THE 1NSTITUTE

OF PETROLEUM

I
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Volume 1: Large Bulk Pressure
Storage & Refrigerated LPG

MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE

PART 9

ISBN 0 471 91612 9

First printed 1987

Reprinted October 1997

This Code is based on accepted good practice and the appropriate standards
for use in the industry. It should be regarded as complementary to the
statutory requirements pertaining to the petroleum industry in different countries.
It is hoped that the adoption of this Code will help reduce the risk of accidents.

Published by
THE INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM,LONDON
A charitable company limited by guarantee
 INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

Volume 1

LARGE BULK PRESSURE STORAGE AND REFRIGERATED LPG

Being thejirst of a two volume revision of Part 9 of the
Institute of Petroleum
Model Code of Safe Practice in the
Petroleum Industry

February
1987

A Code jointlyprepared by The Institute of Petroleum,

The Institution of Gas Engineers and
The Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical Association ( U K )

Published on behalf of
THE INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM, LONDON
John Wiley & Sons
Chichester - New York - Brisbane - Toronto - Singapore
Copyright @ 1987 by The Institute of Petroleum, London

All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced by any means, or

transmitted, or translated into a machine language
without the written permission of the copyright holder.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data:

Institute of Petroleum
Liquefied Petroleum gas: a code.-
2nd ed.-(Model code of safe practice
in the petroleum industry. Pt. 9).
Vol. 1
1. Liquefied petroleum gas-Storage-
Standards
I. Title 11. Institution of Gas Engineers
111. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry
Technical Association 111. Series
665.7'42 TW56
ISBN 0 471 91612 9

Printed and-bound in Great Brilain By

Galliard (Printers) Ltd.. Great Yarmouth.
Norfolk.
 CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

1 Properties of Liquefied Petroleum Gas

1.1 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Properties and Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.4 Odorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.5 Prevention of Water Deposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 Pressure Storage at Refineries. Bulk Distribution Plants and Large Industrial Consumer Premises
2.1 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1 Inclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2 Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.3 Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2.2 Requirements for the Layout Location and Spacing of LPG Pressure Storage Installations . . .4
I 2.2.1 General layout principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.2 Location and spacing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.3 Bunds and separation kerbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.4 Ground conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.5 Pits and depressions in the storage area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
2.2.6 Other hazardous storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.7 Layout of storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.8 Protection of facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.3 Pressure Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.3.1 Designcode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.2 Design criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.3 Fittings . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.4 Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.5 Level gauging equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.6 Pressure relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.7 Shut-off valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.8 Emergency shut-off valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.9 Excess flow valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.10 Drainsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.11 Filling capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.12 Insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
V
 CONTENTS

2.3.13 Icing of valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.3.14 Protection-painting . _.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-8.
2.3.15 Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
2.3.16 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
23.17 Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2.4 Piping. Valves and Fittings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

2.4.1 Design code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.2 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.3 Pipe thickness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.4 Pipe joints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.5 Welding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.6 Valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.7 Flangesand fittings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.8 Bolting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.9 Installation and flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.10 Thermal pressure relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.11 Insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.12 Articulated pipe connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.13 Inspection and testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.14 Hoses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.15 Emergency shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.5 Foundations and Supports for Vessels and Piping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.5.1 Codes and specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.2 Ground conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.3 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.4 Loadings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.5 Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.6 Support systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.7 Pipe supports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.8 Fireproofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2.6 Pumps. Compressors and. Meters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2.6.1 Pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.2 Compressors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.3 Meters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.4 Protection of pumps. compressors and meters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6.5 Transfer systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2.7 Road and Rail Loading and Unloading Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.7.1 Location and layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7.2 Grouhd conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7.3 Loading and unloading equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7.4 Stray currents. earthing and bonding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.8 Electrical. Static Electricity. Lightning Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.8.1 Electrical apparatus. earthing and bonding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8.2 Lightning protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.9 Requirements for Fire Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.9.1 Fire plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9.2 Controloffires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9.3 Protection systems . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9.4 Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9.5 Communicationslalarm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9.6-- Cooling water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.9.7 Care and maintenance of fire-fighting equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

vi
 CONTENTS

2.9.8 Drainage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.9.9 Removal of combustible materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.9.10 Warning signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.10 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.10.1 Housekeeping . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . : . . . . . . . 15
2.10.2 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.10.3 Emergency procedures/plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.10.4 Emergency action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.10.5 Purging and filling of systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.10.6 Draining water in service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.10.7 Transfer operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.10.8 Access to storage and operating areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.10.9 Lighting of storage and operating areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.11 Inspection of Pressure Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.11.1 Permit to work systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.11.2 Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.11.3 External inspection-above-ground vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.11.4 Internal inspection-above-ground vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.11.5 Buriedlmounded vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.11.6 Cracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.11.7 Pressure relief valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3 Refrigerated Liquefied Petroleum Gss Storage

3.1 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.1 Inclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.2 Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.3 Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.2 General Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.2.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.2 Level of safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.3 Prudent provisions for spillage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.4 Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.5 Vapour formation and fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3.3 RequirementsforLocationandSpacingofRefrigeratedLPGTanks . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3.1 Limits for thermal radiation flux levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3.2 Rate of leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3.3 Vapourtravel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3.4 Requirements for Bunds and Impounding Basins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3.4.1 Individual tank bunding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4.2 Bund capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4.3 Bunddesign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4.4 Bund safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

3.5 Requirements for Low Pressure Refrigerated Storage Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

3.5.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.5.2 Tankfittings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5.3 Tank connections and appurtenances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5.4 Pressure/vacuum control and relief systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5.5 Insulation of tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5.6 Corrosion protection of tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.5.7 Marking of tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

vii
 CONTENTS

3.6 Requirements for Piping. Valves and Fittings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

- 3.6.1 Pipingcode . . . . . . . . . . _.. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.6.2 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.6.3 Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.6.4 Thermal pressure relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.7 Requirements for Foundations for Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.7.1 Foundation design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.7.2 Uplift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3.8 Requirements for Fire ProtectiodLoss Control Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3.8.1 Fire plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.8.2 Control of fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.8.3 Protection systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3.9 Inspection of Refrigerated Storage Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3.9.1 Permit to work systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.9.2 General philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.9.3 The possibility of internal corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.9.4 Problems associated with internal inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.9.5 Requirements for internal inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.9.6 Requirements for external inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.9.7 Competent persodrecords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

3.10 Requirements for the Initial Filling of Storage Tank or Re-commissioning After Inspection . . 28
3.10.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.10.2 Ice/hydrate formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.10.3 Permit to work systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.10.4 Removal of air-drying out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.10.5 Displacement of inerts by LPG vapour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.10.6 Cooling down and commissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

3.11 Requirements for Taking Tank out of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3.11.1 Permit to work systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.11.2 Removal of liquid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.11.3 Purging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 1.4 Sources of inert gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.11.5 Purging procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.11.6 Preparation for entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.11.7 Entry into tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

3.12 Operational Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

3.12.1 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.12.2 Emergency proceduredplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.12.3 Commissioning. gas freeing and entry into tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 .
3.12.4 Transfer operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Appendices
1 Thermal Radiation Flux Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2 Calculation of Thermal Radiation Flux Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3 LeakSourcesandTypicalLeakRatesfromLPGStorageSystems . . . . . . . . . . 65
4 Vapour Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5 Cooling Water Requirements for the Protection of Refrigerated LPG Storage Tank
Systems Exposed to Thermal Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
...
Vlll
 CONTENTS

6 Safe End Limits When Purging with Nitrogen vol. per cent . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
I
7 Glossary of Terms . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
I 8 Guidance on Work Permit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
9 Some Codes of Practice, Specifications, Standards, etc., Relevant to the LPG Industry . . . 84
I 10 List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . *. . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

I
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, 88
I

ix
 FOREWORD’
This Code is Part 9 of The Institute of Petroleum
Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum
Industry. It supersedes the edition published in
1967, the technical recommendations of which
have both been amplified and brought up to date.
Its purpose is to provide a general guide to safe
practice in storing, handling and transport of
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), and it gives, for
the most part, recommendations for safe practice
rather than a set of rigid rules. It is the intention
that this approach should more easily allow the
use of new methods, techniques, materials, etc.,
which may be developed in the future and which
meet the requirements for safe practice given in
this Code.
It must be stressed that in determining any
required safe procedure the effect of any unusual
circumstances, on which it is impossible to
generalize, must receive due consideration and,
further, that design, construction and operation
of plant and equipment must be carried out only
by suitably trained personnel.
Attention is drawn to the Institute’s Area
Classification Code which should also be con-
sidered during the design of LPG facilities.
Attention is also drawn to the fact that in many
countries there exist statutory requirements,
both local and national, relating to LPG, and this
Code should be regarded as being complemen-
tary to such requirements.
This Code is arranged as two volumes containing
six separate chapters supported by a number of
Appendices.
The volumes and chapters are as follows:
Volume 1
Chapter l-General information applicable to
LPG.
Chapter 2-Pressure storage at refineries,
bulk distribution plants and also
industrial consumer premises,
where such storage is large.
X
Chapter +Refrigerated LPG.
This subject was previously
dealt with in Clause 2.4 of Chapter
2 of the 1967 Code under the title
Low Pressure Refrigerated Stor-
age. However, because of the
evolution of new techniques for
handling refrigerated products,
the increase in quantities being
stored and handled and the result-
ing need for special safety con-
siderations with respect to these
large quantities, it has been
decided to consider refrigerated
storage separately.
Relevant Appendices
Volume 2
Chapter 1-Pressure storage at industrial,
commercial and domestic prem-
ises (originally Chapter 3 of the
1967 Code).
Chapter 2-Plant for the filling, handling and
storaBe of cylinders (originally
Chapter 4 of the 1967 Code).
Chapter >Transport by road and rail (ong-
inally Chapter 5 of the 1967
Code).
For marine transport reference
should be made to the Inter-
national Safety Guide for Oil Tan-
kers and Terminals (ISGOTT),
and for pipeline transport to the
IP Code of Practice for Petroleum
Pipelines.
Relevant Appendices.
4. The Liquefied Petroleum Gas Sub-Committee,
which prepared this Code; is a Sub-Committeeof
the Engineering Committee of the Institute. It
comprises representatives of The Institute of Pet-
roleum, The Institution of Gas Engineers and
 FOREWORD
The Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical
Association (UK).
5. For the purpose of this Code certain interpret-
ations which are given in Appendix 7 apply irres-
pective of any other meaning the words may have
in other connections. Where used in the Code
such defined terms are printed in italics.
6. Although it is .believed that adoption of the
recommendations of the Code will help to reduce
xi
the risk of accident, The Institute of Petroleum,
The Institution of Gas Engineers and The
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical
Association (UK)cannot accept any responsi-
bility, of whatever kind, for damage or alleged
damage arising or otherwiseoccumng in or about
premises, areas or vehicles to which this Code has
been applied.
 1
PROPERTIES OF LIQUEFIED
PETROLEUM GAS
1.1 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
(LPG)
1.1.1
The term Liquefied Petroleum Gas or LPG includes
commercial propane, commercial butane and mix-
tures thereof.
1.1.2
LPG at ambient temperature and normal atmos-
pheric pressure is usually a gas but is readily liquefied
by either additional pressure, or refrigeration, or a
combination of both.
It is stored and handled:
(a) as a liquid under pressure at ambient tempera-
tures,
(b) as a fully refrigerated liquid kept at sufficiently
low temperature to produce a pressure substan-
tially atmospheric,
(c) as a semi-refrigerated liquid kept at a higher
temperature than (b) to produce an intermediate
pressure.
1.1.3
LPG is supplied against product specifications e.g.
BS 4250, Gas Processors Association of the JSA
(GPA) .
1.1.4
The two grades of LPG most commonly handled are
referred to as commercial butane and commercial
propane respectively. Mixtures of commercial butane
and commercial propane are also handled.
1.1.5
LPG-may be produced as an odourless product. For
general usage it is odorized as necessary to permit
detection of leakage by smell (see 1.4).
1.2 PROPERTIES AND
CHARACTERISTICS
1.2.1
Commercial butane is a hydrocarbon mixture consist-
ing predominantly of a mixture of normal and
isobutani: a n d o r butylene, i.e. C4s.
1.2.2
Commercial propane is a hydrocarbon mixture con-
sisting predominantly of propane a n d o r propylene,
i.e. C3s.
1.2.3
Physical properties of these two commercial grades
are given in Table 1.
1.3 HAZARDS
1.3.1
LPG is usually stored and transported as a liquid.
Leakage of liquid results in the formation of large
volumes of vapour as 1 volume of liquid produces
approximately 250 volumes of vapour at atmospheric
pressure.
1.3.2
Even small quantities of LPG vapour in air may form
a flammable mixture. The limits of flammability of
LPG are approximately 2% to 10% volume of gas in
air and this results in LPG leakage forming large
volumes offlammable gas-air mixtures.
1 volume of vapour can form 10 to 50 volumes of
fiammuble gas-air mixture ...
1volume of liquid can form 2,500 t o 12,500 volumes
offlammable gas-air mixture.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

Table I The cooling which occurs on evaporation of liquid

Typical properties of commercial LPG grades. LPG causes frost bums to the skin anddamage to eyes
if protection, e.g. gloves and goggles, is not used
Commercial Commercial
when contact with LPG is a possibility.
Property butane propane
Refrigerated LPG causes severe frost bums and eye
Density at atmospheric damage even if little or no evaporation occurs.
boiling point, kgllitre 0.60 0.57
Density at I5"C. kgllitre 0.57 0.51 1.3.7
m3/tonneat 15 "C 1.72 1.96
Density of vapour com- LPG whether in liquid or vapour form is only slightly
pared with air at 15 "C toxic. The vapour is an asphyxiant in high concen-
and 1bara 2.00 1s o trations and is anaesthetic. Thus precautions must be
Ratioof vapour volume to taken in entering confined spaces such as tanks
liquidvolumeat 15 "C because of these properties of the LPG (and also
and 1bara 230 270
Boiling point at
because of its flammability and the risk of reduced
atmosphericpressure 0 "C -44°C oxygen levels).
Vapour pressure bara,
-40 "C - 1.4 1.3.8
0 "C 2 8.0 Liquid LPG has a high coefficient of expansion.
45 "C 5 18
Latent heat of vaporiz- Adequate ullage must therefore always be provided
ation, kllkgat 15 "C 372 358 in storage vessels (static and transport) to prevent
Specific heat of liquid at them becoming hydraulically full as a result of tem-
15 "C, kl/(kg"C) 2.4 2.5 perature rise. Pipelines and equipment which are
Limitsof flammability normally liquid full must be protected, by operating
vol% in gas-air mixture procedures a n d o r safety equipment, against the high
at atmospheric pressure 1.8-9.0 2.1-10
pressure which would result from the liquid's expan-
sion with temperature rise.
1.3.3 1.3.9
LPG at ambient temperature and normal atmos- A container which has held LPG and is nominally
pheric pressures is normally a gas which is heavier empty is still potentially dangerous. In this state the
than air. Commercial butane vapour and commercial internal pressure is approximately atmospheric and
propane vapour are approximately 2.0 and 1.5 times should the valve be open or leaking a flammable
as heavy as air, respectively. LPG vapours will there- mixture may result due to air diffusing into the con-
fore sink to the lowest levels of the surroundings and tainer when temperatures fall or vapour issuing from
flow along the ground or through drains or such-like the container when temperatures rise.
passages. Under still air conditions the natural dissi-
pation of accumulated vapour may be slow. 1.3.10
The density of liquid LPG is approximately half that
1.3.4 . of water, and when leakage occurs in low ambient
A small release of LPG into the atmosphere will temperatures the product could be carried away by
result in a finunuble. mixture which may be ignited water.
some distance from the point of leakage.
1.3.11
1.3.5 If water is used for hydraulic testing of storage etc.
LPG has a low viscosity; hence it has little or no then its weight and not that of the LPG contents is
lubricating properties and it is more likely to find a relevant for foundation design.
leakage path than water or most other petroleum
products. These facts are significant with respect to 1.3.12
the design of plant and have particular relevance to The presence of water in LPG systems presents a
the glands and seals of pumps, compressors and hazard from icing under certain conditions (see 1.5).
valves.

1.3.6 1.4 ODORIZATION

Whilst LPG is colourless both in the liquid and vapour
phases the cooling which takes place when the liquid
evaporates results, in cases of Leakage, in water con-
densation and even freezing of water vapour con-
tained in the air; this appears as a white mist or cloud.
Odorization is not required if harmful in the use or
further processing of the LPG or ifit will serve no
useful purpose as a warning agent in such use. In
other circumstances the odour should be distinctive,

2
 PROPERTIES OF LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

unpleasant, and non-persistent and should indicate 1.5 PREVENTION OF WATER

the presence of gas in the air at a level in excess of 20%
of the lower limit of flammability. DEPOSITION
The odorization requiremeni can be met by the
Methanol or propylene glycol may be added to LPG
addition of controlled quantities of suitable odorizing
to prevent water deposition and hydrate formation.
agents, e.g. ethyl mercaptan, dimethyl sulphide. Care
For refrigeratedproductwater and other trace compo-
is necessary in handling those odorants which are
nents must be removed prior to refrigeration.
toxic in concentrated form.

3
 2

PRESSURE STORAGE, AT
REFINERIES, BULK
DISTRIBUTION PLANTS AND
LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CONSUMER PREMISES

2.1 SCOPE 2.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

2.1.1 Inclusions
This chapter covers LPG pressure storage instal-
lations, above ground, mounded or below ground, at
refineries and bulk distribution plants as well as at
large industrial consumer plants where storage
involves vessek of individual capacity greater than
135 m3 or group storage greater than 450 m3.
2.1.2 Exclusions
2.1.2.1 This code does not cover storage in frozen
earth pits or underground caverns.
2.1.2.2 This chapter is not intended to cover either
' refrigerated stbrage, which is covered in Chapter 3, or
storage of LPG at the smaller industrial consumer
premises, which is covered in Volume 2.
LAYOUT, LOCATION AND SPACING
OF LPG PRESSURE STORAGE
INSTALLATIONS
2.2.1 General Layout Principles
The layout of LPG Storage Installations shall ensure
that in the event of ignition of leakage of product the
effect on other parts of the installation or on people or
property located outside the installation is minimized.
The principles to be followed in the location and
spacing of Pressure storage vessels and ancillaries are
set out in 2.2.2. These are based on the consideration
of the possible effects of leakage of LPG.
Measures aimed at preventing leaks are set out in
2.3 to 2.10. Additional measures to minimize the
effects of leakage to ensure that the facilities are
adequately protected are set out in 2.2.3 to 2.2.7.
2.2.2 Location and Spacing

2.2.2.1 LPG pressure storage vessels, pump bays and

2.1.3 Object
2.1.3.1 The object of this chapter is to recommend
basic safety requirements and practice for the design,
construction and use of LPG pressure storage, par-
tially refrigerated storage and ancillary facilities.
2.1.3.2 It is not intended to preclude the use of
alternative designs, materials and methods where
these provide equivalent standards of safety.
loading and discharge facilities shall be located and
spaced to ensure:
(a) That they are sufficiently distanced from fured
sources of ignition.
(b) In the event of a fire as described in 2.2.2.3 the
heat radiation flux levels resulting will not exceed
the relevant maximum levels given in Table 1 of
Appendix 1.
(c) Accessibility for fire fighting.

4
 PRESSURE STORAGE
(d) That spillage from one vessel or work area does
not flow under any other vessel or directly to any
other important facility/work area.
2.2.2.2 LPGpressure storage vessels, pump bays and
loadingldischarge facilities shall be located to ensure
the following minimum distances to fixed sources of
ignition irrespective of the requirements of 2.2.2.1:
22.5 m For storage vessels not exceeding 337 m3
30 m For storage vessefs exceeding 337 m3
25 m For pump bays and loadinghnloading
facilities
Deflection walls may be used to extend the vapour
travel path from leakage as identified in 2.2.2.4 to
meet these safety distances.
Such walls should be so located as to minimize the
risk of flame engulfment of storage vessels, in the
event of ignition of escaped product and also so as to
ensure free ventilation of the storage area from at
least three directions, taking account of prevailing
winds.
2.2.2.3 The radiation flux levels laid down in Table I
of Appendix 1 shall be based on the ignition of
product discharging from the vessel's relief valves as
well as spillage from the vessel, its appurtenances and
other identified leak sources (see Appendix 3), and
possibly forming a pool of a size dictated by the
spillage rate, evaporation rate and duration (see
2.2.2.4) and the local topographyllocation of a bund
or impounding basin.
The atmospheric conditions relevant to the site
shall be applied in determining the flux levels.
Calculation methods are described in Appendix 2.
2.2.2.4 The rate of spillage and its duration used in
2.2.2.3 shall be based on identified potential leak
sources in the system. The identification and quanti-
tative assessment of such leak sources require a sys-
tematic evaluation of the design and operating pro-
cedures, taking into account failure modes and the
likelihood of their occuriing.
Examples of potential leak sources and indications
of leakage rates from them under specific conditions
and using a simplified typical equation are given in
Appendix 3.
2.2.2.5 Provision should be made to minimize the
probability of ajlammable cloud resulting from a spill
as defined in 2.2.2.3 from reaching the site boundary.
Typical provisions may include such measures as
spacing, limitation of spill pool area, screening and
vapour dispersion equipment.
Appendix 3 provides examples of potential leak
Sources and typical leak rates-ad Appendix 4, refer-
ences to mathematical models for kalculating hazard
distances arising from such releases.
5
2.2.2.6 The permitted radiation level on thermally
protected adjacent LPG storage vessels is based on the
protection of the adjacent vessel, e.g. by the appli-
cation of cooling water at the rate specifiedin 2.9.6.4.
Where cooling water is the method of protection
then its provision and application must be reliable.
Equivalent protective systems are acceptable pro-
vided their efficiency can be demonstrated at the
specified radiation level and over the expected dur-
ation of the fire.
2.2.2.7 The minimum cooling water application rate
of 7 litres/(minute m2)specified in 2.9.6.4 is based on
protection of a pressure storage vessel against flame
engulfment, rather than by thermal radiation, and is
therefore higher than would be calculated when using
the method given in Appendix 5.
The required cooling water application rate for
other equipment referred to in Appendix 1 may be
calculated by the method in Appendix 5. i
2.2.2.8 In the case of below-groundlmounded LPG
pressure storage, in addition to meeting the require-
ments of Appendix 1 for a relief valve and spill fire,
there shall also be a minimum spacing of 3 metres
between the vessel shell and the site boundary.
2.2.2.9 In the event that the requirements of Table 1
of Appendix 1dictate lesser distances then there shall
be a minimum spacing between adjacent above-
ground LPC pressure vessels of 1.5 metres or 0.25
times the sum of the adjacent vessel diameters,
whichever is the greater. For below-ground mounded
storage the spacing between adjacent vessels shall be
determined by the site conditions and the require-
ments for safe installatiodremoval of such vessels as
well as their inspection, testing and maintenance.
2.2.2.10 The maximum number of vessels in any
Group shall be 6. Any one group shall be separated
from any other group by 15 m.
2.2.2.12 In any group vessels shall be in a single line,
i.e. shell to shell and not end to shell or end to end.
2.2.3 Bunds and Separation Kerbs
2.2.3.2 The provision of bun& around above-ground
LPG pressure storage designed and constructed in
accordance with the requirements of this code is not
normally required.
2.2.3.2 Separation kerbs, low to avoid gas traps, with
a maximum height of 0.6 m may be required to direct
spillage to suitable places away from storage vessefs
and other vulnerable equipment.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
2.2.4 Ground Conditions
Ground beneath above-ground pressure storage and
vessels in unfilled below-ground chambers should be
either concreted or compacted and graded to levels to
ensure that any spillage has a preferential flow away
from the vessel and its connections.
2.2.5 Pits and Depressions in the Storage Area
To prevent the formation of gas pockets, pits and
depressions, other than those which are provided as
catchment areas, should be avoided in and close to
the storage area.
2.2.6 Other Hazardous Storage
No pressure vessel for LPG should be located within
the bunded enclosure of:
(a) a tank containing anyflammable liquid,
(b) a tank containinig liquid oxygen or other hazard-
ous or cryogenic substance,
(c) a funk containing refrigerated LPG or liquefied
natural gas (LNG),
(d) a heated storage tank, e.g. residual fuel oil or
bitumen.
2.2.7 Layout of Storage
The layout and grouping of above-ground vessels, as
distinct from spacing, should receive careful consider-
ation to ensure accessibility for fire-fighting and to
avoid spillage from one vessel flowing under any other
or to any vulnerable equipment.
2.2.8 Protection of Facilities
2.2.8.1 To prevent unauthorized access, the area
which includes vessels, pumping equipment and load-
ing/unloading facilities should be enclosed by an
industrial .type fence at least 2 m high unless it is
otherwise adequately protected, e.g. the area comes
within a greater fenced plant area or is otherwise
isolated from the public.
2.2.8.2 When damage to LPG systems from vehicu-
lar traffic is a possibility, precautions to guard against
such damage must be taken.
2.2.8.3 Below-ground and mounded storage should
be protected from above-ground loadings due to
vehicular traffic or other cause, either by fencing off
the area under which the storage is buried or by the
use of reinforced concrete slab or other cover
adequate to prevent the weight imposing concen-
trated direct loads on the vessel.
If the storage area is not fenced off, the vessel
manhole cover and other fittings should be protected
against damage and tampering.
The perimeter of the area under which storage is
buried should be permanently marked.
6
2.2.8.4 Below-ground and mounded storage vessels I
- should have a minimum cover Of 500 mm.
2.3 PRESSURE STORAGE
2.3.1 Designcode
2.3.1.1 Vessels should be designed, fabricated,
inspected and tested in accordance with a recognized
pressure vessel code as appropriate, e.g. BS 5500,
ASME Section VIII.
2.3.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the
material used for construction, bearing in mind the
minimum temperature that the material of the vessel
could reach in service or an emergency. Such a
minimum temperature may well be below the
minimum ambient temperature in emergency situ-
ations and may also be so for vessels with high offtake
rates in normal service.
2.3.I .3 Vessels for a partially refiigeruted product
should be designed in accordance with the low tem-
perature requirements of the code referred to in
2.3.1.1.
2.3.2 Design Criteria
2.3.2.1 The design pressure of the container should
be not less than the vapour pressure of the actual LPG
to be stored in it, at the highest temperature that such
contents will reach in service and should also take into
account any additional pressures developed in oper-
ation.
The vapour pressure is dependent on the surface
temperature of the contents and not the bulk mean
temperature.
2.3.2.2 For partially refrigerated pressure storage the
capacity of the refrigeration plant andor the insu-
lation system should be such that the LPG is main-
tained at a temperature at which its vapour pressure is
below the set to discharge pressure of the relief valve.
2.3.2.3 The design of the buriedlmounded vessel
should allow for any differential settlement/move-
ment (including frost heave) as well as for the weight
of superimposed loads.
2.3.2.4 Vacuum conditions
If operating conditions may be 'expected to lower
product. temperatures to the extent that the vapour
pressure of the stored product falls below atmospheric
pressure, e.g. butane under very cold conditions,
then either the vessel should be designed for the
necessary degree of vacuum or the system should
 PRESSURE STORAGE
incorporate positive means for preventing vacuum
formation.
2.3.3 Fittings
Each vessel should be provided with at least one of
each of the following fittings, all of which should be
suitable for use with LPG over the vessel's design
range of pressure and temperature:
(a) pressure relief system connected directly to the
vapour space,
(b) manhole,
(c) drain system,
(d) meansof determining the liquid level (see 2.3.5),
(e) pressure indicator connected to the vapour space,
(f) temperature indicator for contents,
(g) maximum level device, e.g. high level alarm,
fixed ullage gauge.
2.3.4 Connections
2.3.4.1 Connections should be minimized, particu-
larly those below the maximum liquid level.
2.3.4.2 Connections should be designed and attached
to the vessel in accordance with its design code, e.g.
BS 5500, ASME Section VIII. Connections should
preferably be welded and fianged but screwed connec-
tions smaller than 50 mm to BS 3799 or equivalent
may be used.
2.3.4.3 The manhole should be not less than 0.55 m
internal diameter.
2.3.4.4 For below-ground and moundeii vessels the
manholes and connections should be extended to suit
the depth of cover, i.e. to facilitate access to valves,
etc.
2.3.5 Level Gauging Equipment
Consideration should be given to providing two inde-
pendent level gauges in addition to the maximum
level device. Column type gauge glasses for determin-
ing liquid level are not acceptable.
2.3.6 Pressure Relief
2.3.6.1 Code requirements
The requirements for pressure relief as specified in
the vessels design code, e.g. BS 5500, ASME Section
VIII, must be complied with.
2.3.6.2 Pressure relief valves
(a) Relief valves should be spring loaded; weight
loaded relief valves should not be used.
(b) Relief valves should be constructed so that the
breakage of any part will not"obstruct the free
discharge of vapour under pressure.
7
2.3.6.3 Pressure setting of relief valves
The pressure at which relief valves start to discharge
and reach full flow should be in accordance with the
vessel's design code, e.g. BS 5500, ASME Section
VI11 .
2.3.6.4 Capacity of relief valves
The full vapour flow capacity for relief valves should
be determined for a vessel exposed to fire conditions
in accordance with API RP520 or equivalent. How-
ever, the relief valves must also provide protection
against any overpressure resulting from overfilling,
when relief valve discharge would be flashing liquid.
For above-ground vessels no credit should be taken
for the effect of any insulation on limiting heat absorp-
tion unless the insulating material has adequate fire
resistant properties.
In sizing relief valve capacity for moundedlburied
storage credit may be taken for the inherent insulation
provided by the covering material, as specified in the
relevant code.
2.3.6.5 Relief valve marking
Every relief valve should incorporate permanent
markings as follows:
(a) manufacturer's identification, including
-manufacturer's name or symbol,
-catalogue or type number,
(b) nominal inlet and outlet sizes,
(c) start to discharge pressure,
(d) certified capacity in defined terms.
2.3.6.6 Relief valve installation
(a) Where provision is made to isolate any relief
valve for periodic servicing or testing, the relief
valve or valves which remain connected to the
vessel should provide the full capacity required
by 2.3.6.4. Relief valve connections to vessels
should be as short as possible and should not
throttle relief valve discharge.
(b) In discharge lines the formation of liquid traps
and the creation of back pressures, which might
prevent the proper functioning of the relief valve,
should be avoided. Particular attention should be
paid to this aspect when discharge lines are long,
e.g. discharge into flare lines.
(c) Relief valves, discharging directly to atmosphere,
should be fitted with vent pipes, be adequately
supported and have outlets at least 2 m above the
top of the vessel and any access platform to which
they are fitted and at least 3m above ground level.
(d) Vent pipes should be corrosion resistant and be
designed to allow the escape of moisture and
condensate. They should ensure that, in the event
of ignition of discharging vapour, flame impinge-
ment on the vessel or any adjacent vessel, piping,
equipment or structure is avoided.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
2.3.7 Shut-off Valves
2.3.7.1 All liquid and vapour connections on vessels
with the exception of those for relief valves, plugged
openings and those where the connection through the
rank shell is not greater than 1:4 mm diameter should
have shut-off valves and should preferably be of the
fire-safe type (see BS 5146,'BS 6683).
2.3.7.2 The shut-off valve required by2.3.7.1 should
be located as close to the vessel connection as prac-
ticable, except that where there are no mechanical
joints between the shut-off valve and the vessel and
the intervening piping is designed, constructed and
tested in accordance with the vessel's design code,
e.g. BS 5500, ASME Section VIII, the shut-off valve
may be located at the downstream end of that length
of piping.
2.3.8 Emergency Shut-off Valves
It is recommended that all liquid and vapour connec-
tions, other than for relief valves, level gauges and
drainage connections which are larger than 3 mm for
liquids and 8 mm for vapour, should have an
emergency shut-off valve, e.g. an excess flow valve,
an automatically operated valve or a remotely con-
trolled valve. The emergency shut-off vatve should be
in addition to the shut-off valve of 2.3.7.1 unless that
shut-off valve is remotely controlled, can be operated
from a safe area and is of a fail-safe type.
2.3.9 Excess Flow Valves
2.3.9.1 Where the emergency shut-off valve of 2.3.8
is of the excess flow type, its closing rate of flow
should be below that likely to result from failure of
the line it is protecting under any ambient tempera-
ture conditions likely to be experienced. Excess flow
valves should have a rated closing capacity sufficiently
above the flow requirements to prevent closure in
normal operation.
2.3.9.2 Pressure surges resulting from the closure of
excess flow valves (and other emergency valves)
should be considered at the design stage.
2.3.10 Drain Systems
2.3.10.1 Double valving
Drain connections should be provided with a shut-off
valve in accordance with 2.3.7.1 and should prefer-
ably be limited.to 50 mm nominal size. This shut-off
valve should be provided with a length of piping
terminating with a second shut-off valve, preferably
limited to 25 mm nominal size. The first valve should
preferably be a quick shutsff type'; the second valve
should be a throttling type.
8
2.3.10.2 Drain connecrions
The length of piping betweenthe valves required by
2.3.10.1 should be such that the risk of simultaneous
obstruction of both valves is minimized. A sufficient
length of piping should be provided downstream of
the second valve, to ensure that discharge will not
take place beneath the vessel. The second valve and
the piping should be adequately supported and
secured to prevent breakage by jet forces. Both valves
on the drain system should have a means of actuation
which cannot be readily removed or moved from the
closed position except by intentional operation.
2.3.10.3 Dewatering pots
As an alternative to the systems described in 2.3.10.1
and 2.3.10.2 each vessel may be equipped with its own
dewatering pot whereby water can be drained to a
predetermined level indicated by suitable gauges.
Such dewatering pots should be equipped with a
double valve system on the discharge.
2.3.11 Filling Capacity
The maximum quantity of LPG which should be filled
into any vessel should be such that the vessel will not
become liquid full due to expansion of its contents
with rise of temperature, i.e. the highest level which
the contents will reach in operational service, due to
whatever cause, must never fill the vessel.
2.3.12 Insulation
Insulation when provided on vessels should:
(a) withstand, together with its cladding, direct
impingement from hose streams,
(b) be impervious, either by a cellular construction
or the provision of an efficient vapour barrier, to
the ingress of water vapour,
(c) be sufficiently robust to ensure that minor
mechanical damage will not destroy its vapour
barrier.
2.3.13 Icing of Valves
Insulation, steam heating or other means should be
used to prevent icing of valves or other fittings, e.g.
vessel drain systems, if product quality, operating
procedures andor ambient temperatures are favour-
able to ice/hydrate formation (see 1.5).
2.3.14 Protectiorr-Painting
2.3.14.1 Vessels and their supports should be treated
externally to prevent corrosion.
2.3.14.2,Below-ground or mounded vessels need
special consideration for external protection (e.g.
coating, cathodic protection, etc.). Such protection
must be adequate to resist corrosion 'from the sur-
rounding material.
 PRESSURE STORAGE
2.3.14.3 The backfill or covering material which will
be in contact 'with below-ground or mounded vessels
should be clean and free from rocks'or similar abras-
' ive material. The backfilkovering material should be
carefully consolidated and the covering of mounded
vessels prevented from migration. The minimum
cover provided should be 500 mm.
2.3.14.4 For above-ground vessels finish painting in a
light colour increases reflection and minimizes tem-
perature rise of the contents from solar heat gain.
2.3.15 Marking
Each pressure vessel should be conspicuously and
permanently marked to include the following:
the pressure vessel code to which it is designed
and constructed,
the manufacturer's name and serial number,
the capacity in defined units,
the maximum and minimum safe working press-
ure,
the minimum safe working temperature, .
the date of the original test, test pressure and the
symbol of the inspecting authority and space for
subsequent inspectiodtest markings.
Markings should be on a corrosion resistant metal
plate attached to the vessel located so as to remain
visible.
2.3.16 Identification
Vesselsshould carry a number or other suitable mark-
ing, plainly visible for easy identification.
2.3.17 Examination
Each pressure vessel should be inspectedtested at
intervals by a competent person and the date of the
last inspectionhest marked permanently and clearly
on its data plate (see 2.11 regarding inspection).
2.4 PIPING, VALVES AND FITTINGS
2.4.1 Design Code
Piping systems should conform to the provisions of a
recognized piping code as appropriate, e.g. BS 3351
or ANSI B 31.3.
2.4.2 Materials
2.4.2.1 All materials, including non-metallic parts
for valves, seals, gaskets and diaphragms should be
resistant to LPG under the service conditions to
which they are subjected.
2.4.2.2 With the exception of the permissive use of
valves of nodular iron as noted in 2.4.6.4 cast iron
materials should not be used.
9 *
2.4.2.3 Seamless steel, seamless copper or brass pipe
or tubing may be used for sizes up to and including
12.5 mm. It is recommended, however, that non-
ferrous pipe or tubing should be confined to instru-
ment piping, piping for control equipment or vapour
lines and should be as short as practicable.
2.4.2.4 All pipes larger than 12.5 mm, up to and
including 400mm, should be seamless (API 5L Grade
B rnax 0.23% carbon). Pipes larger than 400mm may
be submerged arc welded (API 5L Grade B rnax
0.23%carbon or equivalent).
For temperature service down to -38°C carbon
steel seamless pipe should be used 'for all sizes (API
5L Grade B rnax 0.23% carbon or equivalent).
For temperature service down to -50°C sizes
larger than 12.5 mm, up to and including 400 mm,
should be seamless fine grained steel (AB33 Grade 6
rnax 0.23% carbon). Sizes larger than 400mm may be
electric fusion welded to ASTh4 A671 Grade CC 65
Class 32 max 0.23% carbon (base material A 516
Grade 65 or equivalent).
2.4.3 Pipe Thickness
Irrespective of the design code used, minimum pipe
thickness shall be as follows:
Nominal pipe size Minimum thickness
Under 150mm
Except for screwed connections Schedule 40
Pipe with screwed connections Schedule80
(seeClause2.4.4)
150mm 6.4mm
200 to 300mm inclusive Schedule20
350 mm and larger Schedule 10
The schedule thicknesses referred to are those
specified in BS 1600 and ANSI B 36.10.
2.4.4 Pipe Joints
2.4.4.1 Joints on piping runs should preferably be
welded joints.
2.4.4.2 Pipe joints of 50 mm nominal size and larger
should be welded or flanged. Joints smaller than
50 mm nominal size may be welded, flanged or
screwed.
2.4.4.3 Screwed joints should not be used in buried
piping or for low temperature service except for small
diameter lines such as instrument lines and pressure
gauge connections.
2.4.5 Welding
2.4.5.1 Qualifications for welding procedures and
welders should be in accordance with the require-
.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
ments of BS 4871, BS 2633, ANSI B 31.3 or their
-_..equivalents.
2.4.6 Valves
2.4.6.1 The primary shutoff valves for vessek should
be of thefire-safe type and of steel or nodular iron to
BS 2789 or equivalent.
2.4.6.2 Liquid line valves should preferably be of the
jire-sufe type and of steel or nodular iron to BS 2789
or equivalent.
2.4.6.3 Forged brass valves with bronze trim may be
used for line valves but the lower melting point of
these materials in the event of a fire should be taken
into consideration.
2.4.6.4 With the exception of the use of valves of
nodular iron made to an appropriate standard, e.g.
BS 2789,cast iron valves should not be used.
2.4.7 Flangesand Fittings
2.4.7.1 Steel flanges and flanged fittings should be to
BS 1560,ANSI B 16.5 or equivalent standards.
2.4.7.2 Slip-on or weld neck raised face flanges are
preferred; screwed flanges may be used for sizes
smaller than 50 mm except in piping for low tempera-
ture service.
2.4.7.3 Steel butt welding fittings, other than flanges,
should be to BS 1640, ANSI B 16.9 or equivalent
standard and be at least of the same schedule thick-
ness as the pipe. For pipe to BS 3601 and BS 3602butt
welding fittings to BS 1965 should be used.
2.4.7.4 Steel socket welding and screwed fittings and
screwed couplings should be to BS 3799, ANSI B
16.11 or equivalent standard.
2.4.7.5 Steel unions should be to BS 3799 or equiv-
alent standard. They should have ground metal-to-
metal seats; gasket type unions should not be used.
2.4.7.6 Plugs should be solid steel plugs or similar to
BS 3799 or equivalent standard. Cast iron or brass
plugs should not be used.
2.4.7.7 Spirally wound gaskets are recommended for
LPG service (see BS 3381).
2.4.8 Bolting
Bolting should be to BS 4882 or equivalent standard.
10
I
I
2.4.9 Installation and Flexibility
2.x9.1 All pipelines should have adequate flexibility
to accommodate settling of vessek or other equip-
ment, thermal expansion and contraction or any other
stresses which may occur in the pipework system.
2.4.9.2 Flexibility should preferably be provided by
the use of bends or loops. Where lack of space
prohibits the use of these methods of obtaining flexi-
bility, suitable expansion joints of the bellows type,
properly anchored and guided, may be used. Bellows
should be protected from torsional loads.
2.4.9.3 Piping should preferably be laid above
ground and be protected against both physical dam-
age and corrosion. When piping must extend through
a wall or be buried, it should be protected against
physical damage, from superimposed loads and cor-
rosion.
2.4.9.4 The need for bracing/protection of small bore
connections should be considered, particularly those
located near to rotating or other equipment or where
accidental impact is possible.
2.4.10 Thermal Pressure Relief
2.4.10.1 Any equipment or section of pipeline in
which liquid may be trapped, e.g. between shut-off
valves, should be protected by the use of operating
procedures or suitable equipment against excessive
pressure caused by thermal expansion of the contents.
2.4.10.2 To meet the requirements of 2.4.10.1 the
minimum setting of relief valves should not be less
than the maximum pressure under normal operating
conditions of the section of pipeline which they are
protecting, and the maximum setting should be not
more than the design pressure.
2.4.10.3 If pressure relieving devices discharge to
atmosphere, the discharge should be arranged in a
safe manner.
2.4.11 Insulation
2.4.11.1 Pipeline insulation should be in accordance
with the requirements of BS 3351, ANSI B 31.3 or
their equivalents.
2.4.11.2. Insulation, steam heating or other means
should be used to prevent icing of valves or other
fittings if product quality, operating procedures and/
or ambient temperatures are favourable tdkdhyd-
rate formation.
 PRESSURE STORAGE

2.4.12 Articulated Pipe Connections 2.5 FOUNDATIONS AND SUPPORTS

FOR VESSELS AND PIPING
2.4.12.1 Materials used for articulated pipe connec-
tions should be suitable' for use with LPG at the 2.5.1 Codes and Specifications
service conditions applicable. The materials, principles, methods and details of
design and construction of foundations and supports
2.4.12.2 Articulated pipe connections should be should comply with approved codes and specifi-
designed to be capable of withstanding a test pressure cations, e.g.
of at least 14 times the maximum pressure they will Foundations . . . BS CP 2004
carry in service. Site Foundations . . . BS 5930
Earthworks . . . BS 6031
2.4.13 Inspection and Testing Loadings . ..BSCP3
Reference should be made to the sections on inspec- and BS 6399
tion and testing in the piping code referred to, e.g. BS Mass and reinforced concrete . . . BS CP 114
3351, ANSI B 31.3 or their equivalents: Brickwork and masonry . . . BS 5628
Structural steel . . . BS 449
Structural concrete . . . BS CP 110
2.4.14 Hoses

2.4.14.1 Materials 2.5.2 Ground Conditions

Hose materials should be suitable for use with the
grade of LPG and the service conditions applicable. If
wire braid is used for the reinforcement of hoses it
should be of corrosion resistant material such as
stainless steel.
A thorough knowledge of the ground conditions
should be obtained with particular reference to estab-
lishing the allowable bearing pressure, total and dif-
ferential settlement expected, including any effects of
earth tremors, risk of flotation and any possibility of
change of original conditions.

2.4.14.2 Design pressure

Hoses should be designed to withstand a minimum 2.5.3 Materials
bursting pressure of 4 times the maximum pressure The choice of materials for foundations and supports
they will carry in service. will be influenced by ground conditions, loadings and
detailed design considerations. Materials may be:
2.4.14.3 Inspection (a) brickwork or masonry,
Hoses should be examined visually every day if used (b) mass or reinforced concrete,
continuously, and at each time of use if used intermit- (c) steel plate, steel pipe or structural steel,
tently. They should be replaced when they show (d) sand, etc. (for below-ground or mounded
visible signs of deterioration. storage).

2.4.14.4 Testing
Hoses should be tested periodically to their maximum
working pressure and for electrical continuity, the
frequency of test depending on the amount of use.
Records of these tests should be kept.
2.4.1 4.5 Protection
Hoses when not in use should be protected from
deterioration.
2.4.15 Emergency Shutdown
Emergency valves, e.g. breakaway couplings, excess
flow valves, automatically operated valves or
remotely controlled valves, should be installed in
pipelines to which hoses and artjxlated pipe connec-
tions are linked to limit discharge of LPG in the event
of their failure.
2.5.4 Laadings
The greatest combined effect of dead and imposed
loadings should be used for the design as incurred by
the following factors; it is recommended that the
relevant authority be approached for local infor-
mation on appropriate meteorological records:
(a) dead loading: weight of vessel, supports and con-
tents,
(b) test loading: weight of test fluid,
(c) wind loading: shape factor, height, exposure and
suction effect on leeward side,
(d) snow loading,
(e) earthquake loading,
( f ) superimposed loading (in the case of befow-
ground or mounded vessels),
(g) operational loading: vibratioii3hermal (natural
and operational), cyclic.

11
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
2.5.5 Settlement
The possibility of settlement, hparticular differential
settlement, must be taken into account in the design
of the support system in order to limit stresses in the
vessel shell and pipework.
2.5.6 Support Systems
2.5.6.1 The design of support systems should follow
the requirement of the code to which the vessel is
designed and constructed.
2.5.6.2 If field welding on the vessel is required, it
should be carried out in accordance with the code to
which the vessel is designed, constructed and tested.
2.5.6.3 The spacing of individual supports should
depend on vessel shell stressing and foundation load-
ings should be related to ground conditions.
2.5.6.4 The design of support systems should allow
for movement of the vessel as a result of pressure and
thermal effects.
2.5.6.5 To avoid flotation the storage vessel should as
appropriate, be securely anchored, weighted or have
adequate pier height.
2.5.6.6 If, in order to meet the requirements of
2.5.6.4 and 2.5.6.5, the vessel is secured at one end
the other being left free to move axially then piping
connections should be sited at the fixed end.
2.5.6.7 Vessel skirts should be provided with both
inspection openings and vents to prevent accumu-
lation of vapour.
2.5.6.8 Vessel support systems should be designed to
prevent or to drain any accumulation of water.
2.5.6.9 To avoid corrosion of the vessel shell any
saddles or steel corrosion plates as appropriate should
be continuously welded to the vessel in accordance
with its design code.
2.5.7 Pipe Supports
Pipe supports should be designed and spaced to suit
the pipework configuration and the anchorage and
friction forces involved.
2.5.8 Fireproofing
.Supports for nbove-groundstornge and piping local to
any vessel should befireproofed. Fireproofing should
provide the supporting structure 2 hours of protection
(see BS 476) and should be waterproofed.
12
2.6 PUMPS, COMPRESSORS
AND METERS
2.6.1 Pumps
2.6.1.1 The design, materials and construction of
pumps should be suitable for LPG under the foreseen
operating conditions.
2.6.1.2 Mechanical seals are preferable to packed
glands.
2.6.1.3 Positive displacement pumps should have a
bypass valve or other suitable protection against over-
pressure.
2.6.1.4 Pumps should be protected by strainers at
least during commissioning.
2.6.1.5 When pumps operate in parallel, each pump
suction and discharge line should contain a block
valve designed for at least the maximum pressure the
pump can deliver.
2.6.2 Compressors
2.6.2.1 The design, materials and construction of
compressors should be suitable for LPG vapour under
the foreseen operating conditions.
2.6.2.2 Positive displacement compressors should be
equipped with pressure relieving devices on the dis-
charge side.
2.6.2.3 Suitably sized liquid traps should be installed
upstream of compressors. They should preferably be
equipped with a high-level shutdown device, a level
indicator and a drain. It is also recommended that an
oil trap is located downstream of any compressor in
which LPG and lubricating oil are in contact.
2.6.3 Meters
2.6.3.2 The design, materials and construction of
meters and their ancillaries should be suitable for
LPG under the foreseen operating conditions.
2.6.3.2 Meters should be protected by filters.
2.6.4 Protection of Pumps, Compressors and Meters
Pumps, compressors and meters should be protected
against accidental damage by suitable positioning
andor physical protection.
2.6.5 Transfer Systems
2.6.5.1 Transfer systems should be designed to
 PRESSURE STORAGE
minimize the risk of operator errors, e.g. propane in
butane equipment.
Equipment should be clearly marked, particularly
at crossover points, to show the grade of LPG it is
designed to handle.
2.6.5.2 There should be a means of rapid shut-off but
resultant surges must be considered at the design
stage.
2.6.5.3 If automatic alarm devices are used to indi-
cate approach to maximum permissible filling level or
automatic shut-off valves to prevent overfilling, then
they should be independent of, and not operated by,
the primary level gauge(s) on the vessel.
2.6.5.4 To prevent uncontrolled discharge of LPG in
the event of hose or articulated pipe connection
failure, emergency shut-off valves, e.g. excess flow
valves, automatic or remotely controlled valves,
should be installed in pipelines adjacent to the con-
nection.
2.7 ROAD AND RAIL LOADING
AND UNLOADING FACILITIES
2.7.1 Location and Layout
2.7.1.1 Road
The location and layout of road loading/unloading
facilitiesshould be separate from other traffic, should
permit ease of vehicle access and exit, preferably
without need for reversing, and have spacing between
connection points sufficient for the largest vehicles
anticipated. Kerbs or other suitable barriers should
be provided to protect product handling facilities.
The location of the facilities should also meet the
requirements of 2.2.2 and of Table 1of Appendix 1.
2.7.1.2 Rail
Rail tank wagon loadinghnloading facilities should
be separate from those for other products and where
practicable served by separate tracks.
Rail sidings should be constructed with the appro-
priate structure gauge clearances. Whenever possible
entry to rail sidings should be laid to a falling gradient
from the main line; a suitable gradient is 1in 400.
The location of the facilities should also meet the
requirements of 2.2.2 and of Table 1of Appendix 1.
2.7.2 Ground Conditions
Ground beneath loading/unloading facilities should
be either concreted or compacted and graded to
levels to ensure that any spillage has a prserential
flowaway from the road or rail tanker(s).
13
2.7.3 Loading and Unloading Equipment
2.7.3.1 Flexible connections between the fixed load-
inghnloading facilities and the roadrail vehicle may
be by articulated pipe connections (see 2.4.12) or
hoses (see 2.4.14). They should enable connection to
be made with correctly positioned vehicles without
incurring undue strains on fixed facilities or transport
unit connections. Emergency valves in accordance
with 2.6.5.4 should be installed.
2.7.3.2 Readily accessible means should be provided
to enable the operator to shut off the flow of LPG in
an emergency.
2.7.3.3 Safety systems should be provided which will
prevent roadrail vehicle movement, either accidental
or driveaway, before hoses or articulated arms are
disconnected.
2.7.3.4 Safety systems should be provided which will
minimize product leakage in the event of roadrail
vehicle movement before hoses or articulated arms
are disconnected.
2.7.3.5 Safety systems should be provided which will
prevent access by locomotives to the sidings whilst
rail tank wagons are still connected to the loading or
unloading facilities.
2.7.3.6 Platforms
Platforms, which may be provided to give access to
loading or unloading equipment above ground level,
or between loading equipment and the top of the road
or rail vehicles, should be designed so that they are at
the optimum height for the operations involved.
2.7.3.7 Non-slip materials should be used for the
walkway surfaces of platforms and the treads of access
stairways. The platforms should be of adequate width
to give free passage around any loading equipment
above the surface level of the platform.
Handrails or other means of protection against
falling should be provided on road loading gantries
for personnel using vehicle walkways during loading
or unloading operations.
2.7.3.8 Where a platform provides access to a multi-
plicity of connections, there should be an emergency
exit remote from the normal access stairway.
2.7.3.9 If access is required between the fixed plat-
forms and the tops of the vehicles, hinged gangways
may be necessary to bridge the gaps.
2.7.3.10 Construction materials
Materials used in the construction of loadinr or
unloading structures should be non-combustible.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
2.7.4 Stray Currents, Earthing and Bonding
- one leading to direct flame impingement 0.
2.7.4.1 General
Road and rail loadinglunloading facilities should be
electrically continuous with the rest of the product
system (see 2.8.1 and 2.10.7.6(d)).
2.7.4.2 Rail sidings
Rail sidings for loadinglunloading of rail tank wagons
should be insulated from the main line to prevent
stray currents from electrified lines or signalling track
circuits (see 2.8.1).
2.8 ELECTRICAL, STATIC
ELECTRICITY, LIGHTNING
PROTECTION
2.8.1 Electrical Apparatus, Earthing and Bonding
Electrical apparatus and installations, earthing and
bonding, telecommunications and instrumentation
should comply with the recommendations of the IP
Electrical Safety Code.
2.8.2 Lightning Protection
LPG pressure storage vesseLF do not require lightning
protection.
2.9 REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE
PROTECTION
2.9.1 Fire Plan
A fire plan must be prepared for the protection of the
system and be based on a systematic evaluation of the
design and operating procedures, taking into account
failure modes, the likelihood of their occurring and
available resources.
2.9.2 Control of Fires
As small LPG fires can be extinguished using suitable
first-aid fire extinguishers, e.g. dry powder, units of
adequate size should be available adjacent to all
loadinglunloading points and other work sites, e.g.
pump areas.
2.9.3 Protection Systems
2.9.3.1 Each LPG storage vessel and each bulk load-
ingldischarge facility shall be provided with a fire
protection system which will ensure its structural
integrity under fire conditions, e.g. intensity, dur-
ation, as covered by the fire plan (see 2.9.1).
2.9.3.2 Fire protection may be achieved by the use of
spacing, location, insulation or similar systemsandor
by the use of cooling water.
14
2.9.3.3 The possibility of a major fire outbreak, and
,a storage
vessel, can be minimized by sound engineering in
plant design and layout. Sound operating practice
and adequate instruction of personnel with respect to
notmal and emergency operating procedures are also
minimizing factors.
2.9.3.4 The cover provided for below-ground or
mounded storage (see 2.2.8.4) will afford protection
against direct flame impingement and will minimize
heat absorption from nearby fires.
2.9.4 Access
Suitable access for fire-fighting equipment and fire
authority apparatus should be provided, and should
be kept clear at all times.
2.9.5 Communications/Alarm
An adequate communicationdalarm system for sum-
moning the emergency services and warning person-
nel should be provided. This system should be tested
at regular intervals.
2.9.6 Cooling Water
2.9.6.1 When cooling water is the protective medium
then 2.9.6.2 to 2.9.6.10 must be complied with.
2.9.6.2 Provision must be made for an adequate
supply of water for fire protection and a minimum of
2 hours of supply is recommended to meet the
requirements of 2.9.1.
2.9.6.3 The application of water to storage vessels
may be by any one of, Nor a combination of, hydrants,
hoses, mobile equipment and fixed monitors as well
as by fixed spray systems required by 2.9.6.5.
2.9.6.4 Mobile equipment, fixed monitors, etc., and
fixed spray systems or combinations of them should
be designed.to permit the application of water at a
rate equivalent to at least 7 Iitres/(minute m2)of
above-ground vessel surface area.
2.9.6.5 All above-ground storage should be provided
with fixed spray systems designed to ensure that a film
of cooling water is applied to the whole surface of the
vessel to ensure that all surfaces including product
pipelines in the immediate vicinity exposed to thermal
radiation are protected.
Provided sufficient back-up facilities are available
the rate of water application from the fixed sprays
need not.be the total required by 2.9.6.4 above.
2.9.6.6 Hydrants where provided should be readily
accessible at all times and so spaced as to provide for
the protection of all the facilities.
 PRESSURE STORAGE
2.9.6.7 Sufficient lengths of fire hose should be pro-
, vided and be readily available. It is desirable to equip
the outlet of each line with a combination jet and fog
nozzle.
2.9.6.8 Control of the water supply to fixed spray
systems, hydrants, etc., must be possible from outside
the danger area and spray systems on vessels should
be individually controllable. Consideration should
always be given to the need for more than one control
I point, e.g. on opposite sides of the installation.
2.9.6.9 Measures to prevent the freezing of cooling
I
water supplies and frost damage to supply lines, spray
systems, etc., must be provided.
2.9.6.10 The application of cooling water on bulk
road vehicles and rail tank wagons whilst being filled
or discharged must be possible from fixed spray sys-
tems andor immediately available mobile equip-
ment.
I
2.9.7 Care and Maintenance of Fire-fighting
Equipment
Fire-fighting equipment should be regularly
inspected, tested and maintained. Particular atten-
tion should be paid to the spray water systems to
ensure the water film is achieved, e.g. nozzles not
blocked. Firemains, hydrants, standpipes, hoses and
other equipment should be protected from frost and
mechanical damage. Portable first-aid fire extin-
guishers should be suitably mounted to protect them
from deterioration.
2.9.8 Drainage
Suitable trapdseparators should be incorporated in
drainage systems to prevent LPG (liquidhapour)
migrating to areas where it could create a hazard, e.g.
, any closed or piped drainage system.
2.9.9 Removal of Combustible Materials
Readily ignitable material should not be allowed to
remain within 6 m of any above-ground pressure
sforuge vessel or between it and any spillage or deflec-
tion or separation wall. Such material should also be
removed from the vicinity of below-ground or
mounded storage.
If weed killers are used, chemicals which are a
potential source of fire danger should not be selected
for this purpose.
2.9.10 Warning Signs
- In areas where smoking and naked lights are pro-
hibited,-'prominent notices to this effect should be
posted, particularly at access points.
15
2.10 OPERATIONS
2.10.1 Housekeeping
2.10.1.1 All parts of an LPG installation, particularly
storage areas and filling/discharge points, should be
kept clean, tidy and free from extraneous material.
2.10.1.2 Following the completion of any construc-
tion or maintenance work all surplus materials and
debris should be immediately removed.
2.10.1.3 Ladders, stairways, walkways and access
platforms should be maintained in a safe condition.
2.10.2 Training
2.10.2.1 All involved with the handling of LPG
should understand the characteristics of the product
and be familiar with the sections of this code relevant
to their spheres of responsibility.
2.10.2.2 Plant personnel should be instructed in the
fundamentals of fire-fighting and fire-control with
particular reference to fires involving LPG. They
should .also be instructed in the correct handling of
any fire-fighting and fire-control equipment provided
and should be exercised in this respect at intervals.
The location of all vapour and liquid piping and valves
should be known and.their use understood.
2.10.3 Emergency ProceduredP1an.s
2.10.3.1 Procedures and plans must be developed to
handle emergencies arising from leakage, fire or any
other circumstance which could give rise to such
emergencies. Such plans should include all necessary
liaison with the local authorities, neighbouring indus-
try or the general public.
2.10.3.2 Plant personnel should receive regular
instruction in their roles in the emergency plan as well
as in the practical handling of emergency situations.
2.10.3.3 To ensure the adequacy of the emergency
procedures and personnel awareness of them, exer-
cises based on simulated incidents should be carried
out periodically with the participation of the public
emergency services which are available in the area.
2.10.4 Emergency Action
The following aspects should be featured in any estab-
lished emergency procedures plan and training
associated with it:
(a) In any emergency situation it is of paramount
- importance to avoid endangering human life.
(b) In any emergency situation summon help, e.g.
local fire-fighting services.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
(c) In any emergency situation attempt to isolate the
part of the plant affected.
(d) In a@ emergency situation account for all per-
sonnel and evacuate all those not directly con-
cerned with handling the emergency.
(e) In the case of major leakage, large areas may be
affected by the vapour cloud and the evacuation
of personnel and removal of sources of ignition in
areas ahead of the cloud should be camed out.
(f) Fires and LPG leaks must always be approached
in the same direction as the wind.
(g) LPG fires should normally be controlled but not
extinguished until the source of release can be
shut off.
(h) It must always be recognized that because of the
risk of weakening the shell in the vapour area,
direct impingement of flame on a pressure vessel
is particularly hazardous. Thus, in any fire situ-
ation, where circumstances prevent successful
protection of a vessel from the possibility of
failure, evacuation of all personnel from the pos-
sibly affected area must be considered and, if
necessary, camed out in accordance with the
emergency plan.
2.10.5 Purging and Filling of Systems
2.10.5.1 Permit to work system
Permit to work systems should be operated when
purging and filling storage vessels and systems involv-
ing venting and draining.
2.10.5.2 Oxygen content
When storage vessels and systems which contain air
are to be filled with LPG the oxygen content should
first be reduced to a safe level (see Appendix 6).
2.10.5.3 Air displacement
(a) Ai.r may be replaced by an inert gas, water or
LPG vapour (the latter is not the preferred
method). If inert gas is used and its source is
cryogenic, care should be exercised to ensure full
vaporization before entry into the LPG system to
avoid sub-cooling of any part of the system.
(b) When water is used for air displacement the use
of freezing point depressants such as methanol
may subsequently be necessary to avoid ice and
hydrate formation in valves, pressure reducing
equipment, etc.
(c) If LPG vapour is used to replace the air, then the
vessel and system bill, for a period of time,
contain a flammable mixture and a flammable
mixture will be vented; adequate precautions to
prevent its uncontrolled ignition are essential.
(d) In the case of air displacement by means of an
inert gas or LPG vapour, sampling and testing of
the vessel's contents and the mixture discharged
from the vents should be carried out to determine
16
the completeness of the air removal and the
flammability of the issuing gas. The oxygen con-
tent in thesystem should be reduced to a level
insufficient to support combustion.
(e) A slight positive pressure must be maintained in
the LPG system during air displacement and
subsequent filling.
2.10.5.4 Prevention of excessive chilling
In filling the storage vessel and system care should be
taken to prevent excessive chilling of the LPG
pumped into it.
2.10.6 Draining Water in Service
2.10.6.1 Particular care should be exercised when
draining srorage vessels in service in order to minimize
the escape of LPG. Of the two drain valves required
by 2.3.10.1, that nearer to the vessel should be fully
opened first and draining then controlled by gradually
opening the second valve.
If, on opening the second valve, no flow occurs,
both valves should be closed immediately to allow
subsequent investigation.
On completion of the draining operation, the valve
further from the storage vessel should be closed first,
then the other valve.
2.10.6.2 When draining vessels equipped with de-
watering pots, the valve upstream of the dewatering
pot should always be closed before opening the drain
system downstream of the dewatering pot. The oper-
ation of the two valves downstream of the dewatering
pot should be as described in 2.10.6.1.
2.10.7 Transfer Operations
2.10.7.1 Product transfers
Before LPG is transferred from one container to
another and whilst the transfer is in progress, whether
it involves storage vessels, bulk road vehicles, rail
tank wagons o r portable containers, the procedure
detailed in 2.10.7.2 to 2.10.7.8 should be followed.
2.10.7.2 Receiving vessels should always be checked
that they are suitable to handle the grade of LPG to be
transferred and that sufficient ullage exists to receive
the quantity involved.
2.10.7.3 The interconnecting liquid and vapour pip-
ing system and manifold should be checked to ensure
that it is in safe working condition and that only valves
required for the transfer operation, and any operation
proceeding simultaneously, are open. A check should
also be made to ensure that:
(a) Grades of LPG cannot be charged into vessels,
pipelines or equipment not designed to handle
them.
 PRESSURE STORAGE
(b) Unacceptable product contamination cannot
occur.
2.10.7.4 Duringproduct transfer
The receiving vessel should be checked to ensure that
it is not being filled above its safe working level.
2.10.7.5 On completion of product transfer
The receiving vessel should be checked to ensure that
it is not filled above its safe working level.
2.10.7.6 Filling or discharging
When filling or discharging bulk transport the follow-
ing additional procedures should also be carried out:
In addition to the required use of a driveaway
prevention system (see 2.7.3.3) the accidental
movement of the vehicle during the transfer oper-
ation should be prevented. The parking brake of
a bulk road vehicle or the handbrake of a rail tank
wagon should be on and, where necessary, wheel
chocks should be used.
When fillingldischarging rail tank wagons safety
systems preventing/prohibiting access of loco-
motives and other rolling stock to the sidings
must be operational.
Any driving units or electrical equipment on bulk
road vehicles not required and not specifically
designed for the transfer operation should be
stopped andor isolated.
A bulk road vehicle should be earthed or electri-
cally bonded to the LPG fixed installation before
the LPG connection is made. No special earthing
arrangements are normally required for rail tank
wagons as they are earthed via the track.
Before the vehicle is moved the liquid and vapour
connections should be disconnected, care being
exercised to avoid spillage. In the absence of
leakagelspillage the electrical bonding connec-
tion, where appropriate, may then be broken.
Where wheel chocks have been used they should
be removed. The vehicle should be checked to
ensure that it is in safe working order and the
surrounding area checked to ensure than any
LPG that has leaked or has been vented has
safely dispersed.
2.10.7.7 Attendance during operations
(a) Any transfer operation must be fully supervised
throughout by a competent person. The departure
of this competent person requires the stopping of
the operation.
(b) No drain valve, bleed valve, pipeline, etc., in the
LPG system which communicates directly to the
outside air should be left open without an
operator in attendance unless positive measures
have beenizen to prevent the escape of product.
(c) Unattended vehicles should not be left connected
to fillingldischarge systems.
17
2.20.7.8 Emergency stoppage ofoperations
The person in charge of the transfer should ensure
that it is stopped in the event of.
(a) a potentially hazardous leak occumng,
(b) an emergency occumng in the Vicinity,
(c) the transfer having to become unattended for any
reason.
2.10.8 Access to stotage and operating Areas
Stairways, ladders, walkways and platforms provided
to give-safe access to tanks, valves and operating
equipment should be used.
2.10.9 Lighting ofstorage and operating Areas
Operations should only be camed out when adequate
daytight or artificial tight is available.
2.11 INSPECTION OF PRESSURE
STORAGE
2.11.1 Permit to Work Systems
Permit to work systems should be operated in connec-
tion with all procedures covered in 2.11.
2.11.2 Preparation
Before any inspection of a pressure vessel is under-
taken, there should be adequate briefing with respect
to:
(a) the scope and relevant sections of the applicable
vessel design code,
(b) the materials of construction and their predicted
performance under normal operating conditions,
(c) the history of the system concerned.
This should be supported by discussions with plant
operating personnel, particularly in respect of any
unscheduled departure from normal operating
conditions or possible plant upsets which may have
occurred since the vessel was last inspected. Such
information could be significant and would serve to
highlight where particularly precise observation
might be needed.
2.11.3 External Inspection-Above-ground Vessels
External inspection may be largely carried out whilst
the vessel is in service.
External inspection constitutes a survey of the
vessel, its supports, the foundations or supporting
structures, the associated platforms and access lad-
ders and the external insulation, where applicable.
The predominant application of on-stream inspec-
tion is the measurement of wall thickness at key
points on the shell o f a pressure vessel, particularly
where past inspection records indicate that there is
some corrosion occurring in service.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
Further points for attention include:
-
(a) signs of general or local deterioration of foun-
dationdsupport structures due to flooding, etc.,
(b) condition and proper engagement of vessel sup-
port anchor bolts, nuts and washers,
(c) examination of suppodskirt to vessel weld con-
nections for cracking, etc.,
(d) checking whether any settlement of the foun-
dations has occurred since last inspected,
(e) random checking of metal surfaces underneath
external insulation and fireproofing to determine
the extent or otherwise of waterhnoisture pen-
etration, ascertaining the cause of any possible
penetration and assessing whether further more
extensive external inspection should be pro-
grammed.
2.11.4 Internal Inspection-Above-ground Vessels
For internal inspections of above-ground LPG press-
ure storage vessels a visual examination is generally all
that is needed. Such a visual examination should be
supported by wall thickness measurements if past
records or the incident examination indicate that
corrosion may have occurred.
2.11 .S Buried/Mounded Vessels
Any cathodic protection system installed should be
thoroughly inspected at least once per year. This
18
periodic inspection is additional to and separate from
routine monitoring, e.g. checking induced currents.--
At periods not exceeding 5 years the vessel should
be internally inspected and wall thickness measure-
ments made at key points on the shell, particularly
those for which past records indicate the possibilityof
any changes occumng.
Checks should be made for any soil settlement
which could affect the structural integrity of the
vessel.
All accessible nozzledconnections should be
periodically inspected for signs of corrosion, damage,
etc.
2.11.6 Cracks
The possibility exists that cracks may be found during
inspections. Once located the depth of the crack
should be established by non-destructive methods.
This will normally give the information needed for
later assessment but in some borderline cases more
vigorous testing may be required.
2.11.7 Pressure Relief Valves
The pressure relief valves and other associated con-
nections are of paramount importance and must be
regularly and thoroughly inspected for corrosion,
blockage, etc., and the valves themselves tested and
maintained at intervals not exceeding 5 years.
 3
REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED
PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE
3.1 SCOPE
3.1.1 Inclusions
This chapter covers refrigerated LPG tanks, above
ground, fully in-ground and partly in ground, and
their associated systems and 'includes guidance on
piping, valves and fittings, fire protection, as well as
co'mmissioning and inspection. This chapter must be
read in conjunction with Chapter 2 which covers large
LPG pressure storage installations, as repetition has
been avoided.
3.1.2 Exclusions
3.1.2.1 This code does not cover storage in frozen
earth pits or underground caverns. ,
3.1.2.2 This chapter does not cover partially refriger-
ated storage which is classified as pressure storage and
is included in Chapter 2.
3.1.3 Object
3.1.3.1 The object of this chapter is to recommend
basic safety requirements and practice for the design,
construction and operation of refrigerated LPG
facilities and to indicate the basic philosophy on
which these requirements are based.
3.1.3.2 It is not intended to preclude the use of
alternative designs, materials and methods where
these provide equivalent standards of safety.
3.2 GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
3.2.1 Definitions
3.2.1.1 For the-purpose of this code refrigerated
storage, whether above-ground, fully in-ground or
partly in-ground, is considered as covered by the
19
three following definitions, which are additional to
the design and construction requirements of recog-
nized standard codes for refrigerated storage tanks.
These standard codes are presently written for the
design and construction of metal tanks, but this code
does not preclude the use of alternative materials,
e.g. concrete, for tank construction provided that the
storage system integrity is at least equivalent to that of
a conventional tank and the additional requirements
of this code are also complied with.
3.2.1.2 Single containment storage system
A single containment storage system is one having
either a single or double wall tank, but so designed
and constructed that only the inner containing el-
ement in contact with the refrigerated product meets
the low temperature ductility requirements for
storage of that product.
The material of the inner containing wall shall have
properties at the storage temperature such that a
sudden rupture of this wall can be considered as a
'non-credible' mode of failure.
The outer wall (if any) of a single containment
storage system is primarily for the retention and
protection of insulation and is not designed to contain
liquid in the event of leakage from the inner container.
Such leakage, should it occur, would be contained by
a low height bund wall surrounding the tank.
3.2.1.3 Double containment storage system
A double containment storage system is one having a
double wall tank designed and constructed so that
both inner and outer elements meet the low tempera-
ture requirements for storage of the refigerafed pro-
duct. The refrigerated product is normally stored
within the inner wall, but the outer wall shall be
capable of containing any leakage of refrigerated
product from the inneLfank.
At least one of the walls of a double containment
storage system shall be of a material with properties at
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
the storage temperature such that a sudden failure of
this wall can be considered a 'non-credible' mode of
failure. This will normally be the inner wall, but if
sudden rupture of the inner wall cannot be ruled out
as a credible mode of failure then the outer wall must
be designed to contain the liquid released by this
failure mode.
A double containment storage system is not
required to contain product vapour in the event of
liquid leakage from the inner tank.
3.2.1.4 Full containment storage system
A full containment storage system is one meeting all
the requirements of a double containment storage
system (see 3.2.1.3) plus the additional requirement
that it shall avoid the uncontrolled release of product
vapour in the event of liquid leakage from the inner
tank. (In this context the release of vapour through
pressure relief valves is considered a controlled
release.)
3.2.2 Level of Safety
Refrigerated storage tanks and groups of such tanks
when designed, constructed, located, spaced, pro-
tected, operated and maintained within their design
limits and in accordance with the requirements of this
code provide an acceptable level of safety for both
plant operators and the public.
3.2.3 Prudent Provisions for Spillage
Whilst the integrity of a tank as per 3.2.2 above is
accepted, the complete absence of leakagdspillage
must be regarded as an ideal and therefore it is
prudent to provide sensible measures for the contain-
ing and handling of such leakage/spillage and for
dealing with the possible consequences of its occur-
rence.
3.2.4 Leakage
The probability of leakage can be minimized by:
limiting both the number and size of all connec-
tions on the tank, particularly those below the
maximum liquid level, e.g. by the use of sub-
merged pumps for liquid discharge and top filling,
the use of emergency remote control and/or
automatic fail safe shut-off valves on liquid con-
nections on the tank and other important lo-
cations,
the double valving of all liquid connections on the
tank below the maximum liquid level, the first
being as near to the tank shell as practicable,
the use of welded connections upstream of the
first shut-off valve on each connection below the
maximum liquid level.
20
3.2.5 Vapour Formation and Fire
-.
3.2.5.1 The size of the vapour cloud resulting from
liquid leakage can be minimized by:
(a) Limitation of the liquid pool area. Bunding close
to a tank if of sufficient height and strength to
hold the foreseen leakage (see 3.3.2) and thus
conforming to the requirements of a double con-
tainment system (see 3.2.1.3) will result in a
lower rate of vapour formation than would be the
case for wider spaced bunds of the single contain-
ment system (see 3.2.1.2). However, the full
containment system (see 3.2.1.4) would provide
the greatest security against such vapour release.
(b) Limitation of the heat transfer rate to the liquid
pool. The surfacing of bunded areas with
materials which will limit the rate of heat transfer
to a liquid pool will minimize vapour formation.
3.2.5.2 If spillage is ignited the flame size, and con-
sequently the area affected by such a fire, will be
minimized by limitation of the liquid pool area.
3.2.5.3 If product leaking from a tank, and/or its
associated pipelines, into a bund results in a major
accumulation which is subsequently ignited it is pos-
sible that the resulting fire would not be extinguished
but be left to burn itself out. Therefore:
(a) Bund height need not be limited in order to
facilitate access to a tank/bund fire.
(b) Tanks, working areas, process facilities, site
boundary, etc., must be located or protected to
limit the thermal radiation flux levels to which
they would be subjected as a result of such a fire.
Protection may be afforded by the use of suitable
spacing, insulation, screening, water application,
etc. ,or by a combination of such measures.
3.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCATION
AND SPACING OF REFRIGERATED
LPG TANKS
3.3.1 Limits for Thermal Radiation Flux Levels
3.3.2.1 Refrigerated LPGstoragetanks and theircon-
tainment systems shall be located and spaced so that
the minimum distance to any fixed source of ignition
is 30 m, irrespective of radiation flux levels.
3.3.1.2 Containment systems, i.e. tanks and their
associated bunds and impounding basins, shall be
located and spaced so that in the event of a fire, e.g.
tank fire or fire resulting from the ignition of spillage
of flammable products, thermal radiation flux levels
 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE
shall not exceed the relevant maximum levels given in
Table 2 of Appendix 1.
3.3.1.3 The thermal radiation flu levels of 3.3.1.2
shall be based on the ignition of flammable product
either in a tank or from spillage. In the case of spillage
the pool formed will be dictated by the spillage rate,
evaporation rate and duration (covered by 3.3.2) and
the topographyllocation of the site and facilities
associated with it.
Reference should be made to Appendix 2 for guid-
ance on calculation of thermal.radiation levels with
respect to the LPG facilities.
3.3.1.4 The calculationof radiation flu levels for the
purpose of complying with 3.3.1.2 shall be based on
the size of fire resulting from the conditions laid down
in 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.2 and assuming the atmospheric
conditions relevant to the site.
3.3.2 Rate of Leakage
The rate of leakage of flammable product and its
duration, used in 3.3.1.3,:shall be based on identified
potential leak sources in the facilities which need to
be considered. The identification and quantitative
assessment of leak sources should be based on a
systematic evaluation of the design and operating
procedures of such facilities, taking into account fail-
ure modes and the likelihood of their occurring.
Examples of potential leak sources from LPG
facilities and indications of leakage rates from them
under specific conditions are quoted in Appendix 3.
3.3.3 Vapour Travel
Provision shall be made to minimize the possibility of
a flammable vapour cloud of LPG resulting from a
spill as defined in 3.3.2 from reaching the site bound-
ary. Such provision may include such measures as
spacing, limitations of spill pool area, insulation of
bundlimpounding areas, screening and vapour dis-
persion equipment.
Reference should be made to Appendix 3 for
examples of potential LPG leak sources and rates of
leakage and to Appendix 4 for information relating to
mathematical models for calculating hazard distances
arising out of spillages of LPG and the resultant
vapour cloud formation.
3.4 REQUIREMENTS FOR BUNDS
A N D IMPOUNDING BASINS
3.4.1 Individual Tank Bunding
__ -
3.4.1.1 No refrigerated LPG storage tank shall be
located within a bund enclosing any other tank.
21
3.4.1.2 Each refrigerated storage tank shall be com-
pletely surrounded by a bund unless the topography
of the area is such, either naturally or by construction,
that spills (as defined in 3.3.2) will be directed safely
by gravity drainage and diversion walls, if required,
away from adjacent tanks, equipment and sensitive
areas to an impounding basin suitably located within
the site boundary.
3.4.1.3 Full and double containment systems (see
3.2.1) by definition meet the requirement of 3.4.1.2,
but low bun& may be required around tank main
connections to contain leaks from external piping,
valves and fittings as dictated by the systematic evalu-
ation requirements of 3.3.2.
3.4.2 Bund Capacity
3.4.2.1 For storage systems which do not conform to
the requirements of full or double containment sys-
tems (refer to 3.2.1) the bundlimpounding basin shall
be capable of retaining the total content above ground
level or of the largest tank connected to any shared
impounding basin.
3.4.2.2 Where low bunds are provided around tank
connections (see 3.4.1.3) they should be of sufficient
capacity to contain the quantity of spillage likely to be
leaked into them (see 3.3.2).
3.4.3 BundDesign
3.4.3.1 Bunds and impounding basins shall be
designed to contain both water and the applicable
refrigerated LPG. They shall be constructed so their
integrity is not threatened under the conditions laid
down in 3.3.1.3 (see 3.8.1).
3.4.3.2 Foundation design for bunds andor outer
walls of double and full containment systems (refer to
3.2.1) must take into account, but not necessarily be
limited to, possible frost heave of underlying soils,
earthquakes and settlement limitations. Where there
is the possibility of interaction between bund and rank
foundations then the total design should obviate as
far as is practicable a common failure mode which
could cause loss of integrity of the system.
3.4.3.3 The area within a bund should be graded to
levels which ensure that spillage has a preferential
flow away from a tank and its connections and is
conducted to any impounding basin provided by suit-
ably designed open runways. The effect of grading on
evaporation rates should be considered;
3.4.3.4 To minimize pool size consideration should
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
be given to sectionalization within a bund andor
impounding basin (see
:)1.5.2.3
3.4.3.5 Bunds and impounding busins shall be pro-
vided with water removal systems designed to prevent
LPG spillages escaping into any system outside the
area of the bundlimpounding basin.
3.4.3.6 The capacity and reliability of water removal
systems for rain water and fire water where applicable
shall be sufficient to prevent the accumulation of such
quantities of water as would cause damage to the tank
foundations, bund wall, or lead to tank flotation.
3.4.3.7 Consideration should be given to the design
of bun& and the installation of the necessary facilities
to allow for the safe recirculation of water because of
the quantities which may be required in an
emergency.
3.4.4 Bund Safety
Consideration should be given to the monitoring of
bunded areas for LPG leakage. Attention should also
be given to double containment systems, and the
areas surrounding in-ground tanks and the entry of
personnel into such areas shall be strictly controlled
(see 3.5.1.6).
3.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR LOW
PRESSURE REFRIGERATED
STORAGE TANKS
3.5.1 Design
3.5.1.1 A single containment system or the inner
metal container of a double or full containment system
must be designed, constructed and tested to comply
with a recognized standard, e.g. for metal containers
BS 4741,API 620Appendix R, EEMUA Recommen-
dations for the Design and Construction of Refriger-
ated Liquefied Gas Storage Tanks.
There are no equivalent standards for the design,
construction and testing of concrete containers, and
until such documents become available it is recom-
mended that the guidelines published by FlP-FkdCr-
ation Internationale de la Prkcontrainte (Ref. No. 316
September 1982)should be followed.
3.5.1.2 All inner (primary) containers shall be tested
to the maximum filling level with water.
3.5.1.3 Where the outer shell of double or full con-
tainment systems is of metal this outer tank shall be
tested as per 3.5.1.2. Ho-ever, in order to prevent
damage to the inner tank during this testing the water
22
level in it shall always be kept above that in the outer
rank.
Outer shells constructed of prestressed concrete,
or reinforced concrete with an external earthen
embankment, do not require water testing unless
specified by the user or approving authorities. Refer-
ence should also be made to the EEMUA document
on RLG storage tanks.
3.5.1.4 All welds (both vertical and horizontal) shall
be 100% radiographed,.
3.5.1.5 Where applicable (see 3.2.1) metallic
materials should be selected with regard to their
toughness characteristics at the design temperature.
The toughness requirements shall meet at least the
requirements as specified in the standards referred to
in 3.5.1.1 or the code or standard to which the tank is
designed, constructed and tested.
3.5.1.6 Double containment and full containment
storage systems shall be provided with means for
detecting and removing liquid leakage into the annu-
lar space.
Full containment storage systems shall also be pro-
vided with means for detecting and removing the
build-up of condensation in the annular space.
3.5.1.7 Liquid levels
In selecting the maximum filling level account shall be
taken of the following:
(a) expansion of the product due to temperature rise
to the equilibrium temperature of the product for
the pressure at which the relief valves are set to
operate ,
(b) the time required to shut off the flow of LPG into
the tank in the event of failure of the protective
device,
(c) unevenness in the level of tank settlement,
(d) earthquakes (if applicable).
3.5.1.8 Each tank shall be provided with at least two
independent means of determining the liquid level.
Additionally each tank shall be provided with a
high level alarm and a high level trip system which
shall be designed to stop all liquid flows into the tank
to prevent over-filling.
The high level trip system shall be independent of
both high level alarm and of the liquid level gauges.
3.5.1.9 Normally, means, such as the recirculation of
product, should be provided to avoid roll-over caused
by stratification in the tank.
3.5.1.10 Tanks shall be designed to avoid flotation,
e.g. in the event of blockage of bund drainage sys-
tems.
 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE
3.5.2 Tank Fittings
3.5.2.1 Tank fittings such as drains, sampling valves,
pressure gauges, temperature gauges, block valves,
their attachment and bolting must be made of
materials which comply yith the requirements of BS
1510, the low temperature provisions of BS 3351 or
ANSI B.31.2, or equivalent.
3.5.3 Tank Connections and Appurtenances
3.5.3.Z Tank connections, fittings and appurtenances
shall not be positioned below the maximum liquid
level, unless required for exceptional reasons of
design, construction or operation.
3.5.3.2 All tank connections below the maximum
liquid level and all liquid pipeline connections shall be
provided with emergency shut-off valve which shall
be remotely operable and fitted as close to the rank
shell as is practicable. The connection between this
valve and the tank should preferably be welded,
unless an internal valve is also incorporated in the
tank connection. If the connection between the first
external shut-off valve and the tank is not welded then
it must be flange connected with all bolts being ten-
sioned under controlled conditions.
3.5.3.3 All pipe connections below the maximum
liquid level shall be double valved; where filling and/
or suction lines have to be below liquid level the
second valve shall be outside but close to the outer
wall or bund.
3.5.3.4 Any connection above the liquid level shall
be provided with positive means of isolation.
3.5.4 PressureNacuum Control and Relief Systems
3.5.4.1 All tanks should be provided with a pressured
vacuum control and relief system to prevent the
design pressure range of the tank being exceeded in
all the conditions of 3.5.4.9 and 3.5.4.10.
3.5.4.2 The purpose of the control system as covered
in 3.5.4.1 is to prevent uncontrolled release of hydro-
carbon vapour to the atmosphere and to prevent air
entering into the tank under specified operational and
atmospheric conditions.
The relief system should cope with all other con-
ditions, including failure of the control system.
3.5.4.3 The tank operating pressure is normally kept
within its specified range by performance control of a
boGff compressor system which reliquefies the
vapours generated, thus preventing their loss to
23
atmosphere during normal operatinglatmospheric
conditions.
Vapours are generated by:
(a) liquid entering the tank,
(b) system heat inleak, i.e. through walls etc.,
(c) energy input from pumps etc.,
(d) maximum rate of decrease in atmospheric press-
ure.
3.5.4.4 Additional protection systems should be pro-
vided to control pressure increaseddecreases to
within the design range when this is beyond the
capacity of the boil-off compressor or its equivalent
system.
3.5.4.5 High pressures outside the scope of the boil-
offcompressor or equivalent system should be limited
to the design pressure, e.g. by the following systems:
(a) Pressure controlled release of vapour to a safely
located flare or vent system.
Such a system is normally designed to cope
with at least such operational upsets as tripping of
the boil-off compressor (or equivalent) system,
hot product run-down into the tank.
The controlled release of pressure by such a
system is normally by way of a pressure control
valve in the suction line to the boil-off com-
pressor, but provision of relief valves opening to
a safely located flarehent system is an alternative
solution. In any case the controlled release to a
safely located vendflare system should be at a
pressure level which prevents the emergency
relief valves connected to atmosphere from
operating.
(b) Closure of the tank liquid inlet valve and where
applicable tripping of tank circulation pumps.
(c) Final protection by emergency relief valves open-
ing to atmosphere.
3.5.4.6 Low pressures outside the scope of the boil-
off compressor (or equivalent) system should be
limited to the design range, e.g. by the use of the
following systems:
(a) The supply of hot gas or liquid product or inert
gas into the tank; such provision is normally
referred to as the vacuum protection system.
(b) Tripping the boil-off compressor system and the
tank product transfer pumps.
(c) Final protection by vacuum valves opening and
allowing air to enter the tank.
There shall, however, be at least two independent
means of vacuum protection before air is allowed to
enter the tank.
The mixing of air with flammable LPG vapour in
the tank is obviously undesirable and is only accept-
able when the alternative (implosion leading to poten-
tial tank failure) would constitute a greater hazard.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
3.5.4.7 The opening of vacuum valves must be
- minimized by the provision of sufficiently reliable
vacuum protection systems. Such protection may
employ the systems indicated in 3.5.4.6.
3.5.4.8 Pressure and vacuum relief valves should be
fitted and sized in accordance with the standards to
which the tankisdesigned (see3.5.1.1),APIStandard
2000 or equivalent and with 3.5.4.9 and 3.5.4.10.
Pressure relief valves should be adequate to relieve
the worst case emergency flow, assuming all other
outlets from the tank, including that to the flare, are
closed.
3.5.4.9 The following factors require consideration
in sizing pressure relief valves:
(a) Liquid entering the tank at maximum rate.
(b) Maximum possible boil-off, assuming failure of
the normal possible control system.
(c) Maximum rate of decrease of atmospheric press-
ure as determined from relevant meteorological
records. (If not available, assume 5 mbarh.)
(d) Emergency venting requirement as per API STD
2000.No credit should be taken for the effect of
insulation on limiting heat absorption unless the
material has proven $re restbran! properties.
Flame height should not be limited to the 30 ft as
indicated in API Standard 2000 but be in accord-
ance with the calculated value (see 3.3.1 and
Appendix 2).
(e) Effect of radiation from an adjacent (tank) fire
(see 3.3.1).
(f) Effect of possible hot product run down into the
rank.
(g) Flow of hot liquidvapour into tank, assuming
failure of the vacuum protection system.
(h) Effect of possible contamination when different
products are handled.
3.5.4.10 The following factors shall be considered in
sizing vacuum relief valves:
(a) Maximum possible liquid withdrawal rate.
(b) Maximum possible vapour withdrawal rate (as-
suming boil-off compressor system fails to trip).
(c) Maximum increase in atmospheric pressure as
determined from relevant meteorological
records. (If not available, assume 5 mbarh.)
(d) Vacuum conditions as a result of ambient tem-
perature lower than the atmospheric boiling
point of the product handled.
(e) Cool-down of roof by spray-water after adjacent
(tank) fie (see 3.3.1).
3.5.4.11 Relief valve line-up
Pressure and vacuum relief valves must be lined up
with block valves with spare positions and interlocks
as necessary so that inspectiodmaintenance can be
carried on without opening the rank to atmosphere
anhwithout reducing relief capacity below design
requirements.
3.5.4.12 Emergency relief valves should discharge
directly to atmosphere.
They shall be designed and installed so that:
(a) Attached vent pipes are adequately supported
and have outlets at least 2 m above the top of the
rank to which they are fitted and at least 3 m
above ground level.
(b) In case of ignition of the discharge, flame im-
pingement on the tank and its associated equip
ment is impossible.
(c) In case of ignition of the discharge the radiation
levels of Table 2 of Appendix 1 are not exceeded.
This requirement may necessitate the installation
of protective measures, e.g. water sprays.
3.5.4.13 Precautions must be taken to counter the
effect of icing on relief valves. Special attention
I
should be given to prevent the possibility of freezing-
up of the vendflare system.
3.5.4.14 Vent pipes if fitted to relief valves must be
designed to allow the escape of moisture and conden-
sate, and both they and any loose fitting rain caps I
provided must not interfere with the safe operation of
the relief valves.
3.5.4.15 Care must be taken to prevent blockages
due to liquid in venddare lines, relief valve headers,
etc. Therefore such lines should be free of pockets '
I
and slope towards a knock-out drum.
3.5.5 Insulation of Tanks
3.5.5.1 A tank's external insulation and cladding
shall:
(a) Be weatherproof and capable of withstanding
direct impingement of the cooling water from any
fixed deluge system.
(b) Be impervious to the ingress of water vapour,
e.g. by the provision of an effective vapour bar-
rier.
(c) Be sufficiently robust to ensure that minor
mechanical damage will not destroy its vapour
barrier.
(d) Withstand a temperature of 100°Cwithout failure
of its insulating or mechanical properties: it
should also be fire retardant and preferably fire
. resktant. (See also EEMUA Recommendations -
for the Design and Construction of Refrigerated
Liquefied Gas Storage Tanks.)
24
 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE

3.5.6 Corrosion Protection of Tanks
3.5.6.1 The provision of an internal'corrosion allow-
ance is generally unnecessary.
3.5.6.2 The lank shell and roof should be protected
against external corrosion.
3.6.3.2 Piping systems and their supports shall be
suitably insulatedprotected within those parts of the
installation in which fire exposure conditions or
severe radiation from fires may be foreseen (see 3.8.2
and 3.8.3).
3.6.4 Thermal Pressure Relief

3.5.7 Marking of Tanks 3.6.4.1 Any equipment or sections of pipeline in

Each refrigerated storage system should be identified which liquid LPG may be trapped, e.g. between
by the attachment of name plates readily visible and shut-off valves, must be protected against excessive
accessible which should give the following infor- pressure caused by thermal expansion of the liquid
mation: contents either by the use of operating procedures or
suitable equipment.
(a) manufacturer's name and serial number,
(b) design standard, 3.6.4.2 The minimum setting of thermal pressure
(c) maximum LPG filling level, relief valves shall be not less than the maximum
(d) liquid volume of the tank when filled with LPG to working pressure of the section of pipeline or equip-
the maximum safe level, ment which they are protecting and the maximum
(e) maximum and minimum design pressure in setting should not be more than the design pressure.
defined units,
(f) maximum and minimum design temperature in 3.6.4.3 If thermal relief valves discharge to atmos-
defined units,
phere the discharge must be arranged in a safe
(g) density of the LPG for which the tank is designed manner.
in defined units,
(h) year of construction and test.

3.7 REQUIREMENTS FOR

3.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR PIPING,
VALVES AND FITTINGS
3.6.1 Piping Code
Piping for refrigerated product must donform to the
low temperature requirements of BS 3351, ANSI B
31.3 or equivalent.
3.6.2 Materials
3.6.2.Z All materials, including non-metallic parts of
valves, seals, gaskets, etc., shall be resistant to LPG
under the service conditions of pressure and tempera-
ture to which they may be subjected.
3.6.2.2 Cast iron must not be used for piping systems
handling refrigerated LPG.
3.6.2.3 Except for the instrument lines downstream
of an isolating valve, screwed joints and compression
fittingsshould not be used in piping for low tempera-
ture service.
3.6.3 Installation
FOUNDATIONS FOR TANKS
3.7.1 Foundation Design
3.7.Z.I Reference should be made to the relevant
parts of 2.5 to 3.4 and to the EEMUA Recommen-
dations for the Design and Construction of Refriger-
ated Liquefied Gas Storage Tanks.
3.7.1.2 The design of tank foundations should
include adequate protection against damage due to
frost heave of underlying soils. Commonly used
methods of protection are the provision of an external
heating system under the tank or the elevation of the
base slab above ground level to allow circulation of air
below the tank.
If an external heating system is incorporated in the
design, adequate facilities should be provided to
monitor, control and check the foundation tempera-
tures. Moreover, maintenance of the heating system,
inclusive of replacement of heating coils, should be
possible when the tank is in operation.
In the case of fully or partly in-ground tanks, the
tank walls and base and those of the containment pit
shall be similarly protected against frost heave of
adjacent soil.

3.6.3.1 All construction piping welds shall be 100% 3.7.2 Uplift

radiographed on construction ''iiid radiographs When the rank is designed for a positivepressure with
retained for future reference. holding-down bolts or deadweight anchors to

25
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
counteract uplift, the foundations shall be designed to
, resist the uplift at thedesign pressure but with the
rank empty.
I in an adjacent tank/bund/irnpounding basin, all sur-
3.8 REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE
PROTECTIONLOSS CONTROL
SYSTEMS
3.8.1 Fire Plan
The concept of a loss control system should be based
on the philosophy that a local mishap resulting in a
release of LPG into the atmosphere should not esca-
late to the extent that the facilities are endangered
and the public at large is subjected to an unacceptable
risk.
Such a concept should be based on a systematic
evaluation of the design and operational procedures
taking into account failure modes and consequences
asoutlinedin3.3.1,3.3.2and3.3.3aswellasavailable
resources.
Because of the nature of the product an LPG
release will always form a vapour cloud with the
possibility of ignition. The emphasis of the loss con-
trol system therefore should be focused on control of
fires and protection against heat radiation as covered
below.
3.8.2 Control of Fires
I
3.8.2.1 As small LPG fires can be extinguished using
dry powder such extinguishers should be available.
3.8.2.2 Certain high/medium expansion foams can
be used for controlling refrigerated LPG pool fires
and thereby reducing radiation levels; normal foams
I
I
have been shown to be ineffective for such purposes.
When the fire plan (see 3.8.1) calls for the use of
foam, or similar media, for the control of pool fires
then applicators in sufficient number must be pro-
vided to enable blanketing of the designated area,
e.g. bund.
3.8.3 Protection Systems
3.8.3.1 Fire protection may be achieved by the use of
spacingllocation, insulating or similar systems a n d o r
by the use of cooling water.
3.8.3.2 The fire protection system must be designed
to cater for the likelihood that large refrigerated LPG
fires may have to be allowed to bum themselves out.
3.8.3.3 Each refrigerated LPG storage tank shall be
provided with a fire protection system which will
ensure its structural integrity under fire conditions,
e.g. intensity, duration covered by the fire plan (see
3.8.1).
26
3.8.3.4 When cooling water is the protective medium
then each tank shall be equipped with a fixed deluge
system capable of applying water at a rate sufficientto
ensure that as a result of a fire (see 3.8.1), e.g. such as
faces including piping and structures exposed to ther-
mal radiation are prevented from exceeding 100°C.
3.8.3.5 It is recommended particularly when water
supplies are restricted that the fixed deluge system
should be sectionalized to enable the water appli-
cation rate to be varied on different parts of the
system.
3.8.3.6 Remote control of the fixed water deluge
system shall be possible from areas not exposed to
excessive thermal radiation.
3.8.3.7 Special consideration must be given to the
quantities of water required for fire protection, and
provisions such as recycling may have to be employed.
Measures should be taken to ensure separation of the
recycled water from jlarnrnable products.
3.8.3.8 Measures to prevent the freezing of cooling
water supplies and frost damage to supply lines, spray
systems, etc., must be provided.
3.9 INSPECTION OF REFRIGERATED
STORAGE TANKS
3.9.1 Permit to Work Systems
Permit to work systems should be operated in connec-
tion with all procedures covered in 3.9.
3.9.2 General Philosophy
The routine internal inspection of non-refrigerated
tanks and pressure vessels at fixed time intervals is
camed out to monitor the extent of internal corrosion
andor corrosion not detectable by external inspec-
tion. However, LPGs themselves are not corrosive.
Additionally because of the temperatures involved
the primary liquid containment system of refriserated
LPG storage is not subject to corrosion under service
conditions.
Thus if corrosive contaminants can be excluded
from the system and if corrosion can be eliminated
during the construction and commissioning stages
then the need for a routine inspection can be consider-
ably reduced or even obviated.
Advantage should be taken of any out of service
period for operational reasons to carry out an internal
inspection.
3.9.3 The Possibility of Internal Corrosion
Internal corrosion can develop in a refrigerated LPG
storage tank for such reasons as:
 /'REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE
4
(a) water used f r hydrostatic testing not being of
sufficient pun y, e.g. chloride or sulphatecontent
too high,
(b) purging materials not dry andor truly inert, e.g.
products of combustion containing carbon
dioxide, which dissolves in water, adhering to the
tank walls, leading to stress corrosion,
(c) contaminated product in the system, e.g.
ammonia as a result of unsatisfactory cleaning of
a nondedicated tanker,
(d) contaminated vapour introduced into the system
to prevent vacuum conditions.
3.9.4 Problems Associated with Internal Inspection
During the considerable time involved in the total
procedure of taking out of service, purging, emptying,
inspecting and returning to service of a refrigerated
LPG storage rank, the following problems may arise
which outweigh any benefits likely to be obtained
from routine internal inspections (see 3.9.2):
(a) The opening up of a sealedcorrosion-free system
entails the probability of introducing corrosion.
(b) The increased risk of damage to and deterioration
of the system during the lengthy non-routine
procedures involved.
(c) Internal inspection of a refrigerated storage tank
requires the whole structure to be subjected to
temperature cycling; until more experience is
available to indicate the absence of risk in this
process it must be considered a potential problem
area.
(d) The procedures for taking out of service and
re-commissioningcan lead to changes in the insu-
lation system, e.g. compression and decom-
pression during warming up and cooling down
which can result in a loss of its flexibility, andor
ingress of water into the insulation because of a
vapour seal leak (not possible whilst the tank is
still in cold service).
(e) Purging entails the disposal of gases which can
form flanimable mixtures when mixed with air
and when large tanks are involved both the quan-
tities of product and the duration of the pro-
cedures add substantially to the risks involved.
3.9.5 Requirements for Internal Inspection
Internal inspection need only take place when:
(a) External inspection gives rise to concern such
that an internal inspection is considered necess-
ary, e.g. settlement, frost heave, foundation
problems.
(b) Doubt exists regarding the quality of the stored
product, vacuum breaker gas or the previously
used test or purge medium such that a possibility
of internal corrosion is suspected.
(C) The tank has been taken out of service for another
specific purpose.
27
Where a number of ranks in similar service have been
constructed of similar materials and to a common
design the results of the internal inspection of one
may be taken as a guide to the necessity for inspecting
others.
3.9.6 Requirements for External Inspection
3.9.6.1 Pressure and vacuum relief valves
Tank pressure and vacuum relief valves and other
associated connections are of paramount importance
and must be regularly and thoroughly inspected for
corrosion, blockage, etc., and the valves themselves
tested and maintained yearly.
3.9.6.2 Bottom heating facilities
The importance of preventing frost heave requires
that bottom heating system operations are checked
regularly and a weekly frequency is recommended. In
addition the heating system itself shall be checked
yearly.
3.9.6.3 Tank settlement
Tank base levels and settlements shall be checked at
frequent intervals during a water test (i.e. at various
heights of water fill and during draining). After com-
missioning, tank levels and settlements shall be
checked at yearly intervals for the first 3 years, follow-
ing which the inspection period may be extended to
3-yearly periods if no problems have been encoun-
tered.
3.9.6.4 Tanks with suspended roofs
Outer roofs shall be checked for external corrosion at
intervals not exceeding 1year.
3.9.6.5 inspecrion as a part of normal operations
As a part of the normal operation of the facility there
should be an ongoing check for leakage andor mal-
operation. Tanks and pipelines should be inspected
for cold spots, the zone between tanks and closehigh
bund walls should be monitored for LPG vapours, the
space between the walls of full or double containment
storage systems should be checked for liquid LPG
and the condition of external insulation (and its
vapour barrier) controlled as a check on external
corrosion of the tank.
3.9.6.6 Anchorage
Holding down bolts and anchor straps should be
checked for deterioration and tightness at intervals
not exceeding one year.
3.9.6.7 Piping
The filling.=d offtake piping including bellows and
spring supports should be checked annually for move-
ment.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
3.9.7 Competent PersodRecords
All inspectimactivities should be carried out under
the supervision of competent personnel and should be
fully recorded.
3.10 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
INITIAL FILLING OF STORAGE TANK
OR RE-COMMISSIONING AFTER
INSPECTION
3.10.1 General
It is assumed that instructions in respect to examina-
tion of the tank to ensure its installation/inspection in
accordance with specification and readiness for use
I
will be made as for any other important piece of plant
or equipment. This section therefore confines itself to
the special aspects of LPG filling.
Attention is drawn to the necessity for ensuring
that the tank and its ancillary fittings are not taken
outside their design limits, e.g. pressure and tempera-
ture, during the procedures of commissioning and
re-commissioning.
3.10.2 Ice/Hydrate Formation
Particularly during initial commissioning icehydrates
may be formed as a result of residual water in the
system. Appropriate methanol injection points
should be provided and emergency shut-down valve
I operation should be frequently checked during this
I
period.
3.10.3 Permit to Work Systems
Permit to work system should be operated in connec-
tion with all procedures covered in 3.10.
3.10.4 Removal of Air-Drying Out
3.10.4.1 To avoid the risk of aflnmrnabfe mixture
forming, air shall be removed from the tank and all
lines connected to it, prior to the introduction of LPG.
3.10.4.2 Air is best removed by purging with an inert
gas such as nitrogen. The purge gas must be dry, i.e.
have a dew point lower than the temperature of the
funk when in service.
3.10.4.3 Because products of combustion contain
carbon dioxide and this can lead to stress corrosion of
wet fank walls, the use of inert gas generators (con-
trolled combustion) should be avoided.
3.10.4.4 Purging shall be continued until the oxygen
content is reduced at least to the level indicated in
Appendix 6. For operational reasons purging is also
normally continued if necessary until the tank is dry.
3.10.4.5 Consideration should be given to the rela-
28
tive densities of the purging medium and air to
minimize mixing;*. when the inert gas is lighter than
air it should be introduced at the top of the tank
displacing the air downwards to a vent at the bottom
and, vice versa, where the purge gas is of the same
density as the air to be replaced it should preferably
be admitted at a point opposite to the discharge vent.
3.10.5 Displacement of Inerts by LPG Vapour
3.20.5.2 Displacement of inerts is preferably done by
introducing cold LPG vapours into the bottom of the
tank and venting the inerts from the top. This method
uses the so-called piston effect whereby the mixing of
the LPG and inerts and therefore the product loss is
minimized.
Where LPG vapours are not available inerts may
be removed by the introduction of liquid LPG sprayed
from the top of the tank. In applying this method
extreme care should be taken to avoid sub-cooling of
tank materials to below the design temperature. This
can happen as a result of the low LPG partial press-
ures which occur in the tank particularly in the initial
stage of the operation. At low partial pressure the
boiling point temperature of the LPG will be‘below
the atmospheric boiling point.
Note: To obviate local cold spots liquid LPG should
never be introduced at the bottom of the tank.
3.10.5.2 All gas discharged to atmosphere during the
operation must be vented in a safe manner.
3.10.6 Cooling Down and Commissioning
3.10.6.1 Cooling down will normally be achieved by
allowing LPG liquid to flash in the tank.
The liquid is normally injected into the top of the
tank via a spray nozzle system protected by strainers.
In the early stages of the cool-down operation it is
extremely important to avoid liquid LPG falling on
the bottom tank’plates or impinging on the walls
causing local cold spots outside the minimum design
temperature which could give rise to cracks in the
tank’s plates or welds due to uneven temperature
distribution.
The liquid injection rate will normally be steadily
increased until the tank reaches its working tempera-
ture and a level of about six inches of liquid has
accumulated on the bottom. At this point the cool-
down is considered to be completed and the normal
filling rate can be resorted to.
3.10.6.2 The rate of cooling down which is controlled
by the rate of liquid injection must be within the
design specification as given by the tank manufac-
turer.
 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE
3.10.6.3 During the cool-down procedure pre-
cautions must be taken to prevent vacuum conditions
occumng, e.g. ensuring availability of make-up gas.
3.10.6.4 During cool-down the pressure and tem-
perature of the tank and related piping and pipe
supports shall constantly be monitored. Furthermore,
whilst the above procedure is being followed frequent
e made of all rank connec-
untested.
3.10.6.5 During cool-down the vapour generated in
the rank should either be recovered by the boilsff
recovery system or safely ventedflared.
3.10.6.6 On completion of cool-down the functioning
of all instruments which indicate, record and control
levels, temperature and pressure shall be checked.
3.11 REQUIREMENTS FOR TAKING
TANK OUT OF SERVICE
3.11.1 Permit to Work Systems
Permit to work systems should be operated in connec-
tion with all procedures covered in 3.11.
3.11.2 Removal of Liquid
3.11.2.1 Liquid should be pumped out of the tank to
the lowest practical level. The tank shall then be
positively isolated from all sources of liquid LPG.
3.11.2.2 The remaining liquid should be disposed of
by controlled vaporization. Heated LPG vapour or
inert gas may be introduced to speed this process.
3.11.2.3 LPG vapour, inert gas or mixtures removed
from the tank must be disposed of safely.
3.11.3 Purging
3.11.3.1 Inert gas should be introduced into the tank
to sweep out any flammable gases which remain, the
purged material being disposed of safely.
3.11.3.2 The time required for purging is dependent
on the rank volume, its internal structure and the rate
at which inert gas is introduced. A suitable instrument
shall be used to measure the gas concentration in the
issuing purge until a safe level is reached (see Appen-
dix 6).
3.11.3.3 Positive isolation from the LPG vapour and
any otherflammable vapour system shall be made as
soon as recovery of LPG vapour ceases.
29
3.11.3.4 Purging shall be continued at least until the
safe level indicated in Appendix 6:s reached.
3.11.4 Sources of Inert Gas
3.11.4.1 Dry nitrogen is preferable as a purging
medium to the product of an inert gas generator
which contains both water and carbon dioxide, factors
promoting stress corrosion.
3.11.4.2 Inert gas from an inert gas generator should
be continuously checked to ensure that its contents of
both oxygen and carbon monoxide each remain below
1%.
3.11.5 Purging Procedure
3.11.5.1 The injection of the purging material should
be camed out in such a way that mixing of inert and
flammable gases is minimized. The presence of
unpurged dead pockets must be avoided as far as is
practicable.
3.11.5.2 If the purge medium used is heavier than
LPG it should be introduced at the lowest point
available and the flammable gas removed by upward
displacement to a vent situated as near the top as
possible; if the inert gas is lighter than LPG the
reverse procedure should be applied.
3.11.5.3 The connection used for admission of the
purging media should be of such a size as to ensure an
adequate rate whilst minimizing mixing. The outlet
vent should be larger than the inlet connection and
should be valved to enable control of the venting rate.
3.11.5.4 Throughout the purging operation a small,
but definite, positive pressure must be maintained in
the tank. The design pressure must not be exceeded.
3.11.5.5 Sampling points should be fitted to the
vents, adjacent to the control valves, to facilitate
sampling of the vented gas.
.'_.
3.11.5.6 Once purging is commenced it should be
continued to completion without interruption. How-
ever, should it be necessary to suspend the operation
definite steps, e.g. a back-up system, must be taken to
ensure a positive pressure is maintained and the
creation of vacuum conditions prevented.
3.11.5.7 Purging will normally cease when tests on
the vented purge gas indicate LPG antents lower
than the limits quoted in Appendix 6.
Where practicable, sampling of tank contents
should be carried-out to identify any unpurged
pockets of LPG. Dependent upon subsequent oper-
ations further purging may be required.
 LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
3.11.5.8 On completion of purging a positive press-
ure shall be maintained to prevent vacuum conditions
being created by changes of ambient conditions.
. 3.11.5.9 Throughout and on completion of purging a
lank will not be safe for entry without breathing
apparatus and notices to this effect must be promi-
nently displayed at all entry points.
3.11.6. Preparation for Entry
3.11.6.1 On completion of purging the tank contents
will not support combustion, will not support respir-
ation and may even contain toxic gases derived from
the originalflammable gas andor the inert gas.
3.11.6.2 Consideration should be given to keeping
the tank fully inerted during inspectionhepairs to the
extent that this is practicable. This will obviate the
hazards which could arise due to the presence of
unpurged pockets of LPG vapour as well as minimiz-
ing the problems reviewed in 3.9. This will require the
use of special breathing apparatus and stringent pre-
cautions (see 3.11.7).
3.11.6.3 If the inerts are to be replaced by.&, the
possible presence of unpurged pockets of LPG vapour
must be recognized and all sources of ignition
excluded from the area.
3.11.6.4 Air blowers used to assist in ventilation shall
be bonded to the tank to avoid the hazard of static
electricity.
3.11.6.5 Ventilation of tunks should be continued
until the requirements of 3.11.7.3 are met.
3.11.6.6 Oxygen shall not be used to ventilate ranks.
3.11;7 Entry into Tanks
3.11.7.1 Before entry a check shall be made that the
tank has been positively isolated from every source of
hazardous gas, liquid or vapour, e.g. by blanking off
or physical disconnection.
3.11.7.2 Before any entry is made into a tank it is
essential for a competent person to establish that a
dangerous atmosphere does not exist. A certificate to
that effect must be issued authorizing entry and stat-
ing clearly any conditions applicable, e.g. necessity
for breathing apparatus.
3.11.7.3 Before any entry is made into a rank without
suitable breathing apparatus it is essential for an
authorized person to make further tests and to estab-
- lish that:
30
(a) The oxygen content of the atmosphere within the
tunWconfined space is not less than 20% by VOL
ume.
(b) There is no hazard arising from dangerous sub-
stances in the atmosphere.
3.11.7.4 Certificates issued in connection with
3.11.7.2 and.3.11.7.3 above must indicate clearly the
period for which they are applicable, when and what
further testing will be required and any other special
conditions relating to the entry, e.g. ventilation,
arrangements for continuous communication with
people inside and for rescue.
3.12 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
3.12.1 Training
3.12.1.1 All involved with the handling of refriger-
ated LPG should understand the characteristics of the
product and be familiar with the relevant sections of
the code.
3.12.1.2 Personnel shall be formally instructed with
respect to the processes and facilities with which they
are involved before they have an active role in the
operation of the plant. This instruction shall include
details of operating procedures and location, function
and limitation of instrumentation and equipment
both for normal operation and emergency situations.
3.12.1.3 Plant personnel should be instructed in the
fundamentals of fire fighting and fire control with
particular reference tocrefrigerared LPG and the cor-
rect handling of the equipment provided for this
purpose.
. .
3.12.2 Emergency ProceduredPlans
3.12.2.1 Procedures and plans should be developed
to handle emergencies arising from leakage, fire or
any other circumstance which could give rise to such
emergencies. Such plans should include all necessary
liaison with the local authorities, neighbouring indus-
try or the general public.
3.12.2.2 Plant personnel should receive regular
instruction in their roles in the emergency plan as well
as in the practical handling of emergency situations.
3.12.2.3 To ensure the adequacy of the emergency
procedures and personnel awareness of them, exer-
cises based on simulated incidents should be carried
out periodically with the participation of the public
emergency services which are available in the area.
 REFRIGERATED LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS STORAGE

3.12.3 Commissioning, Gas Freeing and Entry into (a) Vapour produced during the transfer operation
Tanks will be safely handled.
Reference should be made to 3.10 and3.11. (b) Each grade of LPG can only be discharged into
ranks, pipelines or equipment designed to handle
3.12.4 Transfer Operations it.
(c) Unacceptable product contamination cannot
3.12.4.1 Receiving tanks should always be checked occur.
that they are suitable to handle the grade of LPG to be
transferred and sufficient ullage exists to receive the 3.12.4.3 The receiving funk should be monitoied to
-quantityinvolved. ensure that it is not being filled above its safe working
level.
3.12.4.2 The interconnecting piping system and
manifold should be checked to ensure that it is in safe 3.12.4.4 Any transfer operation must be fully super-
working conditio cooled, and that only valves vised throughout by a competent person to enable
required for the immediate action in case of emergency. The depar-
operation are open. ture of this competent person requires the stopping of
the operation in a safe condition.

31
 Appendix 1

THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Chapters 2 and 3 of the code require that the design layout and location of storage and other facilities shall reflect
the thermal radiation flux limits defined in Tables 1 and 2 for pressure and refrigerated storage respectively.
This approach may appear to ignore the time element which is significant in determining the hazard posed
by a particular thermal radiation fluxlevel whereas in fact exposure has been taken into account in defining the
laid-down limits.
The decision by the IP not t o include clearly stated exposure times in the design limits reflects their view that
currently there is insufficient agreed data available to enable such numbers to be quoted with the required level
of confidence.

Table 1
Pressure storage
Maximum radiationflux levek
Site kWlm2 BTU(h ft2)
Equipment
Theoutersurfacesofadjacent
pressurestoragevessels(1)
Thermallyprotected (2) 44 13,750
Unprotected (3) 8 2,500

Theouter surfacesof adjacent

storagetankscontainingflnmmable
products (4) and process facilities
Thermally protected (2) 32 10,Ooo '
Unprotected (3) 8 2,500

Filling/dischargepoints 8 2,500

Personnelinside boundary
Processarea (5) 8 2,500
Protected work area (6) 8 2,500
Work area (7) 5 1,500
Critical area (8) 1.5 500

Plant boundary
Remote area (9) 13 4 .Ooo
- Urban area (10) 5 1,500
Critical area (8) 1.5 500

32
 THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Table 2
Refrigerated storage
Maximumthermalradiationflux levels
Site ' kW/m2 BTU(h d)
~ ~~~

Equipment
Theoutersurfaces of adjacent
refrigerated storagetanks
Thermallyprofected (2) 32 10,OoO
Unprotected (3) 8 2,500

The outer surfacesof adjacent storage

tanks containingjlarnmableproducts (4)
Thermallyprotected(2) 32 10,ooo
Unprotected (3) 8 2,500

The outersurfacesofadjacent LPG

pressurestorage vaseLPand process
facilities(1 1) 8 2,500

Personnelinsideboundary
Processarea (5) 8 2,500
Protectedwork area (6) 8 2,500
Work area (7) 5 1,500
Critical area (8) 1.5 500

Plant boundary
Remote area (9) 13 4,000
Urban area (10) 5 1.500
Critical area (8) 1.5 500

Notes
(1) The distance from an LPG pressure storage vessel to a refrigerated storage tank is determined by the
requirement of Chapter 3 (see 3.3.1) and Table 2 of this appendix.
(2) Such facilitiedareas are protected by means of water sprays, insulation, radiation screens or similar systems.
(3) Protection is provided by spacing alone.
(4) Special consideration should be'given to the location of floating roof tanks containing high vapour pressure
products since effective water cooling of their roof structures is impracticable.
(5) A normally unoccupied area occasionally manned by trained and suitably clothed persons familiar both with
escape routes and opportunities for temporary shelter afforded by the process plant.
(6) A permanent building where personnel inside are shielded andor have shielded means of escape.
(7) An open area or small (e.g. temporary) building without shielded means of escape.
(8) This is either an unshielded area of critical importance where people without protective clothing may be
required at all times including during emergencies or a place difficult or dangerous to evacuate at short
notice (e.g. a sports stadium).
(9) An area only infrequently occupied by small numbers of persons, e.g. moorland, farmland, desert.
(10) An area which is neither a remote area nor a critical area.
(11) The allowable thermal radiation flux level is restricted for these facilities in view of the potentially longer
duration of exposure resulting from a refngerated tanklbund fire.

33
 Appendix 2

CALCULATION OF THERMAL
RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

1 Introduction
2 Discussion
2.1 Fire characteristics
2.2 Flame surface flux
2.3 Geometry of flamekarget
2.4 Additional factors
3 Calculation Methods
3.1 General equations
3.2 Liquid pool fires
3.3 Jet flames
References
Addendum-Calculation of Gas Velocity and Temperature (Jet Flames)
4 Figures
Figures 1 to 4 Geometry for view factor calculations
Figures 5 View factors for vertical cylinders
6 View factors for tilted (l5O) cylinders
7 View factors for tilted (30") cylinders
8 View factors for tilted (450) cylinders
I
9 View factors for tilted (60")cylinders
I 10 View factors for tilted (-15") cylinders
11 View factors for tilted (-30") cylinders
I 12 View factors for tilted (-45") cylinders
13 View factors for tilted (-60") cylinders
14 Attenuation due to atmospheric transmittance
5 Example Problems for Calculation of Thermal Radiation Flux Levels for Pool Fires
5.1 Standard data
5.2 Example 1. Propane pool fire
Figures 15 and 16
5.3 Example 2. Fire from roof of refrigerated propane storage tank
Figures 17 and 18 .-.
5.4 Example 3. Fire from roof of refrigerated propane storage tank burning down to pool fire at ground level
Figures 19 and 20 i

34
 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this appendix is to describe briefly the main factors which affect thermal radiation from fires and
to provide typical simple methods for estimating flux levels. The description is not intended to be exhaustive but
to give an indication of ‘the relative importance of the various factors which are taken into account in the
calculation. The methods described are relatively easy to use and should be applicable to most types of fire where
the burning characteristics are known or can be estimated. When used with a proper appreciation of the variables
involved they should provide a reasonable estimate of thermal radiation flux levels. Other, more sophisticated,
calculation methods have been developed and may be more suitable for particular applications. However, it
should be recognized that the level of accuracy in any thermal radiation flux estimation will depend more on the
accuracy of the basic data (fraction of heat radiated, environmental conditions, burning rate, etc.) than on
differences in calculation methods.
The subject of thermal radiation from fireshas received a great deal of attention in recent years and there is
a large bibliography of published information. In addition experimental work is currently in probess to extend
the data base on which the calculation methods depend. In this appendix reference is made only to published
information which is used in the calculation methods described.

2 DISCUSSION
In the context of this code of practice two types of LPG fire are of particular relevance. A ‘pool fire’ is caused by
the ignition of an LPG liquid pool normally in some identifiable containment such as a bund, impounding barin
. . or storage rank with damaged roof. The second type is that resulting from ignition of a gas jet, e.g. from a relief
~
valve. While these two types of fire have very different characteristics the basic elements of the calculation are
common to both.
For the purposes of this discussion the parameters involved in the calculation are divided into three areas: I
I

characteristics of the fire,

flame surface flux,
geometry of flamdtarget.
I
Each of these is important in determining incident radiant flu on a target.

2.1 Fire Characteristics I

The important factors are the length, shape and orientation of the flame. For a pool fire the length and shape of
the flame are determined by the dimensions of the liquid pool, and the orientation primarily by the wind velocity.
The presence of obstacles (equipment, structures) can have an effect on flame orientation but no easily applicable
correlations exist to account for these deviations.
The flame length from a relief valve fire is mainly dependent on the gas release rate and exit velocity, and is
analogous to a conventional flare. In general, therefore, calculation methods used for flare design, e.g. API
RP521 (l), should be applicable to the ignited relief valve situation. While these methods are considered
adequate for ‘distant’ targets when a ‘point source’ calculation may be used (see 2.3 below), more sophisticated
methods may be required for ‘close’ targets.
The main purpose of using more sophisticated techniques is to take account of the flame shape (length,
diameter, radiating surface area) which becomes increasingly important for targets close to the flame. Such
techniques should also account for the differences in flame characteristics between ignited relief valve vents and
flarestacksdescribed briefly below.
Exit velocities from pressurized LPG system relief valve vent pipes generally approach the velocity of sound
(sonic), and correlations intended for determining flame lengths for flare design are not strictly applicable. Sonic
releases entrain air more rapidly and may burn more efficiently resulting in shorter flames. It is also characteristic
that the flame is ‘lifted off from the point of release, i.e. burning starts at an elevation above the end of the
discharge pipe.
Flame deviation due to wind can be readily estimated and there should be no obstacles in the path of a relief
valve discharge to complicate this part of the calculation.
--
2.2 FlameSurfaceFlux - ..-
The estimation of flame surface flu is one of the most difficult parts of the calculation. It is also critical since target
flux levels are directly proportional to the emitted radiation from the flame surface. (It should be noted that the

35
 APPENDIX 2

estimation of flame surface flux is analogous to determining the fraction of heat radiated-’F‘ factor-in the API
Rp521(1) ‘point source’ calculation method.)
Until recently little experimental work was available on flame surface flux from LP‘G pool fires, and
American Gas Association (AGA) data based on LNG tests (2)was often used for LPG. However, recent LF’G
test data indicate a considerably lower flame surface flux for LPG fires. The difference is generally attributed to
obscuration of the LPG flame by black soot so that a significantfraction of the surface will not be emitting thermal
radiation at any particular moment.
As noted earlier flame surface flux is analogous to ‘fraction of heat radiated’, the F factor used in ‘point
source’ calculation methods. For relief valve fires the F factors may differ considerably from traditional flare
design figures due to the different flame characteristics noted in 2.1 above.

2.3 Geometry of FlameITarget

The proportion of emitted radiation incident on a target is mainly dependent on the distance of that target from
the point or area of emission (i.e. the flame surface). In cases where the distance between flame and target is large
in comparison with the dimensions of the flame the radiating surface may be considered as a ‘point source’ which
simplifies the calculation considerably. However, significant errors can result if the method is used for targets
close to the flame. As a general guide for relief valve fires the point source method should only be used for targets
beyond one flame length from the ‘point source’ of radiation (usually taken as the centre of the flame). For targets
relatively close- to the radiating surface for which an ‘area source’ calculation method should be used, the
orientation of the flame relative to the target will significantly affect the incident radiation level. This is termed
the ‘view factor’ or configuration factor and is taken into account in the calculation method described.
The orientation of the receiving surface is also a factor, and can become important where the target is close
to the flame. This effect becomes less marked for distant targets and is generally disregarded for calculations
where the receiving surface is not well defined, e.g. for thermal radiation levels at a plant boundary.

2.4 Additional Factors

2.4.1 Atmospheric trammittance

The attenuation of thermal radiation due to absorption and scattering by water vapour, carbon dioxide, dust, etc.,
in the atmosphere can have a significant effect on levels reaching a target. Correlations for attenuation due to
water vapour (the major factor in most instances) have been developed and are included in the calculation
methods.

2.4.2 Flame spillover (blowsing)

Observation of large pool fires indicates that the base of the flame tends to be carried over the edge of the liquid
pool in the direction of the wind. The phenomenon has been described as ‘blowsing’. Data on the magnitude of
this effect in relation to pool size and wind velocity are limited, but at worst the flame could be moved by about
half the pool diameter.
The result would be that downwind targets, relatively closer to the flame surface, would receive a
significantly higher radiation level than estimated on the basis of a flame emanating from the edge of the defined
liquid pool. A correlation is included in the calculation methods.

3 CALCULATION METHODS
3.1 General Equations
The general equation for calculating thermal radiation on a target outside a flame may be taken as:
I = I0.O.T equation (1)
where
I = maximum radiation on target (kW/m2)
I. = radiation from flame surface (kW/m*)
@ = configuration or view factor
t = atmospheric transmittance

Each of these terms is discussed in.-

more detail in the following sections for the particular types of LPG fire which
are of interest.
The above equation may be applied to all types of fire, but for calculations where the distance to the target

36
 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

is large compared with the dimensions of the flame a simpler method can be used. This considers the flame as a
‘point source’ of radiation, and the maximum incident radiation on a distant target is then given by:
I = (Q.F.r)/(4.n.d2) equation ( 2 )
where
Q = total heat release (kW)
F = fraction of heat radiated
T = atmospheric transmittance
d = distance from point source to target (m)
A detailed description of this calculation method is given in API RP521(1).

3.I . I Configuration (view)factor (@)

The configuration or view factor takes into account the size and shape of the flame as well as the distance between
the flame surface and the target. For the purposes of this code the flame shape most commonly encountered can
be represented by a circular cylinder, e.g. in the case of a tank or pool fire. Methods for calculating view factors
for this particular flame shape are described below.
(One other type of fire which may occur, e.g. in a channel conducting a liquid spillage to an impounding
basin, would result in a plane flame surface. View factors for this type of flame can be obtained from McGuire ( 3 ) ) .
The simplest form of cylindrical flame occurs in low or zero wind conditions when the axis of the flame may
be assumed vertical. The geometry for calculating view factors for this situation is shown in Figure 1 and the
method of Raj (4) has been used to generate the view factor curves shown in Figure 5.
The view factor calculation becomes more complex when the flame is distorted by wind action to become a
skewed, inclined circular cylinder as shown in Figure 2. The integral defining the view factor is difficult to solve
analytically but may be evaluated numerically using a computer program similar to that described by Rein,
Sliepcevich and Welker (5). View factors, calculated in this way are shown in Figures 6 to 13.
It should be recognized that the view factors given in Figures 5 to 13 are maximum values which assume that
the target is at the optimum angle to receive radiation from the flame.
The view factors presented in Figures 5 to 13 were calculated assuming that the base of the cylindrical flame
and the target are both on the same horizontal plane. However, these data may be used to calculate view factors
for two other cases which commonly arise.
The case of a target located at some elevation between the plane of the flame base and the top of the flame
is illustrated in Figure 3 and would be applicable to many items of plant which could be affected by a ground level
pool fire.
The other case of a target which is below the base of the cylindrical flame is described in Figure 4 and would
apply to ground level targets in the event of a tank roof fire.

3.1.2 Atmosphere transmittance ( r )

The radiation from the flame to surrounding objects will be partially attenuated by absorption and scattering
along the intervening path by water vapour, carbon dioxide, dust and aerosol particles. On a clear, humid day,
the major component of attenuation will be that due to water vapour.
This attenuation of thermal radiation by absorption in the atmosphere is taken into account by multiplying
the calculated radiation by a factor r , the atmospheric transmittance. The atmospheric transmittance is the
fraction of heat transmitted by the atmosphere.
Figure 14 gives r as a function of distance and relative humidity.

3.1.3 Radiation fromjlame surface (b)

A discussion of methods for estimating flame surface flux for LPG pool fires is included in 3.2.7.’
For jet flames an estimate of the fraction of heat radiated from the flame is required for the point source
method of calculation as described in 3.3.1. If an area source method is to be used for a jet flame calculation the
flame surface could be assessed from the fraction of heat radiated from the flame and an estimate of the flame
surface area.
The application of the general equations described in this section is detailed in the following two sections which
cover calculation methods for LPG liquid pool fires in 3.2 and for LPG jet flames in 3.3.

3.2.LAuid Pool Fires

This section describes a method for determining the radiant heat flux E e l s which may result from liquid pool fires
using equation (1). The method is based on readily available correlations as referenced in the description. Since .

37
 APPENDIX 2

experimental data on tank fires is currently not available it is proposed that this method should also be used for
tank fire calculations.
The approach involves the determination ofa number of factors specific to the fire.
- S i z e of the liquid pool
-Linear burning rate
-Length of the flame
-Deviation of the flame from the vertical
-Hame spillover from the edge of the pool
All these factors are required to calculate:
-Radiation view factor (@)
-Radiation from flame surface (ZO)
-Atmospheric transmittance (T)
These factors are then combined to give:
-Incident radiant flux on the target ( I )

3.2.I Liquid Pool Size (D)

Liquid pool size will be a function of leak/spill rate and duration, liquid composition, the topographical features
of the spill area and the liquid burning rate.
Pool size is a particularly important factor in determining the characteristics of a fire, as will be seen from the
following sections. All correlations quoted include pool diameter (D) as a parameter, and are based on circular
pool fires. For non-circular pools an equivalent pool diameter may be calculated as follows:
D = 4 . (SA)/(PP) equation (3)
where
(SA) = surface area of pool (m2)
(PP) = perimeter of pool (m)
This expression is not applicable to long thin pools, for which reference (3) should be applied.

3.2.2 Liquid burning rute (V)

In general the burning rate (linear regression rate of liquid surface) increases with pool diameter as the surface to
volume ratio of the flame decreases and more heat is available to evaporate liquid from the surface of the pool.
The correlation recommended is taken from a paper by Brown, Wesson and Welker (6). The general
equation is given below and is based on work carried out by the AGA (2):
V = Va.[l - exp (-/ID)] equation (4)
where
V , = maximum burning rate ( d s )
= burning rate size coefficient
D = pool diameter (m)
For large LPG pool fires the following figures may be taken:
V , = 2.17 x 10-4 ( d s ) (reference 7)
/3 = 0.67 (reference 6)
An alternative empirical method for burning rate estimation has been suggested by Burgess and Zabetakis
(8), Stark (9) and others.
It should be noted that burning rate will be increased if water (e.g. fromcooling sprays) enters the liquid pool
and increases the vaporization rate.

3.2.3 Length offlame (L)

The flame length from a pool fire is related to the burning rate, pool size and ambient air density. These factors
have been correlated by Thomas (10) in the equation
0.61
L M equation (5)
D

38
 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

where
L = flamelength(m)
D = pooldiameter(m) ~

M = mass burning rate (kg/mz s)

e, = ambient air density (kg/m3)
g = gravitational acceleration (m/s2)
and M is defined by
M = V.eI
where
V = linear burning rate ( d s )
el = liquid density (kg/m3)
This correlation was derived from observations on the burning of wood piled in rectangular cribs, but Brown (6)
has confirmed its applicability to LNG fires, and indeed it is generally accepted as being universally applicable
and sufficiently accurate for LPG fires.

3.2.4 FLame deviation (e)

A correlation of wind tilting of pool flames has been derived from experimental observation ofLNG pool fires by
Raj (4). The correlation is similar to that of Thomas (10) and is given by

where
cose=i for u * C 1
cos e = l/(W)
for u * > 1 I equation (6)

8 = angle of flame tilt (")

U*= dimensionless wind velocity
and U * is defined by
equation (7)

where
U = windspeed(m/s)
M = mass burning rate (kg/m2 s)
e, = vapour density (kglm')
g = gravitational acceleration ( m /s 2 )
D = pool diameter (m)
Qvis measured at saturated conditions and normal boiling point.
Additional complications are to be expected in modelling pool fires, because of the presence of tanks and
other structures. It is difficult to take into account the effect on flame size due to the presence of structures, and
the fire characteristics in the presence of a strong wind are difficult to model. The wake flow behind tanks and the
wind flow over dike walls may influence the pool burning significantly.

3.2.5 Flame spillover Vame drag or blowsing)

The extent to which the flame spills over the edge of the pool in the direction of the wind is primarily a function
of pool diameter and wind speed. The following correlation was derived by Moorhouse (11) based on data from
rectangular, ground level pool fire tests:
D*lD, = 1.5 (Fr)0.06Q equation (8)
where
D* = elongated flame base dimension (m)
D , = maximum pool dimension in wind direction (m)
Fr = Froudenumber
and Fr is defined by . -

Fr = u2/(gLl equation (9)

39
 APPENDIX 2

where
U = windspeedtrrs)
g = gravitational acceleration (m/s2)
D = pool diameter (m)
This correlation may be used for circular ground level pools but is not ideal. In the case of a tank roof fire flame
spillover may be lower but no correlation is currently available.
For the purpose of thermal radiation calculations it is assumed that the liquid pool is displaced by (D* - 0)
metres in the direction of the wind.

3.2.6 Radiation viewfactor (4)

The flame characteristics calculated in 3.2.1 to 3.2.5 may be used to calculate the radiation view factor by the
methods described in Figures 1to 4.

3.2.7 FZame surfacepux (I,-,)

The estimation of flame surface flux is probably the most difficult of any radiation calculation. The burning
process is an extremely complex phenomenon and very difficult to model theoretically. It is therefore preferable
to use measured values of flame surface flux wherever possible.
The AGA tests (2)provide the most widely accepted data for surface flux levels from LNG fires, and, in the
absence of similar data on LPG fires, an LNG value has often been used as a basis for LPG thermal radiation
calculations. However, more recent tests reported by Mizner and Eyre (7) and BG (12)indicate lower figures are
appropriate for large diameter LPG pool fires.
It is anticipated that further experimental work will lead to general acceptance of surface flux levels for LPG
in the future, but for the present the following is recommended for pools above 20 m diameter:
Flame surface flux for LPG pool fire = 50 kW/m2(see Note below)
This is an average figure for the whole of the flame surface. It has been noted that the area of the flame nearest to
the liquid pool generally emits a higher flux than the upper surface. This phenomenon may become important for
targets close to the flame base, but insufficient data are available to include a correlation at this stage.
Note: This figure should only be used in the context of the calculation method described in this appendix.

3.2.8 Atmospheric transmittance (.T)

The attenuation of thermal radiation due to atmospheric transmittance may be estimated from Figure 14 which
gives T as a function of distance and relative humidity.

3.2.9 Incident radiation on target (I)

The thermal radiation level on a target may be calculated as the product of flame surface flux, radiation view factor
and atmospheric transmittance as shown in equation (1).

3.3 JetFlames
The term ‘jet’ flame has been used to describe the type of flame produced in the following situations:
(a) aflare,
(b) ignited vapour or vapourfliquid released from a relief valve,
(c) ignited leakages from high pressure pipework or process vessels.
In other words, situations in which the flame shape is influenced by the initial momentum of the release.
The most widely used method for this type of calculation has been that recommended in API RF521(1). This
uses a ‘point source’ of heat approach as shown in equation (2) and has proved to be entirely satisfactory for its
main application in sizing and locating elevated flare stacks. This type of calculation generally involves gas exit
velocities in the range 0.2 to 0.5 Mach and ‘targets’ of interest relatively distant from the ‘point source’ of heat.
For the present applications it may be necessary to calculate thermal radiation flux levels for ignited relief
valve discharges (where the exit velocity from the discharge pipe approaches 1.0 Mach) on targets which are
closer to the flame. For these types of application a modification of the API FW521 point source method is
appropriate for the reasons described below.
A high velocity gas release will entrain air more rapidly into the gas jet resulting in a shorter’flammablejet
length. If the release is ignited the flame length will be correspondingly shorter than for a low velocity (flare design

40
basis) release. In addition the flame will tend to ‘lift off from the point of release, thereby moving the source of
radiation to a higher elevation.
A second characteristic of high velocity jet flames is a cleaner, less radiative flame due to the more efficient
gadair mixing. Estimates of the extent of this effect are included in the calculation methods.
The use of a simple point source of radiation at the flame centre can lead to increasing errors in thermal
radiation calculations as the distance between flame and targe’t decreases. For ‘close’ targets the distribution of
radiative heat over the length’ofthe flame becomes increasingly important, as does the flame shape in determining
the distance between the radiating source (flame surface) and the target.
With this background the following methods are proposed for the various types of jet flame calculation which
may be required.

3.3.1 Point Source Method

The use of the API RP521 (1) method using the Bnustowski and Sommer (13) approach as described in API
-521 appendix A example 2 (Sept. 1982 edition) (1) is recommended subject to the following conditions:
(a) The ‘target’ receiving radiation should be at least one flame length away from the ‘point source’ of heat. (For
the purpose of this calculation the ‘point source’ of heat is assumed to be the flame centre and the flame length
is twice the distance from the point of discharge to the flame centre.)
(b) For LPG vapour releases the fraction of heat radiated from the flame is taken as 0.38 for gas exit velocities
up to 0.5 Mach and 0.22 for exit velocities above 0.9 Mach. Interpolation between these figures may be used
for intermediate gas exit velocities.
(c) Allowance should be made in the calculation for attenuation of thermal radiation due to atmospheric
transmittance as described in 3.1.2 of this appendix.
(d) The calculation of gas exit velocity and gas temperature (when the former exceeds 0.5 Mach) should be by
the method shown in Addendum.

3.3.2 Area source method

Where the target is less than one flame length from the point source of heat (see 3.3.1 (a)) an estimate should be
made of the shape and dimensions of the flame. A publication by Chamberlain et al. (14)illustrates this type of
approach, although there are other methods often developed by individual companies for in-house use and from
in-house data. Until a generally accepted method becomes available such methods will continue to be used for
plant design and layout. Individual justification for the use of any particular method may be required for planning
approval purposes.

REFERENCES
(1) API. Guidefor Pressure Relief and DepressurisingSysfetns. API RP521 (Sept. 1982).
(2) AGA Project IS-3-1.LNG Safety Programme-Inferim Report on Phase I1 Work. Battelle (July 1974).
(3) McGuire, J. H.Heat Transfer by Radiation. Fire Research Report No. 2 (1953).
(4) Raj, P. P. K. Calculations of Thermal Radiation from LNG Fire-A Review of the State-of-the-Art. Paper No. 77-T-33,
AGA Transmission conference, Missouri (19n).
(5) Rein, R. G., Sliepcevich, C. M., and Welker, J. R. J. Fire and Flammability. 1 (1970).
(6) Brown, Wesson, H.R., and Welker, J. R. Predict LNG fire radiation. Hydrocarbon Processing (May 1974).
(7) Mizner, G. A., and Eyre, J. A. ‘Large scale LNG and LPG pool fires.’ I. Chem. E. The Assessment of Major Hazards.
Manchester (April 1962).
(8) Burgess, D., and Zabetakis. M. G. Fire and Explosion Hazard3 Associated with LNG. USBM Report 6099 (1962).
(9) Stark, G.W. V. Liquid Spillage fires. I. Chem. E. Symposium Series No. 47.
(10) Thomas, P. H.The size of flames from natural fires. 9th International Conference on Combustion (1963).
(11) Moorhouse. J. Scaling criteria for pool fires derived from large scale experiments. The Assessmentof Major Hazards. I.
Chem. E.(NW Branch), Manchester, April 1982.
(12) British Gas plc (Publication pending).
(13) Brzustowski. T. A.,and Sommer, E. C. Predicting radiant heating from flares. API Division of Refining-Proceedings.
Vol. 53 (1973).
(14) Chamberlain, G.A., ef al. Developments in design methods for predicting thermal radiation from flares. 1. Chem. E.,
ChemicalEngineering Research and Design,65, No.4 (July 1987).

41
 APPENDIX 2
. ADDENDUM-CALCULATION OF GAS VELOCITY AND TEMPERATURE
(JET FLAMES)
(Foruse in the Bmustowski and Sommer Method for calculating Thermal Radiation from Jet Flames when the
E x i t Velocity exceeds0.5 Mach.)
n e process engineer will usually have the following information available:
(a) gas composition,
(b) maximum pressure for fire relief (usually 120% of set pressure), P , in psia, and the corresponding
stagnation temperature, T- in K,
(c) PRV orifice area A and discharge coefficient c d (if c d is unknown assume a value of 0.9),
(d) number of PRVsTperating during depressurization N,
(e) vent orifice diameter doin m.
1. Assume each PRV issues into its own vent pipe, and the vents are sufficiently close together that a single
effective diameter dCff
can be used; i.e.

2. Calculate total mass flow M :

m = NACdPmas

where
y -
= ratio of specific heats 1.1 for propane and butane
R = gas constant = 8.314 J/(mol. K)
W,= gas molecular weight, kilogram basis
0.044 for propane and 0.058 for butane
Thus

3. Check for choked flow at effedve vent orifice. The mass flow rate at which flow becomes choked is given by

where

Thus

(a) If m e m,the flow is unchoked, and the gas velocity

4mRT, 1.045 X 10-4mT,,
"j=ndt,,Po= d&
For propane or butane
1 I

I uj --
1.045 x 10-4m~-
d2l I ds
 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

(b) Ifk > mcthe flow is choked and a useful intermediate parameter is Pc, the static pressure in the vent pipe,

= 3.67 -$-
dca
/& N/m2
For propane and butane,

1 P, = 3.416 2 fi1 N/m2

Then the jet Mach number Mi is given by

For propane and butane,

I

The jet static temperature

*I* I
The gas velocity

For propane and butane,

The jet diameter

For propane and butane.

I I

Use ui, di and Ti in the expressions for lower-explosive-limitancentration parameter and the jet-thrust-and-
wind-thrust parameter in the Brzustowski and Sommer correlations.
APPENDIX 2

4 FIGURES

Figure I
Geometryfor calculating viewfactors for a verticalflame.
L = flame length (m)
R = flameradius(m)
X = horizontal distance from flame centre 16 target (m)
View factors for a range of values of L,R and X are shown
in Figure 5.

Figure 2
Geometry for calculating viewfactors for a tiltedparne.
L = flame length (m)
R = flame radius (m)
X = horizontal distance from flame centre to target (m)
8 = angle of flame tilt (")
View factors for a range of values of L, R, X and 8 are
shown in Figures 6 to 13.

Figure 3
Geometry for calculating view factors i f the target is above
the base of theflame.
'L = flame length above the plane of the target (m)
L - = flame length below the plane of the target (m)
R = flame radius (m)
X = horizontal distance from flame centre to target (m)
8 = angle of flame tilt (")
Two view factors are calculated:
@+ represents the view factor for that part of the flame
above the target and is calculated from L+.R,X and
8 using Figures 6 to 9.
@- represents the view factor for that part of the flame
below the target and is calculated from L - , R,X and
-8 using Figures 10 to 13.
The overall view factor (@) is the sum of $J+ and @-.

Figure 4
Geometry for calculating view factors if the target ir below
the base ofrheflame.
The flame is extended until it reaches the horizontal plane
of the target.
LTo' = total length of (extended) flame (m)
LH" = length of hypothetical flame added by extension
(m)
R = flameradius(m)
X = horizontal distance from centre of hypothetical
flame base to target (m)
8 = angle of flame tilt (")
Two view factors are calculated from Figures 6 to 9:
using LTo',R, Xand 8.
@HYQ using LHp,.R, X and 8.
The overall view factor (4) is obtained by subtracting 4Hw
from

44
CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

X /R

Figure 5
Maximum view factors for vertical cylinders,

45
 APPENDIX 2

Figure 6
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 8 = IS”.

46
CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

X/f?
Figure 7
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = 30"

47
 APPENDIX 2

Figure 8
Maximum view factorsfor tilted cylinders 9 = 45”.

48
CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

X/R
Figure 9
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 9 = W .

49
 APPENDIX 2

Figure 10
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 9 = -15".

50
CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

X/R
Figure I 1
Maximum view facrors for tilted cylinders 9 = -30".
..-

51
 APPENDIX 2

1.o

0.5

X/ R
Figure 12
Maximum view factors for tilted cylinders 0 = -4Y.

52
CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

X/R
Figure 13
Maximum view factorsfor tilted cylinders 0 = -60".
--

53
 APPENDIX 2

Re Ia t ive humidity E D C B A
A = 10%
B = 30%
C = 50%
D = 70%
E = 100%
Distance
flame to
target

- 100
- 90
- 80
-70
- 60
- 50
- 40
- 30

- 20

UUII I 10
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.o

Atmospheric transmittance (T )

Figure 14
Atmospheric transmittance.

54
 C A L C U L A T ~ O NOF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

5 EXAMPLE PROBLEMS FOR CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION

-
FLUX LEVELS FOR POOL FIRES
5.1 Standard Data
The following standard data are used in all example problems:
Propane property data
Liquid density at atmospheric pressure = 579 kg/m3
Vapour density at normal boiling point = 2.30 kglm'
Vapour density at ambient temperature= 1.86 kg/m3
Molecular weight =44
Specificheat ratio = 1.1
Lower flammability limit in air = 2.1% vol
Ambient conditions
Air density = 1.22 kg/m3
Air molecular weight = 29
Air temperature = 15°C
Gravitational acceleration = 9.81 m/s2

5.2 Example 1. Propane Pool Fire

Calculate the thermal radiation flux levels in the vicinity of a 20 metre diameter pool of burning propane (e.g. due
to ignition of a spillage in a rundown aredimpounding basin).
Ambient conditions are assumed to be:
Wind speed =5ds'
Relative humidity = 30%
'Targets' of interest are at the following elevations:
Ground level (as base of fire)
10 metres above ground level
Thermal radiation flux levels (relative to distance from the fire) over the range 1.5 to 44 kW/m2(see Appendix 1)
are required.

Calculation
This is a liquid pool fire and the method described in 3.2 is followed.
From 3.2.1:
Pool diameter ( D ) is 20 metres (circular pool-diameter given).
From 3.2.2:
Calculate the liquid burning rate (V) (from equation (4))
V = V,[1 - exp (-PO)]
V = V,[1 - exp (-0.67 X 20)]
V = 2:17 X 10-4metredsec (for large pool)
From 3.2.3:
Calculate the flame length ( L ) from equation (5).
L = 420{M/[e,(g~)o-s]}o~6'
M = Vel = 2.17 x 10-4x 579
M = 0.1256 kg/sec
L = 42 X 20{0.1256/[1.22(9.81X 20)0.5]}0-61
L = 42 metres
From 3.2.4:
Calculate flame deviation (e) from equations (6)and (7).
8 = (u*)70-5
U * = u/(MgD/e,)'"
U * = Y(0.1256 x 9.81 x 20/2.30)'"
U* = 2.27

55
 APPENDIX 2

e = (0.664)
8 = 48.4" -. -
For calculation purposes take 8 = 45".
From 3.2.5:
Calculate flame spillover ( D * )from equation (8).
D* = D x 1.5 (Fr)o*069
Fr = ( u ) ~ / ( S D )
Fr = (5)2/(9.81 x 20)
Fr = 0.1274
D* = 20 X 1.5(0.1274)0.w
D* = 26.0 metres
Flame spillover is therefore 6 metres.
For the purpose of view factor calculation the flame spillover is accounted for by assuming that the liquid pool is
displaced 6 metres in the direction of the wind, i.e. 6 metres nearer to the targets.
From the above calculations the sketch shown in Figure 15 can be constructed in order to simplify the
calculation of view factors.

Calculatiomfor ground level targets

The geometry for calculating view factors for this case is covered in Figure 2.
View factors (@) are taken from Figure 8 for a 45"flame deviation.
Atmospheric transmittance (t)is taken from Figure 14 for each target distance.
Flame surface flux (Zo) is taken as 50 kW/m2from 3.2.7.
The characteristic lengtldradius ratio for the flame is given by
L = 42 metres R = DE = 10 metres L/R = 4.2
Thermal radiation flux levels at targets from 5 metres to 100 metres distance from the edge of the (displaced)
flame (point C in Figure 15) will be calculated to cover the required range of incident radiation on targets.
Calculation of thermal radiation flux levels:
X' X'/R 4J r I X
~~

5 1.5 0.71 0.92 32.7 11

10 2.0 0.57 0.88 25.1 16
20 3.0 . 0.38 0.83 15.8 26
40 5.0 0.17 0.78 6.6 46
60 7.0 0.08 0.75 3.0 66
80 9.0 0.045 0.73 1.63 86
100 11.0 0.027 0.71 0.96 106

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame to the target.
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame to the target.
X (m) is the distance of the target from the edge of the original pool.
X = X* + 6(l)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 15) = 6 metres
The results are shown on Figure 16.

Figure I5
W i n d r n Sketch of Example I Fire.
A-B = liquid pool dimension (D= 20 m)
-p- A-C = elongated flame dimension (D' = 26 m)
F--------- - - -IO-mp%- ele@i-on--
G r a n d level
X-Y = axis of 'original' flame (L= 42 m)
A Y BC E
e = angle offlame tilt (4.40)
For targets at I0 metres elevation
E-F = target vertical elevation (10 m)
C-F = flame length below target (L-= 15 m)
F-G = flamelength above target (L+= 27 m)
C-E = distance correction to elevated target (11 m)
Notes: L- = (E-F)/sin (90 - 0) = 15.1 metres
L+ = L - L- = 42 - 15.1 = 26.9 metres
C-E = [(E-F)/sin (90 - e)] sin 0 = 11.3 metres

56
 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

P mal radiation Distance to target from edge of Do01 (m)

flux level (kW/m2) Ground level 10 metres elevation
(maximum)

10 metres Thermal radiation

\ \
elevation flux level (kW/m*)

I 1 I I I I l l I I I I I 0
20 40 60 80 100

Dlstance to target from edge of pool (m)

Figure 16
Example 1 radiation levelr.

57
 APPENDIX 2

Calculationsfor targets at 10 metres elevation

The geometry for calculating view factors for this case is covered in Figure 3. -
View factors (#+) are taken fromsigure 8 and (#-) from Figure 12.
Atmospheric transmittance ( r )and flame surface flux (1,) are taken as for the ground level target.
The lengthsof the flame below ( L - )and above (L') the target elevation (10m) are calculated in Figure 15.
L+IR = 27/10= 2.7 L-/R = 15/10= 1.5
Thermal radiation flux levels will be calculated at targets from 5 metres to 100 metres distance from the edge
of the (displaced) flame at 10metreselevation (Point Fin Figure 15). Calculation of thermal radiation flux levels:
X' X'IR e+ 4J- @ r I X
5 1.5 0.71 0.17 0.88 0.92 40.5 22
10 2.0 0.55 0.11 0.66 0.88 29.0 27
20 3.0 0.32 0.056 0.376 0.83 15.6 37
40 5.0 0.12 0.023 0.143 0.78 5.6 57
60 7.0 0.05 0.012 0.062 0.75 2.33 77
80 9.0 0.028 0.008 0.036 0.73 1.31 97
100 11.0 0.017 0.005 0.022 0.71 0.78 117

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (at 10 m elevation) to the target.
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (at 10 m elevation) to the target.
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the original pool.
X = X' + 6(1) + lO(2)
(1) Flame spillover (B-Cin Figure 15) = 6 metres
(2)Correction to ground level (C-E in Figure 15) = 11 m
The results are shown in Figure 16.

5.3 Example 2. Fire from Roof of Refrigerated Propane Storage Tank

Calculate the thermal radiation flux levels in the vicinity of a refrigerated propane storage tank burning from the
roof. Assume the worst case condition in which the whole area of the roof has been destroyed (i.e. maximum fire
diameter).
Ambient conditions are assumed to be:
Wind speed = 4 m/s'
Relative humidity = 30%
Tank dimensions are taken as:
Shell height = 25 m
Diameter = 36 m
'Targets' of interest are:
(a) Adjacent identical storage tanks (protected by water sprays) on which a maximum thermal radiation flux
level of 32 kW/m2is permitted. The minimum spacing between tanks and representative radiation levels on
the shell and roof (for water spray rate estimates) are to be calculated.
(b) The (remote area) plant boundary at which a thermal radiation level of 13 kW/m2 (at ground level) is
allowable. The minimum distance from tank to boundary is required.
The storage tank is assumed to be of a type which will not 'burn down', i.e. the base of the visible flame will remain
at an elevation of 25 metres above grade.

Calculation
This is a liquid pool fie and the method used in Example 1 is followed.
For this case the calculations are summarized except where the method differs from Example 1.
Equivalent pool diameter (D)= 36 metres
Liquid burning rate (V) = 2.17 x 10-4metreds
Flame length ( L ) = 63 metres
Flame deviation ( 6 ) = 35"
Flame spillover (calculated) = 8 metres

58
 CALCULATION OF T H E R M A L RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

E x P S Figure I7
Sketch of Lkample 2 Fire.

-
A-B = liquid pool dimension (D= 36 m)
A-C = elongated flame dimension (D*= 44 m)
X-Y = axis of 'original' flame (L= 63 m)
Wind direction 0 = angle of flame tilt (35")
For targets at ground level
B-H = vertical distance below flame base (25 m)
Y-Z = 'hypothetical' flame length (LHw= 30.5 m)
X-z = 'total' flame length (LT"= 93.5 m)
J-K = distance correction to ground level target (17.5 m)
I
For targets at 33 metres elevation
1 Ground level
G
I
2
I
F J H K
I
M-N = target vertical elevation (8 m)
C-M = flame length below target ( L - = 9.8 m)
M S = flame length above target (L' = 53.2 m)
C-N = distance correction to elevated target (5.6 m)

The sketch in Figure 17 illustrates the conditions. The flame is 'extended' to ground level for the purpose of
calculating view factors for ground level targets.
The flame spillover effect is shown as calculated above, but a lower spillover would be expected for this type
of elevated fire.
For this calculation the maximum height of the domed roof on the adjacent tank is taken as 33 metres.

Calculationsfor targets at 25 metres elevation

For the purpose of tank spacing thermal radiation flux levels are required for targets at the same elevation as the
base of the flame.
The procedure for calculating view factors is similar to that used for ground level targets in Example 1
(Figure 2).
View factors (e)are taken from Figure 7 for a 30" flame angle.
Atmospheric transmittance (T) is taken from Figure 14.
Flame surface flux (I,) is taken as 50 kW/m2 from 3.2.7.
Flame LIR = 63/18 = 3.5
Thermal radiation flux levels will be calculated a t targets from 5 metres t o 45 metres from the edge of the
flame base (Point C in Figure 17):

x* X'IR qJ r I X
5 1.3 0.67 0.92 30.8 13
9 1.5 0.59 0.89 26.3 17
18 2.0 0.45 0.84 18.9 26
27 2.5 0.35 0.81 14.2 35
36 3.0 0.27 0.79 10.7 44
45 3.5 0.22 0.77 8.5 53

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame to the target (both at 25 m elevation).
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame to the target (both at 25 m elevation).
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the tank
X = X* + 8(1)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 17) = 8 metres
These results are plotted on Figure 18.

Calculationsfor targets at 33 metres elevation

These figures will be used t o specify thermal radiation flux levels on the adjacent tank roof. The assumption made
is that the funk roof is exposed to radiation only from that area of the flame which is above roof elevation, i.e. in
this case above 33 metres.
View factors, atmospheric transmittanceand flame surface flux are calculated as above. _-
Flame LIR = 53.U18 = 3.0

59
 APPENDIX 2

Thermal radiation Distance to target. from tank shell (m)

flux level (kW/m2) Ground level ,
25 metres elevation 33 metres elevatic ,
I
(maximum)
124 I
Tank shell l a n k roof
-- --
55 58
38 43
12 18

Ref. Appendix 3.1

Thermal radiation
flux level. (kW/m*

I '
0
I I I
20
t I I I
40
I l l I
60
I 1 I

80
I l l

l(

Distance to taiget from tank shell (m)

Figure 18
Example 2 radiation levek.
 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Thermal radiation flux levels are calculated as for the 25 metre elevation case, for targets between 5 metres
and 45 metres from the edge of the displaced flame at 33 metres elevation (Point M in Figure 17):
X' X'IR @ r I X
5 1.3 0.67 0.92 30.8 19
9 1.5 0.59 0.89 26.3 23
18 2.0 0.44 0.84 18.5 32
27 2.5 0.34 0.81 13.8 41
36 3.0 0.255 0.79 10.1 50
45 3.5 0.20 0.77 ,7.7 59

X' (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (at 33 m elevation) to the target.
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (at 33 m elevation) to the target.
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the tank.
X = X' + 8(1) + 6(2)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 17) = 8 metres
(2) Correction for elevation (C-Hin Figure 17) = 6 metres
These results are plotted on Figure 18.

Calculationsfor targets at ground level

The geometry for calculating view factors for this case is covered in Figure 4.
View factors (@)are taken from Figure 7.
Atmospheric transmittance and flame surface flux are taken as for previous examples.
Lro'IR = 93-5/18 = 5.2
LHYPIR = 30.5118 = 1.7
Thermal radiation flux levels are calculated for targets between 15 metres and 150 metres from the edge of
the extended flame base:
X' X'IR 9To' @"W 9 r I X
15 1.8 0.51 0.43 0.08 0.85 3.4 6
18 2.0 0.465 0.36 0.105 0.84 4.4 9
27 2.5 0.375 0.23 0.145 0.81 5.9 18
36 3.0 0.31 0.153 0.157 0.79 6.2 27
54 4.0 0.213 0.078 0.135 0.76 5.1 45
72 5.0 0.155 0.048 0.107 0.74 4.0 63
90 6.0 0.112 0.031 0.081 0.72 2.92 81
108 7.0 0.084 0.022 0.062 0.71 2.20 99
126 8.0 0.064 0.016 0.048 0.70 1-68 117
144 9.0 0.05 0.012 0.038 0.69 1.31 135

X' (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (extended to ground level) to the target.
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (extended to ground level) to the target.
X (m) is the horizontal.distance of the target from the edge of the tank.
X = X* + 8(1) - 17(2)
(1) Flame spillover (B-Cin Figure 17) = 8 metres
(2) Correction for 'extended' flame (J-K in Figure 17) = 17 metres
These results are plotted on Figure 18.

5.4 Example 3. Fire from Roof of Refrigerated Propane Storage Tank Burning Down to Pool Fire at Ground Level
In this example all conditions are the same as in Example 2 except that the storage tank is assumed to be of a type
which will 'bum down', i.e. the fire will start at a visible flame elevation of 25 metres and will finish as a 36 metre
diameter LPG pool fire at ground level.
The initial thermal radiation levels will be as calculated for Example 2. Data for the same 'targets' and
conditions are required for the latter stages of the fire at ground level.

Calculation .- .-
All initial calculations are as for Example 2. A sketch illustrating the latter stages of the fire with the tank burned
down to ground level is shown in Figure 19.

61
 APPENDIX 2

E -.x P s m u r e I9
Sketch of Example 3 Fire.
A-B = liquid pool dimension ( D = 36 m)
A-C = elongated flame dimension (D' = 44 m)
X-Y = axis of 'original' flame (L= 63 m)
8 = angle of flame tilt (35")
For targits at 25 metres elevation
M-N = target vertical elevation (25m)
C-M = flame length below target (L-= 30.5 m)
A Y 8 C NH M-S = flame length above target (L+= 32.5 m)
C-N = distance correction to elevated target (17.5 m)
For targetsat 33 metres elevation
F-H = target vertical elevatioo (33 m)
C-F = flame length below target (L-= 40.2 m)
F-S = flame length above target (L+= 22.8 m)
C-H = distance correction to elevated target (23.1 m)

Calculationsfor targets at 25 metres elevation

This elevation represents the top of the shell of an adjacent tank and is treated as in Figure 3.
View factors ($) for that part of the flame above the target are taken from Figure 3 and for the flame below
the target from Figure 4.
Atmospheric transmittance (I) and flame surface flux are as for Example 2.
L'IR = 32.5118 = 1.80 L-IR = 30.5118 = 1.69
Thermal radiation flux levels will be calculated at targets from 5 metres to 45 metres from the edge of the flame
at 25 metres elevation (point M in Figure 19). Calculation of thermal radiation flux levels:

X' X'IR #+ 9- 9 T I X
5 1.3 0.67 0.30 0.97 0.92 44.6 30
9 1.5 0.59 0.235 0.825 0.89 36.7 34
18 2.0 0.41 0.155 0.565 0.84 23.7 43
27 2.5 0.28 0.11 0.39 0.81 15.8 52
36 3.0 0.20 0.08 0.28 0.79 11.1 61
45 3.5 0.14 0.06 0.20 0.77 7.7 70

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (at 25 m elevation) to the target.
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (at 25 m elevation) to the target.
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the tank.
X = X' + 8(1) + 17(2)
(1) Flame spillover (E-F in Figure 19) = 8 m
(2) Correction for elevation ( B Ein Figure 19) = 17 m
These results are shown on Figure U).
The 25 metre elevation level also represents the edge of an adjacent rank roof. The thermal radiation flux
levels differ from those calculated above for the tank shell because the roof will receive only minimal radiation
from that part of the flame below 25 metres elevation. This is partly due to the shielding of parts of the roof by the
tank shell, but also because those areas of the roof which are 'visible' to the flame are at a very unfavourable angle
to receive and absorb thermal radiation. Therefore, for the roof (25 m elevation) only the view factor for the flame
length above the target is applied.
The calculation for the roof at 25 metres elevation is shown below and also plotted on Figure 20:

X' - X'IR 9 r I X
5 1.3 0.67 0.92 30.8 30
9 1.5 0.59 0.89 26.3 34
18 2.0 0.41 0.84 17.2 43
27 2.5 0.28 0.81 11.3 52
36 3.0 0.20 0.79 7.9 61
45 3.5 0.14 o.n 5.4 70

62
 CALCULATION OF THERMAL RADIATION FLUX LEVELS

Thermal radiation Distance to target from tank shell (m)

-
flux level (kW/m2) Ground level 25 metres elevation 33 metres elevation
(maximum 1
1.5 140 -
Tank shell
- -
Tank roof
- -
Tank roof
-
5.0 76
8.0 56 69 61 60
13 39 57 49 52
32 13 37 29 35
-50
Ref. Appendix 3.1 I

25 metres
elevation \ - 40
Tank
rmf \ 33 metres
Thermal radiation
flux level (kW/m2)

I I I I I I I I I 0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Distance to target from tank shell (m)

Figure 20
Example 3 radiation levels.

63
 APPENDIX 2
Calculationsfor targets at 33 metres elevation
-"'his is also a tank roof calculation and, again, the roof is assumed to receive minimal radiation from that area of
the flame below 33 metres elevation.
The calculation is similar to that for a 25 metre elevation target shown above.
Flame L'IR =.22.8/18 = 1.27
Thermal radiation flux levels are calculated for targets from 5 metres to 45 metres from the edge of the
(displaced) flame at 33 metres elevation (Point Fin Figure 19). Calculation of thermal radiation flux levels:
X' X'IR 9' 7 I X
5 1.3 0.66 0.92 30.4 36
9 1.5 0.57 0.89 25.4 40
18 2.0 0.36 0.84 15.1 49
27 2.5 0.22 0.81 8.9 58
36 3.0 0.15 0.79 5.9 67
45 3.5 0.105 0.77 4.0 76

X* (m) is measured from the edge of the displaced flame (at 33 m elevation) to the target.
X' (m) is measured from the centre of the displaced flame (at 33 m elevation) to the target.
X (m) is the horizontal distance of the target from the edge of the tank.
X = X* + 8(1) + 23(2)
(1) Flame spillover (B-C in Figure 19) = 8 metres
(2) Correction for elevation (C-Hin Figure 19) = 23 metres
These results are plotted on Figure 20.
Calculationsfor targets at ground level
The calculation is exactly th'e same as that for a target at 25 metres elevation in Example 2, i.e. flame base and
target at the same elevation.
The figures are plotted on Figure 20, together with the additional data generated below to extend the range
of results:
X' X'IR 9 7 I X
~~

54 4.0 0.175 0.76 6.7 63

72 5.0 0.12 0.74 4.5 81
90 6.0 0.08 0.72 2.88 99
108 7.0 0.06 0.71 2.13 117
126 8.0 0.045 0.70 1.58 135
144 9.0 0.037 0.69 1.28 153

64
 Appendix 3

LEAK SOURCES AND TYPICAL LEAK

RATES FROM LPG STORAGE
SYSTEMS

Leak sources from LPG storage systems should for design purposes be confined to certain well-defined situations
provided:
(a) the finished design and operating procedures employed are based on the results of systematic analysis of the
system taking into account failure modes and the likelihood of their occurring and
(b) the system is designed, constructed and maintained in conformity with an acceptable code.
In the case of pressure storage such situations are considered to be limited to possible leakage from vessel
flange and piping gaskets, pump seals and to the failure of small bore connections.
In the case of refrigerated systems leaks are similarly limited to flange gaskets and small bore connections
but, additionally, experience has indicated the possibility of limited cracks occumng in plate material.
Tables are given below which, based on simple flow formulae, illustrate the order of magnitude of LPG
releases to be expected from typical credible release sources under the postulated storage conditions. These
formulae are typical of a number of equations which could be used depending on choice, flow regime, release
conditions anticipated at the orifice, storage conditions, etc. Release rates are given for both butane and propane
and the calculations assume the physical properties of the pure materials rather than those of the various
commercial grades manufactured.
This appendix does not in any way attempt to indicate the risk of credible failures happening, which is an
important part of the systematic evaluation of the design and operating procedures for the plant, but confines
itself to indicating the type of leak source and the leakage rate considered to be typical for that source.
For simplicity no account has been taken in the examples given of the installation of emergency valves, e.g.
excess flow valves, for limiting leakage rates and duration.

1 PRESSURE STORAGE
The typical simple equation used for pressure storage (results shown in Tables 1and 2) is for small ‘hole’ sizes and
assumes a homogeneous equilibrium two-phase flashing liquid release from the orifice. This contrasts with a
single-phase spray release which may occur under certain circumstances. It also contrasts with the formula used
for refrigerated LPG releases (see 2) in which non-flashing 100% liquid release is assumed.
Thus Tables 1 and 2 are based on the formula .-
W = ACd[2 &(Pi - P,.)]o.s
65
 ~~

APPENDIX 3

where
W = releaErate (kg/s)
A = area of release hole (m’)
C, = coefficiedt of discharge, assumed here to be 1.0*
Pi = initial pressure (Nlm’, Pascals)
P, = critical pressure (N/m2) (assumed here to be 0.55 Pi)
d, = mean density of vapourlliquid mixture (kg/m3)
- 1
Mv/dv + (1 - M,)/d,,
where
dv = density of vapour (kg/m3)
d, = density of liquid (kg/m3)

where
= initial temperature (K)
T,
= equilibrium temperature corresponding to P, (K)
L = latent heat of vaporization (kJ/kg)
C = heat capacity of liquid (kJ/kg per degree centigrade)

Table I
Releme resultingfrom pipe jlange gatket failure.
Gasket 1.5 mm (U16 in) thick
Failure between adjacent bolt holes
Flange sizes based on ANSI 300 Ib flange rating
Butane stored at 1.5 barg (2.5 x 16 Pascals)
Propane stored at 7 barg (8 x l@Pascals)
Pipe diameter Area ofrelease hole Butane release rate Propane release rate
(mm (in)) (m2 x P) (kg/s, 1.5 barg) (Ws, 7 bwg)
75 0.23 0.53
118 0.35 0.81
106 0.35 0.70
129 0.39 0.89
133 0.40 0.93

Table 2
Release resulting from smaU bore connection failure.
Butane stored at 1.5 barg (2.5 x 1 6 Pascals)
Propane stored at 7 barg (8 x l@Pascals)
~~~

Pipe diameter Area of release hole Butane release rate Propane release rate
(mm (in)) (m2x I O - ~ ) (kgls, 1.5 barg) ~~
(kgls, 7 bard
0.88 1.88
6.25 13.75
~~ ~ ~~~

Nore (a): The effect of friction (e.g. in long pipes) which can considerably reduce release rates
is not taken into account.
Note (b): Full bore flow is assumed, i.e. no account is taken of emergency valve operation, or
other flow limiters.

A coefficientof discharge of 1.0 has been used but other lower values, in some cases as low as 0.6, m a y be appropriate depending upon the
flow regime and the orifice conhguration. etc.

66
 LEAK SOURCES AND TYPICAL LEAK RATES FROM LPG STORAGE SYSTEMS

2 REFRIGERATED STORAGE
The typical simple equation for deriving Tables 3 , 4 and 5 is intended for the flow of an incompressible liquid
through an orifice and assumes no flashingtakes place across the release gap.
This is not strictly correct as, initially at least, some flashing will occur, but use of this equation gives the
greater release rate as compared with, for example, the equation for steady flashing flow conditions used for
pressure storage. Thus Tables 3,4 and 5 are based on the formula:
W = AC&(PI - P2)]’” kgls
where
A = area of release gap (m2)
p1 = upstream absolute pressure (N/mz)
P2 = downstream (atmospheric)pressure (N/m*)
,g = density of liquid at storage temperature (kg/m3)
C, = coefficient of discharge*
Note I : All the release rates quoted in Tables 3,4 and 5 have been determined for a static system.
Note 2: The densities of refrigerated butane and propane are so close that the release rates will be substantially
the same for both, and also for mixtures of them.

Table 3
Release resultingfrom p i p e j h g e gasket failure.
Gasket 1.5 mm (1116in) thick
Failure between adjacent bolt holes
Flange sizes based on ANSI 300 Ib flange rating

Propane -4CPCJbutane -9°C

Head Area of release rates of liquid LPG
Pipe diameter in tank release hole
(mm (in)) ( 4 (m2 x IO-~) kg/s ft’ls m3/s
~~~~~ ~~

20 133 1.2 0.07 0.002

20 134 1.2 0.07 0.002
20 134 1.2 0.07 0.002
20 160 1.5 0.09 0.0025
30 133 1.5 0.09 0.0025
30 134 1.5 0.09 0.0025
30 134 1.5 0.09 0.0025
U) 160 1.8 0.11 0.003
Note (c): The height of product chosen. i.e. 20 m and 30 m, are typical of a large tank
approximately two-thirds full and full respectively.

Table 4
Release raulthg from tank small bore connectionfailure.

Propane -4CPUbutane -9°C

Head Area of release rates of liquid LPG
in tank release hole
(m) (m2 x 1 0 ~ ~ ) kgls *IS m3/s
20 285 2.6 0.16 0.005
20 507 4.7 0.28 0.008
20 2028 18.7 1.12 0.032
30 285 3.2 0.19 0.006
30 507 5.7 0.34 0.010
U) 2028 22.7 1.36 0.039
Refer to Note (c).
.- --
For the cases considered a coefficientof dischargeof 0.8 has been used. In practice coefficientsofdischargeas low as 0.3 may be appropriate
depending upon the flow regime and the orificeconfiguration. etc.

67
\
 APPENDIX 3

Table 5
Release from tank material failure-split 20 cm in length.

Propane -WC/butane -9°C

Area of release rates of liquid LPG
Width of split Head release hole
(mm (in)) (m) (m2x IO-~) kg/s f?/S m3/s

1.5 (1/16) 20 290 2.57 0.16 0.005

3.0 (118) 20 580 5.34 0.32 0.01
1.5 (1/16) 30 290 3.25 0.20 0.06
3.0 (118) 30 580 6.50 0.39 0.01
Refer to Note (c).
Note (d): A split limited to 20 cm can be considered if the plate has properties at the storage
temperature such that a sudden rupture of the whole tank wall is a non-credible
mode of failure.

68
 Appendix 4

VAPOUR DISPERSION

A number of theoretical mathematical models have been derived for predicting vapour dispersion from LPG
spillages. Work on these models and the empirical correlations which take account of various physical processes
which influence vapour dispersion is known to be continuing.
To date no single model is universally acceptable and many companies have their own in-house approaches
which they use on a worldwide basis.
A paper published in the Journal of Hazardous Murerials, 6 (1982), entitled ‘Heavy gas dispersion models’,
by D. R. Blackmore, M. N. Herman and J. L. Woodward, contains a review of the following models:
Ground level releases Jet release
Zephyr Astleford e!al.
Transloc Bloom
Sigmet-N Cox et al.
Mariah Ooms etal.
Disco
Hegadas 11
Cox and Carpenter
Eidvik
Fay
Flothman and Nikodem
Denz
Germeles and Drake
Picknett
Van Buijtenan
Van Ulden

69
 Appendix 5

COOLING WATER REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE PROTECTION OF
REFRIGERATED LPG STORAGE
TANK SYSTEMS EXPOSED TO
THERMAL RADIATION

Appendix 2 describes and illustrates with examples a method by which radiation levels incident on targets as a
result of fire situations may be calculated. The application of water to the target is one way of reducing the effects
of thermal radiation as, in evaporating, water carries away the incident energy. Additionally if a layer of water is
maintained on the target surface then its temperature will not rise above the 100°Climit stipulated in 3.8.3.4 of
the Code.
Cooling water is normally applied by a fixed spray system using open-ended nozzles with a diameter of not
less than 8 mm in order to minimize the risk of blockage. Fixed water monitors should not be used alone as with
them it is not practicable to cover the total exposed area with an even water distribution. Such an even distribution
with a water layer over the surface to be cooled is essential as interruption of the water layer could lead to the
development of local hot spots which could result in rapid loss of mechanical integrity of the structure.
The water application rate is dependent upon the form of the spray system, e.g. open-ended nozzles, the
cooling requirement, e.g. limiting surface temperature to 100"C,and the heat flux received.
Normally the maximum level of heat flux received is used as the basis for the calculation for relatively small
units. However, for large structures such as tank roofs it can result in considerable overstating of the requirement
unless sectionalization of the spray system is carried out. For example, the maximum heat flux in the case of an
adjacent tank fire would occur at the adjacent tank rim and the main part of the roof structure would be at a lower
flux level.
Whether the cooling water is recirculated or not has a bearing on the rate at which it is to be applied. If the
water is not recirculated then the sensible heat absorbed in raising it from ambient temperature to 100°Cmay be
taken into account as well as the heat of vaporization.

EXAMPLE
~ Assume the maximum heat flux received = 32 kW/mz
The spray water system does not involve water recirculation.
Ambient water temperature max = 20 "C
Required maximum target surface temperature = 100°C
As a factor of safety assume that only 25% of the latent heat of evaporation is taken into account.
It is required to determine the necessary water application rate.

70
 COOLING WATER REQUIREMENTS FOR REFRIGERATED STORAGE TANKS

Solution
1 kg of water absorbs as sensible heat (20 "Cto 100 "C)= 336 kJ
1 kg of water absorbs in evaporating 2,257 kJ
Therefore for calculation purposes assume -
4
2 257
= 564 kJ is used.
Thus heat absorbed by 1 kg of water = 336 + 564
=mkJ
Radiant heat flux to be absorbed = 32 kW/m2
= 32 kJ/(dm2)
Therefore required water application rate = - 32
900
= 0.036 kg/(s/m2)
This is equivalent to 2.16 I/(min/rn*)of surface area to be protected.
Similar calculations can be camed out for other portions of the tank receiving lower flux levels.

71
 Appendix 6

SAFE END LIMITS WHEN PURGING

WITH NITROGEN VOL. PER CENT

Safe end point for inert purging

Gas freeing Recommissioning

YOgas max YOO2max
I
I I
I I A I B

Butane 4 9.O
Propane 5 9.0

In the above Columns A and B recommend practical limits to cater for variations in gas composition, etc.
Column A-represents the maximum allowable concentration offlammablegas in the gadinert mixture to enable
safe subsequent introduction of replacement air.
Column B-represents the maximum allowable concentration of oxygen in the aidinert mixture to enable safe
introductiodreplacement by flammable gas.
i
Note: The above figures do not represent safe levels at which entry is permissible.

72
 Appendix 7

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

For the purpose of this Code the following interpretations apply irrespective of any other meaning the words may
have in other connections. Where used in the Code, these terms are printed in italics.
Above-ground storage: Storage of which no part, other than foundations, is below ground level or covered by
earth or similar materials.
Below-groundburied storage: Storage of which no part, other than wnnections, is above ground level.
Blank flange: A solid flange which can be bolted to a flanged connection on pipes or equipment to block off flow
from it. The flanges should be of the same rating.
Bleed valve: A small vent valve, usually immediately downstream of a block valve, which can be opened to
ascertain whether there is pressure on the down side of the block valve when closed.
Blind: (See Blankflange and Slip blind, terms which are preferable as they are unambiguous.)
Block valve: A valve which controls the passage of a liquid through a pipe with the intention that it permits either
full flow or no flow.
Bonding: Provision of a low resistance electrical conductor between sections of plant, equipment or structures.
Breathing apparatus: A device which ensures that the wearer has a continuously available supply of uncontami-
nated air through a face mask, helmet or mouthpiece.
Bund, bunding, bunded area, bunded enclosure: An enclosure bounded by a wall or by natural or constructed
ground contours and designed to confine a spillage of product.
Bund wall: A wall of appropriate height and she, constructed of suitable material and designed to confine a
spillage of product.
Capacity: The interval volume of the container.
Container: A general term used to denote a vessel or rank for holding LPG whether for bulk storage, transport or
portable use.
Competent person: A person who has the necessary ability in the particular process, trade, plant or equipment to
which the text refers to render him capable of the work involved and who has been duly authorized to
undertake the work.
Cryogenic: Relating to low temperatures, e.g. below -100 "C.
Earthing: The provision of a safe path of electrical current to ground, in order to protect structures, plant and
equipment from the effects of stray electrical currents and electrostatic discharge.
Fire safe: A term used to denote a defined standard of resistance to fire exposure, e.g. to standards laid down in
BS 5146.
Fireproofed: Provided with a defined standard of protection against fire exposure, e.g. BS 476 Part 8.
Fire resistant: The ability to control the surface spread of flame to a specified rate under laid down conditions,
e.g. BS 476.
Flammable (synonymouswith Inflammable): Refers to any substance, solid, liquid, gas or vapour, which is easily
- ignited. The addition Qf the prefix 'non' indicates thatthe substance is not readily ignited but does not
necessarily indicate that it is non-combustible.
Fully in-ground: Totally below ground level.

'73
 APPENDIX 7

Fully refrigerated: Cooled to a temperature at which its vapour pressure is at or below atmospheric pressure.
Gas-free: A rank, vessel, container, pipeline or area is considered to be gas-free when the concentration of
flammable gases is within the safe prescribed 1imits.The term gas-free does not imply absence of toxic gases
or sufficiencyof oxygen for tank or vessel entry.
Hazardous area: An area in which there exists or may exist an atmosphere containingflarnrnable gas or vapour in
a concentration capable of ignition. (The term refers exclnsively to hazards arising from ignition.)
Hot work: This includes welding or the use of any flame or electric arc or the use of any equipment likely to cause
heat, flame or spark. It also includes caulking, chipping, drilling, riveting and any other heat producing
operation, unless it is carried out in such a way as to keep the temperature of the tools and work below 100°C.
impounding basin: (As for bund, bunding, bunded area, bunded enclosure.)
Mounded storagdvessel: Storage above or partly in the ground which, excluding connections, is completely
covered by earth, sand or other suitable material.
Naked lightdnaked flames: Include all unconfined flames, fires, exposed incandescent material, lamps of an
unapproved pattern, electric welding arcs and portable hand or power operated equipment liable to cause
incendiary sparks.
Non-credible: Having such a low frequency of occurrence as to justify its exclusion from consideration for all
practical purposes.
Partially refrigerated: Cooled to a temperature between ambient and the materials' boiling point such that its
vapour pressure is reduced below that related to its level at ambient temperatures.
Partly in-ground: Refers to storage which is partly below ground and partly above ground.
Permit: See Work permit.
Permit to work system: A formal system for controlling work which is potentially hazardous which specifies
precise conditions for the work, including its limitation and duration and which can only be authorized by
specified levels of authority.
Pressure storage: Storage of or for LPG at its vapour pressure at ambient temperatures.
Pressure vessel: A conrainer designed for the storage or transport of LPG at ambient temperatures, built to a
recognized Code such as BS 5500 or ASME Section VIII.
Refrigerated LPG: LPG which is cooled to a temperature at which its vapour pressure is substantially at
atmospheric pressure.
Refrigerated product: (As for refrigerated LPG.)
Refrigerated storage: Storage for product which is at such a temperature that its vapour pressure is substantially
at atmospheric pressure.
Semi-refrigerated: (As for Parriully refrigerared.)
Slip blind: Acircular flat plate with a handle which can be bolted between two flanges to block off flow. The handle
should extend outside the flanges. The plate should be thick enough to withstand the anticipated pressure
which need not be the flange rating pressure.
Source of ignition: Naked lights, fires, certain electrical equipment, hot surfaces above ignition temperature or a
spark or flame produced by any other means.
Spectacle hlind: A solid circular plate connected to a circular plate with a hole in it by a straight handle. The plates
are designed to be bolted between flanges on piping and equipment. The first will block off flow and the
second will pass normal flow. The plate should be thick enough to withstand the anticipated pressure which
need not be the flange rating pressure. The advantage of this device is that no additional mechanical stress is
applied to the equipment when it is changed between the open and closed position.
Storage vessel: A conrainer for the bulk storage of LPG at ambient temperatures.
Tank: A conrainer for the bulk storage or transport of liquid and specifically for refrigerated LPG as distinct from
the pressurized product.
Thermally protected: Provided with cooling water facilities or other effective means, e.g. insulation, designed to
limit the effect of radiation from fire.
Vessel: A conrainer for the bulk storage or transport of LPG at ambient temperatures.
Work permit: A document issued by an authorized person to permit work to be carried out safely in a defined
area under specific conditions.

74
 Appendix 8

GUIDANCE ON WORK PERMIT

PROCEDURES

The following is intended to assist those responsible in producing their own local work permir procedures, which
are essential to the safe management of an LPG plant. It must be stressed that the details will depend on the sue,
layout and scope of operations in the plant as well as its internal organization, and they must therefore becarefully
worked out at a local level.

(A) 'GENERAL
No construction, repair, maintenance work, dismantling or modification to facilities should be carried out
anywhere inside an LPG plant without the authority of the manager or his authorized representative.
In all cases except for work of a routine and non-hazardous nature, this permission should be given in the
written form of a workpermit. .

(1) Work Pennit

The work permit should clearly specify
(a) the particular item of plant equipment to be worked upon,
(b) the work to be permitted and
(c) all the conditions that are to be observed to enable the work to be carried out without hazard; these conditions
should include all the special precautions to be taken, such as isolation, gas testing, protective clothing and
appliances, breathing appararus, safety, fire-fighting equipment.
To enable this to be done effectively, the layout of the work permit form should include a comprehensive
checklist section, giving the issuer a methodical procedure by which to consider and stipulate all the necessary
conditions to be followed, and the user of the permit a similar check-off opportunity. (The dual nature of this
check-off procedure by both the parties involved is particularly emphasized.)
An integral part of the work permit system of control is that it is used in conjunction with gas test and other
certificates that are additionally required to cover specific precautions listed on the work permit.

(2) Gas Test Certificates

The authorizations of hot work involving a source of ignition or of entry into a confined space such as a refrigerated
storage rank or pressure vessel are examples requiring a check for gas-free conditions to be made. For this purpose
the work permit will indicate the necessity for gas test certificates to be issued. Such a gas test certificate can be an
integral part of the work permit form or can be a separate document.
It must be kept in mind that a gas-free teskresult is indicative of conditions only at the actual time of testing.
Repeat gas test checks are often stipulated under the conditions of issue of a work pennit.

75
 APPENDIX 8

Gas testing should only be permitted to be carried out by authorized persons who have received training in
the use and care
-.
-.
of gas detectors and who are knowledgeable as to their limitations.

(3) Other Required Certificates

Other specific certificates in addition to gas test certificates may be required in conjunction with the work permit,
e.g. certificatesto cover excavation, electrical equipment and prime mover isolations, or use of radiation sources.

(4) Administration of Work Permif Forms

The use of standard printed work permit forms and gas test and other certificates should be made a requirement
and the use of any other individually made out forms should be prohibited.
It is an essential part of control that all work permit and gas test and other certificate forms be made in
duplicate (i.e. original and carbon copy) and all such pairs of forms should have an identifying serial number. All
gas test and other certificates should include the identifying serial number of the workpermit to which they relate.

(B) SCOPE OF WORK PERMITS

(1) Where it is considered that work is of a routine and non-hazardous nature and no work permit is required,
effective and appropriate supervision should still be provided to ensure safe conduct of the'work.
It is of help to have written standing instructions which define such routine duties and these should be
reviewed and kept up to date.
(2) Certain open areas or certain buildings (e.g. offices, workshops, laboratories) within the plant may be
designated as areas within which normal work, includinghot work or use of sources of ignition, may be camed
out without a workpennit or under a blanket work permit renewable at intervals (e.g. annually). The extent
of such a designated area should be clearly defined on the ground (andor by notices, fencing, etc.), and
chosen so that unrestricted hot work or other sources ofignition do not endanger the plant operations or
facilities.
(3) At all other locations a work permit is required for any.work which may create a hazard; examples of such
work are:

entry into any confined space such as a tank or vessel for cleaning out or any other purpose;
work which involves hot work, naked lights or other sources of ignition, or requires the use of mobile
internal combustion engines, air compressors or portable electric lights with trailing leads;
work in the open or in buildings, in or near a hazardous area, which have not been designated as in (2)
above;
work in, near, or on tanks, vessels, pipelines, equipment or other facilities or in pits, culverts, drains,
etc.;
excavations;
work on electrical feeders, distributors or equipment.

(C) PROCEDURE PRIOR TO THE ISSUE OF A WORK PERMIT;

CONDITIONS OF ISSUE
(1) Before issuing a permit, the person signing it should inspect the site and satisfy himself that conditions and
precautions covered by the permit will render the operation safe.
(2) The safety considerations to be stipulated on the workpermit should be amved at by full consideration of all
the factors relating to both the work to be carried out and its location. Firstly consider the equipment to be
worked on to determine whether LPG or other hazardous liquid or vapour may escape during the work.
Secondly consider the method of doing the job to assess whether this will introduce any potential hazards
(e.g. sources of ignition).
Thirdly consider the location in relation to other equipment (e.g. manifolds, vents, drains) to assess the
likelihood of a hazard affecting the job. The consideration of these factors can be aided by the use of a
systematic checklist on the work permit form, but should include any additional factors that may be necessary
to ensure full safety during the job. Gas-free or other testing requirements should be stipulated at this stage.
The factors to be considered should include the following; it is necessary to assess these conditions not
just at the time of issuing thepermit but on a continuing basis to cover the full period of the workto be carried
out (see (F) below).
76
 GUIDANCE ON WORK PERMIT PROCEDURES

(a) Emptying the liquid LPG, depressurizing and disconnecting equipment, pipelines, pressure vessels,
tanks, etc., as necessary.

(b) Isolation
Isolation may be by locking isolation valves of the double block and bleed type, by fitting blankflanges
or blinds, or by swinging spectacle blinds to the closed position. The use of single valves or cocks alone,
as a means of isolation for allowing work on equipment, is acceptable only for short periods during which
blank flanges or blinds are being fitted or spectucle blinds are being swung. Increased security may be
achieved by locking these single isolation valves. Double block and bleed systems are preferred to single
valves wherever practicable.
For entry into confined spaces, all possible sources of harmful gases and liquids must be isolated by
the use of slip blinds, spectacle blinds or blankflanges. A register of isolation fitting and removal should
be maintained so as to prevent any of these items being overlooked.

(c) Isolation of electrical supplies

This should be camed out by a competent person who has been given clear instructions on the method
to be used. A different method of isolation may be stipulated if the work does not involve exposure of
the electrical equipment but is confined to the driven item (e.g. locking out of the contactors may be
sufficient for adjustment of a pump seal but withdrawal of fuses and earthing down may be required for
disconnection of the motor). An attempt to restart an isolated drive should be made to check the
effectiveness of the isolation. A warning notice should be fixed to all isolated equipment to prevent
inadvertent reconnection whilst repairs are in progress.
(d) Mechanically driven equipment
The source of fuel or power must be positively isolated.
(e) Freeing of the equipment from LPG vapours remaining after emptying under (a) above.
(f) Sealing offof all sewers, drains, ducts or gutters within 15 m af any intended hot work (to prevent danger
of hazardous vapours arising).
(g) Checking forgus-free conditions necessary for the class of work to be camed out (see (A) (2), (B)(3)).
The need for a gas test to be carried out should always be borne in mind in regard to any work in an
LPG plant regardless of its location.
(h) Atmospheric air contains 21% oxygen and it is not desirable for persons to have to breathe air in which
the oxygen content is less than 20%.
It is stressed that adequate instructions should be given in the use of breathing apparatus of the
appropriate type to all personnel required to wear it in the course of their duties.
(i) Need to wear protective clothing a n d o r breathing apparatus and stipulation of the type to be worn.
(j) Clearing away of combustible materials, removing o r wetting down of decks, platforms, scaffolds, etc.
(k) Safe disposition of welding or other equipment to be used in carrying out the work.
(I) Earthing of electrical or welding equipment, o r steam, air or water hose nozzles to be used in the work.
(m) Display of suitable warning notices about the site.
(n) Location of overhead or buried electric power lines o r product lines, particularly if digging, using cranes
or other mechanical equipment.
( 0 ) Provision of fire4ghting facilities and standby fire personnel if necessary.

The above guidelines cannot cover all special conditions that may arise. Where other circumstances require
further special conditions these should also be entered upon the work permit in the extra space provided.

(D) ISSUE OF WORK PERMIT

No permit should be signed or issued until the plant manager or his authorized representative has ensured that all
the relevant factors have been checked, the conditions entered on the permit and authorization given for the
work. All work permits should be made out and signed in duplicate and the person in charge of carrying out the
work should also sign the permit (both copies) to signify that only the work permitted will be done and that the
special conditions on the permit will be strictly observed.
A copy of the jointly signed permit will be held by the issuer (the manager or his authorized representative)
and the other by the person in charge of carryingout the work. Apermit has no validity without the two signatures
which indicate the responsibility assumed by both parties. It is recommended that theuser’s copy of the pennit be
displayed at the work area so as to enable all workers to see it.
77
 APPENDIX 8

(E) VALIDITY OF WORK PERMITS

-
(1) Workpermits should state clearly the work to be-done (see (A) (1))and define the period for which they are
valid. Permits should not be signed ahead of the time of starting the work or without full inspection of the site
and all conditions; the date and time of signing should then be entered on them. (If subsequent delay occurs,
permits should be revalidated by further inspection and again signed with the new time or date before the
work commences.)
For extended work periods the permit should be revalidated at specified intervals as necessary. The
fre,quency at which gas tests should be carried out and gas test certificatesissued (see (A) (2)) should be stated
on the work permit.
Such frequency will depend upon the specific circumstancesand location of the work to be carried out in
respect of surrounding activities etc. and general rules cannot be laid down. Under some circumstances
repeat gas tests at two-hourly intervals and again at the start of each day or separate work period will be
adequate; in other cases circumstances may require more frequent checks for Bmmable vapours and an
automatic continuous monitoring gas detector should be considered (e.g. tank cleaning).
(2) Permits may be valid for the duration of the work when its nature does not create a hazard, or when the special
conditions associated with the issue of thepermit ensure that all hazards will be removed during the period of
work.

(F) CANCELLATION OF PERMIT/CERTIFICATE AND STOPPAGE OF WORK

(1) All work should be stopped, the persons withdrawn and the permit surrendered for cancellation immediately
if it is apparent that any of the stipulated conditions of the permit is not being or cannot be met; or in the case
of a gas test if a reading is obtained which exceeds that permitted for the work being carried out. Full
re-examination of all conditions should then be made and the necessary remedial steps laid down before
re-issue of the permit.
(2) A work permit is to be withdrawn (or surrendered) immediately if the conditions under which it was issued
change. It should also be withdrawn when a contractor or other person carrying out work ignores the warning
that he is in breach of safety regulations or any conditions of the permit.
(3) On completion of the work the work permit should have the time and date of completion entered on it to
indicate that the equipment is available for reuse and should be signed by the person responsible for carrying
out the work. The issuing authority should sign the permir to indicate its cancellation and should enter the
time and date of this cancellation when it differs from the time of completion of the job. From this time no
further work is permitted.

( G ) REMOVAL OF EQUIPMENT TO WORKSHOPS OR OUTSIDE THE PLANT

If equipmeFt has to be removed to a workshop, contractors’ premises or other location for repair or replacement,
apermir should specify the cleaning orgq-freeing to be done before transport, storage or starting work so that no
hazard will arise in subsequent handling. When equipment is so removed, the supervisor responsible for moving
or despatching it should ensure that it is cleaned and gas-freed in accordance with the permit and is safe to handle
in transit. He should attach instructions to it indicating any further precautions necessary to ensure that no
flammability hazard will arise when hot work is carried out. The workshop or other premises receiving the
equipment should not accept it without such instructions, which should bear the signature of the despatching
supervisor and the date of despatch.

(H) TYPICALFORMS
The following forms are typical of those required to assist safe working practices in an LPG plant.
It must be stressed that any forms used must be designed to suit local geographical and organizational
circumstances, and should be backed up by formal written procedures. These examples should therefore be used
for guidance but should not be regarded as standard.
Specimen form 1 Hot Work Permit
Specimen form 2 Entry Permit
Specimen form 3 Permit to Work on or near Electrical Equipment
-
Specimen form 4 General Work Permit
Specimen form 5 Permit for Line Disconnecting and Vessel Opening

78
 SPECIMEN FORM 1
HOT WORK PERMIT
~ ~~

St:irtiiig Tiiiic: Dine:

Finisliing T i m e : Itate:
M;iiiirenance/(:oiitr;Icror Personnel:
I.(r.;ition-specify precisely:
1)escription o f Work:

Sole: S / A = Sot App1ic;ihle

Initial hit11iteiiis completed:

T 1)ESCRIPTION YES N/A

.Y
P I Tesi. as free-area. sewers. etc.
E
I 2 Surrounding are;, m;itle safe

Personnel:
~~\iinteii;ince/<:ontrarror

Iiiiti;il ;ill items coinpletetl:

DF.S(:RIPTION

I Test. gas frc-:ire;i. sewers. etc.

H i i s equipiiient heen purged?

3 Iias equipment heeii hl;iiiketl?

-I I lave you iiisperted the equiptiient?

T 3 Is it free o f pressure and liquid?

Y
P (i Are surrounding iireiis safe?
E
(e.g. sewers. open vessels)
2
7 Is the equipment isolated electrirally?

tl Is fire protection :iv;iilahle?

9 Has safety ohserver been instructetl?

Speciii I (:oncl it ic ms:

Signatures: (:lieeked by Head Operator: Ikite:

(;;is Tester: Operations Supervisor:

- S~;iinren;ince/<:cinl
r;ictor Personnel:

RESEW.41.: Permit renewed: Tinie: 1);tie :

Aut lioriiing Signatory

Ensure complete undersvandinr: o f Hot Work Perniit Procedure.

TYPE I PER.MIT: Applies t o all Iiazardous work. not involving naked flame or continuous
spark p r ~ d u c t i o n .
1. Entry t o or use o f low voltage electrical equipment. i.e. 5 0 \‘ or less.
2. Vehicle entry i c i units. hut on ;iccess roads only.
3. Use of air driven rotary drills.
TYPE 2 PERMIT: For all Hot Work inviilving open flame o r ccintinuous spark producticin.
In addition vehicle entry t o prcress areas off access roads o r lifting over livc
equipment.
 SPECIMEN FORM 2
ENTRY PERMIT
Serial No.:

To he used when entry to confncd spaccs is required. Confned spaces inclirde

pressure vessels. LPG tanks, ducts, sewcrs. pipelines and a n y excavation or pit
overtivc feet deep. THIS PERMIT DOES NOT ALLOW HOT WORK.
This permit is valid 011 thc day of issue and up to OS.00 llic Collowing day.

Request
Permit required (date) (time)

Location of work, specify precisely,

Description of work

Signed: Maintenance/Contractor Personnel.

Safety Check

Yes I If No-Why?
I

i
1. Is the equipment free of pressure?
~~ ~~~ ~~~

2. Is the equipment free of oil. gas.

steam and water?

3. 1s the equipment free of inerts:'

4. Are all lines spaded or disconnected? I 'I I

5. Is all electrical equipment locked
out of service?

6. Does equipment test free of gas

I I ' I
and toxic vapours?

7. Does oxygen content exceed 20% ?

8. Is a stand-by man required?

Details of Any Other Safety Requirements:

Specify protective equipment to be worn

Signatures: Gas Tester (Area Operator) Date:-

Head Operator Date:-

Maintenance/Contractor Personnel Date:-

80
 SPECIMEN FORM 3
PERMIT To WORK ON OR NEAR
ELECTRICAL EQUIPM.ENT

This permit must be issued to the person in charge of the work and retained b y
him until the work is completed or stopped. T h e equipment must not be made
alive again until this permit is surrendered to an authorized person and cancelled
by him.

ISSUED BY .............................. DATE ..............................TIME ............

Authorizing the following work
............................................................................................................
............................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................
............................................................................................................
Precaufions Taken:-(Isolation, Earthing, Potential Tests etc.)
............................................................................................................
............................................................................................................
............................................................................................................
............................................................................................................
DANCER NOTICES POSTED A T ..........................................................
............................................................................................................
I hereby certify that the above equipment is safe to work on. ;

Issued by ............................................. Received by .................................

CANCELLATION OF AUTHORITY TO WORK

This is to certify that the above work is completed and that all tools and gear have
been removed ready for making alive, and that all men engaged on the work have
been warned that it is no longer safe to touch the equipment.

Signed. ............................. Date.. ............................ Time ........................

This permit is hereby cancelled. T h e person cancelling need not necessarily be the
person who issued the permit, provided always that he is au~horiredtodosoand that
he is fully aware of the circumstances and that before making the equipment 'alive'
again ensures that all temporary earthing and danger notices have been removed.

Signature of person cancelling permit .........................................................

Date.. ............................ Time ...................................................

81
 SPECIMEN FORM 4
GENERAL WORK PERMIT

Starting Time: ............................................. Date .................................

Expiring Time: ............................................. Date .................................
Maintenance Personnel: ...........................................................................
Valid only for this locar,ion: .....................................................................
............................................................................................................
(Specify exact extent of work area)
Description : ..........................................................................................
............................................................................................................

I Check all items for completion Yes No Explain

I 1. 1s equipment live?

2. Does temperature present

a Safety Hazard?

3. Is the equipment or area frec of

LPG or inerts?
4. Is the electrical circuit locked
a n d tagged out o f service?

Permit Approved by: ............................................................ (Signature)

Distribution:
Original: Maintenance Foreman
Copy: Operating Supervisor
Copy: Job Site
T H I S PERMIT DOES NOT ALLOW ENTRY OR HOT WORK

RENEWAL
Permit Renewed Time:. ................................... Date .............................. ..
Authorizing Signatory: ...........................................................................
Remarks: .............................................................................................
............................................................................................................
............................................................................................................
C O M P L E T I O N : This is to certify that the above work is complete, all tools and
gear have been removed, the work area has been cleared and applicable locks and
tags have been removed.

Signed : ................................................................................................
Time: .................................... Date: ......................................................

THIS PERMIT M A Y BE REVOKED A T A N Y T I M E

82
 SPECIMEN FORM 5
PERMIT FOR LINE DISCONNECTING
AND VESSEL OPENING
Serial No.:
(Please PRINT Clearly)

To bc itsed for opening ol' tanks or pressurc vessels; insertion or removal of

spades. valves. sections of line. orifice plates, strainers and similar operations.
This i i d u d e s all operations liahlc to relcase Dammable or harmfill materials t o
the attnosphere.
This permit is valid on the day of issue until 08.00 the following day.
This permit does N O T allow entry to tanks, vessels or other equipment.

Request

Permit required (date) (time)

Location of work, specify precisely

Description of work

Question Yes No

I . Is there any Hot Work Permit valid for work within 50 f t of

proposed work location?

2. Has rhc cyuipmcnr been gas freed?

3. Is the equipment isolated?

4. Is there a ventfdrain open?

Specify protective equipment to be worn

Signatures: Area Operator Date

Head Operator Date

Maintenance/Contractor Personnel Date

83
 Appendix 9

SOME CODES OF PRACTICE,

SPECIFICATIONS, STANDARDS, ETC. ,
RELEVANT TO THE LPG INDUSTRY

AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE (ANSI)

I
I
B 16.5 Pipe flangesand flanged fittings, steel nickel alloy and other special alloys: 1981
I B 16.9 Factory made wrought steel butt welding fittings: 1978
I B 16.11 Forged steel fittingssocket-welded and threaded: 1980
B 31.2 Piping and piping systems: 1968
B 31.3 Chemicalplant and petroleum refinery piping: 1984
B 36.10M Pipe steel: 1985

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE (API)

Spec 5L Specificationfor line pipe, 35th edition, May 1985
API 510 Pressure vessel inspection code-maintenance inspection, rating, repair and alteration, Fourth
edition, 1985
RP 520 Design and installation of pressure-relievingsystems in refineries:
Part I-Design, Fourth edition, 1976
Part II-Installation, Second edition, 1963(Reaffirmed 1973)
RP 521 Guide for pressure-relievingand depressuring systems, Second edition, 1982
STD 620 Recommended rules for design and construction of large, welded, low-pressure storage tanks, 7th
edition, 1982, Revision 1,1985
STD 2000 Venting atmospheric and low-pressure storage tanks (non-refrigerated and refrigerated), 3rd
edition, 1982

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS (ASME)

Boiler and pressure vessel code: 1983
Section VIII-Unfired vessels
Section IX-Welding and brazing qualifications

84
 CODES OF PRACTICE

BRITISH STANDARDS INSTITUTION (BSI)

BS 449 The use of structural steel in building
BS 476 Fire tests on building materials and structures
BS 1506 Carbon low alloy and stainlesssteel bars and billets for bolting material to be used in pressure
retaining applications: 1986
BS 1560 Steel pipe flanges and flanged fittings for the petroleum industry: Metricdimensions.Part2: 1970
BS 1600 Dimensions of steel pipe for the petroleum industry. Parts 1and 2: 1970
BS 1640 Steel butt-welding pipe fittings for the petroleum industry. Parts 1and 2: 1962,Part 3: 1968
BS 1965 Butt-weldingpipe fittingsfor pressure purposes. Part 1: 1963(1983), Carbon steel
BS 2633 Class 1arc welding of femticsteel pipework for carrying fluids: 1973(1981)
BS 2789 Spheroidalgraphite or nodular graphite cast iron: 1985
BS 3351 Piping systems for petroleum refineries and petro-chemical plants: 1971
BS 3381 Metallicspiralwound gaskets for use with flangesto BS 1560. Parts 1and 2: 1973
BS 3601 Steel pipes and tubes for pressure purposes: Carbon steel with specified room temperature
properties: 1974
BS 3602 Steel pipes and tubes for pressure purposes: carbon and carbon manganese steel with specified
elevated temperature properties. Parts1and 2: 1978
BS 3792 Recommendations for the installation of automatic liquid level and temperature measuring
instrumentson storage tanks: 1964
BS 3799 Steel pipe fittings, screwed and socket-weldingfor the petroleum industry: 1974
BS 4250 Commercial butane and propane: 1975
BS 4741 Vertical cylindrical welded steel storage tanks for low-temperature service. Single wall tanks for
temperaturesdown to -50 "C: 1971
BS 4871 Approval testing of welders working to approved welding procedures: 1982
BS 4882 Bolting for flanges and pressure containing purposes: 1973
I
BS 5146 Inspection and test of steel valves for the petroleum, petrochemical and allied industries. Part 1: 1974
I BS 5500 Unfiredfusion welded pressure vessels: 1985
BS 5628 Code of practice for use of masonry
BS 5930 Code of practice for site investigations: 1981
(formerly CP 2001)
BS 6031 Code of practice for earthworks: 1981
BS 6399 Design loading for buildings
BS 6683 Installation and use of valves: 1985
CP 3 Code of basic data for thedesign of buildings
CP 110 Structuraluse of concrete
CP 114 Structuraluse of reinforced concrete in buildings: 1969
CP 2004 Foundations: 1972

ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS USERS ASSOCIATION (EEMUA)

Recommendations for the design and construction of refrigerated liquefied gas storage tanks: 1986
FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA PRECONTRALNTE (FIP)
Preliminary recommendations for the design and construction of prestressed concrete containment structures
for the storage of refrigerated liquefied gases (Ref. 316: 1982)
GAS PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION (GPA)
Liquefied petroleum gas specifications and test methods
HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE (HSE)
Guidance notes
CSl Industrial use of flammablegasdetectors
GS4 Safetyin pressure testing
GS5 Entry into confined spaces
Guidance booklets
HS(G)5 Hotwork: Welding and cuttingon plant containingflammable materials
HS(G)34 The storageof LPG at fixed- installations
Obtainable from HM Stationery Office.PO Box 569, London SE1 9". UK.

85
 APPENDIX 9

INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM (IP)

Model codes of safe practice in the petroleum industry
Part 1 Electrical
Part 6 Petroleum pipelines
Part 12 Inspection of pressure vessels
Part 13 Inspection ofpressure piping systems
Part 14 Inspectionand testing of protective instrumentationsystems
Part 15 Area Classification(Pending)

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING/OIL COMPANIES

INTERNATIONAL MARINE FORUM
International safety guide for oil tankers and terminals (ISGOTT)

LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS INDUSTRY TECHNICAL ASSOCIATION UK

Code No. 2 Safe handling and transport of LPG in bulk by road
Code No. 3 Prevention and control of fire involvingLPG

ADDRESSES OF RELEVANT ORGANISATIONS

1. American Gas Association, 1515 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22209, USA
2. American National Standards Institution Inc., 1430 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA
3. American Petroleum Institute, 1220L Street, NW Washington, DC 20005, USA
4. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 345 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017, USA
5. British Gas Plc, Rivermill House, 152 Grosvenor Road, London SWlV 3JL, UK
6. British Standards Institution, Linford Wood, Milton Keynes, MK14 6LE, UK
7. Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association, 14 Belgrave Square, London SWlX 8PS, UK
8. Gas Processors Association, 6526 East 60th Street, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74145, USA
9. Federation Internationale de la Precontrainte, do The Institution of Structural Engineers, 11 Upper
Belgrave Street, London SWlX 8BH, UK
10. Health and Safety Executive, Baynards House, 1Chepstow Place, Westbourne Grove, London W2 4TF.
UK
11. Institute of Petroleum, 61 New Cavendish Street, London WlM 8AR, UK
12. International Chamber of Shipping, 30 St Mary Axe, London EC3A 8ET, UK
13. Oil Companies International Marine Forum, Portland House, Stag Place, London SWlE 5BH, UK
14. Institution of Gas Engineers, 17 Grosvenor Crescent, London SWlX 7ES,UK
15. LiquefiedPetroleum Gas IndustryTechnical Association UK, 17 GrosvenorCrescent, London SWlX 7ES,
UK

86
 Appendix 10

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGA American Gas Association

ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute .
APYRP American Petroleum Institute Refinery Practice
ASME American Societyof MechanicalEngineers
BG British Gas Plc (formerly British Gas Corporation)
BS British Standard
CP Code of Practice
EEMUA EngineeringEquipment and Materials Users Association
FIP FCdCrationInternationalede la PrCcontrainte
ISGOT" InternationalSafety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals
GPA Gas ProcessorsAssociation (USA)
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LPGITA Liquefied Petroleum Gas Industry Technical Association (UK)
RLG Refrigerated Liquefied Gas
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

87

References are to section and clause numbers. Def. indicates that a definition of the term is in Appendix 7.
For example ‘Atmospheric pressure 1.2.3,1.3.1,1.3.3,etc.’ implies references to clauses 1.2.3,1.3.1.1.3.3, etc.
Abbreviations, App. 10
Above-ground storage, Def.,
pressure2.1.1,2.2.2.9,2.2.3.1,
2.2.4,2.2.7,2.3.6.4,2.3.14.4,2.5.8,
2.9.6.5,2.9..9,2.11.3
refrigerated 3.1.1,3.2.1.1
Accesdaccessibility 2.2.2.1, 2.7.3.9,
2.9.4,2.9.6.6
Air2.10.5,3.5.4.6,3.10.4,3.11.6
Alarms 2.3.3,2.9.5.3.5.1.8
Anchorage 2.5.7,3.9.6.6
Area classification, Foreword
Articulated anndpipe connections
2.4.12,2.4.15,2.6.5.4,2.7.3.1,
2.7.3.3
Atmospheric pressure 1.2.3, 1.3.1,
1.3.3,3.5.4.9,3.5.4.10
Below-groundlmoundedstorage,
Def., 2.1.1, 2.2.2,2.2.8,2.3.2.3.
2.3.4.4, 2.3.6.4.2.3.14, 2.5.4,
2.9.3.4
Blank flange, Def., App. 8
Bleed valve, Def., App. 8
Blind, Def., App. 8
Block valve, Def., App. 8
Bondindearthing, Def., 2.7.4.2.8,
2.10.7.6
Breathing apparatus, Def., 3.11.5.9,
3.11.6.2, 3.11.7.2, 3.11.7.3
Bund, bunding, etc., Def.,
pressure storage 2.2.2.3,2.2.3.1 ,
2.2.6
refrigerated storage 3.2.1.2,3.2.5.1,
3.2.5.3, 3.4.1,3.4.2, 3.4.3, 3.8.2.2,
3.8.3.4, 3.9.6.5
Bulk road vehicles 2.7.1.1.2.7.3.314,
2.10.7.1,2.10.7.6
Burns (frost) 1.3.6
Capacity,Def.,2.1.1,2.3.6.4,2.3.6.5,
2.3.9.1,2.3.11,2.3.15,3.4.3.6
Carbon dioxide 3.9.3,3.10.4.3,
3.11.4.1
Cast iron 2.4.2.2,2.4.6.4. 3.6.2.2
INDEX
Caverns 2.1.2.1, 3.1.2.1
Checkinglinspectingltesting 2.3.1.1,
2.3.17,2.4.13,2.4.14.3,2.4.14.4,
2.9.7,2.11,3.9
Code
object of 2.1.3,3.1.3
scope 2.1, 3.1
design2.3.1,2.4.1,2.5.1,3.5.1.1,
3.6.1,3.7.1.1
Combustible material 2.9.9
Commercial butane 1.1.1, 1.1.4,1.2.1, Entry 3.4.4,3.11.6,3.11.7
1.2.3, 1.3.3
Commercial propane 1.1.1, 1.1.4,
1.2.2, 1.2.3. 1.3.3
Communications 2.9.5, 3.11.7.4
Competent person, Def., 2.3.17,
2.10.7.7,3.9.7,3.11.7.2,3.12.4;4
Compressors 2.6.2. 2.6.4. 3.5.4
Condensation 3.5.1.6
Container, Def., 1.3.9, 2.3.2.1,
2.10.7.1
Containment
-. single 3.2.1.2
double 3.2.1.3
full 3.2.1.4
Cooling water 2.2.2,2.9.3.2,2.9.6,
3.8.3, App. 5 Flame
Corrosion 2.3.6.6, 2.3.14, 2.3.15,
2.11.3,3.5.6,3.9.2, 3.9.3,3.9.4
Cryogenic, Def., 2.2.6
Delugdspray systems 2.9.6,2.9.7,
3.8.3.4,3.8.3.5,3.8.3.6
Design
pressure storage 2.3.1,2.3.2
refrigerated storage 3.5.1
piping 2.4.1.3.6.1
foundations 2.5.1,3.7.1
Dewatering pots 2.3.10.3.2.10.6.2
Drainagddraining
pressure storage 2.3.3,2.3.10, 2.9.8,
2.10.6.1,2.10.6.2,2.10.7.7
refrigerated storage 3.5.2.1,
3.10.6.4
Drive-away protection 2.7.3.3,
2.10.7.6
88
Double containment 3.2.1.3
Earthinglbonding, Def.. 2.7.4.2.8,
2.10.7.6
Electrical 2.8
Emergency
proceduredplans 2.10.3,2.10.4,
3.12.2
shutoff valves 2.3.8, 2.4.15. 2.6.5.4,
2.7.3.1,3.2.4
Excess flow valves 2.3.8,2.3.9,2.6.5.4
Fences 2.2.8.1,2.2.8.3
Fire
extinguishers 2.9.2,3.8.2.1
plan 2.9.1, 2.9.3.1,3.8.1.3.8.2.2.
3.8.3.3
proofed, Def., 2.5.8
protection 2.9, 3.8
resistant, Def., 3.5.4.9,3.5.5.1
safe, Def., 2.3.7.1.2.4.6.1.2.4.6.2
water 3.4.3.6
hydrants 2.9.6.3.2.9.6.6.2.9.6.8, ‘
2 .9.7
Flame engulfment 2.2.2.2, 2.2.2.7
impingement 2.9.3.3,2.9.3.4,
2.10.4,3.5.4.12
Flammable, Def., 1.3.2, 1.3.4, 1.3.9,
2.2.2.5.2.2.6,2.10.5, 3.10.4.1.
3.11.3.3, 3.11.5.1,3.11.5.2,3.11.6.1
Flotation 2.5.6.5, 3.4.3.6,3.5.1.10
Foam 3.8.2.2
Foundations 2.5, 3.7
Frost 1.3.6,2.9.6.9,2.9.7. 3.4.3.2,
3.1.1.2,3.9.5
Frost burn 1.3.6
Full containment 3.2.1.4
Fully in-ground, Def., 3.1.1,3.2.1.1
Fully refrigerated, Def., 1.1.2
Gas-free, Def., 3.12.3,App. 6,App. 8
Gaugedgauging 2.3.3, 2.3.5.3.5.1.8
Glossary App. 7
Hazardous area, Def., App. 8

Hazards of LPG 1.3
Hoses2.4.14,2.4.15,2.6.5.4,2.7.3.1,
2.7.3.3
Hot work, Def., App. 8 ,
Hydrants 2.9.6.3,2.9.6.6, 2.9.6.8,
2.9.7
Hydrate 1.5,2.3.13,2.4.11.2,3.10.2
Icdicing2.3.13.2.4.11. 3.2.1.2,
3.5.4.13,3.10.2
Impounding basin. Def., 2.2.2.3,
3.4.1.2,3.4.2.1,3.4.3, 3.8.3.4
Inertgas2.10.5.3,3.10.4,3.10.5.1,
3.11.2,3.11.3,3.11.4,3.11.5.1,
I 3.11.6
Inspectiodcheckingltesting2.3.1.1,
2.3.17.2.4.13.2.4.14.3. 2.4.14.4,
2.9.7,2.11,3.9
Insulation2.3.12.2.4.11, 3.2.1.2,
3.3.3,3.5.4.9,3.5.5.1,3.6.3.2
I
Kerbs 2.2.3.2, 2.7.1.1
Layouflocatiodspacing
pressurestorage 2.2.1,2.2.2. 2.2.7,
2.9.3.2, App. 1
refrigerated storage 3.3.3,3.8.3.1,
APP- 1
loadinglunloading2.2.2.1. App. 1
Leakagelleakdspillage
pressure storage 2.2.1,2.2.2, 2.2.3,
2.2.7.2.7.2, 2.9.9, 2.10.4
refrigerated storage 3.2.4,3.2.5.2,
3.3.1,3.3.2.3.3.3,3.4.1. 3.4.2.2.
3.4.3.4,3.4.3.5,3.5.1.6,App. 3
Lighting 2.10.9
Lightning 2.8.2
Loadinglunloading 2.2.2.2, 2.7,
2.9.2
Meters 2.6.3,2.6.4
Methanol 1.5
Monitors 2.9.6.3
Mounded storage, Def., 2.1.1,2.2.2,
2.2.8,2.3.2.3,2.3.4.4, 2.3.6.4,
2.3.14,2.5.4.2.9.3.4
Naked lightslflames, Def., 2.9.10
Nodular iron 2.4.2.2,2.4.6.4
Non-credible, Def., 3.2.1.2, 3.2.1.3
INDEX
Odorization 1.4
Oxygen 2.2.6,2.10.5.2,2.10.5.3,
3.10.4.4. 3.11.4.2,3.11.6.6,3.11.7.3
Partially refrigerated, Def., 2.3.2.2,
3.1.2.2
Partly in-ground, Def., 3.1.1, 3.2.1.1,
3.7.1.2
Permit to work systems, Def..
2.10.5.1,2.11.1,3.9.1,3.10.3,
3.11.1,App. 8
Philosophy 3.1.3.1.3.2.3.9.2
Piping
bolting 2.4.8
designlconstruction 2.4.1. 2.4.3,
2.4.4,3.6.1
fiangeslfittings2.4.1.2.4.7
inspections 3.9.6.7
installatiodflexibility 2.4.9, 3.6.3
insulation 2.4.11
materials 2.4.2.3.6.2
valves 2.4.6
Pressure storage, Def.,
design 2.3
fire protection 2.9, App. 5
inspections 2.11
locatiodspacingllayout 2.2, App. 1
operation 2.10
Properties of LPG 1.2
Purging2.10.5,3.11.3, 3.11.5, App. 6
Pumps 2.6.1.2.6.4
Radiation flux 2.2.2.1, 2.2.2.3,
3-2.5.3.3.3.1,App. 1, App. 2
Rail tank wagons 2.7.1.2. 2.7.3.
2.7.4.2, 2.10.7.1,2.10.7.6
Refrigerated storage, Def.,
design 3.5
fire protection 3.8,App. 5
initial filling 3.10
inspections 3.9
locatiodspacing 3.3, App. 1
operation 3.12
taking out of service 3.11
Relief valves
pressure storage 2.2.2.8,2.3.6.
2.3.7.1. 2.3.8
refrigerated storage 3.5.4,3.9.6.1
Road vehicles (bulk) 2.7.1.1,
2.7.3.2.10.7.1, 2.10.7.6
89
Semi-refrigerated, Def.,
Shutoff valves 2.3.7,2.4.6, 2.6.1.5,
2.6.5.3
Sidings (rail) 2.7.1.2,2.7.3.5,2.7.4.2
Single containment 3.2.1.2
Slip blind, Def., App. 8
Source of ignition, Def., App. 8
Spaciqgllocatiodlayout .
pressure storage 2.2.1, 2.2.2,
2.5.6.3,2.9.3.2, App. 1
refrigerated storage 3.3.3.4, 3.8.3.1,
APP. 1
loadinglunloading 2.2.2.1. 2.7.1,
APP. 1
Spectacle blind, Def., App. 8
Spillagelleakage
pressure storage 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3,
2.2.7,2.7.2,2.9.9,2.10.4
refrigerated storage 3.2.4,3 -2.5.2.
3.3.1.3.3.2, 3.3.3,3.4.1,3.4.2.2,
3.4.3.4, 3.4.3.5,3.5.1.6, App. 3
Sprayldeluge systems 2.9.6,2.9.7.
3.8.3.4.3.8.3.6. 3.8.3.8
Storage
pressure, Chapter 2
refrigerated, Chapter 3
Surges 2.3.9.2. 2.6.5.2
Testingkheckinghnspections 2.3.1.1,
2.3.17. 2.4.13,2.4.14.4,2.9.7,
2.11,3.9
Thermal pressure relief 2.4.10, 3.6.4
Training 2.10.2. 3.12.1
Transfer operations 2.10.7.3.12.4
Unloading/loading 2.2.2.2. 2.7, 2.9.2
Vacuum 2.3.2.4,3.5.4, 3.9.3, 3.9.6
Vacuum relief valves 3.9.6
Vapour cloud 2.10.4,3.2.5.1. 3.3.3
Vapour pressure 1.2.3.2.3.2
Vapour travel 2.2.2.2.3.3.3, App. 4
Ventinglvent pipes 2.3.6,3.5.4,
3.10.4,3.10.5,3.10.6,3.11.5
Warning signs 2.9.10
Weldinglwelded 2.4.2.4, 2.4.4.2,
2.4.5,2.5.6.2,3.2.4,3.5.3.2
Work permits (systems), Def.,
2.10.5.1,2.11.1. 3.9.1,3.10.3,
3.11.1, App. 8