POLICE POWER

MMDA v VIRON TRANSPORTATION

FACTS:

1. Recognizing the worsening traffic situation in Metro Manila and nearby

provinces, on February 10, 2003, then-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
issued the questioned EO 179, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater
Manila Mass Transport System." Among the salient points of the EO are the
following:
a. In one of the Whereas clauses: The MMDA recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the
mass transport system by providing common mass transport terminal
facilities, integrating buses and railway systems.
b. Secs. 2 and 3: The project was for four interim common terminals,
focusing initially on North and South Metro Manila. The MMDA would be
designated as the Implementing Agency for the project.
c. For this project, the MMDA would have several functions and
responsibilities:
1. preparation of the project Master Plan
2. coordinating with agencies and landowners for the use of land/properties
for the project
3. supervising and managing construction of structures and facilities.
4. executing necessary contracts for the implementation of the project in
accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations
5. managing funds as may be necessary for the projects in accordance with
prevailing accounting and audit practice in government
6. enlisting the assistance of any national government agency, office, or
department, including LGUs and GOCCs, as may be necessary
7. assigning and hiring personnel for the above purposes
8. performing such other related functions as necessary to accomplish the
objectives and purposes of EO 179.
2. The MMDA's governing board and policymaking body, the Metro Manila
Council (MMC), issued Resolution No. 03-07 s.2003 expressing full support
of the Project. In particular, the MMC stressed the need to remove the bus
terminals along major Metro Manila thoroughfares.
3. The MMDA then began implementing the EO.
Around February 24 of the same year, two bus companies filed petitions
before the RTC of Manila:
a. Viron Transport filed a petition for declaratory relief, alleging that the
MMDA was poised to issue a Memo Circular or Order closing, or tantamount
to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of Metro
Manila. Its terminals in Sampaloc, Manila and in Quezon City would be
among them. They allege that such is outside the authority of the MMDA to
regulate traffic under its charter, RA 7924. In addition, they seek a ruling on
the legality of the said acts alongside the Public Service Act and related laws
which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as
requisite for operating as common carriers.
b. Mencorp Transport filed a similar petition, making similar allegations as
Viron. They also seek that the EO be declared unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land
transportation units over their respective terminals.
4. The TC in its original decision ruled in favor of MMDA, holding that the EO
was a valid exercise of police power as it satisfied the subject matter and
means tests. However, they reversed on MR, holding that the EO was an
unreasonable exercise of police power, that MMDA's authority under Sec. 5e
of its charter does not include the power to close the terminals, and that the
EO is inconsistent with the Public Service Act. MMDA's MR being denied, they
file the present petition with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

1. W/N the case presents a justiciable controversy, allowing for a petition for
declaratory relief.
A. PETITIONER MMDA's ARGUMENTS a. There is no justiciable controversy
as nothing in the body of the EO mentions or orders the closure and
elimination of bus terminals. No evidence was cited apprising the transport
groups of an immediate plan to close down their terminals. b. Even then, the
EO is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate
with the MMDA, and to make available for use government property along
EDSA and SLEX. As such, the EO only created a relationship between the
Chief Executive and the implementing officials, and not third persons. B.
RESPONDENTS' COUNTER-ARGUMENTS a. There is a justiciable controversy.
They resorted to the Court because the EO, in one of its whereas clauses
(see Facts), set out the MMDA's plan to eliminate the bus terminals. Viron
even alleged that there is already a diagram laying down the design of one
the terminals, and that such is already being constructed. (the MMDA even
affirmed that they have begun implementing the EO)

2. W/N the MMDA has the authority to order the elimination of the bus
terminals given the law and the Constitution.
A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS a. The MMDA has no authority to order the
elimination of their bus terminals under the EO. Such violates the
Constitution and the Public Service Act; they do not even have the necessary
authority in their charter.
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS a. The real issue is the President's authority
to undertake/cause the implementation of the project. EO 125 (Reorganizing
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications), her residual power, and
the Revised Administrative Code constitute sufficient authority. b. Moreover,
the EO is a valid exercise of police power. 3. Assuming arguendo that police
power was validly delegated to the MMDA, W/N the EO was a valid police
power measure. A.
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS: a. No issue as to public purpose. Traffic
congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. b.
The exercise of the power was oppressive and transgressed their rights over
their respective terminals (of a confiscatory character).
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS: a. There was a valid exercise of police
power. 4. Regardless of the implementing agency, W/N the EO is in line with
the provisions of the Public Service Act.
A. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT: a. The closure of the terminals is not in line
with the PSA, which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their
own terminals as requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers.
B.
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT: a. The closure is in line with the PSA. The issue is
more on the President’s authority. III.

RULING COURT’S RULING

1. YES, as the EO is already being implemented, and there is already the
possibility of closure of terminals (an event that would make the EO
applicable to the transportation companies)-- such would be ripe for
declaratory relief.

- General: The requirements of a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63

of the Rules of Court are: (1) There must be a justiciable controversy, (2)
Such controversy must be between persons with adverse interests, (3) The
party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, and (4)
The issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. As to the
argument that closure was not contemplated: - A justiciable controversy is
present when an actual legal controversy exists between the parties, and is
before the Court, and the declaration sought would help in ending the
controversy: in other words, where there is a claim of a right which is
actually contested. Moreover, in a petition for declaratory relief, the action
must be brought before the breach or violation as per Rule 63, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court. - The resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the
EO. Several provisions under the EO show an intent to immediately execute
the plans laid therein: - The EO was made effective immediately. - Sec. 2
laid down the immediate establishment of common terminals for north- and
south-bound commuters. - Sec. 8 directed the DBM to allocate funds for the
terminals. - Such resolve is bolstered by the MMC's Resolution 03-07, where
it also stressed the intent to remove bus terminals, and to establish common
terminals. The MMDA even affirmed that they have begun implementing the
project. - This is no longer conjectural or anticipatory—it is an actual,
justiciable controversy. For them to wait for actual issuance of an order of
closure would be to bring the case outside the ambit of declaratory relief. As
to the argument that the EO is unrelated to third persons: - The provisions
of the EO are clear that the MMDA seeks to eliminate the existing bus
terminals, including those owned by the respondents. Said respondents
would have to operate from the common terminals. - Surely, there would be
an adverse effect on them for they stand to be deprived of their
constitutional right to property without due process of law. 2. NO, as (1) the
agency with the power to establish and administer integrated programs for
transportation is the DOTC, and (2) even if the MMDA could be delegated the
power, the MMDA's Charter is limited merely to administer and apply the
law. I. On the part of the President - Secs. 4, 5, 6, and 22 of EO 125 gave
the DOTC the power to establish and administer comprehensive and
integrated programs for

transportation and communications, with the DOTC as the primary entity for
the promotion, development, and regulation of transportation and
communications. - Such power extends to the President through her control
of the executive department, bureaus and offices under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of
the Constitution, and Sec. 1, Bk III and Sec. 38, Chapter 37, Bk IV of the
Revised Administrative Code. The latter even defines supervision and control
to include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted
by law or regulation to a subordinate. [Note that such a delegation is a
delegation of police power. This is a matter of importance in related issues.]
II. On the part of the MMDA - However, EO 125 states that the DOTC is the
primary implementing and administrative entity for transportation. With this
alone, EO 125 is ultra vires by making the MMDA the implementing agency.
- Moreover, RA 7924 does not give authority to the MMDA to eliminate bus
terminals. - The scope of the MMDA's functions was already settled in MMDA
v Bel-Air, where the Court stressed that they are limited to the delivery of
seven basic services-- one of which is transport and traffic management,
including the mass transport system, and that only certain acts were allowed
under their charter: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of
systems and administration. - That scope did not give them anything
resembling police or legislative power, unlike the legislative bodies of LGUs.
They cannot order the elimination of terminals, the act being one of police
power. 3. NO, as the means used in lessening traffic congestion were unduly
oppressive. - There are two tests for a valid police power measure. (1) Public
purpose test - the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that
of a particular class, requires its exercise (2) Means test - the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals - There was no issue as to public
purpose, only as to the means employed. The effect of the EO would
necessarily be the closure of the existing bus terminals—is this oppressive?.
-
This is similar to Lucena Grand Central Terminal v JAC Liner, where a city
ordinance requiring all PUVs in Lucena to unload and load at a single
common terminal was struck down due to overbreadth, the Court then
finding that it was beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem in the city. Worse, the compulsory use of the central terminal was
held oppressive as it subjected its users to additional fees and charges.
Surely there could have been alternatives-- if terminals lack adequate space
that drivers have to load and unload on the streets, then they could impose
regulations for terminal specifications. Worse, the scope is so broad that
even entities that may be able to provide better facilities are barred. - The
same is the case here. There are so many less intrusive measures that could
have been availed of, such as banning colorum vehicles or strictly enforcing
traffic rules. Here, there is certainly an invalid exercise of police power. - A
caveat: the EO cannot said to be confiscatory of properties as their
certificates of public convenience confer no property rights-- they are mere
licenses or privileges that must yield to legislation. 4. NO, as the law
recognizes the terminal facilities as a necessary service, with the elimination
of such running contrary to it. - Paragraph (a), Sec. 13, Chapter II of the
Public Service Act (now part of the LTFRB charter) vested the PSC (now
LTFRB) with jurisdiction, supervision and control over public services (at
least for land transport), as well as their franchises, equipment, and other
properties. It may also impose conditions as to construction and service as
the public interest and convenience may require. - Among these is the power
to compel public utilities to furnish safe, adequate and proper service,
including facilities (Sec. 16 of the Public Service Act). This recognizes the
terminals as a necessary service where elimination would run counter to the
law. PETITION DENIED. EO 179 DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
ULTRA VIRES.
Tano vs Socrates
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted Ordinance
No15-92 which banned all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa city
from January 1 to January 1998. The ordinance provided that it shall be
unlawful for any person or any business enterprise or company to ship out
from Puerto Princesa to any point of destination wither via aircraft or sea
craft of any live fish and lobster except sea bass, catfish, mudfish, and
milkfish fries. To implement the said ordinance, Office Order No.23 was
enacted which provide that any person engaged or intending to engage any
business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having his possession
any of the articles which a permit is required to had to obtain first a mayor's
permit. On 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government
of Palawan enacted Resolution 33 which prohibited the catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling and shipment of the marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms, to wit: Mameng, Suno, Panter or Senorita, Lobster below
200 grams and spawning, Taklobo, Mother Pearl Oysters, and Giant Clams
for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan.

The respondents implemented the said ordinances. Petitioners Alfredo Tano

et al were charged criminally in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Without seeking redress form the concerned local government units,
prosecutor's office and courts, petitioner directly invoked our original
jurisdiction by filing this petition. The petitioners contended that: (1) the
ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood and unduly
restricted they form the practice of their trade, in violation of section 2, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution; (2) were conducted before the enactment of
Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the
Mayor's Permit could be granted or denied; (3)Ordinance NO.2 of Palawan
altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and
shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction
whether it was caught or gated through the lawful fishing method; (4) the
Ordinance No. 2 was null and void , the criminal cases based thereon against
the petitioners have to be dismissed. On 15 June 1993, the OSG was
required to comment on the petition.
The Respondents Governor Socrates and the members of the
Sangguniang defended the validity of the said Ordinance No 2 as a valid
exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare
clause of RA 7160. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the
Province of Palawan had the right and responsibility to insure that the
remaining coral reefs, where fish dwell, within its territory remain healthy for
the future generation. They also further maintained that there was no
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses because public
hearings for the Ordinance were conducted. On 25 October 1993, petitioners
filed an urgent plea for the issuance of TRO, claiming that despite the
pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the RTC was bent on proceeding with
the criminal case against petitioners. Acting on the said plea, the judge
ceased and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pretrial.
On 22 April 1997, the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources were required to comment.
There were two sets of petitioners in this case. The first composed of
Alfredo Tan et al; the second is composed of 77 all of whom are natural
persons who claim to be fishermen, except the Airline Shippers Association
of Palawan. The primary concern of the first petitioner is to prevent the
prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the
constitutionality or legality of the princes they allegedly violated shall have
been resolved. As to the second set of petitioners, the instant case is one for
Declaratory Relief.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional.
Held:
 No. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local government
units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections
149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. General Welfare . — Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied there from, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, Enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology ,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal
objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of
fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to
protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
It imposes upon the Sangguniang banyan, the Sangguniang panlungsod, and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]protect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive
fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance."

The petition is dismissed. Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:

Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-
reliance.xxx xxx xxxSec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence
fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the
communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and
research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and
other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fish workers shall receive a
just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of

Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila,
et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is
a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels
and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was
licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28
June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the
lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon.
Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as
it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said
Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF

BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the
following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or

otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499
which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except
those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD:
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in
declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police
power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This
delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
general welfare clause.

The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of
such delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power

as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be

struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the
due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection
of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of
argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the
City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
community’s social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of
private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated,
the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se
offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used
as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per
se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and

other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees.
In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired
end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes
on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty
and property.

Modality employed is unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can

not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is
intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory”
taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s regulation
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that

government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited”

establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to “wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate
area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area.” The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a
closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is
practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the
previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that
the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory
as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations
found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private
property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning

ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power,
which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not reasonably be
made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for
noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation.
Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them.
The police powers of local government units which have always received
broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular
taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance
does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to
disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community.”

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated

establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business.

HON. FERNANDO vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE G.R NO.

161107, MARCH 12, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent’s St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s
Academy Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions
organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal
offices and business addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at
West Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively. Respondent SSC is
the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56, 306. 80 square
meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the
residence of the sisters of Benedictine Order, the formation house of the
novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property
enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago.
Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities and other
improvements.
On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Marikina
City enacted Ordinance No. 192 entitled “Regulating the Construction of
Fences and Walls in The Municipality of Marikina. Sections 3.1 and 5 of the
ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this
ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in
height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be an open fence type, at
least eighty percent (80%) seethru; xxx xxxx xxx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5)
meter parking area allowance located between the front monument line and
the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and educational
and religious institutions.
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their
Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and at the same time, to move
it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park.
On April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for an extension of time to
comply with the directive. In response, the petitioners, through then City
Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the subject
Ordinance. The respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order arguing that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in
enforcing Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. That demolishing their fence and
constructing it 6 meters back would result in the loss of at least 1, 803. 34
square meters, worth about P9, 041, 700.00, along West Drive, and at least
1, 954. 02 square meters, worth roughly P9, 770, 100. 00, along East Drive.
The respondents, thus, asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on
their property would be tantamount to an appropriation of property without
due process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a portion
of their property through eminent domain. They also pointed out that the
goal of the provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not exist
as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient protection
for many years. The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of which, they could
restrain property rights for the protection of public safety, health, morals or
the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid
exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina.
RULING:
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The State, through
the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power
is embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A No.
7160), known as the General Welfare Clause. Ordinance No. 192 was passed
by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police power.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for
the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court – the rational
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. We ourselves have often applied
the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.
“Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
are rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Applying strict
scrutiny test, the focus is on the presence of compelling rather than
substantial governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest. “ Even without going to a discussion of the
strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down
for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose. More
importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, local governments may be
considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Lacking a concurrence
of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process
clause. Setback Requirement The Court joins the CA in finding that the real
intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for
use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive
use of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general
public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on
eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation. Regarding the beautification purpose
of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial
use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance
of the community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and
oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use
of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 192 is invalid. 80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners
must show the reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights, and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is “to discourage, suppress or prevent
the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts”. The ultimate goal of this
objective is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and
security. The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive
to private rights. The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not
appear obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide
better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a more
satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall. Compelling the
respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which
necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property.
The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue
interference with the respondents’ rights to property and privacy. Section
3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced
against the respondents. Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of
prohibition is hereby issued commanding the petitioners to permanently
desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No.
192, Series of 1994, as amended, on the respondents’ property in question
located in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
OBJECTS OF APPROPRIATION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Nature of action: This is a direct appeal, upon a joint record on appeal, by

both the plaintiff and the defendant from the dismissal, after hearing, by the
Court of First Instance of their respective complaint and counterclaims.
Facts of the case:
The petitioner through the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own
Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government
offices to call private parties. This application contained a statement that the
applicant will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file
with the Public Service Commission. One of the many rules prohibits the
public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private
use. The Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with
RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby
the Bureau would convey radio telephone overseas calls received by RCA's
station to and from local residents. Because of this, the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of
Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under
which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's
facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the
trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve
private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the
PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of
April 12, 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. The
petitioner proposed to the PLDT that both enter into an interconnecting
agreement, with the government paying on a call basis for all calls passing
through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone
System to the PLDT. The proposal did not prosper and prompted the
petitioner to file suit against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, in the praying in its complaint for judgment
commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau, for the use of
the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines
under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable,
and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to
restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore
those severed
Issue:
Whether or not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such contract.
Held:
Yes, the respondent may be compelled to enter into such contract.
Parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is
had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract.
Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our
contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may
be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
However, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of
eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection
of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of
the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. The power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power
may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. The decision of
the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as
it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the
Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a compensation,
that the trial court may determine to be just, including the period elapsed
from the filing of the original complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the
records are ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and
other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE NATIONAL

IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA) v. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN,
INC
In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value
separate from that of the expropriated land because real properties are
characteristically indivisible; hence, the ownership of the land extends to the
surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
FACTS:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Kabacan (RTC) a complaint for expropriation of a portion of
three parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters for its
Malitubog-Marigadao irrigation project. The committee formed by the RTC
pegged the fair market value of the land at Php 65.00 per square meter. It
also added to its computation the value of soil excavated from portions of
two lots. RTC adopted the findings of the committee despite the objections
of NIA to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation
of the value of the land. NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the
RTC’s decision. CA deleted the value of the soil in determination of
compensation but affirmed RTC’s valuation of the improvements made on
the properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the value of the excavated soil should be included in the
computation of just compensation.
HELD:
Petition DENIED. Just compensation was the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. Measured not by
taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The equivalent to be rendered to the
property should be real, substantial, full and ample. ◦ Sum equivalent to the
market value of the property (broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller
in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition; the fair value of the property; as between one who receives
and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government). There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated
soil from that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court
did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value
separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily
refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually
loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the
taking. In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al. The SC held that
rights over lands are indivisible. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of
the Civil Code which provides: “The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of
its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any
works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances.
He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.”
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the
subsoil under it. Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial court’s Decision
when it ruled it is preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not only for the
value of the land but also for the soil excavated from such land when such
excavation is a necessary phase in the building of irrigation projects. That
NIA will make use of the excavated soil is of no moment and is of no concern
to the landowner who has been paid the fair market value of his land. As
pointed out by the OSG, the law does not limit the use of the expropriated
land to the surface area only. To sanction the payment of the excavated soil
is to allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the land at the
time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public
improvements.
TAKING
RP v Heirs of Borbon G.R. No. 165354. January 12, 2015
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) entered into a private
property owned by respondents, heirs of Saturnino Borbon, in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines for its Power Transmission Project.
NAPOCOR then filed for expropriation of an easement of right of way over a
portion of the said property. However, during the pendency of the appeal,
NAPOCOR filed a motion to discontinue the expropriation proceedings since
the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public
purpose due to the fact that the public purpose ceased to exist. Therefore,
the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State
was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners and that the
dismissal of the expropriation proceedings should be in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be
discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
HELD:
Yes. The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance
of NAPOCOR is proper, but, the dismissal of the proceedings must be upon
such terms as the court deems just and equitable. Here, NAPOCOR seeks to
discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the
transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already
been retired. The retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped
the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. Accordingly, the
Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings and requires the
return of the property to the respondents. In view of the discontinuance of
the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents,
NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the
possession by paying actual or other compensatory damages.
The compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a result
and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including
the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s
construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the
Court treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the
effect of converting the case into an action for damages.
Deprivation of Use
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. COMELEC
DOCTRINES 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PROHIBITION
AGAINST TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION; COMPELLING PUBLISHERS TO "DONATE" COMELEC SPACE,
A VIOLATION OF. — To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec
space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2722 (not
less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property
for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency
of such compulsory "donation": only once during the period from 6 March
1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week?
or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis
temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The
monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising
rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-
urban areas, may be very substantial indeed. The taking of private property
for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is
sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of
authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for
Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers
to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts
to suggest. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property
for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking;
another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity
for the taking has not b e e n s h o w n b y r e s p o n d e n t C o m e l e c. I
t h a s n o t b e e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e members of PPI are
unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print
space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested,
let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of
eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually
to be assumed. . . . Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
FACTS:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for
the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall
be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to
enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue
and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by
the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper
and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates
the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On
behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police
power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held
that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts
to “taking” of private personal property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space.
The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution
No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national
emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
BARTOLATA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Bartolata acquired ownership over a parcel of land by virtue of an
Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands. Subsequently, respondents
acquired 223 sq. m. of petitioner’s property for the development of the
Metro Manila Skyway Project. The parties agreed that in exchange for the
acquisition, petitioner would be paid just compensation for the appraised
value of the property, an aggregate of ₱l2,265,000 for the entire affected
area. Subsequently, respondents appropriated ₱l,480,000 in favor of
petitioner as partial payment. Since the date of initial payment, petitioner
continuously demanded from respondents the balance but the latter refused
to settle their outstanding obligation prompting petitioner to file a Complaint
for a sum of money.
Respondents raised that the Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands
granting title to petitioner over the subject property states that the “land
shall be subject to the easement and servitudes provided for in Section 109-
114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.” They also then argued
that pursuant to Section 112 of CA 141 the government is entitled to an
easement of right of way not exceeding 60 meters in width, without need of
payment for just compensation, save for the value of improvements existing
and any payment for the government’s use of the easement, unless made to
compensate the landowner for the value of the improvements affected, is
unwarranted. Thus, they prayed, that the ₱l,480,000 partial payment made
to petitioner for the acquisition of the latter’s property, which was well within
the 60-meter threshold width, be returned to the government. Petitioner
contended that PD 2004 which amended RA 730 allegedly removed the
statutory lien attached to the subject property. Respondents, however,
countered that petitioner could not have benefited from PD 2004 since the
removal of restrictions and encumbrances contained in PD 2004 only applies
to public land sold by the government for residential purposes without public
auction, whereas petitioner was awarded the subject property through a
public auction sale.
ISSUE # 1: Whether or not the property acquired by virtue of an Order of
Award is subject easement of right of way in favor of the government
despite the enactment of PD 2004.
RULING:
YES. First, no less than the Order of Award granting petitioner title
over the subject property reads that the parcel of land conferred to him is
subject to the restrictions contained under Sec. 109-114 of CA 141, which
necessarily includes the easement provided in Sec. 112. Notably, petitioner
was awarded the subject property in 1987, while PD 2004, which allegedly
removed all encumbrances and restrictions from awarded properties, was
signed into law much earlier in 1985. This alone raises suspicion on the
applicability of PD 2004 to the subject property. Second, the Court finds no
reversible error in the RTC and CA’s interpretation of the coverage of PD
2004 and RA 730. The title of RA 730 itself supports the rulings of the courts
a quo that the laws petitioner relied upon only cover the sale of public lands
for residential purposes and to qualified applicants without public auction.
xxx x x x RA 730 was crafted as an exception to Secs. 61 and 67 of CA 141.
These provisions govern the mode of disposition of the alienable public lands
enumerated under Sec. 59 of the same law. Synthesizing the provisions, CA
141 provides that public lands under Sec. 59 can only be disposed for
residential, commercial, industrial, and other similar purposes through lease
or sale, in both cases, “to the highest bidder. ”
The conduct of an auction is then required under Secs. 61 and 67. By
way of exception, however, RA 730 now allows the sale of public lands
without public auction to qualified applicants. It is through this exceptional
case of purchase of public land without public auction wherein PD 2004
would apply. Under its plain meaning, only public lands acquired by qualified
applicants without public auction and for residential purposes are free from
any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation. The provision is
inapplicable to petitioner’s property which was awarded to petitioner not in
accordance with RA 730, but through public auction. What is more, the
easement of right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141 is not subsumed in the
phrase “restrictions against encumbrance or alienation” appearing in the
amendment introduced by PD 2004. xxx
ISSUE # 2:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to just compensation.
RULING: NO. The seminal case of Andaya likewise involved property subject
to the statutory lien under Sec. 112 of CA 141. xxx The Court affirmed the
CA’s interpretation of Sec. 112 of CA 141 and ruled that the Republic was
under no obligation to pay therein respondent Andaya just compensation in
enforcing its right of way. Be that as it may, the Court did not foreclose the
possibility of the property owner being entitled to just compensation if the
enforcement of the right of way resulted in the “taking” of the portions not
subject to the legal easement. Jurisprudence teaches us that “taking,” in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, “occurs not only when the
government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his
property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction
or material impairment of the value of his property.” Xxx
To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the property owner
will be entitled to just compensation for the remaining property under Sec.
112 of CA 141: (1) that the remainder is not subject to the statutory lien of
right of way; and (2) that the enforcement of the right of way results in the
practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the remaining
property, or in the property owner being dispossessed or otherwise deprived
of the normal use of the said remainder.
ISSUE # 3: Whether or not the petitioner should return the initial payment
made by the respondents in the amount of ₱l,480,000.
RULING: NO. Respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering the
initial payment of ₱l,480,000 from petitioner Guilty of reiteration, Sec. 112
of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation for the
government’s enforcement of its right of way. The contract allegedly entered
by the parties for the government’s acquisition of the affected portion of the
property in exchange for just compensation is then void ab initio for being
contrary to law. Consequently, petitioner has no right to collect just
compensation for the government’s use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent
the ₱l,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents, such amount
paid shall be governed by the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust
enrichment. xxx Regardless, respondents’ action to compel petitioner to
return what was mistakenly delivered is now barred by the doctrine of
estoppel. The doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair
dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak
against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of
estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case. As a
general rule, the State cannot be barred by estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents. But as jurisprudence elucidates, the doctrine
is subject to exceptions, viz:

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked
except [in rare] and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where
they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to
protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be
applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly
require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations … , the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals.
PUBLIC USE
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes
FACTS:
The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) filed four Complaints with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282
hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City,
under Philippine Tourism Authority's express authority "to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land
within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5,
paragraph B(2), of Presidential Decree No. 564 or the Revised Charter of the
Philippine Tourism Authority for the development of said land into integrated
resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with
potential tourism value. The petitioners had a common allegation in that the
taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution; that
there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private
property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the
intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land
reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First
Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The PTA having
deposited with The Philippine National Bank an amount equivalent to 10% of
the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. The
lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate
possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.
Hence, the present petition questioning the orders of Respondent
Judge Juan Reyes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the properties for the promotion
of tourism is unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO. There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly
provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article
IV states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of
national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to
transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the
Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed
at cost to deserving citizens. While not directly mentioning the expropriation
of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on
social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power
together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far-reaching insofar as taking of
private property is concerned.

Section 6, Article II provides: Sec. 6. The State shall promote social

justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards
its end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment,
and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership
and profits. xxx xxx xxx Section 12, Article XIV provides: See. 12. The State
shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the
goals enunciated in this Constitution. In Visayan Refining Co. v. Samus, the
Court held that the policy objectives of the framers are couched in general
terms such as social justice local autonomy, conservation and development
of the national patrimony, public interest, and general welfare, among
others. The specific mention of the Constitution agrarian reform and the
transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership…do not
preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such
purposes like tourism and other development programs.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain is inseparable from
sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in
government even in its most primitive forms. The only purpose of the
provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the
sovereign power. It is not a grant of authority The power of eminent domain
does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. It is
inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any
recognition of it in the constitution. The provision found in most of the state
constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by
implication grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a
power which would otherwise be without limit. The constitutional restraints
are only public use and just compensation. The Philippines is not a laissez
faire State which restricts the definition of “public use” to literally mean use
by the public, contrary to what the petitioners assert. This traditional
definition has been discarded since there is scarcity of public land and a
limited government resource, which impels the exertion of sovereign power.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated that “at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use.” In the case at bar, the petitioners' contention that the promotion
of tourism is not "public use" because private concessioners would be
allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc.
inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit.
Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other
private businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in the
least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The
lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land
does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering
exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use.
The expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development
is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold
to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns.
 Manosca vs. CA 
Facts:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was ascertained
by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of
Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on
the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose
and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a
religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the
1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo was born is
valid and constitutional.
Held:
Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time
when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what
public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small
lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the
exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT
SANGKAY
FACTS:
The Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, as the owners of land situated in
Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and
of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just
compensation for an underground tunnel that traversed their property. They
alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground
tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the
operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII
traversed their land; the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the
agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and
that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation are
entitled to just compensation despite that there was no complete and actual
dispossession from the property.
RULING:
Respondents are entitled to the payment of just compensation.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub-terrain
portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land. This is because in this case, the nature of the
easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use.
Respondents, as the owner of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to
a just compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is
possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property. There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that
the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that
the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be
an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action
may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but
may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful
manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the
owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether
the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect
changes hands.