ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. THE ACTIONS OF ANHUR WITH RESPECT TO THE MENHIT WETLAND COMPLEX

VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Government of Anhur failed to give due regard for the natural environment during

military operations, in gross violation of International Humanitarian Law

1.1 The damage to Menhit Wetland Complex caused by the military actions of Anhur, is

a violation of the core principles of International Humanitarian Law

Parties to a conflict must respect the applicable rules of IHL, and indeed, acts or omissions

which amount to violations of International Humanitarian Law will entail the international

responsibility of a State, provided those acts or omissions are attributable to the State

according to the rules on State responsibility.1 The core principles underpinning International

Humanitarian Law include the principles of distinction [1.1.1.], military necessity [1.1.2.],

proportionality [1.1.3.] and humanity [1.1.4.] – all of which are considered to have a bearing

on environmental protection during armed conflict.2

1.1.1. Principle of Distinction

1
ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, (2016) ¶ 131–132. See also Henckaerts and Doswald-

Beck (eds), ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I, commentary on Rule 149, p.

530.

2
Malviya, Laws of armed conflict and environmental protection: An analysis of their Inter-relationship, ISIL

Yearbook of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law, Sydney (2001).

The principle of distinction is a cornerstone of IHL and the first test to be applied in warfare

as it distinguishes between military and civilian nature of natural environment, and prohibits

indiscriminate attacks and direct attacks against natural environment.3 The principle of

distinction requires belligerents to conduct operations in a manner that respects the difference

between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants and military

objectives on the other.

This rule has been established as a norm of customary international law applicable in both

international and non-international armed conflicts.250 The application of the general

customary rule of distinction specifically to the natural environment is articulated in Rule

43.A of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, on the basis of the

civilian character of the natural environment.251

Natural environment is intrinsically civilian in nature.4 This express recognition is reflected in

State practice,5 the International Law Commission’s work on the protection of the

environment in relation to armed conflicts,6 and scholarly work of international law

commentators.7 The Menhit Wetland Complex, being a Ramsar site, is internationally

important to global biodiversity since it supports more than 150 tree species and over 34

3
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds), ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. I, Rule

43, p. 143
4
Droege and Tougas, “The protection of the natural environment in armed conflict: Existing rules and need for

further legal protection”, pp. 27–28.

5
See J.B. Bellinger III and W.J. Haynes II, “A US Government response to the International Committee of the

Red Cross Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol.

89, No. 866, June 2007, p. 455.

6
ILC, Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts (2019), Principles

13 and 14, pp. 250–256.

species of fish, 3 endangered species of birds and 8 species of notable mammals, in addition

to being an important area for migratory birds. 8 Therefore, given its rich environmental value

of the Complex, it is inherently civilian in nature.

Under International Humanitarian Law, an attack cannot be directed against the natural

environment unless it is directed against a specific part of it that has become a military

objective.9 For a part of the natural environment to fulfil the definition of a military objective,

a certain specificity is necessary. For a military action to be valid under international law, it

must be limited to the neutralisation of a distinct area of the natural environment. The

definition of a military objective can only be fulfilled by distinct parts of the natural

environment,10 therefore, irreversible damage caused to 80,000 hectares of the peat swamp in

the Menhit Wetland Complex, resulting in the loss of trees and vegetation, soil, and wildlife,

as a result of indiscriminate use of 200 high explosive artillery rounds,11 stands in complete

violation of the principle of distinction. The general prohibition of indiscriminate attacks

represents an implementation of the principle of distinction; the protection extended by this

rule to the natural environment thus arises from its default civilian character.12

7
M.N. Schmitt, C.H.B. Garraway and Y. Dinstein (eds), The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed

Conflict, with Commentary, IIHL, San Remo, 2006, Rule 4.2.4, p. 59.
8
Stetson Record, ¶ 14.

9
See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be

Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol III art.2(4), October 10, 1980

[hereinafter CCW].
10
Droege and Tougas, “The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict: Existing Rules and Need

for further Legal Protection”, pp. 27–28.

11
Stetson Record, ¶ 20-21.
12
See UNGA, Resolution 47/37, Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, 1992.
1.1.2. Principle of Military Necessity

The principle of military necessity implies that the use of military force is only justified to the

extent that it is necessary to achieve a defined military objective. Furthermore, the principle

of military necessity seeks to prohibit military actions that do not serve any evident military

purpose. The principle of military necessity is reflected in the 1907 Hague Convention IV, in

Article 23(g) on enemy property, which stipulates that it is forbidden “to destroy or seize the

enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the

necessities of war.”13 This provision has significant environmental relevance as Schmitt

observes,14 hostilities may have particularly disastrous consequences when they occur in

zones of major ecological importance or particular fragility.15 Tougas reiterates, taking all

feasible precautions to protect the natural environment against the effects of attacks is

therefore particularly pertinent for parties to conflicts who control territory featuring such

areas; special consideration should be given to the protection of those parts of the natural

environment that are especially vulnerable to the adverse consequences of hostilities.16

13
Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art.23(g), October 18, 1907.

14
Schmitt, Michael N. (2000). “War and the environment: Fault lines in the prescriptive landscape.” In J.E.

Austin and

C.E. Bruch (Eds.), The environmental consequences of war: Legal, economic, and scientific perspectives.

Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge.

15
See K.M. Gaynor et al., “War and wildlife: Linking armed conflict to conservation”, Frontiers in Ecology and

the Environment, Vol. 14, No. 10, December 2016, pp. 533–542.
16
Droege and Tougas, “The protection of the natural environment in armed conflict: Existing rules and need for

further legal protection”, pp. 43–44.

Lastly, military necessity demands that the distinct part of the natural environment in

question must, by its nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to

military action, and its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the

circumstances ruling at the time, must offer a definite military advantage. 17 Hence, it is clear

that the widespread, long-term and severe damage caused to 65% of the peat swamp failed to

offer any definite military advantage to Anhur and therefore, violates the principle of military

necessity in its entirety.

1.1.3. Principle of Proportionality

The principle of proportionality affirms that for the protection of the natural environment

against incidental damage, it is particularly important that, when assessing the anticipated

concrete and direct military advantage against the expected incidental civilian harm, account

is taken of the attack’s indirect effects, also referred to as “reverberating”, “knock-on”,

“cascading” or “second, third or higher-order” effects on the civilian population and civilian

objects that are reasonably foreseeable.18

Bearing in mind this appreciation of the highly context-dependent assessment of when

damage will be “excessive” (and therefore unlawfully disproportionate), an example of

disproportionate incidental damage to the natural environment would be the burning of an

17
“Protection of the environment in international armed conflict”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations

Law, Vol. 5, 2001, pp. 533–534.

18
Doswald-Beck (ed.), San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, p. 9,

para. 13(c). See also Dinstein (eds), The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, Rule 4.2.4, p.

59; HPCR, Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, commentary on Rules 88–89,

pp. 246–251; and Schmitt/Vihul (eds), Tallinn Manual, Rule 83, p. 232.
entire forest to eliminate a single, small enemy camp. 19 The military advantage anticipated

from the attack as a whole, rather than from isolated parts of the attack, is to be take into

account in the proportionality assessment. 20 Therefore, the Anhuri commander was entirely

incorrect in conducting a proportionality analysis before the artillery barrage and concluding

that the anticipated death and destruction was not excessive.21

Although, this obligation derives its doctrine from Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I of

the Geneva Convention,22 to which Anhur is not a State Party, it must be observed that

Article 55 of Additional Protocol I is tantamount to current customary law and therefore, is

applicable to non-parties to the Protocol. Furthermore, this is also reflected in State practice.23

1.1.4. Principle of Humanity

The principle of humanity prohibits inflicting unnecessary suffering, injury and destruction. 24

Thus a Party cannot render useless such objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian

population. According to this principle the destruction of timber resources and valuable

biodiversity resources are considered “inhumane” means of warfare. In this respect, it should

19
See UNEP, Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International

Law, p. 13: “[B]urning an entire forest to reach a single minor target, for example, would be considered a

disproportionate strategy in relation to the military gain.”

20
Gisel (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities under

International Humanitarian Law, pp. 11–13.

21
Stetson Record, ¶ 25.
22
Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol I art.51(5)(b), 1977.
23
Report of the International Expert Meeting, Quebec, 22–23 June 2016, ICRC, Geneva, 2018, pp. 43–51.
24
Hague Regulations art.23(e), 1970.
be noted that the Martens Clause also refers to the “laws of humanity.” 25 The expansion of the

Clause to include environmental considerations, as proposed by the International Union for

Conservation of Nature (IUCN),26 clearly seeks to build on the principle of humanity and

“public conscience” to protect the environment in the absence of specific treaty law.

The Martens Clause and especially the terms “laws of humanity” and “requirements of the

public conscience” either individually or combined, have an autonomous normative value

under international law.27 The term “laws of humanity” has been associated with the notion of

“elementary considerations of humanity”, while the term “requirements of the public

conscience” has been suggested as being identifiable in the motivation of States,

organizations or individuals that has led to the adoption of treaties in the area of IHL. The

“laws of humanity” and the “requirements of the public conscience” are potentially

autonomous sources of international law.

1.2 The Government of Anhur is liable for the widespread, long-term and severe harm

caused to the Menhit Wetland Complex by its military operations

The gross failure of the Government of Anhur to give due regard to the natural environment

during its military operations has resulted in widespread, long-term and severe damage to the

Menhit Wetland Complex [1.2.1] and the prohibition of wide-spread, long-term and severe

25
Ticehurst, Rupert. (1997). “The Martens Clause and the laws of armed conflict.” International Review of the

Red Cross, Vol. 317, p. 125.

26
IUCN, A Martens Clause for Environmental Protection, World Conservation Congress Resolution 2.97,

October 2000.
27
See ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016, ¶ 3290–3298.
damage to the environment as a result of armed conflict is a part of customary international

law [1.2.2].

1.2.1. Anhur’s military operations have resulted in widespread, long-term and severe

harm to the natural environment

Weapons and the use of weapons in such manner that may be expected to cause widespread,

long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited as per the principle,

established by Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention. 28 Furthermore, State practice

establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in international, and also in non-international, armed

conflicts.29 

The prohibition on inflicting widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural

environment is also repeated in the Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment in Times

of Armed Conflict and the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on observance by United Nations

forces of international humanitarian law.30

The Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the

ICRC considered as a war crime “wilfully causing widespread, long-term and severe damage

28
Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol I art.35(3) and art.55(1), 1977.
29
M. Bothe et al., “International law protecting the environment during armed conflict: Gaps and opportunities”,

International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 879, September 2010, p. 576. See also Schmitt, Michael N.

(1997). “Green war: An assessment of the environmental law of international armed conflict.” YaleJournal of

International Law, Vol. 22.

30
Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, § 11 ( ibid., § 159); UN

Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Section 6.3 (ibid., § 161).

to the natural environment”.31 The final text agreed for the war crime included in the Statute

of the International Criminal Court defines this war crime as “intentionally launching an

attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause … widespread, long-term and severe

damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the

concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”.32 The Statute thus establishes an

additional condition with respect to the criminalization of the prohibition contained in this

rule.

The Government of Anhur has committed ecocide by firing 200 high explosive artillery

rounds, responsible for the destruction of 80,000 hectares of peat swamp, which serves as a

habitat for multiple endangered species and is a site of international importance. “Ecocide”

is defined in the penal codes of the countries of the former Soviet Union as “mass destruction

of the flora and fauna and poisoning of the atmosphere or water resources, as well as other

acts capable of causing an ecological catastrophe”. 33 Viet Nam’s Penal Code refers to

“destroying the natural environment”.34

The three conditions, that are, widespread, long-term and severe are cumulative and the

phrase “long-term” was understood by the adopting States to mean decades. The Committee

Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia stated in its final report in 2000 that the threshold was so high as to make it
31
ICRC, Working paper on war crimes submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an

International Criminal Court.

32
ICC Statute art.8(2)(b)(iv). 
33
See the legislation of Armenia (ibid., § 189), Belarus (ibid., § 192), Kazakhstan, (ibid., § 204), Kyrgyzstan

(ibid., § 205), Republic of Moldova (ibid., § 207), Russian Federation, (ibid., § 212), Tajikistan, (ibid., § 215)

and Ukraine (ibid., § 217).

34
Viet Nam, Penal Code (ibid., § 219).
difficult to find a violation. The report indicated that for this reason there was disagreement

as to whether the damage in the Gulf War crossed this threshold. 35 Similarly, with

approximately 65% of the peat swamp forest being burned, the damage caused to the Menhit

Wetland Complex, would take decades, if not more than a century, for the area to recover.36

1.2.2. The prohibition of wide-spread, long-term and severe damage to the environment

as a result of armed conflict is customary international law

The 1949 Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified and many of their provisions

are considered to constitute an integral part of customary international law. Significant

practice has emerged to the effect that this prohibition of wide-spread, long-term and severe

damage has become customary. This prohibition is set forth in many military

manuals.37 Causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment is an

offence under the legislation of numerous States. 38 This practice includes that of States not, or

not at the time, party to Additional Protocol I.39 Several States indicated in their submissions
35
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, Final Report 

36
Stetson Record ¶24.

37
 See Military Manuals of Argentina (ibid., § 163), Australia (ibid., §§ 164–165), Belgium (ibid., § 166), Benin

(ibid., § 167), Canada (ibid., § 168), Colombia (ibid., § 169), France (ibid., § 170), Germany (ibid., §§ 171–

173), Italy (ibid., § 174).

38
See Legislation of Australia (ibid., § 190), Azerbaijan (ibid., § 191), Belarus (ibid., § 192), Bosnia and

Herzegovina (ibid., § 193), Canada (ibid., § 195), Colombia (ibid., § 196), Congo (ibid., § 197), Croatia (ibid., §

198), Georgia (ibid., § 201), Germany (ibid., § 202), Ireland (ibid., § 203), Mali (ibid., § 206), Netherlands

(ibid., § 208).
39
Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, § 11 ( ibid., § 159); UN

Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Section 6.3.

to the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons case and Nuclear Weapons

(WHO) case that they considered the rules in Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol

I to be customary.40 In the same context, other States appeared to be of the view that these

rules were customary as they stated that any party to a conflict must observe this rule, or must

avoid using methods or means of warfare that would destroy or could have disastrous effects

on the environment.

The ICJ in its judgement in the case of Nicaragua v. United States41 based part of its decision

on the Parties’ adherence to a UN resolution and stated that its opinion was based on

customary international law. Commentary on this decision suggests that the conclusion of

this reasoning is that UN resolutions may, if they enjoy sufficiently wide acceptance,

constitute customary international law.42 If these so-called soft law documents are indeed

considered customary international law, it ensures that their provisions become binding on all

States.

In the ICTY’s decision of Yugoslavia v. NATO, the report of the Special Committee

established to study the case stated that “the NATO bombing campaign did cause some

40
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ GL No 95, [1996] ICJ Rep 226,

ICGJ 205 (ICJ 1996), 8th July 1996, United Nations [UN]; International Court of Justice [ICJ]
41
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, ICJ 14, 27

June 1986.

42
Anderson Terry L. and Grewell, J. Bishop. (2000). The greening of foreign policy. PERC Policy Series, PS-

20. Property

and Environment Research Center, Bozeman, MT. p. 11. See also Kelly, Patrick J. (2000). “The twilight of

customary international law.” Virginia Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 40, No.

115, pp. 450-476.

damage to the environment,”43 mentioning the bombings of chemical plants and oil

installations. Furthermore, the report then analysed the question of environmental damage in

light of the customary principles of military necessity and proportionality, stating that:

“[E]ven when targeting admittedly legitimate military objectives, there is a need to avoid

excessive long-term damage to the economic infrastructure and natural environment with a

consequential adverse effect on the civilian population. Indeed, military objectives should not

be targeted if the attack is likely to cause collateral environmental damage which would be

excessive in relation to the direct military advantage which the attack is expected to

produce.”44

1.3 The actions of the Government of Anhur are violative of their treaty obligations

The indiscriminate and disproportionate military action undertaken by the Government of

Anhur is violative of the obligations imposed by the Ramsar Convention and the World

Heritage Convention, which continue to apply during armed conflict [1.3.1]. Furthermore, the

principles of self-defense, force majeure and necessity do not override any potentially

relevant duties and obligations of the Government of Anhur, under the Ramsar Convention

on [1.3.2].

1.3.1. The Ramsar Convention and the World Heritage Convention continue to

apply during armed conflict

43
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign

against

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, ¶14.

44
Id. ¶18.
The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts

on Treaties provide essential guidance in this respect. In line with Article 3 of the Draft

Articles45, the starting point as to the continued application of an International Environmental

Law (IEL) treaty is whether the terms of a treaty address its applicability in armed conflict.

The ILC’s special rapporteur has found that multilateral environmental treaties that directly

or indirectly (meaning either by express statement or by inference) provide for their

application in times of armed conflict include 46: Convention on Wetlands of International

Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention) (1987)47

In cases where treaties of IEL do not indicate whether they continue to operate in situations

of armed conflict, or where treaty provisions addressing the issue are unclear, Article 7 of the

ILC’s Draft Articles48 indicates that the subject matter of treaties relating to the international

protection of the environment involves an implication that they continue to operate, in whole

or in part, during armed conflict. Thus, in light of the combined effect of Articles 3, 6 and 7

of the Draft Articles, rules of international treaty law that protect the environment may

continue to apply alongside IHL during times of armed conflict.49

45
Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties art.3, October 10, 2011.

46
See UNGA, Report of the Sixty-third session of the International Law Commission, Annex E, pp. 361–362.

See also UNEP, Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International

Law, pp. 34–40.

47
Article 2(5) states that a Contracting Party can delete or restrict the boundaries of the wetlands it has already

included in its list of wetlands of international importance “because of its urgent national interests”. A situation

of urgent national interest includes situations of armed conflict.

48
ILC, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties art.7, October 10, 2011.
49
See UN General Assembly, Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-

General, UN Doc. A/47/328, 31 July 1992, para. 11; UN General Assembly, Protection of the environment in
Whether a treaty can be terminated, withdrawn from or suspended is to be determined in

reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Articles 31 and 32, the nature of

the armed conflict, the extent of the armed conflict, the effect of the armed conflict on the

treaty, the treaty subject matter and the number of Parties to the treaty. 50 Treaties whose

subject matter “involves the implication that they continue in operation” indeed continue in

effect during armed conflict.51 The list of sample subject matter includes IHL, treaties relating

to a permanent regime or status and treaties relating to the protection of the environment.52

Lastly, during a non-international armed conflict, in principle IEL treaties continue to apply

between States, at least in the case of conflicts without the involvement of third States.53

Most importantly, scholars have suggested that the Ramsar Convention [a] and the World

Heritage Convention [b] are the only two areas under IEL where the obligations are

times of armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/48/269, 29 July 1993, para. 24; ILC,

Preliminary report by Special Rapporteur Marie G. Jacobsson, para. 108.

50
ILC, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties art.4, October 10, 2011.
51
Id. art.5.
52
Id. Annex.
53
ILC, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties (2011), Article 1 and commentary, p. 179:

“The typical non-international armed conflict should not, in principle, call into question the treaty relations

between States”; and ibid., Article 6(b) and commentary, p. 188: “The greater the involvement of third States in

a non-international armed conflict, the greater the possibility that treaties will be affected, and vice-versa.” See

also UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on protection of the environment in times of armed

conflict, 1992, para. 30.

sufficiently concrete and clear that they may provide “real guidance to commanders on the

battlefield or to be enforced after the event.”54

a. Ramsar Convention

The Ramsar Convention is the only global environmental treaty to deal specifically with

wetlands.1 Article 3 provides that Contracting Parties should, as far as possible, promote

the wise use of wetlands within their territory. The “wise use” of wetlands is defined as the

maintenance of their ecological character, achieved through implementing ecosystem

approaches within the context of sustainable development.2 This is a fundamental tenet of

Ramsar and has been equated to the maintenance of ecosystem services to ensure the long-

term maintenance of both biodiversity and human well-being.3

The Convention creates a general obligation for Parties to include at least one wetland within

their territory on the List of Wetlands of International Importance,55 and then “to promote the

conservation of the wetlands included on the List, and as far as possible the wise use of

wetlands in their territory.”56 Under the Convention there is a general obligation for the

Contracting Parties to include wetland conservation considerations in national planning. They

have committed themselves to “formulate and implement their planning so as to promote …

as far as possible, the wise use of wetlands in their territory” (Article 3.1 of the treaty). The

54
Bunker, Alice Louise. (2004). “Protection of the environment during armed conflict: One gulf, two wars.”

Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, Vol. 23, pp. 201-211.

55
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat art.2, 2 February 1971, 996

UNTS 245.
56
Id. art.3(1).
Conference of the Contracting Parties has approved guidelines on how to achieve “wise use”,

which has been interpreted as being synonymous with “sustainable use” (§4.2).57

b. World Heritage Convention

Through the World Heritage Convention58, State Parties recognize their duty to identify and

safeguard for present and future generations certain places that constitute part of the heritage

of humankind. The Convention states that “the outbreak or the threat of an armed conflict” is

sufficient to place a property on the World Heritage in Danger list. 59 A threatened site can

also benefit from a reinforced monitoring mechanism if it is at risk of losing the values for

which it was inscribed on the World Heritage List. 60 Therefore, the inclusion of a provision

specifically triggered by armed conflict indicates that the Convention continues to apply

during hostilities.

An MOU was signed between the Ramsar Secretariat and the World Heritage Centre in May

1999 with a view to: promoting the nominations of wetland sites under the two Conventions;

coordinating the reporting on sites listed under both Conventions; and in many cases

collaborating on advisory missions to those sites, as needed. One conclusion of this project is

that while it might not be possible to avoid damage to the ecosystem during conflict, it is

possible to actively use the Convention to sensitize the warring factions and to limit the

damage. An important provision of the Convention in this respect is Article 6.3, which

57
https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/library/handbook1_5ed_introductiontoconvention_e.pdf

58
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Convention, Preamble, 23

November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151.

59
Id. art.11(4).
60
Decision of the World Heritage Committee 31COM 5.2 (New Zealand, 2007).
indirectly provides for continuance during hostilities by mandating that each Party

“undertakes not to take any deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly

the cultural and natural heritage” of another Party (i.e. the objects and sites defined earlier in

the Convention).61

61
Tarasofsky, R.G. (1993). “Legal protection of the environment during international armed conflict.”

Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 24, pp. 65.