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GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT

of the qualifier "direct" with regard to the incidental civilian harm),as well as the context and humanitarian purpose
of the rule.2•1 11 is furthemlOre reflected in State practice."'

us. The scope of the obligation 10 takl' into account the indirect effects of an attack, and the related question as to
when an indirect effect is reasonably foreseeable, will depend on the facts of each case based on an
assessment of Information from all sources available at the relevant time,'"' and informed by past practices and
empirical data.'<» For example, dependjng on how the auack Iscarried out, It may be forl'seeable that an a11ack on
a facility contaming chemical substances may cause the release of such chemicals into the surrounding
natural environment.''" Depending on the circumstances, It may also be foreseeable that an attack expected to
affect the l'lectricity supply, for e.xamplr by damaging a power plant, could disrupt the sewage or wastewater
treatment systems Lhat rely on electricity and, in tum, harm the quality of the water and soil by polluting them
with untreated was1ewa1er.2•• In addition, as information regarding the long-term risks auendant 10 disruption of
ecosystems increases, so 100 does the foreseeability of Indirect effects, and assessments of excessiveness of
incidental damage to the natural environment must take such information into accoun1.2••

u9. The UN Environment Assl'mbly has noted that the long-term consl'quences of environmental degradation resulting
from pollution caused by armNt conflict "include, inter alia, the loss of biodiversity, the loss of crops or Livestock,
and lack of access to clean water and agricultural land, and the negative and sometimes irreversible impacts on
ecosystem services and their impact on sustainable recovery, contributing to further forced displacement related to
environmental factors".J00 These examples relate generally to the effects of armed conflict on the natural
environment rather than the effects of a11acks. However, to the extent that an attack could foreseeably result ln
direct or indirect effects such as these, they need to be taken Into account when weighing the anticipated concrete
and direct military advantage against the expected incidental damage.

,., l' ICRC, lnrtmorionol Humanirorian Law and rht Challtngts of Conrrmporary Armtd Conflicts: Rtcommlrrlng ro Proltctlon InArmtd
Conflict on rht 70th Annivrrso,y of rht Gtneva Canvenrions, pp. 18 and 68; IIA Study Group on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st
ntury, "The conduct of hostilities and international humanitarian law: Challenges of 21st century warfart>", pp. 352-354;
Schmltl/Vlhul (eds), Tallinn Manual, con11nent.1ry on Rule 113, p. 471, para. 6; M. Sassoli and L Cameron, "TIU.' protection of
dvllbn objN:ts: Current stale of the l,,w and Issues dt kgt /trtnda", In N. Ronzhtl and G. Venturini (etls), Thr Law of AirWar/art:
Conrtmporary llluts, Eleven 1111crna1lonal1 The IIague, 2006, p. 65; L. Gis...l, "Relevant incidental hann for lht' proportionality
prindpl<'". in ICRC/College of Europe,Urban \Var/are, Proceedings of 16th Bruges Colloquium, 15-16 October 2015, Colltglum,
No. 46, Autumn 2016, pp. us-u7; I.Robinson and E. NohJt', "Proportionality and precautions in anack: Thr reverberating
eJfecu of using explosive weapons ln populatt-d areas", lnrunorlonal Rtv/t1Y of tht Rtd Crou, Vol 981 No. 1, April 2016, pp. u2-
116; and Gillard, l'ropo,rionollry in rheConducr of llosr/llries:Tht lncidtnral Harm Sldt of rhe Asswmtnt, pp. 18-19, paras 62-64,
,.. For an ovcrvil'W of rclevanl SI.lie practice, sec L. Gisel (NI.), Tht Principlt of Proporrionoliry in the Rulrs Govtrnlng rheConduct of
/101111/rlts undu lnrtrnorionol/lumon/rorion Law, Repon of the lnlenl.llional Expert Meeting, Quebtt, 22-23 June 2016, ICRC,
Geneva, 2018, pp. 43-SL See also Roblnson/Nohlc, "Proportionality and precautions In attack: The reverbcrallng dfectsof using
Hploslvc weapons ln populatt'd areas", pp.115-1.16.
- See fn. U.5 above.
- For some of !he parametrrs that can be taken lnlo account when determining thc scope of thc obligation to Ukt Into
account the Indirect l'ffects of an auack, src Roblnson/Nohle, "Proportionality and prttautfons in attack: The reverberating
efftcts of using explosive weapons ln populated arras", pp.117-131.
,., For example, the bombing of the Panlcvo Industrial complex and of a petroleum refinery In Novi Sad by NATO forcrs during
the war In Kosovo in 1999!NI 10 1hc release or some 80,000 tons of crude oll ln10 the soU and or many tons of othtr toxic
substances: llulme, \\/or Torn Envlronmtnt, p. 188. See also UNEP/UnltNI Nations Centre for Human Selllements (UNO{S), nu
Kosovo Conflict: Consrquencts /or t/1e Envlronmtnr & /luman Stllltmtnu, UNEP/UNCHS, Nairobi, 1999, pp. 32-38.
•• DfO('gc{fougas,"The protection of the natural environment in armt'd conOin: Existing rules and need for further legal
prolN:lion", p. 30. For an example of environmental contamination due 10 elcctricity shortages during conOlcts, Stt
UNEP, Environmenral Alstnmtnt of the Gaza Strip following rht escolarion of hosrilitlts in December 2008-January 20091 UNEP, Nairobi,
2009, p. 39:
Sewage systrms wcre Impacted in several ways during the hostJUrlcs. Firs!, as the clcctriclly supply collapsed, transfer
pumps ceascd to function, resulting In sewage bringdivcrted to the nearest available lagoons, Including infiltration
lagoons. Second, the limited treatment that hadbeen taking plan• In sl.'wagl' treatment plants also ceased due to
electricity shortages. Theefnucnl leaving scwage treatment plants to be disposNI of ln tl1r sea or by lnfiltrallon In the
groundwat.cr was tJ1erdorc entirely untreated.
... Droege,rougas,"The protection of th<' natural environment In ,umt'd conntn: Exlnlng rules and nccd for further legal
pro1rctlon", pp. 31-µ. l'urthermorr, src para. 124 of the prl'sent Guidelines regarding the "prccaurlonary principle" or
intl'mational environmental law and Its rrlevanre to the obligation 10 take proper precautionary mensures 10 prevent undue
damage. Information regarding conOic1-rela1ed environmental dam.:ige Is Increasingly available as methods develop for
documenting and monitoring this da1n.1gc; see e.g.W. Zwljnenburg tt al., "Solving the Jigsaw of conOlct-rcblcd environmental
dam.tge: Utilizing opl'n-source analysis to Improve research Into environmt'ntal hl'allh risks", Journal of Public Health,Vol. 42,
No. 3, November 2019.
,.. UN Environment Assembly, Res. 3/1, Pollution mitigation and control In .ireas affected by armed conflict or
terrorism, 30 January 2018, prcambular para. 13.

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GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT

Excessiveness in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage


120. With respect to the concept of "concrete and direct military advantage", the tenn "military" has traditionally been
understood as gaining ground and annihilating or weakening the enemy armed forces,l•• and as noted In the
commentary on Rule 5 of the present Guidelines, it excludes advantages that would be merely political, social,
psychological, moral, economic or financial In nature.1•1 In addition to this requirement, the terms "concrete and
direct" mean that the anticipated advantage "should be substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which
are hardly perceptible and those which appear only in the long term should be disregarded"."'' Finally, the advantage
anticipated from the attack as a whole, rather than from isolated parts of the attack, ls to be taken Into account In
the proportionality assessment.'"4

121. There Is no precise formula to apply when assigning relative values to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated and the Incidental civilian damage that may be expected, and assrssing whethrr the latter
Is excessive. The application of the principle of proportionalhy is highly fact dependent.1• It is clear that the
weight given to various typl's of Incidental civilian damage will vary. For example, damagr 10 thr natural
environment in the middle of an uninhabited desert will carry much less weight than damage to a natural water
resrrvoir used by villagers for drinking or irrigation.

122. Bearing in mind this appreciation of the highly context-dependent assessment of when damage will be
"excessive" (and therefore unlawfully disproportionate), an example of disproportionate Incidental damage to
the natural environment would be the burning of an entire forest to eliminate a single, small enemy camp of
minor lmponance.106 To the extent that It constituted damage incidemal to an attack, many experts considered
that the pollution arising from the burning of oil fields and the deliberate spilling of millions of gallons of oil
into the sea during the 1990-1991Gulf War was excessive In relation to the military advantage that may have
been anticipated, such as the creation of smoke to obscure Iraqi ground forces from coalition air operations or
the hindering of a possible amphibious altack.'"7 The damage to the natural environmrnr in this case is reportrd
to have included the contamination of 800 kilomrrres of coastline with oil slicks, s<'vere air pollution
throughout Kuwait, arid rain and spikes in the mortality rates of local wildlife, including certain endanger<"d
species.'°" More recently, during the conflict in Iraq in 2016 and 2017, reports Indicate that the burning of oil
wells - with wells alight for up to nine months - created dense black clouds stretching over tens of kilometres,
caused tens of thousands of barrels of oil to now into wadis forming at least 23 large lakes, and polluted
extensive tracts of grazing land and dryland farming.309 The expected effects of attacks involving the burning
of oil wells Include serious environmental pollution, and these effects must be assessed against the ml.lltary
advantage that may have been anticipated (for example, to potentially obscure ground operalions from the
air).110

'"' S4ndoz/Swin.irskl/Zlmmumann (eds), Commtnta,y on tht Addltlanal Protocols, p. 685, paril. 1218.
'"' IIPCR, Manual on International Law Applicablt to A/rand Mi.is/It Warf arr,commentary on Rule 1(w), p. 36,11ara. 4: JI.A Study
Group on !ht Conduct or Hostilities In tht 2151Century, "The conduct of hosUUtfos and lnt,mation.11 humanitarianlaw:
Challenges of 2151century warfare", p. 364,.
'"' Sandoz/Swin.irskl/Zlmmennann (eds), Commtnta,y on tht Additional Protocols, p. 684, para. 2209.
,.. Sl'e the following declarations and r,srrvations made byStates upon r,111fic.illon of Addition.ii Protocol 1: Australia, 21 Jun,
1991, para. 4: lk'lglum, 20 May 1986, para. 5;Cilnada, 20 Nov,mber 1990, Comml'nt rrg.irdlng Ankle 51; France, 11April 2001,
para. 10; rmany, 14 Febmary 1991, para. S: llaly, 27 Febmary 1986, para. 6; Ntlhrrlands, 26 lunr 1987, pua. 5;New :U-al.ind,9
Fl'hruary 1988, para. 3; Sp,iln, 21April 1989, Comml'nt regarding Article 51; and United Kingdom, 12 December19n, para. (I). For
a further discussion or the notion or an "attack as a whole", stt Gisel (ed.), Thr Principle of Proportionality In rht Rulrs Govtrning
tht
Canducr of /lost/I/tits under lnttrnatlonal Humanitarian I.aw, pp. 11-13.
'"'ICTY, final Rtpart lo lht Prosuutor by tht Cammitltt tuabllshtd lo Rtvitw tht NATO &>mbing Campaign Agalnu tl1t Ftderal
Rtpubllc o/Yu9oslavla, paras 19-20; Glsl'I (NI.), Tht Prine/pit of Proportlonal/ty In tht Rulo Govtrnln9 tht Conduct of 1/ostilltits
under lntt.rnational Humanitarian Law, pp. 52-65.
,.. SeeUNEP, Prott<ting tht tnvironmtnt during Armt'd Con/fiCI:An lnvtnlo,y and Analysis of lnttrnational Lo1Y, p. 13: "(Bluming an
entlre forest lo reacha singlt minor targrt, forex.imple, would be consldertd a disproportionatestrategy Inrelation to the
military gain."
..,Ibid.; Dlnsteln, "Protection of lhl' environment In ln1crnatlon11l arml'd conflict", pp. 543-544; Schmitt, "Green war", p. 58.
,.. lntcrn.itlonat Law and Polley Institute (ILPI), Prottction o/tht Natural tnvironmtnt in Armtd Conflicr: An tmplrlcal Srudy, ILPI,
Oslo, 2014, pp. 17-18.
,.. UNEP, Ttchni<al Not-t E:nvironmtntal hsuts in Art'aS Rtlalctn from /Sil.: Mosul, Iraq, UNEP, Nairobi, 2017, pp.6-9.
, ..SNe.' .g. United States Department of Defense, "Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of tht Persian Gulf War,
Appendiox on the Role of th, Law of War", p. 637; and Schmlll, "Green war", p. 53.

2
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN

Rule 8 - Precautions
In the conduct of military operations, constant core must be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects, including the natural environment. All feasible
precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to rninjmize, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury co civilians and damage to civilian objects, including the natural
environment

Commentary
123. The principle of precautions, which is stated here with the addition of an express reference to the natural
environment, has been established as a rule of customary international law applicable in international and non
International armed conflicts with regard to any civilian object.111 The application of the general principle of
precautions specifically to the natural environment is articulated in the second clause of Rule 1.1. of the
ICRCStudy on Customary International Humanitarian Law.l" As noted above, on the basis of its civilian character,
any part of the natural environment that Is not a mJlitary objective must be protected against Incidental damage.
The principle of precautions ln attack is codified more generally in Article 57 of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1.

124. As noted in the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, there is practice to the effect that lack
of scientific certainty as to the effects on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve parties to
a conflict from taking proper precautionary measures to prevent undue damage. As the potential effect on the
environment will need to be assessed during the planning of an attack, the fact that there ls bound to be some
uncertamty as to its lull impact on lhe environment means U1at the "precauuonary prmc1ple" tram mternauonal
environmental law is of particular relevance to such an attack. The precautionary principle in environmental law
has been gaining increasing recognition. There is, furthermore, practice to the effect that this environmental law
principle applies in armed conflict The study therefore concluded that lack of scientific certainty as to the effects
on the natural environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the conflict from taking
precautions.JIJ

Constant care in the conduct of military operations


125. The principle of precautions encompasses a general obligation to take constant care to spare civilian objects
(including the natural environment) in the conduct of military operations.1" It operationalizes the obligation to
employ metJ1ods or means of warfare wilh due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural
environment, which is addressed In Rule 1 of the present Guidellnes.J'\

126. The tem1 "military operation" is broader than "attack" and should be understood to mean "any movements,
manoeuvres and other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat11.!10 This is an
important distinction, as It means that constant care must be taken in view of the impact of military operations on
the natural environment durlng, for example, troop movements or the establlshme.nt of mil.itary bases,m which do
not per sc constitute "attacks", but which can nevertheless cause significant Incidental damage to the natural
environment.

1" SN' Htnck.lens/Doswald-0C'Ck(tds), /CRC Srudy onCustomary /nttrnarlonol1/umanirorian Lo •, Vol I, Ru!, 15 and commtntary,
p. 51: https://iW-dat.1bascs.lcrc.ori;/cus10111ary-lhl/c-11i:ft.locsfv1_ruLrulc-1s and rtlattd practlct.
"'SN' ibid., scrond scnt,nce or Ruic 44 and commentary, pp. 147 and 149-150: ht1ps://ihl-dalJbascs.lcrc.o[l:/customJry
ihl/cng/docs/\'l_rul_rulcl.l. and rtlatl'<Ipractice.
••• SN' Ibid., third scntl'nce or Rul, 44 ;ind commentary, pp. 147 and 150: http .//lhl-dat.1b.iscsJcrc.org/custom.uy
lhl/cni:]docs/V1_rul_rulc1.1.and related practice.
"' The const.1nt car, obligation Is set out In Article 57(1) or Additional Protocol I and In Hrncberu/Oos ld-lll'ck (Nis), /CRC
Study on Cu11omo,y ln1trna1ional 1/umanirarian I.ow, Vol. I, first sentence or Rule 15, p. 51: h1tps:/Jihl-
daIJba scs.icrc.ori;/cu.!l>oInary-ih IJcni;/doc /v l_ ruI_ r uIc 15.
,,, The due regard obligation Is set out In llcncl<Jcrts/Doswald-0eck (Nis), /CRCSrudy on Cusromo,y lnltrnotional 1/umanilarian I.ow,
Vol. I, first ntenc-e of Ruh 44, p.147: hllps://il1l-d.11.1b.1scs.icrc.org/customilf)'-ihl/cng/docs/\'1_ruLrukL.L.. II is restated and
discussed ln Rule Iof the prtsl'nt GuldeUnes; see the commentary on the lattt'f rl'gardlng the lntaactlon between tl1esl' two
rules.
"• S.lndoz/Swlnarsld/Zlmmermann (Nis), Commenra,y on the Additional Protocols, p. 680, para. 2191; UnltN1 Kingdom, The Joint
Service Manual of the I.ow of Armed Conflict, 2004, para. 5.32, ln. 187; Bothe/Paruch/Solf,New Rules forVictim.I of Armed Conflicrs,
pp. 325-326, para. 2.2.3, and p. 408, para. 2.8.2; It.A Study Group on the Conduct of HostJlltles In the 21st Century, "The
conduct of hostlllllu and international humanltar n law: Challenges or 2151 century warfare", p. 380.
"' Dtsplte the title of Ankle 57 of Additional Protocol 1, there is no reason for the obligation to take constant care to be limited to
th, attacker, and It should be sttn asapplying also to the taking of precautions against the eff,cu of attacks; stt Boothby,
The t.owo/Targtling, p. u9; and G. Com and J.A.Schoettlcr, "Targetlng and civilian risk mltlgatlon: The essentlal role or
prKautlonary measures", Millra,y Low Review, Vol. 223, No. 4, January 2015, p. 832. SN' also Rule 9 or th, present Guidelines.
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

127. This obligation requires all those involved in m!IILary operations to continuously bear in mind the effects of those
operations on the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects, take steps to reduce those effects as much
as possible and seek to avoid any Lhat are unnecessary.1"' For instance, NATO has developed six
Environmental Protection Standardizalion Agreements (STANAGs), which, among olhers, provide
environmental planning guidelines tor military activities, to which commanders should, where practicable,
adhere.3'9 Experience has also shown that it is importanl for parties to a conflict to take into consideration the
risk that the use of hazardous substances in the operation of certain means of warfare may contaminate the
ground and thereby impact food sources for animals.J2°

us. By contrast, certain obligations which now from the principle of precautions arc relevant especially when
conducting attacks, and these are addressed below.

All feasible precautions


129. The meaning of the phrase "feasible precautions" has been Interpreted by many States as being limited to those
precautions which are practicable or practically possible, taking into account aJI circumstances ruling at the time,
including humanitarian and military considerations.Jl' The 1996 Amended Protocol II and 1980 Protocol IIJ to the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CC\V) define the term similarly.l" What precautions are feasible in
given circumstances will therefore be highly fact specific and may vary depending on factors such as the military
advantage sought by the operation, whether it is time sensitive, the terrain (whether man-made or natural), the
situation and capabilities of the parties to the conflict, the resources, metJiods and means available, and the type,
likelihood and severity of the expected incidental civilian harm, including harm to the natural environmcnt.l'1
Specifically with regard to incidental damage to the natural environment, the area expected to be affected and the
scope of those effects, the fragility or vulnerability of the natural environment in that area, the expected severity of
the damage and the expected duration of damage are elements of the humanitarian considerations to bl' taken into
account in assessing the feasibility of a specific precaution.

130. It should also be noted that the mere fact of taking some precautionary measures would not necessarily be enough
to satisfy this obligation as defined above; there is an obligation for parties to a conflict to take all those precautions
that are feasible in the circumstances. As indicated by several States upon ratification of Additional Protocol I,
feasible precautions must be based on an assessment of information from aJJ sources available to them at the
relevant time.111. This requires parties to proactively seek out and collect reasonably available information."

Specific precautions for attack


13t. The following obligations are specific appl.ications of the principle of precautions with regard to attacks. On the
basis that the natural environment is civilian in character, these obligations provide general protection to any part of
the natural environment that is not a mil.itary objective.

'" UnllNI Klngdom, Tht Joint Strvict Manual o/tht Lawof Armtd Conflict, 2004, para. 5.32.1; Schmilt/Vihul (eds), Tallinn Manual,
commentMy on Rule 1.14, p. 476, para. 4; Oeler, ut.kthods and means of combat", p. 199; N. Neuman, "A precautionary tale: The
thN>ry and practice of prl"Cautioos in attack", /srotl Ytorl>ook on Human Righi!, Vol. 48, 2018, JlP. 18-29.
••• s« t.g. NATO, STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection during NATO-Ltd MilitoryActivirits,pp. 2-1-2-3:
"(OIdentify frasible mitigation measures, if applicable, to reduce the risk to the envuonment and to hum.in he;ilth and safety.
Consider alternative locations or activities that still achieve thl' military objectivt of the training or operation while reducing or
eliminating the risk to tJ1e environment or human health and sarrty." For other environmental protection STANAGs, see
https:/ /www.natolibi;uit.lc .ln!u/Environmcnt/:--ATO· Documents.
,,. For example, in Ast;ma In Afghanistan, land on which the inhabitants grazed livestock was polluted for yearsby hazardous
chemicals usNI lo Urt missiles, and this ln turn exposed the local population to high risks: UNEP, Post-Conflict Branch, Ground
Contamination Alll'Hmmt Rtport:MilitaryWostt Storogt Slft,Astona,A/ghanisran, UNEP, N.ilrobl, 2006.
..., See Hene:kaens/Doswald-Beck (eds), /CRCSrudy onCustomary lnttmational tlumonitorion Law, Vol. I, commentary on Rule15,
p. 54: http ://ihl-t.lataba c .lcr .u1g/rn tu111ary•1hl/cni:/t.lotsN1_rul_rulc15.
'"Amtnded Protocol II to the CCW (1996), ArL 3(10); Protocol Ill lo tht CC\V (1980), ArL 1(5).
"' II.A Study Group on the Conduct or Hostilities in the 21st Century, "The conduct of hostilities and international humanitarian
J;iw: Challenges of llSt century warfare", p. 374. This list Is not txhaustive.
"4 Se ce.g. the declarations and reservations made upon ratlfic.11ion or signature of tht 19n Additional Protocol I by: Australia,

21 June 1991, para. I.; Ireland, 19 May 1999, para. 9; llaly, 27 February 1986, para. 5; Nttherlands, 26 June1987, para. 6; New
Ze;iland, 9 February 1988, para. 2; and United Kingdom, 12 December 1977, para. D. France lndic.itNI this understanding
specifically in relation to the environment: Declarations made upon ratification or the 19n Additional Protocol I, u April 2001,
para. 6.
'" Gisel (ed.), ThtPrindplt of Proportionality in tht Rules Goveming tht Conduct of Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,
p. 48; ICTY, Final Rtport tatht Prostcutorbytht Comminee £5rablishtd 10 R inv rht NATO Bombing Campaign Against rhe Federal
Rtpublic o/Yugoslavla, para. 29; Russian Federation, Application of IHL Rules: Rtgulatlons for the Armtd Forces of tht RU5Sian
Ftdtration, 2001, para.131.

5
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

132. Each parry co the conflict must do everything feasible coverify that targets are mllirary objectives, including that any part of
the narural environment has become a military objective before it is attackedm. For example, if a specific area of
foliage
has been identified as a military objective because it is understood to be obscuring the manoeuvre of opposing
uoops from view, efforts should be made to verify that the troops are in fact located In that area and that
defoliation would ofter a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time (for example, enable
targeting that would otherwise not have been possible, or forcing them lo retreat to a less advantageous area).

133. All feasible precautions must be taken in the c/1oice of means and merhods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in
any event 10 minimizing, incidentallossof civilian life,injury tocivilians and damage10 civilian objects,including any part
of the nawral environmenr that is 1101 a military objecrive.'" Parties could comply with this obligatlon by, for
example, assessing the environmental impact of the wl.'aponry to be used and using avallable alternative
weaponry that rl.'duces the risk of damage to specific partsof the natural environment concerned.J2.8

134. Each party ro che conflict rnusr do everyrhing feasible co assess whether thearrack may be expected tocause incidencal loss of
civilian life,injury to civilians, damage to civilian objeers, including any part of the natural environment char is nor a military
objective, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage ancicipared.Jl• In this vein, prior assessments of the potential environmental Impact of an attack,
including the expected consequences of the weapons and ammunition used, must be conducted whenever
feasible.330 When planning attacks in or around areas of major environmental Importance or fragility, the mapping of
these areas, for example by reference to existing resources such as the World Heritage List or IUCN's conservation
databases, may also beconducted prior to the launching of an attack, If feasible, to assess the extent of the
Incidental damage likely to be caused to the natural environment as a result of the attack.

135. Each party to the conflicr rnusr do everything feasible 10 cancel or suspend an arrack if it becomes apparenr rhar rhe
target, including when iris a parr of che nacural environment, is nor a milirary objective or rhar the artack may beexpected
10 cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury ro civilians, damage to civilian objem, including rhe narural
environmenr, or a combinarion chereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct rni/irary
advantage an1icipa1ed.JJ1 If it were to become apparent during an attack that a target such as a military warehouse
- thought previously to be storing ammunition, for example - was instead storing toxic substances likely to leak
and poison nearby water sources if the warehouse was to be bombed, thereby having a disproportionate Impact on the
natural environment relative to the mUitary advantage anticipated, then everything feasible must be done to cancel
or suspend such an
attack.

136. Unless circumsrances do1101 permit, effecrive advance warning of attacks rhar may affect the narura/ environment should be
given ro allow for measures to safeguard ir. This is a recommendation rather than an obligatlon, as IHL requires
that warning be given only for auacks which may affect the civilian population (rather than civilian objects).JU
However, It is still recommended to consider issuing warnings which would allow the safeguarding of the natural
environmenLm For example, if circumstances pcm1it, giving a warning of an attack on an elcctririty network that
- while also qualifying as a military objective - maintains a wastewater trt>atment system, may allow an opposing
party to put in place a temporary generator to support some key sewage treatment facilities and thus avoid serious
damage to the quality of water and soil in the area, even if such damage is not expected to affect the civilian
population.

.,. Additional Protocol I (19n), An.57(2)(a)(i); Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck (Nls), ICRCStudy onCusromary Jnrtmarional
llumanitarian Law, Vol. I, Rule 16, p. 55: h11ps://lhl-d.uabascs.icrc.orglc11!,L0111Jry-lhl/cng/doc:s/\'vuL.rukJ6.
"'Additional Protocol I (19n), Art. 57(2)(a)(li); llenckaerts/Ooswi!ld-Beck (Nls), ICRCStudy on Cwromary tnttrnarlonal
llumanitarian Law, Vol. I, Rule 17, p. 56: hups.//ihl-dJtaba,es.icrc.urg/cuslomary-ihl/cni;/docs/vt_rul_ruk17. Stt also ibid.,
Rule 44, p. 147: https://ihl-dJtJbJs,·s.icrc.org/customary-ihl/cni:/docs/,'l_rul_rulc44-
"' Oroege{fougas, "The protection of the natural environment in armed conmct: ExL tlng rules and need for further legal
protection", p. 35-
.,. Additional Protocol I (19n), AIL57(2)(a)(W); llenckacru/Doswald-Beck (eds), ICRC Study on Cwtomary lnttrnatlonal
llumanitarian Law, Vol. I, Rule 18, p. 58: hllps://ihl-databases.icrc.or&fcustomary-lhl/eni;/docs/vt_rul_ruk18.
.,. Oroege,rougas,"The protertlon of the natural environment In armed conflict: Existing rul.-s and nl'ed for further legal
protection", p. 30. Stt also NATO, STANAG 7141, foint NATO Docrrint for E:nvironmtntal Prortction during NATO-Ltd
AlillraryAcrivlrits; and United States Department of Defense, Finnish Ministry of Ot>fence and Swedish Armed Forces,
Environmental Guidtbookfor Mllirary Optrarioru, March 2008.
'" Additional Protocol I (19n), Art. 57(2)(b); Henckaerls/Ooswald-Beck (eds), ICRC Studyon Cwromary lnrtrnatlonal flumanirarian
Law, Vol. I, Rule 19, p. 60: h1t1is://ihl-dat..1basc_s.icrc.ori;/custumary-[hl/cni;/docs/v1_rul_rnle19.
"' Additional Protocol I (19n), Art. 57(2)(c); Henck.lerLS/Ooswald-Beck (eds), /CRCStudyon Customary lnrtrnational flumanirarian
Law, Vol. I, Rule 20, p. 62: htlps://ihl-diltabascs.icrc.ori:Jcustomary-ihl/eni:Jdocs/vt_rul_rule20.
111 Droege{fougas, "The protl'rtion of lhe natural environment In armed conflict: Existing rules and need for funher legal

5
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED
protection", p. 35.

5
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

137. When a choice is possible berween several milirary objecrives for obraining a similar mflirary advanrage, the objecrive robe
selecred must be rlrar tl1e arrack on which may be expecred to cause rhe /easr danger to civilian lives and ro civilian
ob}eCIS, including any parr of rhe narural environment rhar Is nor a m/lirary objecrlve.114 Parties to a connlct could
comply with this obligation by selt'Ctlng the military objective the furthest from particularly vulnerable parts
of the natural environment, such as underground aqui.fers, sensitive natural habitats or endangered spccies.m

114 Additional Protocol I (1977), An. 57(3); Htnckaerts{Doswald-Beck (t'ds), ICRC StudyonCustomary lnrtrnational Humanitarian
Law, Vol. I, Rule 21, p. 65: https://ihl-dJtJba.sl'S.icrc.org/cu.stomary-U11/c111:/docs/vuuLrulc.21. Some States hold the vltw
that tltl' obligation applies only wh,n the advantage ls "the same".
"'Drotg,,rougas,"Thl' protl'Ction of tht natural l'nvironml'nt in armt'd ronOict: Existing rult's and nttd for funht'r ltgal
prottttion", p. 34-

S9
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

Rule 9 - Passive precautions


Parties to the conflict must take all feasible precautions to protect civilian objects under
their control, including the natural environment, against the effects of attacks.

Commentary
138. Thi.s general rulr, which Is statrd here with the addlUon or an express reference to the natural environment, has
been established as a norm of customary International law applicablr in both intrmational and non-intC'mational
armed con0icts.t1• It reflects the obligation set forth in Article SS(c) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. Contrary to
Rules 5-8 of the present Guldellnrs, which lmposr obligations on parties carrying out attacks, this rule concerns
measures to be taken by a pany to thr conflict to protect the natural rnvironment under its control against the
effects of enrmy auacks. on the basis that 1hr natural environment is civilian in charactrr, this rule applies to any
part of the natural environment that ls not a military objectivr.

139. Even though It Is addressed to parties to a conOict, this obligation may have to be Implemented through measures
taken in peacetime (that Is to say, not only in times of conflict), notably when it comes to the choice of location of
a fixed military Installation.117

140. As discussed In the commentary on Rule 8 of the present Guidelines, lack of scientific certainty as to the effects on
the natural environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to a conflict from taking
precautions.n1

Feasible precautions
141. As noted in the commentary on Rule 8, the mranlng of "feasible precautions" has been Interpreted by States as
being those precautions which are practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances
ruling at the time, Including humanitarian and mUitary consldrratlons.n• Numerous States have indicated that
military commanders have to reach decisions concerning what precautions against the effects of auacks are
practicable or practically possible on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources available
to them at the relevant time.t,o Such assessmrnt will also have to take into account that States and other parties
to a confJict owe this obligation not only to thr natural environment, but also to civlUans and other civilian objects
under their control.

142. The transboundary, seemingly limitless nature of the natural environment means that parties to a conflict will in
reality be "surrounded" by thr natural environmrnt at all times. Even considering that the obligation to take all
feasible precautions to protect the natural environment ls that of !hr party to thr conflict undrr whose control It Is,
this raises the question as to how onerous the burden or taking such precautions can be in practice.

143. As the natural envlronmrm In Its entirety Is not a movable object in the traditional sensr of the word (though, of
course, certain parts or it, such as fauna,14' may be movable), It cannot be completely "removed" from the vicinity
or military objectives.14' The fact that military oprrations will nrcessarily be surrounded by thr natural environment
does not, however, mean that precautions cannot br taken to protect it from differing degrees of harm. For example,
when a choler is possiblr between stationing troops at several locations, all of which offer similar advantages
across rhe range of pertinenr operarional facrors, the location srlectcd must be that which is expected to cause
the least
damage to civilian lives and civilian objects, including the natural environment, in the evrnt that the location Is
attacked by opposing forcrs. Thus, given thr choice betwern an open, uninhabltrd grassland and a zonr of
particular

• See Hencl<Mrts/Doswilld-Brck (eds), ICRCSrudy on Cuiromory lnltrnarional llumanirarian Law, Vol. I, Rull' 22 and commentary,
11

p. 68: h1q,s:/fihJ-dJtJb.1scs.Jcrc.org/cus1omary-il11/c.ng/docsNLruLruk22 and related practk<'.


'"Sandoz/Swinarskl/Zlmmtnnann (eds), Commtnroryon the Addlrlonol Prorocols, p. 692, para. 2244,
"' See llenckaerts/Dosw,1ld-B!'ck (eds), ICRCSrudy onCuiromary lnltrnarional Humonlrorlon Law, Vol. I, third sentence or Rule 41.
and commt'ntary, p.1so: h11ps://ihi-dJLlbascs.icrc.org/custon:iary-ibl/c11i:fdoc /vLruLruicl.J.and related practice.
n• See fn. 311 above and rel:lll'd text.
,.. Set' fn. 145 abovt'.
"'While org,miud by private lndividu;ils and not a pany to the conflict, see, for example, the removal or wild animals from
a zoo In a th<'ml' park In Aleppo; S. Guynup, "How Syrian Zoo Animals Escaped a War-Ra ged City", NorIona/ ographlc,5
Octobt'r 2017: https:/ /www.11a1ion.:ili:coi:rJpltic.com/ncws/2017/1O/WilJllfc- watch-rc,cuini:• J11l111ab-alc11po-syrl.1-zoo/.
w For the obligation to remove civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives to the extent feasibl<", see

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED
Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck(eds), /CRCSiudyon Cusromory lnlernational llumanitarian uiw,Vol. I, commcntaty on Rule 24,
p.74: https:/ /lhl-d.it.ibases.icrc.or,:/custom.uy- lhlJcn docs/Vt_ruLrull!U..

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PRCYfECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

biological diversity or fragility, a decision as to where to station troops should consider whether hostil.lties In the
latter arl'a will entail more danger to thl' natural environment than in the grassland area,1-t1

Areas of major ecological importance or particular fragiUty


144. Hostilitil's may haVl' particularly disastrous consequences whm they occur in zonl's or major ecological
importancl' or particular fragilhy.1" Taking all feasible precautions to protect the natural environment against the
eHects or attacks is thl'refore particularly pertin('nt for parties to conrtlcts who control territory featuring such
areas; special consideration should be given to the protection of those parts of the natural environment that are
especially vulnerable to the adverse consequences of hostillties.14\ Such areas include groundwater aquifers,
national parks and endangered species habitats. For example, thl' consequences of conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo on Vlrunga National Park, which contains some of the richest biodiversity in Africa, are
well docum('ntecl, and Include the destruction of unique ecosystems and threats to specics.14•

145. Feasible precautions In this regard could include, for instance, informing opposing parties of the existence and
location of and ongoingconservation efforts in areas o( particular ecological significance or fragility.1° Parties
could furthermore refrain from locating troops or military material in these areas. In this vein, the ICRC has
proposed that one way of protecting important or fragile areas could be to formally place them off-limits to all
military activity.J4A Similar proposals have been made by the ILC,"0 UNEP1;oand IUCN.m They were also
considered during the drafting of the 1977 Additional Protocols.')2 A similar system of specially protected areas
already exists in relation to cultural property and to cultural and natural heritage, and such areas mayinclude
national parks.HJ

146. According to the ICRC proposal, such areas should be delineated and designated as demilitarized zones before an
armed conflict occurs, or at the latest when the fighting breaks out, from which all military action and the presence

141 For practices Indicating how potenLlal damage Lo Lhe natural c.nvlronmrnt could bt' lncorporatrd In Lite planningor camps, see
l'.g. NATO, STANAG 2582, Environmtnrol Prorecrion Besr Prortices and Standards for.Milirory Comps in NAroOptrarions, Annex 11-1-
H J.
144 Rt'garding sudt consequences, stt e.g. UNEP, Lebanon: Pos1-Conflict £nvironmtnlal Alsenmtnt, UNEP, Nairobi, 2007, p. 134;

UNEP, The Dtmocraric Rtpublir of 1/1e Congo: Posr-ConflicrEnvironmenral Alstssmtnt:Synrhtsi /or Policy Makers, UNEP, Nairobi, 2011,
p. 26; and UNEP/UNCHS, Tht KosovoConflict: Consrquences for tht £nvironmtnt & Human SmltmtnlS, pp. 60-62. For an
assessmt'nt of Lhc. dfKtS of conflict on Borjomi-Kbaragaull National Park in Grorgia and maritime. fauna in Lhe Gulf, see ILPI,
Prottdion of tht Narural Environmenr in Armtd Conflict: An Empirical srudy, pp. 29-31and17-18, respectlvdy. Regarding the tJJects
or conflict on wUdlifo habitats, stt K..M. Gaynor tial., "War and wildlife: Linking armed conflict to conservation", fronriers in
uology and rht
£nvironmtnr, Vol. u.,No. 10, December 2016, pp. 533-542.
,.. Dr e,rougas, "The protection or Lhe natural envlronmem In armed conflict: Ex.Isling rules and need for furlhe.r ll'gal
protection", pp. 43-44.
,...UNEP, Tht Dtmocrarlc Rrpublic of Congo: Posr-Conflicr Envlronmenrol Autssmrnr: Synrhts/1 for Policy 111aktrs, p. 26; ICRC,
Srrtngrhtnlng Ltgal Prorecrion /or Vier/ms of Armed Confllm, p.17.
141 For C'Xamptt', during armt'd conflict In the Democratic Republic or the Congo, the govi:-mment const'rvallon dt'panment

communicated with non-state anned groups regarding the malntt'nancc or conservation t'fforu and prot«tlon or national parks.
Thls communlcuion was conducted with coordination suppon from conservation organizations, as well as from UNESCO and
the Unitl'd Nations Foundation. For funhcr det.ails, see J. Shambaugh, J.Oglethorpe and R. 11am, TheTrampltd Grass: hlirl9orln9
rhe Impacts of Armtd Conflict on rhe Environmtnr, Dlodivcrslty Support Program, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 48.
"-' Al the 33rd International Confrrence of the Red Cross and Rrd Crescrnr, Gtneva, Ot'cember 2019, 1hr ICRC promotNI a
model pledge that encouraged States to designate as demllJtarlzed zones areas considered particularly vulnerable or Important
from an environmrntal standpoint. Burkina Faso subsequently plcdgrd to do so. Stt also ICRC, Srrrn9rhrnin9 Ltgal Prorrcrion /or
Vicrims of Armed Conflim, pp. 17-19; and Drocge(rougas, "Thr protl'Ctlon of the natural environment In armed conflict:
Existing rules and need for funher leg.ii protection", pp. 43-44.
... See the positions of States on the ILC's proposal to include .a draft principle on thr establishment of prot«ted zones for areas
of major ecological imporLlncc in the rontcxLor Its work on the protl'Ctlon of the environment In rt'lation to anned conrucu:
Statemt'nts before the Sixth Commilltt of the UN Gener.,( Assembly of Austria, 70th ssion, Agt'nda item 83, 9 November 201s;
El satvador, 70th session, Agenda item 83, 9-11 November 2015; Iran, 70th session, Agenda ilem 83, 10 November 2015; Italy,
70th session, Agenda ltl'm 81, 6 November 2015; Lebanon, 70th session, Ag,nda Item 83, 10 Nov,mbt'.r 2015; Norway, on behalf
of tht' Nordic countries, 70th session, Agenda item 83, 9 Novembt'r 2015; Ruuian Fe<lt'ration, 73rd session, Agenda itl'm 82, 31
October 2018; Sv.itzerland, 68th session, Agenda item 81, 4 November 2013 and 70th Sl'Ssion, Agenda item 83, 11 November 2015;
and Unirtd St.ltes, 70Lh session, Agenda Item 83, 10 November 2015.
'"' UNEP, l'roruring lht Environment during ArmedConflict:An lnvrnrory and Analy,is of lnrrrnorionol Law, p. 54-
m IUCN, orart Convention on the Prohibition of Hostile Military Acrivilies in Protl'Ctrd Areas (1996).
ni Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmermann (eds), Commenraryon tht Additional Prorocob, p. 664, paras 2138-2139.

"'The 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for Lhe Protection of Cultural Property, which entered Into force on 9
.Mardt 2004, establishes a system of enhanced protection under which cultural property meeting cenalo conditions ls emerrd on
a list, and parties to the Protocol under1akr never to use it for military purposes or to shield military sites. See also World
Heritage Convention (1972), Arts 6(3) and 11(4), under which listed cultural and natural heritage sites are protected from dlrl'Ct
and Indirect damage during armed confllcL llc.rltage protectl'd under Lhls Convention can notably lndude silt's of ecological
significance: for example, a number or national park. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and thl' C..-ntral African

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PRCYfECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED
Republic are on the "List of World Heritage in Danger".

6
GUIDELJNES ON THE PROTECTION OFTHE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

of combatants and military material are barred. Indeed, although no rule of IHL currently exists to confer
internationally recognized protection on specific natural areas, IHL does permit the establishment of demilitarized
zones by agreement between the parties to a conflicL3

'"' For further details rrgardlng agreements that can be made under Ult. to protect the natural environment, see Rule 17 of the
presen Guidelines. On the use of demllltarlud :tones to protect the natural environment, see also Droege,rougas,"The
protecuon or the natural environment in armed conflict: Existing rules and need for further l al protection". pp. 44-45.

6
GUIDELINESON THE PROTECTIONOFTHE NATURAL ENVIRONMENTIN ARMED

Section 2. Protection afforded to the natural environment by the


rules on specially protected objects other than the natural
environment
Rule 10 - Prohibitions regarding objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population
Attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population is prohibited, including when such objects arc part of the natural
environment.

Commentary
147. This general rule, which is stated here with the addition of an express reference to the natural environment, has
been established as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-
international armed connicts.m The customary rule is informed by the obligations set fonh in An'icle 54(2) of the
1977 Additional Protocol I and Article 14 of the 1977 Additional Protocol 11.These provisions build on the
principle prohibiting starvation of the civilian population by prohibiting the most usual ways in which
starvation is brought about.ls•

Attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless


148. The verbs "attack", "destroy", "remove" and "render useless" are used In the alternative to indicate a broad
prohibition covering acts committed both in offence and In defence. It includes the pollution of water sources with
chemical or other agents, rendering them useless, or the destruction of crops with defoliants.m

Objects protected
149. This ruJe provides both direct and lndfrect protection to the natural environment, which can suffer significant
degradation when objects Indispensable to the survival of the civilian population are targeted.JS!

150. Direct protection is afforded 10 the natural environment when an object specifically protected by this rule - I.e. an
object indispensable to the survival of the civilian population - is also a part of the natural environment. Certain
objects Indispensable to the survival of the civilian population are expressly identified by the ICRC's 1987
commentary on Anicle 55 of Additional Protocol I as partsof the natural environment: foodstuffs, agricultural areas,
drinking water and livestock.W>These are thus directly protected by this rule. This direct protection was applied by
tJw Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission In Its finding that Ethiopia's bombing of Harsile water reservoir in Eritrea
in 1999 and 2000 wasa violation of Article 54(2) of Additional Protocol 1, which the Commission held to be part of

"'See llenckaerts/Doswald-Bcck (eds), ICRC StudyonCustomary International /lumanlrarlan Law, Vol. I, Rule S4 and commcnt.1ry,
p. 189: hllps://ihl· LIJlJbJ c .Jcrc.orJ:]cu lo111.ir)' • ihl/cni:/Lluc /1•1_rul_rulcSl. and rl'latt'd practice.
'"' SJndoz/Swinuskl/Zlmmennann (eds), Commrnrary on rhr Addlrionol Prorocoh, p. 655, para. 2098, and p. 1458, pua. 4800.
Objt<ts indL ns.1hle to thl' survival of thl' clvlllan population include "foods111ffs, agricultural areas for the production of
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water lnst.1llalions and supplies and irrlgallon works" (Addillollill Protocol 1, Art. S4(2))
and can also Include mt'dlclne, clothing, bedding and means of sheller. s« llrnckaerts/Doswald-lk'ck (eds),
ICRCSrudyon cuiromary lnrrmorionol Humanirarion Low, Vol. I, commenrary on Rule 54, p. 193: hll1>s://ihl-
da1abascs.icrc.oq;/customary ihl/cJ1i:fdocs/V1_rul_rulcst.: and Sandoz/Swinarskl/Zimmennann (eds}, Commtntary on lht
Additional Protocols, p. 655, paras 2102-2103, and p. l4S8, l>ilras 4803-4805.
m Sandoz/SIYinarskJ/Zlmmermann (eds), Commrnrory on tht Additional Prorocoll, p. 655, para. 2101.
'"This concern was expresSt"d, all>l'it In broader lenns, in UN Environment Assembly, Res. 3/1, Pollutlon mltlgarlon and control
in areas affected by armed conflict or terrorism, 30 January 2018, preambular para. u: "uprdslng its grave concern r..-garding
pollullon and environmental degradation raused by armed conflict or lrrrorlsm through the targt'llng of natural rt'Sourccs, vital
civilian lnfr.istruc1ure, lncludlng waler filtration facllllies, sa1li1.alion and elcc1rld1y networks, and resldenlial properties". Fora
database recording the alleg<"d 1arg..-1lng of environml'nlal infra. truc1ur..-(which in somr lnsranccs may cons1l1u1e objects
Indispensable 10 the survival of the civilian population) in the context of armed conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, see
Targtring of ln/rastrucrurt in lht loliddlt Ca.st: E:nvlronmenr, Con/lier, and Law, a project of Dukr University's Nicholas School of the
Environment: hllp,://>ilo.111sl111IJ>.dui-.c.cdu/l1111c/n1Jµs/.
,.. For recognition of such objects as indis1>ensabll' lo the survival of the civilian population, see Additional Protocol I,
Article 54(2); and Sandoz/SIYinarski/Zimmermann (eds), Commenlary onthe Additional Protocols, p. 655, para. 2102. For
idrntilicalion of suclt objrcts as constltucm parts of ll1c natural envltonmrn.t, see Sandoz/Swlnacskl/Zlmmamann(eds),
Commtntary on rht Additional Prorocols, p. 662, para, 2126. See also Henckatrts/Constanlln, "Protection of thr natural
environment", p. 476, which states regarding rules protecting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
t h a ut ltJhe relevance of thesr rules for the natural environment Is self-evident, as thry protrct agricultural arus, drinking
water supplies, and livestock, whlch arr constituent rlcments of the natural t'nvlronmrnl".

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PRCYfECTION OFTHE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARM.ED CONFLICT

customary l.ntematlonal law at the time of the bombing.I"° Harsile water reservoir was both a drinking water
installation and a supply of drinking water:although the man-made elements of an installation, which are protected
as objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, do not form part of the natural environment, the
drlnking water itself is a part of the natural environment and is also protected by this rule.

151. More recent examples also Illustrate the importance of the direct protection this rule may provide to the
natural environment. UNEP has reported that in 2014, hundreds of square kilometres of agricultural land were
flooded by a non-state party to the connict in Iraq using the Fallujah barrage water-diversion structure, causing
serious degradation to lhe land as well as the displacement of thousands of people.361 Reports also indicate that in
2015- 2016 parties to the conflict in Yemen damaged multiple sites of agricultural land, which itself is estimated to
cover less than 3 per cent of Yemen's land surface, as well as a number of water-diversion structures.362 This Is
reported to have contributed 10 decreased land cultivation, reduced crop yields and diminished food availability for the
local population. Reports further Indicated that these effects were distinctly felt by women and girls.1•1 Thi?
agricultural land and water Installations may have been directly protected by this rule, although a full analysis
would need to assess whether all conditions for the application of the rule were fulfilled in these specific
examples.

152. Indirect protection of the natural environment is afforded by this rule when the attack, destruction, removal or
rendering useless of an object indispensable to the survival of the civilian population that does nor form part of Lhe
natural environment would nevertheless have a negative impact on the natural environment. For example, a man
made Irrigation Installation protected by this rule does not form part of the natural environment, but Its operation
may be a lynchpln that sustains thl? flora and fauna of an orhrrwise arid arra of land, which Is indisprnsablr to the
survival of 1hr civilian popul.:illon.Thr 1.:irge1ing of such an object could therefore disrupt the ecosystem
dependent on thr Irrigation Installation for its water supply, and thus negativrly impact thr natural
environmrnt.1•• More generaUy, attacks on objects Indispensable to the survival of I.he civilian population can
also cause large-scale population dlsplacrment, which - as displacrd communltlrs seek shelter, fuel and
alternative mrans of income - can in tum have effects on thr natural environment ranging from the deforestation
of biodiverse areas to wildlife poaching.w, Thus, In complement to this rule's primary purpose of protecting
the civilian population, Its implications for thr indirect protrcrion of the natural environmrnt can br widr-
ranging.

Speclfic purpose
153. Rule to applies to the natural environmrnt Lhe prohibition of attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless
objrcts Indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. According to Article 54(2) of Additional Protocol 1,
this is prohibited when done "for thr specific purpose of denying thrm for their sustenance value to the civilian
population or to thr adverse Party whatever the motive, whethrr in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to
move away, or for any other motive". Upon ratification of Additional Protocol I, France and the United Kingdom
stated that this provision did not apply to attacks that lacked such specific purpose. As noted in the ICRC Study on
Customary International Humanitarian 1...,w, "ls!everal military manuals also specify that In order to be Illegal,
the lntmt of the attack has to be10 prevent the civilian population from beingsupplied. Most military manuals,
however, do not Indicate such a requirement and prohibit attacks against objrcts lndlspl?nsable to the survival of
the civilian population as such. This is also the case with much of the national legislation which makes it an
offence to violate this rule."1•6 This should inform the understanding of Rule to.

,.. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Western Front, Aerial Bomb,mlmcnl and Related Claims, Erltrra's Claims 1, 3, S, 9-13,
14, 21, 25 & 26, PJrtlal Award, 19 Orcember 2005, paras 98-105.
,., UNEP, Ttchnical Norr - Envlronmtnlal /lsuts inArro.s Rttaktnfrom ISIL:Mosul, Iraq, pp. 3 and 21-u.
,.,M. Mundy, Tht Srrarrgirs of lht Coolirion in lht YtmtnWar: Atrial Bombordmenr and Food War,World Peace Foundation,
Oct.ober 2018, pp. U-16.
,., United Nalions Population Fund, "Yemen's deadly cholera outbreak puts pregnant women In danger", 21 July 2017:
ht1ps://www.u11fpa.ori:/ncw /ycmcn -deadly-cholera-outbreak-puts- prci:nant-womcn-dani:cr; L. Nimmo,ulntcmational
Women's Day 2020: Women, war and water in Yemen" (blog), Conflict and Environmcnt Observatory, 6 /1\arch 2020.
,.. Such foresl•eable cfll-t:ls must form part of a proportionality assessment; sec Ruic 7 of the presl'nl Guidelines.
,., Rcgardlng thl' consequences of popularIon displ.-. ment for the naturnl environment, see e.g. UNEP, Tht Dtmoaaric Rtpubllc of
tht Congo: Poll·Confllcr Cnvlronmtnral Asitumtnr:Synrhnil for Policy111akcrs, p. 2<,; UNEP, Rwanda: from Posr-Conflkr 10
£nvironmtnrally Su!lainable Devtlopmenr, UNEP, Nairobi, 2011, p. 66; UNEP, £nvironmtnlol Comldera1ion1 of Human Displaetmtnl In
Libtria:A Gulde for Decision-Makers and Practltlontrs, UNEI', Nairobi, 2006; and UNEP, 1'0s1-Conflicr £nvironmenral Assessmtnr -
Albania, UNEP, Nairobi, 2000, pp.38-46. See also the section on the envlronmenral effects of human dlspla ml'nl In ILC, Stcond
rtporl by Sptcial Rappontur Moria Lthlo, pp. 20-23; andILC, Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment In Relation
to Armcd Conflicts (2019), Principle 8 ("Human dlsplaccment") and commentary, p. 232.
,.. Henckal'rts/DoSWilld-Ueck (eds), Cusromary lnltmarional Humanirarion Law, Vol. I, comment.1ry on Rull' 54, p.190 (foolnolcs

6
omlncd): hitps:/ /1111- dJ tab.iscsJcrc.ori:tcustomary-U11/cni:tdocstv1_rul_rulcs4.

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OFTHE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

Exceptions to the prohibition


154. There are two exceptions to Lite prohlblllon on attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects
indispensable 10 the survival of the civilian population. Rule 10 is to be understood in light of these exceptions.J67

155. '111e first exception, which Is found In Additional Protocol I, Is based on the consideration that these objects can
be attacked, destroyed, removed or rendered useless If they qualify as mllltary objectives, but only provided that
this may not be exp<'Cted to cause starvation among the civilian population or force lls movement.Jt>R

156. 111e second exception consists of the so-called "scorched earth policy" applied In defence of national territory
against Invasion, which is allowed under Additional Protocol I under specific conditions. A party to a conflict may
destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population under its own
control within its own territory, if required by imperative military necesslty.v-• According to the ICRC Study on
Customary International Humanitarian Law, II Is doubtful, however, whether the exception of scorched earth
policy applies to non-International armed conflicts because IL does 1101 feature in Article 11. of Additional
Protocol Jl.l7° It should be noted that there are diverging views on this. Scorched earth tactics have reportedly
been used during recent conflict in Iraq, where a retreating be!Ugerent sabotaged wells, chopped down or set fire to
orchards and burned oil wells.m

"' Ibid.,pp.192-193. l'or tbe view that Rule 54 should have Lncluded an explicit re!erena to tbe exreptlons provided Ln Article
54 or thl' 1977 Additional Prolocol 1, Sl'I' G.H. Aldrich, "Customary lnll'rnallonal Humanitarian L.1w - An lntl'rprl'tatlon on
bthalr or the lntrrnational Commltttt of thl' Red Cross", Brillsh Ytarbook of lnttmationaf Law, Vol.76, No. I, 2005, p. 517. See
also J.M. llenckaerts, "Customary International llumanltarlan Law - A rcjoindt<r to Judge Aldrich", ibid., pp.527 and 528.
••• Sl'I' Additional Protocol 1, Art. 54(3). Sl'I' also Sandoz/Swinarski/Zlmmermann(..-ds), Commtntaryon tht Additional Protocols,
p. 1459, para. 4807; and Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck (eds), /CRCStudy on Customary /nltmationaf Humanitarian IAw,Vol I,
comml'ntary on Rulr 54, p. 192: hllp,://lhl-da1abas s.lcrc.org/cu,tomary-ihl/engldocs/v1_ruLrulc.s4.
'" Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmermann(..-ds), Commrntary on thr Additional Protocols, p. 655, para. 2101, and p. 658, paras 2118-2119,
as well as pp. 604-605, paras 1888 and 1890.
,,. He_nckaerts/Ooswald-B«k (eds), /CRC Study onCustomary lnltrnational Humanitarian Law, Vol. I, commentary on Rule 54,
p. 193: https://ihl-databa,CJi.krc.oq:Jcu,tomary-ihVcnl!fdocs/vLrui_.rulcs4.
mW. Zwijnenburg and F. Postma, Uving under a Black Sky:Conflict Poflution and Environmtntaf HtalthConcerns in Iraq, PAX,
Utrecht, November 2017, pp. 4, 8 and 20.
GUIDELINES ON THE PRCYfECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN

Rule 11 - Prohibitions regardingworks and installations containing


dangerous forces
A Particular care must be taken if works and installations containing dangerous forces,
namely darns, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, and other installations
located at or in their vicinity are attacked, in order to avoid the release of dangerous
forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
8.
i. For States party to Addilional Protocol I, works or installations containing dangerous
forces, namely darns, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, may not be
made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among
the civilian population, subject to the exceptions specified in Article 56(2) of the
Protocol Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or
installations may not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe
losses among the civilian population.
ti. For States party to Protocol II additional co the Geneva Conventions (Additional
Protocol II) and non-state actors that are party to armed conflicts to which the
Protocol applies, works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams,
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, may not be made the object of
attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population.

Commentary
157. Rule u.A has been established as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non
international armed conflicts.m Rule 11.BJ reflects Article 56(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and is binding
betw<.'cn parties to this Protocol in situations of int<.'rnational armed conflict, subj<.'Ct to the exceptions set down
in Article 56(2). Rule lLB.LIIs a restatement of Articl<.' 15 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II and must be complied
with by parties to that Protocol, as well as by non-state actors that are party to non-International armed conflicts to
which the Protocol applles.m

The difference between Rule 11.A and Rule 11.B


158. Rule 11.A and Rule 11.B both cover "attacks", as understood for the purposes of the conduct of hostilities, namely
"acts of violence against lhe adversary, whether in offence or in defence".m In addition, works and installations
containing dangerous forces remain protected byall the other relevant IHLrules, Including with regard to opNatlons
other than attacks, such as the obligation to take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects in the conduct of military operatlons.m

159. Rule uA requires parties to a conflict to take "particular care" when attacking works or installations containing
dangerous forces. For Its part, Rule 11.B Is stronger in that it outright prohibits such auacks If they may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Thus, even when such
works or installations become military objectives,37• lhey nevertheless cannot be targeted when an attack may

m See Henckaeru/Doswald-Beck (eds), ICRC Study on Customary International 1/umanftorian Law, Vol. I, Rule 42 and
commC'ntary,
p. 139: https://ihl-databascs.icrcori:Jcustomary-ihl/cng/tlocs/v1_rul_rulct.2 and refated practice.
171
On the scoof application of Addltional Protocol II, see Sa.ndoz/Swinarskl/Zlmmermann (eds), Commentary on tht
Additiona!
Prorocols, pp. 33-56.
"'Addltional Protocol I (1977), Art. 49. This rrfers to "combat action"; destructive ac:ts undertaken by a belligerent in its
own territory would not comply wlth the definition of "attacl<" as such acu are not mounted against the adversary:
Sandoz/Swlnarskl/Zimmennann (eds), Commtnrary on the Additional Protocols, p. 603, para. 1880, and p. 605, para. 1890.
m See Rule 8 of the present Guidelines. This point Is also rttalled In Additional Protocol I (1977), Art. 56(3).
.,. In the sens,of the drfmilion of mlliury objectives in Addition.ii Protocol I (1977), Art. 52; and Hrnckaerts/Ooswald-

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PRCYfECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN
cause

m See Henckaeru/Doswald-Beck (eds), ICRC Study on Customary International 1/umanftorian Law, Vol. I, Rule 42 and
commC'ntary,
p. 139: https://ihl-databascs.icrcori:Jcustomary-ihl/cng/tlocs/v1_rul_rulct.2 and refated practice.
171
On the scoof application of Addltional Protocol II, see Sa.ndoz/Swinarskl/Zlmmermann (eds), Commentary on tht
Additiona!
Prorocols, pp. 33-56.
"'Addltional Protocol I (1977), Art. 49. This rrfers to "combat action"; destructive ac:ts undertaken by a belligerent in its
own territory would not comply wlth the definition of "attacl<" as such acu are not mounted against the adversary:
Sandoz/Swlnarskl/Zimmennann (eds), Commtnrary on the Additional Protocols, p. 603, para. 1880, and p. 605, para. 1890.
m See Rule 8 of the present Guidelines. This point Is also rttalled In Additional Protocol I (1977), Art. 56(3).
.,. In the sens,of the drfmilion of mlliury objectives in Addition.ii Protocol I (1977), Art. 52; and Hrnckaerts/Ooswald-

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PRCYfECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN

Rule 11 - Prohibitions regardingworks and installations containing


dangerous forces
A Particular care must be taken if works and installations containing dangerous forces,
namely darns, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, and other installations
located at or in their vicinity are attacked, in order to avoid the release of dangerous
forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
8.
i. For States party to Addilional Protocol I, works or installations containing dangerous
forces, namely darns, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, may not be
made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among
the civilian population, subject to the exceptions specified in Article 56(2) of the
Protocol Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or
installations may not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe
losses among the civilian population.
ti. For States party to Protocol II additional co the Geneva Conventions (Additional
Protocol II) and non-state actors that are party to armed conflicts to which the
Protocol applies, works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams,
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, may not be made the object of
attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian
population.

Commentary
157. Rule u.A has been established as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non
international armed conflicts.m Rule 11.BJ reflects Article 56(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and is binding
betw<.'cn parties to this Protocol in situations of int<.'rnational armed conflict, subj<.'Ct to the exceptions set down
in Article 56(2). Rule lLB.LIIs a restatement of Articl<.' 15 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II and must be complied
with by parties to that Protocol, as well as by non-state actors that are party to non-International armed conflicts to
which the Protocol applles.m

The difference between Rule 11.A and Rule 11.B


158. Rule 11.A and Rule 11.B both cover "attacks", as understood for the purposes of the conduct of hostilities, namely
"acts of violence against lhe adversary, whether in offence or in defence".m In addition, works and installations
containing dangerous forces remain protected byall the other relevant IHLrules, Including with regard to opNatlons
other than attacks, such as the obligation to take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian
objects in the conduct of military operatlons.m

159. Rule uA requires parties to a conflict to take "particular care" when attacking works or installations containing
dangerous forces. For Its part, Rule 11.B Is stronger in that it outright prohibits such auacks If they may cause the
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Thus, even when such
works or installations become military objectives,37• lhey nevertheless cannot be targeted when an attack may

m See Henckaeru/Doswald-Beck (eds), ICRC Study on Customary International 1/umanftorian Law, Vol. I, Rule 42 and
commC'ntary,
p. 139: https://ihl-databascs.icrcori:Jcustomary-ihl/cng/tlocs/v1_rul_rulct.2 and refated practice.
171
On the scoof application of Addltional Protocol II, see Sa.ndoz/Swinarskl/Zlmmermann (eds), Commentary on tht
Additiona!
Prorocols, pp. 33-56.
"'Addltional Protocol I (1977), Art. 49. This rrfers to "combat action"; destructive ac:ts undertaken by a belligerent in its
own territory would not comply wlth the definition of "attacl<" as such acu are not mounted against the adversary:
Sandoz/Swlnarskl/Zimmennann (eds), Commtnrary on the Additional Protocols, p. 603, para. 1880, and p. 605, para. 1890.
m See Rule 8 of the present Guidelines. This point Is also rttalled In Additional Protocol I (1977), Art. 56(3).
.,. In the sens,of the drfmilion of mlliury objectives in Addition.ii Protocol I (1977), Art. 52; and Hrnckaerts/Ooswald-

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PRCYfECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN
cause

m See Henckaeru/Doswald-Beck (eds), ICRC Study on Customary International 1/umanftorian Law, Vol. I, Rule 42 and
commC'ntary,
p. 139: https://ihl-databascs.icrcori:Jcustomary-ihl/cng/tlocs/v1_rul_rulct.2 and refated practice.
171
On the scoof application of Addltional Protocol II, see Sa.ndoz/Swinarskl/Zlmmermann (eds), Commentary on tht
Additiona!
Prorocols, pp. 33-56.
"'Addltional Protocol I (1977), Art. 49. This rrfers to "combat action"; destructive ac:ts undertaken by a belligerent in its
own territory would not comply wlth the definition of "attacl<" as such acu are not mounted against the adversary:
Sandoz/Swlnarskl/Zimmennann (eds), Commtnrary on the Additional Protocols, p. 603, para. 1880, and p. 605, para. 1890.
m See Rule 8 of the present Guidelines. This point Is also rttalled In Additional Protocol I (1977), Art. 56(3).
.,. In the sens,of the drfmilion of mlliury objectives in Addition.ii Protocol I (1977), Art. 52; and Hrnckaerts/Ooswald-

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

severe losses among the civiHan population because of the release of dangerous forces,m subject to the three
exceptions in situations of International armed conflict specified in Article 56(2) of Additional Protocol 1.

160. For the purposes of Rule 11.A, taking particular care when attacking works and Installations containing dangerous
forces will involve recognizing the special peril inherent in any such attack by conducting an assessment under the
principles of proportional.ity and precautions that is sensitive to the uniquely high risk of severe losses involved in
such attacks and by taking all necessary precautionary measures.11• Such measures must ensure that assessments
of what precautions are "feasible" consider the risk of particularly acute humanitari.an consequencesm and could
involve, for example, requiring that a higher or elevated level of command take the decision to launch such an
attack.J.So

161. For the purposes of Rule ti.Fl, which applies only to States party to Additional Protocol I, to States party to
Additional Protocol II and to non-state actors that are party to armed confHcts to which AdditionaJ Protocol II
applies, determining when an auack is prohibited will depend on whether losses among the civiJian population may
be severe. This assessment must be made in good faith, on the basis of objective elements, such as the proximity of
inhabited ateas, population density, the specificities of the surrounding land, the amount of dangerous forces
expecced to be released by che auack, and - for nuclear eleccrical generating stations in particular - the pocentially
decades-Jong duration of the adverse effects of such forces.181 In this vein, and given the intrinsic dependence of
civilian populations on the naturaJ environment, it will be necessary in assessing the severity of the impact to
consider the excent to which the release of dangerous forces would damage the natural environment's capacity to
sustain the life of the civilian population.J82

Worksand installations containing dangerous forces


162. Both Rule 11.A and Rule 11.B apply specifically to three types of works and installations containing dangerous
forces: darns, dykes and nuclear electricaJ generating stations.3•3 The ICRC furthe.rmore recommends that these
rules be appl.ied to other installations containing dangerous forces, such as chemicaJ plants and petroleum
refineries.3K4 For example, in 2017 shelling by panies to the conflict in Ukraine around large water-treatment
facilities storing liquified chlorine gas prompted experts to raise concerns that the release of toxic gas couJd klll
anyone within 200 metres and cause severe health consequences for those within a radius of 2.4 km;,.\ by the same
logic, animaJs
(which form part of the natural environment) would have been impacted. In any case, any attack against other
types of works and instaJlations such as chemical plants and petroleum refineries that have become military
objectives

171
Sandoz/Swinarskl/Zimmermann (l"tls), Commentary on theAddirional Prorocols, p. 669, para. 2153-
"'On the need to take all necessary precautions in such attacks, see Henckaens/Doswald-Bttk (eds), ICRCSrudyon Customary
lntrmational Humanirarian Law, Vol. I, commentary on Rule 42, pp. 141-142: https://ihl•dJt.lbJses.icrc.orl:]customary ilt!
Jc_nl:]docsJv1_rul_rulct.2 and supponing references, In particular Colombia, Presidency, OHice of !he Human Rlghts Adviser,
Commtnts on the article1>ublished In Lo Prensa by P.E. Victoria on the 19n Additional Protocol 11, undated, para. S, reprinted
In Congussional Rtcord Conctrning tht [nacrmtnt of Law 171 of 16 Dtctmbtr 1994; France, Reservations and d larations made upon
ratlflcatlon of lh<'1977 Additional Protocol J, II April 2001, para. 1s; ll.lly, Manual; d;IComborunr;, 1998, para. 246; and
Unlt<'d Kingdom, Rc-setvalions and declarations made upon ratific'alion of the 19n Additional Protocol I, 28 January 1998,
para. N. On the importance of the proportionality test in such attacks, see e.g. United States, Airforce Pamphlet 110-31,
lnrernationa/ Law - The Condu<t of Armed Conflict and Air Operationi, 197(,, para. S· J(d). More generally regarding the
application of the general rules on proportionality and precautions to the natural environment, see Rules 7 and 8 of the present
Guidelines.
,.,. T htee r m "feasible" has bcl•n interpreted 10 mean practicable or 1>r3ctic3lly possible, taking Into acrount all clrcums13nces
ruling al thl' timl', including humanitarian 3nd military considerations. In thl' conlt'XI of works and instal tions containing
dangerous forces, !he humanitarian considerations relevant 10 !his assessment will be panicularly heavily weighted. See Rule 8
for a further disrnssion of ft'aslblc precautions.
,.. Regarding Lhe level at which a decision to attack a work or Installation containing dangerous forces should be Llken, see e.g.
Aust.rali.l, The Manual of lht low of Armed Confliel, 2006, para. 5,49, which st.lies tl1at "any such attack would be approved al the
highest command level". See al.so United Slates, Air force Pamphlel 110·JI, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air
Operations, 1976, para. S-J(d), which states that "[l)arget selection of such objects ls accordingly a matter of national decision at
appropriate high policy levels". More generally on the requirement that States makt' legal advisers availabll', when necessary, to
advise military commanders at Lhe appropriate level on !he application of IHL, see Rule 31 of the present Guidelines.
"' Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmermann (eds), Commenraryon rheAddirionol Proroco/s, pp. 669-670, para. 2154.
,., The link between the natural environment and losses among the civilian population is addressed in greater detail under the
headingucoosequences of the release of dangerous forces", paras 164-165 of Lhe present Guidelines.
,., Inclusion of other works and installations containing dangerous forces could not be agreed upon at the 1974-19n Diplomatic
Confrrence. for an overview of !his discussion, see Sandoz/Swinarskl/Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Addirional Protocols,
pp. 668-669, paras 2146-2150.
"'Ht'nckaens/Doswald-Bl'Ck (eds), /CRCStudyon Cusromary lnrernotional /lumonitarion lAw,Vol. I, commentary on Rule 42,
p.142: bttps:J./ihl.c.databascs.icrc.orglc.ustoma!;'.=ihl/cng/docs/v1_n1Lrule4L

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED
,., OHCHR, "Chl'mical dis<lster fear in Eilstem Ukraine prompts UN expert to raise alarm", Geneva,10 March 2017:
https://\ Ww.ohchr.orgLEN/NcwsE\•ents/Pages/DisplayNcws.aspx NewslD.£?1344&.LangID=E.

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECl'ION OFTHE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

remain governed by the rules or proporLlonallty and precautions,1•• the application or which will require that
the foreseeable effects of such an anack are taken Into account.

163- Article 56(7) of Additional Protocol I provides that States Parties may mark works and installations containing
dangerous forces with a srecial sign to facilitate their clear and quick identirication.This internationally recognized
sign Is a groupof three bright orange circles of t'qual slzt', rtact'd on the same axis, tht' distanct' between each circle
being one radlus.u•1Although this possibility is established within the framework of Additional Protocol 1, the
ICRC encourages all parties to conflicts - regardless of whether they are Parties to Additional Protocol I, and
regardless of whether the conflict Is Lnternational or non-International in character - to consider marking works
and installations containing dangerous forces with this sign. In any event, the absence of such a sign does not
remove the special protection afforded to objects by these rules, but it Is nevertheless in the interest or parties to
conflict that wish their dams, dykes or nuclear electrical generating stations to be respected to mark them
clearly.JSS

Consequences of the release of dangerous forces


164. Both Rule 11.A and Rule 11.B provide indirect protection to the natural environment in two ways. First, from a
practical standpoint, any release of dangerous forces capable of causing severe losses among the civilian
population is also likely to damage the natural environment in which the population Lives, so by requiring that
such a release be ,woldcd (Ruic II.A) or is prohibitt'd (Ruic 11.B), the natural environment benefits from indirt'ct
protection. For example, tht' a11acks on the German hydroclt'ctricdamsor Edt'r and Mohnt' in May 1943 kllkd 1,300
peoplt', but also damaged 3,000 hectares of cultivated land and killed 6,S00 livestock,••·• both of which constituted
parts of the natural environment.

165. Second, and of sign.lficance for the legal criterion of "severe losses among the civilian population", the natural
environment and the health of the civilian population may be intrinsically interlinked, and damage to the natural
environment caused by the release of dangerous forces may also have fatal consequences for the civilian
population. For example, the release of nuclear energy would Involve the contamination or surrounding land and
water supplies with radioactive particles and the dispersal of dirt and soot affecting the atmosphere and climate.
This would be likely to have a severe Impact on rarming and food production, potentially putting communities at
risk of starvation.100 Recognition of this Unk between the natural environment and severe losses among the civilian
population ls of vital importance, and indeed some States have expressly identified the protection of the natural
environment as one of the purposes of limiting attacks against works and installations containing dangerous forces,
alongside the purpose of protecting the civilian population.J•1

••• Stt Rulrs 7 and 8 o( the! prl'sent Guldl'lines.


••1Addi1ion.1I Protocol I (1997), Ari. 56 and Annex I, An.17.
'" Sandoz/Swlnarskl/Zimml'rmi'lnn (eds), Commtnloryon lht Additional Prorocoh, p. 672, para. 2182.
"' Ibid., p. 667, para. 2143.
,,. L. Maresca and E. MltcheU, "The human costs and legal consequences o( nuclear wea11ons under ln1ema1lonal humanitarian
law", lnrrrnarional Revirwo{lht RtdCross, Vol. 97, No. 899, 2015, p. 641.
'" s e.g. Lithuania, Criminal Codt,1961, as amended In 1998, Ankle 337, which makes II a w.1r crime lo l.1unch "a mllltary
attack against an object posinga great threat lo the environment and people - a nuclear plant, a dam, a storage facility of
haz.irdous substances or olhl'r similar objrct - knowing 1ha1 It might ll3ve rxtremely grave consequrnces"; and Council of
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, RN:. 1495, Environmental Impact o( the war In Yugoslavia on South-East Elll'opt, 24 January
2001, para. 2, which points out that States Involved In military operations during the war In the former Yugoslaviawdlsrcgarded
the international rules set out In Articles 55 and 56 of Protocol I (1977) 10 the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Intended 10 limit
envlronmenLll damage In armtd conflict".

6
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OFTHE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

Rule 12 - Prohibitions regarding cultural property


A Property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, including such
property which constilutes part of the natural environment, must not be the object of
attack or used for purposes which arc likely to expose it to destruction or damage,
unless imperatively required by military necessity. Any fonn of theft, pillage or
misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, such property is
prohibited.
B. For States party to Additional Protocols I and II, as well as for non-state actors that are
party to non-international anncd conflicts to which J\dditional Protocol II applies,
directing acts of hostility against historic monuments, works of art or places of worship
which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, including when U1ese are
part of the natural environment, or using them in support of the military effort, is
prohibited.

Commentary
166. The general rule embodied in Rule 12.A, which is stated here with the addilion of an express reference to the natural
environment, has been established as a norm of customary International law applicable in both international and
non-international arnwd confllcts.19' Rule 12.8 reflects Article 53 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and Article 16
of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, similarly with the addition or an express reference to the natural environment. It
is thus binding b('tWL'en States party to Additional Protocol 1, as well as on parties to non-International,irmed
conrlicts to which Additional Protocol II applies, and Is applicable in situations of international and non-
International armed conflict, respectively.1•11

167. 111ese rules are without prejudice to anyother International Instruments protecUng cultural property and the
natural environment that may apply in times of armed conflict.JQ4

Prohibited acts
168. Cultural property Is protected both when It Is under the control of an advers.iry (such that belligerents must
refrain from directing a11acks against it) and when it is under a belligerent's own control. In the latter case,
belligerents must refrain from using cultural property for purposes that are likely to expose it to destruction or
damage and furthermore must refrain from any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any act of
vandalism directed against, that property. The expression "acts of hostility" used in Rule 12.ll covers bolh auacks
In the framework of the conduct of hosti.lities and the destruction of property under a belligerent's own control.I•'

169. Rules 12.A and 12.B provide specific protection to cultural property, reinforcing protection of these types of
objects as compared with other civilian objects. As such, parts or the natural environment also qualifying as
cultural property benefit from the additional protection provided by these rules. Cultural property under so-called
general, special or enhanced protection••• may or must bear the respective distinctive emblems."" Furthennore,
these rules limit the circumstances in which such property may be lawfully targeted to very exceptionalsituations,
as outJlned below. While there Is no general prohibition under IIIL of using a civilian object to contrlbu1e to its
military action,

"' Sl'l' Hl'nck.ierts/llosw.ild-Bl'Ck (eds), ICRCStudyon Cusromary lnttrnnrional /lumanitarian /Aw, Vol. I, comml'nt.iry on R11lr JR,
p. u7: htq":l/lhl-djt,1baw, k1c.ori:/cu,10111ary •1hl/rni:}don/v1_1ul_rulc3S; Ibid., romml'mary on Rull' 39, pp. 131-132:
http,://lhl•djwb.i,c,.iuco1i:/lll>lo111.ny-lhl/c11i:Jdoc,tv1_rut_rulcJ9; and Ibid., commrntary on Ruic 40, p. 132:
h11v,://IJ1l dJtJb.iscs.1crc.ori:/ us10 lllJ ry-1hI/cIrs:./docs/n_ ru LruiCJ.o.
,., On the scope or application or Additional Protocol 11, su Sandoz/SwlnJrskJ/Zimmermann (rds), Commentary on tht Additional
Protocol!, pp. 1347-1356.

04
Sl'e l'.g. World Heritage Convention (1972).
,., Sandoz/Swinarski/Zimmermann (eds), Commtntory on tht Additional Protocols, p. 647, para. 2070; Bothc/Pansch/Sotr, Ntw
Ru/ts for Victim! of Armtd Conf1i<1s, p. 375, para. 2.5.2. Stt also R. O'Krde, Tht Prattclion of Cultural Proptrty in l\rmtd Conflicr,
Cambridge Univrrsity Prrss, Cambridgr, 2006, p. 215.
, .. For more information on general or special protection, see Hague Convention for the Protection or Cultural Property In the
Event or l\nnrd ConOict (1954), Chaps I and II; andSecond Protocol to the llaguc Convention for the Protl'Ction or Cultural
Property (1999), Chap. 2. for runher details on enhancrd protection, sl'e Srcond Protocol to tht' Hagur Convl'nt:lon for the
Protection or Cultural Property (1999), Chap. J.
'" llague Convention for the rrot«tion orCultural Property (1954), Arts 6 and 16-17. I\ distinctive emblem for cultural
propeny under enh,mcNI protrction was established by a decision adopted In 2015 by States party to the Second Protocol to the
Convtnllon: UNESCO, Second Protocol to thr Hague Convention or 1954 for the Protection or Cultural Property In the Event or
l\nn..-d Conflict (1999), Sixth Meeting of the Panics, CLT-15/6.SP/CONF.202/DECISIONS, Paris, 18 January 2016, Decision 6.SP 2,
p. 2: ht1ps://unesdoc.uncsco.ori;].1rk:/4lill3/Pfououu.3sso.
GUIDELLNES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVLRONMENT IN ARMED

under Rule 12.A parties to an armed conflict must refrain from using cultural property for purposes which are likely
to expose It to destruction or damage, unless imperatively rl'quired by military necessity. Furthermore, unlike
for other civilian objects, in addition to pillage, this rule prohibits any form or theft or misappropriation or,
and any acts or vandalism directed against, property of great importance 10 the cultural heritage of every
people. Under Rule 12.B, it is prohibited to use cultural property In support or the military effort.

170. The obligations laid down In the first sentence of Rule 12.A may be waived when "imperatlv('ly required by
military necessity".'"' Convers('ly, the obligation laid down in the second sentenc(' or Hui(' 12.A Is not subjrct 10
any exceptions.

171. With regard 10 Rule 12.B, Article 53or Additional Protocol I and Article 16 or Additional Protocol II do not provide
for a waiver or the obligations ii contains, although several States at th('1974-1977 Diplomatic ConfNence argued
that notwithstanding thr absence of a waiver, objects protected by thr relevant provisions could become the object
of attack if used, Illegally, "for military purposes".1••

Objects protected
172. These rules provide both ctlrect and indirect protection to the natural environment.

173. Direct protection is afforded to the natural environment when an object forming part of the natural environment
qualifies as cultural property.< 00 The notion of cultural property is concerned primarily with man -made objects.
Under the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, It covers movable and immovable
property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, as well as certain buildings and crntrrs
containing monuments.•0• Based on this definition, the natural environment will not genera Uy qualify as cultural
property. This being said, the possibility that a part of Lhe natural environment, such as a tree of particular
importance, may qualify as cultural property was envisaged at the Diplomatic Conference leading to the adoption
of the 1954 Convention.••• Furthermore, objects such as archaeological sites,40J a cave containing prehistoric
paintings, or a statue carved in the rock may conceivably qualHy both as cultural property and as a part of the
natural environment. Similarly, although natural sites, as such, were not included in the definition of cultural
property under the 1954 Hague

1•• Article 4 of the 1954 Hagul' Convention for the Protection of CUiturai Property provides that High Contracting Panil's may

only waive the obligations rl'lated to directing an act of hostility against propeny of grrat lmponancr to the cultural heritageof
evl'ry peopleor to using It for purposl's which ilrt!likely to exposl' it to destruction or damage In casl'S when! military necessity
imperatively requires such a waiver. Article 6(a) of the 1999Second Protocol to the Convention has sought to clarify the meanlng
of lmprrativr mlllt.uy necessity, stating with rl'g,ud to directing an act of hostility agalrut propeny of gr,.it lmporunce to thl'
cultural heritage of evl'ry propll', that a waiver on this basis may only h<' invoked when and for as long as: (I) the cultural
property In question has, by Its function, bct.>n made Into ii mllltary objective; and (2) thrr, lsnof,aslble alternative to obtain a
slmil,u mlllt.1ry adv.intage to that offl'r<'d by ilttacking that objl'ctlve. With rl'gard to th<' US<' of such J>roperty for purp0S<'S which
are likely to expose It to destruction or damagl', Articll' 6(b) of the Protocol states that a waiver on the basis of imperative
mllltary ncc..-sslty may only be lnvok.rd "when and for as long as no choler Is posslblt' bt'twttn such use of tht' cultural property
and another feasible method for obtaining ii similar military advantage". Sce also llencluerts/Doswald-Bcck. (t'ds), /CRC Study on
Customary lnttrnotional llumanltorlan Law,Vol. I, co111ment.1ry on Rule JR, pp. 129-130: l1ttp,.//1hl· d,1t.1lJ.1, ,.1u LOI ):/lU>tomary·
ihl/l'lli:)dou/\'1 tul 1ul,·1 . On the notion of "l11111eratiVl' military necessity" In general, see para. 180 of the present Guldl'lincs.
, .. Stt e.g. the statemt'nts of the Federal Republic of Germany, Official Records of tht Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1974-19n,
Vol. VI, CDDII/SR.42, pp. 225-221,; Nl'lhrrl,rn,ls, Ibid., Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.53, pp. 1<,1-1<>2; Unit rd Kingdom, Ibid., Vul. VI,
CDOII/SR.42, p, 23R; and Uniled States, ibid.,Vol.VI, C:DDH/SR.42, pp. u.0-241. As noted in Sandoz/Swinarski/Zhnmermann
(Nls), Commrnra,yon 1hrAd.J/1/ona/ l1ro1ocoh, commcmary on Article 53 of Additional Protocol 1, p. 6648, r.ua. 2079, the use of
protected objects in support of 1hr military cflort, in violation of this provision, docs not necessarily justify attacking these
objects, as this will depend on them being ii military objeclive. To render an attack Jl'-'rmissible, in addition to being used for
military (lUf'l'OSt'S, the obj«t must make ill\ effective contribution to mllilary action for the adversary, and its total or partial
destruction, rapture or neutrnlization in the circumstances ruling at the time must offer a definite military advantage.
- For tht' purpo s of these Guidelines, the l<'rm "cultural propt'rty" ls used genl'Tkally to refer to all objects prolt'Cled by Rull's
12.A and 12.B within their respt'ctive scopes of application. The rules do not discuss, and an.- without prejudil'1.' to, the regimes
of "special protection" and "mhanced protection" established by the 1954 Hague Convention for lht' Protection of Cultural
Property and lts 1999 Srcond Protocol, rl!Spl'Ctivcly.
,.. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property (1954), Art. 1.
'"' J. Toman, Tht Prorrction of Cultural Properly in !ht Event of Atmtd Conflict, Dartmouth Publishing Company, Brookfield
(Vermont), 1996, p. 53, citing the discussions that took place during the 1954 Diplomatic Conference; stt Intergovernmental
Conferenl'1.' on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Rteards of tht Confertnct Convtntd by lht
United Nations Educational, Scitntific and Cu/rural Organization,lfrld at The flaguefrom .21 April lo 14 Moy 1954, Staatsdrukkerijen
Uitgeverijbedrijf, The Hague, 1961, p. 115, para. 129.
'"' With regard lo underwater sites of archaeological and historical Interest, stt Toman, Tht Proltdlon of Cultural Properly In tM
Event of Armtd Conflict, p. 53.

7
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OFTHE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IN ARMED

Convention,= the}• - or pansof them - mayqualify as cultural property if they otherwise fulfiJ the relevant criteria
For example, the ancient Maya city of Calakmul, Campeche, located and dispersed within a dense tropica.l forest,
constitutes at the same time a "center containing monuments"40 registered as cultural property under special
protection according to the 1954 Hague Convention400 and a site listed by UNESCO as both a natural and a cultural
World Heritage Site.407 As in this case, World Heritage Sites may conceivably qualify as part of the natu.ral
envi.ronment and, if tlley meet the definition of cultural property under the 1954 Hague Convention, they - or parts
of them - could also qualify as cultural property. If they do not meet the relevant criteria, they will not be
considered cultural property.

174. Parts of the natural envi.ronment, such as specific mountains, forests or islands,40" may also have, independently of
their cultural value, a certain spiriwal significance and be considered as sacred bya particular population. They may
in such cases qualify as places of worship protected by Rule u.B, provided they constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples.

-The1954 Diplomatic Conference discussNI the inclusion of "natur.tl slles of great beauty" in the protective scope of the
Convention but did not pursue the idea. Similacly, during a revision of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Prope.rty, an extension of the scope of the treaty to include "natural huitage" was not taken further. For more information
on
the reasons behind this decision, see P.J. Boylo1n, Rtviewof lht Convtnrion for rht Prortcrion of Cultural Property In the Evenr of
Armtd Conflict (The Hague Convemion of 1954), UNESCO Doc. CLT-93/WS/u, Paris, 1993, paras 18.8-18.10.
'"""Omtcrs containing monuments" is ,1 subcatt'gory of cultural property deftm-d in Article s(c) of the 1954 Hague convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property.
'"Stt UNESCO, International Rrgister of Cultural Property under Special Protection, CLT/HER/CHP, 23 July 2015, Section;
Muico, para. ll.1; http://www.uncsco.oq;/ncw/f1lcadmin/J,\ULTL\\ED1NIIQJCLT/pdf/ R pstcr201s£N.ptl!.
.., Thirty-nine World Heritage Sites are curnntly classified as beingof a mixt'd natural and cultural nature, which can be used as
guidance in finding otb'1examples of objects qualifying as both natural sites and cultural property.
... Posslblt examples of such places can be found in r.g. C. McLeod, P. Valentine and R. Wild (eds), Sacrtd NaruralSitts:GuidtlintS
for Prortcrtd Arta Managm, IUCN, Gland (Switzerland), 2008.

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