, but require it to be more
active, though in a different role: it should move away from the present controller's role to the
enabler's role.
What has been the state's role in the promotion of export-oriented policies, as compared to
the earlier orientation towards import substitution in the countries of the region? Economic
reforms have been ushered in without much consultation at the planning stage. On the labour
front, however, the legal framework has not changed much except for liberalized
compensation for voluntary separations in the context of privatization and
restructuring/adjustment at the enterprise level in almost all the countries. Legal restrictions
on termination and closures remain, but collective bargaining provides for greater flexibility
and assertion of employer prerogatives of the type Malaysian industrial relations legislation
provides in respect of 'employment, transfer, promotion, work assignment and work force
adjustment'. Bangladesh and Pakistan mandated restrictions on workforce reductions in the
first year of privatization. What happens after that is anybody's guess. Indian legislation is
considered stiff and the Indian government is considered generally reticent, if not reluctant, to
dole out administrative clearances for lay-offs, closures, or retrenchment. However, collective
agreements provide for these in the private sector without reference to the state.
Have labour market and industrial relations (laws and other policies) reforms kept pace
with the changes in macroeconomic liberalization policies in the countries of the region?
The literature on the south-east Asian experience suggests such a linkage, but in India such an
alignment is still elusive.
What governance arrangements link the changed role of the state to sound industrial
relations in the countries of the region? Where power is decentralized, changes can be
discerned. For instance, in India, at the state level, direct privatization of the state-owned
public sector is taking place, but at the central level, privatization efforts have been stillborn.
At the state level, public enterprises which are unable to pay redundant workers' wages are
not paying. At the central level, this is not the case. Even firms which the Board of Industrial
and Financial Restructuring ordered to be closed due to their unviable nature, have not been
closed. Some states in India introduced secret ballot, while others simplified labour inspection
and cancelled registration of unions on technical grounds. What the state is not able to do, the
consumers and the judiciary are accomplishing. When consumer rights clash with worker
rights, the former prevails over the latter. Courts are coming down heavily on the workers in
the organized sector and are soft on the workers in the unorganized sector. A spate of
judgments in India in the post-liberalization era substantiates this.
Has there been a marked tendency towards decentralization in collective bargaining? In
India, collective bargaining has traditionally been decentralized. The only exception are the
large industries in India in which the state is the major employer. In banks, ports, steel, and
coal, centralized industry-wide bargaining is still prevalent.
What changes have occurred in the incidence of strikes and in conflict resolution
mechanisms? The incidence of strikes has come down, but that of lockouts is growing in
several countries of the region. The union's capacity to strike may have come down.
Alternatively, they seem to prefer covert to overt forms of conflict. Dispute and conflict
resolution mechanisms continue much the same as before, with their independence at the
lower levels still being in question.
What evidence is there, if any, to suggest that there is a shift in emphasis from conflict
resolution to conflict avoidance and from dispute handling to preventive maintenance in
industrial relations? There is hardly any evidence of such efforts by the state. At the firm
level, however, cooperative agreements provide for peace clauses. Where external pressures
precipitated economic crises, cooperative agreements between labour and management are
becoming possible. Where mistrust is prevalent and transparency is lacking, mutual
understanding becomes impossible, leading to stalemates in problem solving.
What are the new roles, if any, of the state in industrial relations, including in the areas of
skills training (vocational), workforce adjustments, and the national/ institutional
framework of industrial relations? In India, the state has initiated a major revamp of the
national vocational training system with the possibility of setting up a credible accreditation
system. At the company level, agreements providing for training, retraining, and multiskilling
are being reached.
What has the state done to promote sound labour relations? What practical measures has the
government taken to bring about a genuine shift from dominant conflict- oriented forms of
labour relations to dominant co-operative arrangements? Since national development will
largely depend on the functioning of the tripartite machinery, it is essential that workers' and
employers' interests should be represented by strong, representative, effective, and well-
structured workers' and employers' organizations. It is not enough for the government to have
promotion of sound labour relations as a policy objective. It has to be pursued with the
requisite political will. Also, sound labour relations should contribute to the overall
competitiveness of industry and economy.
What has the state done to initiate policy reform? If policymakers wait for reform until the
economy collapses, they will have fewer options and probably a more painful transition.
Contrarily, if reform is tackled before the government has established its commitment and
credibility, the results can be counterproductive and set back the cause of reform, with
disastrous consequences for growth and social well-being. A credible and sustainable reform
programme requires that government, capital, and labour perceive a common interest.
Winning the support of organized labour is critical, especially if, as is sometimes the case,
unions represent only that part of the labour force that was relatively privileged before the
transition and may have a vested interest in impeding reform. Social pacts can provide a
vehicle for labour, employers, and governments to reach some consensus on the reform
package as a whole and on the trade-offs involved. However, social pacts can have their own
drawbacks if they lack the wider support of the administrative and economic ministries within
the government. Also, if they are purely voluntary, compliance may become a casualty.
The government needs to focus on some of the persistent problems that it faces with regard to
its role in the industrial relations situation. The following are some of the constant problems related to
the government's role in industrial relations:
i. Persons who are appointed to the post of (a) Labour Minister, (b) Labour Secretary, and (c)
Labour Commissioner are expected to have an in-depth understanding of the historical, social,
and economic dimensions of the subject, apart from having the elementary empathy and
sensitivity so essential for handling labour issues. In actual practice, this does not happen. The
Ministry at the Central level and the departments at the state level, therefore, fail to make
their presence felt and create the desired impact.
ii. Trade unions have political and ideological affiliations. If the Labour Minister, at either
Central or state level, has his/her roots in any one of the trade unions, his/her decision cannot
have the necessary degree of objectivity or impartiality. He/she is sure to be influenced, to
whatever degree, by the ideological beliefs of his/her past.
iii. Industrial Relations Commissions, as envisaged by the First National Commission on Labour
(1966-69), would have provided an answer to the imbroglio of the biased ideologies of
ministers. However, this was unacceptable to most of the states, as it would have resulted in
the erosion of the authority of the Labour Minister concerned.
iv. One year comprises of 52 weeks and 365 days. If we have over thirty Tripartite Committees
at the Central level and an equal number of Committees at the state level, we may be paying
lip-service to tripartism, however, we will be unable to do any justice to their actual
functioning. This calls for a complete reorganization of the number, scope, and mandate of
these committees and their actual functioning.
v. The Central and state governments have done precious little to ensure that
a. Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts are set up according to the need, i.e., related
to the number of cases/disputes that are on an average taken up for
conciliation/adjudication;
b. persons of caliber and professional competence handle Tribunals and Courts;
c. labour-oriented recurrent training and orientation are provided to these persons;
d. the trend is arrested wherein
i. some cases have lingered for 15-20 years with the Tribunals, and
ii. constitutional writ jurisdictions of the High Courts (Articles 226 and 227) and
the Supreme Court (Article 32) were invoked to challenge the awards of the
Tribunals and to stall their implementation; and
e. the perverse trend of taking recourse to protracted litigation and non- implementation
is arrested.
vi. There are different judgments of the apex court at different points of time on the definition of
the appropriate government and the interpretation of various sections and sub-sections of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Contract Labour (Regulations of Conditions and Abolition)
Act, 1970; Minimum Wages Act, 1938; etc. which have confounded the prevailing confusion.
8. FUTURE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
Past experience reveals that both the market and the state fail if unquestioned faith is reposed
in either of them singularly. Both have their respective roles to play. Too much of reliance on one will
prove counterproductive.