Atp-3.2.2 Edb v1 e

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NATO STANDARD
ATP-3.2.2
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALLIED

LAND FORCES
Edition B Version 1
DECEMBER 2016
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION
Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION
15 December 2016
1. The enclosed Allied Tactical Publication ATP-3.2.2, Edition B, Version 1,

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALLIED LAND FORCES, which has been approved
by nations in the Military Committee Land Standardization Board, is promulgated
herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in
STANAG 2199.
2. ATP-3.2.2, Edition B, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes

ATP-3.2.2, Edition A, Version 1, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local
procedure for the destruction of documents.
3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used

commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the
publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member or
partner nations, or NATO commands and bodies.
4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.
Edvardas MAZEIKIS
Major General, LTUAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office
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RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION
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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS
[nation] [detail of reservation]

DEU The DEU understanding of the definition of "Commander's Critical
Information Requirements (CCIR)" is based on the reference-
definition in the keystone document AJP-2, Ed1 Vers A (page 5-2,
para 4a): Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR):
Information concerning areas that are either critical to the success of
the mission or represent a critical threat are expressed as
Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIS). CCIR cover
all aspects of the commander's concern including Friendly Force
Information Requirement (FFIR), Essential Elements of Friendly
Information (EEFI) and the Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).
The two key elements of CCIR's are Priority Intelligence
Requirements (PIR) and Friendly Force Information Requirements
(FFIR). PIR's are derived from the CCIRs and their identification and
drafting initiates and drives the intelligence process.
DNK The references to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
stated in STANAG 2199 do not resonant with the Danish decision
making and planning process at the tactical level. The DNK
perspective on the tactical planning process will be incorporated in
the NATO Allied Procedural Publication (APP) 28. However, DNK
officers at grade 03 and above are trained in NATO Operational
Level Planning Process (OLPP) and hence are interoperable with
staffs using the NATO OLPP.
FRA France will use its operational decision making process, translated
into English, when it is designated as the framework nation in
operations or exercises, including for the tactical levels.
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTALS .......................................................................... 1-1

0101. Overview .............................................................................................. 1-1
SECTION I – INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1-1
0102. General ................................................................................................ 1-1
0103 Relation Between Command and Control ........................................... 1-2
0104 Components of Command and Control ............................................... 1-3
0105 Exercising Command and Control ....................................................... 1-4
SECTION II – THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL ................... 1-4
0106 General ................................................................................................ 1-4
0107 Human Factors .................................................................................... 1-5
0108 Uncertainty ........................................................................................... 1-5
0109 Time ..................................................................................................... 1-6
0110 Land Forces’ Operations ..................................................................... 1-6
0111 Logistics ............................................................................................... 1-6
SECTION III – CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................... 1-7
0112 General ................................................................................................ 1-7
0113 Mission Command ............................................................................... 1-7
0114 Exercising Mission Command ............................................................. 1-8
0115 Command and Information Systems ................................................... 1-9
CHAPTER 2 COMMAND..................................................................................... 2-1
0201 Overview .............................................................................................. 2-1
SECTION I – NATURE OF COMMAND.................................................................... 2-1
0202 General ................................................................................................ 2-1
0203 Definition .............................................................................................. 2-1
0204 Elements of Command ........................................................................ 2-1
0205 Principles of Command........................................................................ 2-9
SECTION II – ROLE OF THE COMMANDER ........................................................ 2-12
0206 General .............................................................................................. 2-12
0207 The Commander in the Operations Process ..................................... 2-12
0208 Commanders Foster a Positive Command Climate .......................... 2-16
0209 Train Subordinates in Command and Control ................................... 2-18
0210 Command During Operations ............................................................ 2-19
0211 Leadership ......................................................................................... 2-22
CHAPTER 3 COMMAND SUPPORT .................................................................. 3-1
0301 Overview .............................................................................................. 3-1
0302 General ................................................................................................ 3-1
0303 Location ............................................................................................... 3-2
0304 Design and Organization Considerations ............................................ 3-3
SECTION II – INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ....................................................... 3-4
0305 General ................................................................................................ 3-4
0306 Information ........................................................................................... 3-5
0307 Communication and Information Systems ......................................... 3-14
0308 Information Management Activities ................................................... 3-17
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SECTION III – PERSONNEL .................................................................................. 3-21

0309 General .............................................................................................. 3-21
0310 Staff .................................................................................................... 3-22
0311 Deputy Commander ........................................................................... 3-24
0312 Chief of Staff ...................................................................................... 3-25
0313 Training ………………………………………………………………… 3-25
SECTION IV – EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES ...................................................... 3-25
0314 General .............................................................................................. 3-25
0315 Support Equipment ............................................................................ 3-25
0316 Facilities ............................................................................................. 3-25
SECTION V – DOCTRINE ...................................................................................... 3-26
0317 General .............................................................................................. 3-26
0318 Procedures......................................................................................... 3-26
0319 Standard Operating Procedures ........................................................ 3-26
SECTION VI – ORGANIZATION FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL .................... 3-27
0320 General .............................................................................................. 3-27
0321 Fundamentals .................................................................................... 3-27
0322 Principles ........................................................................................... 3-28
SECTION VII – THE COMMAND POST ................................................................. 3-29
0323 General .............................................................................................. 3-29
0324 Definition ............................................................................................ 3-29
0325 Purpose .............................................................................................. 3-29
0326 Functions ........................................................................................... 3-30
0327 Organization....................................................................................... 3-30
SECTION VIII – CONTINUITY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL .......................... 3-30
0328 General .............................................................................................. 3-30
0329 Requirements..................................................................................... 3-31
0330 Location ............................................................................................. 3-31
0331 Time Management ............................................................................. 3-31
CHAPTER 4 EXERCISING COMMAND AND CONTROL .................................. 4-1
0401 Overview .............................................................................................. 4-1
0402 General ................................................................................................ 4-1
0403 Intelligence ........................................................................................... 4-2
0404 Information Operations ........................................................................ 4-2
SECTION II – ASSESS ............................................................................................. 4-3
0405 General ................................................................................................ 4-3
0406 Tasks.................................................................................................... 4-3
0407 Seize, Retain, and Exploit the Initiative ............................................... 4-6
SECTION III – PLAN ................................................................................................. 4-7
0408 General ................................................................................................ 4-7
0409 Assessment During Planning............................................................... 4-8
0410 Operational-Level Planning Process ................................................... 4-8
0411 Decision-Making Process .................................................................... 4-8
0412 Phasing a Joint Operation ................................................................. 4-11
SECTION IV – PREPARE ....................................................................................... 4-16
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0413 General .............................................................................................. 4-16

0414 Assessment During Preparation ........................................................ 4-16
0415 Activities ............................................................................................. 4-17
SECTION V - EXECUTE…………………………………………………………….... 4-20
0416 General .............................................................................................. 4-20
0417 Assessment During Execution ........................................................... 4-21
0418 Types of Decisions ............................................................................ 4-23
0419 Execution Decisions .......................................................................... 4-23
0420 Adjustment Decisions ........................................................................ 4-29
0421 Directing Action .................................................................................. 4-31
ANNEX A RELATED ALLIED PUBLICATIONS AND STANAGS ........................... A-1
ANNEX B STAFF ORGANIZATION AND STAFF OFFICERS ............................... B-1
ANNEX C NATO COMMAND AUTHORITIES ....................................................... C-1
Appendix 1 to ANNEX C Levels of Authority ......................................................... C-1-1
Appendix 2 to ANNEX C Considerations for Integrating Newly Assigned Units in a
Multinational Operation .......................................................................................... C-2-1
ANNEX D WAR GAMING ...................................................................................... D-1
ANNEX E LIAISON ................................................................................................. E-1
Appendix 1 to ANNEX E Liaison Officer Selection and Responsibilities .............. E-1-1
Appendix 2 to ANNEX E Sample Checklists for Liaison Officers.......................... E-2-1
Appendix 3 to ANNEX E Establishing and Manning Coordinating Points ............ E-3-1
ANNEX F REHEARSALS ....................................................................................... F-1
ANNEX G FORMATS FOR ORDERS AND DESIGNATION OF TIMINGS,
LOCATIONS, AND BOUNDARIES .......................................................................... G-1
PART I – DESIGNATION OF DAYS AND HOURS AND DESCRIPTION OF
GROUND LOCATIONS, AREAS, AND BOUNDARIES ........................................... G-2
PART II – WARNING ORDERS ............................................................................... G-7
PART III – OPERATION PLANS, OPERATION ORDERS, AND FRAGMENTARY
ORDERS………………………………………………………………………………….. G-7
PART IV – ANNEXES TO OPERATION ORDERS ............................................... G-10
PART V – ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS ORDERS ................................... G-11
Appendix 1 to ANNEX G Format for Warning Orders ........................................... G-1-1
Appendix 2 to ANNEX G Format for Operation Orders......................................... G-2-1
Appendix 3 to ANNEX G Format for Operation Order (Overlay Type) ................. G-3-1
Appendix 4 to ANNEX G Format for Fragmentary Orders to Existing Operation
Orders …………………………………………………………………………………...G-4-1
Appendix 5 to ANNEX G Format for Intelligence Annex to the OPORD .............. G-5-1
Appendix 6 to ANNEX G Format for Fire Support Annex to the OPORD ............. G-6-1
Appendix 7 to ANNEX G Format for Engineer Annex to the OPORD .................. G-7-1
Appendix 8 to ANNEX G Format for Administration/Logistics Annex to the OPORD
…………………………………………………………………………………………... G-8-1
Appendix 9 to ANNEX G Format for Communication and Information Systems Annex
to the OPORD........................................................................................................ G-9-1
Appendix 10 to ANNEX G Format for Army Aviation Annex to the OPORD ...... G-10-1
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Appendix 11 to ANNEX G Format for Operations Security Annex to the OPORD

…………………………………………………………………………………………. G-11-1
Appendix 12 to ANNEX G Format for Movement Annex to the OPORD ............ G-12-1
Appendix 13 to ANNEX G Format for Administrative/Logistics Order ................ G-13-1
ANNEX H COMMON SUBJECTS FOR FORMATION STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES ........................................................................................................ H-1
ANNEX I COMBINED INTEROPERABILITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE ........... I-1
Appendix 1 to ANNEX I Commander's Critical Information Requirements ............. I-1-1
Appendix 2 to ANNEX I Representative Information Flows .................................... I-2-1
Appendix 3 to ANNEX I Types of Information to Exchange .................................... I-3-1
LEXICON………………………………………………………………………………. LEX-1
Part I – Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................... LEX-1
Part II – Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. LEX-3
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1-1. The Operations Process ........................................................................ 1-4

Figure 2-1. Principles of Command .......................................................................... 2-9
Figure 2-2. Commander’s Visualization ................................................................. 2-14
Figure 2-3. Visualization in Execution .................................................................... 2-21
Figure 3-1. The Elements of Command Support ..................................................... 3-1
Figure 3-2. Information and the Command and Control System ............................. 3-2
Figure 3-3. A Cognitive Hierarchy ............................................................................ 3-5
Figure 3-4. Relevant Information ............................................................................ 3-11
Figure 3-5. Information Requirements.................................................................... 3-12
Figure 4-1. Distribution of Operations Process Activities ......................................... 4-1
Figure 4-2. The Recognition of Variance.................................................................. 4-6
Figure 4-3. The Decision-making Process ............................................................... 4-9
Figure 4-4. Assessment During Execution ............................................................. 4-21
Figure 4-5. Adjustment Decision Methods ............................................................. 4-29
Figure B-1. Staff Structure Model ............................................................................. B-2
Figure D-1. War Gaming ..........................................................................................D-1
Figure D-2. Belt Technique.......................................................................................D-4
Figure D-3. Avenue-in-Depth Technique..................................................................D-5
Figure D-4. Box Technique.......................................................................................D-6
Figure D-5. War-Game Work Sheet .........................................................................D-8
Figure F-1. Rehearsal Techniques Relative to Time, Resources, OPSEC,
Participation, and Understanding ............................................................. F-3
Figure F-2. Vertical Time-line Rehearsal Technique.............................................. F-10
Figure G-1. Designation with Days .......................................................................... G-4
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Figure G-2. Designation with Hours ........................................................................ G-4

Figure G-3. Sample Map Identification .................................................................... G-5
Figure G-3-1. Sample Overlay Order ................................................................... G-3-3
Figure I-1-1. Commander's Critical Information Requirements .............................. I-1-1
Figure I-2-1. Information Flow ................................................................................ I-2-1
Figure I-2-2. Information Flow at Brigade Level ..................................................... I-2-2
Figure I-2-3. Information Flow at Division Level ..................................................... I-2-3
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1. Elements of Command ............................................................................ 2-2

Table 4-1. Exercising Command and Control .......................................................... 4-2
Table 4-2. Assessment Measures and Indicators .................................................... 4-5
Table 4-3. Possible Actions .................................................................................... 4-32
Table C-1. Support Relationships ............................................................................C-3
Table C-1-1. Levels of Authority ........................................................................... C-1-1
Table D-1. Sample Synchronization Matrix ..............................................................D-7
Table E-1. -Senior Liaison Officer Guidelines for Rank and Grade ......................... E-5
Table G-1. Letter Designations for Days and Hours ............................................... G-3
Table G-2. Nickname and Time Designation Example ........................................... G-4
Table G-11-1. Target Priorities ........................................................................... G-11-3
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PREFACE
0001. Introduction
a. The fundamental changes occurring in the geo-political and military structure of Europe
over the last few years have meant new challenges and concerns for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). Although NATO’s original threat has all but disappeared,
NATO confronts some traditional and emerging adversaries who can affect their interests.
Advances in communication and information systems (CIS) also promise profound
implications for command and control (C2).
b. Recent NATO operations and further developing concepts have shown that elements
of different nations’ land forces regularly deploy alongside and pass through each other’s
area of operations or group within multinational formations. Likewise, the pace of
technological progress in areas affecting C2 of land forces requires a common
understanding of how to incorporate those developments into NATO forces and operations
to the greatest effect.
c. Operations under these conditions demand a high degree of interoperability. Significant
differences do remain, particularly in organization and equipment. These differences will
continue to exist among land forces of the alliance for some time. Further differences
remain in the manner and degree to which land forces of the alliance, as well as of other
partners, have incorporated modern CIS into their forces. Therefore, it is essential that
these forces possess a common understanding of the principles of C2 in land operations
and the appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures of C2 of land forces to ensure
interoperability within the joint operational environment.
d. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.2.2 has been developed to ensure this common
understanding and approach. It contains selected aspects of the same content as Allied
Joint Publication (AJP)-3.2, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND OPERATIONS.
However, these aspects have been restricted to those materials within AJP-3.2 that may
be deemed to belong more properly in a C2 publication than in a tactical one. ATP-3.2.2
will continue to be amended to reflect the fundamental development in NATO’s strategic
concept, the way in which tactical doctrine evolves, and decisions on what materials
currently in AJP-3.2 more properly belong in the C2 publication. ATP-3.2.2 is subordinate
and related to AJP-3.2, and AJP-3, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF
OPERATIONS.
0002. Purpose. ATP-3.2.2 outlines the doctrine for exercising C2 in planning, preparing,
executing, and assessing NATO land component operations within the joint operational
environment to maximise combat effectiveness. It introduces and explains mission command
as the allied concept for C2 of land forces. It emphasizes fundamentals and concepts rather
than specific equipment or systems, although it discusses the role of equipment and CIS in
supporting C2.
a. This ATP describes doctrine for C2 used by NATO commanders. It focuses on how the
NATO commander exercises C2 over his forces in conducting operations to accomplish
missions. It describes in detail the interaction between the commander and command
support to exercise C2 effectively. The publication supports AJP-3.2, ALLIED JOINT
DOCTRINE FOR LAND OPERATIONS.
b. Although a joint related publication, ATP-3.2.2 is produced as a guide for commanders
and staff within the land component and to inform joint commanders and staff. The primary
focus of ATP-3.2.2 is combined arms land forces C2 doctrine, tactics, techniques, and
procedures at formation (brigade/task force) and above.
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0003. Scope. This allied publication provides C2 doctrine applicable to NATO land forces
organizations at formation and above. It includes the previously agreed decision-making
process, targeting process, and the staff structure, duties, and responsibilities from AJP-3.2
and liaison duties.
0004. Agreement
a. Unless they have indicated otherwise by a stated reservation, nations by ratification of
ATP-3.2.2 have agreed that—
(1) In dealing with NATO agencies and member nations in all matters of land force C2
doctrine, they will use the terminology in this publication.
(2) For alliance operations, they will use the doctrine stated in this publication.
b. It is understood and accepted that the land force C2 doctrine of any nation may go
beyond and expand on ATP-3.2.2. However, this must not lead to a decrease in the ability
of land forces to work effectively together. Similarly, it is realised that national procedures
to implement common doctrine may differ markedly. Overcoming this potential threat to
interoperability requires STANAGs and multinational field standard operating procedures
in areas where interaction is necessary. In addition to providing a common doctrine and
vocabulary for C2 of land operations, ATP-3.2.2 will assist with the identification of areas
where additional standardisation is required.
0005. References. Throughout ATP-3.2.2, references list other NATO documents in which
additional or more complete information on particular subjects is found. Annex A lists the
documents related to ATP-3.2.2. References are intended to reflect latest versions of
documents, unless stated otherwise.
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CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTALS
0101. Overview
Command and control is the authority, responsibilities, and activities of military commanders
in the direction and coordination of military forces and in the implementation of orders related
to the execution of operations. The commander’s essential task is to exercise command and
control (C2) of military forces using the art and science of warfare. Command support is the
people, leadership, organizational structure, equipment, and doctrine components combined
as an integrated system at all levels of command to manage resources, and provide situational
awareness, and knowledge for commanders and staffs to plan and the conduct of operations.
Command support enables commanders to fulfil command responsibilities for mission
accomplishment and for the health and welfare of subordinate military personnel. Command
support allows the commander to influence the actions of forces and impose his will on the
enemy. Through C2, he initiates the actions of, influences, and synchronizes the elements of
combat power to create desired effects that support achievement of his objectives.
SECTION I – INTRODUCTION
0102. General
Superior C2 can provide the vital advantage to operations.
a. The fundamental nature of C2 includes its characteristics, importance, and purpose;
the relationship between command and control; the elements of C2; and the C2 process.
(1) The goal of C2 is mission accomplishment. The main criterion of success for C2 is
how they contribute to mission accomplishment.
(2) The objects of C2 are forces-combat, combat support (CS), and combat service
support (CSS).
(3) The commander exercises authority and direction over those forces made available
to him through the establishment of command or support relationships.
(4) The commander dedicates and organizes resources to exercise C2.
(5) The commander uses these resources to plan and continually assess operations
for which the force prepares and executes.
Effective C2 demonstrates the following characteristics:
(1) Ability to identify and react to changes in the situation.
(2) Ability to provide a continuous, interactive process of reciprocal influence among
the commander, staff, and available forces.
(3) Ability to reduce chaos and complexity, or lessen uncertainty.
c. However, even commanders who exercise the most effective C2 cannot eliminate
uncertainty or create precise, mechanistic, predictable order.
d. The land commander—aided by command support—uses the decision-making
process (see Chapter 4, Exercising Command and Control, for more information) derived
from the operational-level planning process (OLPP) to establish commander’s intent and
allocate resources. In so doing, he uses his tactical experiences and training to guide him
in translating a campaign plan into comprehensible tasks for the subordinate commanders.
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He directs coordinated actions by subordinate forces to tasks that collectively represent

mission accomplishment. The staff uses information management to—
(1) Collect, process, display, store, and disseminate information.
(2) Build a common operational picture. (See Chapter 3, Command Support, for more
information.)
(3) Determine requirements.
e. Finally, the commander, assisted by the staff, observes execution and adjusts the plan
in a dynamic environment where unexpected opportunities and threats present
themselves.
f. Of all the combat functions, only C2 integrates all the others, in that it—
(1) Gives support and direction to military operations.
(2) Integrates subordinate and supporting forces to allow separate activities to achieve
coordinated actions.
(3) Determines force responsiveness and resources utilization.
0103 Relation Between Command and Control

1. Command may be described (but not defined) as the process by which the commander
impresses his will and intent on his subordinates. It encompasses the authority and
responsibility for deploying forces to fulfil his mission within the respective state of command.
Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into
action. The art of command lies in conscious and skilful exercise of command authority through
decision making and leadership. Commanders use judgment and intuition acquired from
experience, training, study, and creative thinking to visualise the situation and make sound and
timely decisions. Effective decision making combines judgment with information; it requires
knowing if to decide, when to decide, and what to decide. Timeliness is the speed required to
maintain the initiative over the enemy. Decision making is both an art and science.
2. Control may be described (but not defined) as the process through which the
commander—assisted by the staff—organizes, directs, and coordinates the activities of the
forces allocated. It implies the continuing oversight, direction, and coordination of assigned
forces in accordance with the commander’s intent and plan. Control enables regulation and
oversight of activities of the forces accomplishing the mission. To achieve control, the
commander and staff use standardized procedures, to include reporting procedures, standard
operating procedures (SOPs), and control measures, in conjunction with the equipment,
communications, and information systems available. To control is to regulate forces and
functions so they can execute the commander’s intent. Control of forces and functions helps
commanders and staffs define requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control
allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, and place themselves in the best
position to observe, assess and lead. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to employ
land forces to achieve objectives and attain the end state effectively and efficiently.
3. Together, these two processes form C2, which the commander, his staff, and his
subordinates use to plan, direct, coordinate, and control operations.
a. Command resides with the commander. Control is inherent within command and,
except for those critical aspects that commanders perform themselves, normally resides
with the staff and occurs through command support.
b. The elements of command are authority, decision making, leadership, and control.
(See Chapter 2, Command, for more information.)
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(1) Authority. Authority is the delegated power to issue orders or enforce compliance.
It includes responsibility, accountability, and delegation.
(2) Decision making. Decision making is selection of a course of action as the one
most favourable to accomplish the mission. It translates the commander’s visualization
into effective action. Making major decisions is the commander’s duty, advised and
assisted by his staff. Making minor decisions on behalf of the commander, within the
commander’s intent and competence, is staff responsibility.
(3) Leadership. Leadership is the ability to influence people by providing purpose,
direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the
organization. Commanders lead through a combination of example, persuasion, and
compulsion. It also involves force of will. While providing leadership is a commander’s
primary responsibility, it is also a responsibility of every military superior, including
officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).
(4) Control. Control is that authority exercised by a commander over part of the
activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his
command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.
In the sense of continuing oversight, direction, and coordination of assigned
subordinate forces, control is largely the duty of the staff, although commanders attend
to some critical aspects themselves. It includes collecting, processing, displaying,
storing, and disseminating information for creating the common operational picture and
using information during planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing operations.
The elements of control are—
(a) Information.
(b) Structure.
0104 Components of Command and Control
C2 requires two components: the commander and command support.
a. The Commander. At all levels, the commander is the key individual in C2. He
combines the art and science of warfare. He creates a positive command climate to
inculcate and foster trust and mutual understanding, trains his subordinates in C2, and,
using the command support, exercises C2 to direct the conduct of operations. The role of
the commander is imperative for successful C2. (See Chapter 2, Command, for a
discussion of the nature of command and the role of the commander.)
b. Command Support. A commander cannot exercise C2 alone except in the simplest
and smallest of units. At every echelon of command, command support provides that
requirement.
(1) Personnel. Command support begins with people (the staff). Since combat
involves military personnel, the commander bases his exercise of C2 on human
characteristics rather than on equipment and procedures.
(2) Information Management. Information management (IM) consists of CIS and the
relevant information, including databases. The computers—hardware and software—
and communications directly involved in C2 constitute CIS.
(3) Procedures. Procedures are standard and detailed sequences of activities to
accomplish tasks. They govern actions through command support so commanders
exercise C2 more effectively and efficiently. Adhering to procedures flexibly minimises
confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitance.
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(4) Equipment and Facilities. Finally, equipment and facilities provide sustainment
and a work environment for the other elements of command support. (See Chapter 3,
Command Support, for more information.)
0105 Exercising Command and Control
1. Exercising C2 takes place dynamically throughout an operations process of planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing continuously. These activities are cyclical and continuous.
They do not necessarily occur sequentially. As Figure 1-1 shows, part of each activity occurs
at any given time with the commander at the centre.
2. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing occur continuously in operations. Units
perform all four actions simultaneously. For example, while preparing for or executing one
operation, the unit is always planning for branches and sequels or the next operation.
Subordinate units within the same command may be in different stages of the process at any
given time. (See Chapter 4, Exercising Command and Control, for more information.)
Figure 1-1. The Operations Process

SECTION II – THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
0106 General
Military operations are complex—a complex friendly system interacts with a complex enemy
system in a fiercely competitive way. Thus, military action may defy orderly, efficient, and
precise control. The following dimensions of the C2 environment help explain the complex
nature of military operations.
a. Human factors.
b. Uncertainty.
c. Time and space.
d. Land forces’ operations.
e. Logistics.
f. Information.
g. Technology.
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0107 Human Factors

The most important dimension of the C2 environment is the human one. People are the basis
of military organizations, and military operations occur as human interactions. Humans are
integral to C2 at all levels: as commanders, as personnel providing command support, and as
the forces the commander directs. Command support helps military personnel accomplish
missions effectively but does not eliminate or lessen the role of humans. Even in multinational
operations, effective C2 accounts for the characteristics and limits of human nature, and it
exploits and enhances uniquely human skills.
a. Operations are chaotic, and unexpected problems occur. The most important factor
contributing to this chaos is the opponent trying to accomplish his mission and actively
trying to defeat friendly forces. In both Article 5 and non-Article 5 crisis response operations
(NA5CROs), the constant level of tension over time can lead to unexpected problems.
b. Stress affects all military personnel from the commander on down. Effective C2 also
recognizes and mitigates the results of stress on individual military personnel and units.
Otherwise, stress causes human error, increasing uncertainty or increasing time for actions
to take effect.
0108 Uncertainty
1. The defining problem of C2 is the need to deal with uncertainty. The fundamentally
complex and interactive nature of military operations, to include asymmetric forces, generates
uncertainty as a natural side effect. Even the behaviour of friendly forces is often unpredictable
because of the stress on individuals. In their interrelationships, humans sometimes make
mistakes. The complex and dynamic nature of combat may make determining the relationship
between cause and effect difficult and may contribute to the uncertainty of military operations.
Commanders must continually assess and reassess the nature of military operations.
2. Land combat is rarely symmetrical. Adversaries normally differ in some regard, and
sometimes significantly so. Asymmetry may reflect differences of intent, doctrine, composition
of forces, culture, technology, and size. Adversaries tend to contrast conventional forces of the
alliance by developing means that benefit their own advantages and undermine their
opponents. Furthermore, in an asymmetric contest, rogue states, hostile organizations, or
individuals may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.
3. The commander faces a thinking enemy. The enemy creates uncertainty because he
strives against friendly forces and attempts to deny them information, or to disseminate
disinformation.
4. C2 strives to reduce uncertainty to a manageable level by gathering and using
information, but land forces can never eliminate it. Therefore, the commander and his
command support must function effectively in an uncertain environment.
5. Command support aims to reduce uncertainty by gathering and disseminating
information. Information only reduces uncertainty if it contributes to knowledge or
understanding. More information only leads to saturation or information overload, after which
incoming information—no matter how relevant or accurate—may not be accepted. Above all,
decreased uncertainty depends on the interpretation of the information. Information
management, which deals with these problems, is discussed in Chapter 3.
0109 Time
1. Time is important only in relation to mission accomplishment by friendly forces. In
military operations, how quickly the enemy can react effectively to friendly actions is the
primary time factor to consider. Other factors—such as the density of civilians, the will to inflict
collateral damage, national public opinion, and budget constraints—may affect time.
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2. Consideration of time reveals two prominent factors. First, friendly forces must be able
to conduct the operations process more quickly than the enemy must. Second, the value of
information about the enemy decreases with time while the situation continues to change. The
rapid tempo of operations limits the amount of information that forces can collect and process
before making a decision. Delaying decisions beyond that point allows the enemy to gain an
advantage. (See Chapter 4, Exercising Command and Control, for more information.)
3. Even after the commander reaches and disseminates his decision, all actions require
a certain amount of time to execute. Some actions require greater time for commander’s
decision and execution, and other actions’ time requirements vary according to the situation,
their complexity, or the planning process. The correct combination of these times has a major
impact on the decision process. The time for execution can only be reduced to some absolute
minimum. If this is less than the enemy reaction time, there is no problem. If it is greater, then
the commander seeks another solution—by adjusting the resources, the concept, or even the
mission.
4. Effective command support allows the friendly commander and forces to use time more
effectively than the enemy does. The enemy has the same goal and faces the same problem,
so the objective is to achieve relative advantage in timeliness over him.
0110 Land Forces’ Operations
1. Four characteristics distinguish land force operations:
a. Scope. Land operations contain many more interactions between friendly and enemy
forces at lower levels than any other form of operations.
b. Duration. Land forces remain in contact with enemy forces almost continuously.
c. Terrain. Land operations take place among a complex variety of natural and
man-made features in the densest of all media of combat.
d. Permanence. Land operations make permanent the often-temporary results of other
operations.
2. Land forces’ lowest tactical echelon—their irreducible unit of manoeuvre or
movement—is the individual soldier. These military personnel number in the thousands for a
brigade commander or the tens of thousands for a land component commander. Operating
within prescribed limitations, they exercise their individual initiative and receive directives
passed through multiple echelons of command.
3. The common operational picture based on friendly unit reporting is transmitted through
several layers of command. This may result in inaccurate reception or interpretation at lower
levels. Communications with subordinates may be tenuous. Information about subordinate
formations may be vague as the enemy tries to destroy communications and the environment
limits their reliability.
0111 Logistics
1. Allocation of resources includes logistics. Logistics planning requires more time in
advance. Land forces must have logistic support based on plans that anticipate losses and
consumption.
2. A commander organizes material resources when making operational decisions. This
organization of resources may be implicit in the command and support relationships
established. It may also differ in whole or in part from those relationships, such as in
establishing various priorities—of fire, work, or sustainment. In any case, organization of
resources does not violate unity of command and should support unity of effort. Furthermore,
this organization or allocation of resources should have minimum restrictions on their
employment to allow reallocation or use as the tactical situation requires.
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3. The terms of reference for an allied land force commander may include greater
restrictions on the allocation of resources than would be true in national forces. He still
considers this factor in operations.
SECTION III – CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
0112 General
1. The preferred C2 philosophy for allied forces is mission command. Historically,
commanders have employed variations of two basic C2 concepts: mission command and
detailed command. Militaries and commanders have frequently favoured detailed command,
but an understanding of the nature of war and patterns of military history point to the
advantages of mission command. Detailed command stems from the belief that success in
battle comes from imposing order and certainty within an area of operation. Detailed command
techniques may actually result in a high degree of coordination during planning.
2. However, during execution, these techniques leave little room for independent
adjustments by subordinates; subordinates must consult the higher commander before
deviating from the plan. Detailed command is ill-suited for taking advantage of rapidly changing
situations. It does not work well when the communications and information flow is disrupted. It
inhibits the judgment, creativity, and initiative required for successful military operations.
Because of these disadvantages, mission command is the preferred C2 concept in most cases.
3. In practice, no commander relies on solely detailed command or purely mission
command techniques. The degree to which he incorporates some detailed command
techniques depends on various factors such as—
a. The nature of the action or task.
b. The qualities of his staff and subordinate commanders.
c. The nature and capabilities of the enemy.
4. Mission command concentrates on the objective of an operation, not on how to
accomplish it. It emphasizes timely decision making, understanding the higher commander’s
intent, and the clear responsibility of subordinates to act within that intent to attain the desired
end state. With the commander’s intent to provide unity of effort, mission command relies on
decentralized execution and subordinates’ initiative.
0113 Mission Command

1. Elements. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through
decentralized execution based on mission-type orders for effective mission accomplishment.
Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising
disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an
environment of trust and mutual understanding. Successful mission command rests on the
following four elements:
a. Commander’s intent.
b. Subordinates’ initiative.
c. Mission-type orders.
d. Resource allocation.
2. Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what
the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with to all relevant factors
in particular respect to the enemy, terrain, and to the desired end state. It is his personal
expression of what should be achieved. All subordinate commanders must clearly understand
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the commander’s intent for adequate preparation of their own orders. Its focus is on the force
as a whole. The commander formulates and communicates his intent to provide unity of effort
during operations.
3. Subordinates’ Initiative. Subordinates’ initiative is the assumption of responsibility to
decide and initiate independent actions within the commander’s intent and when the
commander’s concept of operations no longer applies, the operation order no longer applies,
or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to accomplishing the mission presents itself.
Subordinates decide how to accomplish their missions within delegated freedom of action and
exercise initiative during execution, but they have an absolute responsibility to fulfil the
commander’s intent.
4. Mission-Type Orders. A mission-type order is an order issued to a subordinate unit
that indicates the mission to be accomplished without specifying how it is to be done. Mission-
type orders state the—
a. Task organization.
b. Commander’s intent and concept of operations.
c. Unit mission.
d. Subordinates’ mission.
e. Minimum-essential coordinating instructions.
5. The mission assigned to a subordinate must include all the normal elements (who,
what, when, where, and why) with particular emphasis on the purpose (why) in order to guide,
along with the commander’s intent, the subordinate’s initiative. A properly written mission
statement becomes especially important in mission command. While commanders supervise
subordinates’ execution of operations, they only intervene to direct operations to coordinate,
restore operations, or exploit success.
6. Resource Allocation. Commanders allocate appropriate resources to subordinates to
accomplish their missions. In mission command, commanders consider information a
resource—comparable to more traditional ones (such as forces and means)—and share it
through all levels of command.
0114 Exercising Mission Command

1. Mission command concentrates on the objective of an operation and not on how to
achieve that objective. This C2 concept emphasizes timeliness of decision making,
understanding the superior commander’s intent, and a clear responsibility of subordinates to
fulfil that intent. With the commander’s intent to provide unity of effort, mission command relies
on decentralized execution and initiative by subordinates. The fundamental basis of mission
command is creating trust and mutual understanding between superiors and subordinates.
Mission command applies to all operations, including crisis response operations (CROs).
2. Orders and plans in mission command are as brief and simple as possible, relying on
subordinates to coordinate and the human capacity to understand. By decentralizing decision-
making authority, mission command increases tempo and improves the ability to deal with fluid
and disorderly situations.
3. Given the characteristics of CROs, mission command retains applicability. Achieving
unity of effort becomes even more complex yet remains desirable, and the commander’s intent
becomes key. Circumstances of remote locations or rapidly arising situations can force
commanders to conduct decentralized operations, and subordinates must use their disciplined
initiative to solve problems as they arise.
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0115 Command and Information Systems

1. CIS are an assembly of equipment, methods, and procedures and, if necessary,
personnel who enable commanders and their staffs to exercise C2. CIS convey information
between military authorities for C2 purposes. Modern CIS leverage information-age
technologies to enhance C2. CIS of modern land forces facilitate and strengthen mission
command.
2. The perception of modern CIS is that they might minimise command by increasing
information and providing commanders better, more accurate, and timely information and
intelligence. This allows CIS to rely less on judgment to visualize the current and future states.
With more accurate information, CIS would be better able to dictate the terms, location, and
tempo of the battle even at lower echelons. This would appear to create tension with the
concept of mission command.
3. CIS do not change the fundamentals of command. They can increase the effectiveness
of decision making and leading. They should allow commanders to devote more time to the
human sides of command and to support their achievement and use of visualization.
4. Modern CIS enable mission command by allowing commanders to provide information
to subordinates to guide their disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. This
information provides the subordinates with a common operational picture to facilitate their own
situational awareness (SA) and conveys their superior commander’s perspective. The higher
commander can monitor the subordinates’ action and, with his staff, resynchronize operations
rapidly with CIS after a subordinate exercises individual initiative.
5. CIS can provide commanders with increased SA. Commanders then focus their
intuition on fewer unknowns, being able to visualize better the current and future end state.
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CHAPTER 2 COMMAND
0201 Overview
Command is personal. An individual, not an institution or group, commands. How a
commander exercises command varies with the characteristics of that commander. The basic
techniques of command do not change or expand with the increase in complexity of the forces
that a commander commands. However, direct leadership within the command decreases as
the level of command increases and organizational leadership becomes more relevant.
SECTION I – NATURE OF COMMAND
0202 General
The nature of command includes its definition, its elements, and the principles of command.
The definition follows, and succeeding subsections discuss the elements and principles. The
principles of command discuss how to use the elements of command to accomplish the
responsibilities.
0203 Definition
Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction,
coordination, and control of military forces. Command is a human endeavour, and it relies more
on the dynamics that exist between a commander and his subordinates rather than simple
legal authority. The two great responsibilities of command are accomplishing the mission and
caring for the members of the command.
0204 Elements of Command

The elements of command are authority, decision making, leadership, and control. The
definition refers explicitly to authority. It implicitly requires decision making (direction for
accomplishing a mission) and leadership (providing for the health, welfare, morale, and
discipline of members of command). Control is inherent in command. (See Table 2-1 on page
2-2.)
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Table 2-1. Elements of Command

 Responsibility
Authority  Accountability
 Delegation
 Quality and timeliness of decision
 Clear and succinct decisions
 Importance of training
Decision making
 Prevalence of outcome over process
 Staff assistance
 Common understanding of method
 Influence the troops
Leadership
 Facilitate efforts to accomplish the mission
 Information
Control  Communication
 Structure
a. Authority
(1) Authority is often linked with a legal power assigned to a person by an organization
(as the NATO definition does). North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreements
and regulations provide authority, responsibilities, and accountability for allied land
force commanders. In NATO operations, national commanders retain the legal, punitive
authority over their military personnel. NATO commanders’ authority over the forces
depends on the state of command given by nations for their forces and usually is
restricted to operational matters. Nations may further modify the standard authority of
NATO command authority.
(2) NATO commanders have another source of authority—personal authority.
Personal authority ultimately derives from the actions and example of the commander.
In multinational operations, it is often more powerful than legal authority.
(3) Authority includes three sub-concepts:
(a) Responsibility. Responsibility is the obligation commanders assume both for
their decisions and for the actions, accomplishments, and failures of their unit.
Above all, the commander is responsible for accomplishing missions. Then, he is
responsible for military personnel—their health, welfare, morale, and discipline. In
NATO operations, the NATO commander normally acts through and with national
commanders in fulfilling these responsibilities for military personnel. Finally, the
commander is responsible for maintaining and employing the resources of his force.
In most cases, these three responsibilities do not conflict. However, the
responsibility for mission accomplishment can conflict with responsibility for military
personnel. In an irreconcilable conflict between the two, including the welfare of the
commander himself, mission accomplishment must take precedence. The
commander keeps such conflicts to an irreducible minimum.
(b) Accountability. Accountability is the requirement to answer to superiors for
mission accomplishment, for the lives and care of the military personnel under his
command, and for the effective and efficient use of resources. In multinational
operations, a NATO commander answers to his superior NATO commander, who
is ultimately accountable through NATO military channels to NATO political
structures and the member nations. Accountability also includes an obligation to
answer for properly using delegated authority. In turn, subordinates are
accountable to the commander for fulfilling their responsibilities.
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(c) Delegation. To accomplish the mission or assist in fulfilling his responsibilities,

the commander may delegate authority to subordinates, including staff officers.
Delegation allows subordinates to decide and to act for him or in his name in
specified areas. While the commander can delegate authority, he cannot delegate
responsibility. Subordinates are accountable to their commanders for the use of
delegated authority, but commanders remain solely responsible and accountable
to their superiors for the actions over which subordinates exercise delegated
authority. There are several methods to delegate authority, including authority for a
field of interest or technical specialty, a geographical area, or specific kinds of
actions. Commanders may limit delegation of authority in time, or they may use a
standing delegation.
b. Decision Making
(1) One of the most important actions of command is making decisions. Decision
making is the selection of a course of action as the one most favourable to accomplish
the mission. Many aspects of military operations—movement rates, fuel
consumption, weapons effects—are quantifiable. Other aspects—the impact of
leadership, complexity of operations, and uncertainty about the enemy—belong to
the art of war. The commander focuses the most attention on those decisions
belonging to the art of war.
(a) There are two basic ways to make decisions. The structured approach aims to
produce the optimal solution to a problem from among those solutions identified. It
emphasizes analytic reasoning processes guided by experience, and it is used
when time is available. It serves well for decision making in complex or unfamiliar
situations. It is methodical, and it allows the breakdown of tasks into recognizable
elements. It ensures commanders consider, analyse, and evaluate all relevant
factors. It provides a methodology when a decision requires great computational
effort. It provides good context for decisions, especially for explanations. It helps
resolve conflicts among courses of action (COAs). Finally, it serves inexperienced
personnel by giving them a methodology to replace their lack of experience.
NATO’s structured approach is the operational-level planning process (OLPP) and
the decision-making process in Chapter 4.
(b) The other view, naturalistic decision making, is the act of making a decision that
emphasizes recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education,
intellect, boldness, perception, and character. It relies on the experienced
commander’s (and staff officer’s) intuitive ability to recognize the key elements and
implications of a particular problem or situation, reject the impractical, and select
an adequate COA to solve a problem. Naturalistic decision making replaces
methodical analysis of options with assessment, obtains a satisfactory solution
rather than an optimal one, and uses analysis to refine the decision. Structured
decision making conducted in a time-constrained environment relies heavily on the
concepts of naturalistic decision making. Naturalistic decision making can result in
decisions that are just as good, and made faster, than the results of a more
structured approach. However, naturalistic decision making does not work well
when the situation includes inexperienced commanders, complex or unfamiliar
situations, or competing COAs.
(c) In practice, the two approaches are rarely mutually exclusive. The selection, or
weighting of the proportion, of one over the other depends primarily on how much
time and information are available and the experience of the commander and staff.
(2) Skilled Judgement.
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(a) Sources. Commanders decide using judgment acquired from experience,

training, study, imagination, and creative and critical thinking. Judgment forms an
estimate based on available information, filling in the information gaps with an
informed intuition. Experience contributes to judgment as it provides an empirical
basis to rapidly identify practical COAs and dismiss impractical ones. Study is the
final source of judgment. It may provide knowledge essential to the commander’s
understanding and decisions as well as the situation that he and his forces face in
war.
(b) Dimensions. Judgment is required for selecting the critical time and place to
act, assigning missions, prioritizing, managing risk, allocating resources, and
leading. Commanders apply judgment in several important dimensions. How they
apply judgment in each proceeds from how they intend to accomplish the mission.
These dimensions are as follows:
i. Decentralization.
ii. Subordinates’ initiative.
iii. Risk.
iv. Resolve.
v. Resource allocation.
vi. Use of staff.
(c) Decentralization. While decentralized execution is NATO’s doctrinal solution
to uncertainty and increasing tempo in operations, it is not the only solution.
Centralized execution is appropriate for managing scarce resources, especially
those resources usable throughout a commander’s area of operations (AOO), or in
certain cases achieving decisive massing of combat power. It is also appropriate
for specific operations when greater than normal coordination—either within the
force or with other services’ or nations’ forces—is involved. If the organization has
not trained together adequately or has too many newly assigned major subordinate
organizations, the commander may centralize execution until he has trained his
organization in more decentralized operations. Centralization contributes to loss of
overview on the part of subordinates, resulting in a loss of context by which
subordinates may exercise disciplined initiative. These circumstances remain the
exception rather than the norm to the doctrine.
(d) Subordinates’ Initiative. For most operations, the benefits of exercising
initiative outweigh the cost in coordination. However, for some operations such cost
may be unacceptable. The commander judges how much initiative to allow
subordinates within mission command. Mission command charges the subordinate
commander to always take the initiative if presented with the choice of losing an
opportunity for success or responding to an unanticipated threat to the mission or
force. The subordinate may depart from his orders if he has not been able to contact
his commander, or he lacks time to obtain permission to seize a fleeting opportunity.
However, if any doubt exists about contacting the higher commander or acting, the
subordinate should act within his commander’s intent. In this case, he informs his
higher commander at the first opportunity after he has commenced or completed
taking action. His exercise of individual initiative must lead to benefits for the
operation that outweigh the costs to the coordinated operations of others. A
commander exercises initiative in taking advantage of opportunity for victory—
whether in terms of greater damage to the enemy, rapid completion of the mission,
or less cost to his own forces—as opposed to preventing defeat.
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(e) Risk
i. Mission command requires commanders who seek initiative and take
calculated, disciplined risks—making decisions where the outcome is
uncertain—focused on winning rather than preventing defeat. The willingness
to take calculated risks requires skilled judgment to reduce risk by foresight and
careful planning, and to determine whether the risk is worth taking to grasp
fleeting opportunities. The commander alone decides what risk his force will
accept during mission execution. His decision lies in whether or not to accept
that risk for perceived gains or advantages.
ii. The calculated risk should not be confused with the gamble. The calculated
risk is acceptable when the commander can evaluate the outcome as worth the
cost to his force. A gamble in decision making—normally not acceptable—
occurs when a commander risks his force to accomplish a mission without a
reasonable level of information about the outcome. The situations that justify a
gamble occur when defeat or destruction of the friendly force is only a matter of
time and the only chance for mission accomplishment or preservation of the
force lies in the gamble.
(f) Resolve. Resolve consists of focus on the mission and flexibility in the method
by which the commander accomplishes the mission. The commander applies
resolve to keep focus on the mission, maintaining flexibility in the methods or
resources dedicated to accomplishing it. Obstinacy consists of pursuing an
ineffective method or dedicating resources to an unproductive COA while not
making any progress toward accomplishing the aim. Skilled judgment distinguishes
between setbacks and hardships normally expected in combat and those that
indicate failure.
(g) Resource Allocation. Skilled judgment when allocating resources is not only
logistics but also combat and combat support (CS) resources, especially
information. There are three dimensions:
i. Balancing effectiveness and efficiency.
There is a distinct hierarchy of considerations in balancing effectiveness versus

efficiency. Foremost is mission accomplishment, or effectiveness. When there are
different ways to accomplish the mission, efficiency comes into play.
 Within considerations of efficiency, there is also a hierarchy: lives of
military personnel and other resources. First is to conserve the lives of
military personnel, even if other resources are wasted. Only then may
saving other scarce resources become important. Commanders conserve
resources and act accordingly, but mission accomplishment and preserving
lives of military personnel take precedence.
ii. Applying the principle of economy of force.
 In applying the principle of economy of force, the commander weights
the decisive operation to ensure mission accomplishment. This requires
allocating minimum-essential combat power to other operations. Shaping
operations should always have the minimum necessary; the decisive
operation is weighted with all possible combat power. If subordinates
believe they have not received sufficient resources or see an unacceptable
cost to the force, they inform their commander.
iii. Visualizing short- versus long-term benefits.
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 In visualizing short-term versus long-term benefits, commanders

determine their relative importance. The commander balances the need for
immediate mission accomplishment with requirements for subsequent
operations.
(h) Use of Staff. The commander relies on and expects initiative from his staff
officers as much as from his subordinate commanders. How much the commander
delegates to his staff, and his personal involvement in their activities, requires
skilled judgment. Within the headquarters (HQ), the commander must judge when
to intervene and participate personally in staff operations as opposed to letting his
staff operate on their own. As with his interaction with subordinates, the key is for
the commander to determine where he should best use his limited time for greatest
effect—where his personal intervention will pay the greatest dividend.
c. Leadership. As the senior leader of an organization, the commander directly applies
the leadership element of combat power. Military leadership is the aptitude to influence the
troops, providing them an intention, directives and guidance, and motivation to reach the
marked objectives. It contributes to the success and effectiveness of the operational
organization and the development of the process that facilitates the individual and
collective efforts to accomplish the mission. Military leadership extends the commander’s
influence on the combat functions across the chain of command, managing to be an
element unifier and multiplier of combat power. Subordinate commanders and small-unit
leaders reinforce that element. Having the legal authority of command and issuing orders
does not fully suffice for leadership in battle.
d. Control. Within the context of command, control implies the continuing oversight,
direction, and coordination of assigned forces in accordance with the commander’s plan
and intent. It includes collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and disseminating
information for creating the common operational picture and using information, primarily by
the staff, during the conduct of operations.
(a) Threats. Threats to mission accomplishment that act before, during, and after
operations create the requirement for control. First is the enemy. He may act against
the friendly commander himself, or the commander’s computer information systems
(CIS) and forces. He may act using lethal or nonlethal effects. The second threat is
the environment, to include the impact of operations on civilians and civilians upon
operations, as well as the impact on other actors. The final impediment to mission
accomplishment is the actions of friendly forces themselves: human error, equipment
limitations, and the “physics” of executing an action. These factors often cause
deviations from the plan during execution.
(b) Elements. The elements of control are information, communication, and
structure.
i. Information. Information is the most important element of control. It is the
meaning assigned to data. It also includes any form of description or representation
from data to understanding that relates to military operations. Information gives
structure and shape to the material world, thus allowing commanders and their
staffs to give meaning to and gain understanding of the events and conditions in
which they make decisions and conduct operations. Chapter 3 discusses
information.
 Data and information from all echelons of command are shared among all
users generate a common operational picture. By applying judgment to the
common operational picture, the commander can achieve Situational
awareness (SA) from which he begins the decision-making process. The
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commander directs to implement his decision by disseminating execution

information, typically as orders and plans. He receives feedback from
subordinates and supporting forces in the process. This information flow
creates a reciprocal influence between the commander and subordinate forces.
 One important piece of information for a commander in multinational
operations is whether his subordinates understand his intent. If the commander
is assured that his subordinates understand his intent, he may require less
detailed information from them. If the subordinates do not understand his intent,
he then provides more intensive information requirements and participates
more in the command and control (C2) process.
ii. Communication. Communication conveys information from one person or
place to another. Communication allows the organization to disseminate and share
information from one person, element, or place to another. It links information to
decisions and decisions to action. No decision in combat can be executed without
clear communication to the commander’s subordinates. Communication among the
parts of an organization supports their coordinated action.
 How the commander communicates contributes to or detracts from leading.
Through it commanders exercise immediate, personal, and positive control over
their forces. A major purpose of communication lies in sharing images,
particularly the commander’s intent.
 Communication has an importance far beyond exchanging information.
Effective communication strengthens bonds within an organization; it builds
trust, cooperation, cohesion, and mutual understanding.
iii. Structure. Structure is a defined organization—establishing relationships
among its elements—or process—establishing relationships among activities. This
structure or organization is both internal (HQ structure—command posts) and
external (command authority) among subordinate forces.
 In military terms, this relationship is between the commander and his staff
and subordinate forces. (Command support discussed in Chapter 3 is the
structure of C2.)
 Structure also determines interactions among the elements of the
organization, whether units or individual people. The effectiveness of these
interactions affect the collection, dissemination, and processing of information.
(c) Forms of Control. Control takes two basic forms—procedural and positive.
Military operations require both forms to offset each other’s inherent weaknesses.
They can complement each other and enhance military operations. The commander
establishes the balance for each situation.
i. Procedural Control. Procedural control uses a combination of previously
agreed and promulgated orders, regulations, policies, doctrine, and tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) to regulate forces to execute missions.
 Doctrine and TTP are procedural controls that create a common approach.
They govern process rather than product or outcome. Doctrine is the more
flexible as it deals with the fundamental principles. It contains a common
language that enables all other methods of procedural and positive control.
Processes structure the way land forces solve problems or implement
decisions.
 Tactics are the arrangement of forces and capabilities in the AOO.
Techniques are general and detailed methods (such as battle drills or crew
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drills). Troops and commanders use these to accomplish assigned missions

and functions, specifically, the methods of using equipment and personnel.
Procedures are standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to
perform recurring tasks. Collectively, they are known as TTP.
 Control measures, such as graphics on an operations overlay, help the
commander establish procedural control. The type and extent of control
measures are situation-dependent, although they have very specific, standing
meanings. The commander tailors control measures in consonance with the
higher commander’s intent to the mission, terrain, and amount of independent
action or flexibility he chooses to allow his subordinates.
 Normally, the commander does not include control measures that restrict
planning and routine action. In situations where a commander must limit
subordinates’ freedom of action, he specifies graphic control measures and
constraints in the operation order (OPORD). For successful mission command,
the commander should always use only the minimum-essential control
measures.
ii. Positive Control. Positive control requires commanders and leaders to actively
assess, decide, and direct forces within their AOO. Specific techniques of positive
control are orders and plans (discussed previously), liaison, and staff visits.
Commanders use positive control to accomplish or direct complex or vague tasks.
However, it tends to overload leaders with information (or requests for information);
to increase their fatigue (as they attempt to decide too much or be in too many
places); and to cause subordinates to rely on commanders to make all-important
decisions. It is most useful in rapidly evolving operations and when—
 The occurrence of forecasted events requires a decision to implement one
of several solutions.
 The situation is dynamic.
 Task identification by individual subordinates is difficult.
 Task accomplishment is complex, and implementing actions are
multifaceted. Several sets of solutions are possible, each explicitly described
and involving multiple means. For example:
 A liaison enables relevant information to pass from the sending HQ to
the receiving HQ and vice versa. By virtue of the information passing
function, liaison officers and detachments serve control. In addition to
passing information, liaison personnel can add meaning and context to
information received at their supported HQ as well as at the supporting HQ.
Liaison personnel can also expedite passage of critical or exceptional
information.
 Staff visits give the sending HQ valuable information about the view of
operations at the HQ visited. Staff visits may or may not be by invitation
from the visited HQ, and they may be announced or unannounced. Staff
visits should not upset the conduct of operations in the visited HQ, and they
should not require special billeting or resources from the visited HQ’s
military personnel.
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0205 Principles of Command
The principles of command guide how the elements of command fulfil the fundamental
responsibilities of command: mission accomplishment and people. Figure 2-1 graphically
relates these responsibilities to the principles of command listed below.
Figure 2-1. Principles of Command

a. Unity of Effort
(1) Mission command reconciles the absolute requirement for unity of effort at all levels
with decentralization of execution by emphasizing the commander’s intent.
Decentralization of execution is sustained by, and contributes to, timely and effective
decision making through subordinates’ initiative. Mission command can only work in an
environment of trust and mutual understanding. Mission command provides a common
baseline for command not only during operations but also in peacetime activities. To
employ mission command successfully during operations, the unit must understand,
foster, and frequently practice the principles of command during training. The principles
of command apply to all levels of command.
(2) Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly
recognized objective, even if the forces are not necessarily part of the same command
structure. The commander’s intent provides a focus for separate but coordinated efforts
by subordinates and delegates decision making to them. Designating priorities in
operations also aids unity of effort, and it is part of understanding commander’s intent.
(3) Understanding the commander’s intent two echelons up further enhances unity of
effort, while still providing the basis for decentralization of decision making and
execution in fluid operations. Subordinates aware of the commander’s intent are far
more likely to act with initiative, yet purposefully, in unexpected situations. In mission
command, subordinates have an absolute responsibility to fulfil the commander’s
intent.
(4) However, unity of command may not be possible in certain circumstances, but
commanders may still organize to achieve unity of effort. When unity of command is
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not possible, organizational decisions must achieve unity of effort through cooperation
and coordination among all elements of the force—even if they are not part of the same
command structure.
b. Decentralized Execution. Decentralized execution allows and requires subordinates
to use their initiative to make appropriate decisions to further their higher commander’s
intent. Decentralized execution allows subordinates with up-to-date information to make
decisions and reduces the amount of information passed up and down the chain of
command. Generally, the more fluid the circumstances, the greater the need for decisions
at lower levels. However, decentralized execution should be exercised routinely or it will
rapidly disappear as subordinates become used to waiting for instructions from higher HQ.
(1) Decentralization of execution, central to mission command, requires delegation of
specific decision-making authority. This delegation may be explicit, as in the detailed
tasks outlined in orders, or implicit, as in the implied tasks and decentralized execution
found in mission-type orders. Delegation of authority also reduces the number of
decisions made at the higher levels. It allows increased agility through reduced
response time at lower levels of command. This delegation not only applies to
subordinate commanders but also to the organization’s staff members.
(2) When delegating authority to a subordinate, a commander allocates sufficient
resources to subordinates to accomplish their mission. These resources should include
information, forces, materiel, and time. The commander still synchronizes the activities
of his subordinates.
c. Trust
(1) Trust goes up and down the chain of command. Like respect, it must be earned.
Subordinates more willingly exercise the initiative required in mission command with
trust. Likewise, commanders delegate greater authority to subordinates whom they
trust to act within their intent.
(2) Trust is based on personal qualities, including professional competence, personal
example, and integrity. It starts with technical and tactical skills in military operations
because those are the easiest to demonstrate. Often slowly gained, trust can be lost
quickly.
d. Mutual Understanding. Commanders can aid mutual understanding by using a
demeanour and personal mannerisms that reinforce, or at least do not contradict, the
spoken message. Units develop the ability to communicate nonverbally through familiarity
and a shared philosophy and experiences. Officer professional development meetings,
terrain walks, and professional discussions can lead to mutual understanding.
e. Timely and Effective Decisions and Actions
(1) Making and communicating decisions faster than the enemy can react effectively
provides the commander with the means to create a tempo with which the enemy
cannot compete. These decisions include determining the information that he needs;
assigning missions; prioritizing, allocating, and organizing forces and resources; and
selecting the critical times and places to act. Decision making during operations
includes knowing how and when to adjust previous decisions. Finally, the commander
must anticipate the impact of his decisions, to include how those decisions will affect
future operations and the enemy’s reaction to such decisions.
(a) In planning, the commander’s decision takes the form of choosing among
options. During preparing or executing, the commander makes execution or
adjustment decisions that exploit opportunities that assessment reveals or resolve
problems identified during preparation or execution. Chapter 4 defines and
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discusses these concepts. Timely decisions and actions create the advantage and
then exploit it. Some considerations are—
 Commanders take enemy plans, capabilities, and reaction times into
account when making decisions.
 Commanders who can make and implement decisions faster, even to a
small degree, gain an accruing advantage that becomes significant over time;
making decisions quickly—even with incomplete information—is crucial.
 Commanders adopt a satisfactory COA with acceptable risk more quickly
than their foe does.
(b) Because the decision process at the lower echelons of command is faster and
more direct, commanders push the decision cycle as low as possible to obtain
faster decisions in battle.
(2) Commanders adopt and combine both naturalistic and structured decision making
as required. Commanders emphasize naturalistic decision making as the norm. It helps
to increase tempo and provide the flexibility to deal with uncertainty. The naturalistic
approach is consistent with the view that there is no perfect solution to tactical
problems. However, when time is not a critical factor, commanders should adopt an
analytical approach or reinforce naturalistic decision making with more methodical
analysis.
(3) When time is available, the commander and his staff follow a more analytical
approach. In a time-constrained environment, streamlined processes permit the
commander and staff to shorten the time between receiving orders or perceiving a need
for adjustment and issuing orders to their subordinates. Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)
and warning orders (WNGOs) are essential in this environment. Experienced
commanders and their staffs use existing products or conduct steps in their heads
instead of on paper, and they use many shorthand procedures and implicit
communication.
(4) The running estimate is key to keeping the commander aware of feasible options.
In turn, the commander’s visualization focuses the staff’s estimates. To dominate the
enemy during operations, the commander is never without options.
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SECTION II – ROLE OF THE COMMANDER
0206 General
The commander creates and maintains an effective command climate through leadership
actions. They rest on values, attributes, and skills he possesses and develops. Part of the
command climate must be the commander’s style and philosophy of command. The
organization should become accustomed to how he commands, as well as his role within the
operations process.
0207 The Commander in the Operations Process

At the centre of the operations process is the commander. Commanders apply the art and
science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing to guide
their staff and subordinates throughout the conduct of operations. The commander’s role in
the operations process takes on a different emphasis during planning, preparing, executing,
and assessing. For example, during planning commanders focus their activities on
understanding, visualizing, and describing while during execution, commanders often focus on
directing, leading, and assessing while improving their understanding and modifying their
visualization.
a. Understanding. Throughout the operations process, commanders (supported by their
staffs, subordinate commanders, and other partners) seek to build and maintain their
understanding of an operational environment and the problem. To frame and reframe
problems, commanders lead design activities and collaborate with superior, subordinate,
and adjacent commanders as well as other military and civilian organizations within the
AOO. They circulate and talk with subordinate commanders, Soldiers, and members of
other military and civilian organizations while observing operations for themselves.
Commanders continuously update their understanding based on inputs from others and
their personal observations. Based on their updated understanding, to include an
assessment of progress, commanders adjust operations as required.
b. Visualizing
(1) Visualizing consists of creating and thinking in mental images. One of the most
important acts of visualizing is the commander’s mental image of the end state—
whether it is the end state of his unit or organization in training or in operations.
Visualizing includes anticipating outcomes, understanding the relationships between
means and ends, and understanding inherent risks. While the commander assesses
the current situation, he also visualizes future operations.
(a) Personal Interpretation. A commander bases his image of a situation not only
on its facts, but also on his interpretation of those facts. He generates images from
others’ observations as well as his own. In general, the higher the level of
command, the more he depends on information from others and less on his own
observations. However, his interpretations of that information remain personal.
Visualizing military operations effectively depends on understanding the human
factors involved in operations and the dynamics of operations themselves.
Commanders consider both factors and dynamics when visualizing.
(b) Human Factors. Part of command lies in recognizing when to push military
personnel to their limits and when to rest military personnel to prevent individual
and unit collapse.
(c) Operations. The dynamic relationships among friendly forces, enemy forces,
and the environment create the complexity of operations. Friendly forces compete
with the enemy to obtain operational advantages in both physical and information
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environments. Advantages in the physical environment allow land forces to

accomplish a mission with minimal losses. Advantages in the information
environment complement and reinforce advantages in the physical environment.
(d) Friendly Forces. Friendly forces do not always perform to capabilities. They
may have just received new replacements or had an extended period of operations
under heavy stress. They may have sustained sufficient casualties to render their
unit less capable; experienced an enemy chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear attack; or just arrived in theatre and are not yet acclimated.
(e) Enemy Forces. During operations, the enemy may upset the friendly plan,
desynchronize friendly forces’ coordination, destroy friendly units, and defeat
friendly actions. The enemy exploits his advantages to further his own operation
and to defeat the friendly forces by reacting to their moves.
(f) Environment. The environment is neutral in terms of favouring one side over
the other. It can keep both sides from performing according to their capabilities or
can be used to advantage by the best-equipped and trained force to cope with its
impact. The commander must understand the environment’s characteristics and
account for them. (Chapter 3, Command Support, discusses the mission variables
and operational variables.)
(2) Commander’s Visualization. The commander’s visualization is the process of—
(a) Achieving a clear understanding of the force’s current state with relation to the
enemy and environment—SA based upon the common operational picture.
(b) Developing a desired end state to represent mission accomplishment.
(c) Determining the sequence of activities that moves from an unacceptable
condition (current situation) to an acceptable condition (end state) by achieving
sequential intermediate points (decisive conditions). It is a way of mentally viewing
the dynamic relationship among friendly forces, enemy forces, and the environment
at the present state, while conducting operations against an opposing force over
time, and at the end state of an operation. The commander visualizes the second-
and third-order consequences of the interrelationships among these factors,
developing COAs to reduce their negative impact and exploit the positive impacts
on mission accomplishment. The commander’s visualization occurs until the end
state of an operation is attained. It focuses on three main factors:
i. Foreseeing a feasible outcome to the operation that results in mission
success and leaves the force postured for the next operation (the end state).
ii. Understanding the current state of friendly and enemy forces. This is SA,
derived from applying judgment and experience to the common operational
picture. This SA includes physical factors (such as location of forces), human
factors (such as fatigue and morale), and the relationships between friendly and
enemy forces and the environment that potentially represent opportunities and
threats for friendly forces.
iii. Visualizing the dynamics between the opposing forces during the sequence
of actions leading from the current situation to the end state. This includes
evaluating possible enemy reactions and friendly counters to those moves. It
produces planning guidance.
(3) End State. Commanders begin to visualize the end state when they receive or
generate a mission. They start by applying their current SA to this mission. As they
analyse or receive the staff’s analysis of the mission, they develop a mental image of
the friendly forces in relation to the enemy, the environment, and possible future
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operations at the conclusion of the operation that represents success or the end state.
(See Figure 2-2.)
Figure 2-2. Commander’s Visualization

(4) Situational awareness. Before the commander can visualize the desired outcome,
he first forms a clear understanding of the situation using the operational variables or
mission variables. This framing of an operational environment takes place during
mission analysis. Commanders develop essentially three views of each situation. The
first view is a close up of the situation, a feel for the action gained through personal
observation and experience. The second view is an overview, an overall look at the
situation and the overall development of the operation. Finally, the third view is that of
the situation from the enemy’s perspective.
(a) SA supports the commander’s visualization. The commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIRs), continuously updated, guide the commander’s
achievement of SA. Information management supports SA.
(b) If the commander’s SA is better than his opponent’s SA, he has a significant but
temporary advantage. He can maintain the advantage by acting faster than his
opponent can.
(c) Time is equal for all actors (friendly, enemy, and neutral) within an operational
environment—they can exploit or waste it. Commanders retain the initiative within
the time dimension through the timing and tempo of activities. Operational tempo,
the rate of activities over time, includes shaping time advantageously to retain the
initiative.
(d) The commander visualizes the arrangement of activities simultaneously and
sequentially to create effects that support achievement of his objectives.
Simultaneity of activities in space and time overwhelms opposing commanders with
a wide range of immediate decision requirements. Simultaneity in space presents
opposing forces with devastating consequences throughout the depth of the AOO.
Simultaneity in purpose synchronizes the link among activities in an operational
environment, ensuring that friendly forces direct all operations toward the desired
end state.
c. Describing
(1) Definition. To describe the mission, commanders relate operations to time and
space in terms of achieving the purpose of the overall operation. In all operations,
purpose and time determine the allocation of space. Commanders clarify their
descriptions as circumstances require. Commanders use the commander’s intent,
CCIRs, and planning guidance as their primary methods of description, using terms
suited to the nature of the mission and their experience.
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(a) In multinational operations, a better effort in describing leads to subordinates

comprehending the context of the commander’s decision better and making better
decisions when exercising individual initiative.
(b) The commander’s intent, CCIRs, and planning guidance all serve to guide and
focus command support in decision making and execution. At the start of the
planning, the commander may expect to have gaps in information relative to the
mission. Nevertheless, he makes some initial decisions. One decision is what
information he needs to fill those gaps. He uses judgment to fill those gaps to make
other decisions until command support provides him the information.
(c) The commander decides how to conduct operations to attain the end state. The
commander also uses the precise vocabulary for the task and purpose found in
AJP-3.2 for constructing mission statements.
(d) The commander uses rehearsals to describe further.
(2) Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent serves as a driver of planning, not
as a product. Later in the operations process, the commander’s intent focuses
subordinates’ initiative.
(a) The commander personally prepares his intent statement. When possible he
delivers it, along with the order, personally. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual
understanding of what the issuing commander wants by allowing immediate
clarification of specific points.
(b) In the absence of orders, the commander’s intent, together with the mission,
directs subordinates toward mission accomplishment. When significant
opportunities appear, subordinates use these elements to orient their efforts.
(3) Planning Guidance. Planning guidance may be as broad or detailed as
circumstances dictate. It includes procedural guidance on the planning process itself.
However, it must convey to the staff the essence of the commander’s visualization of
the operation.
(a) The guidance emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how the
commander intends to mass his combat power to accomplish the mission according
to his higher commander’s intent. Planning guidance includes priorities for all
combat, CS, and combat service support (CSS) elements and the commander’s
vision of the elements’ support of his concept. The amount of detail in the guidance
depends on the time available, the staff’s level of proficiency, and the flexibility the
next higher commander provides.
(b) If the commander has identified one or more points, or an operation he
considers decisive, he conveys this to the staff. This point is not an end state but
a location on the ground, a time, or an event in which decisive results can be
achieved.
d. Directing. Directing converts a commander’s decision into effective action by forces.
Commanders generate effective action through directing forces and synchronizing the
combat functions. Commanders direct the outcome of major operations, battles, and
engagements by—
(1) Assigning missions.
(2) Prioritizing and allocating resources (forces and other types made available from
nations).
(3) Assessing and taking risks.
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(4) Deciding when, where, and how to make adjustments.

(5) Committing reserves.
(6) Seeing, hearing, and understanding the needs of subordinates and superiors.
(7) Guiding and motivating the organization toward mission accomplishment.
(a) Orders and Plans. The commander communicates his decision to
subordinates in orders or plans. Plans and orders are written or oral
communications that direct the conduct and synchronization of action. They are
issued in whole or in part to subordinate forces for planning or executing. The only
difference between a plan and an order is that the force may or may not execute
all or part of a plan at some future or unspecified date, while an order’s execution
(positive control) is always specified, if not immediate. A commander can change,
refine, and update them from continuing estimates and studies. A subordinate
may use his commander’s plans as a guide to action in the absence of orders
about an event within the space or time covered by a plan. There are many types
of plans and orders; each type has a specific purpose in relation to the echelon of
command.
(b) Control Measures. Control measures further direct action by establishing
specific responsibilities and limits to prevent units from impeding one another and
to impose necessary coordination. They may be permissive or restrictive. A
commander imposes only the minimum control measures to provide essential
coordination and deconfliction among units. He removes restrictive control
measures as soon as possible. (See APP-6, NATO Joint Military Symbology, for
doctrinal control measures and rules for drawing control measures on overlays
and maps.)
e. Leading. As the senior leader of an organization, the commander directly applies the
leadership element of combat power. Subordinate commanders and small-unit leaders
reinforce that element. Having the legal authority of command and issuing orders does not
fully suffice for leadership in battle.
f. Assessing. Commanders assess continuously to better understand current conditions
and determine how the operation is progressing. Commanders incorporate the
assessments of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners in the AOO to form
their personal assessment of the situation. Based on their assessment, commanders
modify plans and orders to accomplish the mission better. If their assessment reveals a
significant variance from their original commander’s visualization, commanders may
choose to reframe the problem and develop a completely new plan.
0208 Commanders Foster a Positive Command Climate

Successful mission command depends on a command climate that encourages subordinate
commanders at all levels to think independently and to take the initiative. Subordinates also
expect to know the “reason why.” A commander explains his intent to his subordinates and
fosters a sense of involvement in decision making and shared commitment. The following
factors help create a positive command climate:
a. Accept Risk and Errors
(1) The commander inculcates acceptance of risk within his command in two ways.
First, in leading by example, he makes decisions in training and on operations that
accept risk. At such times, he informs his subordinates either at the time of the decision
(if time permits) or in the after action review (AAR) the risk he accepted and why. He
ensures that risk management does not become risk aversion, particularly for tactical
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risk. Second, he accepts risk in his subordinates’ decisions. In training, he might allow
them to take the consequences of a too-risky tactical decision, instructing them
afterwards on a more appropriate level of tactical risk.
(2) Accepting risk goes hand in hand with accepting errors. The commander trains
subordinates to act within his intent when they exercise initiative. Likewise,
commanders give subordinates latitude to make mistakes and learn.
(3) There are two basic types of errors: errors of commission and errors of omission.
Errors of commission occur when a person attempts to act toward some end, such as
accomplishing a mission. Errors of omission occur because a person failed to act, often
because he did not want to accept the risk associated with that action. Subordinates
willing to risk errors of commission show initiative, and they stand a greater chance of
seizing initiative or opportunity. Subordinates committing errors of omission—failing to
act—would not be as apt to seize initiative or opportunity. For this reason, commanders
prefer errors of commission to errors of omission in fostering mission command.
b. Foster Trust and Mutual Understanding
(1) Trust and mutual understanding are critical to the tempo of decentralized
operations. The commander fosters this trust and mutual understanding by word and
deed. Such trust and mutual understanding contribute to cooperation among
multinational forces.
(2) Commanders educate and train themselves, their staffs, and their subordinates in
the common doctrine to establish mutual understanding. It is a common approach to
C2 based on a professional understanding of doctrine—including that of a common
terminology— that assists mutual understanding and is fundamental to mission
command.
(3) The commander can use modern CIS (discussed in Chapter 3) to foster trust and
mutual understanding by video teleconferencing to exchange personal views about
tactical or leadership situations. With wider dissemination and more precise and
accurate processing of information, CIS can allow commanders to share the
information and displays they base their SA on, giving context to their discussions and
orders. Another CIS capability that supports this goal is the white board. The
commander and subordinates use the white board to test options and share ideas
rapidly and graphically.
c. Use Effective Communications
(1) Written directives (to include those transmitted electronically) continue to have an
indispensable place in exercising C2, including administration, to ensure clarity and
consistency of approach. In NATO operations, written communications in the NATO
languages—English and French—should consider non-native speakers of those
languages and be written as simply as possible. In war, oral communications may be
more important than written for reasons not only of time but also of leading. Face-to-
face communications are the most effective. Commanders make themselves available
to communications and information.
(2) Commanders make their intent, whether written or oral, clear to subordinates.
During operations, there is seldom time for questions or debate over the meanings of
tactical terms or command expressions.
d. Build Teamwork. Current conditions of operations often require commanders to
develop teamwork among units and staffs task organized on an ad-hoc basis. Building on
the cohesion available at lower echelons provides one method. Training and rehearsals
provide other opportunities for developing teamwork. The commander develops teamwork
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between officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), including and requiring officer-
NCO teams during training, especially on staffs.
0209 Train Subordinates in Command and Control

Training subordinates in C2 includes commanding prior to operations, promoting leadership
qualities, and assessing subordinates. While training subordinates is normally a national
responsibility, a NATO commander may train staff and commanders to ensure that they
understand his practice of NATO doctrine.
a. Prior to Operations. Before operations, a NATO commander directs, trains, and
prepares as much of his command as has been made available to the extent permitted by
the command authority of his forces. Mission command requires an understanding of
operations two echelons up; training subordinates reflects this requirement. NATO
commanders coordinate with national commanders in this training.
(1) Foster an Understanding of Operations. Professional development includes the
critical study of campaigns and battles, and the study of human behaviour, to learn
relevant lessons for the future. While there is a scientific side to the war, the “science”
of war is an applied science rather than a theoretical one. Professional development
activities include—
(a) Participating in tactical exercises without troops.
(b) Participating in simulations of tactical problems.
(c) Developing new technical skills.
(d) Reading and discussing current military doctrine and unsolved problems and
taking into account lessons learned and historical examples when applicable.
(2) Develop Staff Procedures. Commanders develop their own TTP for those areas
in which doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance and adapting doctrinal TTP to
their command’s situation. These procedures and interactions, which NATO formation
standard operating procedures (SOPs) capture, incorporate the elements of mission
command. Commanders train their units to use these SOPs to govern routine actions.
Training subordinates in this way develops a command where simple intent or concept
statements by the commander lead to swift, coordinated, effective actions. Such
training can develop the organization’s command principles.
(3) Train Staffs and Subordinates. Commanders can train subordinates to operate
in the absence of detailed orders. With information available to all levels of the
command and increasing dispersion in the AOO, the commander trains subordinates
to counter unexpected enemy actions and to take advantage of unforeseen
opportunities.
(a) Training provides the means to practice, develop, and validate—within
constraints—the practical application of a common doctrine. It also provides the
only peacetime basis for first-hand experience to commanders and staffs in
exercising C2. Commanders can use training experiences to create experience and
trust within their organizations, fostering teamwork and the confidence of the force.
(b) NATO commanders train themselves, their staffs, and subordinates in making
decisions and developing plans. This training includes—
i. Decision making using the decision-making process (see Chapter 4) under
both unrestricted and time-constrained conditions.
ii. Emphasis on seizing fleeting opportunities, reacting to unforeseen enemy
actions, and quickly modifying plans when conditions change.
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iii. Producing a product that is timely (beats the enemy’s decision cycle) and
effective yet not perfect.
iv. Maintaining proficiency in using procedures flexibly through drills. Drills are
strict, methodical training, or exercising, of procedures. The quicker the unit
executes these drills, the better the force develops and maintains tempo.
b. Promote Leadership Qualities. Formal leader development is a national
responsibility. Normally, the NATO commander’s role in promoting leadership qualities lies
in providing an example of the values and attributes of a leader and demonstrating
leadership skills and actions.
c. Assess Subordinates. The commander judges men so that he can appoint the right
subordinates in the right place for the right time. In NATO commands, commanders will be
more constrained in their ability to assess subordinates than they would in national
commands. Assessing individuals and handling them well applies to the commander’s staff
as well as to his subordinate commanders. Recognizing subordinates’ strengths and limits
is vital.
0210 Command During Operations

The existence of an operational mission against adversaries who actively attempt to
accomplish their mission (while the commander attempts to accomplish his) distinguishes
command during operations from other cases of command. In so doing, a thinking, competitive
enemy consciously attempts to disrupt the friendly commander’s operations. The complexities
of operations rarely allow a carefully rehearsed plan to unfold smoothly. The outcome of
engagements, battles, and major operations depends on not only superior information but also
superior decision making based on that information. The commander focuses subordinates
and staff on what information is important.
a. Applying Doctrine. Command during operations demands sound knowledge and
understanding of doctrine, the commander’s ability to translate his superior’s intent into
effective action at his level, and expertise in applying doctrine in operations.
b. Command Across Echelons. The tactical commander exercises C2 in a shorter
timeframe than an operational-level commander. He also exercises C2 directly because
there are few levels of command between him and the effect of his directions on operations.
The lower the level, the more the commander concerns himself more with tactical success
in the current engagement and less with long-term planning and execution.
c. Directing Operations. As the operation evolves, the commander adjusts control
measures as necessary to maintain synchronization and freedom of action that ensure
mission accomplishment.
(1) Prepare. During preparation, the commander updates and validates his
visualization as the results of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and
reconnaissance (ISTAR) operations become available. As friendly assumptions prove
true or false, as intelligence confirms or denies enemy or adversary actions and
provides information and intelligence about the condition of the operational
environment, and as the status of friendly units changes during preparation, the
commander determines whether the new information invalidates the plan, requires him
to adjust the plan, or validates the plan with no further changes. The earlier the
commander identifies the need for modifications, the easier it can be to incorporate and
synchronize them into the plan. He balances the loss of synchronization and
coordination caused by a change to the plan against the problem of executing a plan
that no longer fits reality. He describes his view of the implications of the changes for
his visualization and the plan, and he directs actions to effect his revisions to them.
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(2) Execute. During execution, the commander, enabled by command support,

continually evaluates the progress of the operation to ensure that subordinate units
execute appropriate measures for the actual situation. He may modify some tasks even
if the plan unfolds as desired. It is critical that he determine what criteria point toward a
need for changes and then determine what required changes get the maximum
effectiveness from the unit within the higher commander’s intent.
(a) The commander fights the enemy, not the plan. The keys to tactical flexibility
are a well-trained, flexible unit with sound battle drills, flexible leaders capable of
adapting to rapidly changing circumstances, and a staff that recognizes significant
changes in the situation, prepares FRAGOs, and coordinates to alter the plan
accordingly. The commander’s intent can do much to allow prompt and effective
exercise of subordinate’s initiative with minimum direction.
(b) Execution includes a continuous process of assessing the current state of the
operation and making adjustments to exploit opportunities and react to unforeseen
enemy actions. During this process, the commander uses his visualization,
continuously updated with a current common operational picture, to provide that
assessment of the progress of operations. CCIRs—continuously updated during
operations—guide his SA updates. After the start of planning, his SA improves in
an uneven fashion as the unit feels the influence of fog and friction, as shown in
Figure 2-3. Even as his SA of the current operation improves, he visualizes the end
state of the follow-on operation.
(c) As he visualizes the implications of events during execution of the operation,
he describes his conclusions to his staff and subordinates through updated CCIRs
and guidance. He then directs actions when necessary, primarily using FRAGOs.
Figure 2-3. Visualization in Execution
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(3) Assess. As the commander assesses the operation (described in Chapter 4), he
uses his command support to provide realistic alternatives, enabling visualization to
evolve. The commander should not hesitate to modify his plan or scrap it altogether if
he thinks it is necessary to save the force and the mission, or to achieve a greater
success.
(4) Adjust. Adjustments take many forms. The simplest adjustment is to shift assets
from one part of the operation to another. However, the commander avoids reinforcing
a failing effort without a clear indication that additional resources will result in success,
or unless he has no better options for employing those additional resources. He
reinforces success if this creates opportunities for more success. If progress is not
satisfactory, he decides to solve the problems identified in the operation or to take
advantage of opportunities, as discussed in Chapter 4. Depending on the time available
or the complexity of the problem, he may use analytic or intuitive decision making. Once
he directs action to adjust to the new situation, he revises his visualization to take
account of the new circumstances his decision introduced into the operation. Chapter
4 describes decision making during execution in detail.
d. Directing Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. During command in non-
Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CROs), the distinction between higher and tactical
echelons is far less clear-cut in terms of the relevance of decisions as far as their
operational or strategic consequences are concerned. (See AJP-3.4, NON-ARTICLE 5
CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS.)
(1) First, the “enemy” in these operations may be multiple enemies and adversaries;
they may not always be physical, human beings (for example, they could be man-made
or natural disasters). Nor do all of the enemies and adversaries directly oppose the
commander on every issue.
(2) Second, commanders at lower tactical levels may be confronted with legal, political,
social, and media pressures normally associated with more senior commands. Military
commanders are unlikely to have unity of command, nor may all the actors in these
situations be under local command, military or otherwise. Commanders find their
planning less focused on concentrating the lethal effects of actions on an enemy than
on concentrating nonlethal effects against multiple enemies and adversaries.
(3) Finally, tactical commanders may find explicit operational-level considerations
when exercising command during these operations.
(4) Communications and liaison become even more important and widely used in
NA5CROs by commanders to achieve unity of effort, trust, and mutual understanding,
including organizations not subordinated to the commander. In NA5CROs,
commanders ensure that force-wide communications link the services and other
participating organizations, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many of
these non-subordinated organizations can affect military operations, yet they may have
goals and operations significantly different from the commander’s. Their systems may
not be compatible with the military’s, yet applying CIS to provide accurate and timely
dissemination of information in these operations is vital to the commander’s SA.
Commanders may have to expand the use of liaison officers (LOs) and normal rules of
communications.
0211 Leadership
After the commander has made his decision, he must still guide the organization in its
execution. He leads by example and by direction, positioning himself where he can best
command without depriving himself of the ability to respond to changing situations. Modern
technology better allows him, from any location within the AOO, to access the information he
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needs to assess the operation and risks and to make the necessary adjustments. After forces
have been put in motion, the commander provides the strength and will to follow through with
his choices. He knows when he must change them and make further decisions.
a. Command Presence. Commanders can establish command presence in a variety of
ways, to include the following:
(1) Briefings.
(2) Backbriefs.
(3) Rehearsals.
(4) Leader’s reconnaissance.
(5) On-site visits.
(6) Commander’s intent.
(7) After action reviews.
(8) Commander’s guidance.
b. Location of the Commander. The following basic factors influence the decision on
the commander’s location. They are common to all levels of command:
(1) Need to see and experience first-hand.
(2) Need to motivate and lead.
(3) Access to information to make timely decisions.
(4) Ability of the commander to judge the condition and morale of his forces.
(5) Communicate to subordinate, adjacent, and higher formations.
(6) Decision-making capability.
(7) Security, including physical protection.
(8) Position of subordinate units within assigned AOO.
(9) Main supply route and alternate supply route network and position of logistic support
units within assigned AOO.
(10) Time and location of critical events.
(a) Modern CIS can assist commanders in achieving forward command without
paying the price of losing communications with or connectivity to the information
and analysis of their command posts (CPs). When commanding forward,
commanders gain first-hand appreciation for the situation that can rarely be gained
any other way. Equally important, they can avoid the delays and distortions that
occur as information travels down or up the chain of command. Finally, by their
presence, they direct emphasis to critical spots and focus efforts on them.
(b) As the echelon of command increases, the commander commands more and
more through subordinates. He may want to have personal contact or intervene to
lead or to make decisions at the location or unit executing the decisive operation.
Similarly, when a commander loses his understanding of the situation, he needs to
re-establish a clear visualization of events.
(c) In larger tactical and operational formations, the HQ normally is the focus of
information flow and planning. Yet commanders cannot always visualize the AOO,
direct, and synchronize their units’ efforts from a computer screen at the command
post. Commanders sometimes assess the situation face-to-face with subordinate
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commanders and their military personnel—away from their command posts.

Effective command support permits commanders to position themselves wherever
they can best command while allowing them to respond to opportunities and
changing circumstances.
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CHAPTER 3 COMMAND SUPPORT
0301 Overview
Commanders cannot exercise command and control (C2) alone except in the simplest and
smallest of organizations. Even at the lowest levels, commanders need some support to
exercise C2 effectively. At every level, command support provides commanders such support.
Figure 3-1 shows the elements of command support. This chapter addresses the resources
that the commander must devote, acquire, or receive to accomplish C2 functions. It includes
organizing those resources to exercise C2 and establishes the command post as the doctrinal
organization for exercising C2 during operations.
Figure 3-1. The Elements of Command Support
0302 General
1. Command support—defined in Chapter 1—provides three basic functions. It—
a. Creates and maintains the common operational picture.
b. Supports decision making by improving its speed and accuracy.
c. Prepares and communicates directives.
2. Figure 3-2 on page 3-2 shows how command support, provided by computer
information systems (CIS), accomplishes these functions for the commander and among
higher echelon, lower echelon, and adjacent forces. The graphic also shows the relationship
of the information management activities—collecting, displaying, processing, storing, and
disseminating—within command support. The rest of the chapter discusses general concerns
of command support as a whole (including location and design considerations) and then each
of the components in turn.
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Figure 3-2. Information and the Command and Control System

3. Command support consists not only of equipment but also of all resources used to
support C2. In establishing command support, units must allocate sufficient resources to
support C2 while simultaneously maintaining the effectiveness of other systems. Command
support must not waste resources through unnecessary duplication, although a certain level
of redundancy is necessary for robustness.
0303 Location
The following characteristics determine a suitable location:
a. Communications. The location must offer good communications with sufficient or
required redundancy to superior, subordinate, supporting, supported, and adjacent
headquarters (HQ.) It should be screened from enemy and adversary information activities,
to include cyber and physical attacks. Access to civil communications and information
systems, especially in crisis response operations (CROs), may be important. At higher
echelons, maintaining communications with the host nation (HN), the home base, and other
Service and force components are considerations.
b. Security. Security is the condition achieved when designated information, materiel,
personnel, activities, and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage,
subversion, and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure. It is achieved
through physical and electronic protection and concealment, and chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence measures. Sufficient safeguards must be
installed to ensure integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the information. Dedicated or
on-call forces may provide physical security for command support facilities. Security
considerations must be balanced against the communications requirement.
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c. Concealment. Although discussed separately, concealment contributes to security.

Woods or built-up areas offer the best concealment from view. Barns, large sheds, or
factory complexes all help counter thermal imagery surveillance. They also provide some
basic CBRN protection.
d. Accessibility. The site should be easily accessible yet not liable to accidental detection
by enemy land or aerial reconnaissance. Higher-level commands may also consider
access to ports or fixed-wing airfields.
0304 Design and Organization Considerations

The details of CIS depend on the level and nature of the command and its assigned operations.
The following should be considered in the design and organization of CIS:
a. Deployment. CIS deployability must match the unit’s role and deployability. The size
and mobility of the CIS affect deployability. The number of systems available and their
power considerations further affect deployability.
b. Continuity of Command. CIS must sustain the continuous exercise of C2, 24 hours a
day in all seasons. External communications and survivability in the face of ground, air, or
other threats are the primary ways CIS meet this requirement.
c. Fusion of Command and Staff Effort. Command support should integrate command
and staff efforts. The internal layout and utilities of facilities should facilitate access to and
integration of various staff sections with each other and with the commander.
d. Size. A greater level of CIS may provide greater flexibility and survivability through
greater redundancy. This comes at the cost of larger size but decreased security,
deployability, and mobility. The commander identifies necessary elements and eliminates
unnecessary ones.
e. Hardness. Hardness refers to the degree of physical and electronic protection provided
to the systems, primarily by facilities and equipment. It involves a combination of active
and passive measures. Dispersing the systems helps reduce a unit’s electromagnetic
signatures.
f. Modularity. Modular CIS design offers flexibility in deploying and employing the
systems. It allows elements to be deployed as required by the type of operation and
situation. Later, adding modules accommodates expansion. A larger HQ can disperse into
smaller facilities through modern communications.
g. Capacity. CIS require sufficient capacity to cope with the quantity of information
necessary for a force to operate effectively and to ensure timely passage of that
information.
h. Survivability. CIS must be reliable, robust, resilient, and at least as survivable as the
supported force. Distributed systems and alternate means of communications provide
these requirements. Units organize and deploy CIS to ensure that under stress they
degrade gradually, not catastrophically. CIS must cope with communications degradation
or failure.
i. Range. CIS need enough range to link all HQs with which they must communicate, to
include those outside the force’s area of operations (AOO). Increasingly, this may require
satellite systems.
j. Mobility. CIS must have the mobility of the force they support. Some elements of CIS,
especially those that provide range and connectivity to the rest of the force, may need to
move more quickly.
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k. Control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum. In a joint or multinational context, efficient

use of the available and allocated spectrum is critical to coherent communications
architecture.
l. Interoperability. In joint and multinational operations, CIS must be compatible and
interoperable. Military systems need to work with civilian systems, particularly during
stability and support operations where military communications systems might be
integrated, such as with the communications system of the police force. Full or sufficient
technological interoperability may involve fewer liaison officers (LOs) but will not replace
need for some LOs.
SECTION II – INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
0305 General
1. Information management (IM) is the continuous provision of relevant information to the
right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational awareness and decision
making. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and
disseminate information. It provides structure through which to communicate and transform
information in decision making and put decisions into action. It is essential to determining
critical information, routing information rapidly and accurately, transforming information, and
disseminating information in a timely manner. Commanders and staffs assess the
effectiveness of IM by considering how information contributes to lessening uncertainty.
2. IM narrows the gap between the information the commander requires and the
information he has. All information must be relevant, and the staff must ensure it is also
accurate, timely, usable, complete, and precise. Tactical operations produce large amounts of
information. Commanders and staffs can avoid potential information overload by establishing
criteria for what information to present to the commander. Guidance on these criteria must
come from the commander.
3. Effective IM facilitates the rapid flow of information in all directions. Improvements in
technical means for distributing information allow users to identify relevant information among
the quantity of information in the CIS process. Effective IM facilitates communications vertically
(within the chain of command) and horizontally (among adjacent, supporting, and supported
units). Redundancy in transmission paths safeguards against disruption and battle damage.
However, the transmission path information follows is less important than whether it reaches
the right destination at the right time in a usable format.
4. The commander bases his information management guidance on—
a. His degree of willingness to cope with uncertainty (for example, what is plausible to find
out).
b. Number and types of decisions he expects to make personally.
c. Gaps in relevant information for specific decisions.
d. His ability to obtain needed relevant information.
e. Subordinates’ ability to understand his commander’s intent.
f. His use of LOs and informal communications networks.
5. Advances in CIS are mandating changes in IM. First, communications connectivity
allows broadcast dissemination of information. This advance incorporates direct downlink of
raw data from multiple sensors to multiple echelons simultaneously and broadcasts processed
information from theatre or national production agencies to deployed forces. Deployed units
can receive information on a push or pull basis.
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6. Second, IM requires analysing, fusing and exploiting information and intelligence from
a variety of sources, a capability of CIS. Advances in sensors, processors, and communicators
provide increased worldwide capabilities for detailed and timely reconnaissance and
surveillance. Both military and non-military sources provide information used to produce
relevant intelligence. Open-source intelligence or reporting provides the order of battle and
other technical data.
7. IM consists of two elements: relevant information and CIS.
0306 Information
This subsection discusses the following related concepts. First is the cognitive hierarchy of
information. Second are the subject categories of information—operational variables and
mission variables—and categories of purposes of information within C2. Third is relevant
information—and its associated categories of commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs) and information requirements (IRs)—and criteria to evaluate relevant information.
a. Cognitive Hierarchy. A cognitive hierarchy consists of four different levels of
information. A principal task of information management is to collect and then transform
this information by adding progressively greater meaning at each level, raising it from the
lowest level, data, to the highest, understanding. With understanding, the commander can
make better decisions and regulate actions by his forces more effectively. (See Figure 3
3.)
Figure 3-3. A Cognitive Hierarchy

(1) Data is the lowest level—raw signals detected by a sensor or collector of any kind
(human, mechanical, or electronic) from the environment or communicated between
any kind of nodes in a system. Data is rarely useful until it has been processed to give
it meaning. The exception is combat information, which is that frequently perishable
data gathered in combat by, or reported directly to, units that may be immediately used
in battle or in assessing the situation. Combat information is treated as exceptional
information. Collection should be focused, as much as possible, on only that data
needed to build the common operational picture.
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(2) The next level, information, is unprocessed data of every description that may be
used in the production of intelligence (AAP-6, NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND
DEFINITIONS). In the context of the cognitive hierarchy, it consists of data that has
been processed to provide further meaning. Processing includes filtering, fusing,
formatting, organizing, collating, correlating, plotting, translating, categorizing, and
arranging. Information is useful for immediate application to avoid threats, acquire
targets, or take other immediate actions. Information forms the basis of the common
operational picture.
(3) Knowledge is information analysed to provide meaning and value or evaluated as
to implications for the operation. As a result, various pieces of information that have
been integrated and interpreted begin to build a picture of the situation that is a product
useful for decision-making forms. The commander and staff can recognize
relationships between events in the area of interest, fathom the way an enemy thinks,
and forecast what he might do. Moreover, the commander and the staff begin to
recognize what they do not yet understand—and thus identify the uncertainty with
which they must deal. Knowledge can often be represented on the common operational
picture.
(4) Understanding comes from applying judgment to knowledge to gain a deeper level
of awareness of the situation’s inner relationships and implications for the future.
Judgment is a purely human skill, based upon experience, expertise, and intuition.
While the staff may support the commander in achieving understanding, the most
important understanding is that which the commander achieves. When the commander
achieves situational awareness (SA), he sees patterns emerging from events in the
area of interest, and he anticipates consequences of both his forces’ actions and the
enemy’s. Uncertainty and time preclude perfect SA prior to deciding and acting.
Understanding cannot be conveyed through the common operational picture. It is best
disseminated as commander’s intent, guidance, or CCIRs.
(5) Command support transforms information as it moves up the hierarchy. Because
processing involves rote application of procedure, CIS may process many types of data
more quickly and efficiently than people can. To a degree, analysis and evaluation rely
upon rules of logic or deduction, so expert systems can assist to some extent by helping
to integrate pieces of processed data. Judgment is a human mental activity—not a
procedural act like processing but an act of learning. CIS cannot reduce judgment to
procedures or rules.
(6) Integration occurs as information moves up the hierarchy from data to
understanding. The commander and command support piece together multiple bits of
data—numerous pieces of analysed and evaluated information—to make information.
Finally, multiple forms of knowledge distill under judgment into understanding. This
integration involves reducing the total number of bits that must be considered at any
one time.
(7) The goal in IM should not be processing vast amounts of data but approaching
understanding as soon and as closely as possible. Commanders make the final
judgments, but command support can provide easily assimilated information or
knowledge that is as close to final form as possible.
b. Operational Variables. Operational variables are fundamental to developing a
comprehensive understanding of an operational environment. They analyse and describe
an operational environment in terms of six interrelated operational variables: political,
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure, (PMESII). Additionally, the
PMESII model extends to include the physical environment and time (PMESII-PT), if
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necessary. The following briefly describes and illustrates in a question (in parentheses)
each variable a small-unit commander might need to have answered.
(1) Political. This variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all
levels of governance—formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert
political powers. (Who is the tribal leader in the village?)
(2) Military. This variable includes the military and paramilitary capabilities of all
relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment.
(Does the enemy in this particular neighbourhood have antitank missiles?)
(3) Economic. This variable encompasses individual and group behaviours related
to producing, distributing, and consuming resources. (Does the village have a high
unemployment rate?)
(4) Social. This variable includes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an
operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviours of society
members. (Who are the influential people in the village—for example, religious
leaders, tribal leaders, warlords, criminal bosses, or prominent families?)
(5) Information. This variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and
effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate,
or act on information. (How much access does the local population have to news
media or the Internet?)
(6) Infrastructure. This variable comprises the basic facilities, services, and
installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. (Is the electrical
generator in the village working?)
(7) Physical Environment. This variable includes the geography and man-made
structures, as well as the climate and weather in the AOO. (What types of terrain or
weather conditions in this AOO favour enemy operations?)
(8) Time. This variable describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or
conditions within an operational environment, as well as how various actors in an
operational environment perceive the timing and duration. (For example, at what
times are people likely to congest roads or conduct activities that provide a cover for
hostile operations?)
c. Mission Variables. Six factors—mission, enemy forces, terrain and weather, troops
and support available (friendly forces), time available, and civil considerations
(METT-TC)—comprise the mission variables—the categories into which relevant
information is grouped. The commander and staff consider relevant information in each
category in all types and forms of military actions. Their relative impact may vary by
operation, but the command support must consider information from each category.
(1) Mission. The first factor is always the assigned mission. Understanding the mission
provides the focus for planning as well as decision making during execution. The
commander analyses his mission or decisions in terms of the higher commander’s
intent, mission, and concept of operations. As the commander allocates tasks and
resources to his subordinates, he ensures that his decisions support his decisive
operation and his higher commander’s intent. He and the staff then view the factors of
METT-TC with respect to their impact on mission accomplishment.
(2) Enemy Forces
(a) The second factor to consider is the enemy—dispositions (to include
organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine, equipment
capabilities, commanders’ biography, and probable course of action or intent. One
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of the most important factors about the enemy—yet most difficult to obtain because
of its nature—is the enemy intention. While staff analysis can produce enemy
capabilities, it must also evaluate indicators for evidence of enemy intentions.
Information about the enemy also includes how the enemy might exploit friendly
weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
(b) Enemy information comes from many sources, to include the full array of
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets,
plus combat information. Of all the relevant information, information about the
enemy is inherently the most uncertain. There is, therefore, a designated manager
for that information: the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G2). Enemy information
also includes the enemy’s speed of advance, tempo of operations, and known
strengths and vulnerabilities. Technology must display the enemy force in the same
digital frame of reference as friendly force information.
(3) Terrain and Weather
(a) Terrain and weather are natural conditions that man has only a limited ability to
influence. Terrain and weather are relatively neutral, in contrast with friendly and
enemy forces, because they favour neither friendly nor enemy forces unless one
side is better prepared to operate in the environment or are more familiar with it.
(b) Information on terrain includes not only data such as features, slope and
elevation, soil conditions, and vegetation, but also their impact on vehicle and
human speed, maintenance, tempo, trafficability, and manoeuvrability by various
types of forces. Terrain information must be regularly updated to take account of
the effect of combat, as well as of nature.
(c) Weather and climate have direct and indirect consequences on conducting
tactical operations, which the commander must assess and anticipate. Weather is
shorter-term but less predictable than climate for planning purposes. The direct
consequences immediately affect the operations of friendly or enemy forces, and
the relative consequences for each force are a function of preparation by the force
rather than favouring one or the other. The indirect consequences of weather and
climate are those on other elements of the environment—terrain and human,
military and non-military—which either hamper or help military operations of one or
both forces. For example, stable weather conditions favour enemy use of chemical
or biological agents. Cold weather slows both men and machines, but it also freezes
water and allows the force to move across normally wet areas that would otherwise
be passable only with greater difficulty.
(4) Troops and Support Available (Friendly Forces)
(a) Every commander knows the number, type, capabilities, and condition of
available friendly troops. He also knows the disposition and situation of his forces
without having to visit each unit on the ground. He normally maintains information
of friendly forces two echelons below him. He understands subordinates’ readiness,
including maintenance, training, strengths and weaknesses, commanders, and
logistical status. Visits on the ground should serve to confirm reports or to provide
direct understanding of the decisive points or factors of the operation. Personal
visits provide insights into the intangibles that data and reports cannot capture.
(b) The commander considers his troops available when analysing whether he has
enough forces to accomplish his mission. Increasing assets in one area may
compensate for a shortage of assets in another. A commander ensures that he
provides a subordinate with the right mix of troops to accomplish the mission when
he assigns him a mission.
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(5) Time Available

(a) Time available stems first from consideration of the enemy’s time to react
effectively to friendly actions. Time available is then considered in terms of the
ability of forces to plan, prepare for, and execute operations. The time available to
conduct the operations process varies with the size of the unit, its mission, and the
capability of the enemy to conduct his operations process. Time available also
depends on useful and usable time. For example, for some activities, hours of
darkness would be useable time, while for others darkness would not be useful for
action.
(b) Consideration of time available further includes the time that subordinate
commanders and units require for their own planning, preparation, and execution.
(6) Civil Considerations
(a) With the impact of current operations on the civilian population, civil
considerations are more a part of the commander’s planning factors. Civil
considerations are how the man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and
attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations, within
an AOO influence the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations are an
essential factor of the environment across the range of military operations. Attitudes
and activities of the civilian population in the AOO influence the outcome of military
operations. Civil considerations of the environment can either help or hinder friendly
or enemy forces; the difference lies in which one has taken the time to learn the
situation and anticipated possible impacts on the operation.
(b) Human modification of terrain can change the shape of the land or its
trafficability. It may also change local weather by modifying local wind or water
pathways. The commander considers these man-made features and their results
on natural terrain features and climate when he considers terrain.
(c) The consequences of some civil considerations may merely impede the forces’
activities, while others affect the military personnel and prevent them from
functioning to their full capability. The consequences can often be overcome or
even turned to friendly advantage through anticipation and preparation. Careful
preparation can turn parts of civil populations into advantages for friendly forces’
and disadvantages for enemy forces’ operations.
(d) Operations also often require allied land forces to coordinate with international
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The commander also
has legal and moral responsibilities to refugees and non-combatants in the AOO
that may include providing them humanitarian assistance. The commander’s
awareness of civilian infrastructure factors such as the location of toxic industrial
materials may influence the choice of a course of action (COA) and the conduct of
operations.
(e) The existence of an independent press guarantees that allied military activities
that do not meet allied military standards for dealing with non-combatants will be
reported in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), host nation (HN), and
international public forums. Commanders must consider the outcome of their
decisions and their forces’ actions on public opinion.
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d. Relevant Information. Relevant information is all information of importance to the

commander and staff in the exercise of command and control. Relevant information
consists of information concerning METT-TC that applies to accomplishing the mission.
Relevant information is the foundation for the common operational picture. Relevant
information answers questions the commander and staff deem necessary to exercising C2.
These questions or requirements are in two categories: CCIRs and IRs. Essential elements
of friendly information (EEFI) become commander’s priorities when he states them.
(1) Purpose
(a) Large amounts of relevant information are collected routinely in operations and
are provided by standard reports and ISTAR activities. This information is essential
for ongoing staff tasks to be performed regardless of the type of mission (such as
maintenance of vehicles, personnel actions, staff estimates, and others). Other
relevant information is mission specific, and assets must be specifically tasked to
collect it. CCIRs and IRs are used to prioritize collection asset allocation.
(b) Information becomes relevant if it supports a mission, and if it is accurate, timely,
usable, complete, and precise. Relevant information provides the basis for creating
and maintaining the common operational picture and the substance of execution
information. It is the basis for achieving SA. In the context of this publication, SA is
the understanding of an operational environment in the context of the commander’s
mission. It facilitates decision making by identifying opportunities for mission
accomplishment, threats to mission accomplishment and the force, and gaps in
information. As the commander uses his own SA for C2, he tries to affect the SA of
the enemy (limiting its quantity or relevancy) and tries to influence the perceptions
and actions of others (public or private organizations that influence the success of
his operation). These considerations directly relate to information operations.
(2) Information Requirement
(a) In intelligence usage, information requirement is information regarding an
adversary or potentially hostile actors and other relevant aspects of the operational
environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the
intelligence requirements of a commander (AAP-6). IRs are also information about
mission variables that must be collected to meet the requirements of the
commander and his staff for the successful execution of operations. A HQ must
focus IRs on relevant information. The commander does this through the
designation of CCIRs as discussed later in this chapter.
(b) IRs provide the foundation for staff analysis to recommend specific IRs to be
approved by the commander as CCIRs to support the decision making process,
drive collection planning, and direct reporting requirements. The staff must ensure
IRs support operations and are truly relevant to commander’s decision making,
support targeting efforts, or enhance the commander’s situational awareness. IRs
can strain limited collection assets. Unfocused requests for information may provide
a lot of data but not assist in mission accomplishment. Figure 3-4 illustrates the IR
to CCIR to decision development cycle. The process may begin with IRs concerning
elements critical to the success of the mission or represent a threat to mission
accomplishment. (See AJP-2, Chapter 5.2 for more information).
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Figure 3-4. Relevant Information

(c) Figure 3-5 (on page 3-12) illustrates the relationships among the cognitive
hierarchy, IRs, and CCIRs. The cognitive hierarchy shows where meaning is added
to data when it is collected in response to IRs. The staff collects relevant information
using various sources. It adds meaning to the data to process it into knowledge,
creating the common operational picture. The commander applies his judgment to
the common operational picture to achieve SA. Then when a mission is added, he
can make critical decisions.
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Figure 3-5. Information Requirements

(3) Criteria for Relevant Information
(a) Because sources of information are imperfect and susceptible to distortion and
deception, IM includes assessing the relevancy of information carefully. The
following criteria, listed in relative order of importance, help to evaluate information
for relevancy:
i. Accuracy. Information that conveys the true situation.
ii. Timeliness. Information not overtaken by events.
iii. Usability. Information that is in common, easily understood formats and
displays.
iv. Completeness. All necessary information the decision maker requires.
v. Precision. Information containing the required level of detail.
vi. Reliability. Information that is uncorrupted, undistorted, or from trustworthy
sources.
(b) The following priorities apply:
i. Incomplete or imprecise information is better than no information at all.
ii. Untimely or unusable information is the same as no information at all.
iii. Irrelevant or inaccurate information is worse than no information at all.
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(c) In general, a commander does not require information beyond a moderate level
to accomplish his mission, so long as it is accurate, timely, and usable. Beyond
that, he can achieve mission success at reduced cost when he has additional
information; however, collecting additional information may carry an unacceptable
cost in timeliness. IM should focus on CCIRs first.
(4) Uses of Relevant Information. The uses of relevant information also have
categories: the common operational picture and execution information. The CIS collect
relevant information and uses it to create the common operational picture and support
SA as a basis for making a decision. Execution information provides a means for
communicating a clearly understood vision of the operation and its desired outcome,
which guides subordinates as they carry out a decision.
(a) Common Operational Picture. The common operational picture is an
operational picture tailored to the user’s requirements, based on common data and
information shared by more than one command. CIS now available provide all
levels of commanders with near real-time information on the current situation as a
common operational picture. The common operational picture is derived from data,
information, and knowledge common to all echelons. The commander and staff
tailor its display for resolution and content appropriate to their echelon of command
and the mission. Reports normally convey common operational picture information.
Usually reports have a prescribed purpose and format, and they may transmit
critical, exceptional, or routine information.
(b) Execution Information. Execution information is the selection of what needs
to be done next if the progress of the operation is meeting expectations. The source
for execution information is the commander’s decisions and the product of planning.
Execution information takes many forms, to include orders, plans, directives,
memorandums, and regulations. Orders and plans constitute the primary means of
transmitting execution information.
(5) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
(a) A CCIR is an information requirement identified by the commander as being
critical to facilitating timely information management and the decision-making
process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The commander
designates CCIRs to let the staff and subordinates know what information he
deems necessary for decision making and focus their efforts on collecting it. The
fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce
resources.
(b) The commander decides what information is critical based on his cognitive
ability and his visualization. The staff may assist the commander by recommending
CCIRs, based on their analysis of operations, but they should limit the number they
recommend. CCIRs are not static; the commander adjusts and updates them
throughout an operation to reflect his information needs for decision making as the
operation progresses. CCIR are—
i. Specified by the commander for each operation.
ii. Applicable only to the commander who specifies them.
iii. Situation-dependent—directly linked to present and future missions.
iv. Events or activities that are predictable.
v. Time-sensitive. Answers to CCIR must be immediately reported to the
commander by any communications system available.
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vi. Always included in an operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN)

initially.
(c) CCIRs focus the information reported to the commander that is critical to his
decision making. The answers to CCIRs should determine or validate a course of
action or initiate critical events during operations.
(d) CCIRs consist of PIRs and FFIRs. CCIRs may also include latest time
information of value to guide time sensitivity.
i. The commander’s PIRs are a vital part of the CCIRs and are normally
formulated by the intelligence staffs in close cooperation with the commander.
The PIRs encompass those intelligence requirements for which a commander
has an anticipated and stated priority in his tasking of planning and decision
making. The PIRs normally encompass identification and monitoring of areas
that represent opportunities and threats to the mission plan. They are a standing
set of requirements that drive the collection and production effort and provide
the focus of the overall intelligence mission. They should be limited in number
and should provide comprehensive and coherent groupings of key issues. They
may be enduring or limited to a particular phase or situation.
ii. FFIRs are information that the commander and staff need about the forces
available for the operations. FFIRs consist of information on the mission, troops
available, and time available (For friendly forces, this information answers the
question “How do I see myself?”)
(6) Exceptional Information. Exceptional information results from the occurrence of
an unexpected extraordinary event, such as an unforeseen opportunity for success or
an early warning of a pending threat. Exceptional information is information that would
have been a CCIR if it had been foreseen, and it is therefore treated as CCIR and
reported to the commander immediately by any method available. By its very nature,
identification of exceptional information relies on the initiative of subordinate
commanders and the staff.
(7) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. EEFI are key questions likely to be
asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions,
capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational
effectiveness (how can I prevent the enemy force from seeing me). Although EEFI are
not part of CCIRs, they become commander’s priorities when he states them. Like
CCIRs, the commander designates EEFI and transmits them to the staff and
subordinates. They tell the commander what cannot be compromised to the enemy.
When designated, friendly forces must take all necessary measures to ensure that this
information does not fall into enemy hands. For example, a commander may determine
that if the enemy discovers movement of the reserve, the operation is at risk. In this
case, location and movement of the friendly reserve become EEFI. EEFI are essential
to information operations (Info Ops) as EEFI often are key elements in the design of
military deception operations and operations security (OPSEC) measures.
0307 Communication and Information Systems

Communication and information systems is an integrated system composed of doctrine,
procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications
that provides authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct and control
their activities. With the integration provided by modern CIS, commanders can achieve higher
levels of effectiveness and efficiency in collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and
disseminating information. Effective C2 depends on ensuring that the right person has relevant
information at the right time.
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a. Purpose. CIS contribute to achieving information superiority by using and managing

information for timely and accurate decision making and execution. CIS allow the
commander to view and understand his AOO, communicate his intent, and disseminate
pertinent information throughout his AOO to higher, lower, supported, supporting, and
adjacent units. CIS can simultaneously support current operational deployments and future
contingencies. Effective military and non-military CIS help the staff support effective
decisions and actions. The object of CIS technology is to enhance the performance of
people and decrease the overall number of people involved.
(1) With the exception of face-to-face communication, command support could not
work without CIS. These systems directly affect how the commander communicates
and how the staff performs information management.
(2) CIS can also become a weak link if the commander relies too heavily on systems
that the enemy can attack. As it becomes clearer that a commander depends heavily
on CIS for C2, such systems become more attractive for targeting.
(3) Information sharing, possible with modern CIS, supports mutual understanding and
promotes unity of effort. When used expeditiously, CIS can give a commander a
decisive edge over his opponent by reducing time, improving cooperation among
combined arms, and synchronizing the combat functions.
(4) CIS can minimise the time and effort commanders spend assimilating information
and developing understanding by improved processing of data that adds meaning to
data in the creation of the common operational picture. Second, the common
operational picture displays information as meaningful visual images that directly impart
knowledge and further understanding.
(5) Commanders ensure that technology serves their needs by enabling mission
command. With technological development, equipment that improves the ability to
monitor what is happening may also increase the temptation and the means to try to
direct action. Equipment that facilitates or encourages detailed command of
subordinate units may undermine mission command. Commanders who focus at too
low a level of detail risk losing sight of the overall picture. Consequently, increased
capability in equipment brings with it the need for increased understanding and
discipline by users. For effective mission command, senior commanders must still give
the on-scene commander freedom of action to exercise initiative based upon his
knowledge of the local situation, understanding of his commanders’ intent two echelons
up, and responsibility to act.
b. Roles. Military and non-military CIS can combine to provide the commander with a
global-reach capability and access to information from a host of sources. CIS provide the
infrastructure that allows allied land forces to manage information and to interface with the
other sources of information. CIS form the architecture that—
(1) Supports the commander and staff in decision making.
(2) Monitors the current situation through the common operational picture in order to
integrate and synchronize operations.
(3) Coordinates joint support for land force operations.
(4) Links sensors to shooters and updates weapon systems targeting parameters.
(5) Controls decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations as one operation.
(6) Shapes the AOO through support for information activities.
c. Architecture. The integrated architecture of advanced CIS maximizes the C2
capabilities of land forces in all operating environments. Allied land forces use their national
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CIS and various systems to achieve C2 and interoperability. Current initiatives by NATO
members for C2 interoperability include the multinational interoperability program.
(1) Integration. Integrating CIS—both vertically and horizontally—facilitates tactical
and operational success in multinational operations. Global connectivity is essential for
linking strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of IM and the ability to project forces
worldwide. The command’s communications-electronics officer integrates non-military
equipment and software used throughout the AOO. Planners must ensure the deployed
CIS implement open, non-proprietary, commonly accepted standards and protocols to
interface with non-military systems.
(2) Computers
(a) Computers manage information within the CIS, support decision making, and
disseminate execution information. Computers consist of hardware and software.
There are two dangers with their use. One is over reliance on technology; the
second is failing to make proper use of technological capabilities. Those using CIS
must integrate technology properly with the other components of the CIS.
(b) Modern computers open new options in support of military decision making.
They provide faster, higher-quality data vertically and horizontally to a commander.
Additionally, the number of options, branches, and sequels a commander can
potentially envision increases in quality, quantity, and depth. A branch is the
contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission,
orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation
based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruption caused by enemy actions
and reactions. A sequel is the subsequent major operation or phase based on the
possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) of the current major operation
or phase. With computers now performing some activities, commanders and staffs
can shift their time and mental energy from lower-order thinking skills to higher-
order thinking skills of transforming information into knowledge and understanding.
Having a clear, thorough, and accurate picture of the current state allows them to
visualize the likely future states and develop options to respond rather than react
to events as they unfold. Computers also allow forces to increase lethality at
decisive locations and times, increasing tempo and reducing the cost of victory.
(3) Communications
(a) Communications is the principal interaction between commanders and those
who influence or execute their decisions. Communications in modern CIS provide
the commander with near real-time information that can adapt and respond to his
requirements. The following are means of communications:
i. Personal Contact. This includes voice communications (including
telephones, combat net radio, trunk communications, and satellite
communications) and video teleconferencing.
ii. LOs. (See Annex E).
iii. Document Transfer.
iv. Data Exchange.
(b) While all these methods remain useful for the future, voice traffic and data
distribution remain the primary methods of passing information. From an
operational point of view, face-to-face contacts or exchange of LOs assure the
commander that his intent and assessment is understood correctly. Redundant
communications ensure that the designated recipient receives the communication.
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(c) Fixed-message formats help format information in all four means. Formatted
messages define the contents closely and minimise the use of free text. Both the
sending and receiving systems can process such messages automatically.
Currently APP-11, NATO Message Catalogue, provides a set of standard message
formats.
(4) Information Activities. The use of information activities by friendly or enemy
forces can affect CIS. Close coordination between all staff sections is necessary to
reduce the effect of friendly information activities on communications, including the
impact of imposing a restrictive emission control state for deception or OPSEC.
Information activities seeking to protect CIS should always be an important part of the
planning process. (See AJP-3.10.)
0308 Information Management Activities

IM consists of five activities: collecting, processing, storing, displaying, and disseminating
information. In practice, the different activities overlap, effectively complementing one another
within the command support. CIS are critical to the effective functioning of information
management activities:
a. Collecting
(1) Collecting is the continuous acquisition of relevant information about the mission
and operational variables by any means, including direct observation, other organic
resources, or other official, unofficial, or public sources from the information
environment. The commander establishes the priorities for collecting through the
CCIRs. He continuously revises these CCIRs during the operations process as the
situation changes. Collection takes two basic forms: information push and information
pull.
(2) An information-push system collects information by pushing it from the source to
the user, either as the information becomes available or according to a schedule. This
system is best for managing routine reports, which include information that is not time
sensitive. A properly designed information-push system alleviates the problem of
distracting subordinate units from their operations with excessive requests for
information.
(3) An information-push system does not work well in obtaining information to meet
unforeseen information needs. The difficulty of fully anticipating the commander’s
needs in an information-push system can lead to information overload by attempting to
deliver all possible information.
(4) In an information-pull system, the user generates IR, and the source provides
information in response. The common database can serve this system by allowing
authorized users to interrogate the database for information and receive it in their
requested format.
(5) If the information is not readily available, the demand triggers a “demand cascade”
as the requirement filters through the chain of command until it reaches the appropriate
level for collecting data. To avoid demand cascade, commanders should keep some
dedicated collection assets that answer directly to them.
(6) An information-pull system can help focus scarce resources on critical tasks. It can
deliver information specifically tailored to the commander’s information needs and only
produce information the commander requests. An information-pull system provides
exceptional information, and commanders should reserve their use of information-pull
collection for exceptional cases. Nevertheless, a commander must have the capability
in his command support.
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(7) Command support should combine the best characteristics of information-push and
information-pull collection. Information-push is the most efficient way to provide
information needed routinely. Command support should anticipate commanders’ needs
and push routine information to an easily accessible local database. This solution
avoids the danger of information overload associated with information-push collection.
It also circumvents some of the delays normally associated with information-pull
collection.
(8) Commanders will likely not recognize all their information needs initially, so
command support must ensure that truly critical, time-sensitive information is pushed
directly to them without delay. After critical information is passed directly between the
concerned echelons, both echelons should inform intermediate echelons through
normal channels.
(9) CIS collect relevant information to answer IRs. Exploiting the information
environment, ISTAR assets, reports, and messages from friendly forces constitute the
primary means used to collect information with CIS. While ISTAR assets are forms of
CIS, they support the development of intelligence about the enemy and environment.
As such, ISTAR are part of the intelligence operating system rather than C2 directly,
and will not be discussed further. The intelligence operating system provides
intelligence as relevant information.
(10) Modern CIS give access to information available through the Internet and joint
and multinational sources. They increase the system’s capacity to monitor more
sources over a wider area for a longer time. The improved processing capabilities of
modern CIS allow greater capacity and speed of collection to increase the timeliness
and accuracy of the common operational picture. The versatility of many CIS allows
the commander to tailor collection specifically on relevant information and shift
collection as priorities shift.
b. Processing
(1) Processing is raising the meaning of information from data to understanding.
Processing adds meaning to relevant information through progressively higher-level
and complex cognitive methods to create a common operational picture. It includes
lower-level mechanical and mechanistic methods such as organizing, collating,
plotting, and arranging data and information. However, effective processing requires
analysis and evaluation (higher-level cognitive methods) for it to become knowledge
and to support SA. Processing depends primarily on well-trained and adaptive analysts
to provide insight. Decision makers apply judgment to knowledge to achieve
understanding. Understanding enables informed decisions with less than perfect data.
Understanding generates action.
(2) The staff must filter raw data and information to identify relevant information based
on specified criteria (timely, accurate, usable, complete, precise, and related to overall
IRs) to create the common operational picture. This applies especially to exceptional
information.
(3) As the commander applies his education, experience, intuition, and judgment, he
transforms knowledge into SA. This understanding, plus his visualization of an
operational environment, leads to clear intent, comprehensive command guidance,
rapid decisions, and better C2 during execution.
(4) CIS can automate the mechanical aspects and routine functions of processing that
machines can accomplish more efficiently than people can. This frees people to
concentrate on higher-level tasks specifically requiring human cognition and judgment
to recognize opportunities, threats, and gaps in information. Automation has made
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great advances in information processing, but human beings remain the most effective
system for determining relevance and fusing information. Shared databases make
relevant information available electronically at all HQs. CIS automation of processing
can speed and improve the frequency and quality of the staff’s continuous estimates.
(5) CIS provide decision aids that can leverage data and information to provide
expanded capability to support decisions during the entire operations process. During
planning, CIS can help establish a common operational picture that leads to SA for
decision making. Mission planning and rehearsal tools provide improved resolution,
precision, and accuracy on the essential task of visualization. The degree to which CIS
allow the commander more quickly to develop his visualization increases the tempo of
operations. In mission analysis, CIS provide the status of available assets. They
facilitate SA and provide tools to assist in COA development, analysis, and comparison.
CIS enable the commander, staff, and subordinates to plan operations collaboratively.
Following the commander’s decision, CIS support the staff in producing and
transmitting the order.
(6) During preparation, CIS allow commanders and staffs to revise and refine the plan
rapidly. The staff can conduct more coordination and liaison electronically through CIS.
CIS allow for a higher-quality rehearsal based on information developed during war
gaming. CIS also provide timely information on the progress of task organization,
movements, pre-combat checks and inspections, and logistics preparations.
(7) During execution, CIS can help assess variances between expectations during
planning and outcomes during executing (based on real-time information), analyse their
significance (whether positive or negative), and analyse possible actions to solve or
take advantage of the situation. CIS may support development and analysis of
decisions for keeping the operation on track or exploiting opportunities. They allow
resynchronization of actions to accord with the new decision. This capability for rapid
resynchronization reduces one impediment to changing a COA during execution: the
risk of failure or defeat from loss of synchronization caused by a change in the plan.
c. Storing
(1) Storing retains relevant information in any form, usually for orderly, timely retrieval
and documentation, until it is needed for exercising C2. Information is stored because
not all information collected or processed can be displayed at the same time, nor is it
all relevant.
(2) Common databases provide powerful tools for transforming data into information
and knowledge required for military decision. The database provides a bridge allowing
different systems with different purposes to work together or interoperate to support
military decisions. Using a database allows software applications to permit operators
and analysts to sort, store, organize, and query data by unit identification, geographic
location, resource status, or consumption.
(3) The storage of information by CIS includes hardware and software for entering the
data into the storage device and for retrieving it as needed. These databases are no
longer located in one place or on one machine. Modern CIS software allows data on
multiple machines to combine into one shared, distributed database. They allow user-
scalable profiles and search engines to combine information from multiple databases
to answer the commander and organization’s information needs.
d. Displaying
(1) Displaying is representing relevant information in a usable, easily understood audio
or visual form tailored to the needs of the user that conveys the common operational
picture for decision making and exercising C2 functions. The displays should be
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meaningful images, rather than simply masses of data. There are three ways to present
information: written reports, verbal narrative reports, and graphic displays. Standard
formats ensure that all relevant information is included and assist the user in finding
needed information. Displays do not require lengthy instructions, thereby shortening
communications. Properly executed displays use doctrinal terms, graphical
conventions, and formats for presenting information to convey complex concepts.
(2) Graphic displays visually represent current or future operational information. When
possible, commanders and staffs graphically portray quantifiable information using
standard formats with automated or manual means. Graphic information should—
(a) Display symbols, graphics, and terminology consistent with APP-6.
(b) Display relevant information only.
(c) Display information clearly and understandably.
(d) Display information accurately, reliably, and in a timely manner.
(e) Change promptly and easily as the information is updated.
(f) Allow rapid distribution to higher, lower, and adjacent units.
(3) A good display should allow a commander to look across the area of interest in
space and time, and rapidly focus on decisive points, identifying opportunities, threats,
or gaps in information. Good displays should also allow the commander to
communicate directions to subordinates in a manner that facilitates understanding of
the desired end state.
(4) Modern CIS have created new techniques for displaying data as information. These
include imagery; video, colour graphics, and digital overlays; mapping; and database
technology. CIS allow tailorable displays to suit mission needs that are scalable to the
commander’s requirements based on his echelon of command. These CIS allow
displays that update dynamically and automatically to highlight variances in between
the plan and its execution. They allow the commander to recognize immediately key
elements—opportunities, threats, and gaps in information—of the situation and the
relationships among them, assess the implications, and determine an acceptable
decision to respond to the situation.
e. Disseminating
(1) Disseminating is communicating relevant information of any kind from one person
or place to another in a usable form by any means to improve understanding or to
initiate or govern action. It takes two basic forms: broadcast or point-to-point
dissemination. IM activities should exhibit a judicious combination of broadcast and
point-to-point forms of dissemination.
(a) Broadcast. Senders may broadcast information simultaneously to a broad
audience—anyone with access to the information network. Broadcast gets
information to the widest audience in the shortest amount of time. Broadcasting
also transmits information to the entire audience. However, the information cannot
be tailored to any specific commander’s needs. Undisciplined use of this method
can quickly lead to information overload.
(b) Point-to-Point. In point-to-point dissemination, information goes to a specific
user or group of users. Information then passes sequentially from one user to the
next. CIS can tailor information to meet the specific needs of each recipient. Point-
to-point dissemination has built-in control mechanisms that broadcast transmission
lacks. Information reaches a broad audience slowly, and the chances of distortion
increase through each node of dissemination.
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(2) Modern CIS have their own capability to disseminate information. This capability is
so embedded that it is literally part of the hardware and software of computers. This is
most evident in database-to-database information transfers. Database-to-database
transfer is inherently flexible and provides the capacity for managing large amounts of
information and disseminating it throughout the AOO. CIS enable dissemination
through communications that—
(a) Digitize, compress, and broadcast multimedia information using increased
bandwidth, high-efficiency transport systems.
(b) Encrypt and provide multilevel information security.
(c) Manage information networks with smart software that dynamically allocates
throughput capacity on demand and then routes and disseminates information.
(3) Land forces may also rely on some non-military CIS not under their control for
dissemination. These means include—
(a) HN public service networks and postal and telegraph systems.
(b) Commercial communications satellite systems.
(c) Commercial Global Positioning System receivers.
(d) Commercially developed software applications.
(e) Commercial, international news media.
(f) Public-accessed databases and bulletin boards.
(4) These non-military CIS offer an alternative to military means, but only after carefully
assessing the security risks. Using non-military CIS may also reduce the requirement
for deployed military CIS. The use of a non-military system allows planners to
compensate for system shortages and to meet the surge of information requirements
in the early stages of deployment.
SECTION III – PERSONNEL
0309 General
The most important element of command support is people—people who assist the
commander and exercise control on his behalf. The personnel dedicated to the CIS include
the staff and deputy commander. The other elements exist to serve the personnel and the
commander. (See Annex B for details of staff organization and staff officers.)
0310 Staff
1. Purpose. The staff exists to assist and support the commander in making and implementing
decisions. The staff’s effort must always focus on supporting the commander and on helping
him support his subordinate units. The staff supports the commander by providing him relevant
information, making estimates and recommendations, preparing plans and orders, and
monitoring execution. The staff constitutes the most important element among the personnel
dedicated to the CIS.
a. The commander provides his staff with leadership, direction, and guidance. The staff
undertakes all its activities on behalf of the commander. It has no authority by itself; it
derives authority from the commander and exercises it only in his name. The commander
uses the staff to exercise C2 when he cannot do so himself.
b. The larger a staff, the longer it takes to perform its functions. A larger staff occupies
more space, emits a larger electromagnetic signal, and is less mobile than a small one.
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Consequently, it is more vulnerable to detection and attack. A large staff with numerous
specialists may be more capable of detailed analysis and planning than a smaller one, but
mission command values speed and agility over precision and certainty. Commanders
should keep the size of staffs to a minimum to facilitate a high operating tempo and
minimise the space and facilities that the HQ requires.
2. Functions. The staff operates the CIS that support the commander. All staff organizations
and procedures exist to fulfil three important functions.
a. Support the Commander. The most important role of the staff is to support and advise
the commander during the operations process. They do this through IM and controlling
their own functional area.
(1) The primary product the staff provides is information for the commander’s SA. The
staff collect data, process it into useable information in the form of the common
operational picture and staff estimates, and make recommendations based on their
expertise in functional areas. This allows the commander to identify critical
requirements and achieve accurate SA faster than his enemy or adversary.
(2) The commander structures formal staff processes to provide the two types of
information associated with decision making. The first is the common operational
picture, which, when combined with judgment, leads to SA for decision making. In
providing SA information, the staff provides part of the dynamic feedback mechanism
essential for control and subsequent decision making.
(3) The staff also disseminates execution information. While the commander will often
disseminate some execution information personally (for example, the commander’s
intent), he relies on his staff to communicate the majority of it in the form of plans and
orders. The staff must communicate the commander’s decisions, and the intent behind
them, throughout the organization efficiently and effectively to quickly focus the unit on
mission accomplishment.
(4) Finally, the staff exercises control over its functional area. A well-trained, trusted
staff, given significant authority for decisions and execution within its functional areas
and based on commander’s intent, frees the commander from routine decisions and
problems to focus on key aspects of the mission or operation. Standard operating
procedures establish these responsibilities, or the commander delegates them for
specific situations.
b. Assist Subordinate Units
(1) The staff assists subordinate units second to assisting the commander. The ability
of subordinate units to exist, train, and fight depends on the actions of their higher
echelon HQ staff. A proficient staff works in an effective, efficient, and cooperative
manner with higher and lower echelon HQs. The staff assists subordinate units by
providing resources to them to accomplish their commander’s decisions, representing
subordinates’ concerns to the command, clarifying orders and directives, and passing
all relevant information quickly.
(2) The staff establishes and maintains a high degree of coordination and cooperation
with staffs of higher, lower, supporting, supported, and adjacent units. The staff bases
these relationships on mutual respect, developed through a conscientious, determined,
and helpful approach focused on solving problems. Favourable personal relationships
among all members of a HQ staff and with the staffs of other HQs cultivate the desired
relationships.
c. Inform Other Headquarters. Keep subordinate, higher, adjacent, supported, and
supporting HQs informed.
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(1) The staff must pass all relevant information to subordinate echelon, higher echelon,
adjacent, supporting, and supported HQs as quickly as possible after determining that
the information has value to the recipient. The key here is relevant information. The
staff should not pass meaningless masses of data, but relevant information. This often
means the staff must selectively pass information to various recipients, based on their
need for it. While the staff should not overload other HQs with useless data, sending
incomplete information sooner is better than sending complete information too late. The
staff should highlight key information for the recipient. In some cases, the staff passes
information directly from one HQ to another; in others, it provides its own analysis
before it disseminates it further. The staff can clarify execution information sent to
subordinates, clarifying the commander’s intent or adding context to the information.
The use of common, distributed databases can accelerate this function; however, they
cannot replace personal contact to add context.
(2) Keeping other HQs informed contributes to SA at all HQs. The staff supplements
the commander’s direct communications by providing clarification through staff or
technical channels. It can either pass routine information required by the other HQs or
pass critical information based upon the CCIRs. Information passed directly from a
subordinate staff to a higher commander should be limited to the higher commander’s
CCIRs. All other information should go through staff or technical channels. When
authorized, the staff may also apprise its counterparts at other HQs as to the content
of the information being passed from its commander to their commanders to assist the
higher echelon staffs in performing their own support functions to their commanders.
3. Staff Relationships. Staff effectiveness depends in part upon the following relationships.
a. Commander and the Staff. When the commander assigns a staff member a mission,
he also delegates the necessary authority for him to do it. He provides guidance, resources,
and support. The commander must foster an organizational climate of mutual trust,
cooperation, and teamwork.
(1) The commander and his staff focus on recognizing and anticipating tactical
activities to decide and act faster than the enemy. The relationship between a
commander and his staff must be one of loyalty, respect, and initiative within the scope
of his intent. However, the loyalty and respect must not detract from hard truth in
assessments on the part of the staff. Before the decision, the staff gives honest,
independent thought and recommendations to the commander. Likewise, the staff
provides an accurate common operational picture after the operation commences,
even if it conflicts with his decision.
(2) The commander trains the staff. He may delegate routine staff training to the chief
of staff, but the commander must shape the staff into a cohesive group that can work
together to understand what information he deems important. The staff must know his
leadership style, understand his intent, and be able to anticipate the outcome of current
operations to develop concepts for follow-on missions.
b. Staff Integration and Teamwork
(1) A staff has complete cooperation among all branches and sections. A commander,
chief of staff (COS), and executive officer (XO) each play a role in fostering this
atmosphere. However, infrequent opportunities to exercise under operational
conditions can frustrate this effective climate. The commander and his veteran staff
members train to overcome the lack of familiarity.
(2) While all sections have clearly defined responsibilities, none can operate effectively
in isolation. Coordination among them is important. The commander identifies
interaction between staff sections early in the process of organizing the HQ. He equips
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and mans the staff to work not only with other sections within the HQ, but also with
similar sections in other HQs.
(3) Forming ad hoc HQs, organizations, and units, and integrating additional personnel
from coalition partners have characterized many recent operations. Forming a well-
integrated staff team as the basis for counteracting these influences is critical. A well-
integrated staff provides the core into which additional members may be integrated and
ad hoc organizations and units added.
0311 Deputy Commander

The deputy commander at all levels is the principal assistant to the commander.
a. The relationship between the deputy and the staff is unique. Staff members do not work
for the deputy commander unless the commander directs this relationship. Each
commander describes his deputy commander’s roles, duties, and relationships with the
COS, the staff, and the commanders of subordinate units. Normally, he assigns specific
fields of interest and responsibility to his deputies to decentralize decision making while
maintaining overall command.
b. Deputy commanders normally do not have coordinating or special staffs. When they
have specific responsibilities, the HQ staff assists them as the commander prescribes.
Deputy commanders give orders to the COS (or the staff) within the commander’s limits.
They may go to the COS at any time for staff assistance. If a deputy commander needs a
staff, the commander may detail officers from the HQ or subordinate units to help him, or
make a subordinate unit’s HQ available to him.
c. Specific circumstances are particularly important in the role of the deputy commander.
These circumstances are—
(1) Temporary absence of the commander.
(2) Succession of command.
(3) Delegation of authority.
0312 Chief of Staff

The COS should be an experienced commander in his own right who coordinates the work of
the staff divisions by giving clear direction and setting priorities with the understanding he
possesses. He also coordinates and fuses the work of the wider HQ, including the joint force
elements. It is his role to ensure the staff pulls together as a team and has good ésprit de
corps, making the headquarters feel more like a family than a large impersonal organization,
especially in a multinational environment.
0313 Training
Training tactically and technically competent leaders and teams is a key enabler to effective
command support. The best technology cannot support C2 without trained personnel. CIS can
require more training than it eliminates. Training techniques, procedures, and methodologies
must evolve and adapt along with doctrine and technology to ensure they remain efficient,
effective, and appropriate in developing and sustaining competent leaders and teams.
SECTION IV – EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

0314 General
Equipment and facilities include all equipment not found in CIS. The facilities and equipment
must meet several administrative requirements, including the physiological needs of
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personnel—shelter, rest, sanitation, food, and water. Additionally, they must have internal
communications, light and power, and collective mobility.
0315 Support Equipment

Command support requires sustainment and maintenance of personnel and equipment.
Equipment that may serve for sustainment includes transportation, maintenance assets,
shelter, medical support, and supplies for personnel and equipment. At higher tactical levels,
equipment sustaining the command support is usually dedicated as part of the HQ and HQ
unit.
0316 Facilities
Facilities are structures or locations providing a work environment. While the unit
establishment normally prescribes the facilities of command support, they may also consist of
civilian structures and joint platforms (aircraft, ships, or boats). C2 facilities of land forces are
not necessarily restricted to land. The C2 facilities for land forces on operations may vary
widely from unit to unit—tentage; armoured vehicles; tactical vehicles, vans, and trailers; or a
combination of these. Facilities provide for a number of functions.
a. Protection. Facilities provide the commander and staff a protected environment
(shelter and light discipline and CBRN protection) for them to work. Facilities protect C2
equipment from the environment.
b. Focus. Facilities serve as a focal point—a place in which the commander and staff can
view all the information they need for C2 and subordinate commanders can get information.
This aspect may diminish in importance with distributed CIS and tactical Internet.
c. Face-to-Face Meetings. Facilities provide a place for face-to-face meetings. Video
teleconferencing may replace some actual meetings, but it remains critical for a
commander to see his subordinates and read their body language, which is missing in
digital communications.
d. Information Display. Facilities display information not only for the commander and his
staff (their primary purpose), but also for public consumption through the press.
SECTION V – DOCTRINE
0317 General
While some doctrine may be prescriptive and mandatory, doctrine normally sets basic
principles and functions along with approaches and methods for generating combat power.
Doctrine establishes guidance on procedures for problem solving and communicates the
wisdom and judgment derived from past operations to units in the field. They constitute the
starting point for developing procedures for specific units, places, and threats. Doctrinal
procedures cannot be applied absolutely without interpretation to account for the specifics of
a given situation.
0318 Procedures
1. Procedures are standard and detailed steps that describe how to perform tasks. A
procedure begins with an event and results in a product, which may be the initiating event for
another procedure.
2. Procedures can be a source of organizational competence—by improving a staff’s
efficiency or by increasing the operational tempo. Procedures can be especially useful in
improving the coordination of several people who must cooperate to accomplish repetitive
tasks—such as the internal functioning of a command post. However, applied blindly to the
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wrong tasks or the wrong situations, they can lead to ineffective, even counterproductive,
performance.
3. The commander and staff must use, modify, or discard procedures, as the situation
requires; they are not rules to follow automatically.
4. The commander should design or use procedures for simplicity and speed. Procedures
should be simple to perform quickly and smoothly under conditions of extreme stress and
speedy enough to generate tempo. Streamlined staff planning sequences are preferable to
deliberate, elaborate ones. Procedures should be compressible when time is short—which is
frequent during operations. Commanders establish procedures to streamline operations and
aid in integrating new people and attachments. Procedures describe routine actions, thus
eliminating repetitive decisions (such as where to put people in a tactical operations centre,
how to set up a tactical operations centre, and how to set up march formations).
5. Procedures serve when people become unable to perform their duties. Subordinates
can step in and use established procedures to continue to operate.
6. Established procedures do not cover every situation that may arise. Situations may
arise that require systematic activity for a solution. When the commander can translate that
activity relatively easily into procedures, he does so. The commander may evaluate whether
to incorporate the developed (or improved) procedure into the standard operating procedure
(SOP) or doctrine.
0319 Standard Operating Procedures

1. SOPs standardize techniques and procedures to enhance effectiveness and flexibility.
As the name implies, SOPs standardize routine or recurring actions not needing the
commander’s personal involvement. SOPs may also include rare or abnormal events that
could cause mission failure. In NATO forces, SOPs may require national concurrence.
2. SOPs reduce the amount of instructions the commander or his staff need to address
on operations. They provide a common base of understanding for the staff and subordinate
commanders so everybody knows how to execute routine events. Finally, SOPs serve as a
starting point for new personnel to learn the routine of the organization. The unit develops
SOPs from doctrinal sources, applicable portions of the higher echelon HQ’s published
procedures, the commander’s guidance, and techniques and procedures acquired from
experience.
3. SOPs for NATO land forces should be written in plain English or French for better
comprehension by non-native speakers of English and French. In general, SOPs apply until
commanders change them to meet altered conditions or practices. Benefits of SOPs include
the following:
a. Simplified, brief combat orders.
b. Enhanced mutual understanding and teamwork among commanders, staffs, and
troops.
c. Established synchronized staff drills.
d. Established, abbreviated, or accelerated decision-making techniques.
SECTION VI – ORGANIZATION FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL
0320 General
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Organization is an important tool for command support. To organize effectively, a commander

applies the fundamentals and principles of organization for C2, organizes the staff, and
organizes for continuous C2. The basic C2 organization for land forces is the command post.
0321 Fundamentals
1. Information Flow
a. Organizational decisions establish the chain of command (command authority) and
task organization and impact C2 directly. Organizational decisions affect the structure of
the flow of advice to the commander about operational decisions. In large part, the
organization establishes formal communications channels and determines how information
is distributed throughout the force.
b. Information flows informally and unofficially—between individuals according to
personal relationships—as well as according to formally established channels. These
informal channels provide an important redundancy and are especially important in team
building.
c. A battle rhythm has to be established within the HQ, which must also be known by
subordinate commanders. An established battle rhythm supports the flow of information as
everybody knows when important decisions may be made and when new or updated
information may be available.
2. Command Authority
a. When land forces operate in a multinational environment, command authority may be
less defined and more open to interpretation. In such cases, the land forces commander
may seek clarification from his superior or from written documents concerning specific
authority and limitations. He must identify and use the agreed command authority just as
he would national command and support relationships. (See Annex C for formal definition
of the NATO command authority.) Appendix 1 to Annex C presents a graphic comparing
the authorities of the various NATO command authorities.
b. Establishing clear command authority is fundamental to organizing for all operations.
These relationships can achieve clear responsibilities and authorities between subordinate
and supporting units. Some forces are given command authority that limit a commander’s
authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each
command authority allows a multinational commander to establish clear responsibilities
when organizing his force. A commander can determine whether and how he can employ
subordinate formations or units by answering the following questions:
(1) Can he employ the unit for any purpose (can he give the unit a mission)?
(2) If the mission (the purpose of the unit’s employment) is not within his purview, can
he give the unit tasks within the given mission?
(3) Can he break up the formation or unit, or must he retain its integrity?
(4) Are there any restrictions on using subordinate formations or units (for example, for
hostilities only or for a specified duration or place)?
c. Commanders designate command authority within their authority to weigh the decisive
operation and support the concept of operations. Task organization also helps subordinate
and supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and contribute to
achieving the commander’s intent. Commanders should consider the inherent
responsibilities in establishing command authority.
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0322 Principles
Organization, both in peace and war, starts with the chain of command. Organization of C2
should aim to create unity integrity, reasonable spans of control, and effective delegation of
decision making.
a. Chain of Command
(1) The chain of command establishes authority and responsibility in an unbroken
succession from one commander to another. Each commander has designated
authority and responsibility in a given sphere. Command authorities specify the type
and degree of authority one commander has over another as well as specify the type
and degree of support one commander provides another.
(2) The allied land force commander also provides for relations with national
commanders and authorities who communicate with their national forces under his
command. He also establishes relations with national forces in his AOO who remain
under national command but could affect his operations.
b. Span of Control
(1) The organization should ensure a reasonable span of control, which refers to the
number of subordinates or activities under a single commander. NATO land force
commanders normally have narrower spans of control than national commanders
organized at a similar level. The more fluid and rapidly changing the situation, the fewer
subordinate elements a commander can supervise closely. In such situations, a
commander either receives fewer units or uses the principles of mission command.
Large spans of control require commanders to let their subordinates work out the
details of execution.
(2) Commanders establish task organizations that enable them and their subordinate
commanders to command without information overload. Commanders carefully avoid
exceeding the span of control capabilities of subordinates. Allocating subordinate
commanders more units gives them greater flexibility and increases options and
combinations. However, increasing the number of subordinate units increases the
number of decisions commanders have to make. This slows down the reaction time
among decision makers.
c. Unit Integrity
(1) Task organizing into self-reliant task groups increases each commander’s freedom
of action and decreases the need for centralized coordination of support. Commanders
should task organize forces to suit the situation. However, the commander must
reconcile this desire for organizational flexibility with the need to create implicit
understanding and mutual trust, which familiarity and stable working relationships
produce.
(2) One way to balance these demands is to observe national unit integrity in
organizing for C2. There are two dimensions to unit integrity.
(a) Commanders organize task forces based on standing HQs, their assigned
forces, and habitually associated slice elements, maintaining national associations
where possible. Where this is not feasible and ad hoc organizations are formed,
commanders allow time for training and establishing functional working
relationships and procedures.
(b) Once commanders have organized and committed a force, they avoid changing
it during operations unless the benefits of a change clearly outweigh the
disadvantages.
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d. Delegation of Decision Making

(1) A commander directs subordinate commanders rather than individual subordinate
units, letting subordinate commanders direct their units. Commanders can accept less-
than-perfect solutions from their subordinates if subordinates make them rapidly and
decisively within the context of their commander’s intent and keep the commanders
informed of their solutions.
(2) Maintaining the high tempo of operations to retain the initiative requires many
decisions at each echelon of command simultaneously. These factors place a premium
on intelligent delegation of decision-making and executing authority rather than on
centralization.
SECTION VII – THE COMMAND POST
0323 General
The command post (CP) is the basic organization of the unit HQ for exercising C2 during
operations.
0324 Definition
A CP is a unit’s HQ where the commander and staff perform their activities. In combat, a unit
or sub-unit’s HQ is often divided into echelons; the echelon in which the unit or subunit
commander is located or from which he operates is called a command post. The commander
exercises C2 over the force through and with the CP regardless of his location.
0325 Purpose
The CP provides a facility for exercising C2. It is organized flexibly to meet the changing
situations and requirements of a specific operation or action. CPs process and disseminate
information and orders. They sustain the operation or action through continuity, planning, and
coordinating the combat functions. The primary products the CP provides are information for
the commander and staff to support SA and execution information for subordinate and
supporting units. The goal is to enable the commander to make and the force to execute
decisions faster than the enemy can (developing greater tempo than the enemy’s tempo).
0326 Functions
Most functions performed in a CP directly relate to assessing and directing the on-going
operation, planning future operations or actions, or supporting the force. CP functions provide
both types of information: the common operational picture and execution information. CP
functions that directly contribute to these tasks include the following:
a. Developing and disseminating orders.
b. Conducting information management.
c. Submitting staff recommendations for decisions.
d. Controlling operations:
(1) Directing and regulating actions.
(2) Performing critical ongoing functions of execution (listed in Chapter 4).
e. Assessing operations.
f. Overseeing CP administration:
(1) Displacing CPs.
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(2) Providing CP security.

(3) Organizing the tactical operations centre for operations.
(4) Maintaining continuity of operations.
0327 Organization
In addition to the design and organizational considerations listed earlier in this chapter, the
following affects how the unit organizes its CPs:
a. Missions, tasks, and resources. The commander considers what to do, and organizes
and allocates sufficient resources to each element. The efficiency and effectiveness of the
commander and staff are important concerns.
b. Functional responsibilities and authority. Functional grouping of staff sections, or
elements of staff sections, promotes efficiency and coordination. When the CP is
echeloned, the commander clearly defines the authority of each echelon, usually in the
SOP.
c. Echelons. The commander may organize C2 elements into echelons to allow greater
effectiveness and efficiency. This redundancy enables him to move freely while maintaining
C2 and makes his presence felt over a wider area. Echeloning CPs depends on good,
continuous communications.
d. Communications. The commander maintains communications to all nodes during
displacements.
e. Training. The commander organizes and trains his CPs to do in peacetime what is
required in combat, not what is convenient or expedient.
SECTION VIII – CONTINUITY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
0328 General
The organization that commanders establish should provide continuity of command. Continuity
of C2 establishes continuity in conducting functions, tasks, or duties. It includes the functions
and duties of the commander as well as the supporting functions and duties the staff performs.
Continuity implies continuity over time as well as continuity over the entire AOO.
0329 Requirements
Continuity has two requirements. The first is to have a properly designated commander
available to exercise command authority. The second requirement is to organize command
support so that the commander may exercise that authority continuously. The commander
trains the unit, including succession of command, transfer of control among facilities,
continuous operations, and transitions during fast-paced operations to achieve continuity.
0330 Location
The HQ may attain continuity through related considerations of echelonment and location.
Echeloning C2 elements places the minimum resources for C2 functions forward, while
keeping more elaborate facilities farther from enemy detection and attack. Echeloning adds
redundancy to communications within the force and with other forces. An appropriate location
can increase the survivability of CPs by making enemy detection and attack more difficult.
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0331 Time Management

1. Time management plays an especially important role in continuity of C2. First, time
management allows continuity in operations tempo. Effective time management includes
anticipating reaction times by friendly and enemy forces, making decisions, and disseminating
orders in time for formations to react within the operation to seize or maintain the initiative to
maintain or increase the tempo.
2. Time management requires planning and organizing the availability of personnel,
equipment, communications, and facilities so that necessary elements are available to provide
command support 24 hours a day for extended periods. Staffing the CP must meet anticipated
requirements, provide a “surge” capability for unanticipated requirements, and mitigate the
results of sleep deprivation on personnel, including commanders.
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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CHAPTER 4 EXERCISING COMMAND AND CONTROL
0401 Overview
Exercising command and control (C2) is dynamic and occurs throughout the operations
process of planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing military operations. Chapter 4
discusses exercising C2 in terms of these activities as well as supporting topics. Because
assessing occurs throughout the operations process, this chapter discusses it in general and
then again during the discussion of planning, preparing, and executing. Figure 4-1 shows the
activities of the operations process in relation to each other throughout a hypothetical
operation.
Figure 4-1. Distribution of Operations Process Activities
0402 General
While the activities are cyclical and continuous, they do not necessarily occur sequentially, and
the commander guides them throughout. Planning, preparing, and executing do not
necessarily have distinct start and end points. Planning is continuous. While preparing for or
executing one operation, the unit plans (or at least refines plans) for branches and sequels to
the current operation or for the next operation. Preparation is also continuous whenever a unit
is not executing an operation. Preparing for a specific operation starts with receiving a warning
order (WNGO) for that operation. It always overlaps with planning and continues through
execution for some subordinate units. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three
activities. Subordinate units within the same command may be in different stages of the

Plan Prepare Execute
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process at any given time. Table 4-1 depicts the makeup of the activities this chapter
discusses.
Table 4-1. Exercising Command and Control
Plan Prepare Execute

 Decision-making process  Reconnaissance operations  Decide
 Orders and plans  Security operations  Execution
 Force protection  Adjustment
 Revise and refine the plan  Direct
 Coordination and liaison  Apply combat power
 Rehearsals  Synchronize operations
 Task organization  Maintain continuity
 Training
 Troop movement
 Precombat checks and
inspections
 Set logistic conditions
 Integration of new soldiers and
units
Assessment During Planning Assessment During Preparation Assessment During Execution
 Monitor the situation  Monitor preparations  Monitor operations
 Monitor MOPs and MOEs  Evaluate preparations  Evaluate progress
 Evaluate courses of action
Continuous Assessment
 Situational awareness—sources, solutions
 Monitoring—situation, operations, MOPs, MOEs, and variances
 Evaluating—forecasting; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative
MOE measure of effectiveness MOP measure of performance
0403 Intelligence
1. Intelligence is critical to effective C2 throughout the operations process. To maintain the
initiative, the commander seeks to make decisions quickly. This requires an ability to assess
an operational environment, assess the enemy’s decision-making cycle, identify opportunities
for exploitation, and disseminate critical information. Intelligence directly supports the
commander by producing assessments and reports that aid decision making for probable
courses of action (COAs).
2 .Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) is an integrated
intelligence and operations set of capabilities that synchronizes and integrates the planning
and operations of all collection capabilities by processing, exploiting, and disseminating the
resulting information in direct support of planning, preparation, and execution of operations.
The requested information from the ISTAR capabilities comes in the form of various ISTAR
results sent to the commander and his staff elements.
0404 Information Operations

Modern warfare relies more than ever on the capability to collect, process, display, store, and
disseminate information and orders faster and better than the enemy can. This capability
requires a complex technology in a C2 system and a solid and well-trained C2 structure. These
requirements constitute vulnerabilities that the enemy can attack. Therefore, each party during
operations has to degrade the enemy capability to take correct decisions and disseminate
them. At the same time, a fundamental task is to save friendly C2 systems from enemy actions
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against them. For this reason, information operations, including C2 warfare and counter-C2
warfare, assume greater importance now in the general conduct of operations. (See AJP-3.10
for allied information operations doctrine.)
SECTION II – ASSESS
0405 General
Assessing is the continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation, and execution—of
the current situation and progress of an operation and the evaluation of it against measures of
effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) to make decisions and
adjustments. Commanders and staffs base assessments on their situational awareness (SA).
They strive for SA to evaluate progress, forecast opportunities or threats, and identify variances
from the plan in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Taken together, these tasks
provide the feedback necessary for control throughout the operations process.
0406 Tasks
Assessing consists of two distinct tasks: monitoring the current situation and progress of the
operation and evaluating the operation against MOEs and MOPs. These tasks take different
forms during planning, preparing, and executing. Together they allow commanders to assess
the situation in terms of expectations and progress of the operation.
a. Monitoring
(1) Definition. Monitoring is the continuous observation of the common operational
picture to identify indicators of opportunities for success, threats to the force, and gaps
in information. The commander and his staff monitor the current situation or ongoing
operation through the common operational picture. The commander and staff monitor
facts and assumptions to ensure they remain valid and to seek new facts and
assumptions that will affect planning and current or future operations. They also look
for indicators that—
(a) The plan could accomplish its mission more effectively and efficiently
(opportunities for success).
(b) Some action may cause failure (threat to the mission or force).
(c) Critical information is missing (gaps in information).
(2) Considerations. Often, messages and other reports are adequate for monitoring.
Modern computer information systems (CIS) allow monitoring to a greater level of detail
at higher echelons than before, but the best monitoring is least intrusive to the unit or
event.
b. Evaluating
(1) Definition. Evaluating is comparing relevant information on the situation or
operation against criteria to determine success or progress. Evaluating uses relevant
information from the common operational picture to measure, analyse, and report the
performance of forces against MOEs and MOPs to identify variances from the plan or
its assumptions and to forecast trends. Staff sections incorporate assessments that
look at factors such as timelines, distances, loss rates, consumption rates, unit
effectiveness, enemy actions, and facts and assumptions. They incorporate
evaluations into their staff estimates that present recommendations to the commander.
The commander considers these recommendations, makes a decision, and directs
action to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative.
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(2) Considerations. The commander and his staff continuously evaluate the current
and projected situation to determine if changes are necessary to accomplish the
mission, better achieve the commander’s intent, or protect the force. One aid to
evaluation is the following list of questions. By evaluating the answers to these
questions against the MOEs and MOPs, the commander and staff determine variances
from the plan and their significance.
(a) Can the force meet the commander’s intent?
(b) Where is the enemy or adversary? Doing what? How?
(c) Where are friendly forces? Doing what? How?
(d) What is the posture of the enemy or adversary forces now? What will it be?
(e) Where will the friendly force be?
(f) What are the enemy or adversary’s vulnerabilities, and how can we exploit
them?
(g) What are our vulnerabilities, and how can we correct them?
(h) What are the enemy or adversary’s opportunities, and how can we deny them?
(i) What are our opportunities, and how can we exploit them?
(j) Are any changes needed to our concept? Our task organization? Our mission?
(3) Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance. MOEs and MOPs
are information requirements developed during the operations process that measure
the degree of success in accomplishing the unit’s mission. They are normally
expressed either as an explicit evaluation of the present situation or a forecast of the
degree of mission accomplishment. The staff develops MOEs and MOPs in planning,
especially during war gaming, for use in evaluating COAs. Once the commander
approves a COA, the MOEs and MOPs are used to evaluate the progress of operations
against the expectations of the plan. The MOEs and MOPs can, and should, change
during execution.
(a) Modern CIS can support assessing through automated monitoring of critical
indicators of success, identifying variances from expectations, forecasting the
magnitude of changes, and comparing performance against expectations. CIS
allow the commander and staff to focus on the significance of variances and their
implications for success. Qualitatively, they accomplish this support faster with
greater precision than older systems.
(b) Current technology should—
(1) Allow the commander to achieve a higher level of SA initially than previously
achieved.
(2) Allow frequent updates of the common operational picture.
(3) Assist the commander to retain that SA with less degradation.
(c) Criteria in the forms of MOEs and MOPs aid in evaluating progress. MOEs
help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if
a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do not
represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information in
the form of indicators for evaluation.
(d) A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system
behaviour, capability, or operational environment tied to measuring the attainment
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of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. MOEs help

measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. MOEs are commonly
found and tracked in formal assessment plans. MOEs help to answer the question
“Are we doing the right things?”
(e) A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is
tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions such as
“Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” A MOP
confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly
found and tracked at all echelons in execution matrixes. MOPs are also commonly
used to evaluate training. MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things
right?” There is no direct hierarchical relationship among MOPs to MOEs. MOPs
do not feed MOEs, or combine in any way to produce MOEs. MOPs simply
measure the performance of a task.
(f) In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that
provides insight into an MOE or MOP. Indicators take the form of reports from
subordinates, surveys and polls, and information requirements. Indicators help to
answer the question “What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?” A single
indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. (See Table 4-2 for additional
information concerning MOEs, MOPs, and indicators.)
Table 4-2. Assessment Measures and Indicators
Measure of effectiveness Measure of performance Indicator
(MOE) (MOP)
Used to measure attainment Used to measure task Used to provide insight into a MOE or
of an end state condition, accomplishment. MOP.
achievement of an objective,
or creation of an effect.
Answers the question: Answers the question: Answers the question:
Are we doing the right things? Are we doing things right? What is the status of this MOE or
MOP?
Measures why (purpose) in Measures what (task completion) Information used to make measuring
the mission statement. in the mission statement. what or why possible.
No direct hierarchical No direct hierarchical Subordinate to MOEs and MOPs.
relationship to MOPs. relationship to MOEs.
Often formally tracked in Often formally tracked in Often formally tracked in formal
formal assessment plans. execution matrixes. assessment plans.
Typically challenging to Typically simple to choose the Typically as challenging to select
choose the appropriate ones. appropriate ones. appropriately as the supported MOE
or MOP.
(4) Recognizing Variances

(a) Variances are differences between the actual situation during an operation and
the forecast of the situation at that time. CIS display relevant information in the
common operational picture that highlights the existence of variances. Figure 4-2
shows simply and graphically the role of recognizing variances from the plan. In
these cases, the staff uses objective and subjective criteria to assess the common
operational picture to determine the existence of a variance, the significance of the
variance, and its effects on the parts of the plan. If necessary, the staff updates its
estimates and recommends a COA to the commander, who directs the necessary
action to exploit an opportunity or counter a threat to the mission. If the evaluation
reveals no substantial variance, then the commander can execute normal
procedures to restore the operation to the plan.
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(b) There are two forms of variance. The first is an unexpected threat to mission
accomplishment or the force. When a threat is recognized, the commander must
adjust the plan to counter the enemy advantage and restore the friendly advantage
or initiative. The second form of variance is an unexpected opportunity to
accomplish the mission more effectively. Opportunity occurs as a result of
unexpected success against the enemy. When recognized, the commander should
alter the plan (although the concept may, and the intent will usually, remain the
same) to exploit the opportunity if he can do so without compromising the plan or
incurring unacceptable risk. In evaluating variances, assessment must identify
opportunities and threats in time to react effectively.
Figure 4-2. The Recognition of Variance

0407 Seize, Retain, and Exploit the Initiative
Assessing should help the commander and staff identify and anticipate opportunities for
seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.
a. Seize the Initiative. (Set and dictate the terms of action throughout the battle or
engagement). During the offence, friendly forces often have the initiative. However, they
must still consciously set and dictate the terms of action to an enemy who attempts to seize
the initiative for himself. In the defence, seizing the initiative normally consists of wresting
the initiative from the enemy. Defending forces may set and dictate the terms of action
through shaping operations that allow seizing the initiative early, if not setting the terms of
battle from the outset. Seizing the initiative during stability activities is most difficult, as the
enemy or adversary is not as clear as in the offence or defence. In these operations, seizing
the initiative consists of planning and applying enough resources to control the situation.
Seizing the initiative often requires taking risks and their attendant assessment. The
following are general indicators of seizing the initiative:
(1) Friendly forces are no longer decisively engaged or threatened with decisive
engagement.
(2) Friendly forces are able to deploy combat power or forces at the time and place of
their own choosing.
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(3) Enemy forces no longer effectively resist friendly forces or re-establish resistance.
(4) Unanticipated light enemy resistance or large numbers of prisoners of war appear.
(5) Friendly rates of advance or lessening of casualties suddenly accelerate.
b. Retain the Initiative. (Apply unrelenting pressure on the enemy by orchestrating
continuously changing combinations at a tempo that the enemy cannot effectively counter).
This requires planning current actions and anticipating key events hours or days
beforehand to maintain pressure on the enemy. This pressure comes from developing
branches, sequels, or adjustments to the plan to create a seamless, uninterrupted series
of actions that demand the enemy to react immediately and never allow him to regain
synchronization. Command support must keep the operation synchronized at the desired
tempo.
c. Exploit the Initiative. (Follow through on local success to realize long-term decisive
success). Once friendly forces seize the initiative, they immediately plan to exploit it by
conducting continuous operations to accelerate the enemy’s complete defeat. Collaterally,
command support identifies disorganization among friendly forces and directs
reorganization or reconstitution to restore those forces to combat readiness and to develop
options to exploit the initiative.
SECTION III – PLAN
0408 General
Planning is the process by which the commander and staff translate the commander’s
visualization into a specific COA for preparation and execution. Assessment during planning
focuses on monitoring the current situation, establishing MOEs and MOPs, and evaluating
COAs. In mission command, any plan is a framework from which to adapt as the situation
requires and not a script to follow to the letter. The measure of a good plan is not whether it
transpires as designed, but whether it facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen
events.
a. Planning can be a detailed, systematic analysis and evaluation of all factors relating to
an operation and provide insight into what might occur in order to produce an optimum
COA for mission accomplishment. This type of planning anticipates future conditions and
expects possible execution at some more distant time. Alternatively, planning may be
hasty, considering only critical aspects to reach an acceptable COA quickly in the face of
enemy actions. In this case, the staff usually responds to existing conditions and needs a
quick plan for immediate or near-future execution.
b. Planning is a dynamic process of interrelated activities rather than a single process.
The outcome of planning is the commander’s decision about how to conduct the operation.
After this decision, planning continues by creating an order or plan. The order may be a
formal order or a fragmentary order (FRAGO). Planning continues during preparing and
execution.
c. Planning involves an appreciation for planning horizons. Because the future is always
uncertain, planning should not specify future actions with precision. Rather, plans must
remain flexible and adaptable, allowing the opportunity to pursue a variety of options. As
plans extend further into the future, they become less a matter of trying to direct events
and more a matter of identifying options and possibilities. A key to this is the ability to
determine future enemy actions. If unable to predict enemy actions with reasonable
certainty, the plan must keep friendly options open until intelligence builds a clearer picture
of the enemy.
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d. Effective planning requires a sensitive awareness of, and judicious use of, time. Plans
should always be completed as soon as possible to maximize the subordinate command’s
planning time. The staff should use frequent WNGOs and judicious collaborative planning
to facilitate parallel planning with subordinates.
e. A properly framed commander’s intent and effective commander’s planning guidance
create plans that foster mission command. This creates a high tempo of operations that
allows flexibility while executing operations.
0409 Assessment During Planning

During planning, the staff creates the initial common operational picture. This supports
achieving SA that identifies opportunities, threats, and gaps in information to develop and
evaluate COAs. Assessing establishes the initial MOEs and MOPs for the operation. The
commander and staff develop these criteria during the COA analysis and use them for COA
comparison. These criteria are then used for evaluating during preparation and execution.
0410 Operational-Level Planning Process

The operational-level planning process (OLPP) is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(NATO’s) doctrinal planning process at the operational level. It consists of eight steps: initiation,
problem and mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, COA validation and
comparison, commander’s COA decision, operational-level concept of operations and plan
development, and campaign assessment and plan review/revision. (See AJP-5.) The decision-
making process roughly corresponds to these stages. Receipt of some form of mission
directive or the commander perceiving a mission initiation or change initiates the decision-
making process, similar to the initiation stage of the OLPP. The mission analysis and
commander’s planning guidance of the estimate correspond to the orientation stage of the
OLPP. The evaluation of factors and consideration of COA in the estimate correspond to the
plan development stage. The commander’s decision in the estimate leads to the plan in the
decision-making process, corresponding to the plan development stage of the OLPP. In the
decision-making process, the commander may review the completed plan or may have to have
the directing authority review it; in either case, it corresponds to the plan review stage of the
OLPP. See the AJP-5, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING,
for details on the OLPP.
0411 Decision-Making Process

The decision-making process supports land operations at the tactical NATO formation level
below component level. Although much of the decision-making process in the exercise of
command can be delegated, the commander remains ultimately responsible for determining
how his formation is to operate. He is responsible for accomplishing the mission for which he
develops a concept of operations. His staff will also support him with information in the
development and implementation of the plan. Normally he thinks two echelons above and
below his own echelon of command. (See Figure 4-3 on page 4-9).
a. Approach. The decision-making process can be conducted in many ways, with varying
degrees of influence from the commander. The approach can range from one extreme, in
which only the commander goes through the whole process, to the other, in which only the
staff goes through it. A form somewhere in between is usually used in practice. In a pure
“command pull” model, the commander conducts the decision-making process; his staff
then further works out the details. In a pure “staff push” model, the staff implements a
detailed and analytical decision-making process. In this case, the staff compares all
relevant options and then presents its preferred option to the commander, who will make
the subsequent decision. Generally speaking, the higher the level of operation, the more
significant the role of the staff.
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b. Focal Point. The focal point for this activity is the estimate. An estimate of the situation
is a logical sequence of reasoning leading to the best solution to a problem in the time
available. Its purpose is to create a body of information or picture of an operation or battle
appropriate to the echelon of command, which keeps up to date and upon which decisions
are made. As the situation changes, the mission and relevant factors are re-evaluated in a
logical manner to validate current decisions or orders and to issue new orders when
appropriate. The starting point for the process is usually the receipt of a mission from a
superior commander. A superior commander directs a subordinate commander as to what
purpose he is to achieve in the operation. At the tactical level, the superior commander’s
concept of operations should include both his intent and his design for operations. The
estimate process, of which mission analysis is only a part, helps the subordinate
commander at any level then decide how he will reach the desired effect.
Figure 4-3. The Decision-making Process

c. Key Elements. Once the commander has expressed his intent and outlined his
concept of operations in the form of his decision, his staff produces the final version of the
plan with the necessary detail. The operation order (OPORD) is developed from this plan.
(1) The most critical factor facing the commander and his staff in the decision-making
process is likely to be time. It therefore relies on three key elements in order to achieve
success:
(a) Clarity of guidance by the commander.
(b) The successful coordination of concurrent staff activity by the chief of staff
(COS) or operations officer.
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(c) An understanding of the process in detail by the staff.

(2) Normally, the receipt of a task or mission from higher authority begins the process,
although a WNGO would have been issued earlier to create a faster response.
d. Main Effort
(1) Main effort is a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a
commander seeks to bring about a decision. It is the activity that the commander
considers crucial to the success of his mission at that time. When receiving a mission,
a commander will be given a clear indication as to where the superior commander’s
main effort lies. The statement of main effort allows a subordinate commander to
focus his actions on the commander’s aim, maintain that aim, and have flexibility in
achieving it. It is stated in the commander’s concept of operations and will not be
shifted except when necessary to the success of a mission. However, there may be
different main efforts for different stages of an operation. Initially, for example, it may
be with the force fixing the enemy as part of a deep operation before switching to the
main force engaged in the close operation that are striking the enemy. Similarly,
although the main effort for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
elements must always support the main effort of the unit or formation they are
supporting, they will not necessarily coincide with it. For example, the main effort for
CSS might be the refurbishment of another brigade, currently out of contact, but with
a subsequent task essential to the mission.
(2) The commander has a number of ways to give substance to his main effort.
(a) Narrowing of boundaries—economy of force elsewhere.
(b) Grouping—extra combat power on the main effort.
(c) Allocation of priority for CS including artillery, electronic warfare (EW), and
others.
(d) Allocation of priority for CSS.
(e) Planning options for reserves.
(3) The decision on where to establish the main effort depends on the mission, the
commander’s freedom of action, the relative strengths, and the information available.
Ideally, it will be established against the enemy’s weakness. Once defined at one
level, main efforts should be designated at every subordinate level.
e. Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining
(1) The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual
orientation. The decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes
the mission. It determines the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement.
The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders design an entire
operation. Multiple subordinate units may be engaged in the same decisive operation.
Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of a commander’s intent.
Commanders typically identify a single decisive operation, but more than one
subordinate unit may play a role in a decisive operation.
(2) A shaping operation is an operation that establishes conditions for the
decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain.
Inform and influence activities, for example, may integrate Soldier and leader
engagement tasks into an operation to reduce tensions between units and different
ethnic groups through direct contact between leaders and local leaders. In combat,
synchronizing the effects of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, artillery fires, and
obscurants to delay or disrupt repositioning forces illustrates shaping operations.
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Shaping operations may occur throughout the operational area and involve any
combination of forces and capabilities. Shaping operations preserve conditions for
the success of the decisive operation. Commanders may designate more than one
shaping operation.
(3) A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the
decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat
power. Sustaining operations differ from decisive and shaping operations in that they
focus internally (on friendly forces) rather than externally (on the enemy or
environment). They typically address important sustainment and protection actions
essential to the success of decisive and shaping operations. Sustaining operations
include personnel and logistic support, rear area security, movement control, terrain
management, and infrastructure development.
(4) While sustaining operations are inseparable from decisive and shaping
operations, they are not usually decisive themselves. Sustaining operations occur
throughout the area of operations, not just within a support area. Failure to sustain
normally results in mission failure. Sustaining operations determine how quickly
forces reconstitute and how far forces can exploit success.
0412 Phasing a Joint Operation

1. Purpose. A phase is a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large
portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for
a common purpose. Phasing, which is used in any operation regardless of size, helps the joint
force commander (JFC) organize large operations by integrating and synchronizing
subordinate operations. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs visualize, design, and plan an entire
operation or campaign and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and
purpose. It helps them systematically achieve military objectives not attained all at once by
arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Phasing also helps commanders
mitigate risk in the more dangerous or difficult portions of an operation.
2. Application. The JFC’s vision of how the operation should unfold drives subsequent
decisions regarding phasing. In turn, phasing helps the commander and staff synchronize the
concept of operations and organize tasks assigned to subordinate commanders. By arranging
operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and synchronize
subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase should represent a natural
subdivision of the campaign or operation’s intermediate objectives.
3. Phasing Model. Although the commander determines the number and actual phases for
the operation, the phases comprise a flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations.
Within the context of these phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and
component commanders may establish additional phases that fit their concept of operations.
Operation plans (OPLANs) for contingencies that support the combatant commander’s tactical
command post generally do not include security cooperation activities that are addressed in
other approved documents. Combatant commanders generally use the phasing model to link
security cooperation activities in the tactical command post to pertinent OPLANs. The following
is a discussion of each phase in the phasing model.
a. Shape. Shape phase missions, tasks, and actions are designed to dissuade or deter
adversaries, assure friends, and set conditions for the contingency plan. Shape phase
missions, tasks, and actions are generally conducted through security cooperation
activities. Joint and multinational operations and various interagency activities occur
routinely during the shape phase. Shape activities are executed continuously to enhance
international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation by shaping perceptions and
influencing adversaries’ and allies’ behaviour; developing allied and friendly military
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capabilities for self-defence and multinational operations; improving information exchange

and intelligence sharing; providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access; and
mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis.
b. Deter. The intent of this phase is to deter an adversary from undesirable actions because
of friendly capabilities and the will to use them. Deter is generally weighted toward security
activities that are characterized by preparatory actions to protect friendly forces and
indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the planned operation. A number of
flexible deterrent options could be implemented during this phase. Once the crisis is
defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces, and other
predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theatre; employment of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and development of mission-tailored C2,
intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s concept of
operations. Combatant commanders continue to engage multinational partners, thereby
providing the basis for further crisis response. Many actions in the deter phase build on
activities from the previous phase and are conducted as part of security cooperation
activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.
c. Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through decisive use of
joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive operations at
the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the
conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required
to delay, impede, or halt the enemy’s initial aggression and to deny the enemy its initial
objectives. Operations to gain access to theatre infrastructure and expand friendly freedom
of action continue during this phase, while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities
with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.
d. Dominate. This phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in noncombat
situations, to control the operational environment. Success in the dominate phase depends
on overmatching enemy capabilities at the critical time and place. Operations can range
from large-scale combat to various stability operations depending on the nature of the
enemy. Dominate phase activities may establish the conditions to achieve strategic
objectives early or may set the conditions for transition to the next phase of the operation.
e. Stabilize. The stabilize phase is typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained
combat operations to stability operations. These operations help re-establish a safe and
secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent in this phase is to help restore local
political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials may lead operations during
part or all of this phase, but the JFC typically will provide significant supporting capabilities
and activities. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance and
integrate the efforts of other supporting interorganizational partners until legitimate local
entities are functioning. The JFC continuously assesses the impact of operations in this
phase on the ability to transfer authority for remaining requirements to a legitimate civil
entity, which marks the end of the phase.
f. Enable Civil Authority. This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support
to legitimate civil governance. The commander provides this support by agreement with
the appropriate civil authority. In some cases, the commander provides this support under
direction of the civil authority. The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its ability to
govern and administer to the services and other needs of the population. During this phase,
the military end state is attained, signalling the end of the joint operation. Combatant
command involvement with other nations and other government agencies, beyond the
termination of the joint operation, may be required to attain the national strategic end state.
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4. Stages. Within the decision-making process, the estimate has five stages: mission analysis,
commander’s planning guidance, evaluation of factors, consideration of COAs, and joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE).
a. Mission Analysis. The mission is the key element of every order. It is a clear, concise
statement of the task of the command and its purpose. A subordinate commander should
not deviate from his given mission except in exceptional circumstances. In all instances,
however, he should act in accordance with his superior commander’s intent. Therefore,
when the mission statement is received it is analysed to determine the answers to four
questions:
(1) What is the intent of the superior commanders two echelons up, and what is my
role in the overall plan?
(2) What am I required to do, or what essential tasks do I have to complete in order
to accomplish the mission? This will lead to a deduction of the critical activity required
to accomplish the mission and includes both specified tasks and implied tasks.
(3) Are there any constraints?
(4) Has the situation changed in principle and would the higher-echelon commander
still have given these tasks had he known about the changed situation?
(a) Mission analysis is an integral part of the estimate process and not a separate
activity. By determining the points listed above and making the relevant
deductions, it may generate questions or requests to the higher commander as
well as helping to generate the commander’s intelligence requirements or
establish logistic priorities.
(b) As intent, tasks, constraints, and freedom of action are identified, deductions
should be drawn that will assist in shaping the plan. At this stage, unnecessary or
impossible tasks may be excluded. A specific constraint to consider is rules of
engagement (ROE) specified by a higher echelon headquarters (HQ) for the
operation. (See MC 362, NATO Rules of Engagement (NATO RESTRICTED).
Appendix 2 to Annex C contains a checklist of questions on ROE to be answered.)
b. Commander’s Planning Guidance. The mission analysis is completed by a
restatement of the mission. The commander also gives guidance on the continuation of the
estimate and draws up a list of questions, which the staff will need to address to focus their
attention on those aspects relevant during the estimate process. The commander—or more
often his COS, executive officer (XO), or operations officer—concludes the commander’s
planning guidance with directions to the staff on the completion of the estimate, including
the deadline for its completion. This must be complied with to allow the commander time
to make his decision.
c. Evaluation of Factors. Having conducted the mission analysis, the staff considers
numerous factors in a way that allows tasks and constraints to be deduced and then
modified, excluding those tasks not necessary or that are not possible. The factors listed
below will invariably be considered though the mission and situation will dictate the
emphasis placed on them. Some factors may also be considered in parallel. For example,
while the G2 (or S2) staff are evaluating the enemy, the G3 (or S3) and G4 (or S4) staff
will be considering friendly forces, including CSS. Tasks will come principally from enemy
and environmental factors (especially the terrain), friendly forces, and security. Constraints
are largely derived from considerations of security, time, available forces, and legal
requirements. The factors to be evaluated (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) include the
following:
(1) Mission.
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(2) Enemy forces.

(3) Terrain and weather.
(4) Friendly forces (troops and support available including CSS and security).
(a) An assessment of the combat power required to accomplish the essential
tasks is now made. Tasks are assessed at the same level of command used in
the consideration of factors, such as two echelons down. The combat power
required for each task will often exceed the troops available, leading to the
deduction that tasks should be sequenced. However, consideration of COAs may
obviate the need to undertake some tasks or to commit a significant component
of available forces to them. Thus, only a preliminary check on the combat power
required for each task should be undertaken prior to the consideration of the
COAs.
(b) This will produce a summary of possible troops to be assigned to tasks. In

developing COAs, it may be necessary to adjust the balance of troops to various
tasks to economise in one activity and concentrate forces in another. Tasks can
only be related to one another in developed COAs. Therefore, the detailed
allocation of troops or assets to tasks must follow the commander’s decision, not
precede it.
(5) Time.
(6) Civil considerations (including human factors).
d. Consider COAs. A number of COAs may be developed because of the estimate
process. Contrasting elements of each identified COA should be compared as well as the
combat power required to carry them out. Each COA should reconcile the troops available
with the troops required from the identification of tasks so far, and include an outline
concept of operations with a clear indication of the main effort. The advantages and
disadvantages of each COA are considered in relation to the mission and likely enemy
COAs. Any COA that does not meet the superior commander’s intent should be discarded.
At the tactical level, the practicality of a COA can then be checked and compared using
the combat functions. If time permits, it may also prove useful to war game the COA to
determine likely responses to enemy and own forces actions.
(1) All COAs must meet the following criteria:
(a) Feasible: Does it fit within available resources?
(b) Acceptable: Is it worth the cost or risk?
(c) Suitable: Does it solve the problem and is it legal and ethical?
(d) Unique: Does it differ significantly from other solutions?
(e) Flexible: Does it provide commanders options?
(2) The COAs can be analysed in four ways. Each form has its advantages and
disadvantages. Variations of these forms are possible, as are combinations. Making
staff participation as extensive as possible best achieves integration. The commander
determines the appropriate form in his planning guidance. These forms of analysis
are—
(a) Mentally, whether by the commander personally or one of the staff officers.
(b) “Thinking out loud,” together with others, in which the commander may take
part.
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(c) Through a formal procedure, such as war gaming. (Annex D provides details
on war gaming).
(d) In a computer-aided simulation.
e. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
(1) JIPOE provides an understanding of the operational environment and is a basis
for planning. It focuses the intelligence effort and delineates the prioritization of
intelligence requirements. It is a living product and assists in the implementation of
the plan by identifying opportunities to promote decisive action. It commences during
mission analysis and continues throughout the operations process. AJP-2.1,
INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES, includes a detailed discussion of JIPOE and its
relation to the OLPP.
(2) JIPOE complements the OLPP and is integral to planning at all echelons of
command down to and including units. JIPOE describes how the intelligence staff
collect and process relevant information to infer how the opposing force will
implement its COAs, as described in the superior commander’s order. While
intelligence staffs lead this activity, the whole staff must participate in it and support
them to confirm the feasibility of the inferred COAs or to provide additional detail.
These COAs are modelled as doctrinal products that the planning team can use to
identify potential threats to the mission and subsequent information collection
requirements.
5. Commander’s Decision. After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA to
best accomplish the mission. If the commander rejects all COAs, the staff starts COA
development again. If the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely
different one, the staff war-games the new COA and presents the results to the commander
with a recommendation. After approving a COA, the commander issues the final planning
guidance. The final planning guidance includes a refined commander’s intent (if necessary)
and new commander’s priorities to support execution. It also includes any additional guidance
on priorities for the warfighting functions, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation. This
guidance includes priorities for resources needed to preserve freedom of action and ensure
continuous sustainment. Commanders include the risk they are willing to accept in the final
planning guidance. If there is time, commanders use a video teleconference to discuss
acceptable risk with adjacent, subordinate, and senior commanders. However, commanders
still obtain the higher echelon commander’s approval to accept any risk that might imperil
accomplishing the higher commander’s mission.
6. The Plan. Once the commander has made his decision, his staff can begin to develop the
plan (following the formats in Annex G). This involves—
a. Expanding the commander’s concept of operations, as necessary. This will include the
commander’s intent and his scheme of manoeuvre (an outline of the deep, close, and rear
operations, or decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, with a statement of main effort)
required to accomplish the mission. The decisive, shaping, and sustaining framework lends
itself to a broad conceptual orientation. The decisive operation is the operation that directly
accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a major operation, battle, or
engagement.
b. Developing the mission statements for subordinate commanders (normally completed
or checked by the commander himself).
c. Carrying out any necessary staff checks, including confirmation that the task is correct
and subordinates have been allocated sufficient resources to accomplish their missions.
d. Determining and defining the control measures needed for the execution of the mission.
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e. Coordinating the input from staff branches to complete all paragraphs of the plan and
supporting annexes.
7. Directives. Directives provide the principal means by which the intent of the commander
are conveyed to his subordinates and so form a critical link in the chain of command.
a. An order is a written or oral directive issued by a commander to subordinate
commanders to communicate execution information that directs action. The source for any
directive is the commander’s decision—the initial product of planning. It provides a way for
the commander to convey his intent to his subordinates.
b. Orders should be timely and as clear, simple, and concise as each situation permits
while conveying the minimum amount of information necessary for execution. They should
contain a simple, clearly stated commander’s intent and concept of operations.
c. Issuing orders in the command post (CP) allows each staff member to answer
questions about the order and helps the commander make refinements. It also helps
coordination. However, issuing orders is less than half the work of planning.
SECTION IV – PREPARE
0413 General
Preparation includes activities conducted by the unit before executing to improve its ability to
conduct the operation. These activities include, but are not limited to, plan refinement,
rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement. Preparation occurs
any time a unit is not conducting an operation. A unit prepares continuously for deployment or
operations when not conducting a specific operation, including such activities as training and
maintenance of personnel and equipment. Preparation of a unit for a specific operation starts
with receipt of a WNGO and ends when execution begins. Preparation requires staff, unit, and
soldier actions.
0414 Assessment During Preparation

Assessment during preparation monitors the progress of readiness to conduct the operation
and assists in plan refinement. It evaluates preparations against MOEs and MOPs established
by planning to determine variances, and it forecasts the significance of those variables for the
success of the operation.
0415 Activities
Preparation consists of several activities, all of which involve work at the three levels of staff,
unit, and soldier. Common activities during preparation are as follows:
a. Reconnaissance
(1) Reconnaissance is often the most important part of the preparation phase. It is
focused on answering the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). The
commander often launches reconnaissance before developing a completed plan. In
fact, it is often necessary for reconnaissance to provide additional information on which
to base the final plan. The commander coordinates reconnaissance using a
reconnaissance annex to the OPORD. The commander should consider requesting
assistance from sources outside of his control, to include long-range surveillance teams
and joint and strategic assets.
(2) As reconnaissance forces gather information, the staff should modify the collection
plan to account for new information and to redirect efforts to collect additional
information. The commander and his staff must continuously review JIPOE products
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and redirect their reconnaissance efforts to focus on the most important remaining
unknowns, emphasizing the established or revised CCIRs.
b. Security. Security operations during preparation prevent surprise and reduce
uncertainty through security operations, local security, operations security (OPSEC), and
counterintelligence and protective security. These are all designed to prevent the enemy
from discovering the friendly force’s plan and to protect the force from unforeseen enemy
actions. Security elements direct their main effort toward preventing the enemy from
gathering essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). As with reconnaissance,
security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy intelligence-collecting
efforts (friendly counter-ISTAR). When successful, security operations provide the main
body adequate time and manoeuvre space to react to enemy initiatives. To accomplish
this, the staff must coordinate security operations among the units that conduct them and
concurrently synchronize them with local unit security.
c. Force Protection. Force protection employs a combination of active and passive
measures to deter, defeat, or mitigate hostile actions against friendly forces. Force
protection is not a discrete mission assigned to a single unit, but a continuous process
executed by all commanders regardless of their mission, location, or threat. It conserves
the fighting potential of a deployed force, preserving its integrity and capability by
countering the wider threat to all its elements from the enemy, natural and environmental
hazards, and fratricide. It consists of a broad set of unit-specific, coordinated actions
executed to protect the entire force across the range of military operations. The
commander and staff develop and initiate actions for force protection during planning, but
conduct them mainly during preparing and execution. Commanders, at all levels, have the
responsibility to set force protection measures, estimating risks and vulnerabilities in
conducting operational and tactical activities, including adequate self-defence measures.
d. Revise and Refine the Plan. During preparation, the enemy is also acting. As friendly
assumptions prove true or false, as reconnaissance confirms or denies enemy actions and
dispositions, and as the status of friendly units changes, the commander determines
whether the new information invalidates the plan, requires him to adjust the plan, or
validates the plan with no further changes. He balances the loss of synchronizing and
coordinating caused by a change to the plan against the problem of trying to execute a
plan that no longer fits reality.
e. Coordination and Liaison
(1) Coordination is actions taken to maintain synchronization and prevent confusion
and problems. During preparation, units conduct all necessary coordination with higher,
lower, adjacent, supporting, and supported units. This includes sending and receiving
liaison teams as necessary. Coordination also includes establishing all necessary
communications links to guarantee continuous contact during execution. Units should
exchange standard operating procedures (SOPs), if necessary, and coordinate security
and reconnaissance plans to ensure that no breaks in coverage are allowed.
(2) Coordination takes place continuously during preparation for and execution of
operations. Coordinating is the essential function for synchronization. Coordination
may take place in location, time, or function. Coordinating land force operations
begins during planning. Coordination has four objectives.
(a) First, it ensures a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent as well
as subordinates’ and supporting forces’ roles.
(b) Second, it ensures that all affected and interested personnel have been
consulted, as time allows, or informed so that they may respond as desired or
adjust their plans and actions.
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(c) Third, it avoids conflict and duplication of effort among units, and it reduces
fratricide and expenditure of resources.
(d) Finally, it ensures the commander and staff consider all relevant factors, or as
many as time permits, and effectively employ all available assets.
(3) Internal coordination occurs within the unit HQ. It initiates activities within and
among staff sections required for the plan to succeed. It ensures that staff officers
remain fully informed of relevant information affecting their areas of responsibility.
Internal coordination helps resolve problems of external coordination. Internal
coordination also resolves problems, conflicts, and resource allocation to support
preparations by subordinate units.
(4) External coordination includes coordinating with subordinate units, higher HQs, and
supported and supporting units, and often other agencies or organizations for
resources or forces that may not be immediately under the unit’s control during
planning. Coordination among adjacent units or between forces in non-contiguous
areas of operation (AOOs) requires special effort. Any place two HQs must coordinate
their actions is a potential weak point that the enemy may exploit or too many or too
few resources may be committed. This includes major unit or national forces’
boundaries where the interdependence of units could cause delays in execution. In
non-contiguous AOOs, this includes using resources to support two or more such
areas.
(5) Establishing and maintaining liaison is one of the most important means of external
coordination. Liaison may commence with planning and continue through preparing
and executing, or it may commence as late as execution, depending on resources and
the need for direct contact between sending and receiving HQs. The earlier liaison can
be established, the more effective the coordination. (See Annex E for further discussion
of liaison.)
(5) Graphic control measures are among the most basic forms of coordination. The
coordinating instructions sub-paragraph of the OPLAN or OPORD also contains control
measures in written form. (For a listing and definition of all control measures, see
APP-6.)
f. Rehearsals
(1) Rehearsals are the practice of actions designed to improve performance during
execution. All rehearsals for the operation occur during preparation. The extent of
rehearsals depends on the time available. Rehearsals allow participants in an operation
to become familiar with and to translate the plan into a visual impression that orients
them to their environment and other units when executing the operation. They also
imprint a mental picture of the sequence of key actions in the operation and provide a
forum for subordinate and supporting leaders and units to coordinate.
(2) Rehearsals may reveal unknown external coordination problems. Moreover, they
can emphasize times, locations, and solutions for coordinating actions of subordinates
to achieve synchronization at key points. Rehearsals also support internal coordination,
as members of the HQ identify key activities to achieve the desired external
coordination. If HQ members do not all attend a rehearsal, they may still receive
taskings for internal coordination. Rehearsals produce updating of internal coordination
techniques. (See Annex F for details of rehearsals.)
g. Task Organization. Task organization involves organizing available resources and
establishing command and support relationships according to the plan. Actions resulting
from these changes include exchanging SOPs; establishing communications links; and
conducting briefings and rehearsals to integrate units that are assigned, attached, under
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operational control (OPCON), or in direct support into the plan. The unit makes provisions
for required logistic support.
h. Train
(1) Training prepares forces and individuals to execute actions in accordance with
doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), as practiced by the
commander in his unit. Training may prepare the force for specific missions that it
immediately faces or for generic missions or TTP that the commander expects the force
may need in foreseen missions.
(2) In NATO operations, many forms of training are the responsibility of national
commanders. Nevertheless, the NATO commander may give guidance to national
commanders for common training for the multinational force related to a mission. He
may also conduct training for the force as a whole in tasks related to a mission or
operation.
i. Movement. All movement allowed or required to position or reposition units for
execution takes place during preparation. The commander must integrate movement with
OPSEC measures to ensure that it does not reveal any intentions to the enemy. This
movement includes advance party reconnaissance of assembly areas and route
reconnaissance to support movement. It may also include the upgrade of routes for further
movements.
j. Pre-Operations Checks and Inspections. Unit preparation includes completing
pre-operations checks and inspections to ensure that units, military personnel, and
systems are fully capable and ready to execute as time and resources permit.
k. Logistics Preparation. Resupplying, maintaining, and issuing special supplies or
equipment takes place during the preparation phase, as does any repositioning of critical
logistic assets. OPSEC should govern these preparations so as not to reveal friendly
intentions.
l. Integration of New Units and Military Personnel
(1) Integration of new units and military personnel is an especially important activity
in multinational operations. (See Appendix 2 to Annex C for checklists to assist in
accomplishing the integration of forces.)
(2) The commander and staff assure that new military personnel are assimilated into
their units and new units into the force conducting the operation in a posture that
allows them to contribute effectively. They must also prepare new units and military
personnel to perform their roles in the upcoming operation. Integrating includes—
(a) Receiving and introducing new units and military personnel to the force and
environment.
(b) Orienting them on their places and roles in the force and operation.
(c) Establishing C2, sustainment, and communications for and with them within
the force.
(d) Training them on the unit SOP for the operation.
(3) When integrating new forces from national command or other multinational
commands, NATO commanders ascertain when and where transfer of authority takes
place. They verify and clarify with newly assigned subordinate commanders the
meaning of the NATO command authority under which those forces are assigned. If
they are national forces, NATO commanders additionally verify any national
reservations or limitations to the formal NATO state of command.
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(4) Commanders clarify with newly assigned forces their understanding of the
meaning and implications of NATO forces’ ROE. They either resolve any
discrepancies between the newly assigned forces’ understanding and their own
understanding of NATO forces’ ROE or submit the unresolved issues to higher
authorities for decision. This includes understanding any national ROE or national
laws conflicting with NATO ROE that the newly assigned force might have and
resolving discrepancies with NATO forces’ ROE.
SECTION V ⁺ EXECUTE
0416 General
Execution is to put a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and
using situational awareness to assess progress and make execution and adjustment
decisions. Inherent in execution is deciding to execute planned actions, such as phases,
branches and sequels, as well as deciding to change the plan based on changes in the
situation. During execution, the commander directs the application of combat power, ensuring
adequate, but not excessive, synchronization. He must maintain continuity of operations to
prevent the enemy from regaining its equilibrium. Assessment is particularly important during
execution as the situation changes rapidly.
a. Execution entails much more than just putting the plan into action. Executing is a
continuous process of three activities:
(1) Assessing the current state and forecasting progress of the operation.
(2) Making execution and adjustment decisions to account for unforeseen enemy
actions and exploit opportunities.
(3) Directing actions to apply combat power to accomplish the mission.
b. During execution, changes occur—some from effective or ineffective action by the
enemy or friendly forces and some from changes within the environment. Successful
execution depends on identifying and adapting to one or a combination of changes in these
elements.
c. There are two methods for adapting to changes. The first method, already discussed
under planning, consists of anticipating changes and developing branches and sequels to
the plan to deal with them. Anticipating changes does not end with planning; it continues
throughout preparation and execution, especially during execution. Study and
development help the commander apply analysis and judgment to understand a situation,
establish valid, realistic criteria for decisions, and comprehend the relationships in
command to anticipate events and consequences.
d. The second method of adapting to change is improvising, taking action, or adopting
solutions to changes not forecasted during the operation. While improvisation is not
preferred, situations frequently arise requiring its use. The real difference between the
methods is time. Anticipation occurs when the enemy’s actions are foreseen early enough
to develop an analytical response. Improvising occurs when the enemy action is
unexpected and does not allow time for formal planning of a response.
e. During execution, command support must continuously manage relevant information.
It must compare the common operational picture against the commander’s intent, identify
variances from the plan, and recommend solutions for the commander to decide, correct,
or exploit the variances. Finally, it must direct actions to execute decisions to counter
unforeseen enemy or friendly actions or exploit opportunity.
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0417 Assessment During Execution

During execution, assessing the operation is a deliberate comparison of forecast outcomes to
actual events, using MOEs and MOPs, to judge operational success at any point during an
operation. This process identifies the magnitude and significance of variances in performance
of those indicators from expectations and determines the need for adjustments. Commanders
and staffs assess the probable outcome of an ongoing operation to determine whether
changes in the current operation are necessary to accomplish the mission, react to unexpected
threats, or take advantage of opportunity. They also assess the probable outcome of the
current operation in terms of its impact on potential future operations in order to develop
concepts for these operations early. (See Figure 4-4 on page 4-22).
a. Situational Awareness. The commander uses SA to assess the ongoing operation,
rather than to decide among courses of action. The most important question when
assessing the conduct of an operation is whether the current plan is still valid. Assessment
supports the commander in making both execution and adjustment decisions. After he
makes a decision, the staff re-adjusts the plan to include adjustments to MOEs and MOPs
required by his decisions, and the focus returns to executing and assessing.
b. Monitoring an Operation
(1) The commander and his staff monitor the ongoing operation to determine if it is
progressing satisfactorily according to the current plan, to include any FRAGOs that
have modified it. The staff monitors facts and assumptions to ensure they remain
valid and to seek new facts and assumptions that affect current and future operations.
The MOEs and MOPs can, and should, change during execution, often generating
new information requirements.
(2) Monitoring uses relevant information to develop a clear understanding of the unit’s
current state with relation to the enemy and environment during an operation. The
staff processes relevant information and presents it to the commander in a clear
picture of the current operation. All staff members must understand what constitutes
a critical event and what changes in capabilities and resources to report to the
commander or appropriate staff sections immediately.
Figure 4-4. Assessment During Execution
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c. Evaluating an Operation
(1) The commander and his staff continuously use the MOEs and MOPs, including
forecasted performance, to determine variances and their significance. In any
operation, the enemy actively tries to defeat the friendly effort. Sometimes the enemy
makes an unexpected move or friendly actions are ineffective. Sometimes the
environment changes. In all cases, the commander adjusts his plan. These same
factors may also present the commander with an opportunity to achieve greater
success or achieve objectives beyond those immediately assigned. Staffs continuously
update estimates based on their assessments. Staff estimates supplement and support
the commander’s visualization. Intelligence contributes battle damage assessment to
this evaluation.
(2) Evaluation should gain time by anticipating future operations and linking them to
current operations. To link current and future operations, answering these questions
will check the assumptions, estimates, and planning factors used during the planning
process to confirm or adjust plans. The answers will also help anticipate future
operations by developing concepts for anticipated situations, refining friendly options
developed during the planning process, and disseminating concepts early for parallel
if not collaborative planning. The commander and his staff consciously and
continuously pose the following questions and evaluate the answers.
(a) Is the enemy acting as anticipated? If not, do enemy actions invalidate the
current plan?
(b) Is the friendly force accomplishing the mission at an acceptable cost? If not,
what changes are required to put the plan back on track?
(c) Is the progress of the operation leading to a disposition of friendly forces that
can transition effectively to anticipated future operations?
(d) Has the situation changed so that friendly forces can exploit unanticipated
opportunities to attain the end state more effectively than what is called for in the
original plan?
(3) Assessing during execution focuses on progress, that is, whether individual
activities in the AOO, and the larger operation itself, are progressing according to the
MOEs and MOPs. Assessing progress can result in two conclusions. First, that the
operation or its preparation is progressing satisfactorily, that observed variances
between the expectations and current (or forecast) performance of critical indicators
are minor and within acceptable levels. Progress meets the commander’s intent and
the concept of operations is still relevant to the situation. This evaluation results in
allowing the operation to proceed according to plan. It leads to execution decisions
foreseen by the plan.
(4) The second outcome is that the operation as a whole, or one or more of its major
activities, is not proceeding according to expectations, either better than expected or
worse than expected. The assessment can conclude that performance of critical
indicators is much better than expectations. On the other hand, assessment can
conclude that the observed variances, resulting from either friendly failures or enemy
success as measured against the MOEs and MOPs, are sufficient to endanger the
operation’s success. In either case, the commander should make an adjustment
decision to take advantage of the opportunity or to counter the threat.
0418 Types of Decisions

The commander should not hesitate to modify his plan or scrap it altogether if it is necessary
to accomplish the mission (and save the force) or to achieve greater success. Commanders
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at all levels must consider whether the benefits of adjustments outweigh the costs of disrupting
the current plan, particularly its synchronization.
a. Deciding during executing consists of two basic types of decisions:
(1) Execution decisions. If the progress of the operation is meeting expectations, what
needs to be done next according to the plan?
(2) Adjustment decisions. What must be done to exploit opportunity or restore mission
accomplishment?
b. The difference between execution and adjustment decisions lies in whether the plan
anticipates the situation requiring a decision. In execution decisions, the variances in MOEs
and MOPs are within limits for planned actions, sequels, or branches. For adjustment
decisions, the variances are greater than expected from the MOEs and MOPs.
0419 Execution Decisions

An execution decision selects what next needs to be done according to the plan if the progress
of the operation is meeting expectations. The most basic form of an execution decision is
applying resources or conducting activities as outlined within the plan, or within minor
tolerances of the plan. The critical ongoing functions during execution, discussed below, are
also execution decisions when they support planned activities of the operation. Executing
branches and sequels are execution decisions.
a. Forms. One form of execution decision is permissive—to allow planned actions to take
place. This usually requires the commander or staff to recognize that a particular phase or
other action directed in the OPORD have met preconditions for execution and then
directing execution of a preplanned activity. Taking planned actions includes modifying
them to fit the circumstances at the time of execution.
b. Branches and Sequels. Branches and sequels are planned actions. The MOEs and
MOPs used to evaluate progress help identify events that trigger executing branches and
sequels.
c. Critical Ongoing Functions. The unit must accomplish routine tasks during execution,
even if the plan is progressing satisfactorily. Failure to consider these routine tasks can
waste precious resources, squander opportunities, or even lead to failure. Many of these
critical functions help to keep minor variances from becoming threats to mission
accomplishment.
(1) Focus All Assets on the decisive operation. At every stage of the operation, all
elements of the force must contribute to the decisive operation. During execution,
situations may render shaping operations irrelevant or cause assets devoted to them
to be out of position. The commander and his staff must continuously survey all assets
and ensure that they are in position and tasked to support the decisive effort, or that
they are moving to a position where they can provide that support.
(2) Conduct Continuous ISTAR and counter-intelligence. Reconnaissance is
continuous. The commander should never keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
They should always be looking for weaknesses in the enemy disposition. When the
main body directly engages the enemy, reconnaissance assets should be working the
flanks, looking beyond the area of close combat and seeking out opportunities for the
commander to exploit. The commander phases or sequences his reconnaissance
assets to ensure that they are available when needed.
(3) Continue Security Operations. Security forces have specific missions for many
operations. Once they complete these missions, security forces may pass off the battle
to the main body. However, the commander should always look beyond the specific
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security missions and continually assess the security posture of the unit. If there are no
friendly units on the flanks or rear of the friendly force or a gap develops between
adjacent units, then the commander must cover them with some form of security. This
security may take the form of a screen, guard, or cover. It may be an intelligence or
surveillance system to detect enemy absence or presence and provide adequate
warning to the commander of any approaching enemy forces.
(4) Adjust CCIRs based on the situation. The commander and his staff continuously
review his CCIRs during execution. They analyse intelligence requirements (IRs)
against the mission and updated commander’s intent to identify and designate those
that directly affect decision making. As CCIRs are answered or the situation changes,
the commander develops and disseminates new CCIRs. The staff allocates assets to
collect against the new CCIRs.
(5) Adjust Graphic Control Measures. Full integration of forces and systems often
requires that the unit change graphic control measures any time forces move
significantly (to include special operations forces) in the AOO. Moving graphic control
measures provides as much flexibility as possible for all operating systems. The
commander or staff should use graphic control measures sparingly and only for the
minimum amount of time necessary. (See APP-6.)
(6) Perform Battle Tracking. Battle tracking is monitoring elements of the common
operational picture that are tied to MOEs and MOPs. Battle tracking requires special
attention on the part of all staff officers. The operations officer continuously monitors
the progress of air and ground movement and expeditiously recommends changes as
required.
(7) Employ Airspace Control Means. Closely allied to graphic control measures and
battle tracking, but separate for discussion, are airspace control means. Airspace
control is a joint responsibility normally assigned to the airspace control authority. All
commanders, units, and staff officers remain aware of current airspace control means
and their integration with and implications for ground operations. They also consider
the same for ground operations on airspace control means and adjust them as
necessary. (See AJP-3.3.5, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL)
(8) Continue Liaison and Coordination. Internal coordination continues because
friction within friendly forces and actions by enemy forces affect execution.
Headquarters coordinate execution and adjustment decisions internally and externally
to keep operations synchronized.
(a) SA includes knowing the location of adjacent, higher echelon, subordinate,
supporting, and supported units and knowing the actions of those units. It also
includes knowing intelligence sources, and how gaps between units are being
secured and monitored. CCIRs may include any significant changes in the situation
of adjacent units; if challenges occur, units evaluate them for their impact on unit
operations.
(b) Commanders establish positive controls (normally periodic reports) to ensure
that communications with all units still function. They report any loss of required
communications to a higher HQ and act to re-establish them. Doctrinal procedures
prescribe responsibility for establishing contact (from left to right, higher to lower
echelon, rear to front, and supported to supporting). However, when
communications or contact are lost, all units attempt to regain contact.
(9) Conduct Targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the
appropriate response to them while taking account of operational requirements and
capabilities. It is the mechanism for fusing ISTAR and strike assets such as air, aviation,
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indirect fire, EW, psychological operations, civil affairs, and other assets, as available.
Targeting ensures assets are properly coordinated and that the most appropriate
engagement means is used to affect each target. It is, therefore, a tool for the efficient
and effective management of resources and is fundamental in the speed of reaction
towards the enemy. Targeting is a command responsibility, usually under G3 (or S3)
supervision. It must be a coordinated part of the overall concept of operations. This
includes coordination and liaison with the joint targeting coordination board, approval
of and deconfliction with targets on the joint target list, deconfliction of targets and
targeting within the land component’s area of operation, and overall support of the
JFC’s targeting priorities.
(a) Targeting falls into two general classes: deliberate and dynamic.
i. Deliberate targeting prosecutes targets known to exist in an operational
area with actions scheduled. Examples range from targets on joint target lists
in the applicable campaign plan to targets detected in sufficient time that can
be listed in the air tasking order (ATO), mission-type orders, or fire support
plans. Deliberate targets have two subcategories: scheduled or on-call.
 Scheduled targeting occurs when actions are to be taken at a specific
time.
 On-call targeting occurs where actions have not been specified by time.
ii. Dynamic targeting prosecutes targets that have been identified too late, or
not selected for action in time to be included in the deliberate targeting cycle,
and therefore have not been scheduled. Dynamic targets have two
subclassifications: anticipated and unanticipated.
 Anticipated targeting prosecutes targets known to exist in an operational
area but that are not detected, located, or selected for action in sufficient
time to be included in the deliberate targeting cycle.
 Unanticipated targeting prosecutes targets that are unknown or
unexpected to exist in an operational area but, when detected or located,
meet criteria specific to operational objectives.
(b) Time-sensitive targets are defined as those targets requiring immediate
response because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly operations or
are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. The time available does not allow
following a standard targeting timeline. The JFC provides specific guidance and
prioritisation for time-sensitive targets within the operational area.
(c) Targeting priorities
i. The principles of targeting can be applied to all operations of war and at all
levels of command. (See AJP-3.9, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR JOINT
TARGETING, OR AJP-3.9.2, LAND TARGETING). Targeting is a process
owned by the operational echelon disposing of all available means of joint fires.
The means of joint fires subsume joint fire support and targeting. Targeting
preferably addresses targets in deep operations. Thus, the targets referred to
in decisive operations are frequently affected by joint fire support. Joint fire
support processes focus on the targets served by the tactical echelon. The
transition between joint fire support and targeting is floating.
ii. Targeting is not a stand-alone process, but it is an integral part of the
planning process. It requires the coordinated interaction of several staff
branches within the HQ under the direction of G3 (or S3). To allow this to
happen efficiently, there must be a central coordinating authority, and it may,
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therefore, be necessary to form a target support cell. The cell need not be a
permanent grouping but should meet as frequently as necessary.
iii. The targeting process begins with the receipt of the mission and continues
through the development of the plan. It cannot be isolated from the other
planning procedures and is inextricably linked to the estimate. The cornerstone
of the targeting process is the cycle of decide, detect, deliver, and assess. This
process enables staffs to make decisions during the planning stages. Once an
operation has begun, the staff can take actions to the commander for a decision
without constant referral; targets can be engaged as soon as they are identified.
There are six distinct phases in the targeting process within the cycle.
(d) The land targeting cycle consists of six phases and is similar in output to the
joint targeting cycle (JTC) process. In addition, it links with and synchronizes to
provide necessary inputs into the JTC process. The JTC process is described in
detail in AJP-3.9.2.
i. Phase 1 — Analysis of the JFC’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent
 Guidance from the political, strategic, and operational echelons directs
targeting. The first activity of the joint targeting process is to translate the
JFC’s objectives, guidance, and intent into discrete tasks, each logically and
directly related to the overall desired end state. The JFC’s objectives,
guidance, and intent are conveyed to components in the form of the JFC
OPLAN and joint coordination order. The JFC must clearly identify what is
to be operationally accomplished and under what circumstances and
parameters, including appropriate MOEs.
 The components must develop their own objectives, tasks, and
supporting target nominations to achieve JFC objectives. This method of
planning ensures that tactical operations are ultimately driven by North
Atlantic Council (NAC) objectives.
ii. Phase 2 — Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and
Prioritisation
 Target Development—Target development involves the analysis of the
enemy or adversary to determine the best targets to engage in order to
achieve the JFC’s objectives. JIPOE will normally build basic information on
enemy or adversary facilities, organizations, individuals, and equipment.
Multiple target analysis methods, such as target system analysis and critical
node analysis, are normally employed to identify the enemy or adversary’s
strengths, weaknesses, and centres of gravity. The analysis performed in
target development must be conceived of as proceeding through
successively greater levels of detail, flowing from the broad level to the
narrow level. Critical to the success of the entire targeting process is the
establishment of intelligence requirements at all levels, which in turn drives
the production of collection plans. The ultimate goal of this expansive
research is to support centre of gravity analysis and determine exploitable
vulnerabilities of the enemy or adversary. Targeters will then select specific
targets and target elements that can efficiently be engaged to affect the
centre of gravity.
 Validation—Target validation is conducted to ensure compliance with
the JFC’s objectives, guidance, and intent, and with relevant international
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law. Target validation also verifies the accuracy and credibility of all-source
analysis used to develop a target.
 Nomination—Once potential targets are identified and validated, they
are nominated through the proper channels for approval.
 Prioritisation—Nominated targets are prioritised based on the JFC’s
objectives, guidance, and intent to maximize effective use of joint force
capabilities while minimising the likelihood of unintended, and potentially
undesired, consequences.
iii. Phase 3—Capabilities Analysis. This phase analyses the prioritized
targets from the target development phase and matches appropriate
capabilities in order to achieve the JFC’s objectives whilst minimising
undesirable effects. The capabilities analysis includes both lethal and nonlethal
options and related means in order to allow the JFC to have a clear
understanding of capability requirements and all possible options available
upon which to base his ultimate employment decisions.
iv. Phase 4—Force Planning and Assignment. This phase integrates the
capabilities analysis results with the operational considerations resulting in
prioritised targets being assigned to the available engagement assets. This is
the foundation for the planning and execution of operations that perform
discrete tasks that support the JFC’s objectives.
v. Phase 5—Mission Planning and Force Execution. Component
commanders are responsible for the conduct of this phase. It deals with the
direct planning and execution of engagements, and includes coordinating the
necessary assets to conduct assessments of such engagements.
vi. Phase 6—Assessment
 Assessment is used to measure progress of the joint force toward
mission accomplishment. The assessment process is continuous and
directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout planning, preparation,
and execution of operations. Assessment is performed at all levels.
Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader
tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the desired end state and
are incorporated in strategy and guidance development.
 Tactical-level assessment typically focuses on task completion and
target engagement. Combat assessment is an example of tactical-level
assessment and typically focuses on determining the results of weapons
engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities.) Combat
assessment is composed of three interrelated components: battle damage
assessment, weapons effectiveness assessment, and future targeting or
engagement recommendations.
 MOEs in military operations are defined as tools used to measure
results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned tasks.
MOEs are a prerequisite to the performance of assessment. Assessment of
such indicators normally occurs at the tactical, operational, and strategic
levels of operations and goes beyond counting craters or vehicles
destroyed. These measures help determine progress towards
accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Well-
devised MOEs, other measures, and indicators should be observable and
measurable enabling the JFC’s staff and components to understand the
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casual link among specific tasks, creating the desired effects, and
objectives, as well as guide future action.
(10) Manage CS and CSS Units
(a) An operation focuses on massing of combat power at the decisive point and
time. This requires manoeuvring not only combat forces but also CS and CSS
forces. Commanders and staffs determine where to concentrate actions and
direct movements early enough to position all forces, including CS and CSS, to
perform that task. They plan CS and CSS to shaping operations so as not to
interfere with support to the decisive operations.
(b) During execution, it is easy to lose sight of the time required to reposition
assets. Moving CS and CSS units during movements to contact, exploitations,
and pursuits is particularly important. Staffs include these units in the movement
formation and track their locations. Manoeuvre units must not outrun critical
supporting units. Staff elements remain aware of the time required to move assets
for which they have functional responsibility. They initiate movement in time to get
them to the right place at the right time. They allow enough time to account for the
friction accompanying moves during operations.
(11) Perform Terrain Management. The HQ responsible for an AOO deconflicts land
use. It carefully tracks the location and land use of all units in its AOO. The HQ ensures
that adequate space within the AOO, including the use of routes, is available at the
right time to support critical activities, especially the decisive operation. Staffs use
reverse planning to determine which units require what space at what time. They give
priority to those executing and supporting the decisive operation. They ensure that
space is available when those units need it.
0420 Adjustment Decisions

1. Adjustment decisions select a course of action that modifies the order to respond to
unanticipated opportunities or threats. When the commander makes an adjustment decision,
it normally requires resynchronization of operations across the warfighting functions. Further,
the commander may describe his visualization of the adjustment decision through guidance in
the critical ongoing functions discussed above. The staff must consider the impact of his
decision in their areas of responsibility. The commander pays particular attention to the
implications of adjustment decisions on targeting and gives sufficient guidance to initiate and
support the targeting process. Adjustments may take one of three basic forms.
a. Reallocating Resources. The simplest adjustment is reallocating resources. This
usually provides additional assets to the decisive operation; however, it may also require
reinforcing a shaping operation. Commanders do not reinforce a failing effort without a
clear indication that additional resources will result in success. On the other hand, they
reinforce success if this creates opportunities for more success.
b. Changing the Concept
(1) Changing the concept of the operation adjusts the way the force executes the
operation without changing the mission. Most often, this adjustment involves
designating a different operation as the decisive operation. Commanders normally do
this to exploit an unplanned opportunity or counter an unexpected threat. When the
decisive operation is unsuccessful (or less successful than planned), the commander
designates a more successful shaping operation as the decisive operation.
(2) A shaping operation may achieve significant success beyond that anticipated. In
this situation, the commander may shift the decisive operation to it, if that is possible
within the higher commander’s intent. However, commanders do this only if it
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accomplishes the mission in a manner superior to that of the original plan.

Commanders may also shift the decisive operation if unanticipated enemy actions
threaten to defeat the operation. When shifting the decisive operation, commanders
also shift all priorities of support and all available CS and CSS to the new decisive
operation.
(3) Among the most important adjustment decisions are those concerning the reserve:
the number and type of forces to allocate to it, and when and where to commit it.
Employing reserves successfully requires anticipation. Anticipation helps commanders
task organize, position, and move reserves to minimise loss of momentum on their
commitment. When the reserve is committed, the commander designates another force
as a new reserve.
c. Changing or Deviating from the Mission. When reallocating resources or changing
the concept of operations does not resolve a problem that hampers mission
accomplishment, the commander may consider changing the mission or deviating from the
mission within the higher commander’s intent. Commanders do this only as a last resort,
and the new mission must still accomplish the higher commander’s intent. Of the three
adjustment decisions, this one presents the greatest difficulties in resynchronizing the
force’s operations with those of the overall force.
2. Methods
a. Methods for making adjustment decisions fall along the continuum shown in Figure 4-
5. The key factor commanders consider when selecting a decision-making method is the
time available to make a decision and initiate action. Figure 4-5 on page 4-30 shows other
important factors. As underlying factors push the method further to the intuitive side of the
continuum, at some point the OLPP no longer applies. However, the context provided by
the order—that was developed using the military decision-making process—allows
commanders to make adjustments, even major ones, without having to redo the entire
order.
Figure 4-5. Adjustment Decision Methods

b. Adjustment decisions in novel or complex situations should be as analytic as time
allows. Commanders follow the military decision-making process, modifying selected steps
to fit the situation and available time. In time-constrained conditions, commanders and
staffs can using the rapid decision-making and synchronization process. While the military
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decision-making process seeks the optimal solution, the rapid decision-making and
synchronization process seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander’s
intent, mission, and concept of operations. Using the rapid decision-making and
synchronization process lets leaders avoid the time-consuming requirements of developing
decision criteria and comparing COAs.
3. Decision Making.
a. Decisions are how commanders translate their vision of the end state into action. They
choose a decision-making approach appropriate for the situation. In certain situations,
commanders may rely heavily on intuition. In other situations, commanders may take a
more deliberate approach, using systematic analysis. Effective commanders consider their
experience, the staff’s experience, and the time and information available when making
decisions.
(1) Rational Decision Making
(a) Rational decision making generates several alternative solutions, compares
these solutions to a set of criteria, and selects the best COA. It aims to produce the
optimal solution by comparing options. It emphasizes analytic reasoning guided by
experience, and commanders use it when time is available. This approach offers
several advantages. For example, rational decision making—
i. Is methodical and allows the breakdown of tasks into recognizable
elements.
ii. Ensures commanders consider, analyse, and evaluate relevant factors,
employing techniques such as war-gaming.
iii. Provides a systematic approach when the decision involves processing
large amounts of information.
iv. Helps resolve conflicts among COAs.
v. Gives inexperienced personnel a logically structured approach.
(b) Rational decision making sometimes poses disadvantages. It is often time
consuming and relies on large amounts of information and clearly established
evaluation criteria. While it is methodical, changes in conditions may require a
complete re-evaluation, which could delay decisions. When using this approach,
effective commanders weigh the need for analysis against time considerations.
Rational decision making is not appropriate for all situations, especially during
execution, when forces must adapt to rapidly changing situations.
(2) Intuitive Decision Making
(a) Intuitive decision making is reaching a conclusion through pattern recognition
based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness,
perception, and character. Intuitive decision making—
i. Focuses on assessment of the situation more than on comparing multiple
options.
ii. Is effective when time is short.
iii. Relies on a commander’s experience and ability to recognize the key
elements and implications of a particular problem or situation.
iv. Tends to focus on the larger picture more than individual components.
(b) Intuitive decision making is faster and more often done at the lowest levels of
command. When using intuitive decision making, leaders should be aware of their
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own biases and differences between their current operational environment from
past environments.
(c) Commanders blend intuitive and rational decision making to help them remain
objective and make timely and effective decisions. Commanders avoid making
decisions purely by intuition; they incorporate some analysis into their intuitive
decisions. Combining both approaches provides a holistic perspective on the many
factors that affect decisions. Commanders understand that decisions should be
neither rushed nor over-thought.
0421 Directing Action

Implementation of a decision takes communication of the decision and of subordinates’ tasks
in implementing it. In mission command, this normally takes the form of mission-type orders.
Subordinates must then perform their own decision making and direct actions by their forces.
Any change to a plan requires changes in the application of combat power. Table 4-3
summarizes the range of possible actions with respect to decisions made during execution.
a. Apply Combat Power. To effect execution or adjustment decisions, the commander
must direct action that applies combat power. The normal means for directing changes in
action during execution is the FRAGO. Modern CIS give command support the capability
to automate production of orders and associated graphics for dissemination, especially for
execution decisions that use data already stored in the common database. Subordinates
may also exercise initiative within commander’s intent to apply combat power without
waiting for orders.
Table 4-3. Possible Actions
Type Decision Situation Action
Execution Minor Variances from the Plan. Execute Planned Actions
Plan working well. Variances in Commander or responsible person decides which
MOEs and MOPs are within planned actions best meet situation and directs their
acceptable limits. execution. Staff completes follow-up actions.
Decision may simply be permissive; FRAGO not
normally issued.
Execution Anticipated Situation Execute Branch or Sequel
Variances within limits for sequel. Commander or staff review branch/sequel plan if
prepared; commander receives assessments and
recommendations for modifications to plan, and
issues guidance or decision for further actions.
Participation by commander and refinement of
branch/sequel determined by time available. Staff
completes follow-up actions. FRAGO issued if
modifications to branch/sequel are complex.
Adjustment Unanticipated Situation— Commander recognizes threats or opportunities and
Friendly Success determines time available for decision making.
Significant unanticipated positive Selects decision-making method. If no time for OLPP,
variances are to the friendly forces’ outlines decision on single COA for staff to refine or
advantage for mission directs actions by subordinates to counter threats or
accomplishment. exploit opportunities and exercise initiative in
Or accordance with higher echelon commander’s intent.
Normally will not attempt to restore plan. Verbal
Unanticipated Situation— WNGO or FRAGO issued to subordinate
Enemy Threat commanders. Staff resynchronizes operation,
Significant, unanticipated negative modifies MOEs and MOPs, and commences
variances are not to the friendly assessing operations for progress in accordance with
forces’ advantage for mission new decisions.
accomplishment.
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COA course of action

FRAGO fragmentary order
MOE measure of evaluation
MOP measure of performance
OLPP operational-level planning process
WNGO warning order
b. Synchronize Operations
(1) After the commander makes an execution or adjustment decision, the staff must
synchronize the operation to develop actions that create maximum effects to achieve
a commander’s objectives. This involves synchronizing the operation in time, space,
and purpose across all combat functions to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. This
includes informing, integrating, and deconflicting actions by individual staff sections and
subordinate and supporting sections during operations to reduce duplication,
confusion, and problems. In particular, the staff may use the commander’s guidance to
recommence the targeting process. Modern CIS can reduce the penalties of
resynchronizing operations after an adjustment decision by adjusting supporting plans
through automation. The staff may synchronize actions on exercise of initiative by
subordinates.
(2) Synchronization should be pursued only to the extent required to assure success
and not at the expense of speed and flexibility. Often speed of execution will generate
more combat power than detailed synchronization.
c. Maintain Continuity
(1) The commander or his staff considers two dimensions to maintain continuity when
directing actions during execution. First, make only those changes to the current
operation necessary to solve the problem. This ensures that as much of the current
plan as possible remains the same, which in turn means that subordinates have the
minimum number of changes to address. Second, ensure that changes do not preclude
options for future operations.
(2) Planning future operations depends on options developed earlier during planning
or hastily developed for the current situation. It depends on validating earlier
assumptions and updating planning factors and staff estimates. The concept of future
operations may be war gamed using updated planning factors, staff estimates, and
assumptions that project the situation in time, visualize the flow of battle, and project
the outcomes of future engagements. Commanders and staffs must prioritize carefully
between current and future operations.
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ANNEX A TO
ATP-3.2.2
ANNEX A RELATED ALLIED PUBLICATIONS AND STANAGS

001 General
1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations have concluded a wide range of
agreements on various matters, and more are under negotiation. A selection of the more
prominent publications is listed in AJP-3.2, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND
OPERATIONS, ANNEX 3A.
2. It is noted that standardization agreements (STANAGs) are not normally circulated directly
to users, unlike allied publications (APs). Their contents are included in national and command
instructions (for example, training pamphlets and SOPs).
A002 Policy Documents
MC 362 NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
A003 Other Operational and Tactical Doctrine
AJP-2 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY (STANAG 2190)
AJP-2.1 INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES (STANAG 2191)
AJP-3 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
(STANAG 2490)
AJP-3.10 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS
(STANAG 2518)
AJP-3.2 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND OPERATIONS (STANAG 2288)
AJP-3.3.5 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL (STANAG
3805)
AJP-3.4 NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS (STANAG 2180)
AJP-3.4.9 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
(STANAG 2509)
AJP-3.9 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR JOINT TARGETING (STANAG 2524)
AJP-3.9.2 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND TARGETING (STANAG 2285)
AJP-4.10 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR HEALTH SERVICE AND MEDICAL
SUPPORT (STANAG 2228)
A004 Other Cited References
AAP-6 NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (ENGLISH AND
FRENCH) (STANAG 3680)
AAP-15 NATO GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NATO DOCUMENTS
AND PUBLICATIONS
AAP-39 GLOSSARY OF LAND MILITARY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (STANAG
2248)
APP-6 NATO JOINT MILITARY SYMBOLOGY (STANAG 2019)
APP-11 NATO MESSAGE CATALOGUE
AMOVP-1 ROAD MOVEMENTS AND MOVEMENT CONTROL (STANAG 2454)
ATP-91 IDENTIFICATION OF LAND FORCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND IN AN
AREA OF OPERATION (STANAG 2129)
ATRAINP-4 TRAINING IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) (STANAG 2597)
ATRAINP-5 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY LEVELS (STANAG 6001)
STANAG CODES FOR GEOGRAPHICAL ENTITIES
1059
A-1 Edition B Version 1
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ATP-3.2.2
STANAG NATO CODES FOR GRADES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

2116
STANAG THE MINIMUM SCALE OF CONNECTIVITY FOR COMMUNICATIONS
5048 AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR NATO LAND FORCES
A-2 Edition B Version 1
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ANNEX B TO
ATP-3.2.2
ANNEX B STAFF ORGANIZATION AND STAFF OFFICERS

B001 General
This annex provides the basic foundation of staff organizations. Land forces use standardized
staff organizations to benefit from consistency in performance, responsibilities (regardless of
unit type or echelon), training, and resources. It further discusses characteristics of staff
officers.
B002 Basis for Staff Organizations
Military staffs are organized based on mission and fields of interest.
a. Mission. The mission determines which activities to accomplish. These activities
determine how the commander organizes, tailors, or adapts the staff to accomplish the
mission.
b. Fields of Interest. Regardless of the command’s mission, every army staff has
common broad fields of interest that determine how the commander divides duties and
responsibilities. Grouping related activities allows an effective span of control and unified
effort. The broad fields of interest may vary, depending on the echelon of command, the
mission, and the environment. Broad fields of interest include—
(1) Personnel and administration (G1 or S1).
(2) Intelligence (G2 or S2).
(3) Operations (G3 or S3).
(4) Logistics (G4 or S4).
(5) Plans and policy (G5 or S5).
(6) Communication and information systems (G6 or S6).
(7) Doctrine and training (G7 or S7).
(8) Budget, finance, and contracting (G8 or S8).
(9) Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) (G9 or S9).
B003 Factors Affecting Staff Organizations.
Each commander uses his professional knowledge, experience, and leadership style to
organize his staff. Several factors influence this organization:
a. Size and diversity of responsibilities.
b. Local (unique) requirements.
c. The amount of relevant information the section must promptly disseminate.
d. The availability, qualifications, and performance of personnel.
e. The organization and locations of command posts (CPs) and headquarters (HQ).
f. A section’s mobility requirements.
g. Requirements for 24-hour operations and security.
h. Ability to group related activities.
i. Desired span of control.
j. Commander and chief of staff’s preferences.
B-1 Edition B Version 1
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B004 Authorization for Staff Organizations

Every organization and activity must have an authorization document that states a unit’s
approved structure and resources; it is the basis and authority for requisitioning.
B005 Basic Staff Structure Model
1. Staffs at every echelon of command are structured differently, but every staff has some
similarities. The basic model for all staff structures includes a chief of staff (COS) or executive
officer (XO) and three staff groups: coordinating, special, and personal. The number of
coordinating, special, and personal staff officers within each staff group varies at different
levels of command. The commander may integrate national staffs with multinational personnel
to promote unity of effort and to save resources. Figure B-1 depicts the basic staff model.
Figure B-1. Staff Structure Model

2. The COS or XO is the commander’s principal staff officer. He directs staff tasks,
conducts staff coordination, and ensures efficient and prompt staff response. The COS
oversees coordinating and special staff officers. He does not necessarily oversee the personal
staff officers, although he normally interacts with them daily. The commander normally
delegates authority to the COS for the executive management, coordinating, and special staff
officers.
B006 Coordinating Staff Group
1. Coordinating staff officers are the commander’s principal staff assistants and are
directly accountable to the COS. Coordinating staff officers are responsible for one or more
broad fields of interest. They help the commander plan, prepare for, execute, and assess
operations and activities. Collectively, through the COS, they are accountable for the
commander’s entire field of responsibilities. The staff is not accountable for functional areas
the commander decides to personally control.
2. Commanders may designate coordinating staff officers as assistant chiefs of staff,
deputy assistant chiefs of staff, directors, or regular staff officers. These positions generally
reflect the degree of authority the commander delegates to coordinating staff officers and the
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ATP-3.2.2
scope and complexity of operations within a command. However, the commander establishes
a staff officer’s actual authority if it is not inherent in his title.
3. A coordinating staff officer’s authority is limited to advising, planning, and coordinating
actions within his field of interest. He also coordinates and integrates appropriate special staff
officer activities into operations. The commander might also add authority to a coordinating
staff officer to act on specific matters within his field of interest.
4. Directors have staff and line authority. For example, the director of logistic operations
might be responsible for operating support activities in addition to his normal responsibilities.
Typically, a commander might delegate significant responsibility and authority to a director,
allowing him to accomplish specific functions.
5. Normally, coordinating staff officers have a direct interest in other staff officers’ fields
of interest. Therefore, a clear definition of staff responsibilities is necessary to coordinate and
eliminate conflict. Unit standard operating procedures (SOPs), functional publications, or
organizational publications provide procedures to specify primary responsibilities and
requirements for coordination.
6. Coordinating staff officers are responsible for collecting information and analysing its
implications and impact on the command. More importantly, coordinating staff officers must
provide timely and accurate recommendations to the commander to help him make the best
possible decisions. While doing so, coordinating staff officers must often request and receive
information and recommendations from special staff officers. They must also inform all other
coordinating staff officers, as required.
B007 Special Staff Group
1. Special staff officers and advisors help the commander and other staff members in their
professional or technical functional area. The specific number of special staff officers and their
duties vary at each echelon of command. Special staff sections are organized according to
functional areas. For example, the fire support coordinator is the staff officer whose functional
area is fire support. In some cases, a special staff officer or advisor is a unit commander. An
example is an artillery commander or an engineer commander at the formation echelon of a
division or corps.
2. The commander assigns responsibilities to specific coordinating staff officers for each
of the special staff functions. Although special staff sections may not be integral to a
coordinating staff section, there are usually areas of common interest and habitual association.
Therefore, a coordinating staff officer might be responsible for coordinating a special staff’s
actions.
3. Special staff officers may deal routinely with more than one coordinating staff officer.
B008 Personal Staff Group
Personal staff members work under the commander’s immediate control. They also may serve
as special staff officers as they coordinate actions and issues with other staff members. When
performing their duties as special staff officers, personal staff officers may work through the
COS and under a coordinating staff officer for coordination and control purposes. Members of
the personal staff include—
a. Personal assistants, such as aides-de-camp.
b. Personnel the commander desires to supervise directly.
c. Personnel who by national law or regulation have a special relationship to the
commander.
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B009 Staff Responsibilities

Staff activities focus on assisting the commander in mission accomplishment. The staff
contributes to making and executing timely decisions. The commander and staff should be
continually alert to opportunities to streamline cumbersome or time-consuming procedures.
The following are common responsibilities and duties among all staff members.
a. Gather Information and Data. The staff collects, processes, stores, displays, and
disseminates information that flows continuously into the HQ. The staff rapidly provides
critical elements of information to the commander and other members of the staff,
particularly CCIRs.
(1) Staff officers disseminate information using methods that include briefings,
electronic mail, staff papers, reports, and summaries. They use reports and
summaries extensively to provide information to higher echelon, subordinate,
supporting, supported, and adjacent commands.
(2) Staff research is collecting and evaluating facts to solve problems or to provide
information. The problem determines the extent of research. Only after analysing the
problem and listing the main issues to consider can the staff officer determine how
much and what kind of information to collect. The staff officer must decide when he
has enough information to draw valid conclusions. To be valid, conclusions must be
relevant to the topic, objective, and supported by the data. The staff officer must arrive
at the conclusions through a logical thought process.
(3) Within their areas of interest, staff officers conduct the following general
information management activities:
(a) Submitting information and intelligence reports and intelligence requirements
to the G2 or S2.
(b) Maintaining current common operational picture information and monitoring
operations.
(c) Participating in the joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment (JIPOE) process.
(d) Reporting information of interest to the mission journal.
(e) Monitoring compliance with operations security (OPSEC) directives and
procedures.
(f) Identifying host nation (HN) requirements and coordinating with the G9 or S9
on integrating HN assets.
(g) Assessing and reporting shortfalls of occupational specialties and personnel
readiness issues to the G1 or S1.
(h) Determining workload requirements and assessing status of their
organizations.
(i) Evaluating the effectiveness of support provided.
(j) Identifying requirements for additional units, personnel, equipment, or
support.
(k) Determining and planning training requirements for the entire force.
(l) Determining requirements for forces and equipment based on the
commander’s priorities in coordination with other staff elements and subordinate
commands.
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(m) Determining the adequacy of priorities for employing units.

(n) Performing review and analysis to determine and enhance their effectiveness
to support operations and achieve objectives.
(o) Identifying and updating information requirements (IRs) and CCIRs about the
mission and operational variables.
(p) Collecting, processing, disseminating, displaying, and storing relevant
information from their specific area of responsibility for others’ use. The IM
coordinator assisted by the relevant information and information system officers
has overall responsibility for compiling relevant information developed by all staff
elements. They manage the networked means available to collect, process,
display, store, and disseminate relevant information needed by the G3 or S3 and
the G6 or S6 to create and disseminate the common operational picture.
(q) Assisting the G3 or S3 and the G6 or S6 in building the common operational
picture.
b. Appraise
(1) Staff officers routinely analyse matters affecting operations to identify problems
that may affect the staff officer’s area of interest or the entire command. Judgment
and experience are major factors in the staff officer’s ability to recognize problems.
He should develop a systematic approach, weighing each new item of information in
relation to other information at his disposal. The different areas of staff responsibility
may well employ specific doctrinal information management (IM) processes based on
the particular requirements of managing information within their staff responsibility,
for example, the intelligence cycle.
(2) The staff prepares estimates to assist the commander in decision making.
Adequate plans hinge on early and continuing estimates by staff officers. The
commander uses recommendations to select feasible courses of action (COAs) for
further analysis. Failure to make or update these staff estimates may lead to errors
or omissions when developing COAs.
c. Anticipate. The staff must continually anticipate current and future problems or issues
that affect mission accomplishment. Once the staff identifies a problem, the staff officer
must analyse what actions or coordination to take to resolve the issue. Sometimes the staff
officer has the capability and authority to correct the problem without direction from the
commander. If not, once the staff officer thoroughly analyses the problem, he must inform
the commander so he can make the appropriate decision to resolve the issue.
d. Inform. Staff officers cannot be just data collectors and transmitters. They must have
the ability to analyse and clearly articulate information. The staff continuously provides
relevant information to the commander on the progress of operations. This information
helps the commander obtain situational awareness (SA.) One piece of information may not
be significant, but added to others it may be the information that allows the commander to
formulate his visualization to make a decision. The staff—
(1) Advises the commander and other staff on capabilities, limitations, requirements,
resource availability, employment, and all matters pertaining to their areas of interest.
(2) Advises the commander and staff officers on the capabilities, limitations, and
employment of supporting forces.
(3) Informs and advises the commander of directives and policy guidance from higher
HQ.
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e. Recommend
(1) Staff officers make recommendations to assist the commander in reaching
decisions and establishing policies. Staff officers also offer recommendations to each
other and subordinate commanders. These recommendations are for information and
assistance only.
(2) Staff officers may brief recommendations or provide written estimates or studies.
Whether procedures are formal or informal, staff officers must carefully analyse and
compare all feasible alternatives using the best information available. They must
candidly and objectively present the alternatives to the commander by clearly
showing advantages and disadvantages. They must be thoroughly prepared to
recommend a best alternative to the commander. Preparations include coordinating
with the staff officers whose areas of interest the recommendation might affect. Staff
officers prepare recommendations in a form that requires only the commander’s
approval or disapproval. Within their areas of expertise, staff officers make the
following kinds of recommendations:
(a) Command policy and guidance concerning capabilities, limitations, and
employment.
(b) Policies and procedures to enhance capabilities.
(c) Priorities for employment, distribution, and support.
(d) Acceptable risk.
(e) Organization for combat allocations to subordinate units and command and
support relationships between subordinate units and organic units.
(f) Resource allocation and employment synchronization of all organic and
supporting assets (to include those of other services) to support the scheme of
manoeuvre.
(g) General location and movements of units.
f. Issue Directions on Behalf of the Commander. The staff prepares and issues plans
and orders to execute the commander’s decisions, coordinating all necessary details. The
commander may delegate authority to staff officers to issue plans and orders without his
personal approval. The commander assigns a single staff officer responsibility for preparing
and publishing a plan or order. Other staff officers prepare elements of the plan or order in
their areas of interest. Examples include—
(1) Formulating the concept of operations and concept of support in line with the
(2) Identifying specified and implied tasks to support the plan.
(3) Developing the scheme of manoeuvre to support the COA.
(4) Adjusting plans according to feedback.
(5) Identifying constraints.
(6) Preparing, authenticating, and distributing their portion of the command SOP,
operation plans (OPLANs), operation orders (OPORDs), annexes, staff estimates,
appendixes, support plans, command training plans, reports, studies, and
summaries.
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g. Supervise. The staff assists the commander by ensuring that subordinates execute
the commander’s decisions. This relieves the commander of detail, keeps the staff
informed of the situation, and provides the staff information to revise estimates and to
produce progress reports to the commander during preparation and execution. Staff
officers ensure that the intended recipients receive decisions and understand and execute
them within the commander’s intent. They also initiate recommendations for adjustments
when circumstances demand. Supervision is accomplished by analysing reports,
messages, and staff visits. Actions by staff members include—
(1) Monitoring the execution of instructions, plans, and orders.
(2) Ensuring that subordinate and supporting units accomplish missions to support
the commander’s scheme of manoeuvre.
h. Coordinate
(1) Staff coordination results in making certain that pieces fit together in an integrated
whole. Good staff coordination requires personal initiative, a spirit of cooperation, and
the genuine interest of each staff member to achieve a unified effort. Most staff
actions require coordination that extends beyond the immediate command and
includes higher echelon, subordinate, supporting, supported, and adjacent
commands. Coordination is essential for four reasons:
(a) To ensure a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent.
(b) To ensure complete and coherent staff actions.
(c) To avoid conflict and duplication by adjusting plans or policies before
implementation.
(d) To consider all factors.
(2) The coordinating staff officer, under whose area of interest the action falls, has
specific responsibility for coordinating that action. He frequently designates a member
of his section to be the action officer for the action under consideration. The action
officer and all other interested staff officers examine and correlate all actions and
resolve any conflicts. Each staff officer examines the action from his own and the
commander’s points of view and determines the proper action. He then presents the
action to the approving authority for a final decision. Coordination by staff officers
includes—
(a) Coordinating with and providing direction to other staff elements about issues
and information.
(b) Maintaining close contact and exchanging information with the corresponding
staff at higher, subordinate, supporting, supported, and adjacent commands and
other services and agencies. In the joint arena, the G3 or S3 has coordinating
responsibility not only with the J3 (operations), but also the J5 (plans and policy).
The G5 or S5 has coordinating responsibility with not only the J3, but also the J5.
(c) Coordinating with the G5 or S5 for HN support or local civilian support.
B010 Specific Staff Responsibilities and Duties
A HQ will be divided into a number of staff cells, each having a clear function and
responsibilities. The cells cannot, however, act independently of each other, and their efforts
must be coordinated to ensure that the commander receives the information and input that he
needs to make decisions. The specific responsibilities of the staff cells follow. The full list will
normally be found at land component command through corps; lower echelons will not normally
be staffed with all these staff officers.
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a. G1 or S1—Personnel and Administration, including—

(1) Personnel management.
(2) Manpower administration (including reserves and replacements).
(3) Provost and discipline.
(4) Prisoner of war administration.
(5) Casualty procedures.
b. G2 or S2—Intelligence, including—
(1) An intelligence centre providing all-source analytical support to operational staffs
and situation monitoring.
(2) An intelligence operations section providing requirements management and
dissemination.
(3) An intelligence support section, providing intelligence system support and
collection management support.
(4) Meteorology.
(5) Terrain analysis.
c. G3 or S3—Operations, including—
(1) Current operations, providing supervision of operations and cells covering
command and control (C2) warfare (including the electronic warfare [EW]
coordination cell, OPSEC, psychological operations, and deception). (Some nations
include EW as a G6 function).
(2) Some headquarters that constitute a future operations cell responsible for linking
plans and current operations.
(3) Operations support, providing advice on functional areas such as rules of
engagement (ROE), search and rescue.
(4) A reports cell that prepares all reports for the commander, provides operations
summaries, and prepares and maintains records of all significant operational matters.
(5) A nuclear operations and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
defence operations cell.
d. G4 or S4—Logistics, including—
(1) Logistic support and combat service support (CSS).
(2) Health service support. (Not all nations include health service and medical support
under G4.)
(3) Logistic HN support coordination (if not provided by a national or joint HQ).
e. G5 or S5—Plans and Policy, including—
(1) The operational-level planning process (OLPP) and estimate process.
(2) Forward planning and coordination.
(3) Contingency planning.
(4) Operational analysis.
f. G6 or S6—Computer Information Systems (CIS), including—
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(1) CIS management (some nations include EW as a G6 function).

(2) Frequency management.
(3) Cryptography and communications security.
(4) Information security.
(5) Cyber defence.
g. G7 or S7—Doctrine and Training (normally part of a peace-time HQ, but not
necessarily part of an operationally deployed HQ), including—
(1) Doctrine management.
(2) Exercise planning.
(3) Lessons learned.
h. G8 or S8—Budget, Finance and Contracting, including—
(1) Civil secretariat.
(2) Civilian personnel management.
(3) Finance and budget planning, execution, and control.
(4) Contract authority.
i. G9 or S9—CIMIC, including—
(1) Negotiation of coordination and support arrangements and agreements.
(2) Coordination of CIMIC. (See AJP 3.4.9. ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CIVIL-
MILITARY COOPERATION.)
(3) Coordination with national civil emergency planning.
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ANNEX C NATO COMMAND AUTHORITIES
C001 General
To exercise command and control (C2) effectively, a commander must be aware of the
command authorities and command relationships he has with the formations and units
allocated to him for his mission. The following terms and definitions are concerned primarily
with the ability of the commander to assign an independent mission, to reorganize the
formation to suit his purpose, or to direct specific tasks within an agreed mission statement.
The relevant terms are defined below. See Appendix 1 to Annex C for a chart relating North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command authorities (command or control) to authorities.
Appendix 2 contains considerations for multinational and national commanders when
establishing a NATO multinational command or integrating new forces in a NATO multinational
command.
C002 Command
1. Full Command. Full command is the military authority and responsibility of a
commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and
administration and exists only within national services. Note: the term “command” as used
internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national
sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him
since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or
operational control.
2. Operational Command. Operational command is the authority granted to a
commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to
reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander
deems necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration. It may also be used to
denote the forces assigned to a commander.
3. Tactical Command. Tactical command is the authority delegated to a commander to
assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by
higher authority.
C003 Control
As a state of command, control is that authority exercised by a commander over part of the
activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command,
that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directions. All or part of this
authority may be transferred or delegated. The following are NATO levels of authority under
control:
a. Operational Control. Operational control is the authority delegated to a commander
to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks
which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to
retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign
separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself,
include administrative or logistic control.
b. Tactical Control. Tactical control is the detailed and usually local direction and control
of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
c. Administrative Control. Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority
over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters such as
personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational
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missions of the subordinate or other organizations. This normally remains with national
commanders unless expressly delegated to NATO commanders, and then only for a limited
time and purpose.
d. Coordinating Authority. Coordinating authority is the authority granted to a
commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or
activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services
or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation
between the agencies involved or their representatives but not the authority to compel
agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to
obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential
agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.
e. Logistic Control. Logistic control is the authority of the commander to execute logistics
functions and activities within the agreed limits of logistic control in accordance with the
transfer of authority (TOA).
C004 Support
Support is the action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or
sustains any other force. Support is a command authority when the level of support is specified
by a commander authorized to do so. Support terms are normally used with combat support
(CS) or combat service support (CSS) arms where a technical authority generally exists to
advise on employment of these resources. (See Table C-1 on page C-3 for a list of support
relationships.)
a. Close Support. Close support is that action of the supporting force against targets or
objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or
coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the
supported force.
b. Mutual Support. Mutual support is that support which units render each other against
an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the
enemy, and their inherent capabilities.
c. Direct Support. Direct support is the support provided by a unit not attached to or
under the command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the
support required by that unit or formation.
d. General Support. General support is that support which is given to the supported force
as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.
C005 Other Terms
1. Assign. Assign is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement
is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or
personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel.
2. Attach. Attach is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement
is relatively temporary. Subject to limitations imposed in the attachment order, the commander
of the formation, unit, or organization receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree
of C2 there as he does over the units and persons organic to his command. However, the
parent formation, unit, or organization normally retains the responsibility for transfer and
promotion of personnel.
C006 Fire Unit and Combat Support Terms
The following terms relate specifically to fire units and CS units. (See table C-1 for an
explanation of support relationships.)
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a. In support. In support is an expression used to denote the task of providing artillery

supporting fire to a formation or unit. Liaison and observation are not normally provided.
b. Direct support. Direct support is support from artillery whose primary task is to provide
fire requested by the supported unit.
c. General support. General support is support from artillery that executes the fire directed
by the commander of the unit to which it organically belongs or is attached. It fires in support
of the operation as a whole rather than in support of a specific subordinate unit.
d. General support reinforcing. General support reinforcing is a tactical task in which an
artillery unit fires in support of the force as a whole and, on a secondary basis, provides
reinforcing fire for another artillery unit.
e. Reinforcing. In artillery usage, reinforcing as a tactical mission in which one artillery unit
augments the fire of another artillery unit.
Table C-1. Support Relationships
Then inherent responsibilities:
Can
impose on
Are
Establish/ gained
If relation- Have May be Receive assigned Have
maintain unit
ship is: command task- sustain- position or Provide priorities
communi- further
relation- organized ment an area of liaison to: established
cations command
ship with: by: from: operations by:
with: or support
by:
relation-
ship by:
Parent unit;
Direct Supported Supported Supported
Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit supported See note1
support1 unit unit unit
unit
Parent unit; Reinforced
Reinforc- Reinforced Reinforced Not
Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit reinforced unit; then
ing unit unit applicable
unit parent unit
Reinforced Reinforced Parent unit;
General
unit and as unit and as then Not
support– Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit
required by required by reinforced applicable
reinforcing
parent unit parent unit unit
As required As required
General Not
Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit Parent unit by parent by parent Parent unit
support applicable
unit unit
Note: 1 Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and
elements of the supported unit after ion with the supported commander.
C007 Transfer of Authority

Within NATO, TOA is an action by which a member nation or NATO command gives
operational command or control of designated forces to a NATO command. At some point,
national units come under the control of the designated multinational commander. This
process, known as TOA, should be accomplished as early as possible. The timing of the
transfer must be part of the initial negotiations that governs how the coalition forms. Planners
must determine where the TOA—and the follow-on integration of units and headquarters
(HQ)—occurs. Early TOA enables the multinational commander to plan and conduct effective
integration training of the multinational force.
a. The first option is to arrange TOA to the multinational force before deploying a unit’s
home station. Commanders can then control unit arrival sequence to best suit operational
requirements and facilitate reception area base operations. This option also assumes clear
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political consensus, timely decisions on national participation, and a significant lead time
for planning and setting up the multinational force HQ.
b. A second option is to have TOA at an intermediate staging base en route to the
operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area and deploy only when fully
ready and in the sequence required by the coalition force.
c. The third option is to have TOA occur once forces arrive in the area of operations
(AOO). This option leaves each nation responsible to deploy and prepare its contingent for
operations. It does not allow the multinational force positive control of deployment into the
AOO and is less than optimum if immediate combat is likely.
d. Whichever option is chosen, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred. Then
reception operations are not done by repetitive crisis management. Centralized control of
force flow provides the best support to the coalition’s requirements and the best support to
the forces.
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Appendix 1 to ANNEX C Levels of Authority

Table C-1-1 lists and explains the levels of authority.
Table C-1-1. Levels of Authority
Authority FULLCOM OPCOM OPCON (2) TACOM TACON

(7)
Task organize the assigned element X
X
(1)
Assign missions to the assigned X X(4)
X
element (3)
Assign tasks to the assigned element X X X (5)
for the purpose of which it has been X
assigned.
May further delegate command OPCOM OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON
authority (6) OPCON OPCON TACOM TACON
TACOM TACOM TACON
TACON TACON
Coordinate movement, local defence, X X X X
X
and force protection.
Planning and coordination X X X X X
Administrative and logistic
X
responsibility
FULLCOM full command OPCON operational control TACON tactical control
OPCOM operational command TACOM tactical command
Notes:
(1) The gaining commander may task organise the assigned unit and thus assign separate missions to it and its
component parts. This is limited to FULLCOM and OPCOM. A commander assigned forces under FULLCOM or OPCOM
may employ those forces for any purpose.
(2) For forces allocated under OPCON the gaining commander may not break up the organisational integrity of the force
for separate employment. Under OPCON forces assigned may only be employed within certain constraints such as
function, time or location imposed by the higher authority. For example, the forces may only be assigned for a single
phase of a particular operation. This may be done for national purposes in the case of a multinational context, where it
is in a participating nation’s interest to constrain in some fashion the employment of the contributed force. In other cases
the assigning commander may require the force for other purposes later in the operation.
(3) A mission is defined as: A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. (AAP-06).
(4) Under OPCON the gaining commander may assign a mission to the assigned element that is distinct from, but related
to, the gaining commander’s overall mission. OPCON is normally applied to assigned manoeuvre elements such as
infantry and armour forces.
(5) Under TACOM the gaining commander may only allocate to the assigned force a specific task consistent for the
accomplishment of the mission and purpose assigned by the higher commander, that is, within the parameters of the
current mission given by the higher authority. TACOM is used where the superior commander recognizes the need for
additional resources for a task but requires the resources intact for a later role. Under TACOM the assigned force is
allocated for specific tasks and is allocated normally for a limited period of time. This prevents the gaining commander
from employing the assigned force in a role or manner not intended by the higher commander. When the task is complete
or the specific timeframe expires, the TACOM relationship with the gaining force ends. TACOM is usually applied to
specific situations and to combat support elements that have unique capabilities. Example of forces and situations in
which TACOM would likely be used is: an engineer sub-unit assigned to an infantry unit to assist in building field
fortifications for a specific period of time.
(6) With the exception of FULLCOM, a gaining commander may further delegate the same or a lesser command authority
over the allocated force to a subordinate commander, but within the same constraints initially given.
(7) TACON is generally used to indicate those units that will be located within another unit or formation’s assigned
geographical boundaries, and by so assigning, the gaining unit becomes responsible for coordination aspects within the
shared area of operations. The gaining commander has authority to coordinate local defence, force protection and
terrain allocation.
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Appendix 2 to ANNEX C Considerations for Integrating Newly Assigned Units in a

Multinational Operation
C201 General
Commanders participating in a multinational operation may use the following questions with
respect to the force’s participation in the operation to assist in integration.
C202 Command
1. What is the command structure? Is it lead nation, parallel command, or a combination?
2. What political motivations are responsible for each nation’s participation in the operation?
What potential conflicts may arise?
3. Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated coalition operations
been assessed?
4. Have appropriate orientation briefings from civilian agencies been requested?
5. Have status-of-forces been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations?
6. What interoperability factors will affect the mission, for example, command, control,
communications, or logistics?
7. Are there cultural barriers that may prevent a harmonious relationship?
8. What force structure will minimise friction between partners?
9. Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher
authority to resolve inadequacies?
10. What unique capabilities does a national contingent bring to the coalition?
11. What constraints do national authorities impose on coalition forces?
12. Have standards regarding operational or logistics capabilities been established for
certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated a
method of resolution?
13. Have deficiencies with coalition commanders been negotiated for resolution?
14. Have C2 arrangements been made to include the coalition ambassadors, military
attaches, and non-military government officials in coordinating functions?
15. Are forces, computer information systems (CIS) capabilities, and logistic support robust
enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?
16. Have all coalition legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?
17. Have the personnel for the coalition staff been chosen to reflect the required functional
skills, training level, language skill, and avoidance of historic animosities?
18. Have minimum communications capabilities been established for each coalition member
to enable successful 24-hour operations?
19. Has the command structure been designed to minimise the number of layers?
C203 Command Relationship
1. Have command relationships for control of forces been defined?
2. Is there an initiating directive that clearly articulates the command arrangements?
3. Have the command relationships been defined and analysed for—
a. Feasibility of achieving unity of command or unity of effort?
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b. Feasibility of accomplishing the mission under the command relationships?

c. Assistance required from the national authorities in negotiating unity of command or
effort at the strategic level?
d. Clarity of relationships and understanding on the part of all coalition elements?
C204 Language
1. What language will be used for force-wide communications?
2. At what command level will each force resort to its national language?
3. Are there sufficient interpreters for planning and execution?
C205 Mission
1. What is the source of the mission tasking? What is the relationship between the military
force and this political entity? If the source is not the political authority sponsoring the coalition
operation, has clarification and support from national military chains of command been
requested?
2. What is the process to consider and approve changes to the mission statement?
3. How is the military role coordinated with the roles of other governmental agencies, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations?
4. What is the mission? Is it clearly defined, decisive, and attainable?
5. How does the mission statement attain the desired end state?
6. What are the specific objectives of the force? How do the objectives help attain the end
state?
7. Have these objectives been translated into tasks for subordinate commanders?
8. What is the exit strategy?
9. What are the requirements for transition and who is the transition force and controlling
HQ?
10. Has a comprehensive campaign plan been developed?
C206 End State
1. What is the end state? Does it clearly define mission success and the military role in
attaining it?
2. What are the national end state criteria of each coalition partner? Do they differ from
the criteria of the coalition force itself?
3. Does the end state identify the conditions under which the coalition military operation
can be terminated?
4. Are the conditions tangible in military terms?
5. Are they contained in the mission statement?
C207 Mission Analysis
1. Can the force accomplish its mission in the allotted time?
2. What means are available to accomplish the mission and are they adequate?
3. Has the use of strategic forces been considered and for what has it been planned?
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4. Does the force have sufficient assets to protect itself? Do they balance with the potential
political ramifications of failure to protect the force?
5. What is the probable cost of the operation (in lives, money, and resources) and is it
acceptable to the political authorities directing the force’s involvement?
6. Has the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander’s intent?
Does this intent support the desired strategic end state?
7. What are the courses of action to be followed by the coalition force when a national
military element withdraws from the force?
8. What are the courses of action to be executed if the sponsoring organization orders
withdrawal of coalition forces in advance of end state?
9. Do plans exist to transition from a standing start to non-Article 5 crisis response
operations (NA5CROs), standing start to war, or war to NA5CRO? Who will determine when
the transition begins or is complete?
10. What are the redeployment or withdrawal plans for coalition forces?
11. Is the departure of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?
12. What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian or other
peaceful operations?
C208 NA5CRO
(All the above also apply).
a. What and how much of the affected nation’s infrastructure should be restored?
b. Will the coalition’s projected actions solve the long-term problem of the mission area?
c. How will the force control mission creep?
d. What is “one thing” the force can do to stabilize the situation?
e. What tolerance should the force have for violence?
f. Is a weapons bounty program needed?
C209 Rules of Engagement
1. Have rules of engagement (ROE) been agreed upon by national authorities or by
national military commanders?
2. How will national ROE affect other coalition force organizations and operations?
3. What are the procedures for commanders to request a change to the ROE?
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ANNEX D WAR GAMING

D001 General
War gaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of
a battle. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy
assets and probable courses of action (COAs); and characteristics of the area of operations
(AOO). It relies heavily on a doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and experience. It focuses
the staff’s attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative
process of action, reaction, and counteraction. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity
with tactical possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. War gaming is the most valuable step
during COA analysis and comparison, and it should be allocated more time than any other
step. With new technologies available, this process can be shortened using combat force ratios
derived from extensive data banks and software to do analogue analysis of COAs. However,
the commander or chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) must determine how much
time to commit to the war-gaming process.
D002 Analyse Courses of Action
1. War gaming is one method of conducting COA analysis. It identifies which COA best
accomplishes the mission while best positioning the force for future operations. (See
Figure D-1.) It helps the commander and staff to—
a. Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the
friendly forces and minimising collateral damage.
b. Have as near an identical a visualization of the battle as possible.
c. Anticipate events during the operation.
d. Determine conditions and resources required for success.
e. Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities.
f. Focus joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) on desired
end state, decisive points, and enemy strengths, weaknesses, and centre of gravity.
g. Identify coordination requirements to produce synchronized results.
h. Determine the most flexible COA.
Figure D-1. War Gaming
D-1 Edition B Version 1
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2. During the war game, the staff takes a COA and begins to develop a detailed plan,
while it determines the strengths or weaknesses of each other COA. War gaming tests a COA
or improves a developed COA. The commander and his staff (and subordinate commanders
and staffs if the war game is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or
develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or
problems.
D003 The General Rules of War Gaming
Staffs conducting war games need to—
a. Remain objective. Staffs do not allow personality or their sense of “what the
commander wants” to influence them. They must avoid defending a COA just because they
personally developed it.
b. Accurately record advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become
evident.
c. Continually assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the COA. If a COA fails
any of these tests during the war game, they must reject it.
d. Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts to support such conclusions.
e. Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. This must wait until the
comparison phase.
D004 War-Gaming Responsibilities
1. The commander is essential to a successful war game. He normally does not
participate directly because his presence might unduly influence the staff to generate results
in the direction it perceives he desires rather than analyse objectively. However, he may also
participate in it, especially if time is critical. As part of his planning guidance, he decides which
friendly or enemy COAs he wants the war game to analyse. During the war game or at the war
game briefing, he decides how to solve problems arising from the game, where decision points
are, and which contingencies to plan. By doing so, he checks his intent and gets an overview
of the operation.
2. The COS or XO is responsible for coordinating actions of the staff during the war game.
He is the unbiased controller of the process, ensuring the staff stays on a timeline and
accomplishes the goals of the war gaming session. In a time-constrained environment, he
ensures that, at a minimum, the decisive operation is war gamed.
3. The G1 or S1 analyses COAs to project potential personnel battle losses and determine
how CSS provides personnel support during operations.
4. The G2 or S2 role-plays the enemy commander. He develops critical enemy decision
points in relation to the friendly COAs, projects enemy reactions to friendly actions, and
projects enemy losses. Besides playing the enemy commander, the G2 or S2 assigns the role
of friendly G2 or S2 to another member of the staff section if section strength allows. He
ensures that the staff fully addresses friendly responses for each enemy COA. For the friendly
force, the G2 or S2—
a. Identifies information requirements (IRs) and refines the event template to include
named areas of interest that support decision points and refines the event matrix with
corresponding decision points, target areas of interest, and high-value targets.
b. Refines situation templates.
c. Participates in the targeting meetings and determines high pay-off targets based on
JIPOE.
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5. The G3 or S3 normally selects the techniques and methods that the staff will use for
war gaming. The G3 or S3 staff must ensure that the war game of the COA covers every
operational aspect of the mission, records each event’s strengths and weaknesses, and
annotates the rationale.
6. The G4 or S4 analyses each COA to assess its sustainment feasibility. He determines
critical requirements for each sustainment function by analysing each COA to identify potential
problems and deficiencies. In addition, the G4 or S4 ensures that available movement times
and assets will support the COA.
7. The G9 or S9 analyses each COA for effectively integrating the civil considerations of
the mission and operational variables. He also focuses on foreign nation support, local
populations and actors, and the care of displaced civilians. His analysis of each COA considers
the impact of operations on public order and safety, potential for disaster relief requirements,
non-combatant evacuation operations, emergency services, and protection of culturally
significant sites. If the unit does not have an assigned G9 or S9, the unit assigns these
responsibilities to a staff member.
8. Special staff officers help the coordinating staff by analysing the COAs in their own
areas of expertise.
D005 War-Gaming Steps
The staff follows eight steps during the war-gaming process.
a. Step 1. Gather the tools. Tools required include, but are not limited to—
(1) Current coordinating staff estimates.
(2) Event template.
(3) Recording method.
(4) Completed COAs, to include manoeuvre, reconnaissance and surveillance, and
security graphics.
(5) Means to post enemy and friendly unit symbols.
(6) Map of AOO (either paper or digital).
(7) Updated staff estimates and common operational picture.
b. Step 2. List All Friendly Forces. The commander and staff consider all units that can
be committed to the operation, paying special attention to support relationships and
constraints. The friendly force list remains constant for all COAs that the staff analyses.
c. Step 3. List Assumptions. The commander and staff review previous assumptions for
continued validity and necessity.
d. Step 4. List Known Critical Events and Decision Points. Critical events are those
that directly influence mission accomplishment. The list of critical events includes major
events from the unit’s current position to the accomplishment of the mission.
Note: Decision points are events or locations in the AOO where tactical decisions
are required during mission execution. Decision points do not dictate what the
decision is, only that one must be made, and when and where it should be made,
to have the maximum impact on friendly or enemy COAs. When time is short, the
staff must reduce the list to only essential critical events and decision points.
e. Step 5. Determine Evaluation Criteria. Evaluation criteria are those factors the staff
uses to measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other
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COAs following the war game. Evaluation criteria change from mission to mission.
Evaluation criteria may include anything the commander desires.
Note: The criteria should look not only at what will create success, but also at what
will cause failure. The evaluation criteria may be used to determine the measures
of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) for assessing
progress in the operation for the selected COA. They are updated as the operation
progresses.
f. Step 6. Select the War Game Method. There are three recommended techniques—
the belt, the avenue-in-depth, and the box.
(1) Belt Technique. The belt technique divides the AOO into belts (areas) running
the width of the AOO. The shape of the belt is based on mission and operational
variables analysis. The belt technique is most effective when terrain is divided into
well-defined cross-compartments; during phased operations (such as river crossings,
air assaults, or airborne operations) or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined
belts or echelons. (See Figure D-2.)
Figure D-2. Belt Technique

(2) Avenue-in-Depth Technique. The avenue-in-depth technique focuses on one
avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the decisive operation. This technique
is good for offensive COAs or in the defence when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual
support. (See Figure D-3.)
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Figure D-3. Avenue-in-Depth Technique

(3) Box Technique. The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such
as an engagement area, a river-crossing site, or a landing zone. It is most useful
when time is constrained, as in a hasty attack, and is particularly useful when
conducting operations in a non-contiguous AOO. When using this technique, the staff
isolates the area and focuses on critical events in it. (See Figure D-4 on page D-6.)
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Figure D-4. Box Technique

g. Step 7. Select a Method to Record and Display Results. Two methods are used to
portray the action—the synchronization matrix (see Table D-1 on page D-7) and the sketch
note (see Figure D-5 on page D-8). In both methods, staff members record any remarks
regarding the strengths and weaknesses they discover. The amount of detail depends on
the time available. Details and methods of recording and displaying war-game results are
best addressed in unit standard operating procedures (SOPs).
(1) The synchronization matrix method allows the staff to synchronize the COA
across time and space in relation to the enemy COA.
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Table D-1. Sample Synchronization Matrix
Decision Enemy Time or

H-8 H-hour H+*
Points Action Event
1st Bde
2d Bde
Manoeuvre
3d Bde
Avn
Recce
Defense
Air
Fire Support
Information Operations
Engineers
Combat Service Support
Command and Control
Note: The first column is representative only and can be modified to fit formation needs.
(2) The sketch note method uses brief notes concerning critical locations or tasks and
purposes. These notes reference specific locations on the map or relate to general
considerations covering broad areas. They assign the event a number and a title and
use the columns on the work sheet to identify and list in sequence as shown in Figure
D-5 on page D-8.
(a) Tasks and assets (allocated forces).
(b) Expected enemy actions and reactions.
(c) Friendly counteractions and assets.
(d) Total assets needed for the task.
(e) Estimated time to accomplish the task.
(f) Decision points when the commander must decide to execute the task.
(g) Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
(h) Control measures.
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Figure D-5. War-Game Work Sheet

h. Step 8. War Game the Battle and Assess the Results. During the war game, the
commander and staff try to foresee the dynamics of a battle’s action, reaction, and
counteraction. Actions are those events initiated by the side with the initiative (normally the
force on the offensive). Reactions are the other side’s actions in response. Counteractions
are the first side’s responses to reactions. The war game should result in the commander
and staff—
(1) Refining or modifying the COA, to include identifying branches and sequels that
become on-order or be-prepared missions.
(2) Refining location and timing of decisive points.
(3) Identifying key or decisive terrain and determining how to use it.
(4) Refining the enemy event template and matrix.
(5) Refining task organization, to include forces retained in general support of the
command.
(6) Identifying tasks the unit must retain and tasks to be assigned to subordinate
commanders.
(7) Allocating combat functions assets to subordinate commanders to accomplish
their missions.
(8) Developing decision points.
(9) Developing a synchronization matrix.
(10) Developing decision support template (DST).
(11) Developing information operations (Info Ops) objectives and tasks.
(12) Estimating the duration of each critical event as well as of the entire operation.
(13) Projecting the percentage of total enemy forces defeated in each critical event,
and overall.
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(14) Identifying likely times and areas for enemy use of weapons of mass destruction
and friendly chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence
requirements.
(15) Identifying the location and commitment of the reserve.
(16) Identifying the most dangerous enemy COA.
(17) Identifying the location of the commander, unit command posts, and computer
information systems (CIS) nodes.
(18) Identifying additional critical events.
(19) Identifying additional requirements for combat functions support.
(20) Determining requirements for deception and surprise.
(21) Refining command and control (C2) requirements, to include control measures
and updated operational graphics.
(22) Refining CCIRs and IRs—to include the last time information is of value—and
incorporating them into the reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
(23) Developing the intelligence collection and dissemination plan and the resulting
reconnaissance and surveillance plan and graphics.
(24) Develop Info Ops objectives and tasks.
(25) Developing fire support, engineer, air defence, Info Ops, and CSS plans and
graphics.
(26) Identifying or confirming the locations of decisive points, named areas of interest,
target areas of interest, and IRs needed to support the decision points.
(27) Determining the timing of force concentration and initiation of the attack or
counterattack.
(28) Determining movement times and tables for critical assets, to include CIS nodes.
(29) Identifying, analysing, and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of the COA.
(30) Integrating the targeting process, to include identifying or confirming high-payoff
targets and determining attack guidance.
(31) Identifying additional hazards, assessing their risk, developing control measures
to reduce risk from all identified hazards, and determining residual risk.
D006 War Game Briefing (Optional)
Time permitting, a war-game briefing is conducted to ensure the staff comprehends fully the
results of the war game. This briefing is not given to the commander, but it is the staff’s means
to review the war games to ensure that the decision briefing to the commander covers all
relevant points. It is normally given to the COS or XO or the deputy or assistant commander
and may include selected subordinate staff in a collaborative environment.
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ANNEX E LIAISON
E001 General
Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces and,
where necessary, non-military agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and
action. This annex standardizes liaison procedures among land forces participating in joint and
combined operations throughout the range of military operations. It is aimed principally at the land
component, but it recognizes the specific needs of joint, combined, and multinational operations.
It is consistent with the doctrinal tenets of AJP-3 and AJP-3.2. It embodies liaison as it pertains to
Article 5 operations and non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CROs).
E002 Purpose
1. Liaison is a continuous but informal process, normally achieved through consultations
between respective commanders and their staffs by either personal contact or using electronic
means, with the primary purpose of enhancing communication. Liaison can be achieved by one
or a combination of the following:
a. Personal contacts between commanders.
b. Staff visits and personal contacts between staff officers.
c. Exchange of liaison officers (LOs), liaison detachments, and liaison teams.
d. Establishing and maintaining suitable computer information systems (CIS), including
couriers.
2. Liaison is a standing requirement, especially in multinational operations, in peacetime, in
conflict, and in NA5CRO. It must not become an afterthought on deployment. Liaison can reduce
interoperability friction through direct communications and contributes towards unity of effort,
force integrity, and mutual support among different components of the force. It is used in all
phases of operations—as well as during routine activity between units—to facilitate and preserve
freedom of action and maintain flexibility. It is the most commonly used technique for establishing
and maintaining close, continuous communication between commands. Liaison is established
between components to improve—
a. Cooperation and understanding between commanders and staffs of headquarters (HQs)
and forces that are working together.
b. Coordination of tactical matters to achieve unity of effort, mutual purpose, support, and
action.
c. Exact and precise understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to achieve
synchronized results.
d. Coordination between military forces and non-military agencies, for example, civilian
agencies and former warring factions.
3. There may be occasions when the exchange of liaison teams is not sufficient to ensure
adequate understanding and cooperation between several formations. This is more likely in the
case of joint or multinational operations. In addition, a commander may choose to employ
personal LOs to provide an independent source of timely and accurate information.
E-1 Edition B Version 1
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E003 Principles
The principles of liaison augment the principles of communications as laid out in AJP-3.2 and will
apply to all operations, in peace or war. However, it is recognized that NA5CROs place special
additional requirements on liaison because of the increased multinationality at lower levels of
command and the potential for small individual actions to rapidly achieve military and sometimes
political significance. The mutual exchange of information is the critical intent.
a. Multinational Operations. Mutual confidence is the key to making liaison successful.
Liaison activities require the explicit coordination of doctrine and techniques, patience and
tact during personal interaction, and a thorough understanding of the strategic, operational,
and tactical aims supporting any international military effort. Cultural differences and
sensitivities may require special communications and liaison arrangements to ensure explicit
understanding across the alliance or a coalition of partners. In addition, significant
technological differences may exist because of each force’s differing degrees of development,
which will require sensitive and careful liaison to overcome. Further, the LO may need to
deploy with additional communications support and equipment.
b. Joint Operations. The very nature of joint operations is intricate and complex. Every effort
has to be made by a joint force commander (JFC) to integrate the force and establish a good
degree of trust between the components of the force. Each component—be it air, maritime,
or land—has distinct procedures and doctrine with its associated culture. Establishing liaison
is a first step that increases a joint force’s operational capability; creates the foundation to
augment the process of rehearsals, drills, and training; and develops common doctrine and
procedures.
c. NA5CRO. In NA5CROs there are specific factors that merit consideration in relation to
liaison.
(1) The timely passage of accurate information based on a trusting relationship is vital
to counter uncertainty and promote stability in a joint operations area. Liaison is therefore
a vital tool of force deployed on NA5CROs and fundamental to the successful execution
of operations. Failure to conduct liaison risks misunderstanding, friction, opposition, and
possible escalation of conflict. Also, failure to liaise during a support operation in support
to a natural disaster or humanitarian crisis can significantly impede restoration of vital
services and functions.
(2) Liaison has to link the force with other military forces, non-military agencies,
communities, civil authorities (if they exist), parties to the conflict, aid agencies, and the
media. The force must develop friendly working relationships and foster an atmosphere
of trust.
(a) In NA5CROs, the requirements may necessitate a heightened requirement for
close coordination. Therefore, liaison, resources permitting, should be established at
every level from formation down to sub-unit, and sometimes below.
(b) The specialist skills and background experience of LOs should match those of
the organization with which they are attached or deployed, where possible.
(c) Commanders should seek to exploit the opportunities for liaison, and it will
probably require augmentation of establishments to meet the requirement. If liaison
is interrupted for any reason, commanders should seek to re-establish it at the
earliest opportunity.
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(d) Continuity is key to success. In order that a formal transition plan will be
developed, LOs should only be replaced after providing sufficient notice to the
supported commander or agency.
E004 Establishing Liaison
1. Reciprocal Liaison. Liaison must be reciprocal when—
a. A force is placed under operational command or operational control of a HQ of a different
nationality.
b. Brigade size, or similar assets, and higher formations of different nationalities are
adjacent.
c. A national or combined joint force HQ and appropriate echelon of any non-military agency
are involved.
d. Liaison via an interface between allied command and the command and control
information system (C2IS) is always reciprocal. Details of establishing such a C2IS interface
are described in the following paragraphs.
2. Non-Reciprocal Liaison. Where circumstances or resources do not allow the exchange
of liaison teams, responsibility for establishing liaison is governed by the following principles:
a. Liaison is established from a higher echelon force to a lower echelon force.
b. Liaison is established from left to right.
c. Liaison is established from rearward to forward units of the same echelon.
d. Supporting forces establish liaison with forces they support.
e. An incoming force establishes liaison with the outgoing force during a relief of combat troops
(see AJP-3.2).
f. The military establishes liaison with non-military agencies.
3. Between Land and Air Components. Linkage between land and air components is
achieved principally through exchange of specialist teams, such as an air operations coordination
centre (land) to a corps HQ, and a battlefield coordination detachment to an air operations centre.
At lower echelons, army ground LOs are deployed to air force wings and squadrons and air LOs
are deployed to division and brigade HQ. Additionally, selected land and air personnel are trained
in specialist air liaison tasks. For specific air operations, such as airmobile and airborne
operations, distinct relationships are established, as explained in AJP-3.2.
4. Establishing and Manning Coordinating Points. Coordinating points are established to
ensure tactical coordination and mutual support between units and formations. The procedure is
explained in Appendix 3.
5. Between Land and Maritime Elements. Maritime support to land operations may range
from logistic support from the sea to inshore operations such as amphibious operations, command
and control (C2) warfare, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
(ISTAR), and augmenting land firepower with naval gunfire and power projection with carrier
based fixed-winged aircraft or helicopters. Similar to the liaison between land and air components,
command relationships will determine liaison responsibilities. For example, the transfer of
authority (TOA) from the maritime commander to the land commander in an amphibious operation
is a complicated issue, and must be agreed upon between the two commanders and well
understood by their staffs and liaison teams.
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6. Re-establishing Liaison. In the event that liaison is broken, all affected parties have to
attempt to re-establish liaison. However, the primary responsibility rests with the HQ or force
originally responsible for establishing the liaison.
7. Between Civil Agencies and Organizations. Liaison between civil agencies and
organizations and communities will be the responsibility of the G9 (or S9) branch.
E005 Liaison Groupings
The LO is an officer who is exchanged between two or more forces and is empowered to represent
and make appropriate recommendations on behalf of his commander. He must be prepared to
amplify his commander’s intent and points of detail when appropriate. Moreover, the LO helps his
own commander through the timely exchange of information, intent, and situational awareness
(SA). When considering the deployment of liaison personnel, consideration is to be given to
selecting appropriate LOs. The contribution of motivated and sufficiently experienced officers of
the appropriate seniority to the cooperation and mutual understanding between HQs should not
be underestimated. In addition, consideration must be given to representation by appropriate non-
military organizations within liaison groupings. Military liaison staffs fall into three groupings.
a. Liaison Officers or Teams represent the commander or a special functional area.
Chosen individuals should know their commanders, understand their commander’s plans, and
be able to cognitively express their commander’s views and intent to the commander and HQ
staff to which they are attached. Liaison officers may deploy with a small supporting staff,
including a liaison non-commissioned officer (NCO), clerical personnel, specialists, drivers,
interpreters, and communications personnel and their equipment.
b. Liaison Detachments consist of individuals or teams with suitable experience to make
the appropriate liaison contribution. Suitable experience comes from maritime operations, air
operations, intelligence, fire support, airspace C2, engineering, CSS, and so on.
c. Couriers or Messengers are responsible for the secure physical transmission and
delivery of documents and material.
E006 Liaison Qualifications
a. Appendix 1 covers the selection and responsibilities of LOs in detail. There is little purpose
in being too prescriptive about the size, composition, and ranks of liaison teams and
detachments, which will vary according to the task. The most important issue is selecting
those who best meet the selection criteria at Appendix 1. Table E-1 summarizes the ranks
and grades for the senior LO of a liaison team or detachment. This figure offers a guideline,
which considers STANAG 2116, NATO CODES FOR GRADES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.
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Table E-1. -Senior Liaison Officer Guidelines for Rank and Grade
Echelon NATO Grade Rank
Corps OF-5 or OF-4 Colonel or lieutenant colonel
Division OF-3 Major
Brigade OF-2 Captain
Battalion OF-1 1ST Lieutenant
b. It is understood and accepted that certain NCOs will possess the skills required to perform
liaison duties effectively. To alleviate any discrepancy between officers and NCOs, the
commonality of officer skills is used as the template because it is better understood and
accepted.
E007 Sending and Receiving Force Responsibilities
1. The Sending Unit or Force. In addition to selecting appropriate personnel for liaison
duties in accordance with Appendix 1 to this annex, the sending unit or force is responsible for—
a. The training and exercising of LOs.
b. Briefing LOs before dispatch on the latest operational situation. This briefing has to provide
them a clear understanding of what information the LO is to impart to the receiving HQ or
command and what information he is to receive from and convey to the dispatching HQ or
command.
c. Ensuring that the LO understands his commander’s intent and concept of operations.
d. Ensuring that the LO has the proper CIS (including C2IS) and cryptographic material.
2. The Receiving Unit or Force. The receiving unit or force is responsible for—
a. Providing the sending HQ or command with the time and the point of contact for the LOs
to report. The receiving unit or force ensures that the proper map designation and datum point
is specified, with details of any tactical, movement, or logistics information which may be
relevant to the mission.
b. Ensuring the LO has access to the commander and appropriate officers to whom the LO
should provide information concerning his own force.
c. Giving LOs an initial briefing and allowing them appropriate access so that they may
remain informed.
d. Providing administrative support in NA5CROs, as arranged with the non-military agency.
e. Providing the LO protection while at the receiving unit or force. The receiving unit or force
establishes the CBRN dress category and threat state at the receiving HQ.
E008 Liaison Duties
LOs possess responsibilities and duties before, during, and after a liaison tour of duty. Appendix 2
contains a sample checklist. Essentially, LOs provide the receiving force’s commander or staffs
with continually updated knowledge of their force commander’s needs, requirements, and intent,
along with accurate planning standards. LOs should be fully aware of their own commander’s
mission, intent, plan, and main effort.
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E009 Communication and Information Systems
1. The principles for establishing CIS within a NATO force are outlined in AJP-3.2. The
provision of CIS to liaison elements is in addition to this requirement. As well, the provision of CIS
augmented liaison is in addition to the requirement to establish a CIS interface between force
components. Liaison elements normally provide their own CIS back to their parent HQ or
command, except when circumstances dictate the use of communication means at the higher HQ
or command to which they are attached. This latter circumstance will be the norm for maritime
LOs. The receiving force should provide the required equipment when liaison elements are to
communicate on nets within the receiving force.
2. Signal procedures for liaison staff will be in accordance with relevant allied
communications publications and their NATO supplements, and the standard operating
procedures (SOPs) of the receiving HQ or command, particularly with regard to site selection and
security regulations. (See STANAG 5048 for more information.)
3. The following points pertain to cryptographic measures for protection of classified
messages:
a. Where LOs provide their own communications and transmit classified messages, it is the
responsibility of their sending HQ to equip them with cryptographic facilities. However,
necessary safeguarding and protection of such means and material in accordance with
pertinent NATO and national security regulations must be ensured through special
arrangements between the sending and receiving HQ or command.
b. Where LOs do not provide their own communications and thus rely on communication
facilities provided by the receiving HQ, they normally use the cryptographic means and
material of that HQ when transmitting classified messages. They may, however, use their own
cryptographic means, if this has been prearranged by mutual agreement between sending
and receiving HQ and is in accordance with the relevant NATO and national security
regulations for the necessary safeguarding and protection of such material.
E010 CIS Augmented Liaison
The use of CIS by a liaison element presents particular force security issues (operations security
[OPSEC] and information security). The establishment of CIS interfaces during an operation will
be dictated by the force’s CIS instruction. These interfaces will be established in a manner agreed
upon by each participant and according to specified procedures. However, the establishment of
a liaison team is usually far more flexible than current CIS interface capabilities. The use of CIS
within a liaison team, or as a means to establish liaison, highlights the following considerations:
a. CIS have a greater capacity to transmit data in an unmonitored way. Even though no
electronic interface exists between CIS, information and data from the receiving force’s
system can be downloaded or transferred to the sending force’s system (by minimal intrusive
manners or by physically transferring information or data from one system to another).
b. Discrepancies may exist between both components’ system security classifications. In
NA5CROs, non-military CIS are likely to be unclassified, and their operators are likely to be
without security clearance.
c. In the event of providing CIS support to the liaison element, units ensure that the system
is “offline” and (as a stand-alone system) cannot access controlled information.
d. In the event that a contract or agreement exists between nations to establish CIS interface,
then those nations must recognize that CIS have the capacity to act as the means of liaison.
However, when determining this form of liaison, the liaison element should contain a technical
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expert to maintain the interface. (At present, all CIS interfaces, known as gateways, are
technically demanding to maintain.)
e. Used properly, a CIS augmented and authorized liaison team can increase the pertinence
and timeliness of information transmitted. The use of this means can augment the efficiency
of the human interaction already enjoyed by the liaison team or detachment.
E011 Administrative Support
The receiving HQ normally provides the following support for LOs or detachments:
a. Accommodation, messing and rations.
b. Maintenance, where equipment types are compatible.
c. Medical support.
d. Transportation:
(1) Individual LOs will not be required to settle claims unless specific charges are
identified and agreed to before their departure from a parent HQ or command.
(2) LOs operating with non-military agencies should be self-contained, as it is unlikely
that non-military agencies will be able to provide administrative and logistic support.
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Appendix 1 to ANNEX E Liaison Officer Selection and Responsibilities
E101 General
The commander uses a LO to transmit critical information while bypassing layers of staff and
HQs. A trained, competent, trusted, and informed LO is the key to effective liaison. The LO must
have the proper rank and experience for the mission, and have the commander’s full confidence.
Appendix 2 outlines an example of a LO’s checklist. These selection criteria are not limited to
officers. Because the LO represents his commander—
a. LOs must be conversant with their commander’s intent, concept of operations, and rules
of engagement (ROE).
b. LOs must clearly transmit and clarify the recommendations that they make on behalf of
their commander.
c. LOs must be knowledgeable of the operations of their own command, formation, or unit,
and should be familiar with the general organization, C2, and staff procedures of the receiving
HQ or command.
d. LOs must have a working knowledge of the orders, agreements, plans, and objectives of
the current operations.
e. LOs should have an understanding of the tactical doctrine of the command, formation, or
unit to which they are to be attached.
f. In most matters, LOs should be given access to the commanders at the receiving HQ or
command.
g. LOs must, as a minimum requirement, be proficient in the NATO language (English or
French) of the receiving HQ in accordance with ATP-5, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY LEVELS
(STANAG 6001).
h. For Article 5 operations, all liaison personnel must have NATO SECRET clearance for
access to communications and material of the appropriate classification consistent with their
duties.
E102 Protection
For personal protection and following national directives, all liaison personnel must be in
possession of their personal weapon, ammunition, their individual CBRN kit, and individual
protective equipment, including gas mask.
E103 NA5CRO
In NA5CROs, LOs should be familiar with the organization, operations, culture, capabilities, and
procedures of the receiving non-military agency. Although not stipulated in STANAG 6001, where
practical, every effort should be made to provide a LO who possesses the language qualifications
of the receiving agency. The use of contracted interpreters to augment liaison detachments or
teams may be an option.
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Appendix 2 to ANNEX E Sample Checklists for Liaison Officers
E201 Before Departing the Sending Unit
1. Have you understood what the commander wants the receiving commander to know?
2. Have you arranged for a briefing by operations, intelligence, and other staff elements
concerning current and future operations?
3. Have you verified the receipt of and do you understand the tasks your staff has given you?
4. Have you obtained the correct maps, traces, and overlays?
5. Have you ensured arrangements have been made for transport, communications
equipment, and codes and signals instructions? Have you arranged for the replacement of these
items?
6. Have you arranged for the departure of the liaison team?
7. Have you completed your route reconnaissance and time appreciation so that you will
arrive at the designated location on time?
8. Have you ensured that the receiving HQ or command is notified of your departure from
the sending unit?
9. Have you obtained the correct target lists, operation plans (OPLANs), operation orders
(OPORDs), maps, traces, overlays, and at least two blank overlays? Do you have a copy of the
command, formation, and unit SOPs with you?
10. Have you ensured that liaison personnel and interpreters have security clearances and
access appropriate to the mission? Have you verified that the receiving unit obtained the liaison
teams’ security clearances and that the receiving unit will grant access to the appropriate level of
information the mission requires?
11. Have you visited all HQ staff elements and asked if they have tasks for you?
12. Have you ensured that you have your NATO identity card and courier certificate if
required?
13. Have you decided how to destroy the classified information you are carrying in an
emergency?
14. Do you know the passwords? Do you have a copy of the signal operating instructions?
15. Have you informed your HQ when you are leaving, your route, estimated time of arrival,
and, if applicable, your estimated time of return?
16. Have you picked up any correspondence designated for the receiving HQ?
17. Have you carried out a radio check?
18. Have you ensured that you are aware of any impending moves of your parent HQ and the
receiving HQ?
19. Have you ensured that you have information from the receiving HQ or command
concerning requirements for special equipment or dress and on arrangements or requirements
for reimbursement for messing, billeting, transportation, and so on?
20. Have you ensured that you will arrive at the destination before any scheduled briefings?
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E202 While at the Receiving Unit
1. Have you checked-in with the appropriate agency and completed any documentation, and
tested communications procedures?
2. Have you notified your own HQ of your arrival?
3. Have you delivered any correspondence from your own HQ?
4. Have you visited staff elements and briefed them on your unit or formation situation and
collected information from them?
5. Have you ensured that on any traces received that the map scale, grid intersection points,
date-time group of information, date-time group received, and from whom received are noted?
6. Have you contacted your parent HQ or command to exchange information, either at
regular, pre-arranged intervals, or when considered necessary?
7. Have you picked up any correspondence for your own HQ or command, advised them of
your departure, and estimated time of arrival? Have you confirmed with your own HQ or command
if there has been any change to the situation, or if a requirement for further information has been
identified since your departure?
8. Have you informed the receiving HQ of your departure?
E203 Upon Return to Your Sending Unit
1. Have you delivered any correspondence?
2. Have you briefed the appropriate staff elements and written any necessary reports?
E204 When Reporting
1. Have you ensured reporting is accurate?
2. Have you tried to provide concise, complete, and clear reporting?
3. If you have to give information and the accuracy of which is not certain, have you quoted
the source?
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Appendix 3 to ANNEX E Establishing and Manning Coordinating Points

E301 General
Coordinating points are established to ensure the following:
a. Tactical coordination and mutual support between units or formations.
b. Cooperation and understanding between forces that are working together.
E302 Terminology
The following terminology is used for the purpose of this annex:
a. Establishing liaison team. The element from the unit or formation designated to
establish and secure the coordinating point and receive the approaching unit.
b. Approaching liaison team. The element from the unit or formation designated to
arrive at the coordinating point after the establishing unit has secured it.
c. Coordinating point. A designated point at which, in all types of combat, adjacent units
or formations must make contact for purposes of control and coordination.
Note: This appendix complements the contents of ATP-91, IDENTIFICATION OF

LAND FORCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND IN AN AREA OF OPERATION
(STANAG 2129). The details contained within these agreements are to be
employed when establishing and manning coordinating points.
E303 Details
1. Coordinating points may be manned in one of the following ways:
a. Full time by liaison teams from both adjacent units or formations. This will be normal
when adjacent units or formations are of different nationalities, and may also be ordered
by a formation HQ if the tactical situation requires close and continuous liaison.
b. Full time by the unit or formation designated to establish the coordinating point, and
visited by a liaison team from the flanking unit or formation at times specified by the superior
HQ.
c. Periodically by liaison teams from flanking units or formations at a time or times
specified by the superior HQ.
2. The following must be specified by the HQ ordering the coordinating point, confirmed
by the units or formations involved, and known by the liaison teams that will man the point:
a. Location of the coordinating point including a universal transverse Mercator prefix or
eight (8) digit coordinate and a description of the terrain feature.
b. Unit or formation responsible for securing (establishing unit) and the time by which the
point must be secured or established.
c. Times at which the approaching teams will make contact.
d. Description of each unit or formation’s liaison team (number and type of vehicles or
personnel, call signs, radio frequencies, and so on).
e. Routes both liaison teams use to and from the point.
f. Recognition signals both liaison teams employ.
g. Working language at the point.
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3. Whenever possible, the information detailed above shall be included within the
“Coordinating Instructions” of any OPORD issued by the HQ ordering the establishment of a
coordinating point. Should time or circumstances preclude this, alternative reliable
arrangements must be made to ensure all critical items are passed to all parties concerned.
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ANNEX F REHEARSALS
F001 General
A rehearsal is the act or process of practicing an action to prepare for the actual performance.
Rehearsing key combat actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and
to translate the relatively dry recitation of the tactical plan into a visual impression. This visual
impression helps them orient themselves to their environment and other units when executing
the operation. Moreover, the repetition of combat tasks during the rehearsal leaves a lasting
mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation. This appendix describes
rehearsal types, techniques, and responsibilities. Furthermore, it provides guidelines for
conducting rehearsals.
F002 Time
The time required for rehearsal varies with the complexity of the task to rehearse, the type and
technique of rehearsal, and the level of participation. Therefore, the emphasis on rehearsals
should be at the lowest possible level, using the most thorough technique, given the time
available. When time is at a premium, the staff conducts reduced rehearsals, focusing only on
critical events using the reverse planning cycle. (See Figure F-1 on page F-3.)
F003 Rehearsal Types
1. There are five types of rehearsals. Each of the five types achieves a specific result and
has a specific place in the planning timeline.
a. Confirmation brief.
b. Backbrief.
c. Combined arms rehearsal.
d. Support rehearsal.
e. Battle drill or standard operating procedure (SOP) rehearsal.
2. Confirmation Brief. The confirmation brief is routinely performed by a subordinate
leader immediately after receiving any instructions such as an operation order (OPORD) or a
fragmentary order (FRAGO). Subordinate leaders brief the higher echelon commander on their
understanding of his intent, their specific task and purpose, and the relationship between their
unit’s missions and other units in the operation.
3. Backbrief. The backbrief is normally performed throughout planning. It is a briefing by
subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission.
This briefing allows the commander to clarify his intent early in the subordinates’ tactical
estimate procedure. It allows the higher echelon commander to—
a. Identify problems in his concept of operations.
b. Identify problems in a subordinate unit commander’s concept.
c. Learn how subordinates intend to accomplish their missions.
4. Combined Arms Rehearsal. A manoeuvre unit headquarters (HQ) normally conducts
the combined arms rehearsal after subordinate units issue their OPORDs. This rehearsal
ensures that—
a. The subordinate units synchronize their plans with those of the other units in the
organization.
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b. All subordinate commanders’ plans properly achieve the intent of the higher echelon
commander.
5. Support Rehearsal. Units usually perform support rehearsals within the framework of a
single or limited number of operating systems. They are referred to by the primary operating
system being rehearsed, for example, the fire support rehearsal or the combat service support
(CSS) rehearsal. Units perform support rehearsals throughout the planning timeline. Although
these rehearsals differ slightly by operating system, they achieve the same results.
a. They ensure the proponents of a particular operating system that they can support the
higher commander’s plan and accomplish all missions assigned to them.
b. They ensure that the particular operating system support plan is synchronized with the
manoeuvre plan.
6. Battle Drill or SOP Rehearsal. A battle drill or SOP rehearsal ensures that all participants
understand a technique or a specific set of procedures. All echelons use these rehearsals, but
platoon, squad, and section levels use them most extensively. They perform these rehearsals
throughout the planning timeline. These types of rehearsals are not limited to published battle
drills. They could be a rehearsal of a tactical operations centre shift change, an obstacle breach
SOP, or the actions of establishing a logistics site or its defence.
F004 Rehearsal Techniques
1. Generally, six rehearsal techniques are used:
a. Full dress.
b. Reduced force.
c. Terrain model.
d. Sketch map.
e. Map.
f. Radio.
2. As the techniques are listed, each successive technique takes a decreasing amount of time
and resources to prepare and conduct. Each rehearsal technique provides different degrees
of understanding to participants. Each has different security risks. Figure F-1 shows the
rehearsal techniques relative to time, resourcing, operations security (OPSEC), participation,
and understanding.
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Figure F-1. Rehearsal Techniques Relative to Time, Resources, OPSEC, Participation,

and Understanding
3. The following discussion addresses these considerations:
a. Time. This includes the amount required from planning to execution.
b. Multi-echelon. This is the number of echelons that can participate in the rehearsal.
c. OPSEC. This considers the ability of the enemy to gather intelligence from the
rehearsal.
d. Terrain. This includes terrain management considerations.
F005 Full Dress Rehearsal
1. The full dress rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the mission. It
involves every soldier and system participating in the operation. If possible, units conduct full
dress rehearsals under the same conditions—weather, time of day, terrain, and use of live
ammunition—that the force will encounter during the actual operation. The full dress rehearsal
is the most difficult to accomplish at higher command echelons. The commander also develops
a second rehearsal plan that mirrors the actual plan but fits the terrain of the rehearsal.
2. Considerations for full dress rehearsals are—
a. Time. Full dress rehearsals are the most time-consuming of all the rehearsal
techniques. At higher levels, the commander does not encroach on subordinate units’
timetables by scheduling a full dress rehearsal at his convenience. The full dress rehearsal
is the most effective technique for smaller units to ensure that everyone in the operation
understands his part.
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b. Multi-echelon. A subordinate unit can perform a full dress rehearsal as part of a larger
unit’s reduced force rehearsal.
c. OPSEC. The movement of a large part of the force will attract attention from the enemy.
Units must develop a plan to protect the rehearsal from enemy observation. One method
is to develop a second plan to include graphics and radio frequencies. This must be done
carefully to avoid confusing subordinates or giving the plan away if the enemy observes
the rehearsal.
d. Terrain. Terrain management for the full dress technique can be difficult if it is not
planned into the initial array of forces. The rehearsal area must be identified, secured,
cleared, and maintained throughout the rehearsal process.
F006 Reduced Force Rehearsal
1. The reduced force rehearsal normally takes fewer resources than a full dress rehearsal
because it involves only the unit and subordinate units’ key leaders. Terrain requirements can
be the same as for a full dress rehearsal, but there are fewer participants. The commander
first decides the level of leader involvement. His selected leaders then rehearse the plan while
traversing the actual or similar terrain. The reduced force rehearsal allows leaders to rehearse
the mission before moving to the full dress rehearsal. A second rehearsal plan must be
developed that mirrors the actual plan but fits the terrain of the rehearsal.
2. Considerations for reduced force rehearsals are—
a. Time. The reduced force rehearsal normally requires less time than the full dress
technique. Again, the commander must not encroach on subordinate units’ timetables by
scheduling the rehearsal at his convenience.
b. Multi-echelon. A small subordinate unit can perform a full dress rehearsal as part of a
larger unit’s reduced force rehearsal.
c. OPSEC. This rehearsal is less likely to become an OPSEC problem than the full dress
rehearsal because the unit is smaller. However, the number of radio transmissions stays
the same as the full dress rehearsal and remains a consideration.
d. Terrain. Terrain management for the reduced force rehearsal can be just as difficult as
for the full dress rehearsal. The rehearsal area must be identified, secured, cleared, and
maintained throughout the rehearsal process.
F007 Terrain Model Rehearsal
1. The terrain model rehearsal takes less time and fewer resources than the reduced force
or key leader rehearsal, and it is the most popular technique at allied HQ echelons. An
accurately constructed terrain model can help subordinate leaders visualize the battle in
accordance with their commander’s intent. When possible, the commander places the terrain
model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations (AOO). However, if the
situation requires more security, he places the terrain model on the reverse slope of a vantage
point within walking distance of a point overlooking the AOO. The model’s orientation should
coincide with the actual orientation of the terrain to help participants orient to the actual AOO.
The size of the terrain model can vary from the use of icons to represent units to a large model
on which the participants can walk. A large model helps reinforce the participants’ perception
of unit positions on the actual terrain.
2. Considerations for the terrain model rehearsal are—
a. Time. The most time-consuming part of the technique can be the construction of the
terrain model. A clear SOP stating how it will be built ensures the model is accurate, large
enough, and in sufficient detail to rehearse the mission. The SOP must also state who is
to build it, and when.
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b. Multi-echelon. Because the terrain model rehearsal takes less time than the real
operation, multi-echelon rehearsals are difficult.
c. OPSEC. This rehearsal can become an OPSEC problem if the area around the
rehearsal site is not secured. The collection of commanders and their vehicles can draw
the enemy’s attention. Units must sanitize the terrain model after completing the rehearsal.
d. Terrain. Terrain management is less difficult than when using the previous techniques.
The location of the site must be easy to find for the friendly commanders, yet invisible to
the enemy. The optimum location is overlooking the terrain where the mission will be
performed.
F008 Sketch Map Rehearsal
1. Units can use the sketch map technique almost anywhere, day or night. The
procedures are the same as for a terrain model rehearsal, except the commander uses a
sketch in place of a model. Sketches must be large enough for all participants to see as each
subordinate “walks” through the interactive verbal execution of the operation. Units move
symbols to represent their manoeuvre and location on the sketch.
2. Considerations for a sketch map rehearsal are—
a. Time. The time required for a sketch map rehearsal is generally less than other types of
rehearsals. The setup for this rehearsal only requires the sketch itself, and symbols that
commanders and staffs can manipulate.
a. OPSEC. This rehearsal, like the terrain model rehearsal, can become an OPSEC
problem if performed outside and the area around the rehearsal site is not secured. Another
concern is that the collection of commanders and their vehicles can draw attention.
b. Terrain. The optimum location is overlooking the terrain where the mission will be
performed.
F009 Map Rehearsal
1. The map rehearsal procedures are similar to the sketch map rehearsal, except the
commander uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and
control the operation.
2. Considerations for a map rehearsal are—
a. Time. The most time-consuming part is the rehearsal itself. The setup for this rehearsal
is normally the easiest because it requires only maps and current operational graphics.
b. OPSEC. This technique can become an OPSEC problem if performed outside and the
area around the rehearsal site is not secured. Another concern is that the collection of
commanders and their vehicles can bring attention from the enemy.
c. Terrain. The optimum location is overlooking the terrain where the mission will be
performed. However, it can be performed independently of the location of the actual terrain.
F010 Radio Rehearsal
1. The commander and his staff conduct radio rehearsals by interactively and verbally
executing critical portions of the operation over established communications networks. This is
accomplished in a general sequence of events the commander establishes. Because of the
obvious dangers involved with using this rehearsal, the unit rehearses only the essential, most-
critical portions of the operation. When used, these rehearsals include all communications
facilities and equipment necessary to conduct that portion of the operation. To be effective, all
participants must have working communications equipment and a copy of the OPORD and
overlays. The tactical operations centre can rehearse tracking the battle simultaneously.
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2. Considerations for a radio rehearsal are—

a. Time. This technique can be time-consuming if the unit does not have a clear SOP for
performing it and if all units have working communications and are up on the network.
b. OPSEC. This rehearsal can become an OPSEC problem because of the volume of the
radio transmissions and potential compromise of information through enemy radio
monitoring. The unit should use different frequencies to protect the ones used for the
operation. Using wire systems is an option, but this does not exercise the radio systems,
which is the strong point of this rehearsal.
F011 Rehearsal Responsibilities
This discussion of rehearsal responsibilities addresses planning, preparation, and execution.
a. Planning
(1) The commander provides the following information as part of the commander’s
guidance during the initial mission analysis and re-evaluates it when he selects a
course of action (COA)—
(a) The type of rehearsal.
(b) The rehearsal technique.
(c) The place.
(d) The attendees.
(2) The chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) ensures that all rehearsals are
imbedded in the unit’s time management system. He is responsible for—
(a) Publishing the rehearsal time and location in the OPORD or in a warning order
(WNGO).
(b) Completing any rehearsals with the staff.
(c) Determining rehearsal products based on type, technique, and mission
variables.
(d) Coordinating liaison officer (LO) attendance from adjacent units.
b. Preparation
(1) The commander ideally prepares to rehearse the mission with events phased in
the proper order from start to finish. When time is short, this is not always possible.
The commander—
(a) Identifies and prioritizes key events to rehearse.
(b) Allocates time for the events to rehearse.
(c) Conducts personal preparation to include reviews of—
i. Completeness of task organization.
ii. Readiness of personnel and material.
iii. Unit level of preparation for the assigned mission.
(2) The COS or XO, through war gaming and coordinating with the commander—
(a) Coordinates and allocates time for the key events requiring rehearsal.
(b) Establishes rehearsal time limits according to the commander’s guidance and
mission variables.
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(c) Verifies rehearsal site preparation. A separate rehearsal site may be required
for key rehearsal events such as an enlarged objective area or a possible obstacle
site. The rehearsal site must be accurate and complete with—
i. Appropriate markings and associated training aids.
ii. Parking areas.
iii. Local security.
(d) Determines the method for controlling the rehearsal and ensuring its logical
flow.
(3) Subordinate leaders complete their planning process, to include—
(a) Completing a unit order and plans.
(b) Identifying issues derived from the parent unit order.
(c) Providing a copy of their unit order with graphics to the parent unit.
(d) Conducting personal preparation similar to that of the senior commander.
(4) Higher echelon HQ—
(a) Must deconflict all subordinate unit graphics. These composite overlays are
the first step for leaders to visualize the whole unit’s plan.
(b) Publish composite overlays at the rehearsal to include, at a minimum—
i. Manoeuvre.
ii. Fire support.
iii. Mobility and survivability.
iv. CSS.
c. Execution
(1) The commander commands the rehearsal just as he will command the operation.
He maintains the focus and level of intensity, allowing no potential for subordinate
confusion. Although the staff refined the plan, it belongs to the commander who uses
it to conduct the operation. An effective rehearsal is not a commander’s brief to
subordinate commanders. Its purpose is to validate synchronization—what, when,
and where—of subordinate units’ tasks to execute operations and achieve the
(2) The COS normally directs the rehearsal. The COS—
(a) Starts the rehearsal on time.
(b) Conducts a formal roll call and ensures that everyone brings the necessary
equipment, to include unit graphics and previously issued orders, to help adjust
to the rehearsal plan.
(c) Validates task organization for the mission. Linkups must be complete or on
schedule, and required material and personnel must be on hand.
(d) Rehearses the synchronization of combat power from flank, higher, and his
own units, which are often beyond communications’ reach of the commander and
G3 (or S3).
(e) Synchronizes the timing and contribution of each combat function by ensuring
the rehearsal of the decisive points by time or event that connect to a decision.
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(f) Keeps within established time constraints.

(g) Ensures that selected events receive appropriate attention.
(h) Ensures that absentees and flank units receive changes. Transmit changes
by courier or radio immediately.
(3) The G3 (or S3) assists the commander in the forward operation and should
rehearse that task. He—
(a) Portrays his actions during the fight.
(b) Ensures compliance with the plan.
(4) The G2 (or S2) bases his execution actions on the enemy’s COA the commander
selects during the planning process. The G2 (or S2) must—
(a) Portray his best assessment of the enemy’s COA.
(b) Communicate the enemy commander’s presumed concept of operations,
desired results, and intended end state.
(5) Subordinate unit leaders, using an established format—
(a) Effectively articulate their units’ actions and responsibilities.
(b) Record changes on their copies of the graphics or OPORD.
(6) The recorder, after the rehearsal is complete—
(a) Restates any changes, coordination, or clarifications directed by the
commander.
(b) Estimates the time that a written FRAGO codifying the changes will follow.
(7) The conducting HQ staff updates the OPORD, decision support template (DST),
and synchronization matrix.
F012 Assessment
1. A properly executed rehearsal validates each leader’s role as part of the whole force—
what is done, when relative to time and event, and where to reach desired actions. Effective
rehearsals ensure that commanders have a common visualization of the enemy, their own
forces, the terrain, and the relationship among them. Rehearsals identify specific actions
requiring immediate staff resolution and inform the higher echelon commander on critical
issues or locations he, his COS, or his G3 (or S3) must personally oversee.
2. The commander (or rehearsal director in his absence) assesses and critiques all parts
of the rehearsal. Critiques centre on how well the operation as rehearsed achieves the
commander’s intent and on the coordination necessary to accomplish that end. The internal
execution of tasks within the rehearsal is usually left to the subordinate commanders’
discretion.
F013 Conducting a Rehearsal
1. All participants have responsibilities before, during, and after a rehearsal. Before a
rehearsal, the rehearsal director states the commander’s expectations and orients the other
participants on details of the rehearsal as necessary. During a rehearsal, all participants
rehearse their roles in the operation. They ensure they understand how their actions support
the overall operation and note any additional coordination required. After a rehearsal,
participants ensure they understand any changes to the OPORD and coordination
requirements, and receive all updated staff products.
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2. Commanders do not normally address small problems that arise during rehearsals. If
the problem remains at the end of the rehearsal, the commander resolves it then. If the problem
jeopardizes mission accomplishment, the staff accomplishes the coordination necessary to
resolve it before the participants disperse.
3. Before the Rehearsal
a. The rehearsal director begins the rehearsal by calling the roll. He then briefs
participants on information needed to execute the rehearsal. The briefing begins with an
introduction, overview, and orientation. It includes a discussion of the rehearsal script and
ground rules. The detail of this discussion is based on participants’ familiarity with the
rehearsal SOP.
b. Before the rehearsal, the staff develops an OPORD with at least the basic five
paragraphs and necessary overlays. Annexes may not be published; however, the
responsible staff officers should know their content. The rehearsal is not a substitute for
the war game. During the war game, the staff analyses feasible COAs to determine the
optimal one to recommend to the commander. The rehearsal allows commanders and
other key players to practice implementing the COA the commander has decided to adopt.
c. The rehearsal director begins by introducing himself and all other participants as
needed. He then gives an overview of the briefing topics, the rehearsal subjects and
sequence, and the timeline, specifying the no-later-than ending time. He explains after-
action review (AARs) and how and when they occur, and discusses how to incorporate
changes into the OPORD. He explains, in detail, any constraints, such as pyrotechnic use,
light discipline, weapons firing, or radio silence. He ensures that all participants understand
safety precautions and enforces their use. Last, he emphasizes results and states the
commander’s standard for a successful rehearsal. He allows subordinate leaders to state
any results of planning or preparation (including rehearsals) they have already conducted.
(1) Orientation. The rehearsal leader gives an orientation to familiarize participants
with the terrain or scale model in use.
(2) Rehearsal Script. An effective technique for controlling a rehearsal is to use a
script. It keeps the rehearsal on track and is a checklist to ensure all operating
systems and outstanding issues are addressed during the rehearsal. The script has
two major parts: the agenda and the response sequence.
(a) Agenda. The execution matrix, DST, and OPORD outline the rehearsal
agenda. The commander and staff will use them to control the operation’s
execution. Fire support and CSS rehearsals follow the fire support execution
matrix or logistic synchronization matrix. These two products are tied directly to
supported unit’s execution matrix and DST.
(b) Response Sequence. Participants respond in a logical sequence: either by
combat function or by unit as the organization is deployed, from front to rear. The
commander determines the sequence before the rehearsal. It is posted at the
rehearsal site, and the rehearsal director may restate it.
d. After discussing the rehearsal script, the rehearsal director—
(1) States the standard (what the commander will accept) for a successful rehearsal.
(2) Ensures everyone understands the parts of the OPORD to rehearse. If the entire
operation will not be rehearsed, the rehearsal director states the events to be
rehearsed.
(3) Quickly reviews the rehearsal SOP, if all participants are not familiar with it. An
effective rehearsal SOP includes—
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(a) Who controls the rehearsal.

(b) Who walks the rehearsal medium.
(c) When special staff officers brief the commander.
(4) Describes the relationship between how the execution matrix portrays events and
how events are rehearsed.
(5) Briefs the timeline. Designates the rehearsal starting time in relation to H-hour.
For example, the rehearsal director may have the rehearsal begin by depicting the
anticipated situation one hour before H-hour. One event executed before rehearsing
the first event is deployment of forces.
(6) Sets the time interval to begin and track the rehearsal. For example, the rehearsal
director may specify a ten-minute interval to equate to one hour of actual time. (See
Figure F-2.)
Figure F-2. Vertical Time-line Rehearsal Technique

(7) Updates friendly and enemy activities as necessary, for example, any ongoing
reconnaissance operations.
e. An effective rehearsal requires the enemy force to be portrayed realistically and quickly,
without distracting from the rehearsal. One technique for doing this is for the G2 (or S2) to
prepare an actions checklist, a sequence of events much like the one for friendly units, but
from the enemy perspective.
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4. During the Rehearsal

a. After the rehearsal director finishes discussing the ground rules and answering any
questions, the G3 (or S3) reads the mission statement, the commander reads the
commander’s intent, and the G3 (or S3) lays out the current friendly situation on the
rehearsal medium. The rehearsal begins according to the rehearsal plan.
(1) As a rehearsal proceeds, participants verbally walk through the concept of
operations. They focus on key events and the synchronization required to conduct
desired actions. The commander gives orders at the point he expects to give them
during the operation. Subordinate commanders enter and leave the discussion at the
time they expect to begin and end their tasks or activities during the operation. This
practice helps the commander assess the adequacy of synchronization.
(2) The rehearsal director emphasizes integrating events that trigger different branch
actions and actions on contact. The rehearsal director speaks for any staff section
not present and ensures all actions on the synchronization matrix and DST are
addressed at the proper time or event.
(3) The rehearsal director ensures that key combat support (CS) and CSS actions
are included in the rehearsal at the times they are executed. The staff officer with
coordinating staff responsibility injects these items into the rehearsal at the
appropriate times. Special staff officers brief by exception. The staff updates the DST
and gives a copy to each participant. Under time-constrained conditions, the
conducting HQ may provide copies before the rehearsal and rely on participants to
update them with pen and ink changes.
b. The following steps provide a generic sequence of events for a rehearsal. The response
sequence must be determined before the rehearsal and posted to keep the rehearsal
moving.
(1) Step 1. Deployment of Enemy Forces.
(2) Step 2. Deployment of Friendly Forces.
(3) Step 3. Advancement of the Enemy.
(4) Step 4. Decision Point.
(5) Step 5. Branch End State Reached.
(6) Step 6. Recock.
5. After the Rehearsal
a. After the rehearsal, the commander leads an AAR. The commander reviews lessons
learned and makes the minimum required modifications to the existing plan. (Normally, a
FRAGO directs these changes.) Changes should be refinements to the OPORD; they
should not be radical or significant. Changes not critical to the operation’s execution can
confuse subordinates and desynchronize the plan. The commander issues any last-minute
instructions or reminders and reiterates the commander’s intent.
b. Based on the rehearsal’s results and the commander’s instructions, the staff makes the
necessary changes to the OPORD, DST, and execution matrix. Subordinate commanders
incorporate these changes into their units’ OPORDs. The COS or XO ensures these
changes are briefed to any leader or LO who did not participate in the rehearsal.
c. A rehearsal is the final opportunity for subordinates to identify and resolve remaining
issues. An effective staff ensures that all participants understand any changes to the
OPORD and that the recorder captures all coordination done at the rehearsal. All changes
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to the published OPORD are, in effect, verbal FRAGOs. As soon as possible, the staff
publishes these verbal FRAGOs as a written FRAGO that changes the OPORD.
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ANNEX G FORMATS FOR ORDERS AND DESIGNATION OF

TIMINGS, LOCATIONS, AND BOUNDARIES
G001 Aim
1. The aim of this annex is to standardize for the—
a. NATO forces, the format for and essential details to be included in operation orders
(OPORDs) used in joint or single service operations.
b. NATO land forces, and the NATO maritime and air forces when operating in support of the
land forces, the formats and guidance on the preparation of the various annexes to the
OPORD, the administrative or logistics order (when issued separately), and the warning order
(WNGO).
c. NATO forces, a system of designating days and hours in relation to an operation or
exercise.
d. NATO forces, the methods of describing ground locations, areas, and boundaries.
G002 Agreement
1. This annex is divided into five parts as follows:
a. Part I – designation of days and hours and designation of ground locations, areas, and
boundaries.
b. Part II – Warning Orders.
c. Part III – Operation Plans or Orders and Fragmentary Orders.
d. Part IV – Annexes to Operation Orders.
e. Part V – Administrative and Logistics Orders.
6. Paragraphs and sub-paragraphs for orders and their attachments are to be numbered,
lettered, and appropriately indented.
7. Abbreviated names for the various orders are as follows (listed in alphabetical order):
a. Administrative or logistics order - Admin/Logistics Order
b. Fragmentary order - FRAGO
c. Operation plan or operation order - OPLAN or OPORD
d. Overlay order - None, spell out
e. Warning order - WNGO
G-1 Edition B Version 1
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PART I – DESIGNATION OF DAYS AND HOURS AND DESCRIPTION OF GROUND
LOCATIONS, AREAS, AND BOUNDARIES
G003 Designation of Days and Hours
1. Letter Designations. In OPLANs or OPORDs, designated letters have specific meanings
for days and hours. Table G-1 provides the letters that have specific meanings for days and hours.
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Table G-1. Letter Designations for Days and Hours
LETTER HOUR DAY MEANING REMARKS
A Spare.
B Spare.
The day on which deployment for an operation commences or is due
C X
to commence.
The day on which an operation commences or is due to commence.
D X
This may be commencement of hostilities or any other operation.
The day on which a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
E X
exercise commences.
The time designated for the start of cross-FLOT (forward line of
F X
troops) aviation operations.
The day and/or time on which an order (normally national) is given
G X X
to deploy a unit.
1. The specific time at which an operation or exercise commences
or is due to commence. It is also the time at which the line of
H X departure is crossed by the leading element in an attack.
2. In amphibious operations, the time at which the first waterborne
wave of an amphibious assault lands on a beach.
I Not to be used. Could cause confusion.
J X French equivalent to D-day.
The day and/or time on which a convoy system is introduced or is Denmark uses the letter
K X X due to be introduced on any particular land convoy route or sea X in place of K.
convoy lane.
In amphibious or airmobile operations, the time at which the first See also Y hour.
L X helicopter of the heliborne assault wave touches down in the landing
zone.
M X The day on which mobilization commences or is due to commence.
N Spare.
O Not to be used. Could cause confusion.
In airborne operations, the time at which the lead parachute element
P X
is to arrive over the parachute impact point to begin operations.
Q Spare.
R Spare.
S Spare.
T X The day and/or time of transfer of authority.
U Spare.
V Spare.
W Spare.
X Spare.
In airmobile operations the time at which the first helicopter in the
Y X
first wave departs the “pick-up-point” (PUP).
Z Not to be used. Could cause confusion.
a. Planners refer to days and hours before and after the designated days and hours by using
a minus sign for before and a plus sign for after the letter designation and an Arabic number
following that to designate the time.
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(1) Days before and after designated days are shown in accordance with the following
systems. (See Figure G-1.)
Figure G-1. Designation with Days

(2) Hours and minutes before and after a designated time are shown in accordance with
hours and minutes. (See Figure G-2.)
Figure G-2. Designation with Hours

b. Use of Spare Letters. When several operations, exercises, or phases of an operation or
exercise are being planned or conducted, then spare letters may be used for days or hours to
avoid confusion. In all such cases, the operation, exercise, plan, or order requires an annex
or appendix listing the spare letters used and their meanings.
c. Where it is necessary to identify a particular operation or exercise, a nickname (and/or if
applicable, code words) should be placed before the letter. (See Table G-2 for an example.)
Table G-2. Nickname and Time Designation Example
Nickname Time designation
Bald Eagle E-Day
Anvil Express H-Hour
d. When nations translate OPORDs and OPLANs from one language to another, they will
retain the letters used in the original orders, except that D must be used for J in English
versions of French documents, and vice versa.
G004 Description of Locations, Areas, and Boundaries
1. Use of Maps. Documents that state locations with reference to a map are to clearly identify
the specific map and grid reference used. Map identification will be shown at the top of
the document as shown in Figure G-3.
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Figure G-3. Sample Map Identification

a. Map Series Number (and country or geographic area, if required).
b. Sheet Number (and name, if required).
c. Edition.
d. Grid Reference System (used when there is more than one grid reference system or if
different from NATO military grid reference system).
e. Scale (if required).
2. Security. Information on the location of headquarters, units, installation facilities, or dumps is
to be safeguarded from the enemy. Such information is not to be included in documents being
delivered to other formations and units unless—
a. It is essential.
b. It is transmitted by a method that provides appropriate security.
3. Names of Places. Names of places are to be written in block capitals exactly as spelled on the
map used. At least the first time the place is referred to, the name is to be followed by—
a. A military grid reference system coordinate, for example, “NAPIERVILLE (LB6448).” If
there are two places of the same name in the grid square, a six-figure reference is to be used
to identify the place referred. A superior headquarters or assisted command and control
system may require that a “grid zone designator” precede such a grid reference.
b. A set of geographic coordinates (degrees or minutes of longitude and latitude) if the maps
available do not have an overlaid military grid system.
4. Locations and Points on the Ground
a. Locations or points on the ground may be described—
(1) By military grid reference coordinates.
(2) By longitude and latitude if the maps available do not have the military grid system.
(3) By giving the distance and direction from a simple reference point, for example,
“crossroads 1000 metres southwest of church tower of NAPIERVILLE LB6448.”
b. In written orders and reports, grid coordinates or geographic coordinates must be used
the first time the designation of a point or location is given, for example, LB644481. A grid
zone designator may precede the military grid coordinate if required. Thereafter, nicknames
or expressions such as “your ¼” or “my location” may be used and the coordinates repeated
only for increased clarity or convenience to the reader.
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5. Directions. A direction may be indicated in one of three ways:
a. By use of two locations or places, for example, “direction ECKENTAL PV6690-PEGNITZ
PA6851.”
b. As a point of the compass, for example, “NORTH,” “NORTHEAST.”
c. As a magnetic, grid or true bearing in either degrees or mils. The type of bearing and the
unit of measure must be stated, for example, “... a magnetic bearing of 85 degrees ....”
6. Tracks, Roads, and Railways
a. Tracks, roads, and railways are to be described by the names of places located on them,
or, in the absence of names, grid coordinates. Enough places (or grid coordinates) must be
named to ensure the correct track, road, or railway is identified.
b. The word “road,” “track,” or “railway” is to precede (not follow) the place names, for example,
“road LAPRAIRIE-DELSON,” not “LAPRAIRIE DELSON road.”
7. Routes. Routes are to be described in the same way as tracks, roads, and railways. They are
described by a series of place names and coordinates along the route or, in the absence of place
names, by grid coordinates.
a. Where movement is being described along a route, place names (or grid coordinates) along
that route are to be named in the same sequence as the movement.
b. Where movement is not involved and only the route itself is being described, the sequence
of naming place names (or grid coordinates) along that route will normally be—
(1) From left to right on the map (as viewed when facing the general direction of the
enemy).
(2) From rear to front on the map (as viewed when facing the general direction of the
enemy).
c. Points of the compass should always be added for clarity when describing a route if the
possibility of confusion exists, for example, “The route is North West along the road
LAPRAIRIE-DELSON.”
d. If a particular route has already been allocated a nickname (for example, LAME DOG), the
route may be referred to using only that designator.
8. Boundaries
a. Boundaries between units or formations are to be designated by use of military grid or
geographic coordinates or by named terrain features such as rivers, major roads, major
highways, or rail lines. In using terrain features, staffs clearly state whether the terrain features
are inclusive or exclusive to a particular formation. Whenever possible, staffs pick locations
or features that are easy to identify on the ground.
b. Boundaries are to be described from rear to front during an advance to contact, attack, or
pursuit and from front to rear in a withdrawal, delay, or defence. If boundaries (such as rear
boundaries) are generally parallel to the front, then they are described from left to right, as
viewed when facing the general direction of the enemy. Points of the compass may be added.
c. The designation of a boundary shall state specifically which adjacent units or formations
have responsibility and authority for the place, feature, or location referred to in the
description. This is done by stating that each location is either “inclusive” or “exclusive” to one,
or the other of the adjacent forces. The word “inclusive” or “exclusive” is to precede (not follow)
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the designation of the place or location. For example, “inclusive road LAPRAIRIE-DELSON,”
not “road LAPRAIRIE-DELSON inclusive.” In this example, 5 Brigade and 6 Brigade are
advancing side by side. Because they are advancing, the inter-brigade boundary is described
starting from the rear and moving to the front. The most concise way of listing the various
references comprising the boundary is by linking them all to one of the brigades. Thus, the
inter-brigade boundary would best be described as follows: “The boundary for 5 Brigade is
exclusive LAPRAIRIE LB6134, exclusive crossroads LB621352, inclusive wood LB624366,
and exclusive road LAPRAIRIE-DELSON LB6238.”
9. River Banks. River banks are to be described as—
a. “Right” or “left” bank from the point of view of an observer facing downstream.
b. “Near” or “far” in crossing operations.
c. If there is a possibility that confusion might exist, cardinal points of the compass should be
used.
10. Areas. An area is normally described by taking the northernmost (12 o’clock) point first and
giving the remaining points in clockwise order.
11. Positions. Friendly positions are described in the sequence from left to right starting at the
front and moving to the rear (as viewed when facing the general direction of the enemy). Cardinal
points of the compass should be used to describe all friendly flanks and enemy positions, for
example, “2 Brigade is on our West flank,” or “The enemy tanks are concentrated East of us.”
PART II – WARNING ORDERS
G005 Aim
The purpose of a WNGO is to assist units and their staffs initiate the preparations for and the
execution of their new mission by giving them the maximum warning and essential details of
impending operations and information of time available.
G006 General
The production and use of WNGOs is covered in Annex A of an OPORD. See Appendix 1 of this
annex for the format for WNGOs.
PART III – OPERATION PLANS, OPERATION ORDERS, AND FRAGMENTARY ORDERS
G007 Aim
The purpose of an OPLAN or OPORD is to give subordinate commanders the essentials to first
plan for operations and, if necessary, carry out operations. These essentials are situation,
mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort, the
assignment of tasks or missions to formations or units, the support and assistance to be provided,
and command and signal instructions.
G008 General
1. An OPLAN is a proposal for executing a command decision or project. It represents the
command’s preparation for future or anticipated operations. Because plans concern future
operations and help the staff make assumptions about the nature of the situation at the time of
execution, they cannot remain static. As the commander and staff change or adjust their estimates
to reflect the current analysis of this situation, they also change the plans to reflect the results of
this analysis.
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2. An OPLAN is a mechanism that a command uses to plan or prepare to conduct military
operations. Commanders may initiate preparation of possible operations by first issuing an
OPLAN. The primary difference between an OPLAN and an OPORD is that the OPLAN states
critical assumptions that form the basis of the plan (in paragraph 1d of the OPLAN) and time of
execution is not introduced. It is imperative that these assumptions be revalidated to describe the
operational situation needed to transform the OPLAN into an executable OPORD. The OPLAN
becomes an OPORD when the conditions of execution occur and an execution time is
determined.
3. An OPORD should include only such detail as is necessary for commanders of subordinate
formations or units to issue their own orders and to ensure coordination. The detail of how
supporting and specialist units are to carry out their tasks should be issued in their own orders,
which will use the same format as an OPORD unless otherwise specified.
4. An OPORD may be written, oral, or graphical (using traces, overlays, and so on), or a
combination of these forms. Where necessary, parts of an OPORD can be issued separately.
(See Appendix 4 to this annex for format of a FRAGO.)
5. When possible, the standard format, modified as appropriate, also applies to OPLANs and
directives. An example of an OPLAN or OPORD is in Annex B of an OPORD. See Appendix 2 of
this annex for the format for OPORDs.
G009 Paragraphing
1. An OPORD consists of five paragraphs. Paragraph 1 always contains at least sub-paragraphs
a., b., and c. Paragraph 2 contains no sub-paragraphs. There is no restriction as to the number
of sub-paragraphs in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, which will be laid out to suit the requirements of the
operations. All paragraphs and sub-paragraphs must be given headings.
2. Although Paragraphs 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 2, 3, 4, and 5 with their corresponding headings always
appear in an OPLAN or OPORD, they may contain terms such as “No Change”, “See Overlay
(Trace)”, “See Annex...”, and so on. NIL (meaning no information to enter) is permissible opposite
all paragraphs but 2. Such terms should be used as necessary to maintain the integrity of a
paragraph and the brevity of an order. An OPORD may show all details in the form of an overlay
order (details of the overlay order format are in Annex C of an OPORD. See Appendix 2 of this
annex for the format of an OPORD).
G010 Security Classification
1. The current rules, as agreed by the NATO forces, are to be applied to the security classification
and marking of such classification.
2. The issuing headquarters allots a copy number to each copy of an order and maintains a record
showing the specific copy number or numbers issued to each addressee of the total number of
copies published, such as, copy ... of ... copies.
G011 Change From Oral Orders
If oral orders are issued, expressions such as “No change from oral orders” or “No change from
oral orders except for Paragraph 4” are to be used. It is generally desirable to state the date and
time when oral orders were issued together with the place of issue.
G012 Date and Time Signature
The current rules, as agreed by the NATO forces, for describing dates and times in messages
apply, except the month and year must also be shown. The date-time group in an OPORD means
the date and time at which the order was issued. It is also the date and time at which the order is
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effective, unless stated to the contrary in Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the order. The time used in
the Date-Time Group of Signature must include a time zone suffix. An example of date and time
is 230220Z Jan 2000 (0220 hours, zulu time, 23 Jan 2000).
G013 Message Reference Number
The purpose of the message reference number is to allow an OPORD to be acknowledged in the
clear over the radio without the possibility of the enemy learning an OPORD has been issued. It
is normally the internal number of the message releasing authority.
G014 Types of Operation Order
1. The type of OPORD indicates whether it is a combined, joint, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air
Force, or other functional command (for example joint special operations task force) order, for
example:
a. JOINT OPERATION ORDER No. 5.
b. ARMY OPERATION ORDER No. 2.
2. At a single Service headquarters it is not necessary to include the type of order as this is
indicated in the heading “Issuing Headquarters.” In such circumstances the words “OPERATION
ORDER No. ___.” are sufficient.
G015 References
Under the References heading are listed the relevant maps and charts (in accordance with
paragraph G004). In addition, any other documents required by the recipient of the order may
also be listed here. It is not necessary to list here standard orders or standard operating
procedures (SOPs) that may, however, be referred to in the body of the order.
G016 Acknowledgment Instruction
1. Instructions for the acknowledgment of an order are given here, if required. The word
“ACKNOWLEDGE” may suffice.
2. An acknowledgment to an OPORD means that the unit received and understood it.
G017 Signature of Command and Authentication
The name and grade or rank of the commander appear on all copies of the order. The commander
or a specifically authorized representative must sign the original copy (No. 1). If the commander
or designated representative signs a master copy, the use of which permits automatic
reproduction of the document with his signature thereon, no further authentication is required. If
the signature is not reproduced, authentication by the appropriate staff officer is required on all
subsequent copies and only the last name and rank of the commander appear on the signature
block.
G018 Annexes
Information on annexes is contained in Part IV (shown below).
G019 Distribution
When orders are to be distributed either to a unit of a nationality other than that of the issuing
headquarters or to a NATO command, the distribution list is normally given in full. Distribution
includes copies of the order furnished either for action or for information.
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G020 Fragmentary Orders
In rapidly changing situations, commanders may not have time to issue a full OPORD. Instead,
commanders may issue a FRAGO, which is an abbreviated form of an OPORD. The FRAGO will
include only the parts of the original OPORD that have changed. The FRAGO should conform to
the same sequence as an OPORD and all five paragraph headings must be used. After each
heading, the issuing commander or headquarters will send either “No Change” or the new
information, regardless of the paragraph. This ensures that recipients know they have received
the entire FRAGO. Not every situation requires a restatement of paragraphs 2 or 3. For example,
a commander may only change his “Task Organization,” his priority of combat support (CS), or
his combat service support (CSS) priority. Each of these decisions would result in a FRAGO, but
the FRAGO would have all the other portions of the order marked as “No Change.”
PART IV – ANNEXES TO OPERATION ORDERS

G021 Aim
The main purpose of an annex in an OPORD is to keep the basic text of an order short. It also
allows addressees to be given additional copies of certain information (movement tables, for
example). Annexes in OPORDs provide amplifying information that is not appropriate in the main
order, or information that amplifies a specific aspect of the order or combat function not pertinent
to all addressees of an order.
G022 General
1. An annex to an OPORD is an integral part of an order. The number and type of annexes used
is governed by the needs of the particular order. Annexes, when used, should increase the clarity,
usefulness, and brevity of the order.
2. All annexes in OPORDs generally provide information to combat troops, but they may also
provide the commander’s direction to supporting and specialist commanders. An annex to an
order should not be an order from supporting, specialist commanders to their troops, except in
the case of intelligence and movement annexes, which are addressed separately. Although the
annex is an integral part of an order, the information and direction given in the main body of the
order may be repeated as necessary because of differences in distribution that may occur. The
number of annexes to an order will be limited by the need of the particular order.
G023 Format
1. An annex to an OPORD may be written or take the form of a trace, overlay, overprinted map,
sketch, plan, or table. It may be used to give the detail of any part of the order, where appropriate.
2. Annexes to OPORDs are lettered alphabetically in capitals (A, B, C, and so on) and may have
one or more appendices which are numbered in part of the body of the OPORD and are listed
under the heading “Annexes” at the bottom of the order. Appendices must similarly be referred to
in their parent annex.
3. Annexes to OPORDs shall be issued with and in the same number of copies as the main order
and need only be suitably identified with respect to the main order. They must contain a security
classification and, when appropriate, a list of appendices.
4. Those annexes issued at different times from the main order must, in addition, contain a
heading, the signature of the commander or his appropriate representative, or authentication,
acknowledgment instructions, and a distribution list.
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G024 Intelligence Annex
1. The Intelligence Annex to an OPORD, if used, will follow a slightly more rigid form than that of
other annexes. It may well be issued before distribution of the OPORD. Its purpose will be to—
a. Disseminate intelligence and intelligence assessments about enemy forces essential to the
conduct of operations.
b. Serve as a medium for instructing subordinate commanders to acquire information or
intelligence as necessary for the conduct of operations but which can only be obtained
immediately before or when the operation itself has begun. (Note: This annex to an OPORD
is not intended to serve as a substitute for intelligence collection plans.)
c. Give any other necessary intelligence orders or guidance for the operation in question.
2. General instructions for preparing an intelligence annex are the same as for the OPORD. (See
Part III). The following factors are further guidance to preparation:
a. It must be kept as brief as is consistent with clarity.
b. Matters adequately covered in unit or command SOPs should not be repeated.
c. Reference may be made to appropriate intelligence reports, provided addressees have the
reports.
d. Material of limited interest, or which involves considerable detail, may be included in
appendices to the annex to an OPORD. The most likely appendices are enemy situation maps
or overlays, reconnaissance and observation missions, and map distribution tables.
3. The format for the Intelligence Annex to an OPORD is attached in appendix 5 to this annex.
G025 Movement Annex
A movement order may be issued as an annex to an OPORD or an Admin/Logistics order (see
Appendix 8 of this annex) or as a separate order in its own right. Normally it will be used as a
basis for the orders of service commanders to their units and to provide information to fighting
elements. It may also be used when necessary to give direction to Admin/Logistics troops without
direct reference to an OPORD. The format for a movement order is in appendix 12 to this annex.
PART V – ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS ORDERS
G026 Aim
The purpose of an Admin/Logistics order is to give the commander’s plan for administrative and
service support of operations.
G027 General
1. An Admin/Logistics order may be issued in conjunction with or in relation to an OPORD. It will
be used as a basis for the orders of CSS commanders to their units and to provide information to
combat elements.
2. At higher formations, it will generally supplant the Logistics Annex and be referred to in
paragraph 4, ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS of the OPORD.
3. Admin/Logistics orders are usually written but may include traces, overlays, and other annexes.
G028 Format
The format for an Admin/Logistics order is given in appendix 13 to this annex. It follows the same
format as the OPORD.
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G029 Paragraphing
The sequence of paragraphing is shown in appendix 13 to this annex and is the same as an
OPORD. Paragraphs 1 and 2, SITUATION and MISSION, are obligatory. The sequence for the
other paragraphs sequence is EXECUTION, ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS, and COMMAND
AND SIGNAL.
G030 Annexes
Annexes to Admin/Log order are to follow the regulations and formats described in Part IV.
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Appendix 1 to ANNEX G
Format for Warning Orders
G101 General
1. Units and all branches of staffs at all levels require the earliest possible warning of impending
events. WNGOs may be transmitted verbally (radio, telephone, via liaison officers [LOs], in writing
(messages), or electronically (digitally by information systems).
2. WNGOs are intended to provide the essential details of the impending operation, including
available planning time. This will allow unit staffs to initiate preparation and develop execution
plans for their new mission.
3. To ensure formations or units receive timely notice of impending operations, the promulgation
of WNGOs should not be delayed for lack of detailed information. WNGOs should be issued as
soon as possible, with additional details of operational significance being passed in
supplementary orders.
4. WNGOs that involve movement should clearly state a time before which movement is not
authorized. This requires that an additional order be issued before that stated time, either giving
actual movement times, extending the period before which movement is not authorized, or placing
troops at a degree of notice to move.
5. Use of WNGOs has a considerable bearing on the frame of mind with which troops execute a
particular mission. Correct use of a properly prepared WNGO maximizes the available planning
time provided to subordinate commands and allows them to prepare for the activities of the next
mission in the shortest time possible.
6. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the WNGO
are listed below.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
The required classification is placed at the top and bottom of every page.
(Change from oral orders, if any)
Copy No _____ of _____ copies

Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue (may be in code)
Date-Time Group of Signature
Message Reference No.
WARNING ORDER
References: This lists maps, charts, and relevant documents.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order (Optional)
Purpose Statement. This indicates specific tasking or requests to supported and supporting
commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE and preliminary
deployment estimates.
1. SITUATION. This is a short summary of the situation, including, as appropriate:
G-1-1 Edition B Version 1
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a. The political situation and enemy forces in the area of operations.
b. The anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations.
c. The type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for
the commander’s assessment of forces and strategic lift requirements.
d. The assumptions that may significantly affect the commander’s planning.
2. MISSION. This is a concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.
3. EXECUTION.
Intent:
a. Concept of Operations. This provides as much detail as available. This may be done in the
initial WNGO. If the commander issuing the WNGO desires that specific phases or courses of
action (COAs) be examined, they will be listed here. Otherwise, the supported commander
will develop the COAs he considers appropriate.
b. Tasks to Manoeuvre Units. This contains any information on tasks to units for execution.
c. Tasks to Combat Support Units. (See paragraph 3b.)
d. Coordinating Instructions. This provides any information available at the time of the WNGO.
It may include the following:
(1) Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
(2) Tentative execution timing for use in operation planning.
(a) Orders group meeting (including location and attendees).
(b) Movements (including degree of notice).
(3) Anticipated date of execution (D-day). This may be very tentative, but it provides the
commander and his staff a tentative timeline for operational-level planning. It also provides
the anticipated duration of operations.
(4) Known operational constraints. This includes overflight restrictions, port clearance
requirements, limitations on movements, reconnaissance (RECCE), and so on.
(5) Rules of engagement (ROE) considerations.
(6) Supporting commander coordination or monitoring instructions as required by the
supported commander.
(7) Authorization to the extent desired for direct liaison between commanders.
(8) Guidance.
(a) Risk guidance.
(b) Operations security (OPSEC) and deception guidance.
(c) Psychological operations guidance.
(d) Intelligence guidance.
(e) Counterintelligence (CI) guidance.
(f) Civil affairs (CA) guidance.
(g) Public affairs guidance.
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4. ADMINISTRATIVE/LOGISTICS.
a. Transportation.
b. Known logistic constraints.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Communications guidance.
b. Command relationships.
c. Code words or nicknames for the operation.
d. Reporting instructions. Special instructions and suspenses for submission of reports.
e. Classification and declassification guidance.
f. Commander’s place.
ACKNOWLEDGE:
NAME (Commander’s last name)

RANK
OFFICIAL: (Authentication)
ANNEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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Appendix 2 to ANNEX G Format for Operation Orders
G201 General
1. As stated in Part II the essentials of the agreement on OPORD are:
a. The five paragraph format.
b. Paragraphs 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 2, 3, 4, and 5, with their headings.
c. Paragraph 2 without sub-paragraphs or summarized using terms such as “No Change” or
“NIL.”
2. The remaining information contained in this annex is for guidance only. It should not be
construed to restrict the use of a FRAGO to an OPORD in any way.

TYPE AND SERIAL NUMBER OF OPERATION ORDER
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order
Task Organization: This information may be provided in Paragraph 3 “EXECUTION” or in an
annex, which may be in text or graphical form. Under this heading, as appropriate, is listed the
sub-division of the force, including attached units, command authority, together with the names
and ranks of the commanders, when necessary.
1. SITUATION. This briefly provides the general picture so that subordinate commanders will
understand the current situation under the following headings:
a. Enemy Forces. This provides the composition, estimated strengths, identification,
disposition, current location, movement anticipated, capabilities, and assessment of
intentions. References may be made to other record documents that amplify information
included here.
b. Friendly Forces. This contains information concerning friendly forces other than those
covered by the OPORD that should directly affect the action of subordinate commanders.
These forces include those not attached or organic to the command of the contemplated
operation, but whose presence on a flank or other adjacent area is of interest. This includes
information on such forces that subordinate commanders need to know to accomplish their
tasks. This includes the mission of the higher echelon unit and should include the higher
echelon commander’s intent and/or concept of operations, one echelon up.
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c. Attachments and Detachments. This includes units attached to or detached from the issuing
formation or unit. The effective times of the attachments and detachments may be listed here,
in an annex, or in both locations.
d. Commander’s Evaluation. This is an optional sub-paragraph to be used when directed. It
gives briefly the commander’s evaluation of the situation.
2. MISSION. This provides a clear, concise statement of the task or tasks to be accomplished by
the commander and their purpose. This paragraph must not be sub-paragraphed.
3. EXECUTION. This paragraph will be organized to suit the requirements of the particular
operation. It summarizes the overall course of action intended, or the concept of operations. In
subsequent paragraphs, it assigns specific tasks to each element of the task organization charged
with the execution of operations required to accomplish the concept of operations or in support of
those operations, and give details of coordination and task organization not already given in the
task organization section. Instructions applicable to two or more elements of the task organization
can be set forth in a final paragraph of this section headed “coordinating instructions.”
Intent: This accurately conveys to subordinates the commander’s intent.
a. Concept of Operations. This describes, in brief, how the commander visualizes the
execution of the operation from start to completion. The commander’s intent is a concise
expression of the purpose of the operation that describes the desired end state. It should be
understood two echelons down and help subordinates focus on what has to be accomplished
to achieve success so that mission accomplishment is possible in the time available and in
the absence of additional communications or further instructions. This paragraph should set
forth the phases of the operation (if phased); schemes of manoeuvre for major subordinate
task elements that describe precisely what the commander expects to be done; general plans
for the employment of supporting fires and weapons, including nuclear weapons; and the
general plan for the landing force in amphibious operations.
b. Tasks or Missions to Manoeuvre Units. Subsequent sub-paragraphs assign specific tasks
to each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical duties and give details
of coordination and the task organization or groupings if not included under “Task
Organization” or in an annex.
c. Tasks or Missions to Combat Support Units. These sub-paragraphs are used only as
necessary. CS units in sub-paragraphs are listed in the same order as they appear in the task
organization. CS sub-paragraphs are used to list only those specific tasks that CS units much
accomplish and that are not specified or implied elsewhere. If the information is adequately
covered in the OPORD, an annex is not written.
d. Coordinating Instructions. This includes instructions applicable to two or more elements of
the task organization. Typically, such instructions might include boundaries, objective,
beaches, lines of departure, time and direction of attack, and other specifics needed to
coordinate the activities of different subordinate elements. Other information is also included,
such as reporting instructions, anticipated time of execution, and when the order becomes
effective for planning or execution.
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS. This states the administrative and logistics arrangements
applicable to the operation. It described the manner of logistic support for the contemplated
operation. At higher command levels, this paragraph could state “See Administrative/Logistics
Order.” At lower command levels this paragraph, or the Administrative/Logistics Annex, may
eliminate the need for an Administrative/Logistics Order.
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a. Support Concept. This includes enough information to make clear the basic concept for
logistic support. It summarizes the overall operation from the CS and CSS perspectives.
b. Materiel and Services. This lists materiel and services for supply, maintenance,
transportation, construction, and allocation of labour for logistics purposes.
c. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization. This lists plans and policies for hospitalization and
evacuation of military and civilian personnel.
d. Personnel. This lists unit strengths, replacements, and personnel policies and procedures,
including those pertaining to civilians and enemy prisoners of war.
e. Civil-Military Cooperation. This describes control of the civil population, refugees, and other
relevant civil affairs matters.
f. Miscellaneous. In many cases, this references administrative and logistics policies and
procedures in an existing plan as amended by the OPORD.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. This includes signal, recognition, and identification instructions;
electronic policy; headquarters locations and movement; spectrum control and high ground
coordination; code words; code names; and liaison.
a. Command, Control, and Communications. This provides information about pertinent
command, control, and communications networks; SOPs; recognition and identification
procedures; electronic emission constraints, and so on. A separate annex may be required or
reference to an existing plan may be made.
b. Command. Multinational operations can have complex command relationships. OPORDs
must be specific concerning these arrangements, including shifts that may take place as an
operation progresses from one phase to the next. This section clearly states all command
relationships. It includes current and planned command post locations and alternate
command posts with their times of activation and deactivation.
ACKNOWLEDGE:

RANK
OFFICIAL: (Authentication) Use only when applicable. If the commander signs the original, no
further authentication is required. If the commander did not sign, then authentication by the
signature of the preparing staff officer with only the last name and rank of the commander appear
in the signature block.
ANNEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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Appendix 3 to ANNEX G Format for Operation Order (Overlay Type)
G301 General
1. This format conforms with Appendix 2 to Annex G.
2. See Figure G-3-1 (on page G-3-3) for an example of an overlay order.
3. The composer of an overlay order type OPORD must be as free as possible to put on the
overlay what he deems necessary.
4. This type of order may be issued by any suitable graphic method.
5. The written part of the order must be as set forth in Part III of this annex.
6. The writing may be in manuscript (written by hand or typewritten).
7. If tasks are self-evident, they will not be written on the overlay.
8. When the quantity of information makes it necessary, and for the purpose of clarity, the overlay
order may consist of more than one overlay.
9. A colon (:) with no text following means that the information is shown on the overlay. Further
information may be given by the addition of a short written statement or reference after the colon,
for example: “NIL” (no formation to enter), “NA” (not applicable), “NC” no change, “o/o (on order),
“See Annex ___,” and “INTSUM No. ___ (Intelligence Summary No. ___).”
10. Paragraph 2 (Mission) and 3.a. (Concept of Operations) must be written.
11. New symbols (symbols other than those contained in APP-6) may be used, but they must be
explained in the legend.

TYPE AND SERIAL NUMBER OF OPERATION
Task Organization: This can be either detailed here, in Paragraph 3, in a separate Annex, or
separately on the overlay order. In the latter case, it must be depicted using military symbols.
1. SITUATION.
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a. Enemy Forces. Information concerning the enemy may be given as far as possible—on the
overlay order or on a separate overlay; information which cannot be depicted must be written
down. It is also possible to refer to other documents.
b. Friendly Forces. Information concerning friendly forces other than that provided in the
OPORD that affects the action of subordinate commanders can be drawn on the overlay or
stated in the written portion of the order.
c. Attachments and Detachments.
d. Commander’s Evaluation. This section is not used by all nations.
2. MISSION.
3. EXECUTION. Preplanned conventional tasks will normally be shown on the main overlay,
unless their number is such as to obscure other information. In this case, they will be detailed in
a separate annex or overlay.
Intent:
a. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations should be repeated whether shown
graphically or not. Normally the overall fire support plan will be written.
b. Coordinating Instructions. If used, coordinating instructions should always appear as the
final sub-paragraph of the execution paragraph.
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS. The service support organization may be shown on a
separate overlay or in a written annex.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Instructions concerning locations and movements of headquarters
will usually be given on the overlay.
ACKNOWLEDGE:

RANK
APPENDEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:
NOTES:
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Figure G-3-1. Sample Overlay Order
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Appendix 4 to ANNEX G Format for Fragmentary Orders to Existing Operation Orders
G401 General
1. As stated in Part III, the FRAGO is an abbreviated form of an OPORD. As with the OPORD,
the essentials of the FRAGO are—
a. The five paragraph format.
b. Paragraph 2 without sub-paragraphs or summarized using terms such as “No Change” or
“NIL.”
2. The remaining information contained in this annex is for guidance only. It should not be
construed to restrict the use of a FRAGO to an OPORD in any way.

WARNING ORDER
FRAGO No. xx
References: (Mandatory) This references the order being modified.
Task Organization
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order (Optional)
1. SITUATION. (Mandatory) This includes any changes to the existing order.
2. MISSION. (Mandatory) This lists the new mission.
3. EXECUTION.
Intent: (Mandatory) This includes any changes to the existing order.
a. Concept of Operations. (Mandatory)
b. Tasks or Missions to Subordinate Units. (Mandatory)
c. Coordinating Instructions. (Mandatory) This includes the statement “The current overlay
remains in effect” or “See change one to Annex C, Operations Overlay,” “Mark any changes
to control measures on the overlay,” and “As time permits, issue a new overlay.”
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS. This includes the statement “No change to OPORD XX.”
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5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. This includes the statement “No change to OPORD XX.”
ACKNOWLEDGE: (Mandatory)

RANK (Mandatory)
OFFICIAL: (Optional)
ANNEXES: (Optional)
DISTRIBUTION: (Optional)
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Appendix 5 to ANNEX G Format for Intelligence Annex to the OPORD
G501 General
1. This annex provides a summary of the intelligence situation affecting the operation. It informs
the supported units with more detail of the enemy situation, intelligence concerns or requirements
of the commander, and details for handling captured personnel and documents. Information
provided by the Intelligence Annex should be used to develop subordinate commanders’ situation
paragraphs and intelligence collection priorities.
2. Information shown in this example may be used as a guide for the development of the
Intelligence Annex and should not restrict the content of the annex.
3. If publication of an Intelligence Annex is deferred or omitted, the intelligence and information
requirements should appear in the coordinating instruction sub-paragraph of the OPORD. They
are not, however, published in both places except when the commander desires that certain
requirements be emphasized.

ANNEX (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION ORDER NO.
1. SITUATION.
a. To implement an OPORD, it is essential to have intelligence about the enemy forces and
the effects of weather and terrain. Whether this annex and its related appendices and
enclosures contain all such intelligence or merely refer to intelligence available elsewhere is
a matter for national determination. Such references must not be included if participating units
have not been issued the reference documents (for example reinforcement units).
b. When in keeping with national doctrine, a second sub-paragraph may include an
intelligence assessment that will include the enemy’s possible COAs in order of their
probabilities.
2. MISSION.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Scheme of Support.
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b. Intelligence Acquisition Tasks to Subordinate Units. In this paragraph, orders are provided
to subordinate and attached units. It contains a separate numbered sub-paragraph covering
detailed instructions for each unit from which a report is required by the headquarters. These
sub-paragraphs are listed in the same order as units are listed in the OPORD.
c. Counterintelligence.
(1) This paragraph is covered largely by SOPs. Many special instructions having counter-
intelligence (CI) aspects are listed in the OPORD or in other annexes.
(2) Certain instructions and procedures pertaining to the activities of special personnel in
the operation may require limited dissemination on a “need to know” basis; therefore, a
“Special Counterintelligence Measures” appendix may be prepared for a limited and
specified number of addresses.
(3) This paragraph contains the CI chain of command.
d. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Intelligence Requirements. In this paragraph, each priority intelligence requirement
should appear in priority order under separate sub-paragraphs. The fact that they are in
priority order should be made clear. In a final sub-paragraph, other intelligence
requirements, if any, are listed.
(2) Intelligence Acquisition. In this paragraph, requests are provided to higher echelon,
adjacent, and cooperating units. It provides a separate numbered sub-paragraph
pertaining to each unit not organic or attached, from which information or intelligence is
requested.
(3) Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Materiel. This paragraph defines,
completes, or modifies SOPs in force, whenever required, for the duration of the operation.
For example—
(a) Prisoners of War, Deserters, Repatriates, Refugees, or Inhabitants, and Other
Persons. This includes plans including aspects such as segregation and handling to
ensure maximum exploitation of these sources of information.
(b) Captured Documents. This includes instructions for the handling and processing
of captured documents from time of capture to receipt by specified intelligence
personnel.
(c) Captured Materiel and Associated Technical Documents. This includes
designation of items or categories of enemy materiel required for examination, and
specific instructions for its processing and disposition.
(4) Information and Equipment Requirements. This paragraph lists, by category, the
conditions under which certain documents or equipment required by or allocated to units
can be obtained or requested.
(5) Reports and Distribution. This paragraph may be covered largely by SOPs. It stipulates
the conditions (date, number of copies, issue, and so on) regulating the issue of
intelligence reports to the originating command for the duration of the operation. Any or all
of the following items may be covered in this paragraph:
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(a) Period to be covered by routine reports and distribution.
(b) Routine and special reports that differ from SOPs required from subordinate units.
(c) Periodic or special conferences of intelligence officers.
(d) Distribution of special intelligence studies, such as over-prints, imagery
intelligence reports, and order of battle overlays.
(e) Special intelligence liaison when indicated.
(6) Other Instructions (if required). Listed here, under special sub-paragraphs, are
necessary items not covered above or in SOPs or that require action different from that
detailed in SOPs.
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS.
ACKNOWLEDGE:

RANK
APPENDEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:
NOTES:
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INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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Appendix 6 to ANNEX G Format for Fire Support Annex to the OPORD
G601 General
1. This appendix to Annex G provides the commander’s direction to fire support commanders. It
informs the supported units of the fire support they will receive and gives necessary details of fire
support coordination and, in particular, the part they play in such coordination. The Fire Support
Annex serves as the basis for preparing the fire support orders or appendices of the air, aviation,
artillery and naval gunfire support elements and the fire support orders or appendices for chemical
and nuclear weapons when they are required.
2. A paragraph concerning each type of fire support should be provided. These types of fire
support may be in alphabetical order, but such an arrangement should not be used if logic dictates
otherwise.
3. The example format shown below provides a memory aid or checklist of the content for the
sub-paragraphs of the Fire Support Annex. The detailed content of sub-paragraphs should be
included as necessary.

ANNEX (FIRE SUPPORT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO.
1. SITUATION.
(Any items of information that affect fire support and that were not included in Paragraph 1 of
the OPORD or need to be expanded should be given here.)
a. Enemy Forces:
(1) See Annex ____ to Operation Order No. ____.
(2) This paragraph contains enemy air support (fixed wing and helicopters), artillery, air
defence, chemical, naval gunfire, and nuclear capabilities.
b. Friendly Forces:
(1) This paragraph provides an outline of higher unit or formation mission and
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(2) This paragraph provides an outline of higher and adjacent unit or formation fire support
plans.
(3) This paragraph notes additional air, naval, and nuclear resources supporting the unit
or formation.
c. Attachments and Detachments. This paragraph lists fire support resources attached to the
unit or formation by higher headquarters along with any unit or formation elements detached
under command or control of the higher headquarters or adjacent units or formations.
Differences will exist between national command and control terminology.
2. MISSION. This paragraph provides a clear, concise statement of the task or tasks, including a
unifying purpose of the fire support elements.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operations. This paragraph provides a brief statement of the fire support
operation to be carried out, including any major grouping or arrangement of forces and
allotment of effort.
b. Air Support:
(1) General. This provides an outline of major supporting roles or tasks to be carried out
by the air component (and/or air assets of other components as applicable).
(2) Allocation. This lists the allocation by sorties of close air support including any priorities
or specific control arrangements.
(3) Miscellaneous. This provides points of detail not covered above or references an air
support order or appendix.
c. Aviation Support: (This paragraph may be omitted and information put in an Army Aviation
Annex.)
(1) General. This provides an outline of major roles or tasks to be carried out by army
aviation elements in support of operations.
(2) Allocation. This lists the allocation of aviation support, including any priorities or
specific control arrangements.
(3) Miscellaneous. This provides points of detail not covered above or in the tasks to the
aviation manoeuvre unit sub-paragraph or the Aviation Annex.
d. Artillery Support:
(1) Field Artillery:
(a) General. This provides the general concept, including major comments on the
phasing, duration, or general employment.
(b) Allocation. This lists the grouping or organization for combat.
(c) Miscellaneous. Some points included here, if applicable, are—
1. Deployment areas (overlay).
2. Counter-battery policy.
3. Location of surveillance and target acquisition assets.
4. Air observation.
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5. Priority tasks.
6. Reference to artillery order or appendix.
7. Artillery controlled supply rate.
(2) Air Defence Artillery: (Can be a separate annex).
(a) General. This provides the concept of employment and major comments on tactical
control procedures.
(b) Allocation. This lists the grouping or organization for combat.
(c) Miscellaneous. Some points to include, if applicable, are—
1. Deployment areas (overlay).
2. ROE.
3. Command and control procedures.
4. Reference to artillery order or appendix.
5. Air defence artillery or controlled supply rate.
6. Weapons control status.
e. Naval Gunfire Support.
(1) General. This provides the concept of employment, including limitations related to
duration of phasing of the support.
(2) Allocation. This lists the grouping or organization for combat, including—
(a) Allocation of observers or spotters.
(b) Allocation of ships to units or formations.
(3) Miscellaneous. Some points to include, if applicable, are—
(a) Trajectory limitations.
(b) Frequency allocations.
(c) Reference to Naval Gunfire Support Order or Appendix.
f. Coordinating Instructions
(1) This includes fire support coordination measures, for example, fire support
coordination line (FSCL), coordination fire line (CFL), restricted fire line (RFL), and so on.
(2) This lists timings to include F-, H-, L-, and Y-hours.
(3) This includes coordinating instructions on targets to be engaged by more than one
delivery system.
(4) This lists modification instructions.
(5) This lists scatterable mines, barrier free areas, and time restrictions for scatterable
mine emplacement.
(6) This lists chemical defence measures including—
(a) Troop safety.
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(b) Meteorology.
a. This lists references to Administrative/Logistics Orders.
b. This lists the location of ammunition supply points.
c. This lists the daily maintenance requirements or expenditure rates for each weapon system.
a. Command:
(1) This provides the locations of main and alternate headquarters.
(2) This provides the location of formation artillery command post (CP), fire support
coordination cell, fire support element, or air liaison elements.
(3) Liaison.
b. Signal:
(1) Signal operating instructions (SOIs). This refers to standing units SOIs or to an
appendix to this annex.
(2) Counter-surveillance instructions.
(3) Code words.
(4) Nicknames.
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Appendix 7 to ANNEX G Format for Engineer Annex to the OPORD
G701 General
1. This annex provides the engineer commander with orders and informs supported troops of the
engineer support they will receive. It will also explain, where necessary, what, if any, work is
required by the supported troops. If necessary, it will provide coordinating instructions for work to
be done by engineer troops and supported troops. This annex is not a specialist engineer order.
2. In succeeding paragraphs the engineer support should be described.
3. Paragraphs should be in a logical order as applicable to the operations.
4. All detail provided as an example only. Headings appropriate to the operation should be used.
5. Engineer Task Organization: This information may be given in paragraph 3 “EXECUTION” or
in an annex, which may be in text or graphic form. Under this heading, as appropriate, is given
the sub-division of the force, including attached units, together with the names and ranks of the
commanders when necessary.

ANNEX (ENGINEER) TO OPERATION ORDER NO.
1. SITUATION. This provides any items of information which affect engineer work and were not
covered in paragraph 1 of the OPORD or which need to be amplified.
2. MISSION. This provides the engineer unit or formation mission statement.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Scheme of Engineer Operations.
(1) Concept of Operations Supporting the Manoeuvre Plan. (This includes the manoeuvre
or engineer commander’s intent.)
(2) Engineer Main Effort (This is organized by mission, unit, and phase of the operation).
(3) Engineer Support to Close Battle.
(4) Engineer Support to Infrastructure.
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(4) Division-Level Missions in Support of the Brigade.
(a) Obstacles.
1. Countermobility effort.
2. Obstacle belts supporting the brigade deep, close, and rear battle. Identify or
assign belt responsibilities, priorities, and restrictions.
3. Reserve targets. This Identifies, prioritizes, and assigns responsibility for
division and brigade reserve targets. It provides criteria for reserve targets.
(b) Situational Targets.
1. Concept for employment, focusing on how they support the brigade manoeuvre
plan.
2. Brigade planned and executed obstacle plan that clearly identifies location,
intent, and execution criteria.
3. Criteria for each type of obstacle, clearly stating the HQ maintaining the authority
to use scatterable mines and any restrictions on duration (by belt).
b. Engineer Tasks to Subordinate Units.
(1) This lists engineer-level tasks to be accomplished by engineers supporting manoeuvre
elements (only as necessary to ensure unity of effort).
(2) This provides brigade-level tasks assigned to engineer organizations (used to inform
subordinate unit commanders of tasks under brigade control being done by brigade-level
forces).
c. Coordinating Instructions:
(1) General.
(2) Coordination of Obstacle or Barrier Plans. (This includes effective time of obstacle
belts and details of obstacle handover).
(3) Defence Works.
(4) Route Maintenance.
(5) Engineer Supply Points.
(6) Denial Measures.
(7) Host-Nation Coordination.
(a) This provides the type and location of naval group engineer facilities, assets, or
support.
(b) This lists procedures for requesting and acquiring host-nation engineer support
(including limitations of employment or use of host-nation assets.
(c) Infrastructure facilities criteria.
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS. This lists the allocation of critical engineer assets, mines,
explosives, and defence stores.
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Appendix 8 to ANNEX G Format for Administration/Logistics Annex to the OPORD
G801 General
1. This annex provides the commander’s direction to CSS commanders and informs combat
troops of the support to be provided by administrative or CSS units. It is not, however, a technical
order to service support troops.
2. The headings used in this annex will be relevant to the operation and influenced by SOPs.
3. Normally it is important to provide the location of supply points, recovery points, medical
installations and similar items, complete with the times of opening and closing.
4. All details provided as an example only. Headings appropriate to the operation should be used.

ANNEX (ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS) TO OPERATION ORDER NO.
1. SITUATION.
2. MISSION.
3. EXECUTION.
Any items of information that affect logistics operations and where were not covered in
paragraph 1 of the OPORD or that need to be amplified should be given here.
4. ADMINISTRATION/LOGISTICS. This provides the logistics unit or formation mission
statement.
a. Materiel and Services:
1) Supply.
2) Transportation.
3) Services.
4) Labour.
7) Maintenance.
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b. Medical Evacuation and Treatment.
c. Personnel.
d. Foreign Nation and Host-Nation Support.
e. Miscellaneous.
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Appendix 9 to ANNEX G Format for Communication and Information Systems Annex to the
OPORD
G901 General
1. This annex is used to give information on command and control matters and includes such
things as headquarters locations and movements, liaison arrangements, recognition and
identification instructions, code words, and general rules concerning the use of CIS. It may also
give the commanders’ direction to specialist CIS commanders. It is not, however, a specialist
order.
2. In succeeding paragraphs, all relevant information will be given.

ANNEX (COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS) TO OPERATION
ORDER NO.
References: This includes maps, charts, and relevant documents.
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy:
(1) Terrain. This defines all critical terrain aspects that would impact on deployment of
communications and information systems (CIS).
(2) Enemy Capability and/or Activity. This lists significant enemy electronic warfare
capabilities that impact command and control (C2) systems.
b. Friendly Situation.
(1) This lists primary communications gateways providing connectivity to higher, lower,
and adjacent units.
(2) This highlights critical communications security measures required to counter
expected enemy electronic warfare capabilities and protect C2 systems.
(3) This lists external communications assets that augment capabilities of signal support
units.
2. MISSION.
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3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of CIS Operations.
(1) This describes the concept of CIS operations to support the manoeuvre plan, including
primary and back-up systems supporting critical C2 networks.
(2) This establishes the plan for extending C2 systems through each phase of the
operation.
(3) This lists critical links between tactical and strategic communications systems.
(4) This identifies critical limitations of signal support assets, if applicable.
(5) This provides tasks to subordinate units.
b. Tasks to Subordinate Units.
(1) This lists signal supports tasks that specific manoeuvre elements are to accomplish
that the base OPORD does not contain.
(2) This lists signal support tasks that signal units supporting manoeuvre elements are to
accomplish only as necessary to ensure unity of effort.
c. Coordinating Instructions:
(1) This lists critical signal support instructions not already covered in the base OPORD.
(2) This lists key times or events critical to information system and network control
procedures.
(3) Frequency management.
a. Repair.
b. Resupply.
c. Movement.
a. This identifies C2 systems control hierarchy for the common user CIS network.
b. This identifies local area network control procedures for network administration and
management.
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Appendix 10 to ANNEX G Format for Army Aviation Annex to the OPORD
G1001 GENERAL
1. This annex provides the commander’s direction to army aviation commanders and informs all
troops of the specifics of aviation support during the operation. It is not, however, a technical order
to aviation troops.
2. It includes information affecting aviation support that paragraph 1 of the OPORD does not cover
or that needs to be expanded.

References: This includes maps, charts, and other relevant documents.
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy forces. This refers to annex B to OPORD ____, if applicable. It details enemy air
capabilities and air defence capabilities.
b. Friendly forces. This outlines the higher echelon headquarters plan and notes other aviation
resources supporting the unit.
c. Attachments and detachments. This lists aviation resources attached and detached to the
unit or formation. It includes effective times, if applicable.
2. MISSION. This clearly and concisely states the army aviation task.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of operations. This briefly states the proposed aviation operation, including
priorities.
b. This provides tasks to subordinate and supporting army aviation units. It outlines major
roles or tasks that army aviation elements are to perform in support of the operation.
c. Coordinating instructions. This includes instructions that apply to two or more subordinate
units. It refers to supporting appendixes not referenced elsewhere. It includes instructions
which apply to flight operations or which refer to the Airspace Management Annex.
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Appendix 11 to ANNEX G Format for Operations Security Annex to the OPORD
G1101 General
1. This annex provides the commander’s direction to operations security.

References: This includes maps, charts, and other relevant documents.
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy forces. This includes any information affecting OPSEC operations or measures
which paragraph 1 of the OPORD does not confer or which needs to be expanded. It details
the subversive situation and enemy intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and
reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets. It outlines current enemy activities and potential capabilities.
It shows the extent of the enemy threat. It addresses the following sub-paragraphs:
(1) Threat capabilities and subversion. This sub-paragraph details the enemy’s
capabilities for ISTAR, including special operations forces, insurgent groups, terrorist
organizations, and possible support by non-belligerent powers.
(a) Intelligence.
1. Ground surveillance and reconnaissance. This includes visual observations,
patrols, ground radar data, information from unattended ground sensors, and so
on.
2. Air surveillance and reconnaissance. This includes penetrating, standoff,
unmanned aircraft systems and drone flights, reconnaissance satellites, and
ground footprints.
3. Others. (This includes line crossers, refugees, local inhabitants, and so on).
(b) Espionage.
1. Propaganda.
2. Terrorism.
3. Politics.
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(2) Electronic Warfare.
(a) Electronic Warfare Support Measures. This includes communications intelligence
and electronic intelligence data.
(b) Electronic Countermeasures. This includes jamming, deception, and destruction.
(3) Terrain. This details how the terrain could affect enemy ISTAR capabilities and friendly
OPSEC measures.
(4) Weather. The details how the weather could affect enemy capabilities and friendly
OPSEC measures.
(5) Time and space. This details the effect of time and space on enemy activities and on
OPSEC measures. It describes the timeliness of the enemy C2 system and gathering
assets.
(6) Enemy intelligence and security weaknesses. This outlines the enemy’s weaknesses.
c. Subversion.
d. Sabotage.
e. Terrorism.
2. MISSION. This clearly and concisely states the task(s) and the unifying purpose of the
operation.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Operations. This lists OPSEC measures found in the unit SOPs. It emphasizes
new or revised OPSEC procedures. It lists OPSEC measures applicable to the units given
special instructions in the OPSEC plan. It refers to each OPSEC measure with the SOP’s
paragraph and item number (for example, TAPE OVER ALL UNIT VEHICLE MARKINGS,
SOP PARA 3-2).
b. Tasks to Subordinate and Supporting OPSEC Units. This lists additional OPSEC measures
that the SOP does not cover that require emphasis by all assigned and attached units in the
command. These OPSEC measures are designed to counter a specific enemy threat.
c. OPSEC Measures. This lists OPSEC measures that specific units are to implement.
OPSEC measures are in the division’s SOPs and can relate to regular units or to units in
special situations. Other paragraphs or sub-paragraphs may be needed to cover items of
special importance to some operations. (For example, physical and personnel security
measures may need more emphasis at some time, or units responsible for directing
communications security and electronic security or monitoring friendly activities may require
separate instructions.)
d. Coordinating Instructions. This outlines how units can exploit identified enemy
vulnerabilities and weaknesses. (The staff element for control of OPSEC must coordinate with
adjacent and subordinate units and other staff sections to obtain input on which to build
OPSEC measures against the enemy threat).
e. Counterintelligence. This summarizes the CI threat. It discusses internal security problems
within the command (such as the compromise of classified material or loss of
communications-electronics operation instructions).
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f. Other. This lists special instructions not previously covered, such as the following CI
targets (with priorities and locations). (See Table G-11-1.)
Table G-11-1. Target Priorities
UNITS TARGETS PRIORITIES LOCATIONS
1st Brigade A 1 Grid Coordinates
B 3 Grid Coordinates
2nd Brigade Y 1 Grid Coordinates
P 5 Grid Coordinates
g. This lists the CI chain of command.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. This includes liaison and recognition arrangements, identification
instructions, and responsibilities for forwarding information to a communications electronics
warfare intelligence unit or staff intelligence officer. It lists locations of communications electronics
warfare intelligence OPSEC units and teams, types reports needed, lists frequencies, and states
priorities.
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Appendix 12 to ANNEX G Format for Movement Annex to the OPORD
G1201 General
1. This annex provides subordinate commanders with detailed instructions for movements, prior
to or in conjunction with the operation. It explains the commander’s general directives for the
movement of subordinate units. It includes coordinating instructions for complex movements or
independent movement of subordinate units.
2. Subordinate units use this annex as guidance for their detailed movement orders.
3. Paragraphs should be presented in a logical order as applicable to the operation.

ANNEX (MOVEMENT) TO OPERATION ORDER NO.
1. SITUATION. This includes any items of information that affect the government and were not
covered in Paragraph 1 of the OPORD or that need to be amplified.
2. MISSION.
3. EXECUTION.
a. Concept of Movement.
b. Tasks to Subordinate Units.
c. Coordinating Instructions.

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Appendix 13 to ANNEX G Format for Administrative/Logistics Order
G1301 General
1. As stated in Part V, the essentials of the agreement on the Admin/Logistics order follows
the same format as the OPORD.
2. The other information contained in this annex is for guidance only. It should not be construed
to restrict the use of the Admin/Logistics order in any way.
3. Composition and Location of Administrative and Service Units. This information may be
given in the appropriate paragraph of the order in a trace, or in an overlay. The heading may
be omitted as necessary.

TYPE AND SERIAL NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE/LOGISTICS ORDER
1. SITUATION. This provides a general statement of administrative and service support
affecting support of the operation. It includes any information given in paragraph 1 of the
OPORD of particular interest to service units and expands this information as necessary.
2. MISSION. This provides a clear and concise statement of the task.
3. EXECUTION.
Concept of Support Operations.
a. Materiel and Services. (May include additional sub-headings as required.)
(1) Supply.
(2) Transportation.
(3) Services.
(4) Labour.
(5) Maintenance.
b. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization.
c. Personnel.
d. Foreign Nation and Host-Nation Support.
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e. Coordinating Instructions.
f. Miscellaneous.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. This contains the headquarters location and movements, liaison
arrangements, recognition and identification instructions, and general rules concerning the use
of communications and other electronic equipment, if necessary. An annex may be used when
considered appropriate.
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ANNEX H COMMON SUBJECTS FOR FORMATION

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
H001 General
1. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are a set of standardized procedures that
allow the efficient operations of headquarters (HQs) provided to NATO with external
and subordinate elements during missions, deployment, and exercises. The use of
SOPs enables the relevant commander to keep his orders short by referring to valid
SOPs, and by doing so, speeding up the operational tempo. HQ internal staffing and
interaction will be reflected in standing operating instructions (SOIs) on request of the
respective commander and are not subject to this annex.
2. SOPs used by NATO forces should include information related to the following
subjects:
a. Commander’s assessment, concept of operations, and mission statement
(1) Knowledge development, including friendly forces information requirements
(FFIRs) or host nation (HN) information requirements (IRs) and procedures.
(2) Comprehensive operations planning process.
(3) Operations assessment.
(4) Rules of engagement (ROE).
b. Command and Control
(1) HQ structure and organization – crisis establishment.
(2) Command post concept.
(3) Mission deployment and preparation, including readiness and notice to
move.
(4) Order of battle.
(5) Liaison (including civilian-military liaison).
(6) Battle rhythm, including reports and returns.
(7) Certification or in-theatre training.
(8) Air planning cycle.
(9) Orders dissemination.
(10) Battle space management, including real estate management of
combatant command.
(11) Air space management.
(12) Interoperability.
(13) Legal affairs.
(14) Special operations coordination.
c. Information Environment Management
(1) Public affairs.
(2) Strategic communication intent.
(3) Psychological operations.
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(4) Electronic warfare.
(5) Key leader engagement.
(6) Joint military commission.
(7) Protocol and visitor’s policy.
(8) Deception.
(9) Compliance assessment.
(10) Consequence management.
(11) Information exchange requirement.
d. Communication and Information Systems
(1) Information security.
(2) Information systems.
(3) Radio communications.
(4) HN communications.
(5) Satellite communications.
(6) Frequency or spectrum management.
(7) Cyberspace factors, including computer network operations.
(8) Computer information systems (CIS) concept of operations.
(9) Service management framework.
e. Stability Activities
(1) Civil-military cooperation, including interagency.
(2) Support to governance procedures, including building integrity.
(3) Support to capacity building, including security sector reform and
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
(4) Gender issues.
f. Intelligence and Understanding
(1) Intelligence requirements management and collection management.
(2) Intelligence production.
(3) Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR),
including specialized intelligence and assets planning.
(4) National intelligence cells.
(5) Battle damage assessment, including collateral damage.
(6) Indications and warnings.
(7) Meteorological support.
(8) Geospatial support, including terrain analysis.
g. Manoeuvre
The following list is focused on operations that need to be described by detailed
coordinating measures. Classic types of operation (offensive, defensive, and so
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on) are described in doctrine publications and do not necessarily require an
SOP.
(a) Coordination of generic tactical activities (for example, passage of lines,
relief of troops in combat, and so on).
(b) Show of force.
(c) Separation of conflicting parties.
(d) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
(e) Non-combatant evacuation operations.
(f) Support to counterinsurgency operations.
(g) Air mobile or air assault operations.
(h) Personnel recovery.
h. Firepower
(1) Joint fire coordination, including joint air assault team.
(2) Targeting.
(3) Offensive air, including attack helicopter operations.
i. Protection
(1) Operations security.
(2) Mine or countermine operations.
(3) Counterintelligence.
(4) Counter-surveillance.
(5) Explosive ordnance disposal, including coordination with HN and non-
governmental organization (NGO) de-mining teams.
(6) Friendly forces unexploded explosive ordnance prevention, including firing
and jettison areas.
(7) Counter-improvised explosive devices.
(8) Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection.
(9) Air defence.
(10) Battlefield identification measures.
(11) Military police.
(12) Force protection.
(13) Force health protection (according AD 83-1, Medical Support to
Operations).
(14) Prisoners of war.
(15) Detention.
k. Combat Service Support
(1) Logistic planning, including rear battle rhythm.
(2) Logistic support to non-military actors.
(3) Engineer infrastructure logistics.
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(4) Reinforcements.
(5) Casualty notification.
(6) Handling of deceased.
(7) Medical support and medical evacuation.
(8) Mass casualties procedures.
(9) Battlefield equipment recovery or evacuation.
(10) Movement and transportation.
(11) Asset tracking and visibility.
(12) Supply and services, including map supply.
(13) Postal and courier services.
(14) Host-nation support.
(15) Procurement, funding, and contracting.
(16) Maintenance and repair.
(17) Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.
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ANNEX I COMBINED INTEROPERABILITY INFORMATION

EXCHANGE
I001 General
1. This section seeks to highlight the diversity of information exchange within the deployed force
and the responsibility of the staff to understand the information they work with. It is the staff’s
responsibility to ensure that they understand their own information as well as how they acquire it,
process it, and manage it. It is their information, and they are the best placed to judge how it
interacts with other information in the headquarters (HQ) to ensure it is appropriately exploited to
achieve operational success. Only by the staff fully understanding their information environment
can they generate coherent staff work within an efficient battle rhythm in support of the
commander and his plan.
2. This section describes the operational variables affecting command and control (C2)
interoperability and establishes the framework of doctrine. It suggests levels of interoperability
within and between multinational forces. It describes methods by which to achieve C2
interoperability and the constraints to achieving it. This section also recognizes C2 interoperability
with other components within the joint environment. It acknowledges additional requirements for
military command and information systems (CIS) to be interoperable with international, non-
military agencies but does not examine them in detail. The effectiveness of NATO combined
forces and joint forces in non-Article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CROs) or Article 5
operations depends on their ability to operate efficiently together. C2 interoperability in such
operations is key in achieving such effectiveness.
3. Effective C2 requires exchanging a high degree of operational information among an increasing
variety of entities, including between components of different services and non-NATO
organizations. The key information is what the commander considers critical to him and on what
he wishes his staff to focus. These are the commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs). The information requirements and conditions under which they are exchanged depends
not only on the operational situation, but also on the personality of the individual commander.
Operational requirements dictate which information components will be exchanged vertically and
horizontally. Such exchanges must always be supported by appropriate exchange capabilities,
be they analogue or digital, whose capacity to support the commander is well understood by the
staff. Vertical and horizontal information flows are required: vertical to achieve command—which
encompasses situational awareness (SA)—and horizontal to ensure synchronization among
flanking units or formations of other joint components. However, in the context of combined and
joint operations, an information environment well understood by the staff ensures that units and
components exchange only the amount of information essential to the exercise of successful
command.
I002 C2 Interoperability
The degree to which different forces, including forces from different nations, within NATO can
work together in the planning and execution of combined and joint operations ranges across the
spectrum of conflict. Effective C2 interoperability at all levels requires common, or commonly
understood, C2 doctrine and procedures as well as the timely exchange of all relevant information.
This understanding and timely exchange ensure unity of effort (within the philosophy of
decentralized command) and full integration and coordination of NATO forces in support of the
commander of the joint force’s missions.
I-1 Edition B Version 1
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I003 Purpose
1. Combined or joint military operations require units and formations of participating nations to act
as integral components of, to operate subordinated to, or to operate in cooperation with the forces
of other nations. They include all participants sharing political and military risks associated with
any conflict. This implies a requirement to command coalitions effectively and efficiently by
coordinating the activities of all related functional areas in a combined and joint operations
environment. Such coordination mitigates any possible deficiencies due to the limitations and
restraints from the timeliness or military resources used. Timely, accurate, and reliable information
is essential. The capability to collect, process, display, store, and disseminate an uninterrupted
flow of information is critical to the success of combined or joint forces. Interoperability is also
required to reduce the vulnerability of combined or joint C2 by denying potential adversaries the
ability to interfere.
2. C2 interoperability enhances the effectiveness of combined and joint operations by promoting—
a. Unity of command and a unified understanding of the mission.
b. An optimized operational tempo and enhanced survivability and force protection.
c. Cohesion through the rapid passage of information essential to the fulfilment of the mission.
d. A seamless combined force through—
(1) Harmonized doctrine, procedures, and training.
(2) Integrated CIS.
(3) Synchronized logistics activities and a shared logistics burden.
I004 Operational Environments
1. NATO Operations. While NATO Article 5 operations remain potentially the most complex case
for a NATO deployment, recent operational experience indicates that NATO forces are
increasingly likely to conduct operations in NA5CRO. The forces of different NATO nations
operate together and with the forces of non-NATO nations, governmental organizations,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations. For both political
and military reasons, combined or joint interoperability occurs at lower levels than before,
particularly in crisis response organizations. Key to any operation will be effective C2. The
exchange of timely, accurate, and relevant information and intelligence is vital to C2.
a. CIS affect C2 by integrating technology, command structures, and procedures to support
the commander. These systems enhance effectiveness at every level of command.
Commanders remain pre-eminent in defining what information they need for effective C2.
Further, they recognize the vulnerability that CIS create by making CIS such a high-value
target.
b. Information flows both vertically and horizontally in operational environments among all
entities, including military organizations, NGOs, governmental organizations, and host-nation
(HN) organizations. To ensure cohesive action and to prevent mistakes that could reverse
progress being made in sensitive environments, all organizations work from the same data,
and they have a common view relevant to a given operational area. Modern CIS not only can
process the quantities of data required to distil a common view, but also process them in a
timely manner.
c. Commanders require C2 interoperability within and between those levels (vertically and
horizontally) of command at which the exchange of information between commanders or staffs
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is necessary. Relevant and timely information must be available in sufficient detail at all levels
of command. Units exchange information vertically to support C2 and speed the commander’s
decision-action cycle and horizontally to enable a common SA. Commanders expect that
information exchanged horizontally between formations or units of different nations contains
the same level of detail as though the exchange were taking place within a purely national
force. Information needs to be exchanged vertically and horizontally with all other components
at all formation levels and down through the chain of command. It is particularly important that
information be exchanged with the air component at all formation levels and down through the
chain of command to ensure synchronization of the joint battle. Combined or joint operations
also require standardized, or commonly understood, doctrine, procedures, techniques, and
languages. These apply throughout all phases of an operation.
d. C2 interoperability provides necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of
operations. It must, therefore, be seamlessly and fully integrated within the combined and joint
force. Multinational orders of battle and ad hoc coalitions, including maritime and air
components, will necessitate flexible and responsive interoperable command support
organised on a modular basis.
e. Communications transmit the appropriate quantities of information much of which will be
digital data (as distinct from voice). All CIS must share data simultaneously and manage
information to ensure a common SA.
2. Article 5 Operations
NATO forces are structured, equipped, and trained for Article 5 operations. Combined or joint
operations may take place inside or outside the NATO area of responsibility, depending on
international agreements or coalition arrangements. Different nations may provide different
elements of a force. A future operational environment requires forces to be more dispersed—
often in non-contiguous deployment at each level of command—over a larger area of
responsibility. This stretches the CIS. Commanders will have a larger area of interest. CIS will
need significant improvements in the timely and secure provision of information in accordance
with the commander’s priorities.
3. Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
a. NATO forces trained and equipped for Article 5 operations can be adapted for NA5CROs.
These involve many of the same capabilities as in warfare. However, the variety of potential
operations requires additional structures, procedures, techniques, and specialist equipment.
NA5CROs require military forces to operate closely with other agencies, governmental
organizations, and NGOs. As a result, more well-qualified and authorized liaison teams in the
HQ of key agencies and NGOs will be used. NA5CROs will require NATO forces to operate
under greater constraints—legally, politically, and militarily—than during Article 5 operations.
The deployed force must be capable of adapting to the full range of military operations. It must
have the appropriate equipment, numbers, posture, and capability for high-intensity
operations. The force reorganises or adapts its task organization if the commander envisions
extended operations. NATO forces must be configured and their command support sufficiently
versatile to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.
b. NA5CROs result in more complex force structures than in Article 5 operations. More
complex command relationships call for a greater degree of C2 interoperability, including with
non-NATO forces and non-military organizations.
c. In NA5CROs, deployed forces are smaller and have different skills compared to a full
war-fighting organization. Areas of operations (AOOs) are larger and support external bases.
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The lines of communication to the rest of the command structure may be longer and more
complex. Decisions may be made at a lower level, but they may directly influence consultation
as well as C2. Local and apparently insignificant events quickly attain strategic significance.
The information required in NA5CROs differs from that required in Article 5 operations, and
some information previously needed at a higher level of command may be required at a lower
level. This increases the amount of information to be distributed to lower levels, even if the
forces are less numerous than in an Article 5 situation.
I005 Command and Control
1. Commanders of combined or joint NATO forces at every level need a fast and flexible decision-
making process. Interoperability must have C2 as its central focus. Because of the number of
potentially different elements of a force provided from different nations, C2 is more complex in
combined or joint operations than in purely national operations. Effective C2 ensures unity of
purpose and command in any deployed force. Effective C2 requires command support sufficiently
flexible to support the conduct of operations across the range of military operations.
2. Components of the force, via their national communications and CIS, must exchange
information in the AOO effectively and efficiently to help establish an effective, efficient
information-sharing infrastructure. The information exchanged must be relevant to the operation
and support the commander’s priorities. A future operational environment will require the
commander and staff to collect information from, and disseminate it to, all parts of the AOO and
beyond. Command support, therefore, must encompass both vertical and horizontal information
flows. C2 interoperability will never be total due to the constraints discussed below.
I006 Organizational Models
1. Within NATO, there are three basic models for the command and organization of forces with
varying degrees of multinationality: framework nation, integrated, and bi-national.
a. Framework Nation. Under this arrangement, a single nation provides the majority of the
staff, the infrastructure, and CIS. In this case, the formation HQ uses the same language,
command philosophy, and procedures, which must be common in formations or units directly
subordinated to it. Below that level, national structures, doctrine, and procedures will apply.
b. Integrated. A multinational HQ has representation from each of the participating nations
commensurate with the role assigned to that nation or its level of participation. A multinational HQ
follows no particular national staffing method or command philosophy, although, in the interest of
military efficiency, it develops common procedures.
c. Bi-national. Under this arrangement, a formation HQ is on an “equal shares” basis with a
fully integrated HQ.
2. All three models require the formation HQ to provide communications equipment to lower
levels. However, the framework nation in that model may also deploy its own automated CIS
instead of national automated CIS. By contrast, the automated CIS in a truly multinational
formation may be provided by all or any nation and must be interoperable with the
communications regardless of which nation provides the communications.
I007 Levels of Subordination
At whatever level a multinational HQ exists, it is essentially an operational-level HQ because of
the level of decisions that it has to make concerning communications, political aspects, and
national and multinational logistics, among others.
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a. Article 5 Operations. The increased operational tempo, friction, and complexity of Article
5 operations will not normally permit subordination at low levels. Subordination often remains
limited to national formations within multinational forces. Forces that consist of a greater
number of smaller national contingents complicate interoperability requirements and
solutions. This does not preclude the incorporation of some specialist capabilities. Among the
most severe constraints to C2 interoperability at lower levels are a lack of logistic
interoperability and the difficulties of manoeuvring a subordinate formation of one nation within
the command structure of another. Article 5 operations may, on missions that are limited in
time and space, involve subordination of a unit of one nation within the formation of another
nation. This implies the need to exchange information at this level. At these lower levels of
command, however, differences of language, doctrine, and culture tend to limit the C2
interoperability that units can achieve in fast moving operations. These differences impede
rather than increase operational tempo. In combined or joint operations, the widespread use
of automated CIS to fill a continuous need at these lower levels for proper liaison is likely to
be limited.
b. Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. NA5CROs may involve subordination of the
formations of one nation within those of another. Specialist capabilities may need to be
integrated at these lower levels. The levels and diversity of subordination determine the
information flows required. However, such subordination can only occur if planning permits
long training lead-times and no particular political imperatives exist for such a deployment. C2
interoperability is more “ad hoc” than in Article 5 operations.
I008 Constraints on Command and Control Interoperability
While striving to attain C2 interoperability, numerous constraints exist that impede achieving full
interoperability. Such constraints vary with each operation and need to be addressed case by
case. The following factors impose constraints on C2 interoperability:
a. Language. While the use of a common language facilitates understanding, differences in
nuance and interpretation will always exist, even between nations that use the same
language. The lower the echelon in the chain of command, the less likely it is that there will
be sufficient fluency in a common language. At low levels, liaison officers have their own
communications and automated CIS, and they speak the language of the nation to which they
are attached. In the short to medium terms, liaison officers remain one of the principal means
of achieving effective C2 interoperability.
b. Doctrine, Procedures, and Techniques. Military operations only work properly in a
multinational context if doctrine, procedures, and techniques are common or at least
commonly understood. This requires familiarization through training. It also requires the
adoption of common standard operating procedures (SOPs). This requires units to overcome
the following:
(1) Lack of interoperability of data systems and communications.
(2) Differences in, and understanding of, terminology and symbology.
(3) Differences in national deployment and implementation policies.
c. Limitations of Data. Data tends only to be used to exchange facts and, for the foreseeable
future, will have limited utility in transmitting information about the human aspects of
command.
d. Military Communications Bandwidth. The lack of adequate communications capacity is
a major factor that constrains information transfer in support of interoperability. The bandwidth
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available to support CIS in the field is almost invariably far less than that routinely available to
commercial users. Currently, military data replication traffic and the use of free text in
formatted messages need to be minimised. This requires careful filtering and the use of taut
and dynamically changeable information exchange controls.
e. Incompatibility of Combat Net Radio. At the levels below brigade, combat net radio will
continue to be the principal means of communication in the AOO, particularly in Article 5
operations. The inability of national combat net radio to interoperate with those of other nations
is a major impediment to successful C2 interoperability particularly at battalion level and
below. This will frequently result in the need to deploy liaison teams with their own radios to
flanking units or formations to guarantee communications.
f. Incompatibility of National CIS. Few nations’ CIS can exchange data without some form
of translation device. The lack of real-time translation capability could impede achieving tempo
in fast moving operations and increase the chances that data will not be exchanged
successfully. Further, the timelines that individual nations have for deployment of new CIS
and retirement of old CIS do not by nature coincide. Thus, while all nations may be working
toward the same standard, during the transition, legacy systems will not be compatible.
g. Spectrum Management. Electromagnetic emissions do not respect multinational
boundaries. Failure to manage the use of the electromagnetic spectrum with the combined or
joint operational environment results in loss or degradation of important CIS, weapons, and
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems. Spectrum
management founded on the commander’s intent requires practical coordination and, where
necessary, deconfliction of all use of the electromagnetic spectrum with the AOO.
h. Cultural Differences. Cultural differences can jeopardize understanding between forces
of different nations. Fortunately, the uniformity of key values within the NATO nations is one
of the alliance’s principal strengths. Liaison remains the principal means by which such
difficulties can be resolved.
i. Security
(1) Security and systems requirements demand that some information be
compartmentalized or declared nationally sensitive and that such information may not be
released to all elements of the force.
(2) In achieving interoperability, a key requirement is the maintenance of security, at the
appropriate level, of all information exchanged between CIS. The standard of protection
from sender to receiver should be up to “NATO Secret”. In mission planning, it is essential
that provisions be made to ensure all participants have access to information essential to
the conduct of joint and combined operations. Integrity, confidentiality, and availability of
information must be guaranteed.
j. Simplicity. The high stress, uncertainty, and chaos that are commonly associated with high
tempo, combat environments have detrimental physiological and psychological impacts for all
personnel involved. Therefore, CIS should be as user-friendly, simple, and intuitive as
possible. Certainly, national experience finds that if a system (especially a software system)
differs from this design, personnel will not use that system during high stress and time-
sensitive situations. Moreover, the margin for user error rises dramatically if systems are not
user-friendly and intuitive and when users are tired and otherwise not operating at normal
physical and psychological capacities. CIS that are user-friendly, simple, and intuitive
contribute to C2 interoperability.
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I009 The Joint Common Operational Picture
In both Article 5 operations and NA5CROs, units have a requirement to provide information on
the location and status of their own and enemy forces that is both timely and in an easily
understood form. The view of this common operational picture of an operational environment
differs at each level of command in terms of mission, situation, scale, degree of detail, and
timeliness of information. No single view of an operational environment exists at all levels and all
HQs. This implies that units apply some form of filtering and aggregation. The volume of data
involved implies the need for automated information exchange and fusion, both vertically and
horizontally.
I010 Information Exchange Between Levels of Command
1. Within The Land Component. The staff at a HQ needs to know the locations and selected
status information. This information principally includes percentage strengths of personnel and
key equipment, gross statements of logistics (fuel, ammunition, food and water), and an indication
of the mission and activity of the following friendly forces, irrespective of nationally, on combined
and joint operations. This includes—
a. Two levels of subordination in order to exercise C2 of own forces.
b. High priority or specialist elements of the force, such as surveillance or mobility assets, and
other friendly force elements not under own command but within their own AOOs, in order to
exercise C2 of own forces.
c. Superior HQ and its two levels of subordination in order to—
(1) Allow an alternative commander to assume command in place of a superior HQ.
(2) Provide support to, or obtain support from, other elements of the force at the same
level.
(3) Gain “flank” information of the same HQ level and one level down. Where flanking units
come from a different formation, the equivalent information (the same level and one level
down) is required. (“Flank” is placed in quotation marks since, in the nonlinear AOO, such
units and formations required to support others may not be sharing a physical boundary.)
(4) Outline operational environment information pertinent to HQ two levels up, including
mission and major control measures (for example, boundaries, axes, and objectives) in
order to support the higher commander’s intent.
2. Within a Single Headquarters. It is essential that everyone is working from the same
information and that there is a common view relevant to that HQ. Staff cells within one HQ have
differing requirements for subsets of information about friendly forces and other battlespace
entities. As operations progress and battlespace conditions change, the staff’s requirements
change. Often staff cells will then require other information about different units and formations.
Thus, the delivery of friendly force information must be highly configurable within a HQ and
re-configurable during operations.
I011 Information Exchange with Other Components
1. In combined and joint operations, there will always be a need to share information among land,
maritime, air, and special forces components. This will not necessarily be at every level of
command, nor will the level of detail necessarily be the same as within a single service
component. However, such information exchange will be key to the successful coordination of
operations. At a minimum, a joint common operational picture is required so that the other
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components have good SA with which to facilitate responsive reactions from the supporting to the
supported components when required.
2. Establishing liaison elements within the other component commands is regarded an excellent
means of sharing information. Liaison elements also help in gaining valuable background
information about tactics, techniques, and procedures and information requirements of the other
components. Additionally, liaison elements may provide opportunities to discuss certain aspects
of the plan or intended decisions in an informal way.
I012 Understanding the Information Environment to Optimise Information Exchange and
Enhance CIS Interoperability
1. Timely information exchange is essential to the effective exercise of C2. The HQ staff’s
understanding of the information environment is fundamental to both the exercise of command
and its support. Staff members have responsibility to ensure that they understand their own
information as well as know how to acquire, exploit, and manage it with the rest of the HQ and
the deployed force. It is their information, and they are the best placed to judge how it interacts
with other information in the deployed force to ensure it is appropriately exploited to achieve
operational success. Information exchange is achieved by both analogue and digital methods;
the latter revolves around appropriate CIS. It is impossible to design effective CIS without
understanding the information that those systems service. Such understanding allows the HQ to
mitigate the constraints of existing CIS by measuring the HQ’s information exchange needs
against the capabilities of the CIS and to drive development and evolution of enhancements. As
a minimum, the information exchange capabilities, especially CIS, used throughout all phases of
the campaign must support the CCIRs. CIS interoperability within a multinational, combined, or
joint force is paramount.
2. The complexities of multinational or joint operations will reinforce the need to deploy liaison
officers to more locations than is normally the case in national operations. Additional liaison
officers ensure that commanders can keep in close personal touch and that the overall
commander’s intent is fully and consistently understood. These liaison officers must be deployed
with information exchange capabilities appropriate to their role.
3. Successful future operations requires accelerated operational processes, a heightened
operational tempo, and the ability to conduct operations simultaneously within the combined or
joint force. CIS interoperability across the deployed force is a dominant requirement. A key
element of CIS interoperability is the ability to exchange digitized information. A data service must
be inherently flexible to provide an efficient mechanism for exchanging large amounts of
information. Only a robust data service can efficiently support the transfer of the information
required to permit the fusion of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
data needed to support the commander. It also allows the timely dissemination of the fused
product throughout the chain of command. Burgeoning data services make it imperative that the
staff understand their information environment, managing it appropriately according to its
relevance and priority.
4. Whatever methods are employed for C2 interoperability, they must—
a. Support unity of command and delegation of command by ensuring that information can
flow down to the lowest appropriate level for a specific operation. To achieve this, any
information transfers should, as far as possible, employ common standards (including for
data) at all levels of command.
b. Be flexible enough to accommodate the requirements of all likely operational missions.
c. Be able to share information not only between but also within HQ.
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d. Understand the information environment sufficiently to—
(1) Recognise and mitigate constraints imposed by existing CIS and other information
exchange means.
(2) Advise the commander on the best ways of employing his information exchange
capabilities.
(3) Drive the evolution and developments of information exchange enhancements,
especially CIS.
e. Ensure resilience by developing and exercising reversionary modes and back-up systems
that allow graceful degradation, business continuity, and optimised recovery. For example, a
catastrophic failure in one system due to enemy action or technical malfunction must not result
in the whole HQ ceasing to function. Individual systems must also have the ability to recover
quickly.
f. Understand the likely levels of information interoperability likely to be available between
other deployed components, including coalition partners. Interoperability with CIS of other
deployed components and non-military organizations ensures a genuinely integrated
combined or joint approach to operations.
I013 Summary
1. Effective C2 will likely require a high degree of information transfer. Of critical importance within
this process will be that information the commander deemed essential for the successful and safe
conduct of the operation. The level, volume, and frequency of information to be passed varies
with each operation. The information transfer capabilities, both vertical and horizontal within a
force, must be sufficient to ensure that all units within the organization are working to common,
coherent, and current operational information. Units must understand and address constraints on
information exchange, with resilience built into the HQ’s information handling activities.
2. Whatever methods units use to transfer information, the methods must be capable of meeting
the commander’s operational needs by being sufficient in capacity, interoperable, flexible, and
robust.
I014 Conclusions
1. There are necessary and desirable degrees of interoperability that are required within and
between multinational forces. Such degrees of interoperability ensure effective and timely
exchange of information and employ both analogue and digital means. The planning,
development, and delivery of accurate and timely information exchange depend on the staff’s
complete understanding of the HQ’s information environment.
2. Military operations in both the combined and joint military environments must include the
requirement for military information exchange capabilities—especially CIS—to be interoperable
with international, non-military agencies.
3. A number of constraints, applicable to both the vertical and horizontal transfer of information,
prevent current C2 interoperability. Units need to remove or solve constraints before they can
achieve full interoperability.
4. Units attain full CIS interoperability by completely understanding the information environment
to identify requirements and drive appropriate capability development. The identification of
deficiencies will be satisfied through the NATO interoperability environment as established in
NATO policy.
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Appendix 1 to ANNEX I Commander's Critical Information Requirements
Figure I-1-1 shows common commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).
Figure I-1-1. Commander's Critical Information Requirements
I-1-1 Edition B Version 1
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Appendix 2 to ANNEX I Representative Information Flows
I201 General
Information flows within a multinational combined or joint force are likely to be very complex and
involve manoeuvre formations or elements, combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS),
and all the combat functions. STANAG 5048 governs information flows. Figure I-2-1 and Figure
I-2-2 (on page I-2-2) represent only the information flows expected within a combined or joint
force. Figure I-2-3 (on page I-2-3) indicates the relationship between manoeuvre elements and
the combat functions. These figures do not attempt to represent the nonlinear, multidirectional
AOO of the future.
Figure I-2-1. Information Flow

I202 Information Flows Vertically and Horizontally
Information flows vertically from corps to battalion and horizontally at every level of command.
Connectivity to the other components is horizontal and vertical. Units need a mechanism for
ensuring that information from the other components can flow as transparently as possible down
through the chain of command and that tasking information (or requests) can flow in a timely
fashion up or across to the other components. A multinational CIS has potentially greater inertia
built into it than purely national systems, and delays in joint tasking must be avoided if military
effectiveness is to be maintained and even enhanced.
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I203 Information Flow at Brigade Level
Figure I-2-2, at the manoeuvre brigade level, shows how information does and does not flow.
Figure I-2-2. Information Flow at Brigade Level

I204 Other Flows
Information flows from a battalion of one brigade to the HQ of a flanking brigade of another nation.
Information follows the chain of command. If, however, units or formations of the same nation are
subordinated to flanking HQ of different nations, they will probably use their own combat net radio
and CIS to exchange information and synchronise operations. Within a combined force, forces
need a common understanding of information exchange requirements and a system to ensure
that information arrives in the same form and at the same time. For example, information passed
laterally between units of different nations across a boundary (in this case, an inter-brigade
boundary between battalions A and B) reaches brigade A in the same form and time as if it had
come from battalion B, via brigade B to brigade A.
I205 Vertical Information Flows
However, the direct vertical information flow from corps to division and division to brigade is not
as clear-cut as the diagrams at figures I-2-1 and I-2-2 indicate. There is a requirement for corps
echelons to communicate directly with certain brigades—such as engineer, aviation, army organic
air defence (AOAD), and reconnaissance brigades—and even to specialist battalions such as
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence, electronic warfare (EW),
ordnance disposal engineer battalions, and special artillery units. At the divisional level, there is
a requirement for information to flow directly from divisional HQ to battalion or regimental levels
in the case of divisional engineer or reconnaissance battalion or regiment. As
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an example, Figure I-2-3 indicates the sort of flows that units expect among engineers and
reconnaissance elements and the chain of command.
Figure I-2-3. Information Flow at Division Level

I206 Hierachical Chain of Operational Command
Figure I-2-3 is merely representative, but it shows how interrelated the combat functions are with
the hierarchical chain of operational command. An engineer battalion is operating at brigade level,
and the information flow that seems to be diagonal between them is in fact a horizontal flow of
information between a brigade and a brigade-level unit. However, this points out that with such
units passing information both to the brigade and to the parent unit at a division, that division
could get the same report from both the brigade and the parent unit at the division unless there
are special information exchange rules. In the case of military intelligence units, this could cause
“double counting” of enemy without such special rules.
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Appendix 3 to ANNEX I Types of Information to Exchange
I301 General
1. There are different types of information that need to be exchanged horizontally and vertically
in any operational context, although the detail of the information and the information exchange
requirements will be specific for each operation. These types of information can be broken down
into the following categories:
a. Operation orders (OPORDs), directives, and plans (including overlays).
b. SA—to include friendly, enemy, and neutral (civilian) forces—and environmental
information to include meteorological information.
c. Information on control measures, including control orders such as fire mission orders and
airspace control orders as well as control returns and information.
d. CS and CSS information.
e. Reports.
f. Specialist information on functional areas such as artillery, engineers, aviation, and others.
2. Commander’s requirements for the exchange of information and the relative priority of the
means of exchange are portrayed in figure I-1-1 in Appendix 1 and in both figures in Appendix 2.
Types of information to exchange are further illustrated in this appendix. STANAG 5048 governs
information flows.
I302 Operation Orders, Directives, and Plans (Including Overlays)
The commander’s decision-making process is not complete until the ‘decision’ has been
translated into orders and disseminated (both horizontally and vertically). Intent may well have to
be explained, implying personal contact or face-to-face communications such as video
teleconferencing or white boarding. Operational overlays provide a timely and effective means of
transmitting information graphically and circumventing many of the problems associated with
language. From the joint perspective, air tasking orders from the air component commander and
airspace control orders from the airspace control authority need to be disseminated to the
appropriate level.
I303 Situational Awareness
The principal components of SA are information on friendly and enemy forces’ disposition and
status. This information is distributed both horizontally and vertically. Friendly forces information
includes visibility of the recognised air picture and the operational ‘picture’ of other relevant
components. The generation of this information is significantly facilitated by automated CIS.
I304 Friendly Forces (Vertical)
Information on the status of friendly forces will flow upwards (vertically) from lower echelons of
command to higher and downwards from superior HQs to subordinate HQs and units as follows:
a. Flow of Information Upwards. In principle, a HQ will wish to see locations of its own forces
two levels of subordination (as distinct from organization) down. This includes the status of
the combat functions within its own forces. However, there will often be requirements for more
information such as a divisional HQ wanting access to the location of ISTAR or individual
AOAD assets. For example, more data may be required on certain high-value assets or on
resolutions for particular problems. Hence, there will be a requirement to
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
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ANNEX I TO
ATP-3.2.2
alter the filters that determine the granularity of data made available to a particular HQ or staff
cell.
b. Flow of Information Downwards. In addition, it is important for a commander to
understand, in outline only, the picture of an operational environment two echelons up.
Therefore, a battalion HQ requires an outline of the divisional deployment. This understanding
is required to keep his mission, and the way he conducts it, within the context of that of his
immediate and higher commanders.
I305 Friendly Forces
Commanders need an understanding of the situation (horizontally) across the boundary of their
own command. The level of detail required on a flanking formation or unit is greater than just the
understanding of the outline deployment. To effectively coordinate and synchronise efforts,
commanders must understand what is happening in detail as it could significantly influence their
own efforts. The types of information are current and future location, communications interfaces,
liaison details, combat effectiveness, SA, current and future intent, and obstacles.
I306 Enemy Forces
The accuracy of the enemy force’s picture (and status) is determined by the precision and
timeliness of the relevant intelligence. It is also determined by the ability to fuse and process the
information vertically and horizontally. This can best be supported by automated CIS. The
intelligence staff provides the commander with the best possible picture of the enemy location,
strengths, weaknesses, and likely intentions. The intelligence staff resolves anomalies in the
information received and advises the commander accordingly. The staff then disseminates
intelligence throughout the chain of command in the form of overlays (implying a need for
automated CIS), status information, and textual assessments.
I307 Neutral Forces, Civilian Activity, and Environment
1. It will be necessary for NATO forces to maintain a common view of the activities of neutral
forces, civilians (refugees), and civilian organizations, together with detailed knowledge of the
physical environment (both vertically and horizontally). NGOs regularly use the Internet to pass
situation reports around the world. Deployed forces must be able to use all such sources of
information, as they are frequently more recent than military sources and, in any case,
complement military sources. The physical environment will include weather, terrain, trafficability,
availability of routes, bridges, locations of hazards, and traffic jams.
2. The exchange of unclassified information may be the only way to reach a common operational
picture as civilian or non-NATO partners can only use the Internet to share information.
I308 Control Measures Information
Control measures information includes details on boundaries, contact and coordination points,
liaison procedures, key timings, and other data requiring coordination.
I309 Combat Support
CS information might include planned artillery fire plans near a boundary. It may also include
major obstacles (actual and proposed) such as minefields and route demolitions together with
army aviation or close air support missions which do or may impact on a flanking formation or
unit’s activities. This information is shared both vertically and horizontally.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
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ANNEX I TO
ATP-3.2.2
I310 Combat Service Support
Logistics remain a largely national responsibility, but staffs will need to share this information with
the chain of command. Commanders require regular assessments from subordinate commanders
about the impact of any logistic constraints on their ability to conduct missions. In particular, levels
of key stocks and casualty tracking will need to be shared vertically. While lateral logistic
information flows will be normal within a single national formation, the requirement to obtain
authority from a superior HQ for release of logistic assets between one nation and another may
preclude a need for interoperability of logistics systems.
I311 Reports
Reports are a subset of standard information requirements needed to support operations. Reports
are shared both vertically and horizontally. It is essential that reports for use below brigade level
have a similar structure to those used at a higher echelon. The amount of detail required differs
with the echelon of command, but staffs need to be able to extract information from reports at one
echelon, process it, and use it as the source of information in reports at a higher echelon (for
example, for aggregation of reports or dissemination of orders).
I312 Specialist Information⁻Corps, Division, and Brigade
Formation assets—such as reconnaissance, fire support, engineers, aviation, CBRN, air defence,
EW, medical, and some logistic units—need to communicate with one another, their parent
formations, national support elements, and adjacent or flanking units or formations. Specialist
assets, such as CS and CSS units, need to undertake similar information transfers. Some
information, for example, AOAD and CBRN, must be passed in near real time. While the nature
of the information transfer requirements differ markedly, they will have implications for C2. The
following examples are specialist information requirements that require transfer:
a. ISTAR.
b. Fire support.
c. Engineers.
d. AOAD.
e. Army aviation.
f. EW.
g. Logistics.
h. Medical.
i. Military Police.
j. CBRN units.
k. CIS.
I313 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
ISTAR is key to the commander’s ability to achieve information superiority within the AOO. The
requirement ensures that all relevant information reaches those formations, units, and platforms
that will need to act on it and that staffs feed this information into the analysis process in a timely
fashion to support the commander’s decision making. Such information needs to be shared
widely.
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ANNEX I TO
ATP-3.2.2
I314 Fire Support
Coordination of effective fire support between nations requires the passage of orders down to fire
units or ISTAR assets and processing of target information at the receiving HQ. It certainly entails
calls for fire and correction of fire across national boundaries. It is essential that target and fire
control data be passed with the minimum of delay.
I315 Engineers
Engineer information, for example on obstacles, current or planned, will need to be shared across
the boundaries of manoeuvre formations or units. Within a multinational operation, engineers may
well have to co-operate along or across common boundaries.
I316 Army Organic Air Defence
For AOAD, the passage of information between HQs of all levels and down to individual weapon
platforms is necessary to prevent fratricide and deny the use of the air to the enemy. The primary
task is to exchange timely information on the air situation to allow its direct use for warning, cueing,
and target allocation. Exchanging information about the air situation between adjacent army
organic short-range air defence systems can improve the effectiveness on army short-range air
defence. Large quantities of near real-time information is required to synchronise joint air defence,
component air defence, air, airborne and airmobile operations, and suppression of enemy air
defence.
I317 Army Aviation
Army aviation is not constrained in the same way as ground manoeuvre elements of a force. Its
inherent flexibility—and the speed at which it can be switched around the AOO—require it to be
able to exchange information with other components, HQs, and other elements. The current
airspace control information must be available to individual aircraft. Exchange of mission-related
information is required among army aviation units, AOAD, artillery, supporting air and ground
manoeuvre formations, and reconnaissance, particularly in deep operations, to ensure
coordination. The current and applicable information for an airspace control order must be made
available to individual flights.
I318 Electronic Warfare
EW assets are of such importance in finding, fixing, and striking the enemy as well as protecting
friendly systems that staffs need to share EW data with the chain of command and transferred
across boundaries. EW will almost invariably have joint implications.
I319 CBRN Units
CBRN defence units will be formation troops and will need to share information with each other
and with all levels of command in near real time.
I320 Communication and Information Systems
The status of CIS is of utmost importance when executing and supporting C2. Hazardous
conditions and CIS limitations seriously affect C2. The HQ’s CIS advisor must be fully aware of
the capabilities of the CIS at his disposal and how well these match the HQ’s information
exchange requirements. Where capability does not meet the requirement, the J6 must advise the
commander accordingly, preparing options that impact least on the commander’s plan.
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ANNEX I TO
ATP-3.2.2
I321 Military Police

Military police forces contribute with their military police activities in their CS role to land
operations. These four activities are mobility support, security, detention, and police functions.
Military police forces gather information concerning a local security situation within the local
security or police sector (HN, military, or police forces) that could be vital to be known by all
deployed forces. Staffs need to share pertinent military police information on time.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ANNEX C TO
ATP-3.2.2
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
LEXICON
Part I – Acronyms and Abbreviations
This lexicon contains abbreviations relevant to ATP-3.3.2.1(C) and is not meant to be
exhaustive. The definitive and more comprehensive list of abbreviations is in AAP-15, NATO
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NATO DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS.
AAR after action review

AJP allied joint publication
AOAD army organic air defence
AOO area of operations
APP allied procedural publication
ATO air tasking order
ATP allied tactical publication
C2 command and control
C2IS command and control information system
CA civil affairs
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CI counterintelligence
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CIS communication and information systems
COA course of action
COS chief of staff
CP command post
CRO crisis response operations
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
DST decision support template
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
EW electronic warfare
FFIR friendly force information requirement
FRAGO fragmentary order
G1 assistant chief of staff, personnel and administration
G2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
G5 assistant chief of staff, plans and policy
G6 assistant chief of staff, communication and information
systems
G7 assistant chief of staff, doctrine and training
LEX-1 Edition B Version 1
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NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
G8 assistant chief of staff, budget, finance, and contracting

G9 assistant chief of staff, civil-military cooperation
HN host-nation
HQ headquarters
IM information management
Info Ops information operations
INTSUM intelligence summary
IR information requirement
ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and
reconnaissance
JFC joint force commander
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
JTC joint targeting cycle
LO liaison officer
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather,troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
NAC North Atlantic Council
NA5CRO non-Article 5 crisis response operation (NATO)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO non-commissioned officer
NGO non-governmental organization
NA not applicable
NC no change
NIL no information to enter
OLPP operational-level planning process
o/o on order
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information,
infrastructure, physical environment, and time
RECCE reconnaissance
ROE rules of engagement
S1 battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
S4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer

S5 battalion or brigade plans staff officer
S6 battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S7 battalion or brigade doctrine and training officer
S8 battalion or brigade budget, finance, and contracting officer
S9 battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SA situational awareness
SOI standing operating instructions
SOP standard operating procedure
STANAG standardization agreement (NATO)
TOA transfer of authority
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
WNGO warning order
XO executive officer
Part II – Terms and Definitions

adjustment decision
The selection of a course of action that modifies the order to respond to
unanticipated opportunities or threats. (This term and definition are only
applicable in this publication.)
administrative control
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in
respect to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply,
services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the
subordinate or other organizations. (AAP-6)
area of operations
An area defined by the joint force commander within a joint operations area for
the conduct of specific military activities. (AAP-6)
assessment
The process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations,
individuals, materiel or systems. Note: In the context of military forces, the
hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis,
evaluation, validation and certification. (AAP-6)
authority
The delegated power to issue orders or enforce compliance. (This is a new term
and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)
collection
The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the
information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production
of intelligence. (AAP-39)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
combat functions
Categories of related physical actions that tactical commanders integrate and
apply as overwhelming combat power to fix and strike the enemy to execute
operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical-and
operational-level commanders. NATO defines seven combat functions:
manoeuvre, fire support, intelligence, protection (mobility, counter-mobility and
survivability), air defence, combat service support and command and control.
(This is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed
status.)
combat information
That frequently perishable data gathered in combat by, or reported directly to,
units which may be immediately used in battle or in assessing the situation.
Relevant data will simultaneously enter intelligence reporting channels. (AAP-6)
command1
The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction,
coordination, and control of military forces. (AAP-6)
command and control
The authority, responsibilities, and activities of military commanders in the
direction and coordination of military forces and in the implementation of orders
related to the execution of operations. (This is a new term and definition and will
be processed for NATO Agreed status.)
command and control system
An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary,
personnel, that enables commanders and their staffs to exercise command and
control. (AAP-6)
commander’s critical information requirement
Information requirement identified by the commander as being critical in
facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process
that affect successful mission accomplishment. (AAP-39)
commander’s intent
A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the
force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and to the
desired end state. (This term and definition are only applicable in this
publication.)
commander’s visualization
The mental process of developing a clear understanding of the current state in
relation to the enemy, environment, and the sequence of activities which move
the force to the desired end state representing mission accomplishment. (This
term and definition are only applicable in this publication.)
command post
In operations or exercises, a location from which command is exercised. (AAP-
6)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
command support
The people, leadership, organizational structure, equipment, and doctrine
components combined as an integrated system at all levels of command to
manage resources, provide situational awareness and knowledge for
commanders and staffs to plan the conduct of operations.
common operational picture
An operational picture tailored to the user’s requirements, based on common
data and information shared by more than one command. (AAP-39, not NATO
agreed)
communication and information systems
Collective term for communication systems and information systems. (AAP-6)
control1
The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of
subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his
command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or
directives. (AAP-6)
coordination
Actions taken to maintain synchronization and prevent confusion and problems.
(This term and definition are only applicable in this publication.)
data
Raw signals detected by a sensor or collector of any kind (human, mechanical,
or electronic) from the environment or communicated between any kind of
nodes in a system. (This term and definition are only applicable in this
publication.)
decision making
Selection of a course of action as the one most favourable to accomplish the
mission. (This is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO
Agreed status.)
describing
Relating operations to time and space in terms of accomplishing the purpose of
the overall operation. (This term and definition are only applicable in this
publication.)
directing
Communicating execution information. (This term and definition are only
applicable in this publication.)
direct support1
The support provided by a unit not attached or under command of the supported
unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit
or formation. (AAP-6)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
display
Representing relevant information in a usable, easily understood audio or visual
form tailored to the needs of the user that conveys the common operational
picture for decision making and exercising command and control functions.
dissemination
The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any
suitable means to those who need it. (AAP-39, Not NATO agreed)
essential elements of friendly information
Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems
about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain
answers critical to their operational effectiveness. (AAP-39, Not NATO agreed)
evaluation2
In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle
constituting appraisal of an item of information in respect of the reliability of the
source, and the credibility of the information. (AAP-6)
execute
To put a plan into action by applying combat power, assess progress through
situational awareness, and make execution and ajustment decisions to
accomplish the mission. (This is a new term and definition and will be processed
for NATO Agreed status.)
execution decision
The selection of what needs to be done next if the progress of the operation is
meeting expectations. (This term and definition are only applicable in this
publication.)
execution information
Information that communicates a decision and directs, initiates, or governs
action, conduct, or procedure. (This term and definition are only applicable in
this publication.)
fragmentary order
An abbreviated form of an operation order, issued as required, that eliminates
the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may
be issued in sections. (AAP-6)
full command
The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to
subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration
and exists only within national services. Note: the term “command” as used
internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a
purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over
the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will
delegate only operational command or operational control. (AAP-6)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
general support
Support given to the supported force as a whole rather than to any particular
subdivision of it. (AAP-6).
information
Unprocessed data of every description that may be used in the production of
intelligence. (AAP 6)
information management
The means through which an organisation maximizes the efficiency with which
it plans, collects, organizes, controls, disseminates, uses and disposes of its
information, and through which it ensures that the actual value and the potential
value of that information is identified and exploited to the fullest extent. (AAP-
39, Not NATO agreed)
information requirement
In intelligence usage, information regarding an adversary or potentially hostile
actors and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to
be collected and processed to meet the intelligence requirements of a
commander. (AAP-6)
intuitive decision making
Reaching a conclusion through pattern recognition based on knowledge,
judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and
character.
leadership
The ability to influence people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation
while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. (This
is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)
liaison
That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military
forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (AAP-6)
measure of effectiveness
A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability, or
operational environment tied to measuring the attainment of an end state,
achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (AAP-39, Not NATO
agreed)
measure of performance
A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task
accomplishment. (AAP-39, Not NATO agreed)
mission-type order
An order issued to a subordinate unit that indicates the mission to be
accomplished without specifying how it is to be done. (AAP-6)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
mission variables
The grouping of major subject categories into relevant information for military
operations: mission, enemy forces, terrain and weather, friendly forces (troops
and support available), time available, and civil considerations (including
manmade effects on the natural environment) (also called METT-TC). (This is
a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)
monitoring
1. The act of listening, carrying out surveillance on, and/or recording the
emissions of one’s own or Allied forces for the purpose of maintaining and
improving procedural standards and security, or for reference, as applicable.
2. The act of listening, carrying out surveillance on, and/or recording of enemy
emissions for intelligence purposes. (AAP 6)
operational command
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to
subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or
delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems
necessary. Note: It does not include responsibility for administration. (AAP-6)
operational control
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the
commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited
by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign
tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate
employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself,
include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6)
operation order
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders
for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)
operation plan
A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out
simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions
and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate
commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation “plan” is
usually used instead of “order” in preparing for operations well in advance. An
operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then
becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)
operations security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security,
using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the
dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
planning
The process by which the commander and staff translate the commander’s
visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution. (This
term and definition are only applicable in this publication.)
positive control
1. In air traffic control within NATO, a method of regulation of all identified air
traffic within a designated airspace, conducted with electronic means by an air
traffic control agency having the authority and responsibility therein. (AAP-6)
2. In command and control, a technique of regulating forces that involves
commanders and leaders actively assessing, deciding, and directing them.
(This is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed
status.)
preparation
Unit activities performed prior to execution to improve its ability to conduct the
operation. (This term and definition are only applicable in this publication.)
priority intelligence requirement
Intelligence requirement for which a commander has an anticipated and stated
priority in his task of planning and decision making. (AAP-39, not NATO agreed)
procedural control
1. A method of airspace control that relies on a combination of previously agreed
and promulgated orders and procedures. (AAP-6)
2. A technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of orders,
regulations, policies, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures. (This is
a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)
rational decision making
The process of generating several alternative solutions, compares these
solutions to a set of criteria, and selects the best course of action. It aims to
produce the optimal solution by comparing options. (This is a new term and
definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status.)
relevant information
Important information to the commander and staff in the exercise of command
and control. (This term and definition are only applicable in this publication.)
rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the
circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue
combat engagement with other forces encountered. (AAP-6)
running estimate
A staff estimate continuously updated based on new information as the
operation proceeds. (This term and definition are only applicable in this
publication.)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
security
1. The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel,
activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage,
subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure. 2.
The measures necessary to ensure designated information, materiel,
personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage,
sabotage, subversion, terrorism and damage, as well as against loss or
unauthorized disclosure. (AAP-6)
situational awareness
The knowledge of the elements in the battlespace necessary to make well-
informed decisions. (AAP-6)
standard operating procedure (admitted)
A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend
themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.
The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. (AAP-6)
store
An information activity: retaining relevant information in any form, usually for
orderly, timely retrieval and documentation until it required for exercising
command and control. (This term and definition are only applicable in this
publication.)
subordinate’s initiative
The assumption of responsibility to decide and initiate independent actions
within the commander’s intent and when the commander’s concept of
operations no longer applies, the operation order no longer applies, or when an
unanticipated opportunity leading to accomplishing the mission presents itself.
supported commander
A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by
a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from
one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6)
supporting commander
A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other
support and/or who develops a supporting plan. (AAP-6)
tactical command
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his
command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
(AAP-6)
tactical control
The detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or
manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (AAP-6)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2
targeting
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate
response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities.
(AAP-6)
terrorism
The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or
property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to
achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. (AAP-6)
unity of effort
In military operations, coordination and cooperation among all actors in order to
achieve a common objective. (AAP-6)
variance
Difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan
forecast the situation to be at that time.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-3.2.2(B)(1)
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ALLIED

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

1. The enclosed Allied Tactical Publication ATP-3.2.2, Edition B, Version 1,

2. ATP-3.2.2, Edition B, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes

3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

III Edition B Version 1

RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]

CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTALS .......................................................................... 1-1

VII Edition B Version 1

SECTION III – PERSONNEL .................................................................................. 3-21

VIII Edition B Version 1

0413 General .............................................................................................. 4-16

Appendix 11 to ANNEX G Format for Operations Security Annex to the OPORD

Figure 1-1. The Operations Process ........................................................................ 1-4

Figure G-2. Designation with Hours ........................................................................ G-4

Table 2-1. Elements of Command ............................................................................ 2-2

XII Edition B Version 1

XIII Edition B Version 1

XIV Edition B Version 1

1-1 Edition B Version 1

He directs coordinated actions by subordinate forces to tasks that collectively represent

0103 Relation Between Command and Control

1-2 Edition B Version 1

1-3 Edition B Version 1

Figure 1-1. The Operations Process

1-4 Edition B Version 1

0107 Human Factors

1-5 Edition B Version 1

1-6 Edition B Version 1

SECTION III – CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

0113 Mission Command

1-7 Edition B Version 1

0114 Exercising Mission Command

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0115 Command and Information Systems

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SECTION I – NATURE OF COMMAND

0204 Elements of Command

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Table 2-1. Elements of Command

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(c) Delegation. To accomplish the mission or assist in fulfilling his responsibilities,

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(a) Sources. Commanders decide using judgment acquired from experience,

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There is a distinct hierarchy of considerations in balancing effectiveness versus

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 In visualizing short-term versus long-term benefits, commanders

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commander directs to implement his decision by disseminating execution

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drills). Troops and commanders use these to accomplish assigned missions

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0205 Principles of Command