Early Conceptions of Positive Justice as Related to the Development of Logical Operations

Author(s): William Damon

Source: Child Development, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Jun., 1975), pp. 301-312
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development
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Early Conceptionsof PositiveJustice as Related
to the Developmentof Logical Operations

William Damon
Clark University

DAMON, WILLIAM. Early Conceptions of Positive Justice as Related to the Development of

Logical Operations. CHILD DEVELOPMENT,1975, 46, 301-312. In order to investigate the rela-
tion between the development of justice conceptions and the development of mathematical
and physical conceptions, 50 children (10 at each age from 4 through 8) were administered
a "positive justice" interview and 5 of Piaget's concrete-operationalmathematical and physical
tasks. Results indicate that (1) there is a strong association between the level of a child's
reasoning about positive justice and the level of his reasoning about mathematicaland physical
problems; (2) in the great majority of subjects, there was close synchrony (i.e., little segre-
gation) between parallel levels of reasoningin the 2 domains; and (3) there was little evidence
in support of the notion that 1 type of reasoning (e.g., mathematical-physical) provides a
necessary condition for the development of the other (e.g., justice). An analysis of logical
relations between parallel levels in the 2 domains is presented.

In a number of studies, Piaget and In-
helder have proposed a stage model which
describes the development of children's reason-
ing about mathematical and physical concepts
(Inhelder & Piaget 1964; Piaget 1951; Piaget,
Inhelder, & Szeminska 1960). The focus of this
model is the child's acquisition and coordina-
tion of logical "operations," reversible mental
acts which enable the child to reason sys-
tematically about both the stable and the
changing properties of reality. Operations are
first acquired and organized into "groupings"
at approximately age 7, during the stage of
concrete operations. They are later reorganized
into "groups" at approximately age 11, during
the stage of formal operations.
Piaget has suggested, but never tested the
hypothesis, that the development of moral rea-
soning in children is a process paralleling the
development of logical operations. In recent
writings, he has noted that the coordination of
logical operations at the concrete level is sim-
ilar to the structuration of moral' values that
occurs at approximately the same age: "The
organization of moral values that characterizes
middle childhood is . . . comparable to logic
itself; it is the logic of values or of action
among individuals, just as logic is a kind of
moral of thought. Honesty, a sense of justice,
and reciprocity together form a rational system
of personal values. Without exaggeration this
system can be compared to the 'groupings'
of relations or concepts that characterize
logic . . ." (Piaget 1968, p. 56). Beyond such
general characterizations, however, Piaget has
not posited specific developmental relations
between the domains of logical and moral
reasoning.
Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) have pre-
sented a model in which the attainment of
certain Piagetian logical stages is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the attainment
of certain stages in Kohlberg's moral judgment
system. Thus, in this model, fully consolidated
concrete-operational thought is necessary for
the emergence of Kohlberg's stage 2 moral-
ity, and fully consolidated formal-operational
thought is necessary for stage 5 morality. This
model does not, however, specify isomorphic
structural elements in the two domains which
might lead to such developmental relations.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Western Psychological
Association, San Francisco, April 1974. I would like to thank Jonas Langer for his advice on
this research and Wendy Damon for her assistance in collecting data. I would also like to
thank N. Rankin, I. Uzgiris, L. Cirillo, and M. Wiener for their suggestions and comments on
the final versions of this manuscript. Author's address: Department of Psychology, Clark Uni-
versity, Worcester, Massachusetts01610.
[Child Development, 1975, 46, 301-312. @ 1975 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc. All
rights reserved.]

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302 Child Development
Recently there have been some empirical
investigations into the developmental relations
between logical reasoning and moral judgment.
Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, and Haan (1975) re-
ported that all of their subjects who reasoned
predominantly at a "principled" moral level
(Kohlberg's stages 5 and 6) also were capable
of formal-operational thought-a finding which
lends support to the Kohlberg-Gilligan asser-
tion regarding the necessity of certain logical
levels for certain moral levels. Tomlinson-
Keasey and Keasey (1974) reported similar
findings with two samples of adolescent girls,
and likewise interpreted their results as sup-
porting the notion that formal operations are a
necessary condition for the development of
moral stages 5 and 6. Lee (1971) found that,
in children aged 5-15, an increase in certain
moral responses (e.g., "peer" vs. "authority
type" responses) was associated with the de-
velopment of concrete-operational reasoning,
whereas an increase in certain other moral re-
sponses (e.g., "societal order" considerations)
was associated with the development of formal-
operational reasoning. Again, however, none of
the above-mentioned studies presented more
than a cursory analysis of specific structural
relations between the developmental variables
under investigation.
Part of the difficulty in precisely defining
relations between logical and moral thought
has arisen from the ways in which moral
thought has been conceptualized. Kohlberg's
moral stages, for example, are intentionally
global, incorporating such seemingly distin-
guishable issues as law, convention, honesty,
responsibility, justice, religion, and the value
of life. Although Kohlberg has often asserted
the fundamental structural unity in these vari-
ous moral concerns (Kohlberg 1963, 1970),
the basis of this assertion has come increasingly
under question (Peters 1971; Turiel 1974).
Since the relations between the various com-
ponents of Kohlberg's moral stages are as yet
uncertain, it is difficult to speculate exactly
what features of his system bear relations to
the development of logical thought. On the
other hand, attempts like Lee's to operation-
alize moral development have encountered an
opposite set of problems. By viewing moral
development as a simultaneous increase in cer-
tain types of responses and decrease in others,
Lee was able to quantify her subjects' progress
along various moral dimensions; but this quan-
titative approach did not enable her to define
structural relations between the moral dimen-
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sions or between any aspect of moral reasoning
and concrete- or formal-operational thought.
By focusing exclusively on the develop-
ment of a specific moral concept-"positive
justice"-the present paper adopts a position
intermediate between Kohlberg's global model
and Lee's response-oriented conceptualization.
Justice is viewed as a means of resolving con-
flicts between various interpersonal claims,
such that the proposed resolution is acceptable
(or "fair") to all significant persons (Rawls
1971). Positive justice is that aspect of justice
that is concerned with problems generated in
prosocial interaction: for example, problems of
how to distribute property fairly, of ownership
and personal rights, of responsibility for an-
other's welfare, and of what constitutes a good
response to another's actions. Associated with
activities like sharing, taking turns, helping,
etc., concerns of positive justice have been ob-
served to be central to the social and moral
behavior of children as young as 2 or 3 years
(see, e.g., Murphy 1937). Such concerns seem
to arise out of the day-to-day interpersonal
contacts of a young child and evolve in the
course of his ongoing establishment of friend-
ship and affiliated types of social relations. De-
velopmental aspects of a subject's conception
of positive justice then include: (1) the types
of interpersonal conflict recognized by S; (2)
the means that S constructs to resolve such
conflicts; (3) the collection of persons whom
S considers significant in constructing "fair"
resolutions to conflicts; and (4) the nature of
the justification that S invokes to support his
resolutions.
In pilot work (Damon 1971, 1973), inter-
views with young children about problems in
positive justice revealed that even those chil-
dren who were diagnosed at a nonmoral level
(stage 0) by Kohlberg's measures nevertheless
showed consistent, patterned reasoning about
positive justice. Thus, organized reasoning
about this concept can be seen relatively early.
In addition, the concept of positive justice was
seen to develop further through a series of six
distinct phases-hypothesized to be substages
-which were in turn shown to be closely age
related between the ages of 4 and 10. A brief
synopsis of these six positive-justice substages
follows. Though the numbering of these sub-
stages matches that of Kohlberg's model, no
necessary parallelism between this sequence
and Kohlberg's stage sequence is intended. Al-
though there certainly may be some overlap
between Kohlberg's description of his early

moral stages and the sequence of positive-
justice conceptions presented here, the exact
similarities and differences are difficult to
specify because of the global nature of Kohl-
berg's stages.
William Damon 303
persons can have different, yet equally valid,
justifications for their claims to justice. Choices
attempt quantitative compromises between
competing claims (e.g., he should get the most
but she should get some too).

Stage 0 Substage 2-B.-The S coordinates consid-

Substage 0-A.-Positive-justice choices de-
rive from S's wish that an act occur. Reasons
simply assert the choices rather than attempt-
ing to justify them (e.g., I should get it be-
cause I want to have it).
Substage 0-B.-Choices still reflect S's de-
sires but are now justified on the basis of ex-
ternal, observable realities such as size, sex,
or other physical characteristics of persons
(e.g., we should get the most because we're
girls). Such justifications, however, are invoked
in a fluctuating, a posteriori manner and are
self-serving in the end.
Stage 1
Substage 1-A.-Positive-justice choices de-
rive from notions of strict equality in actions
(e.g., everyone should get the same). Justifica-
tions are consistent with this principle but are
unilateral and inflexible.
Substage 1-B.-Positive-justice choices de-
rive from a notion of reciprocity in actions:
that persons should be paid back in kind for
doing good or bad things. Notions of merit
and deserving emerge. Justifications are uni-
lateral and inflexible.
Stage 2
Substage 2-A.-A moral relativity devel-
ops out of the understanding that different
erations of equality and reciprocity, such that
S's positive-justice choices take into account the
claims of various persons and the demands of
the specific situation in relation to one another.
Choices are firm and clear-cut, yet justifications
reflect the recognition that all persons should
be given their due (though, in many situations,
this does not mean equal treatment).
The present study was undertaken to in-
vestigate the child's development through the
above justice stages in relation to his develop-
ment of concrete-operational reasoning. The
purpose of the study was to provide an analysis
of the structural and developmental relations
between this one aspect of moral reasoning and
logical thought. Three areas of isomorphism
between positive-justice conceptions and logi-
cal reasoning were postulated: (1) classifica-
tory acts, (2) compensatory acts, and (3)
perspective-taking acts. It was posited that
classificatory skills would be manifested in
justice reasoning through S's grouping of per-
sons and their justice claims; that acts of com-
pensation would be seen in S's construction of
reciprocal relations between persons and acts,
as in sharing, paying back, notions of desert,
etc.; and that perspective taking would influ-
ence S's mode of justifying his choices to an-
other, as well as the way in which S concep-
tualizes interpersonal conflict. Table 1 presents,

TABLE 1
HYPOTHESIZEDRELATIONSBETWEENSTAGESOF JUSTICE CONCEPTIONAND OPERATIONAL
REASONINGON
THREE ISOMORPHICDIMENSIONS

ISOMORPHICDIMENSIONS
JUSTICE OPERATIONAL
SUBSTAGE STAGE Classification Behavior Compensation Behavior Perspective Taking
0-B 1-intuitive Graphic collections; par- Quantitative correspon- No differentiation of
thought tial alignments; shifting dences (one-to-one or self's point of view from
classificatory criteria; size matched) that of other
transductive logic
1-B 2--preoperational, Nongraphic collections; Acts of reciprocal order- Awareness that other
transitional fixation on certain lim- ing along a single di- may have perspective
thought ited though stable cri- mension; no anticipation different from self's
teria of alternative possibilities
2-B 3--concrete Flexible construction of Coordination of recipro- Perspectives of others
operations hierarchical classes; use cal acts; anticipatory viewed in relation to that
of negation operations; compensations of self; ability to con-
advent of foresight, hind- struct all possible points
sight, and anticipation of view

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304 Child Development
with regard to these three types of acts, the
developmental relations between children's
conceptions of positive justice and their levels
of operational reasoning. The relations postu-
lated in table 1 are, in effect, the hypotheses
to be tested in this study.
Since the "B" justice substages are the
final, fully realized versions of each stage, the
relations posited in table 1 refer to justice sub-
stages 0-B, 1-B, and 2-B. The operational
stages in this table refer to those proposed by
Inhelder and Piaget (1964) and Piaget (1951)
in describing the development of concrete
operations.
Method
Subjects
The Ss were 50 middle- and upper-
middle-class children, five boys and five girls
at each of ages 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The Ss were
drawn from a preschool and an elementary
school in Berkeley, California.
Procedure
Each S was administered a positive-justice
interview and a set of mathematical and physi-
cal tasks designed to assess his level of op-
erational reasoning. As a control against possi-
ble experimenter bias, the justice interview was
administered by one E and the operational
tasks were administered by another. For half
the Ss, the justice interview was administered
1 or 2 weeks prior to the operational tasks;
for the other Ss, the order was reversed.
Instruments
The justice interview consisted of (1) an
open-ended interview focusing on sharing and
a sharing problem adapted from Ugurel-Semin
(1952), and (2) four dilemmas of the type
used by Kohlberg but newly designed espe-
cially for the presentation of positive-justice
conflicts to young children.1 The sharing task
and the first of the dilemmas are presented
below.
Sharing task.-(a) Who's your best friend?
Do you let him play with your toys? Why? [Why
not?] What would happen if you said, "No
[Jimmy], you can't play with my toys?" What
happens if he won't let you play with his toys?
Does your mommy tell you to share your toys? Is
that why you do it? What would you do if your
1 All
procedures and scoring materials for the justice tasks are available on request from
the author.
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mommy told you, "No, you can't let [Jimmy] play
with your toys anymore"?Why is it a good thing
to share? Who gets the biggest piece of dessert in
your family? Is that fair? Should everyone get the
same amount? Who should get the most dessert?
Why?
b) Here are some toys [poker chips]. Let's
pretend your best friend [Jimmy] is sitting right
here. Now I'm going to give you all these toys to
play with. Would you give Jimmy any of them?
Which ones would you give him? Which ones
would you keep yourself? What if he wanted all
these-what would you say to him? Why don't
you take them all for yourself?
Dilemma 1.-All of these boys and girls are
in the same class together. One day their teacher
let them spend the whole afternoon making paint-
ings and crayon drawings. The teacher thought
that these pictures were so good that the class
could sell them at the fair. They sold the pictures
to their parents, and together the class made a
whole lot of money. Now all the children gathered
the next day and tried to decide how to split up
the money. What do you think they should do
with it? Why? Kathy says that the kids in the
class who made the most pictures should get most
of the money. Andy says the kids who made the
best ones should get the most. What do you think?
There were some lazy kids in the class who didn't
draw very much in comparison to the others.
What about them? Jim says that the best-behaved
kids should get more than the rest. Lisa says that
the poor kids should get the money, because they
don't have much. Someone says that the teacher
should get the money, because it was her idea to
sell the pictures. What do you think?
The remaining three dilemmas probed
further for issues raised in the sharing ques-
tions and dilemma 1 and were used to obtain
a further sampling of S's justice reasoning.
Briefly, the second dilemma pitted a smart but
lazy girl against a dull but hard-working boy:
who should get the most stars (i.e., the better
grade) on schoolwork? The third dilemma
posed the problem of a boy who was too poor
to get an allowance: should he receive a free
candy bar even when all the others had to pay
for theirs? In the fourth dilemma, four
children worked to earn bicycles: should
they share their earnings with their father,
among themselves, etc.? S's reasons for
his choices were always elicited by a series of
probing questions and counterconditions. The
probes were administered in a schedule that
was standard across Ss, so that each S had a

chance to respond to each of the questions and
counterconditions. But each interview was also
administered with considerable flexibility, the
order and wording of every probe varying to
fit the pattern of the individual S's responses.
In addition, S was always asked to repeat the
story of the dilemma or otherwise show com-
prehension of the plot before the questions
were administered.
A typed transcript of each S's justice in-
terview was prepared. All protocols were
scored blind, with no information concerning
age or identity of S. Each of the five justice
tasks-the
sharing questions and the four
dilemmas-was scored according to a scoring
guide which described characteristics of each
of the six justice substages. Examples of re-
sponses scored at each of the six substages
follow.
O-A.-Suppose you and Sammy are playing
together and you have these [five] toys? Would
you give him any? I would give him these two.
Why those two? Because I got to keep three.
These are the ones I like. Suppose Sammy said,
"I want to have more"? If he took one then I
would take one back from him. Why is that? Be-
cause I want three... . What will Sammy do
then? He will say that's O.K., because he likes
these [toys].
O-B.-[Keeps four blue chips and gives Jenny
two white chips.] You would keep all these blues
for yourself? Yes, because I like blue. And then
rd play with them. Let's pretend Jenny said, "I
like blue." Would you give her any blue? Never,
because I have a blue dress at home. So you
wouldn't give her any blue at all. Is it fair to do
it this way? Ah, ha, I've got it. I'd give her two
of the white--'d give her those [two] because
she's younger than me, and I get four because I'm
four.
1-A.-Do you think anyone should get any
more than anyone else? No, because it's not fair.
Somebody has 350 and somebody has one penny.
That's not fair.... Andy said that he thought the
one who made the best stuff should get the most
money. The best person who makes te best stuff
is not polite, because you should make them have
the same alike-give everything the same. The
same, because it's not polite when you give people
the most and they [the rest] don't have one. It's
fair to the other children that they have to get it
too.
1-B.--But Kathy thought that she should get
the most because she made the most things. Do
you think that's fair? Well, if she made more
things, then she'd get more money. What if she
didn't make--If she didn't want to make anything,
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William Damon 305
then she wouldn't get as much as all of these kids.
Well, what about the poor kid here, who doesn't
have any money to begin with? Well, the poor kid
should make some stuff, then he'd get more....
What about the lazy kid? Well, he shouldn't get
as much if he didn't work as much, if he didn't do
his work. ....
2-A.-What if Kathy made more stuff? Should
she get more money? Oh, about seven more pen-
nies. It depends on what she made-if she made
something easy or hard. What if she made some-
thing hard? About ten cents more. What about
Andy, who made the best stuff-should he get
more? Well, maybe he should. But since she made
more, she may have some good ones, so then maybe
he can get around five cents more. What about
Billy, who doesn't get any allowance? He should
only get about three cents more because-if he
got a lot more, he might even have more than any-
body adding up their allowance. What about these
others? No, because they don't have such a big
reason.
2-B.-Should the kids who were most coop-
erative get bigger shares? No! Because that really
doesn't make much sense. They are not in a con-
test about attitude and how you share with other
people. They don't care about that. They just want
to have people do good stuff, they don't care about
that. How about giving bigger shares to the poor
kids? No. They [the class] don't care if they [the
poor kids] are poor or not. Well, we might feel a
little sorry for them. But they don't care about
that. They just want the ones who did the best to
get the most money. And why is that? I just said,
that way they'll all try to do better next time.
Each of the positive-justice tasks was
given a stage score that reflected the reasoning
level predominantly used on that task by S.
Since all of these tasks probed the same funda-
mental conceptual issue, an overall "major"
justice-stage score was determined for each S
on the basis of his scores on the majority of
tasks; for example, if S scored 1-B on four of
the tasks and 2-A on one, his major justice-
stage score was 1-B. Overall, an average of
74% of Ss' justice task scores were at the
major substage level, 24 % were one substage
higher or lower, and 2 % were two substages
higher or lower. It should also be noted that
there was not always a clear, scorable response
by S on all five justice tasks. In such cases, the
task(s) in question were not scored, and the
major stage score was derived from S's per-
formance on the remainder of the tasks.
Five operational tasks (OTs), consisting
of problems in mathematical and physical
logic, were administered to S. Each OT se-
306 Child Development
lected for the study was assumed to elicit one
of the three dimensions, outlined above, which
were posited to be isomorphic with both logi-
cal and justice reasoning. The first two OTs
were designed by Inhelder and Piaget (1964)
to study the development of classification be-
havior. The OT 1 was the multiplicative classi-
fication problem, and OT 2 was a class-inclu-
sion problem. The OT 3, the "49 leaves"
problem, was designed to study the child's use
of the logic of relations in constructing multiple
seriations (Inhelder and Piaget 1964) and thus
represented a problem in logical compensation.
The OT 4, Piaget's "mountains test," examines
the child's ability to take Euclidean spatial per-
spectives (Piaget 1951). A scoring guide based
on Piaget's stage descriptions for these tasks
was prepared.
The fifth OT was a new task adapted
from a series of experiments performed by
Piaget et al. (1960) and Piaget, Grize, Szemin-
ska, and Vinh Bang (1968), intended to diag-
nose the child's ability to construct schemes of
proportional measurement (e.g., ratios). In so
doing, the task taps the child's use and co-
ordination of both compensation and negation
(see Piaget et al. 1960, p. 334). In this task,
S was presented with four cardboard pies, A,
B, C, and D. The pies were gradated in size,
with A the largest and D the smallest. Pie A
was divided into fourths, pie B into halves,
pie C into eighths, and pie D into fourths. Cor-
responding to the four pies were four paper
dolls, gradated in size proportionately to the
four pies. The S was told that the problem was
to be sure that each doll's stomach was always
just as full of pie as were all the other dolls'
stomachs. The S was asked to figure out how
many pieces of their pies each doll should get
if doll A were given one piece (one-fourth)
of pie A, and then to figure out how many
pieces each should get if doll A were given
two pieces (one-half) of pie A. Scoring criteria
similar to those used by Piaget for similar tasks
were developed.
All 50 Ss were given all five OTs with the
exception of OT 3, which, because of admin-
istrative difficulties, was given to only 34 Ss.
For each of the five OTs, there were three
possible stage scores: 1 (intuitive), 2 (transi-
tional), and 3 (concrete operational). How-
ever, for OT 2, stages 1 and 2 were not easily
distinguishable and were collapsed, for the
present study, into one (stage 1-2). As with
the justice interviews, each S's typed protocol
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was scored blind. Each S was given an op-
erational-stage score on each of the five OTs.
Since the OTs reflected distinct (though re-
lated) operational abilities, no major OT score
was given.
Reliability of scoring for both the justice
and the operational measures was determined
for a randomly chosen set of approximately
one-fourth (12) of the Ss. Research assistants
were given copies of the scoring guides for the
two sets of measures. For the justice scores,
reliability was determined by calculating the
percentage of perfect agreement between two
raters on the S's stage score, as well as the per-
centage of disagreement by one substage, two
substages, etc. For the justice scores, there was
83% perfect agreement between the two raters
and 17% disagreement by one substage. The
justice ratings were never more than one sub-
stage apart. For the operational-stage scores,
there was 90% perfect agreement between the
two raters and 10% disagreement by one
stage. Operational ratings were never more
than one stage apart.
Results
All Ss were ranked by age, justice-stage
score, and stage score on each of the five OTs.
The Spearman rank order formula was used to
calculate coefficients of correlation between all
of the variables.
In replication of the earlier finding men-
tioned above, there was a significant level of
association between age and justice-stage score,
r(48) = .85, p < .001. Justice substage 0-A
was found predominantly at age 4; 0-B at ages
4 and 5; 1-A at ages 5 and 6; 1-B at ages 6
and 7; 2-A at age 8; and 2-B at age 8. In
addition, there was a significant level of asso-
ciation, p < .001, between age and stage
scores on each of the five OTs; for OT 1,
r(48) = .66; OT 2, r(48) = .59; OT 3, r(32)
= .65; OT 4, r(48) = .73; OT 5, r(48) =
.64. The association between age and justice
was significantly higher, p < .01, than was the
association between age and any of the OTs.
Table 2 reports the intercorrelations be-
tween justice-stage scores and the five OT-
stage scores. All of these relations were signifi-
cant at the p < .001 level. The correlation
between justice-stage score and OT 4 (the
spatial perspectives task) was significantly
higher, p < .05, than was the correlation be-
tween justice and any of the other OTs.
 William Damon 307
TABLE 2
OF JUSTICE-STAGESCORESAND STAGESCORESON FIVE OPERATIONAL
INTERCORRELATIONS TASKS (OTs)

Justice OT 1 OT 2 OT 3 OT 4 OT 5
Justice ............................ .........
OT 1 (multiplicativeclassification)... .76 ... ...
OT 2 (class inclusion) .............. .76 .63
OT 3 (seriation) ................. .78a .77a .67a
OT 4 (Euclidianspatial perspectives) .88 .75 .73 .83a
OT 5 (proportionality)............. .77 .69 .65 .72a .76
NOTE.-All correlationsare significant at the p < .001 level. Unless otherwise specified, = 48.
a D = 32. d-

In addition to calculating the overall cor- intersection of (1) justice substage 2-B and
relations between the variables, the association (2) all other justice substages with (1) op-
between justice and each of the OTs was ex- erational stage 3 and (2) all other operational
amined at each of the five age levels studied. stages. Fisher Exact Tests were performed on
Table 3 reports the strength of these associa- each of these tables, examining the extent to
tions. In general there were few significant cor- which the following intersections represented
relations at the earliest age levels (4 and 5), deviations from their expected values: justice
whereas at ages 6 and above, justice-stage substage 0-B x operational stage 1; 1-B X 2;
scores were significantly correlated with OT and 2-B X 3. The results of these analyses are
scores on the great majority of tasks. But it reported in table 5.
should also be noted that there was relatively
little variability of scores on all measures at In sum, the following patterns are re-
the youngest ages. flected in tables 4 and 5. For justice substages
0-A and 0-B, OT scores are primarily at pre-
Table 4 shows the frequencies of justice- operational stage 1. At 1-A begins a distinct
stage scores across OT-stage scores on each of shift toward operational stage 2, and by justice
the five OTs. To test for the hypothesized re- substage 1-B there is a distinct clustering of
lations presented in table 1, three 2 X 2 fre- OT scores at operational stage 2. At justice
quency tables were constructed for each OT. substages 2-A and 2-B, OT scores are mostly
One of the three showed the intersection of at stage 3 (the level of concrete-operational
(1) justice substage 0-B and (2) all other jus- reasoning). No Ss at 0-A justice showed con-
tice substages with (1) operational stage 1 and crete-operational (stage 3) reasoning on any
(2) all other operational substages. The second OT; and only one 0-B S showed stage 3 reason-
showed the intersection of (1) justice substage
ing on one OT (OT 2). At the most advanced
1-B and (2) all other justice substages with levels, all Ss at 2-B justice performed at opera-
(1) operational stage 2 and (2) all other op- tional stage 3 on all five OTs (with the ex-
erational stages. The third table showed the
ception that one 2-B S was not given OT 3).
TABLE 3 Discussion
CORRELATIONSBETWEENJUSTICE-STAGESCOREAND
OT-STAGE SCORESFOR EACH OF FIVE AGE LEVELS The results of this study support the gen-
eral hypothesis of a strong association between
JUSTICE OPERATIONAL
TASKS the level of children's reasoning about positive
SCORE justice and the level of their reasoning about
BYAGE OT 1 OT 2 OT 3 OT4 OT 5
logicomathematical and logicophysical concep-
Justice score tions. With the exception of the children at the
at age: youngest age level, this association generally
4 ..... .10 .10 .08a -.02 -.22 held among children of the same age, an indi-
5 ..... .34 0 .87*b .59* .42
6 ..... .56* .84** .62C .58* .29 cation of a special relation between the vari-
7 ..... .55* .86** .62c .89** .75** ables beyond the manifest age relatedness of
8 ..... .82** .52 .87*b .70* .80** each. The failure to find this association among
NOTE.-Unless otherwise specified, df = 8. the 4-year-olds and the partial failure to find
a DI = 6.
b DI = 4. it among the 5-year-olds were likely due to the
Di
=D5.
* p
<.05. uniformly low response levels (and hence the
**
p<.01. almost negligible degree of stage variance on

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308 Child Development
TABLE4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF JUSTICE-STAGE SCORES ACROSS OPERATIONAL-STAGE SCORES
ON FIVE OPERATIONALTASKS

OPERATIONAL STAGE SCORES BY OT

OT1 OT 2 OT 3 OT 4 OT 5
JUSTICE STAGE SCORE 1 2 3 1-2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0-A ...... ........... .. 5 ... ... 5 ... 4 ... ... 5 ... ... 4 1
0-B .................. 7 3 ... 9 1 4 2 ... 8 2 ... 9 1
1-A .................. 2 8 1 10 1 2 6 ... 6 5 ... 9 2
1-B .................. 2 7 2 8 3 1 4 3 1 10 ... 4 5 2
2-A .................. ... 4 3 ... 7 ... 1 2 ... 2 5 2 2 3
2-B .................. ... ... 6 ... 6 ... ... 5 ... ... 6 ... ... 6
NOTE.-For OT 3, N = 34; for all others, N = 50.

all measures) found among the youngest sub- speculate on extrinsic factors leading to this
jects. stronger relation, for example, particular en-
vironmental influences such as schooling en-
The relationbetween justice stage and OT countered at various ages and having a differ-
score on the spatialperspectivestask was found
ential effect on reasoningin the two domains.
to be significantlyhigher than the relation be- But this study provides no evidence for or
tween justice stage and any other OT score.
Such a finding lends some support to certain against such speculations.
theoretical interpretations differing from the The hypotheses presented in table 1 pos-
model of structuralisomorphismbetween do- ited particular relations between justice and
mains asserted here. Two such alternative
operational reasoning at specified parallel
models are (1) Feffer's (1970) contentionthat levels. These hypothesized relationswere gen-
the development of both interpersonal and erally supported by the Fisher Exact analyses
mathematical-physicalconceptions reflects a of cell distributions(tables 4 and 5), although
processof decentering,which is uniquely allied the support was less than perfect and varied
to perspective-takingacts in each domain; and
widely in its strength from point to point. An
(2) Kohlberg's(1971) argumentthat all moral analysisof the distributionsreportedin table 4
judgmenthas a perspective-takingbasis, which is offered in an attempt to explain the mutual
leads to the conclusion that particularlystrong
relationsshould be expected between any facet growth of the two forms of reasoning.The dis-
cussionwill focus on justice substages0-B, 1-B,
of moral reasoning (e.g., justice conceptions) and 2-B in relation to their corresponding
and perspective taking as manifested in either levels of operationalreasoning. As in table 1,
social or spatial contexts. three reasoningdimensionselicited by the OTs
The strongerrelation between justice and will be invoked to analyze parallel levels of
age than between any OT and age could be operational thought: classification,compensa-
due to methodological factors. For example, tion, and perspectivetaking.
the justice score was comprised of a consider-
ably largersamplingof S's reasoningthan were Justice SubstageO-B
any of the OT scores, and thus may have rep- On most of the OTs, Ss at 0-B justice
resented a more stable score. One might also scored mostly at operationalstage 1, although

TABLE 5
FISHER EXACT TEST LEVELSOF SIGNIFICANCEFOR CELLS SHOWING INTERACTIONOF JUSTICE SUBSTAGE
0-B, 1-B, AND 2-B WITH OPERATIONAL
STAGE1, 2, AND 3, RESPECTIVELY

OPERATIONAL STAGE BY OT

OT 1 OT 2 OT 3 OT 4 OT 5
JUSTICE SUBSTAGE 1 2 3 1-2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0-B ................. .01 .... ....07 .07 ... .. .005 ...... .05......
1-B .................. ... .18 ... .72 ... ... . 68.. ... ... .001 ... ... .05 ...
2-B .................. ... ... .001 ... .001 ... ... .001 ... ... .001 ... ... .001

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there was some beginning movement toward
operational stage 2, particularly on OT 1.
1. Fluctuatingclassificationcriteria.-The
distinguishing characteristic of stage 1 classifi-
cation behavior (OTs 1 and 2) is the forma-
tion of partial alignments and chain complexes.
The stage 1 S often begins grouping objects on
the basis of one common criterion (e.g., color)
and then shifts to another criterion (e.g.,
shape) without noticing the inconsistency in
his behavior. The result of this "chaining" of
classificatory criteria is a graphic collection
rather than either a nongraphic collection or
a class. At 0-B in the justice domain, there is
a similar fluctuating of the criteria used in jus-
tifying certain judgments-specifically, judg-
ments about which persons in a situation are
worthy of regard. A 0-B S will often begin jus-
tifying a choice by citing one type of personal
attribute as a basis for the choice (e.g., she
should get more because she's a girl) but will
then shift to another attribute in justifying the
same choice (e.g., give it to her because she's
the youngest). Often the main consistency in
0-B justifications is that they serve to support a
choice that favors the self or those identified
with the self. At such times, the 0-B justifica-
tions show many of the same transductive char-
acteristics as do the stage 1 partial alignments
and chain complexes of class logic. The 0-B
child cannot yet group valued personal attri-
butes into coherent collections that are defined
by stable intentional properties. Without this
basic classification ability, the 0-B child cannot
construct judgments that systematically sup-
port the rewarding of selected personal at-
tributes or deeds. The child is confined either
to rewarding a fluctuating variety of physical
characteristics that he conceives as related to
the self, or to constructing quantitative cor-
respondences.
2. Precursoryacts of compensationin the
form of quantitative correspondences.-With
regard to compensation at operational stage 1,
there were two manifestations. First, on OT 3,
the stage 1 child at best could arrange leaves
into "couplets" based on a figurative matching
of sizes or colors. He could not construct re-
ciprocally seriated orderings of all the leaves
on the basis of either criterion. Second, on OT
5, the stage 1 child employed a one-to-one cor-
respondence of pie pieces to dolls as a means
of filling up each doll the same amount. This
one-to-one correspondence was the stage 1
precursor of proportional compensation for
each doll's size. Similarly, quantitative corre-
spondences function as a 0-B precursory form
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William Damon 309
of compensation in the justice domain. These
quantitative correspondences serve to match
physical attributes with amounts of reward
(e.g., the boys should get more, the biggest
should get the most, etc.). In such cases, the
quantitative correspondence is an early form
of merit, that is, a preferential treatment of se-
lected personal attributes. But at 0-B there is
no pay back in these premerit notions-that is,
there is no conception that reward can be a
compensation for being good, doing good, etc.
-and therefore the 0-B form of compensation
is only precursory. Statements of direct reci-
procity-the linking of prior events to present
action-are also precursory at 0-B. The 0-B S
can relate events by means of descriptive reci-
procity statements, describing action-reaction
sequences (e.g., tit for tat) but does not yet
prescribe such reactions. In this sense also 0-B
reciprocity is precursory, for without prescrip-
tivity a statement cannot function as a justice
judgment.
3. Rudimentaryperspectivism.-At stage
1 on OT 4, S could reconstruct only his own
point of view. If the question is simple enough
(e.g., when it involves a binary choice like
"Can the doll see the river from his side of the
mountain?") the stage 1 S can sometimes dif-
ferentiate his viewpoint from that of others.
But, when reconstructing a viewpoint that re-
quires the systematic transposition of spatial
relations like left-right or before-behind, the S
invariably falls back to reproducing his own
point of view. At 0-B in the justice domain, the
S begins to recognize certain conflicts in de-
sire. For example, the child can see that he
might want more dessert than his sister and
that at the same time his sister might want
more than he. Also, unlike S at 0-A, S at 0-B
sees the need to justify his choices to another
on a basis more objective than a statement of
his own desires. But the 0-B child constructs
his justice judgments primarily from his own
point of view. Although 0-B justifications often
take external factors into account, 0-B choices
usually serve the purpose of rewarding the
egocentric wishes of the self. Whatever a
posteriori justifications the S might offer, the
0-B judgment attempts to assure pleasant con-
sequences for the self or for those associated
with the self (e.g., those of the same sex). The
only consistent exceptions to this type of judg-
ment at 0-B are those justice choices based
on simple quantitative correspondences (see
above). In any case, it is clear that, although
the 0-B S can recognize certain justice con-
flicts, he cannot conceptualize them from
310 Child Development
points of view other than his own. The 0-B
choice is still primarily an egocentric assertion
of the S's own desires, unaffected by a possibly
conflicting justice claim of another. As at stage
1 on OT 4, there seems to be no way at 0-B
to construct the other's position as opposed to
that of the self.
On the basis of several important cogni-
tive dimensions, 0-B justice reasoning is sim-
ilar to typical stage 1 logical reasoning. Of par-
ticular interest is the empirical finding that
no 0-B Ss scored higher than stage 2 on any
OT. Thus, there is reason to suspect, at this
level, close informative relations between logi-
cal and justice reasoning, such that the segre-
gation of the two systems in a normal individual
is a rare occurrence.
Justice Substage 1-B
At 1-B in the justice domain, table 4
shows a distinct movement of Ss to operational
stage 2 on OTs 4 and 5 and a consolidation of
Ss at stage 2 on OTs 1 and 3. On OT 2, there
is the small beginning of a movement toward
stage 3. These empirical relations support the
assertion that justice substage 1-B and opera-
tional stage 2 are developmentally parallel.
1. Grouping of persons through use of
constant, noncontradictorycriteria.-At stage
2 on OT 1, S was able to construct consistent,
nongraphic collections through use of one
or more of the available classificatory criteria.
These collections were inflexible and non-
related: the stage 2 S could not switch criteria
once he had constructed his four arrangements,
and these arrangements could not themselves
be organized into sub- or supercollections. In
the justice domain, the 1-B S continues the
process begun at 1-A of constructing justice
judgments on the basis of consistently valued
claims or attributes. These selected claims de-
termine the judgments rather than merely jus-
tifying them as at the 0 substages. Whereas at
1-A the valued claims derive from equality cri-
teria, at 1-B they derive from considerations
of merit. But the S's means of dealing with
these justice criteria is essentially the same at
1-B as it was at 1-A, even though the criteria
are somewhat different. At both substages, the
judgments are consistent but inflexible. Once
the S has decided whether a given personal
attribute is worthy of reward, this judgment
remains unaltered by changes in situation or
presentation of new, conflicting justice claims.
This absolutistic nature of judgments charac-
terizes both justice substages 1-A and 1-B.
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2. Consolidationof compensatoryreason-
ing along a single dimension.-At stage 2 on
OT 3, S can order objects in a trial-and-error
manner on the basis of one criterion. He can-
not coordinate two criteria (e.g., size and
color) to form a multiplicative arrangement.
Thus, acts of reciprocal ordering at operational
stage 2 are limited to a single series and do
not bear the possibility of coordination with
other acts of reciprocal ordering. At justice
substage 1-B, S's compensatory justice reason-
ing develops in a number of ways. First, the
child begins to make prescriptive reciprocity
statements such as "I'll share with her if she
shares with me." Second, S now infuses the
concept of merit with a pay-back notion: S
considers certain acts or personal qualities to
be meritorious and thus deserving of special
compensation. Justice judgments at 1-B are
thus primarily determined by compensatory
reasoning in the form either of direct, pre-
scriptive statements or of rewarding special
claims to merit. But a reciprocity judgment at
1-B is uncoordinated with equality judgments,
as well as with other coexisting forms of reci-
procity judgment. The S at 1-B is unable to
reconcile a plurality of conflicting justice
claims, each of which he may recognize as
worthy in itself. The typical 1-B solution to
such conflicts is to imbue with absolute moral
rightness one justice claim that is justifiable on
reciprocal grounds. At 1-B, S does not weigh
individual claims in light of one another or in
light of the context from which they arise.
On OT 5, the stage 2 S for the first time
establishes an approximate proportional bal-
ance between size of doll and amount of pie.
The establishment of this kind of approximate
amount of pie requires a compensation be-
tween the number of fractional pieces and the
absolute size of each piece. But the stage 2
proportionalities are only approximate, because
such reciprocal acts are uncoordinated with
acts of operational negation. This lack of co-
ordination results in the S's inability to con-
serve fractional relations and therefore in his
inability to construct exact ratios. And so again
we see at operational stage 2 the emergence of
uncoordinated acts of reciprocity paralleling
the 1-B justice reasoning described above.
3. Partial but still-uncoordinated per-
spective taking.-The S at stage 2 on OT 4
attempts to distinguish between different view-
points but cannot establish a system of co-
ordination that will enable him to conserve the
relative position of objects across changes in

viewpoint. When S does succeed at correctly
reconstructing part of another perspective, it
is usually with reference to perceptual cues
rather than to a system of coordinated spatial
relations like left-right, before-behind. At 1-B
justice, S begins to recognize a wider range of
conflicts than do subjects at earlier stages. The
1-B S recognizes justice claims arising from
merit consideration (see above); and, by rec-
ognizing these claims, becomes aware of situ-
ations in which they are placed in conflict with
opposing justice considerations. But the 1-B S
cannot relate one claim to another in any sys-
tematic, coordinated manner. The different jus-
tice claims are selected or rejected on their
own merits, independent of the opposing
claims or of the specific situation in which the
claims have arisen. There is no attempt at 1-B
to mediate between the various possible justice
positions, nor to organize these positions into
a flexible hierarchy capable of dealing with in-
dividual situations. Such attempts are not pos-
sible at 1-B, because the S cannot yet systemat-
ically consider a plurality of justice claims.
Each justice claim remains unrelated to any of
the others. The S at 1-B justice, like S at op-
erational stage 2, can reconstruct certain posi-
tions, or isolated parts of these positions, but
in neither case has S established a system of
relating the positions or the isolated parts.
Without such a system of reference, S cannot
represent (or, in justice reasoning, weigh to-
gether) the various possible perspectives or
points of view.
As should be expected from the preceding
discussion, table 4 shows a distinct clustering
of 1-B Ss at operational stage 2 on OTs diag-
nosing S's reciprocity and perspective-taking
abilities (OTs 3, 4, and 5), and a continuation
of trends begun at 1-A toward operational
stage 2 on those OTs which examine classifica-
tion abilities (OTs 1 and 2). But it is impor-
tant to note that, on each OT, there was at
least one 1-B S who scored at operational stage
1. Such data tend to disconfirm the hypothesis
that operational stage 2 provides a necessary
condition for the emergence of justice substage
1-B.
Justice Substage 2-B
For no S at 2-B (N = 6) was operational
reasoning lower than stage 3 on any OT. At
2-B we see distinct shifts from operational
stage 2 to operational stage 3 on OTs 1, 3, 4,
and 5, whereas on OT 2 the 2-B Ss maintain
the shift to stage 3 that was begun at justice
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William Damon 311
2-A. Such data support the initial assertion of
developmental synchrony between justice 2-B
and the stage of concrete operations.
The Development of OperationalGroupings
and the Coordinationof Justice Elements
At the stage of concrete operations S con-
structs logical operations that are organized
into groupings. Such groupings are necessary
for stage 3 solutions to each of the operational
tasks. For one thing, these groupings give rise
to the anticipation that allows the stage 3 S
to construct flexible hierarchies on the multi-
plicative classification task (OT 1) and to sys-
tematically construct all possible perspectives
on the perspectives tasks (OT 4). Also, the
groupings establish an organization of opera-
tions that enables the S to coordinate acts of
reciprocal ordering on the seriation task (OT
3) and to perform successive acts of reciprocity
and negation on the proportionality task (OT
5) and the inclusion task (OT 2).
Now, something very similar to a group-
ing of operations occurs at substage 2-B in the
justice domain: the justice elements of equality
and reciprocity become coordinated for the
first time. The child at 2-B, like the S at 2-A,
considers the equal worth and relative value of
different justice claims. But the 2-B child can
make an additional judgment as to which claim
is most justifiable in the current situation. Such
a judgment requires the ability to hierarchize
the various justice claims in ways that are ap-
propriate to varying contexts. The ability to
construct flexible hierarchies of disparate jus-
tice claims arises from the coordination of
justice elements, which enables the child to
successively weigh the demands of equality
and reciprocity. The coordination at 2-B im-
plies only a successive weighing of justice
demands. It is not until stage 3 that a simul-
taneous donsideration of equality and reciproc-
ity will emerge.
The similarities between stage 3 opera-
tional reasoning and substage 2-B justice are
clear. In each case there is an initial coordina-
tion of mental acts-logical operations in the
operational domain, justice elements in the
justice domain. These coordinations unite vari-
ous forms of reciprocal and inverse reasoning
into organized systems. Such systems enable
the S to construct flexible hierarchies that can
be rearranged at will. Finally, the initial co-
ordinations established at operational stage 3
and at justice 2-B enable S to successively per-
form mental acts based on reciprocity, nega-
312 Child Development
tion, and equality. The simultaneous perfor-
mance of such acts will not be possible until a
later stage in each domain-formal operations
in the logical domain (Inhelder & Piaget 1958)
and stage 3 in the justice domain. But such
later stages are beyond the scope of this study.
In table 4, all cells showing the intersec-
tion of 2-B justice and operational stages 1
and 2 are empty for each OT. At this one level
of reasoning, then, the data do not contradict
the possibility that an operational level might
provide a necessary condition for the existence
of a justice level. But such findings are incon-
clusive, not only because of the small N in-
volved but also because 2-B justice and op-
erational stage 3 are the final points in the
developmental scales under investigation. It is
safer at this point to conclude that, at the most
advanced levels of reasoning investigated in
this study, there is once again evidence of
synchrony between the two domains in most
Ss. There is relatively little segregation of the
two types of reasoning in most Ss studied:
with only two exceptions, all Ss scoring at
stage 3 on any OT were at 1-B or higher in
their justice reasoning. Again, the data attest
to the existence of close, informative relations
between the two domains.
It appears that most of the data presented
here discount the notion that certain levels of
logicomathematical thinking are strictly neces-
sary for certain levels of moral thinking. Only
at the final points in each system did the data
not contradict such a notion (although the data
were also not strong enough to support it
adequately). Taken as a whole, the develop-
mental patterns presented here suggest that
logical and moral reasoning inform and support
each other in the course of ontogenesis as a
result of isomorphic structural features in the
two domains. The priority of logical to moral
reasoning does not appear necessary in devel-
opment: even among normal Ss, the pattern
may be quite the reverse.
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