NATO Allied Joint Doctrine Guide

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
ALLIED JOINT
DOCTRINE
AJP-01(B)
0410LP1021419
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AJP-01(B)
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE
DECEMBER 2002
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May 2003
PUBLICATION NOTICE ROUTING
1. AJP-01(B), ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE, is available in the Navy Warfare Library. It is

effective upon receipt.
2. Summary: This publication provides ‘capstone’ doctrine for the planning, execution and
support of Allied joint operations. AJP-01(B) is intended primarily for use by NATO
forces, the doctrine is equally applicable to operations conducted by a coalition of NATO
and non-NATO nations within the framework of a NATO-led Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) or for European-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.
Navy Warfare Library Custodian
Navy Warfare Library publications must be made

readily available to all users and other interested
personnel within the U.S. Navy.
Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian
This notice should be duplicated for routing to cognizant personnel to keep them informed of changes to this publication.
It is not accountable.
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RECORD OF CHANGES
Change Date Effective By Whom

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PREFACE
0001. The successful planning, execution and support of military operations requires a clearly
understood and widely accepted doctrine, and this is especially important when operations
are to be conducted by Allied, multinational or coalition forces. The primary objective of
Allied Joint Publication-01(B) (AJP-01(B)) is to provide ‘capstone’ doctrine for the
planning, execution and support of Allied joint operations. Although AJP-01(B) is intended
primarily for use by NATO forces, the doctrine is equally applicable to operations conducted
by a coalition of NATO and non-NATO nations within the framework of a NATO-led
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) or for European-led operations using NATO assets and
capabilities.
0002. The publication is intended for use primarily by commanders and staffs at the operational
level, but could be used at any level as a reference. As the Hierarchy of Allied Joint
Publications is relatively new, and there is at present a partial lack of subordinate ‘keystone’
documents covering the functional warfare and support areas (AJPs 1-9), the present
publication contains more detail than is ideal. However, when subordinate publications are
ratified this detail will be transferred, resulting in a more succinct edition more suited to a
true ‘capstone’ publication. This process has already started following the publication of
AJP-4 which resulted in a shortened logistics chapter in AJP-01(A) and some detail has been
deleted from this edition in anticipation of AJP-3 ‘Joint Operations’ being ratified and AJP-
3.3 ‘Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine’ being promulgated.
0003. It is not the intention that AJP-01 should restrict the authority of a joint commander. He
will, subject to the constraints imposed by the directives issued by higher authority, be
expected to organise the forces assigned to him and to plan and execute operations in a
manner he deems appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his mission.
0004. As NATO continues to adapt its structure and policy to meet the security challenges of the
evolving geopolitical environment, it is necessary for AJP-01 to strike a balance between
incorporating agreed and/or developing NATO policy and doctrine if the publication is to
remain useful.
0005. The AJODWG, conscious that 3 new editions of AJP-01 have been published since 1996 and
that doctrine, if its to be effective needs to be enduring, remains determined to restrict future
amendment to AJP-01 to the bare minimum. However, this new edition was necessary in the
light of some fundamental changes in policy, and because, for the first time, NATO HQ
requires the ratification of AJP-01(B) by all the Allies before it is forwarded to the MC for
consideration and promulgation.1
1
MCM-077-00 MC Guidance on the Relationship between NATO Policy and Military Doctrine refers.
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0006. This edition differs from AJP-01(B) Ratification Draft 1 as follows:
a. Following the promulgation of MC 389/1 ‘MC Policy on NATO’s Combined Joint

Task Force Capability’, Chapters 1,3 & 4 have been updated.
b. Chapter 1 has been amended to reflect the revisions promulgated under MC 317/1
‘The NATO Force Structure’. However, it was a decision of the AJODWG (01) that,
in the interests of early ratification, the balance of the publication would not be
changed and therefore, some inconsistencies with MC 317/1 may remain in later
chapters.
c. Unless specifically mentioned to the contrary, this edition continues to outline Allied
joint doctrine that is generic in nature and hence the generic term Joint Force
Commander (JFC) continues to be used. By the same token, the term Air
Component Commander (ACC) has been used in Chapter 7 to refer either to the
static Air Component Commander or the Joint Force Air Component Commander
(JFACC).
d. Chapter 3 and the annexes have been revised to follow more closely MC 133/3
‘NATO’s Operational Planning System’. Also the section on Rules of Engagement
has been improved to reflect the recently promulgated MC 362 ‘NATO Rules of
Engagement’.
e. The amphibious section in Chapter 5 has undergone another revision.
f. MC 411 concerning Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) has undergone revision

and AJP-9 ‘CIMIC Doctrine’ is at an advanced stage of development. However,
adhering to the principle that AJP-01 can include doctrine in development, a new
Chapter 20 is included which follows the policy on CIMIC outlined in the recently
promulgated MC 411/1.
g. Chapter 22 has been revised to reflect the policy issues outlined in MC 327/2 ‘NATO
Military Policy for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations’ and has been
harmonised with AJP-3.4.1 ‘Peace Support Operations’.
0007. If it is to be useful, AJP-01(B) has to be a living document and be amended accordingly.

Routinely therefore, the AJODWG will review and amend the contents on a two-yearly
cycle. However, where changes in NATO policy impose a significant impact on
promulgated doctrine, it may be necessary to incorporate urgent amendment ahead of the
cycle.
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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE AJP-01(B)
CONTENTS
Page
Chapter 1 - Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept
The Security Environment 1-1
Roles of Alliance Forces 1-2
Command and Control of Alliance Forces 1-3
Forces of the Alliance 1-5
Combined Joint Task Force Concept 1-7
Chapter 2 - Principles of Allied Joint Operations

The Levels of Operations 2-1
General Principles 2-3
Characteristics of Operations at the Operational Level 2-5
The Concept of ‘Operational Art’ 2-7
Aspects of Multi-nationality 2-9
Chapter 3 - Employment of Allied Joint Forces

Stages of a Joint Operation 3-1
NATO Operational Planning 3-1
Key Operational Planning Concepts 3-2
Execution of Allied Joint Operations 3-5
Targeting and Combat Assessment 3-8
Rules of Engagement 3-9
Combined Joint Task Force Operations 3-10
Annexes The Estimate Process
The Commander’s Intent
Operation Planning Stages
Operation Plan Development
Chapter 4 - Command and Control in Allied Joint Operations

Command and Control Terminology 4-1
Principles of Joint and Multinational Command 4-1
Command and Control Responsibilities 4-3
Directives and Orders 4-6
Methods of Control of Forces 4-7
Joint Force Headquarters Organisation 4-10
Annex Principal Staff Functions in an Allied Joint Force HQ
Appendix Notional Joint Force Headquarters Organisation
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Chapter 5 - Maritime Operations
The Concept of Maritime Power 5-1

Characteristics of Maritime Forces 5-2
Roles of Maritime Forces and Types of Operations 5-3
Maritime Force Structure/Force Composition 5-6
Command and Control of Maritime Forces 5-8
Operations in a Maritime Mine Environment 5-10
Amphibious Operations 5-12
Chapter 6 - Land Operations

The Concept of Land Operations 6-1
Characteristics and Capabilities of Land Forces 6-1
Roles and Types of Land Operations 6-2
Command and Control of Land Forces 6-3
Planning and Execution of Land Operations 6-4
Harmonisation/Synchronisation of Land Operations 6-6
Chapter 7 - Air Operations

Characteristics and Capabilities of Air Power 7-1
Types of Air Operations 7-2
Command and Control of Air Operations 7-5
Planning and Executing Air Operations 7-7
Chapter 8 - Special Operations

Definition and Range of Tasks 8-1
Special Operations Tasks 8-2
Principles of Employment of Special Operations Forces 8-5
Planning Considerations in Special Operations 8-7
Chapter 9 - Logistics
Logistic Principles and Policies 9-1
NATO's Logistic Support 9-1
Logistic Command and Control 9-2
Logistic Responsibility and Authority 9-3
Movement and Transportation 9-4
Medical/Health Service Support 9-4
Chapter 10 - Airspace Control

The Airspace Control Concept 10-1
Airspace Control and Command Relationships 10-1
Airspace Control System 10-2
Key Airspace Control Considerations 10-2
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Chapter 11 - Joint Air Defence

Principles of Joint Air Defence 11-1
Active and Passive Air Defence 11-3
Air Defence Capabilities/Components 11-3
Composition of a Joint Force Air Defence System 11-5
Chapter 12 - Intelligence
Principles of Intelligence 12-1
The Requirement for Intelligence 12-2
Intelligence Cycle 12-2
Intelligence Output 12-4
Other Intelligence Resources 12-6
The Intelligence Staff 12-6
Counter Intelligence 12-7
Chapter 13 - Communications and Information Systems

Communications and Information System Principles 13-1
Additional CIS Considerations 13-4
Joint Force CIS Responsibilities 13-4
Joint CIS Management 13-5
Chapter 14 - Information Operations

Definitions 14-1
The Fundamentals of Information Operations 14-2
Non-Military Capabilities Supporting Information Operations 14-3
Military Capabilities Supporting Information Operations 14-4
Command and Control Warfare 14-6
Chapter 15 - Deception
Principles of Deception 15-1
Levels of Deception 15-3
Types of Deception 15-3
The Deception Target 15-4
Deception Methodology 15-4
Counter Measures 15-5
Chapter 16 - Psychological Operations

The Purpose of Psychological Operations 16-1
Categorisation of Psychological Operations Activities 16-2
Factors Affecting Psychological Operations 16-4
Planning and Implementation 16-5
The Relationship between Intelligence, PSYOPS, C2W and PI 16-6
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Chapter 17 - Electronic Warfare

Electronic Support Measures 17-2
Electronic Counter Measures 17-3
Electronic Protective Measures 17-5
Electronic Warfare Capabilities 17-6
Role of the Electronic Warfare Co-ordination Cell 17-7
Chapter 18 - Operations Security

Principles of Operations Security 18-1
Operations Security Measures 18-3
The Operations Security Process 18-5
Chapter 19 - Operations in an NBC Environment

New Risks 19-1
NBC Defence Planning Factors 19-1
Operational Considerations 19-3
Combat Service Support Factors 19-4
Chapter 20 - Civil-Military Co-operation

Introduction 20-1
Definition and Application 20-2
Principles 20-2
Tasks 20-5
Staff Relationships and Organisation 20-8
Chapter 21 - Public Information

Definition 21-1
Public Information Principles and Public Release Policies 21-1
The Operational Environment and Public Information Assumptions 21-3
The Joint Force Commander's Public Information Role 21-4
Public Information Planning and Operations 21-5
Public Information Staff Organisation 21-5
Other Public Information Planning and Operational Considerations 21-7
Chapter 22 - Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

An Overview of Crisis Response Operations 22-1
Operational Considerations 22-5
Peace Support Operations 22-9
Other Operations and Tasks 22-12
Glossary of Terms Glossary-1

Glossary of Abbreviations Abbreviations-1
Reference Publications Reference-1
List of Effective Pages LEP-1
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CHAPTER 1 - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALLIANCE'S

STRATEGIC CONCEPT
Section I - The Security Environment

0101. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-
scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such
a threat emerging over the longer term remains. However, the security of the Alliance
remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks that are multi-directional
and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around
the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance,
which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face
serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial
disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the
dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions
could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed
conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into
neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect
the security of other states.
0102. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant
factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area are to be maintained. The proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
(NBC) weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of
welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges
with respect to proliferation remain. The global spread of technology that can be of use in
the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military
capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air,
land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition,
state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance's growing reliance on
information and information systems through Information Operations (INFO OPS). They
may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO's superiority in traditional
weaponry.
0103. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered
by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take
account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a
wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the
disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of
people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security
and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation
among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-
ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.
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Section II - Roles of Alliance Forces

0104. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the
territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance's
forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the
territorial integrity of Allied nations and - in case of conflict - to terminate war rapidly by
making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO military
capabilities in peacetime are determined by the need to deter and, if necessary, defend
against large-scale aggression in a limited geographical area while retaining the capability to
cope at the same time with smaller scale operations including non-Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations (CRO).
0105. The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance.
An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with
potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic
stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces
may be called upon to conduct non-Article 5 CRO. They may also be called upon to
contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in
support of other international organisations, complementing and reinforcing political actions
within a broad approach to security.
0106. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces
will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands,
including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 CRO may be as demanding as
some collective defence missions. Well-trained and well equipped forces at adequate levels
of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the
appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are
essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared
to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the
political control and strategic direction either of the Western European Union (WEU)1 or as
otherwise agreed. The potential involvement of Partners and other non-NATO nations in
NATO-led operations would add valuable elements of NATO's contribution to managing
crises that affect Euro-Atlantic security.
0107. The collation and provision of intelligence can also act as a deterrent against aggression.
The sooner that nations and organisations are aware of an impending crisis, the sooner they
can take appropriate political or military action to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. If all
parties in a potential conflict situation are aware of effective and impartial surveillance
activities, and, if the information from such activities is widely shared, potential aggressors
may be less likely to break the peace knowing that they are not able to surprise their foes.
Military activities at sea, on land and in the air can be monitored by assets available to the
Alliance.
1
And on its demise the European Union.
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Section III - Command and Control of Alliance Forces

0108. The new NATO Military Command Structure2 that came into force on 1 September 1999 has
three levels of command. These are known as the strategic, regional and sub-regional levels
of command. The third level of command exists only in Allied Command Europe.
0109. In detail, the NATO Military Command Structure is composed of:
a. Strategic Commands. There are two Strategic Commands (SCs):
(1) Allied Command Atlantic. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)

commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) whose
headquarters is known as HQ SACLANT.
(2) Allied Command Europe. Allied Command Europe (ACE) commanded by

the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) whose headquarters is
known as SHAPE.3
b. Regional Commands.
(1) Within the larger ACLANT area there are three Regional Commands (RCs)
for the maintenance of regional identities and geographic expertise: West,
East and South Atlantic Areas (WESTLANT, EASTLANT and
SOUTHLANT). There are also two Combatant Commands directly
subordinate to SACLANT: Striking Fleet Atlantic and Submarine Allied
Command Atlantic (STRIKFLTLANT and SUBACLANT). These
commands provide co-ordination and/or Command and Control (C2)
functions in relevant operational warfare areas.
(2) Within ACE, the operational focus is provided by two RCs based on the
natural division of Europe north and south of the Alps: Allied Forces North
Europe and Allied Forces South Europe (AFNORTH and AFSOUTH).
c. Sub-Regional Commands. Within ACE there is a mix of geographically dispersed

Joint Sub-Regional Commands (NORTH, NORTHEAST, CENTRE, SOUTH,
SOUTHCENTRE, SOUTHEAST and SOUTHWEST)4 and functionally organised
air and maritime component commands (AIRNORTH, NAVNORTH, AIRSOUTH
and NAVSOUTH)5 - the latter having region-wide responsibilities. The Joint Sub-
Regional Commands (JSRCs) provide a dispersed joint planning and C2 capability
able to undertake or contribute to all Alliance missions as directed by the RCs. The
2
As outlined in MC 324 and amplified by Bi-SC Directive 80-80.
3
This historic acronym standing for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe continues to be used despite recent
changes to the NATO military command structure.
4
The acronyms stand for Joint Command North, Joint Command Northeast etc.
5
The acronyms stand for Allied Air Forces North, Allied Naval Forces North etc.
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JSRCs also provide expertise on matters such as geography, climate, operational

environment, national force structures and national C2 capabilities and are prepared
to assume, with augmentation, command of a joint operation. Furthermore, the
JSRCs are prepared, with augmentation, to discharge the planning and conduct of
operations the functions and responsibilities of a Land Component Commander as an
integral part of their joint function.
d. Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters. Employed as an integral part of

NATO’s military command structure, Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters
(CJTF HQ) provide a functional capability to extend the Alliance’s command and
control mechanism for operations of multi-national (combined) and joint task forces
in and beyond Alliance territory.6
0110. Operational Areas.7
a. Areas of Responsibility. The two SCs have permanently designated Areas of

Responsibility (AORs) defined as:
‘The geographical area assigned to each NATO strategic command and to

each regional command of Strategic Command Europe’.
Within the ACLANT AOR there are no permanent boundaries below the strategic
level of command. Within the ACE AOR the two RCs have permanent AORs to
facilitate the conduct of region-wide, daily, routine operations. In the event of crisis
or war, the RCs may be allocated Joint Operations Areas (JOAs) which may extend
beyond their peacetime AORs. There are no permanent boundaries below the
regional level of command.
b. Joint Operations Areas. A SC, or other designated joint commander, will plan and
conduct military operations within a JOA to accomplish a specific mission. A JOA
is defined as:
‘A temporary area defined by a NATO strategic or regional commander, in

which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at
the operational level of war’.
Note: It is defined in co-ordination with nations and approved by the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) or the Military Committee (MC) as appropriate, in
accordance with NATO’s Operational Planning Architecture. A JOA and its
defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographic area,
are contingency- or mission-specific and may overlap AORs.
6
See Section V.
7
Definitions taken from AAP-6.
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c. Area of Operations. Within a JOA, a joint commander may designate Areas Of

Operations (AOOs) in which component commanders would conduct operations8.
An AOO is defined as:
‘That portion of an operational area necessary for military operations and for the
administration of such operations’.9
Section IV - Forces of the Alliance

General
0111. The NATO Force Structure (NFS)10 is composed of Allied, national and multinational
forces, as well as their associated HQs, placed at the Alliance’s disposal on a permanent or
temporary basis under specified readiness criteria. National contributions are made available
to the Alliance under both the agreed mechanisms for the Transfer of Authority (TOA) and
by co-ordination and co-operation agreements, supplemented by common assets for specific
capabilities and scenarios.
0112. Whilst the NATO Command Structure is primarily intended to enable command and control
(C2) of the Alliance’s joint operations, the NFS will provide additional C2 capabilities at the
single Service level.
Types of Forces
0113. The NFS consists of a single set of HQs and forces comprising In-Place Forces (IPF) and a
pool of Deployable Forces (DF). Both elements are held at graduated readiness levels in
order to afford a high degree of flexibility in meeting any requirement to conduct and sustain
operations.
a. In-Place Forces. IPF are predominantly required for collective defence within or
near the territory of the nation providing them. These HQs/forces will be held at
appropriate readiness levels but need not be fully deployable. They provide the initial
response to an emerging threat to Alliance territory. They may also exercise a certain
degree of mobility to contribute to non-Article 5 CRO in their general vicinity. Such
HQs/forces are provided primarily by single nations.
b. Deployable Forces. DF are available for the full range of NATO missions.
Primarily, they comprise multinational HQs/forces, are fully deployable and are held
at appropriate readiness levels. They are organised into a pool of national and
multinational HQs/forces and provide the capability for rapid reaction and
8
The Joint Force Air Component Commander is normally responsible for the co-ordination of all air operations
throughout a JOA.
9
See Glossary.
10
For more information see MC 317/1.
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reinforcement of IPF in the event of an Article 5 operation as well as rapid reaction

and HQ/force rotation for non-Article 5 CRO.
Readiness Levels
0114. In order both to provide flexibility for conducting the full range of missions and to denote
the availability of HQs/forces to NATO commanders, IPF and DF are sub-divided into three
types of forces to reflect their readiness level: High Readiness Forces (HRF), Forces of
Lower Readiness (FLR) and Long-Term Build-Up Forces (LTBF). Together, HRF and
FLR form the Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF).
a. High Readiness Forces. HRF are a limited but significant proportion of land, air
and maritime forces, capable of responding rapidly, and immediately if necessary, to
Article 5 collective defence or non-Article 5 CRO.
b. Forces of Lower Readiness. FLR provide the bulk of the forces required for
collective defence, for further reinforcement of a particular region and for rotation of
forces to sustain non-Article 5 CRO, whether within or beyond Alliance territory.
c. Long-Term Build-Up Forces. LTBF provide the Alliance with a longer-term build-
up and augmentation capability for the worst case scenario of large-scale Article 5
operations, thereby enabling the Alliance to build-up larger forces, both for limited
requirements and in response to any fundamental change in the security environment.
National Assignment of Forces
0115. In peacetime, there are four categories under which forces are available or potentially
available to Allied formations. In summary, NATO Command Forces are HQs/forces in
being which nations have placed under the operational control of a NATO commander;
Assigned Forces are HQs/forces which nations agree to place under the operational control
of a NATO Commander within an agreed readiness time, in accordance with the NATO
Precautionary System (NPS), as specified in special agreements such as MOU or based upon
a NAC decision; Earmarked Forces are HQs/forces which nations intend to place under the
operational command or operational control of a NATO commander at some future time and
finally, Other Forces for NATO are HQs/forces which might be placed under the
operational command or the operational control of a NATO commander in circumstances
which should be specified, or other forces which might co-operate with NATO forces.
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Command Organisations
0116. Within the integrated military structure of NATO there are three basic models11 for the
command and organisation of forces with varying degrees of multi-nationality:
a. Fully Integrated. Fully integrated forces are based on a 'proportional shares'

multinational basis with national components and a fully integrated headquarters.
Commanders of such multinational formations are usually appointed on a rotational
basis.
b. Bi- or Multi-national. Bi- or multi-national formations may be established on the

basis of individual agreements between the participating nations and may encompass
different levels of integration in the respective headquarters.
c. Framework Nation. Forces based on a Framework Nation are commanded by an

officer of that nation, and the nation also provides the communications and logistic
framework. A significant proportion of the staff and the headquarters support will
come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff
procedures, although based on Alliance standards, will also reflect those of the
framework nation. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work
together, procedures may incorporate the ‘best ideas’ of the contributing nations.
Interoperability
0117. The effectiveness of Allied forces in peace, crisis or in conflict, depends on the ability of the
forces provided to operate together effectively and efficiently. Allied joint operations should
be prepared for, planned and conducted in a manner that makes the best use of the relative
strengths and capabilities of the participating countries and the forces they offer for the
operation. A common doctrine supported by standardisation of equipment and procedures,
validated through participation in joint and multinational training exercises, provides the
basis for the formations and units of a joint and multinational force to be able to work
together. At the operational level, emphasis must be placed on the integration of the
contributing nations’ forces and the synergy that can be attained. This will have a significant
effect on the ability of a joint force to achieve the commander’s objectives.
0118. Forces assigned to a CJTF will, to the extent possible, be expected to use standard NATO
agreed doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. To achieve this, some education and
training may be necessary. In addition, one of the early tasks of a Commander CJTF
(COMCJTF) would be to ascertain the degree of interoperability between the equipment and
procedures of Alliance and other forces to make necessary arrangements to integrate fully
the efforts of all participating units.
11
The NATO Multi-national Logistic Centre Concept adds a fourth model - that of the lead nation concept. See
paragraph 0907.
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Section V - Combined Joint Task Force Concept

0119. Should a crisis occur, the NAC might consider the formation of a CJTF composed of forces
drawn from member states. A CJTF is a multinational (combined) and joint task force, task-
organised and formed for the full range of Alliance’s military missions, which COMCJTF
commands from a multinational and joint headquarters. The joint task force may include
elements from non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCN). The purpose of creating
an Alliance CJTF capability is to:
a. Provide the Alliance with flexible and efficient means to generate, at short notice,
rapidly deployable Combined and Joint Task Forces, with dedicated command and
control capability.
b. Facilitate operations in concert with Partners and other non-NATO nations in

situations not related to collective defence.
c. Enable the Alliance, based on the principle of ‘separable but not separate
capabilities’, to support the development of European Security & Defence Identity
(ESDI) within the Alliance by the provision of a CJTF HQ and associated
capabilities or elements thereof for operations under the political control and
strategic direction of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.
0120. Formation of a Combined Joint Task Force. NATO’s Operational Planning System,
including force activation and deployment procedures will be utilised for the activation of a
CJTF HQ and its associated forces. Planning commences when the NAC selects one or
more Military Response Options (MROs), submitted by the MC, and issues an Initiating
Directive. Formal activation of a CJTF HQ would be coincident with NAC/Defence
Planning Council (DPC) approval of the Concept of Operations and the issue of the NAC
Force Activation Directive. The SC would task the appropriate CJTF Parent HQ
Commander12 to initiate preparatory activities for CJTF HQ formation and deployment,
including the preparations for development of a subordinate-level Operation Plan (OPLAN).
In addition, it would be necessary to identify Combined Joint Task Force Component
Commands (CJFCCs) and their associated support elements. Following approval of the
OPLAN by the NAC, CJTF HQ and force deployment would be initiated by a NAC
Execution Directive, and the subsequent release of the Activation Order (ACTORD)
message, by the SC.
0121. National Assignment. Nations agreeing to participate in the CJTF would nominate forces,
on a temporary basis, using mechanisms employed for Alliance missions. For instance, an
Activation Warning Message (ACTWARN) would start the process, and then, following the
Force Generation Conference, the SC would issue an Activation Request (ACTREQ).
Subsequent to the receipt of nations' Force Preparations (FORCEPREP) messages, the SC
12
See Chapter 4 paragraph 0424.
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would issue an Activation of Pre-Deployment (ACTPRED) message to initiate deployment

of national forces to NATO-assigned staging areas.13
0122. Command Structure. The nominated SC will recommend the most appropriate Parent HQ
and Commander CJTF (COMCJTF) through the MC to the NAC for approval along with the
boundaries of the nominated JOA in which the COMCJTF would plan and conduct CJTF
operations. On approval, the CJTF HQ and its supporting component command
headquarters, as required, would be formed, under the strategic direction of the nominated
SC, comprising a nucleus provided by a Parent HQ plus augmentation and support modules
from the NATO command structure or nations. The CJTF structure consists of three layers:
the CJTF HQ, subordinated CJFCCs, and assigned forces for the operation. Other HQs
might assume the role of Supporting Commands.
a. CJTF HQ. A CJTF HQ is a deployable, multi-national, multi-service HQ of

variable size, tailored to the mission and utilised by COMCJTF to exercise command
and control over the entire CJTF. Whilst it is recognised that a CJTF HQ does not
exist until activated, the term CJTF HQ denotes a HQ composed of a nucleus,
sourced from a CJTF Parent HQ, plus necessary augmentation, support elements, and
equipment to achieve and maintain full operational capability.
b. Combined Joint Force Component Commands. A CJFCC comprises a HQ, an

appropriate support capability, and the requisite Communications and Information
System (CIS) capability. CJFCCs are directly subordinated to the CJTF HQ and
used to exercise command and control over assigned forces. A CJFCC could be
single-service or joint and should be capable of deploying when operationally
required. A fully established CJTF usually comprises the following component
commands: a Combined Joint Force Land Component Command (CJFLCC), a
Combined Joint Force Air Component Command (CJFACC), and a Combined Joint
Force Maritime Component Command (CJFMCC). If operationally required other
CJFCCs could be established for special purposes. Depending on the scope of the
mission and the size of the assigned forces, these might constitute component
commands such as: the Combined Joint Force Rear Area Component Command
(CJFRACC),14 the Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command
(CJFSOCC) or the Combined Joint Force Psychological Operations Component
Command (CJFPOCC).
c. Assigned Forces. Subordinated to the CJTFCCs are mission tailored forces

provided by NATO nations and, on a case-by-case basis and subject to NAC
approval, by Partner and other non-NATO nations. The activation of NATO forces
and of forces coming from Partner and other non-NATO nations will follow the
13
For more information see MC 133/3.
14
The COMCJTF may designate a Joint Rear Area (JRA) within his JOA under the control of the JFRACC to facilitate
the co-ordination of JRA operations in support of the entire CJTF.
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agreed procedures.15 When non-NATO nations provide forces in support of Alliance

missions, representatives of those nations should be integrated into the CJTF staff.
These personnel would provide a crucial insight into the capabilities of their forces.
Furthermore, integration of these personnel would promote an atmosphere of trust
and respect.
CJTF HQ
CJTF
Forces*
CJFLCC CJFACC CJFMCC CJFRACC CJFSOCC CJFPOCC
FORCES FORCES FORCES FORCES FORCES FORCES
Figure 1.1 – The Combined Joint Task Force Structure
Note: * CJTF Forces directly subordinate to COMCJTF include JOA communications troops,
provost staff, intelligence units, CJTF HQ support units etc. Under certain circumstances, it could
include the JOA Reserve.
15
See paragraph 0121.
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CHAPTER 2 - PRINCIPLES OF ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS

0201. Common sense and balanced judgement are indispensable qualities for a military commander,
but they alone will rarely ensure success in armed conflict. In most military operations time is
critical and information may be scarce and unreliable. The effects of danger and fatigue usually
have an adverse influence on judgement and unforeseen circumstances frequently upset the
best-laid plans. To meet these exacting conditions, the commander’s judgement must be
backed by a sound knowledge of the doctrine and the advice and expertise of his staff.
0202. The purpose of this Chapter is to set out the general principles of Allied joint operations which
apply across the whole range of Allied military activities including the employment of forces
assigned to a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).1
Section I - The Levels of Operations

0203. Operations by Allied joint forces are directed, planned and executed at three levels. They are
directed at the military-strategic level and planned and executed at the operational and tactical
levels. Actions are defined as military-strategic, operational or tactical based on their effect or
contribution to achieving the specified objectives. The relationship between the three levels is
illustrated in Figure 2-1, indicating that they are not directly linked to a particular level of
command, size of unit, equipment or type of force and its components:
Alliance Political Security

Objectives and Guidelines
Military Strategic Campaign Objectives
Campaign Plan
Operational
&
Major Operations
Tactical
Battles & Engagements
Figure 2-1 - The Levels of Military Operations
a. The Military Strategic Level. At the military strategic level, armed forces are
deployed and employed within an overarching political framework and in a
synchronised fashion with other non-military initiatives (e.g. diplomatic or economic) in
order to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance. The NATO Military
1
While the CJTF concept has been agreed by nations, some specific arrangements have yet to be finalised.
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Committee (MC) considers the realistic contribution that military force can make to the
achievement of Alliance objectives and provides potential Military Response Options
(MROs) to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for consideration. In forming these
MROs, the MC would have consulted with Strategic Commands (SCs) to:
(1) Identify the military strategic goals, define and agree the campaign
objectives/end-state that would constitute success.
(2) Recognise any political, financial or legal limitations on the use of force, with
particular regard to alliance partners.
(3) Define the force capabilities and the need for a strategic reserve.
(4) Establish the outline command and financial arrangements.
(5) Analyse the military risks.
Should the NAC decide on a requirement for military intervention, it would issue a
NAC Initiating Directive (NAC political guidance) to enable detailed operational
planning to commence. The MC is responsible for translating NAC political guidance
into strategic military direction for the SCs. The SCs are responsible for the
development of a military strategic-level Operation Plan (OPLAN) outlining the
mission, command and financial arrangements plus command and control
responsibilities. When endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, this plan would
be provided to the operational commander for development. Thereafter the SC would
monitor the operational level planning and execution of the campaign.
b. The Operational Level. At the operational level and within a designated Joint
Operations Area (JOA), armed forces are deployed and employed in accordance with
the campaign strategy to achieve military strategic goals. Normally this would imply
sustained operations with simultaneous and/or sequential actions by committed forces.
It is at the operational level that tactical successes achieved in engagements and
operations are combined to achieve strategic objectives. To that end an operational
level commander would refine the OPLAN approved by the initiating authority, issue
operation orders and direct operations. He would be responsible for:
(1) Deciding what operational objectives are necessary to achieve strategic

objectives. These decisions will be taken with due regard to political
considerations.
(2) Deciding in what sequence these operational objectives should be achieved.
(3) Allocating forces and resources as necessary for subordinate commanders to

be able to achieve their operational missions.
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(4) Determining logistic requirements and setting priorities, in consultation with

nations, for the provision of logistic support to sustain operations.
(5) Directing the activities of those formations or units not delegated to

subordinate commanders, especially those earmarked as operational reserves.
c. The Tactical Level. At the tactical level, forces are employed to conduct military
tasks and gain military objectives. Successful accomplishment of these objectives is
designed to contribute to success at the operational and strategic levels.
d. Distinguishing Levels of Joint Operations. The distinction between the military

strategic, operational and tactical levels of joint operations will seldom be tidy. This is
because even if a force is only of small tactical value, its employment will have a
political context in relation to the nation that provides it, and, therefore, the force
commander will have an operational component in mind when considering the tactical
level. The key to delineation is that normally a strategic authority allocates objectives
and resources, whilst setting necessary limitations. At the operational level, the
commander orders the activities of the assigned formations in pursuit of the plan of
campaign. At the tactical level, commanders employ units for combat in order to
achieve the military objectives of the campaign. However, in the present security
environment, traditional responsibilities are blurred, and the different levels of
operations merge because even a small tactical incident could be considered politically
sensitive and thus its conduct under strict supervision at the strategic level.
0204. The objectives to be attained by the employment of a joint force and the resulting mission are
the foundations on which a Joint Force Commander (JFC) must base his campaign plan2 and
execution of the operation. Objectives should be clear and unequivocal, and they should define
clearly the desired end-state. The NATO and National Military Authorities (NMAs) concerned
should ensure that a JFC receives the resources and command authority required to achieve the
objectives, and allowing sufficient flexibility and freedom of action to adjust plans to match
conditions in his assigned Joint Operations Area (JOA).
0205. Both NATO and Nations Military Authorities have a collective responsibility for the planning
and execution of NATO’s operations. The responsibilities of NMAs should include the
definition and interpretation of political objectives in such a way as to facilitate the
development of military-strategic objectives and measures necessary to sustain the allied joint
force’s operations. NMAs should also prepare contingency plans to cover possible changes in
the political and military-strategic situation.
Section II - General Principles

0206. Principles for Joint and Multinational Operations. An understanding and knowledge of
key principles for joint and multinational operations, which have proved successful in past
conflicts, is the start point in doctrine development. These principles are not absolute and
2
See Chapter 3 paragraph 0307.
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nations may place greater emphasis on some rather than others, but there is common
agreement on their importance and relevance. Aspects of command are covered in Chapter 4.
a. Objectives. Joint multinational operations must be directed towards clearly defined

and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired
end-state. The mission and objectives must be defined with absolute clarity before
operations begin. When an objective has been identified as the ‘main effort’, all joint
activity must be directed towards its achievement. Four key questions must be
considered in the process of defining the objectives and the end-state:
(1) What is the mission purpose?
(2) What criteria constitute mission accomplishment?
(3) What are the exit criteria?
(4) Who declares success or victory?
b. Unity of Effort. Given agreement on the objectives, commanders from all

participating nations must unite their efforts to achieve the desired end-state. Cohesion
depends on co-operation between nations and service components of the force, and
unity of effort depends upon personal relationships of military commanders, political
leaders and diplomats.
c. Co-operation. Joint and multinational operations depend on co-operation in order to

co-ordinate all activities to achieve the maximum combined effort. Goodwill, a
common purpose, a clear and agreed division of responsibilities and an understanding
of the capabilities and limitations of others, are essential elements of co-operation.
d. Sustainment. Planning for sustainment comprises making all administrative

arrangements necessary for the successful implementation of the operation plan,
including logistic and personnel support. Ensuring a sound administrative baseline
must be part of operational planning from the outset. Similarly, although logistics is
the servant of operations, it can be the deciding factor in determining the feasibility of
an operation or the practicality of a plan.
e. Concentration of Force. Fighting power must be concentrated at the decisive time

and place to achieve decisive results. Superior force is not just a matter of numbers but
also of fighting skills, cohesion, morale, timing, selection of the objectives and the
employment of advanced technology.
f. Economy of Effort. In the absence of unlimited resources, it will be necessary to take

risks in those areas that do not meet the primary objectives. The principle of economy
of effort recognises that, if decisive strength is to be applied in the areas where it will
have most effect, achievement of those objectives cannot be compromised by
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diversions to areas of lower priority. Thus economy of effort implies the employment
of resources in such a manner that a commander’s primary objectives can be achieved.
g. Flexibility. Plans must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the unexpected and to allow
commanders freedom of action to respond to changing circumstances. This requires:
an understanding of the superior commanders’ intentions, flexibility of mind, rapid
decision-making, good organisation and good communications. Flexibility also
demands physical mobility to allow forces to concentrate quickly at decisive times and
places.
h. Initiative. Initiative cannot be taught but it can be developed and fostered through
trust and mutual understanding and by training. It is about recognising and seizing
opportunities and solving problems in an original manner. For a climate of initiative to
flourish, a commander must be given the freedom to use initiative, and must in turn
encourage subordinates to use theirs. Commanders should be encouraged to take the
initiative without fearing the consequences of failure. This requires a training and
operational culture which promotes an attitude of risk taking in order to win rather
than to prevent defeat.
i. Maintenance of Morale. Commanders must give their command an identity, promote

self-esteem, inspire it with a sense of common purpose and unity of effort, and give it
achievable aims. High morale depends on good leadership, which instils courage,
energy, determination and care for the personnel entrusted.
j. Surprise. Surprise is built on speed, secrecy and deception and is fundamental to the
shattering of an adversary’s cohesion achieving results that are disproportionate to the
effort expended.
k. Security. Security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile

activities and threats. Active and passive security measures help to deny critical
information to an adversary. They assist deception and help counter offensive actions.
l. Simplicity. Simple plans and clear orders minimise misunderstandings and confusion.
Section III - Characteristics of Operations at the Operational Level

0207. Distinct from the function of command at the operational level there are some characteristics
which, while evident in all campaigns, will vary to a degree with the differing nature of each
campaign.
a. Relation to Military Strategic Objectives. The operational level is concerned with

the employment of the joint force towards attaining military strategic goals through the
conception, planning and execution of campaigns and operations. Operational level
activity must contribute directly towards achieving previously defined military-strategic
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objectives, which are themselves drawn from the overarching political aims of the
operation. Tactical activity cannot take place purposefully outside this context.
b. Freedom of Action. The operational level commander is required to conceive, plan

and orchestrate all activities that are needed to gain and retain the initiative, in pursuit
of the strategic objectives. The commander will thereby dictate the nature of
operations, battles and engagements. Freedom of action to deploy reserves, set
priorities and allocate maritime, ground, air and support assets is therefore of critical
importance. This freedom of action, however, will be subject to certain constraints,
both political and military. While recognising these constraints, the commander will
convey a clear statement of intent, outline the concept of operations and establish the
objectives to be achieved by subordinate commanders within a JOA.
c. Political Interface. Military activity at the strategic and operational level will clearly
be influenced, and ultimately directed by the political considerations. The need to
consider the political dimension applies equally across the spectrum of military
operations, from Article 5 to non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO). Less
obviously, military activity may adversely affect the local or international political
situation. With this in mind, a commander at the operational level may well require
political advice, which could be provided either by a nominated adviser on the spot, or
by a strategic guidance provided through the chain of command.
d. Joint Operations. At the operational level, forces will usually conduct joint
operations. These may involve components covering appropriate military and specialist
services, as well as governmental and non-governmental agencies. Ideally, the JFC
should have Operational Control (OPCON) of all the elements of the force and be able
to switch resources swiftly to concentrate on the main effort. He will plan the joint
campaign and establish subordinate Service or functional component commands as
required for the execution. In relying on a component command structure, the joint
commander and his staff can concentrate on operational issues appropriate to their
level, thus allowing commanders at all levels to function in the most efficient and
economic way. Each component of the joint force is an integral part of that force and
essential to developing the synergy for joint force success. This synergy is made
possible by each component’s contribution to achieving the joint force objective.
While all combat forces must strive to be decisive within the scope of their own
operations, military operations are normally optimised by the synchronised application
of the total capabilities of the joint force. Therefore JFC will normally employ an array
of joint forces to overcome decisive points.3
e. Multinational Operations. In a multinational campaign, the political dimension is

likely to be complex particularly when non-NATO forces are deployed as part of a
3
For a description of a decisive point see Chapter 3 Paragraph 0308c.
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CJTF. Such a multinational operation would emphasise the need for good personal
relationships between senior national commanders and the achievement of the
maximum practical levels of standardisation of doctrine, operating procedures and
equipment. While nations ultimately remain responsible for the provision of logistic
support for their forces, they would be expected to co-operate operationally in support
of the campaign plan/OPLAN, which may include provisions for selected multinational
logistic support.
f. Resources. The resources a commander is given to fulfil the operational objectives

may be tangible, such as ships or land and air formations or support assets, or
intangible, such as delegated authority over the time allocated to achieve the given
objectives. Resources should be held at the level which ensures their most effective
use. Diplomatic activity will be necessary to allow the commander to have the use of
local resources such as services, facilities and material. Within the NATO area, these
host nation arrangements have already been agreed. However, in non-Article 5 CRO,
expeditious negotiations will be required and will be predicated on timely NATO to
government or bilateral agreements.
g. Civil Military Co-operation. The operational level commander may have explicit or
implicit responsibilities for Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) within an assigned
JOA. Within a JOA, the JFC needs to take into account existing provisions. In other
areas, an Allied commander’s responsibilities can include providing the necessary
services, facilities and material for his force. These might range from consulting the
relevant authorities about the movement of refugees to minimising the damage to or
assisting the rebuilding of the civil infrastructure. Once military operations have ended
(or in Peace Support Operations), the military may be the only form of administration
and authority in the area, and therefore responsibility for CIMIC activities could
become the primary aim of the commander.
h. Relations with the Media. The media are a powerful influence on public opinion
within the international community, on an opponent and at home. Without public
support and the endorsement of the international community, the morale and cohesion
of forces engaged in operations against an opponent will be seriously undermined. The
operational level commander must treat Public Information (PI) as an important part of
the Information Operations (INFO OPS) aspect of the campaign plan/OPLAN using
relationships with the media to benefit from positive images whilst carefully managing
the negative aspects.4 A careful balance must be struck between the needs of security
and the advantages of candour.
4
Co-ordination between CIMIC and PI in support of INFO OPS is essential to maintain Alliance credibility and
transparency of operations.
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Section IV - The Concept of ‘Operational Art’

0208. For the purpose of this publication, ‘operational art’ is defined as: ‘the skilful employment of
military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design,
organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns, operations and battles’. No specific level
of command is solely concerned with operational art. In its simplest expression, operational art
determines when, where and for what purpose forces will conduct operations.
0209. Most military campaigns and operations are designed to wrest the initiative from the adversary.
To maintain and exploit the initiative requires a sense of urgency and determination to outwit
the adversary. To do this the commander must consider the manner in which the end-state can
be achieved. The major tools that he will use when planning his campaign or operation are
described in paragraph 0308; However, there are a number of key concepts he should consider
both before and during the conduct of the campaign5 (the list is neither inclusive nor
exclusive):
a. Synergy and Leverage. Synergy and leverage can be obtained by the imaginative
combined exploitation of different resources. This aspect could include the concept
of the synchronisation of firepower and manoeuvre.
b. Simultaneity and Depth. Simultaneous action and also extension in depth

(sometimes referred to as parallel warfare) shape future conditions and can disrupt an
adversary’s decision cycle as well as his ability to execute operations.
c. Offence and Defence. Offence and defence can be alternated in time, space and level
to put continuous pressure on the opponent.
d. Time Management. The operational commander must be able to stand back from the
detailed conduct of the campaign to take time to identify emerging trends, grasp new
opportunities that arise and detect potential threats.
e. Termination. The conditions needed to terminate the campaign on favourable terms

must be kept under continuous review.
0210. Operational art indicates considerations at the operational level which must reflect more than
just the employment of procedures and techniques based on knowledge of doctrines and
manuals. It should be applied with a broad knowledge and understanding of the complicated
relations of all the factors influencing the planning and execution of a campaign:
a. It includes the effective use of campaign planning tools and seeks to ensure that
commanders use forces, space, time and information effectively through the design of
campaigns and operations. Such a design provides a framework to help commanders
order their thoughts and understand the conditions for success.
5
These are covered in more detail in AJP-3.
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b. It also requires: broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the
relationship of means to ends and an understanding of the inherent and effective
synergy that flows from properly co-ordinated joint operations.
0211. When devising a campaign plan, the commander utilises operational art to consider four
aspects:
a. The identification of the military conditions or end-state which will achieve the
strategic objective.
b. The ordering of activities, both sequentially and simultaneously, that lead to the
fulfilment of the military conditions which should lead to success. It is unlikely that the
strategic objective can be achieved by a single gambit.
c. The application of the military resources allocated to him, within the constraints
imposed upon him, to sustain his sequence of actions.
d. The identification of the risks involved. To achieve success the commander must be
prepared to take risks, but he should also make some contingency plans and seek to
recover the situation should the risk fail.
0212. Concepts of Campaign Design. In seeking to conduct operations, battles and engagements in
pursuit of the strategic objective, the operational level commander will design the plan of
campaign around a number of building blocks, described in Chapter 3, which help him visualise
how the campaign will unfold. Thus the commander articulates a vision or concept of
operational design, a statement of intent for the campaign plan and a command structure for
executing the plan.
Section V - Aspects of Multi-nationality

0213. Challenges. However a force is organised, multi-nationality poses a number of key challenges
whose resolution is crucial to military effectiveness and hence success of the campaign. These
include the formation of an effective command system, an intelligence system which can draw
and share data from a number of multinational and national sources, and a logistic system that
acknowledges national responsibilities for support but also caters for multinational needs.
Multinational command may lead to slower response times than purely national command
arrangements, and the speed and quality of decision-making may become adversely affected.
Such detrimental effects can be counter-acted through the adoption of common doctrine and
procedures plus realistic training. Multinational command requires an attitude of mind that is
international in perspective.
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0214. Multinational Co-operation. Gen. Eisenhower stated that ‘mutual confidence is the one
thing that makes an allied command work’. This confidence stems from the following
intangibles:
a. Rapport. Senior Officers must strive to effect a sympathetic rapport with each other.
The personal relationships amongst military leaders will influence every aspect of
multinational co-operation.
b. Respect. Mutual respect for the professional ability, culture, history, religion, customs
and values of participants will serve to strengthen relationships.
c. Knowledge of Partners. In multinational operations, it is important to be as

knowledgeable about friendly forces as about those of the adversary. Time taken to
understand the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of partners will pay dividends
during joint operations.
d. Patience. Effective co-operation may take time to develop. Differences of opinion

and perspective will require patience to achieve a focused and unified approach.
0215. Advantages of Multinational Co-operation. Whilst the reasons may vary for establishing a
commitment to a common military goal, the aim is usually to accomplish an objective that a
nation could not achieve unilaterally. Depending on the circumstance, there are differing
degrees of national interest at stake and upon this depends the strength and nature of the
contribution to the multinational operation. Nations participating in multinational operations
do so for reasons that are viewed as nationally advantageous in political and military terms.
Contributions must therefore be judged not only on the capability of the forces provided but
also by the full range of political and military benefits they bring to the multinational alliance or
coalition operation. The political advantages of multinational co-operation include sharing
political risks, demonstrating economic, diplomatic, military or political support to other
regions and influencing national and international opinion. The military advantages are that co-
operation adds both depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities) to a force
as well as providing access to national or regional logistic resources and in certain
circumstances, access to high value information and intelligence products.
0216. Risks in Multinational Co-operation. Differences in force capabilities and operating

procedures impose limitations on a multinational force’s ability to operate effectively. Some of
the risks that may need to be addressed are:
a. Mission Creep. There are two broad sources of mission creep. The first is a change
in situation that invalidates the original basis for the operation. The Allied commander
may require additional forces and assets, a new mission or a change in mission tasks or
in command authority in order to continue the operation or protect the force.
Secondly, mission creep is the adoption of additional tasks to a mission that may not
conform to the original purpose and run counter to the political and military intentions
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of some of the nations that contribute to the multinational operation. Divergent

national objectives, which influence each nation’s position and effort, can lead to an
erosion of political will to continue with a military operation and eventually lead to
force dissolution. It will be important, prior to embarking on an operation, to establish
precise parameters for a mission, with the achievement of the end-state forming the
purpose of the mission.
b. Deficiencies in Interoperability. A lack of interoperability in the areas of procedures,

material, doctrine and terminology is likely.
(1) Procedural and tactical differences present the force with situations where
units from different services and/or nations may not be able to work effectively
together.
(2) Language differences present communications problems that may result in

differences in interpretation of the mission or assigned tasks.
(3) Lack of system compatibility can cause technical difficulties.
(4) Inability to exchange information, intelligence, technical data, or

communications can result from a lack of interoperability and national security
concerns.
(5) Inability to use common sources may degrade logistic capabilities.
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CHAPTER 3 – EMPLOYMENT OF ALLIED JOINT FORCES

Section I - Stages of a Joint Operation
0301. An Allied joint operation normally consists of a number of stages some of which occur at the
military strategic level (e.g. force generation). Typical stages at the operational level, which
may overlap depending on the situation and mission, are:
a. Development of a campaign plan/Operation Plan (OPLAN).1
b. Force preparation, including build-up, assembly and pre-mission training.
c. Build-up of logistic support, including host nation support.2
d. Deployment to the area where operations are to be conducted or the reinforcement of

in-place forces.
e. Execution of operations.
f. Post-operation, conflict termination and military post-conflict activities.
g. Re-deployment of forces.
h. Campaign analysis - doctrine evaluation and lessons learned.
0302. A Joint Force Commander (JFC) should have, within the constraints imposed by the Initiating
Authority, the greatest possible freedom of action in the planning and execution of operations
in a designated Joint Operations Area (JOA). All stages of an operation require continuous
co-ordination and review.
Section II - NATO Operational Planning

0303. The operational planning process enables commanders to translate Alliance strategy and
objectives into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations and logistics will
be used to achieve success within a given space and time. NATO operational planning is
conducted through two separate but related processes: Advance Planning and Crisis Response
Planning.3 The SCs implement Military Committee (MC) guidance within the NATO military
command structure through a series of planning tools (i.e. Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational
1
The campaign plan is a more detailed, subordinate plan than the OPLAN presented to the North Atlantic Council.
2
See Chapter 9.
3
The Operational Planning Process is detailed in MC 133/3 ‘NATO’s Operational Planning System’.
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Planning (GOP), Bi-SC Functional Planning Guides (FPGs) and Regional Planning Guides
(RPGs)).4
a. Advance Planning. Advance planning is conducted with a view to preparing the

Alliance to deal with possible future security risks, either Article 5 or non-Article 5. It
entails a comprehensive iterative co-ordination and approval process which is outlined
in the GOP Chapter 5. The final outcome is a Contingency Plan (COP) or Standing
Defence Plan (SDP).
b. Crisis Response Planning. Using the planning guidance provided through the
Advance Planning process, Crisis Response Planning involves the development of
OPLANs. OPLANs are the Commander’s means of relaying his/her vision of the
sequence of operations and supporting functions needed to attain objectives. Where a
suitable COP has already been developed, this should be used as the initial basis for the
preparation of a military strategic OPLAN and the eventual detailed subordinate
campaign plan.
0304. Whether conducting Advance or Crisis Response Planning, the commander (and staff) is
challenged to answer the questions raised in the discussion on ‘Operational Art’ in Chapter 2.
0305. The approval procedure for Advance Planning differs from the more expeditious approval
procedure for Crisis Response Planning. These separate approval procedures are described in
MC 133/3 and the GOP.
Section III - Key Operational Planning Concepts

0306. The Commander’s Assessment. The planning process begins with the Commander’s
assessment of the operational elements required to accomplish the assigned mission. This is
normally referred to as the Estimate Process which is explained in Annex 3A and the GOP,
and should rely heavily on the Commander’s Intent which is also outlined in Annex 3B and the
GOP. The Estimate should include an examination of existing COPs to determine which, if
any, apply to the given operational situation. Based on that determination, the Estimate
Process results in two options:
a. The modification of a COP into an OPLAN.
b. The development of a new OPLAN in an operational situation for which no COP

exists.
0307. Planning Focus. Utilising the Estimate Process and the Commander’s Intent, a campaign
plan which synthesises various options for deployment, employment, sustainment and other
4
Reference to the Bi-SC GOP is made within this document on the understanding that the Allies will be involved in the
development of future versions and are given the opportunity to harmonise the GOP with NATO agreed doctrine.
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relevant military strategic COPs/OPLANs into a coherent whole. This Campaign Plan/
subordinate OPLAN should:
a. Define clearly what conditions constitute success.
b. Focus on the centre(s) of gravity of the opposing and friendly forces.
c. Achieve unity of effort for maritime, land, air and special operations forces.
d. Serve as the basis for further subordinate planning by force components.
0308. Campaign Design. Operational planning demands a thorough understanding of certain key
operational concepts involved in campaign design which are:
a. End-State. The end-state is defined as the stated political and/or military situation
which needs to exist when an operation has been terminated on favourable terms. The
end-state should be established prior to execution.
b. Centre of Gravity. Centre of Gravity (CoG) is defined as the characteristic(s),

capability(ies), or locality(ies) from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or
other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. It
exists at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations. More than one
CoG may exist. CoGs must be identified for both opposing and friendly forces.
c. Decisive Point. Decisive point is defined as a point from which a hostile or friendly
centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or in the
information environment. Decisive points are the keys to unlocking CoGs and can be
attacked directly as appropriate. The commander designates the most important
decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to protect, control, destroy or
neutralise them.5
d. Lines of Operations. Lines of operations link decisive points in time and space on the
path to the centre of gravity. They connect a force with its base of operations and its
objectives. Commanders use them to focus combat power toward a desired end,
applying combat power throughout the three dimensions of space, over time and in a
logical design that integrates all the military capabilities of a joint force in order to
converge upon and defeat the CoG of opposing forces. Lines of operation are
normally described in terms of interior and exterior.
e. Culmination. Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications. In the

offence, the culminating point is that point in time and location when the attacker’s
combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. A defending force reaches its
5
In some cases a commander may designate additional objectives that are not declared decisive points.
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culminating point when it no longer has the capability to mount a counter offensive or
defend successfully. Every effort should be made to avoid a joint force reaching its
culminating point, while influencing the adversarial force in such a way that it reaches
its culmination first.
f. Sequencing. Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in an order

that is most likely to achieve elimination of the opposition’s CoG.
g. Manoeuvre. To manoeuvre is to seek to get into a position of advantage in respect to

the opposition from which force can be threatened or applied. Manoeuvre may be
employed against decisive points or directly at the opposition’s CoG. When planning
operations there are two alternatives:
(1) The Direct Approach. The direct approach involves a linear, uninterrupted
approach against an opposing force’s CoG, often by way of critical decisive
points. This approach may mean engaging the opponent’s strengths (the
protection of his COG and decisive points).
(2) The Indirect Approach. The indirect approach attacks opposing forces’
COG from unexpected directions or at unexpected times. The indirect
approach seeks to exploit opposing force vulnerabilities, while avoiding their
strengths - often referred to as the ‘manoeuvrist’ approach.6 It can also
employ Information Operations techniques.
h. Tempo. Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the opposition, within
tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the
capacity of a joint force to make the transition from one operational posture to
another.
i. Operational Pause. A temporary cessation of operations after the attainment of

major tactical or operational objectives, but prior to reaching one’s own culminating
point, to regenerate combat power in preparation for delivery of a decisive blow.
Adversarial action can also necessitate an operational pause.
0309. Operational Planning Stages. While the Estimate Process is a useful planning tool for
‘immediate’ planning, NATO operational planning generally occurs in stages as presented in
the table at Chapter 3 Annex C. The process is designed to provide specific output from each
phase.7 The planning process provides the commander with the tool to guide and direct the
staff planning actions towards the ultimate process of the planning and production of the best
plan possible to achieve the desired end-state. Chapter 3 Annex D provides detailed
6
The ‘manoeuvrist’ approach is a mental discipline which seeks to gain the initiative by being original and doing the
unexpected with a ruthless determination to succeed.
7
For in depth explanation of this methodology refer to the GOP.
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considerations that need to be taken into account during the writing of a campaign
plan/OPLAN.
Section IV - Execution of Allied Joint Operations

0310. In times of peace, the Alliance conducts joint exercises with the purpose of displaying
solidarity, contributing to Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM),
demonstrating military capabilities, testing command and control arrangements, and practising
force elements in joint and multinational operations procedures that would be required in times
of crisis and hostilities.
0311. In times of a crisis or serious predicament, the ability of the Alliance to react - by timely
recognition of the risks involved and by securing international agreement to increase military
readiness - is a key element in the response to the developing situation. The assembly of a
Joint Force and the appointment of a commander armed with a clear mission directive can
provide a demonstration of the Alliance’s ability to deploy such a force quickly to a threatened
area. This can act as a powerful deterrent or stabilising influence. The deterrent posture can
be enhanced by forming an Allied Joint Force during exercises in peacetime.
Core Operational Functions
0312. Commitment of a Joint Force to an operation focuses the attention of the JFC on the four
essential aspects considered in Chapter 2, paragraph 0211. The core operational functions of
a Joint Force would depend on:
a. The mission of the Joint Force as directed by higher command authorities.
b. The structure and capabilities of the force.
c. The nature of other national forces in a coalition.
d. The type and scope of operations that the Joint Force is to undertake.
0313. The JFC has three core operational functions he performs continuously in the execution of the
campaign; he:
a. Develops and Maintains Situational Awareness (his appreciation of the

situation). The JFC relies heavily on the intelligence process, principally to assist in
assessing the nature and extent of the threat or situation. However, his situational
awareness encompasses a broader personal and continuing operational assessment,
that being the relationship of his planning and the progress made in the execution of
operations to the purpose and objectives for employment of the force.
b. Plans Operations. His planning for current and future operations is driven by his
evolving situational awareness and seeks to best employ the resources and capabilities
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available to him to accomplish the mission. Because the situation will change during
execution, as will his situational awareness, the JFC's planning must be continuous.
c. Conducts Operations. In implementing his operational plans the JFC uses the
capabilities of the assigned forces to achieve the desired end-state. During the
execution of operations the JFC must remain flexible enough to adjust when the
operation fails to go as planned or, based on his assessment, it is being executed as
planned but not achieving the desired result.
0314. At both the operational and tactical levels, operations may be organised within a framework of
‘deep’, ‘close’ and ‘rear’ operations. The terms ‘deep’, ‘close’ and ‘rear’ are used to describe
how these three operations relate to each other, primarily by function (i.e. what they are to
achieve) and secondly by geography and time (i.e. where and when they are to achieve it).
These operations must be considered together and conducted as an entity at the operational
and tactical levels; this requires continuous and careful synchronisation and, where necessary,
integration between levels of command.
Direction and Control of Operations
0315. Essentially, command decisions are those that start or stop an action and set the objectives,
direction, priorities and parameters of the campaign endeavour. Running in parallel with, and
complementary to, the process of command is the exercising of control. A commander should
only become involved in control matters when they affect the outcome of a command
decision. Nevertheless, in any operation, the commander must decide what tasks he must
personally accomplish in supervising the execution of the plan and in what priority he/she
places them.
Threat Assessment/Analysis of Operations
0316. There are two additional features of operational art that apply to the direction and control
process outlined above: the need for the JFC to keep under constant review the threat
assessment, and the importance of reviewing the results of mission analysis and combat
assessment - an essential requirement, especially for economic use of costly, high-technology
weapon systems. Both of these aspects have a decisive influence on campaign planning and
decision-making during the conduct of operations in crisis and hostilities.
Conduct of Operations
0317. In the conduct of operations the JFC is responsible for:
a. Assigning missions and tasks to participating forces consistent with their capabilities,
expertise and (within the parameters that may be specified by nations at TOA) combat
readiness.
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b. Delegating, where appropriate, decision-making authority to subordinate commanders.

Commanders on the scene must be able to make decisions, consistent with the JFC’s
intent, in order to accomplish their mission and protect their commands. A
requirement to consult with higher authorities on every action may stifle the ability of a
component commander to make timely decisions.
c. Establishing a joint targeting system.8
d. Applying force at decisive points. It is the application of military force at decisive

points that will take the initiative from opponents and, when applied successfully,
defeat them.
e. Co-ordinating the actions of subordinates to achieve the integration of activities such

as: Information Operations, air defence co-ordination, communication frequency
management and the timely allocation of logistic resources throughout a JOA. The
JFC may continue to direct deep reconnaissance and interdiction efforts, conduct
special operations, pursue deception operations and employ strategic psychological
operations units. The principal means of integrating this array of operational and
logistic endeavours is by the assignment of mission objectives to subordinates and by
the establishment of command relationships, by phases, throughout the campaign. The
JFC may retain some forces and resources as a reserve for later employment or
assignment.
f. Being aware of the political, economic, cultural and religious situation in the region
affected by the campaign, and take into account the vital interests of the local
population.
g. Refining the campaign plan as the situation develops.
h. Refining the intelligence plan to ensure that the supporting intelligence architecture
and Communications and Information Systems (CIS) meet requirements and is able to
respond to the intelligence requirements throughout all phases of the campaign.
i. Executing the Public Information (PI) policy as directed by higher authority.
j. Keeping the higher commander and supporting authorities informed on the situation
with emphasis on the assessment of developments that may require changes in the
operational concept and/or additional resources.
k. Requesting changes to Rules of Engagement (ROE) as required.
8
See paragraph 0319 et seq.
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l. Requesting the administrative and logistic support required to establish the operational
readiness of the force and to sustain it during the campaign.
m. Maintaining a mechanism to evaluate the operational effectiveness of organisations and

units within the Joint Force. If the JFC anticipates that the effectiveness of a unit is
diminishing due to prolonged combat or intensive engagements, then the commander
should consider reconstitution. Reconstitution consists of those actions that a
commander plans and implements to restore a unit to a desired level of combat
effectiveness commensurate with the mission requirements and available resources.
The JFC will need to initiate efforts to notify nations when reconstitution is
recommended. Reconstitution activities include regeneration and reorganisation.
Regeneration is the timely activation, in full, or in part, of existing force structures and
infrastructure, including the restoration of manning, equipment, and stocks to
designated levels. These actions may take place within the area of operations but
normally require the unit to be moved to a rear area and taken out of operational
status during the regeneration process. The execution of the regeneration process is
the responsibility of nations. Reorganisation is used to shift the internal resources
within a degraded unit to increase its operational effectiveness. Reorganisation is
more immediate in nature, normally taking place within the area of operations during
lulls in the operation. Reorganisation requires co-ordination with the unit’s nation.
n. Notifying higher commander and supporting commanders and authorities when ready
to execute phases of the campaign.
o. Executing Battlefield Psychological Activities or Peace Support Psychological

Activities when directed by SCs.
Joint Operational Procedures
0318. Harmonised operational procedures are required to enable elements of a joint force to co-
ordinate their activities effectively, and at the same time retain maximum flexibility. To
facilitate and expedite the provision and control of mutual support, in what may be a
complicated situation with rapidly changing and conflicting priorities, procedures need to be
standardised as far as practicable and they should be supported by agreed terminology.
Section V - Targeting and Combat Assessment

0319. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them
taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. In this context force is
considered in its most generic sense and includes soft kill techniques such as Psychological
Operations, the use of Special Operations Forces and hard kill options. The relationship
between selection of targets and the objectives is key; it is the focus which ensures that the
application of force is both relevant and the most efficient. As with all actions, attacks must
be accomplished in accordance with the International Law of Armed Conflict and international
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agreements and conventions. The limits on the use of force are defined by the ROE approved
by North Atlantic Council/Defence Planning Council (NAC/DPC) for a particular operation.
Those assembling the attack plan (commanders, planners and legal staff) need to be conscious
of the political and PI dimensions of the plan. Success or failure in convincing public/world
opinion of the need to use appropriate levels of force can influence the operation as much as
failure to achieve the required level of damage to a selected target.
0320. Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board. Within the Joint Force targeting is ultimately the
responsibility of the JFC using the whole spectrum of the joint force’s power. The JFC may
decide to establish a Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board (JTCB) to advise him on targeting
priorities. If established, the JTCB would integrate and prioritise target nominations from SCs
and component commanders and would function as the custodian of the resulting Joint
Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL). The outcome of this joint co-ordination process is
subsequently reflected in component commanders’ plans. For instance, for air and land attack
cruise missile capable units, the list forms the basis of the Air Tasking Order and might impact
on the current Airspace Control Order.
0321. Combat Assessment. Combat Assessment (CA) is an integral part of the targeting process
and is a measurement of the success of the campaign when related to the campaign objectives
in the Initiating Directive. It comprises Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), Weapon Effects
Analysis (WEA) and Re-attack Recommendation (RR).
Section VI - Rules of Engagement

0322. ROE are a means of providing guidance and instructions to commanders and personnel within
the framework of political and military objectives. They define the degree and manner in
which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that the application of force is carefully
controlled.
0323. ROE apply to forces under the command or control of a NATO commander operating in
international waters or airspace and, after the NAC/DPC has specifically promulgated such
authority, on the territory or in the territorial waters and airspace of NATO nations or nations
in which Alliance forces are operating. The engagement of forces under NATO command and
control and forces remaining under national command and control in a commander’s JOA will
require authorisation of appropriate ROE by the NAC/DPC.
0324. ROE are applicable in all stages of peace, crisis and conflict to forces under NATO command
or control. They must be used in consonance with International Law and International Law of
Armed Conflict. ROE will be authorised for operations, including peacetime tasks, and will
continue to apply after a declaration of Counter Aggression.
0325. Peacetime ROE are in effect until modified by message from higher authority. Ordinarily,
commanders include within an OPLAN a proposed ROE profile. The NAC/DPC would
review the proposed OPLAN and provide an initial ROE profile and add any policy guidance
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within the approved OPLAN. Additional ROE may be requested by nations, SCs and
subordinate commanders (including the JFC). One of the JFC’s principal tasks is to establish
uniform ROE which are applicable throughout all components of the joint force and are
necessary for the success of the campaign. Requests for modification to ROE or additional
ROE are made through the appropriate SC. Using a ROE request (ROEREQ) message, the
SC requests from the NAC/DPC, through the MC, additional ROE as thought fit. The MC
will provide advice to the NAC/DPC which will then either veto or authorise the requested
changes, all or in part. The SC will implement the authorised ROE with a ROE
implementation (ROEIMPL) message. When requesting ROE clearance from higher military
authorities it is essential for the JFC to include the following justification details:
a. Explanation of the request.
b. Rationale for the requested ROE.
c. Military consequences if ROE not approved.
d. Recommended PI policy to be covered.
Commanders should not delay their requests while gathering information on political
implications or PI policy.
0326. Notwithstanding the ROE that have been implemented, the JFC and subordinate commanders
have the right to use such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force to defend
themselves against attack or an imminent attack. NATO/NATO-led forces also have the right
to use that force which is necessary and proportional to defend other NATO/NATO-led forces
and personnel in the vicinity from attack or imminent attack. The JFC and the joint staff must
be cognisant that national components of a joint force could be subject to national, as well as
NATO ROE. National ROE could be more restrictive than those that are granted to the joint
force but should not be more permissive. In cases of inconsistency, ROE within a given
operation should not be interpreted as limiting the inherent right of self-defence.
0327. The above paragraphs provide guidance on ROE for a force comprising members of the
Alliance and emphasise the importance placed on agreement to a single set of NATO ROE
agreed by the NAC/DPC as a precursor to the successful accomplishment of a mission.
However, within a CJTF comprising non-NATO nations that may not have access to nor
recognise NATO ROE, it would be necessary prior to the beginning of a campaign to develop
and gain national agreement to the ROE that should be used. These ROE may be based upon
NATO ROE but modified for the prevailing circumstances.
Section VII - Combined Joint Task Force Operations

0328. The CJTF capability will be available for the full range of Alliance military missions, as one of
the potential options from the range of both political and military measures available to the
Alliance. Although the CJTF capability, in principle, is available for Article 5 as well as non-
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Article 5 operations, it will primarily be employed for non-Article 5 Crisis Response

Operations (CRO). A CJTF with its associated headquarters should be capable of rapid and
efficient deployment in and beyond Alliance Territory, including areas with limited or no Host
Nation Support (HNS). Capabilities required for CJTF operations should be sufficiently
flexible and robust to sustain operations for a significant period, including the rotation of
forces, deployment over considerable distances, and the likelihood of no or limited HNS.
Planning
0329. Combined Joint Planning Staff. Under the authority of the SCs, and in accordance with
NAC/MC decisions and guidelines, the mission of the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) is
to support the SCs in strategic operations planning and in the development, implementation,
co-ordination and evaluation of the CJTF concept and to support the unique responsibilities of
Deputy SACEUR with respect to European Security and Defence Identity and the Western
European Union, in accordance with MC 403. Basic CJTF planning would follow the
guidelines established in MC 133/3 and the GOP as outlined in Section II. During Crisis
Response planning, the CJPS would support the SC responsible for the development of the
military-strategic level OPLAN. The CJPS is collocated with SHAPE at Mons.
0330. Parent Headquarters. The starting point in the operational planning process for the
activation of a CJTF HQ would be coincident with NAC/DPC approval of the concept of
operations at the strategic level. 9 The nominated Parent HQ Commander would initiate
preparatory activities for CJTF HQ formation and deployment. His staff would carry out the
following actions:
a. Establish closer contact with the CJPS and the appropriate SC staff on the mission and
ongoing planning. This may include the exchange of liaison officers.
b. Finalise the CJTF HQ staff structure tailored to support the potential mission. This
would include notification and activation of their own nucleus staff and in addition
identify required potential augmentation from other NATO HQs and nations to form a
complete mission tailored HQ.
c. Forward the proposed staff structure and augmentation requirement to the appropriate
SC who would in turn forward it to SHAPE.
d. Determine the HQ support requirements (e.g. Intelligence, Lift, Engineering, Facilities,

Security, Legal, Contracting etc) and provide the information to the appropriate SC.
Co-operating with the CJPS, this should also include an assessment of the need to
activate an appropriate Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC).
9
See also Chapter 1 paragraph 0120.
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e. After the NAC has issued an Initiating Directive, and, under the direction of the
appropriate SC, begin the development of an operational level subordinate campaign
plan/OPLAN to accomplish the mission. This OPLAN will define the complete C2
structure of the CJTF including the identification of potential component command
headquarters. These headquarters could then be alerted of the need to start the
development of any necessary supporting OPLANs.
Execution of CJTF Operations
0331. The execution of an operation commanded and controlled by a CJTF HQ should abide by the
doctrine contained in this publication and, as far as possible, all NATO tactics, techniques and
procedures.
0332. Chain of Command (NATO-led operations). One of the SCs will always remain in the
chain of command for a NATO-led CJTF operation. The actual operational chain of
command best suited for the planned mission and the specific force structure will be approved
by NAC on a case-by-case basis, following NMA advice. If a CJTF is activated for Article 5
purposes, COMCJTF will normally operate under the command of a Commander-in-Chief
(CINC)/Regional Commander. Should COMCJTF operate beyond Alliance Territory, he will,
most likely, operate directly under the command of the appropriate Strategic Commander. In
order to use resources Alliance-wide effectively, Supporting Commanders who are not
directly in the chain of command, will render specified support to the CJTF operation.
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ANNEX 3A – THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

Introduction
3A1. This Annex amplifies the basic campaign planning methodology set out in Chapter 3 by
describing how the estimate process is conducted and the factors considered during the
process.
3A2. The estimate process is central to the formulation of Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s)
campaign plan/operation plan (OPLAN) and subsequent updating of plans in an Allied joint
operation. However, the process has an application at all levels of command. The framework
of an estimate is standard, comprising: a mission analysis, the mission statement, a situation
analysis, analysis of opposition and friendly Courses of Action (CoA), a comparison of
opposition and friendly CoA, selection and refinement of the best friendly CoA.1
3A3. The estimate must lead to a CoA that is suitable, feasible and acceptable, leading to the
commander’s decision and his concept of operations. The weighting given to each aspect
during the process will depend on the overall mission, the intelligence assessments and the
prevailing circumstances.
Mission Analysis
3A4. The mission analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing, from a superior’s order,
the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. It places in context what effect is to be achieved in the
overall design for operations. The commander would establish what constraints apply and
determine, as the campaign progresses, whether further decisions are required. As such it is a
dynamic process which ‘triggers’ and then regulates the remainder of the estimate. It is
continued thereafter as the situation and the mission are reviewed. The mission analysis is the
first step in the process: it includes the determination of the higher command authority’s
purpose and the analysis of national or allied security and military-strategic direction,
including short and long-term objectives to achieve the end-state. End-state objectives should
include the military objectives that will provide the basis for realising the strategic objectives
regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought. The mission analysis
should also include the specified and implied tasks, and determine priorities where
appropriate. Completion of the mission analysis enables the commander to establish the
criteria for suitability of the possible CoA.
3A5. The mission analysis, having confirmed an understanding of the operation/mission directive
issued by higher authority, and the capability of achieving the mission, leads to a reiteration of
the commander’s mission statement.
1
The activities within the estimate process are illustrated in Figure 3A-1.
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INITIATED BY: ESTIMATE LEADS TO:

PROCESS:
INITIATING
DIRECTIVE to the JFC MISSION ANALYSIS MISSION STATEMENT
JFC’s PLANNING
GUIDANCE
(Warning Orders
to components of the
joint force)
SITUATION ANALYSIS
OPPOSITION ANALYSIS
& CoA
FRIENDLY ANALYSIS
& CoA
COMPARISON of CoA
SELECTION of BEST
FRIENDLY CoA JFC’s DECISION
&
STATEMENT OF INTENT
CONCEPT of OPERATIONS
CAMPAIGN PLAN/OPLAN
OPERATION ORDERS
Figure 3A.1 - Key Activities in Campaign Planning and the Estimate Process
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Mission Statement
3A6. The mission statement should be expressed in terms of: who, what, when and where (the
task parameters), and why (the purpose). It should be framed as a clear, concise statement of
the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.
Analysis of the Situation, Opposition and Friendly Forces

3A7. The factors which affect the mission are then considered, starting with analysis of the general
situation and factors affecting the opposing and friendly forces, as follows:
a. The Situation Analysis should consider, in the NATO geostrategic context, the
politico-diplomatic short and long-term causes of the conflict. It should consider the
political influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and the
political, economic, legal and moral constraints. Also the international interests (e.g.
those reinforcing or conflicting with United Nations, NATO or other organisations’
interests, including the positions of international organisations neutral to the conflict),
international law and other competing international situations. This part of the
analysis should also consider the characteristics of the operational area, including:
military geography (topography, oceanography, hydrography, climate and weather,
endemic or epidemic disease situation, transportation and telecommunications). It
should also embrace economics (organisation, the industrial base and mobilisation
capability), social conditions, science and technology factors affecting the operational
area. Completion of the situation analysis has an important influence on the analysis
of the opposition and friendly forces.
b. The Opposition Situation Analysis should consider the opposing forces’ capabilities
and vulnerabilities (the commander would normally have available a formal
intelligence estimate to which the analyst can refer). The analysis should, however,
include the opposition’s broad CoA being taken and available in the future, and their
political, military intentions and objectives (where known). It should also include
their military-strategic and operational advantages and limitations; possible external
military support; CoG (both strategic and operational); specific operational
characteristics (C2, strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements,
logistics, time and area factors (including his bases, used and available), and their
combat effectiveness (including proficiency in joint and combined operations).
c. The Friendly Situation Analysis should follow the same pattern as for the
opposition. The commander would normally have available specific supporting
estimates, including personnel, intelligence, logistic and medical/health care service
support, C2 and communications plus public information estimates. Development of
the possible friendly CoA is derived from the foregoing analyses, and determines how
the mission will be accomplished. Each CoA must be evaluated for adequacy,
feasibility and acceptability. The analysis must consider all CoA open to the
commander that, if successful, would accomplish his mission. Normally, each CoA
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would outline: the concept of operations, the missions to be accomplished (in the
order of accomplishment), the forces required, the logistic/sustainability concept, the
deployment concept, estimates of time required to achieve stated objectives and a
concept for maintaining force reserves.
d. The Restrictions analysis should consider those limitations on the use of force that
are imposed under International Law (e.g. the principles of discrimination and
proportionality affecting Rules of Engagement (ROE)). This analysis should also
consider those aspects related to other strategic requirements (e.g. access to territory,
territorial waters and airspace) and associated diplomatic, economic and information
factors.
Comparison of Courses of Action

3A8. This part of the estimate determines the effect of possible opposition CoA on the success of
each friendly CoA. The analysis is conducted by: time phases, geographic location and
function/event. It also considers the opposition’s decisive points and lines of operation.2
3A9. The comparison then considers conflict termination issues, including friendly action,
opposition reaction and counter-reaction. It concludes with a re-evaluation of suitability,
adequacy and feasibility; it determines what additional requirements exist, makes required
modifications, and lists advantages and disadvantages of each CoA.
Selection of Best Friendly Courses of Action

3A10. Having completed the analyses and evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of each
friendly CoA - refined as necessary to ensure they are likely to succeed in achieving the
operational objectives - they would be presented to the commander who would make a
decision on which CoA best meets his operational objectives.
Decision and Concept of Operations

3A11. The commander’s decision on a CoA would be the logical result of the estimate process. The
decision constitutes the basic directive for the completion of initial planning and for
subsequent action. As such it represents the outline concept of operations, and must include
the commander’s intention.
3A12. The selected CoA should, therefore, be translated into a concise statement of the
commander’s decision - what the force as a whole is to do, explaining as appropriate the
elements of when, where, how and why. This decision is reflected and promulgated in the
commander’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS) which is forwarded to the initiating/superior
authority for approval. In order to facilitate the timely development of the plan, the level of
2
See paragraph 0308.
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detail in the CONOPS must be kept to the minimum necessary to obtain approval by the
initiating/superior authority. The CONOPS should normally consist of: a situation overview,
a mission statement (including the desired military end-state), an outline concept for
execution (including the commander's intent3), conduct of operations, force and capability
requirements, an outline service support concept and key command and control arrangements.
It also forms the central theme of his campaign plan/OPLAN and should be reflected in
subsequent mission directives and orders.
3
For notes on the Commander’s Intent see Annex 3B.
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ANNEX 3B – THE COMMANDER'S INTENT

3B1. The following summary describes the meaning of the term ‘Commander’s Intent’ as used in
the operational planning process.
3B2. For every mission, the commander determines what should be achieved and begins to
develop plans for the force to accomplish the mission. This visualisation embodies the intent
for the conduct and outcome of the operation. It is a mental picture of the current situation
and intended end-state, and how (based on the higher commander’s intent, on the
information available and on intuition) to move from one to the other. The commander must
transmit this vision to subordinates in clear and simple terms. This is accomplished through
the articulation of the commander's intent. Later, the commander, assisted by the staff, will
delineate the specific details of the operation through the concept of the operation. The
commander's intent is the statement that provides the linkage between the campaign
objectives and the campaign plan.
3B3. The commander’s intent statement is the commander’s personal expression of why an
operation is being conducted and what should be achieved. The intent is an expansion and
expression of how a mission is to unfold. It is a clear and concise statement of a mission's
overall purpose, the desired end-state, and any essential information on how to get to that
end-state; it must be clearly understood by all subordinate commanders for adequate
preparation of their own orders.
3B4. The intent defines the end-state in relation to the factors of mission, adversary, operating
environment, terrain, forces, time and preparation for future operations. As such, it
addresses what results are expected from the operation, how these results anticipate
transition to future operations, and how, in broad terms, the commander expects the force to
achieve those results. Its focus is on the force as a whole. Additional information on how
the force will achieve the desired results is provided only to clarify the commander's
intentions
3B5. The intent statement is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an
overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even
when a plan or concept of operations no longer applies, or circumstances require
subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate goal of the force as a whole rather
than a set of sequenced events that may no longer reflect what 'makes sense' at that time or
place.
3B6. In stating the intent, the issuing commander provides subordinates with the freedom to
operate within the larger context of the mission, rather than within the restrictions of a
particular concept of operations or scheme of manoeuvre. The commander’s intent provides
subordinates with the flexibility to adapt their actions to achieve success. By focusing on the
end-state rather than sequential events, it allows commanders to operate with increased
speed and efficiency in decision-making. This allows subordinate forces, and hence the
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whole force, to operate faster, and with greater agility, than the adversary. This keeps the
adversary off-balance and unable to respond coherently.
3B7. The end-state focus supports the initiative of commanders at all levels by freeing them to
focus on the desired results, even when the concept of the operation must be adapted to
changing events, when communications are disrupted, or additional guidance or directives
are lacking. The commander's intent provides subordinates the same opportunity of
developing a vision of their own end-state, as it supports that of the force as a whole.
3B8. Because of its criticality, it is essential that the commander personally prepares and delivers
the intent. While time constraints and combat conditions may require the commander to
deliver the intent verbally, possibly even by radio or electronic means, it is best when it is
articulated to subordinates personally and in written form. Face-to-face delivery ensures
mutual understanding of what the issuing commander wants, and the provision of a hard
copy provides subordinates with the corner stone of their own planning.
3B9. Commanders may provide separate intent statements in support of the campaign plan.
3B10. In summary, the commander's intent provides the link between the mission and how the
commander ‘plans’ to accomplish that mission. The intent should be expressed in simple
sentences that clearly state why the operation is being conducted, the desired military end-
state and criteria for success, the military objectives and how the force as a whole will
achieve the end-state.
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ANNEX 3C – OPERATION PLANNING STAGES

Planning Steps Tasks Output
Stages
Initiation Receive Receive Initiating Directive As directed by the

task(s) Initiating Authority
commence
planning
Military Conduct Identify

Estimate mission - Situation (background and intent/
analysis capabilities of Opposition Forces (OPFOR))
- Superior’s mission, intent, objectives and
end-state
- Constraints, restraints & preconditions
- Tasks (assigned & implied)
- Assumptions and factors
- Strengths and weaknesses (OPFOR & own)
- CoGs (military strategic & operational)
- Decisive points
Determine
- Own objectives, desired end-state and
criteria for success Commander’s
Conduct Planning Guidance
- Initial force structure analysis which may serve
Develop as an Initiating
- Mission statement Directive to
- Commander’s Planning Guidance subordinates
Concept Staff Analyse

Development Analysis - Situation/make deductions (JOA situation,
opposing forces, time & space, assessment
of tasks, command & control,
communications & information systems
Develop Develop
COA - Courses of Actions (CoA)
Analyse
- CoA (test, war game, compare) Decision Brief
Develop Develop
CONOPS - Concept of Operations (CONOPS) CONOPS
SOR and forward for approval
- Statement of Requirements (SOR) SOR
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- Sustainability Statement
Plan Develop Refine

Development - Commander’s Intent and CONOPS
Complete
- Synchronisation of plan
- Confirm and identify forces through the
Force Activation Process
Co- Write
ordinate - Co-ordinate and write OPLAN
- Subordinate plans (SUPLANs) (if required)
- Branch Plans (if required)
Seek Seek
approval - OPLAN approval
Issue Family of
Issue
- OPLAN and SUPLANs OPLANs
Plan Review Review Conduct Updates and/or

- Review for on-going operations new plans
Evaluate - Periodic review
- Revision of decision brief as required
Revise Update
- Issue amendments as required
- Prepare and issue revised plans as required
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ANNEX 3D – OPERATION PLAN DEVELOPMENT

3D1. Following promulgation of the commander's concept of operations, detailed planning of
operations within the campaign is conducted by the staffs. This annex lists some of the more
detailed considerations that the OPLAN needs to provide for.
3D2. Providing a clear demonstration of NATO’s resolve to protect and defend by early projection
and operation of highly visible joint and combined forces.
3D3. Establishing a command structure that clearly defines overall command responsibility, as
well as command responsibility for each phase of a campaign or operation. After defining
the command structure, the commander should give subordinate commanders the requisite
authority to discharge their responsibilities.
3D4. Providing an effective span of control. This is a function or measure of the capabilities of
commanders and their staffs and the complexities of co-ordinating the effort.
3D5. Implementing an intelligence architecture that meets the force’s requirements and provides
an effective interface with the relevant SC/RC intelligence architecture.
3D6. Planning the allocation of forces and resources to the attainment of campaign objectives and
particularly to:
a. Securing of the air, land and sea lines of communication to and within the Joint
Operations Area.
b. Establishing and maintaining sea control and a favourable air situation in the Joint
Operations Area.
3D7. Ensuring that the force’s CIS is interoperable and complemented by standardised formats
and procedures. In addition, inter-personal communication should be in a jointly agreed
language, free of service-unique terminology or jargon.
3D8. Commensurate with his command authority over logistic units and assets, ensuring that the
logistic plan is sufficient to support operations, and that re-supply procedures will provide
continuity of support throughout the operation.
3D9. Considering the integration and conduct of Information Operations (INFO OPS).
3D10. Providing for Force redeployment and eventual recovery.
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CHAPTER 4 - COMMAND AND CONTROL IN ALLIED JOINT

OPERATIONS
Section I - Command and Control Terminology

0401. Effective employment and support of military forces is dependent on the Command and
Control (C2) arrangements established, from the highest to the lowest levels of authority.
This Chapter describes the principles on which the command and control of Allied joint
operations are based.
0402. The terms command and control are closely related and regularly used together; however,
they are not synonymous. Command is the authority vested in an individual. It can be
described (but not defined1) as the process by which a commander impresses his/her will and
intentions on the subordinates for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. It
encompasses the authority and responsibility for deploying and assigning forces to fulfil
their missions. Control is the authority exercised by a commander. It can be described (but
not defined1) as the process through which a commander, assisted by the staff, organises,
directs and co-ordinates the activities of the forces assigned.2
0403. To exercise C2 authority in joint operations, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) and staff
should use standardised procedures and the Alliance’s Communications and Information
System (CIS). Together these two processes form a C2 system which a JFC, the joint staff
and their subordinates use to plan, direct, co-ordinate, control and support operations.
Section II - Principles of Joint and Multinational Command

0404. Unity of Command. At the strategic level, the direction of military operations in the pursuit
of Allied policy objectives is normally the result of the collective decisions made by
sovereign governments in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The basis of such decisions
must be common purpose. At the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of
conflict, a fundamental tenet of operations is unity of command. At whatever level, unity of
command provides the necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of operations.
Unity of command is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and co-ordinate the action of
all forces and military assets in a single commander. The command relations by which this
authority is achieved will be determined mainly by the composition of a joint force when
established. However, constraints may be placed on the use of national force components
and supporting national assets and also by the extent of military activities of other authorities
in a designated Joint Operations Area (JOA). As a minimum, to ensure unity of command, a
JFC would normally have Operational Control (OPCON) over all NATO or attached forces
within a JOA.
1
See Glossary for the AAP-6 definition.
2
Other terminology used in C2 and Information Operations is included in Chapters 13, 14 and the Glossary of Terms
and Definitions.
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0405. Continuity of Command. Unity of command is further enhanced by the continuity of

command for the duration of a campaign or major operation. In principle, ‘the person who
plans should execute’; however, circumstances may not permit this. Command should be
continuous throughout a campaign. The higher command authority, in consultation with a
JFC, should arrange a succession of command; a JFC should arrange an alternate HQ to
meet operational contingencies.
0406. Clear Chain of Command. The structure of a C2 system is hierarchical. Where necessary
and appropriate, direction and orders to a subordinate commander may include tasks for
specific force elements, subject to any limitations imposed by nations and/or attachment
orders.
0407. Integration of Command. The command structure should ensure that the capabilities of the
component services of single nations, or those of several nations, can be brought to bear
decisively to achieve a joint commander’s operational objectives in the most effective way.
Component commands, to which national contingents contribute, are normally functional
(Maritime, Land, Air and Special Operations), but the specific task organisation will be
‘tailored’ by the higher command authority to suit each operation. Integration between
commands is strengthened by a clear chain of command. If separate single national
contingent headquarters are required, they should be established to complement rather than
to obscure or impede the joint or combined chain of command. It may also be necessary to
establish separate national joint components, e.g. when a national joint force is placed under
OPCON of a JFC. Special operations forces, if provided to a joint force, will normally
operate as a separate component under the JFC.3 An efficient and comprehensive liaison
structure is an essential element of the command structure.
0408. Decentralisation. A JFC’s responsibility for mission accomplishment is indivisible, but

delegation of authority to subordinates and their responsibility to act in support of the higher
commander’s intentions are enshrined in the principle of decentralisation. Through
delegation, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully
when unforeseen developments arise and exploit favourable opportunities. Decentralisation
encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making. Subordinate
commanders with delegated authority need to state clearly their intentions, designate the
objectives to be achieved and provide the resources and authority required by their forces to
accomplish their tasks. Although the emphasis given to a decentralised command style in
the doctrine and practice of different services and nations may differ, joint force
commanders and their staffs should employ the principle of delegation. Successful
decentralisation has the following prerequisites:
a. Commanders and staffs should concern themselves primarily with joint and
multinational operational matters.
3
See Chapter 8.
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b. The subordinate commander must fully understand the JFC’s intentions and be free
to exercise initiatives based on that understanding.
c. There must be a common understanding of the operational doctrine governing the

employment of forces. This can be achieved through peacetime training and
exercises.
0409. Co-operation and Mutual Understanding. Without unity of effort and necessary trust to
plan and execute a joint and multinational campaign or major operation, there can be little
chance of success. A mutual understanding of strengths and weaknesses provides the
foundation of co-operation and trust, which is vital in the planning and successful execution
of joint and multinational operations. This must stem from the highest levels. Mutual
understanding also rests on a common application of joint doctrine. Familiarity with the
procedures of each service and nation is best achieved throughout joint and multinational
training. A common approach should be inherent in thought and practice; joint and
multinational training should be undertaken whenever possible, but it is particularly
important, should time be available, prior to any major operation. The greater the degree of
standardisation (in terms of both equipment and doctrine), the better the prospects are for
fruitful co-operation, mutual understanding, and ultimately, for success.
Section III - Command and Control Responsibilities

0410. Allied Command Authority. One of the SCs will always be in the chain of command for a
NATO-led operation. The actual operational chain of command best suited for the planned
mission and the specific force structure will be approved by NAC on a case-by-case basis,
following Military Committee (MC) advice. The SC would be held ultimately responsible
for all operational matters, co-ordinating logistics support, rotation of units and manpower
for extended deployments and for providing the operational interface at the political/military
level in NATO HQ. When developing the military-strategic OPLAN the nominated SC
should:
a. Recommend to the MC the most appropriate command structure/arrangement to

satisfy the operational requirement to be approved by NAC. In doing so the SC
might nominate a RC, Combatant Command or JSRC to lead the operation, in which
case some of the tasks that follow might be delegated.
b. Propose a JFC to be approved by the MC and noted by the NAC and specify his/her
command authority.
c. Define a JOA to be approved by the NAC/MC.
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d. Issue, after the approval of the strategic CONOPS, an initiating directive to the JFC.
This should specify the tasks to be accomplished, the scope of action to be taken and
the degree of authority granted to him as a supported commander.4
e. Establish an intelligence architecture linking NATO HQs with national intelligence

centres to provide the JFC with a common, timely and accurate picture of the
situation during all phases of the campaign.5
f. Recommend to the MC, based on the JFC’s needs and the development of the
operation, the appropriate force and C2 structure to accomplish the mission. In
consultation with HQ NATO, develop sustainment requirements and request support
from national authorities and international entities (i.e. NATO Airborne Early
Warning Force) to support the joint force by sending ACTWARN and ACTREQ
messages for action by nations. Following receipt of national responses, co-ordinate
the force balancing process with nations and establish the supporting deployment
architecture.
g. Recommend to NATO authorities the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to be used, based

on the JFC’s needs and the development of the operations.
h. Obtain funding.
i. Obtain and promulgate diplomatic clearances.
j. Establish an integrated CIS linking Allied Command authorities, the JFC, national,
service and functional components and supporting commanders/authorities. The
Command and Control Communication System (C2CS) should provide timely,
reliable, interoperable and secure communications for planning, direction and control
of the activities of the joint force. The Command and Control Information Systems
(C2IS) should provide a common, flexible data base structure and user-friendly
interfaces to enable military authorities to exercise effective C2.
k. Establish liaison as required for the conduct of operations.
l. Monitor the development of the situation and the JFC’s campaign and provide the
MC with appropriate information.
m. Formulate an Information Operations (INFO OPS) directive for the joint force.
n. Establish a Public Information (PI) directive for the joint force.
4
See paragraph 0412.
5
See Chapter 12.
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0411. The Joint Force Commander. The nominated JFC will:
a. Exercise the command and control (normally OPCON), as delegated by the SC/RC,
over all force components provided to him. The JFC should also exercise co-
ordinating authority over all forces remaining under national control that are
operating in or transiting a JOA. Co-ordinating authority should be granted for, as a
minimum, rear area security, positioning and reporting, logistics, movement control
and ROE.
b. Determine, in co-ordination with the providing commands and authorities, the joint
command organisation that is best suited to undertake the campaign (i.e. the need for
the establishment of component commanders, supporting boards, agencies etc).
c. Assign, within the limits of his/her command/control authority, tasks to component

commanders as required to accomplish their objectives and approve their missions.
d. Establish liaison with the commands and authorities operating in support of the
campaign or independently in a JOA, as well as between the components of the
force.
0412. Supported/Supporting Inter-Relationships in Joint Operations.
a. Establishing Authority. The authority establishing the support relationship should

provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and
execution of their operations. The establishing authority should issue directives
indicating the purpose in terms of the effect desired and the scope of action to be
taken and should include:
(1) Forces allocated to support the mission.
(2) The time, place, and duration of the support.
(3) The priority of the support mission relative to other missions of the
supporting force.
(4) The authority, if any, of the supporting force to depart from its supporting
mission, with or without notification to the supported force, in the event of
an emergency or exceptional opportunity for alternative action consistent
with the purpose of the support relationship.
(5) The general or special authority with which the supporting commander must
comply.
b. Supported Commander. The degree of authority granted to a supported

commander should be specified, at the military strategic level, by the Allied
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command authority in the JFC’s operation/mission directive or, at the operational

level, by the JFC. The supported commander would:
(1) Advise the establishing authority and the supporting commander of the
assistance required.
(2) Exercise general direction of the supporting effort to the extent authorised by
the establishing authority. General direction includes the designation and
prioritisation of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting
action, and other instructions necessary for co-ordination and efficiency.
(3) Advise the establishing authority and the supporting commander of any
change in support requirements.
c. Supporting Commander. A supporting commander or authority would:
(1) Provide support to supported commander as directed by the establishing

authority.
(2) Advise the establishing authority and the supported commander on the
capabilities and limitations of the resources dedicated to provide support.
(3) Advise the establishing authority on the priorities for the accomplishment of
competing tasks for supporting organisations and assets.
(4) Co-ordinate supporting effort with the supported commander.
(5) Provide the establishing authority and the supported commander with timely
information on changes in the availability or capability of supporting
organisations and assets together with an assessment of the potential impacts
on their operations. Consider and, if necessary, pass the establishing
authority requests for additional resources required to provide the support.
Section IV - Directives and Orders

0413. The direction and guidance/objectives a JFC provides to component commanders should
include:
a. A mission statement, the Commander’s Intent, a concept of operations, a campaign

plan and an operation order.6
b. C2 arrangements, including a clear chain of command, the delegation of authority

and the allocation of personnel, agencies or elements which will enable the
6
See Chapter 3.
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subordinate commander to control his/her resources effectively to accomplish the

mission.
c. The ROE authorised for the campaign.
d. Details of the operational, logistic and administrative resources allocated to

accomplish the mission.
e. A statement on the relationship between a supported and supporting commander and

the supporting commander’s responsibilities.
Section V - Methods of Control of Forces

0414. Commanders are able to command and control resources more effectively with assistance
from joint staffs. Specialist or liaison/staff officers, as well as the commanders of
subordinate, supporting or higher elements may provide military advice. Politico-military
advice may also be provided by the respective national component commanders appropriate
to their force contribution or contingent capabilities.
0415. Component Method. For most Allied Joint operations, force elements provided by nations
would be grouped under component commanders subordinate to the JFC who would
exercise his/her authority over these elements through the component commanders. The
degree of control that a commander can effectively manage depends largely on the capacity
of the joint staff and the facilities available. A commander should consider the actual or
potential span of control and the extent of his/her involvement in the detailed conduct of
operations. The JFC would normally have forces assigned to him under OPCON, and he
may transfer OPCON of elements to subordinate commanders if circumstances so require.7
0416. Direct Method. For small-scale operations, a JFC may exercise command authority
directly. When he does so, he must be provided with an appropriate multinational joint staff.
National Contingents
0417. A national contingent within a joint force may be either single-Service or joint in
composition and have a wide range of operational capabilities. A national contingent
commander’s role would be, essentially, to represent national concerns to the JFC, keep own
national authorities informed, and co-ordinate and foster international component relations to
support the JFC’s mission. Specific tasks for a national contingent commander would be to:
a. Exercise C2 as directed by national authorities.
b. As directed by the JFC, co-ordinate and co-operate with other component and
contingent commanders to ensure unity of effort, and establish liaison accordingly.
7
This is a generic statement applicable to the employment of Allied Joint Forces in non-Article 5 situations and not
necessarily correct for Article 5 operations utilising the normal NATO Military Command Structure.
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c. Ensure the administrative and logistic support of own forces required to achieve and
sustain their operational readiness.
d. Advise the JFC on specific capabilities of own forces and constraints limiting their
employment.
e. Ensure that cross-component support is provided as arranged by the JFC and agreed
by own national authorities.
f. Suggest changes in the national C2 arrangements under which own forces are
assigned or attached to the joint force.
g. Provide liaison support to the JFC’s staff.
h. Keep own higher/lower commander(s), own national representatives and authorities

informed on the situation, with emphasis on ROE and developments that may require
changes in the concept of operations, additional national resources or support from
other force components or national contingents.
i. Ensure that provision is made within the intelligence architecture for the integration
of national contributions to the overall intelligence picture for the JFC.
j. Harmonise the national C2IS with other components and contingents (as appropriate)
of the joint force.
k. Implement the JFC’s PI and INFO OPS directives.
A national contingent commander could be supported by an appropriate national

representative attached to a regional Allied headquarters in the command chain. In some
circumstances, the JFC could be dual-hatted as the national contingent commander for the
forces deployed by his own nation.
Functional Components
0418. A functional component is normally composed of forces with similar or complementary

capabilities. A component could comprise national or multinational forces. Exercise of C2
through functional components generally facilitates centralised direction and decentralised
execution of military functions and operations. Depending upon the mission, size and
composition of the joint force, a logistics co-ordinator (under the direction of J4) and
functional component commanders for land, maritime, air and special operations might all
be appropriate.8 The composition of each component would depend on:
a. Political objectives to be achieved and the resulting mission.
8
But see Footnote 7.
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b. Overall military dispositions of the Alliance and/or individual allies in the JOA.
c. Opposing military potential.
d. Geographical, geophysical and environmental conditions in the designated JOA.
0419. A component commander will:9
a. Exercise C2 as authorised by the JFC.
b. Co-ordinate and co-operate with other component commanders, as directed by the

JFC, to ensure unity of effort and establish liaison accordingly.
c. Plan and execute operations consistent with the JFC’s campaign plan and directives.
d. Ensure that cross-component support is provided as directed by the JFC and agreed
by the respective national contingent commander.
e. Provide liaison support to the JFC’s staff.
f. Keep the JFC and the component commanders informed on the situation, with
emphasis on developments which may require changes in the concept of operations
or additional resources.
g. Conduct PI and INFO OPS activities as directed by the JFC.
0420. Synchronisation of Effort. To exploit fully the complementary nature of the Component
Command relationships and to derive the potential synergy for the successful prosecution of
joint operations, synchronisation and co-ordination of effort is of paramount importance. To
direct the main effort of the campaign, the JFC may designate a supported commander10 to
synchronise subordinate operations throughout his designated JOA or within the limits of an
Area of Operations (AOO), and for a given time. The JFC will also designate those
components or elements that will play a supporting role.11
0421. Co-ordination of Effort. Co-ordination is a vital factor for the efficient planning and
execution of operations. Component commanders, when assigned an AOO, are tasked to
plan operations in their area. The choice of AOOs influences the level of co-ordination.
When a component commander conducts operations, co-ordination is required with the other
component commanders in order to support their shaping of the battle space and execution
of operations. If AOOs border each other, co-operation is needed for cross or close border
operations, synchronisation and manoeuvre. Supporting/supported relationships can direct
co-ordination.
9
Command and control of maritime, land, air and special operations are described at Chapters 5 - 8 respectively. The
specific responsibilities of the various component commanders, particularly for CJTFs, are contained in MC 389/1.
10
See paragraph 0412b.
11
See paragraph 0412c.
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Section VI - Joint Force Headquarters Organisation

0422. The JFC should organise the joint force headquarters in order to exercise the most
appropriate form of command and control. The joint force’s mission, the tasks assigned to it
and the composition of the joint force should all be considered. The joint staff should
include representatives from participating nations and services as appropriate. A joint force
headquarters would normally be composed of the following basic elements:
a. The designated commander and personal staff.
b. A joint staff, headed by a Chief of Staff (COS), organised into functional elements
including Personnel and Administration, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics & Health
Service Support, Plans and Policy, CIS, Doctrine and Training,12 Resources and
Finance, and Civil-Military Co-operation branches.
c. Political and legal advisers.
d. Component and contingent commanders or their representatives, as appropriate.
e. Liaison officers and logistic liaison teams from the assigned multinational formations
and from national units operating in a JOA in support of Allied operations.
f. A support unit, responsible for providing the commander and the staff with the
personnel, communications and information systems, administrative equipment,
transportation and security support facilities essential to the efficient and effective
functioning of the headquarters.
g. A number of National Intelligence Cells (NICs), manned by contributing nations on a

voluntary basis, to act as gateways between the national intelligence agencies and
CJTF CJ2.
0423. The principal staff functions of a typical joint force HQ are summarised in Annex 4A, with a
notional headquarters organisation and cell designation at Appendix 4A1.
Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters Organisation
0424. Parent Headquarters. A CJTF Parent HQ is a pre-designated international, joint NATO

HQ, which has been tasked to prepare to stand-up a CJTF HQ and includes a nominated
CJTF HQ nucleus. Each CJTF Parent HQ13 is responsible for the establishment and
maintenance of its CJTF HQ nucleus, its equipment and the core of a CJTF HQ support unit.
In addition, the CJTF Parent HQs conduct their part of the required training and exercise
12
Unlikely to be included in a deployed operational headquarters.
13
Parent HQs are RHQ North, RHQ South and HQ STRIKFLTLANT.
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activities for nucleus, augmentation personnel and support modules to ensure the formation
of an efficient CJTF HQ within the given readiness requirements.
0425. Nucleus. The CJTF HQ nucleus is a permanent minimum framework staff that serves as a
core for a CJTF HQ formed from pre-designated personnel serving at a CJTF Parent HQ.
The nucleus provides the core of the CJTF HQ. It is sized and structured in such a way that
permits the operational planning process to proceed in the CJTF HQ’s nucleus staff
simultaneously and in parallel with strategic planning at the SC level. It will also be robust
enough, if required, to deploy and operate, albeit in a limited manner, on a 24-hour basis
until the HQ augmentation arrives.
0426. Key Nucleus Staff. Within the nucleus, key staff personnel for each functional element are
identified as ‘Key Nucleus Staff’. The role of the key nucleus staff is to ensure cohesion of
the nucleus and ensure the ability to form rapidly a core CJTF HQ to undertake assigned
missions. Key nucleus staff are identified by the CJTF Parent HQ in each nucleus staff.
0427. Staff Augmentation. Augmentation of the CJTF HQ is the process whereby a complete,
mission-tailored and operational HQ is formed. It is conducted by drawing the appropriate
augmentation from the augmentation and support pool. This augmentation and support pool
contains potential augmentation to the CJTF HQ in the form of staff modules and individual
staff members, support modules and CIS modules. An augmentation staff module is a staff
element provided by a NATO or other multi-national HQ or by nations, or formed (identified
and trained/exercised together) from individual staff members of these sources. Individual
augmentees are single staff members from these sources.
0428. Selection of a CJTF Commander. In cases where the Alliance has decided to activate a
CJTF, simultaneously a Commander of the CJTF needs to be proposed by the SC, approved
by the MC and noted by the NAC. In order to ensure the most efficient chain of command
the selection should take into consideration the chain of command that will be established
for the whole operation. The following are potential candidates: an ACE/ACLANT regional
or combatant commander or his deputy, a commander or his deputy at NATO’s Sub-regional
Level of Command (Joint Headquarters (JHQ), CC).
0429. Deputy Commander CJTF. The Deputy COMCJTF (DEPCOMCJTF) would not normally
be selected from the same country or service as COMCJTF and may not even come from the
same Parent HQ as that of the CJTF nucleus staff. Selection would be based on
consideration of the mission assigned to the CJTF and the number and type of units that
comprise the force.
0430. Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff (COS) serves as the principal staff officer to COMCJTF
and would direct and co-ordinate the work of the staff divisions.
0431. CJTF Staff Directorates. Depending upon the mission and forces allocated to him, the JFC
will decide the size and composition of the HQ. The brief notes in Annex 4A and the
structure outlined in Appendix 4A1 provide a possible starting point for planning.
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Directorates would be designated CJ1, CJ2 etc, but not all divisions need be established, for
instance, the planning function might be combined with operations.
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ANNEX 4A - PRINCIPAL STAFF FUNCTIONS IN AN ALLIED

JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS
4A1. This Annex outlines the principal staff functions within a headquarters of an Allied joint force
to support a Joint Force Commander (JFC) in the planning and conduct of a joint operation.
A notional headquarters organisation and cell designation is shown at Appendix 4A1. The
staff functions and organisation set out in this Annex and Appendix 4A1 are provided only
as a basic model. The JFC will organise his staff as he deems necessary to optimise its
ability to plan, conduct and support the operation successfully. He will bear in mind the
circumstances surrounding the establishment of the joint force, its relationship with any
existing NATO HQs, its mission and the environment in which the mission is to be
conducted.
The Staff Functions
4A2. J1 - Personnel and Administration. The Personnel and Administration (PANDA) staff’s
principal role is to advise the JFC and the joint staff on the personnel policies and manpower
management systems and procedures established by national authorities for their force
components. PANDA staff responsibilities include personnel management, accounting,
entitlements and benefits, Joint Personnel Centre Operations, morale, welfare, recreation,
postal services, safety, provost and discipline, Prisoner of War (POW) administration and
casualty reporting. The PANDA staff should also co-ordinate personnel matters with the
personnel staffs of the national contingents.
4A3. J2 - Intelligence. The Intelligence Staff is responsible for the provision of timely
intelligence to meet the JFC’s operational and security requirements within the JFC’s Area
of Intelligence Responsibility and maintaining situational awareness in the JFC’s Area of
Interest.1
4A4. J3 - Operations. The essential role of the Operations staff is to act as the focal point through
which the JFC directs the conduct of an Allied joint operation, ensuring unity of effort and
the most effective use of resources supporting immediate and planned operations. The
Operations staff may comprise sections that cover, maritime, land, air, special operations
forces and space operations (when applicable) plus cells to cover Information Operations
(INFO OPS) and targeting disciplines. The Operations staff are responsible for:
a. Assessing the status and capabilities of assigned forces, as a pre-condition for the
JFC’s decision on Course(s) of Action (CoA) and the concept of operations.
b. Recommending force organisations for planned operations.
c. Advising the JFC on applicable Rules of Engagement and suggesting

changes/additions that the JFC may wish to consider.
1
Intelligence aspects of Allied joint operations are covered in Chapter 12.
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d. Specifying the tasks for force components based on JFC’s concept of operations.
e. Co-ordinating the conduct of INFO OPS.2
f. Monitoring force components’ plans supporting the JFC’s campaign.
g. Production and dissemination of operation orders.
h. Co-ordinating the activities of liaison officers appointed to the joint force.
i. Co-ordinating joint targeting activities as required.
4A5. J4 - Logistics. The Logistics and Medical staffs are responsible for assessing the logistic and
medical/health service support required for achievement of the JFC’s campaign objectives,
and for ensuring that these support requirements are met throughout the campaign.3 Based
on this assessment the logistic staff develops the logistic concept and plans in support of
operations and co-ordinates the overall logistic effort. The size and complexity of
operations, component participation and force contribution of the nations as well as the
degree to which national and/or multinational logistics are to be integrated into the logistics
concept may require specific logistic co-ordinating activities. If appropriate, a Multinational
Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC), in support of the JFC’s logistics staff, 4 may be activated to co-
ordinate support between components, National Support Elements (NSEs), the Host
Nation(s) (HN) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and contractors.5
4A6. J5 - Plans and Policy. The Plans and Policy staff assist the JFC in the preparation of his
campaign plan and the planning for future operations. It co-ordinates these planning efforts
within the Joint Force HQ and with higher, subordinate and adjacent commands and civil
authorities. The Plans and Policy staff will:
a. Determine, on the basis of the intelligence assessments, the military conditions for
successful accomplishment of the JFC’s assigned mission objectives, including
action to be directed against the adversary’s Centre of Gravity (CoG)6 and that
required to protect friendly CoG.
b. Develop CoA by which the JFC’s assigned mission objectives can be accomplished.
2
See Chapter 14.
3
There are certain areas that do not specifically fall under the responsibility of the J4, but should be considered by the
logistic staff as they cross staff boundaries and are vital to successful support of the operation plan. These include
engineering, infrastructure, contracting and rear area security. The JFC may organise these staff functions under J-3 or
J-4, as appropriate and depending upon the specific operation.
4
A MJLC should operate under the direction of J4 and should not constitute an independent nor separate chain of
command.
5
See Chapter 9.
6
See Chapter 3 Paragraph 0308b.
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c. Co-ordinate the JFC’s INFO OPS planning by determining how weaknesses in the
adversary’s C2 structure could be exploited in favour of the joint force, and what
measures should be taken to protect friendly C2 systems. Provide planning guidance
for the execution of the phases of the campaign, with particular emphasis on
synchronisation of forces, time and area towards achievement of the campaign
objectives.
d. Promulgate the JFC’s decisions on the CoA for the campaign through planning
directives and operation plans.
e. Conduct Combat Assessment (CA) of operations as directed by the JFC.
f. Plan, in consultation with the Civil-Military staff, for emergency and disaster relief
assistance in accordance with NATO policies.
4A7. J6 - Communications and Information Systems. The Communications and Information

Systems (CIS) staff should ensure that adequate support is provided for Allied joint
operations, and that interoperable CIS procedures are used at all levels in the joint force.7
4A8. J7 - Doctrine and Training. The Doctrine and Training element of a joint headquarters is
responsible for doctrine management and exercise planning. It is normally found in
peacetime establishments, and may not be required in an operational environment as part of
a joint force.
4A9. J8 - Resources and Finance. The Resources and Finance branch’s tasks are to manage the
civil secretariat, administrative and budgetary aspects of Allied joint operations and to
provide appropriate specialist advice to the JFC.
4A10. J9 - Civil-Military Co-operation. The minimum requirement for a NATO Civil-Military

Co-operation (CIMIC) capability is CIMIC staff at all HQ levels. Their role is to advise the
commander, prepare and develop the CIMIC assessment and the CIMIC lines of activities in
support of the commander’s plan and to carry out liaison. As a result of assessments,
existing military forces or specialist CIMIC assets might be tasked through the chain of
command to carry out CIMIC activities. The size and structure of CIMIC staff will vary
from HQ to HQ and will be mission dependent. Members of the staff do not require
specialist skills applicable to the civilian environment, but they will be trained and
experienced operational staff officers who also understand the workings of International
Organisations and NGOs. They will work closely with all staff branches to ensure that
CIMIC factors are considered in all aspects of planning. They will have a particularly close
relationship with J3/J5 staff through whom CIMIC activities, which will always support the
main OPLAN, will be authorised.
4A11. Public Information. A staff should be established to advise the JFC on Public Information
(PI) policies in conjunction with the relevant SC/RC PI staffs and representatives from the
7
Chapter 13 covers CIS.
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joint force components. The PI staff would be responsible for a programme of

communication with military and civil audiences during Allied joint operations.8 The CPIO
should co-ordinate with INFO OPS, Psychological Operations and CIMIC staffs.
4A12. Linguistic Service. A linguistic service should be established to provide reliable written
translation, oral interpretation and other related support to all elements of the force requiring
such services. The Chief of this Service is responsible for controlling and co-ordinating the
activities of all linguists employed by the force wherever they are located.
8
See also Chapter 21.
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APPENDIX 4A-1 - NATIONAL JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ORGANISATION
The following table illustrates the designation of Cells that may be found in a joint force
headquarters (see note 1), with an outline of the functions that each Cell could be expected to
undertake.1
Cell Title Functions

Designation
(a) (b) (c)
J1 Personnel and Personnel management
Administration Manpower administration
(PANDA) Provost and discipline
Prisoner of war administration
Casualty procedures
J2 Intelligence Comprises:
a. A Joint Intelligence Centre providing all-source
analytical support to operational staffs and situation
monitoring.
b. A Joint Intelligence Ops Section providing
requirements management, dissemination and targeting
support.
c. A Joint Intelligence Support Section, providing
intelligence system support and collection management
support.
d. A BDA Cell providing collection of damage
information and making assessments of target
destruction.
1
See Glossary of Abbreviations for decode of abbreviations used in this table.
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J3 Operations A Joint Operations Centre, providing continuous

monitoring and immediate co-ordination of operations
which may incorporate some or all of the following:
a. A Current Operations Centre, providing supervision of
allied joint operations and cells covering INFO OPS
(including EWCC, OPSEC and Deception). The Centre
also contains Sections covering Maritime, Land, Air,
Special Operations, PSYOPS and Space Operations (see
below).
b. An Operations Support Cell provides advice on
functional areas such as: ROE, NBC Defence,
Meteorology/Oceanography, SAR, CSAR.2
c. A Combined Joint Reports Cell that prepares all
reports for the JFC, provides operations summaries and
prepares/maintains records of all significant operational
matters.
J3(N) Naval Operations Maritime operations, including: anti-air, anti-surface and
anti-submarine warfare, mine-countermeasures,
amphibious operations, organic air and supporting
maritime air operations (co-ordinated with J3(A)).
J3(L) Land Operations Land, including army aviation (co-ordinated with J3(A)),
airborne, airmobile force and supporting land operations.
Force movement.
J3(A) Air Operations Offensive, defensive, and supporting air operations
including SAR & CSAR. Maritime air and army aviation
operations are co-ordinated with J3(N) and J3(L)
respectively.
J3(SOF) Special Operations Special operations, including CSAR.
J3(SP) Space Operations Space operations, including satellites.
J4 Logistics & Health Logistic/Combat Service Support
Service Support Health Service Support
Logistic Host Nation Support co-ordination
Movement and Transportation Co-ordination
Contracting.
Infrastructure Engineering
2
Combat Search and Rescue are planned and co-ordinated by both J3(A) and J3(SF) cells.
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J5 Plans & Policy Campaign planning & estimate process

Forward planning and co-ordination
Contingency planning
INFO OPS planning
Combat Assessment
J6 CIS Communications & Information Systems management
Frequency management
Cryptography
J7 Doctrine & Training Doctrine management
Exercise planning
J8 Resources & Civil Secretariat
Finance Civilian personnel management
Finance & budget planning
Contract authority
J9 Civil Military Co- Provides the Civil-Military interface, including:
operation Negotiation of Co-ordination and Support
Arrangements and Agreements
Co-ordination of Civil-Military Support
Co-ordination with National Civil Emergency
Planning
Notes:
1. In this example the cells are prefixed with a ‘J’ to denote that they comprise part of a joint
headquarters. In a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HQ, the cells may be designated
‘CJ1, CJ2’etc.
2. The J7 staff would normally be part of a peacetime headquarters organisation; the cell is
unlikely to be included in an operational headquarters.
3. The Resource & Finance staff may form a special group, separate from the main
headquarters.
4. A Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre may be formed, under the direction of the Chief of
Staff in order to effect co-ordination between the allied joint force and international bodies,
non-governmental or private voluntary organisations.
5. The joint force commander may have a Staff Judge Advocate and a political adviser on his
personal staff.
6. A Press and Information Centre (PIC) may be established (see Chapter 21). The head of the
PIC would be responsible to the COS.
7. MC 389/1 ‘MC Policy on NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force Capability’ provides a
manning example for a generic CJTFHQ; however the manning requirements for each
CJTFHQ will be mission specific.
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CHAPTER 5 -MARITIME OPERATIONS
Section I - The Concepts of Maritime Power

0501. Maritime operations include any actions performed by forces above and under the sea to gain
or exploit command of the sea, sea control or sea denial and/or to project power from the
sea. In a joint environment maritime operations can have influence on land operations by
the manifestation of deterrence, provision of access to the Joint Operations Area (JOA),
provision of battle space dominance, projection of power ashore and provision of sealift.
Maritime operations can be assisted from land with surveillance, logistic and air support.
0502. In accordance with rights and jurisdictions recognised under International Law, the
preponderance of the sea remains essentially neutral and uninhabited. Maritime operations
therefore contrast with land operations in that the sea cannot be possessed in the same way
that land can. Nations may have interpretations of International Law which differ subtly or
materially from those of other allies or partners. The maritime force commander must be
cognisant of national differences in interpretation and the impact that may have on
operations.
0503. Maritime operations range from peacetime operations such as presence and surveillance and
humanitarian operations, through operations in times of tension to combat operations. They
can encompass show of force and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), wartime
operations at sea, protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), strikes against an
adversary’s maritime air and land forces, and amphibious operations.1 The purpose of this
Chapter is to describe the concepts of maritime power, the roles of maritime forces and their
contribution to allied joint operations.
0504. Command of the Sea. Command of the sea gives the freedom to use the sea for one’s own
purposes and to deny its use to an adversary. Total command of the sea, in the sense that
one’s own, or an alliance’s, maritime forces are unchallenged anywhere and that an
adversary is unable to carry out any maritime operations, can be achieved only by the
destruction or elimination of the adversary’s maritime forces. It is more practicable to limit
the objective of command of the sea in time or place. This is referred to as sea control.
0505. Sea Control. Sea control allows the use of the sea in specified areas and for specified
periods of time. The early achievement and retention of a level of sea control is a likely
requirement across the whole range of military operations, and sea control will be a
component of an allied joint campaign or operation. The level of sea control required will be
a balance between the desired freedom of action and the degree of acceptable risk. Sea
control comprises control of the surface and sub-surface environments and the airspace
above the area in which control is required. The minimum requirement for control of the
airspace is to secure and maintain a favourable air situation, but air superiority will be a
1
See Section VII.
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requirement for robust sea control where an adversary’s challenge from the air is likely to
occur.
0506. Sea Denial. Sea denial is exercised when one party denies another the ability to control a
maritime area without being able to control that area himself. Sea denial is not a concept
distinct from sea control, as denial of an adversary’s freedom of action is an aspect of sea
control. However, the concept is applicable only when full sea control is not exercised by
choice or by necessity. At the operational level, a zone of sea denial may be used as part of
the outer defence of a force or area, or a way of containing opposition forces. At the
strategic level, sea denial can be used in warfare, by sustained attack on an adversary’s
shipping to prevent reinforcement and to sap national morale and the ability to wage war.
0507. Maritime Power Projection. Maritime power projection is the use of, or threat of the use
of, maritime power directly to influence events on land. It exploits sea control to achieve
access to littoral areas and to deliver power ashore in the forms of amphibious forces,
organic aircraft, land attack weapons and special operations forces. Maritime power
projection is a concept that has broad application both during crisis management and in
hostilities. Maritime forces remain one of the most politically acceptable and versatile forms
of military presence, being able to demonstrate the Alliance’s resolve and political intent
without violating an adversary’s (or potential adversary’s) territorial waters or airspace.
During hostilities, maritime power projection forces are able to use the sea to provide access
to territory that is less accessible to land forces or to create forward operating bases for air
forces.
Section II - Characteristics of Maritime Forces

0508. Maritime forces possess the following characteristics: readiness, flexibility, self-sustainment,
mobility and poise. Maritime forces may be used to support allies and friends, deter
aggression, influence unstable situations or respond to aggression:
a. Readiness. One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate

availability to respond to contingencies. Many peacetime functions, such as
presence, logistic and health service support, are closely paralleled by wartime
operations. By maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major
conflicts, maritime forces can provide a wide range of services in support of
peacetime operations.
b. Flexibility. The inherent flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and
commanders to shift focus, reconfigure and realign forces quickly to handle a variety
of contingencies by providing a wide range of weapons systems, military options,
and logistic/administrative skills. Maritime forces offer presence without occupation
and deterrence without commitment. In tasks ranging from forcible entry and strike
operations to NEOs, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, maritime forces can
control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or time of crisis. The
strategic, operational and tactical Command, Control and Information Systems
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(C2IS) capabilities of naval forces provide for a uniquely controllable force to

complement diplomatic efforts.
c. Self-Sustainment. The degree of self-sustainment achieved by maritime forces will

be determined by the nature of the operation and the types of units committed by the
participants. NATO navies, with their ability to conduct replenishment-at-sea, are
capable of operating in forward areas without significant land-based supply
structures almost indefinitely. Maritime forces have inherent Command and Control
(C2) capabilities which can be used with flexibility for many tasks and with mobility
where needed.
d. Mobility. Maritime forces, with their strategic and tactical mobility, have the ability
to monitor a situation passively, remain poised on station for a sustained period,
respond to a crisis rapidly and manoeuvre in combat with authority. Mobility
enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively
visible and threatening to adversaries as the situation requires. If diplomatic,
political or economic measures succeed in stabilising a situation, maritime forces can
quickly be withdrawn without further action ashore. Maritime forces can also
respond to indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly from one end of a JOA
to another or from one strategic area to another, usually independent of fixed
logistics. In combat, the ability to manoeuvre maritime forces quickly provides
maritime commanders with a significant tactical and operational advantage.
e. Poise. The ability to poise in international waters avoids the political complications
and military risks of deploying military forces on land.
Section III - Roles of Maritime Forces and Types of Operations

0509. Large areas of the world are covered by sea and the majority of important land areas can be
reached by sea. The vast area of the sea and the cover it can provide can be exploited by
own forces with deployment, concentration and manoeuvre. The same attributes are
possible for opposing forces, which stresses the importance of threat orientated warfare.
Maritime forces are able to ensure the unconstrained use of important sea areas by exercising
sea control and, if necessary, sea denial as described in paragraphs 0505 and 0506. These
roles include operations to locate, classify and track surface vessels, submarines and aircraft,
and, if necessary, to apply force against them. Sea control may also include Naval Control
of Shipping (NCS), protection of the SLOCs, blockades or embargoes against economic or
military shipping, or denial of the sea areas to an adversary’s military operations.
0510. Conflicts at sea rarely exist in isolation from a land campaign or the pursuit of territorial
objectives. Even when the maritime component is operationally dominant, the ultimate
outcome in the JOA is likely to depend on success ashore. Maritime operations encompass
the full range of joint operations, requiring the application of naval and air forces and, during
amphibious operations, the delivery and support of forces for land operations.
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0511. Planning. Maritime planning is normally done in the context of an Allied Joint Force
Operational Plan (OPLAN). The Bi-SC Guidelines of Operational Planning (GOP) gives
detailed guidance on Joint Force planning, including the format of OPLANs and their
Annexes, one of which is the Maritime Operations Annex. Specific functional guidance on
Maritime Planning is given in the Maritime Functional Planning Guide (FPG) and the
Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS).
0512. Operations and Warfare Areas. Maritime operations/warfare is divided into the following
areas:
a. Anti-Air Warfare. Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) - in the maritime environment - is the

term used for the defence of friendly forces, against the threat aircraft and airborne
weapons, whether launched from air, surface, or sub-surface platforms. As in anti-
surface warfare,2 denial of intelligence and achieving adequate attack warning are
crucial to the AAW battle. AAW is based on the principle of layered defence,
defeating air raids using organic and shore-based aircraft, long and medium range
Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems, point defence missile systems, guns, close-in
weapons systems and electronic decoys and jammers. These layers are necessary to
gain early warning, counter the adversary’s surveillance and targeting effort, destroy
attacking aircraft before they can release their weapons and, finally, to destroy or
decoy missiles before they can hit friendly forces. In a joint operation, AAW is part
of the overall Air Defence (AD) effort.3
b. Anti-Submarine Warfare. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) comprises operations

with the intention of denying the opponent the effective use of his submarines. The
ASW protection of a force depends on defence in depth and close co-ordination
between ships, helicopters, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), shore-based facilities
and friendly submarines. The complexity of such co-ordination, and the special
environmental factors involved makes the submarine threat one of the most difficult
problems to counter.4
c. Anti-Surface Warfare. Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) is action against an

adversary’s surface forces or merchant ships to achieve sea control or sea denial, to
disrupt his SLOC or to defend against surface threat. ASUW operations should
ensure the timely detection and engagement of an adversary’s surface forces so as to
deny their effective employment. It may be conducted by a Surface Action Group
(SAG) comprising a mix of ships and aircraft which may be supported by
submarines. SAGs are preferably detailed in advance, but may be formed at short
notice from available ships and aircraft to provide a response to an emerging threat.
Once a threatening force is detected, the composition and disposition must be
ascertained before counter-action or attack can effectively be executed. In littoral
waters fast attack craft, which are operated by many nations, may pose a threat to
2
Sub-paragraph 0512c.
3
See Chapter 11 and ATP’s 1, 31, 34, and 55.
4
ASW is covered in ATP’s 1, 28 and 55.
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allied operations. Due to navigational constraints, larger combatants may not be

suited to operate freely in these waters. Fast Patrol Boats (FPB), operating together
with larger combatants and helicopters, may offer the best solution to counter this
threat.5
d. Submarine Warfare. The various types of submarines in service provide a range of

options for strategic and tactical employment. They can operate in high threat areas
which might be untenable to other maritime forces and are capable of sustained
independent operations in pursuit of sea denial or as part of a larger task group in sea
control operations. Conventional and nuclear attack submarines may be employed to
enhance the mix of surface and air forces in ASW operations, and these composite
ASW forces form the forward forces for ASUW operations. Submarines are most
commonly used to provide indicators and warnings, and also reconnaissance in
advance of hostilities. Subsequently they can be used to interdict SLOC for sea
denial, or to enforce sea control when acting as part of a larger task group. They may
also be used for strike operations or to support Special Operation Forces.6
e. Mine Warfare. Mine Warfare (MW) is divided into two areas: laying of mines, and
actions taken to counter the threat of an adversary’s mines (referred to as Mine
Countermeasures (MCM)). Minelaying, or the threat of mining, can either be
protective, defensive or offensive. Protective minefields are laid inside territorial
waters - with the aim of securing friendly forces or shores. Defensive minefields laid
in international waters under NATO control are aimed to restrict or channel an
adversary’s movements. Offensive minefields are laid in waters controlled by an
adversary in order to force the adversary to take action such as closing ports or re-
routing shipping, thus disrupting military and economic supply and naval
deployments. MCM may involve actions taken to prevent an adversary from
successfully laying mines by attacking adversary minelayers, laying own minefields
or damaging facilities required for the support of adversary minelaying, to reduce the
effect of an adversary’s minelaying, such as employment of MCM units, routing of
shipping around high threat areas or through cleared routes, and those actions taken
to reduce ships’ magnetic, acoustic and pressure signatures. 7
f. Amphibious Warfare. The Commander Combined Amphibious Task Force

(CCATF) is responsible for the safe and timely delivery of seaborne forces at an
amphibious objective, and the landing of a force in good order at the right place and
time. These operations require defence of shipping (ASW, AAW, ASUW and MW)
and control of ship-to-shore movement either by surface craft or helicopter.8
5
ASUW is covered in ATP’s 1, 31, 34 and 55.
6
Submarine warfare is covered in ATP 18.
7
Operations in a maritime mine environment are discussed in more detail in Section VI and ATPs 6 & 24.
8
Section VII and ATP-8 provide detailed guidance on planning and execution of amphibious operations.
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g. Information Operations. Maritime forces, in particular striking forces, have a

capability to contribute to achievement of JFC’s Information Operations objectives.9
h. Strike10 Warfare. Maritime forces can contribute to strikes against targets ashore
using carrier-based strike aircraft, sea-launched cruise missiles, naval guns, and
special operations forces. In maritime operations, particularly in the littoral
environment, air forces work in close co-operation with naval forces to ensure the
most effective use of available air assets in strike roles.
i. Naval Control of Shipping. The purpose of NCS is to control merchant shipping of

allied nations in periods of crisis and conflict, including Crisis Response Shipping
and neutral shipping under charter to allied nations, in order to enhance their safety.11
j. Maritime Interdiction Operations. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)

encompass seaborne enforcement measures to interdict the movement of certain
types of designated items into or out of a nation or specific area. These measures
may include enforcing economic sanctions via an embargo of a particular country’s
international trade. Embargoes have several distinct advantages over other
compelling measures involving hostile actions and are conducted to resolve disputes
through measures short of armed conflict, while allowing limited and controlled
force to be used, if necessary. If tensions rise, the affected nation’s warfighting
ability can be diminished by an effective embargo on military supplies.12
k. Sustaining Operations Afloat and Ashore. Once allied joint operations are
established ashore, maritime forces would continue to provide direct and indirect
support to combat operations ashore, but may also have an important role in
sustaining land and air forces by maintaining sealift and keeping SLOC open.13
Section IV - Maritime Force Structure/Force Composition

0513. The composition of a multinational maritime force is likely to be dictated as much by the
political considerations of the contributors as by the desirable military structure of the force.
Nonetheless, the joint force and the maritime component commanders should take a careful
inventory of the resources and capabilities offered by each national contingent when
allocating responsibilities. One of JFC’s principal objectives would be to harmonise the
operating procedures, techniques and communications within the joint force and between
multinational elements in coalition operations.
9
See Chapter 14.
10
In this context, the term ‘strike’ is used in the conventional weapons sense.
11
NCS is covered in ATP-2.
12
MIO is covered in AXP-5.
13
Maritime logistics are covered in ALP-11.
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0514. Allied Maritime Forces. Allied maritime forces, declared by nations under the force
categories of RF, MDF and AF, described in Chapter 1, are normally allocated to either
Multinational Maritime Forces (MNMF)s or Area Forces.
a. MNMFs. MNMFs can be activated as the maritime means for NATO to respond to
crisis situations. The concept calls for a building block approach with Standing
Forces as an initial response force that can be assigned to a joint force, employed and
augmented as required. An MNMF would comprise one of the following:
(1) NATO Standing Naval Force. A Standing Naval Force (SNF) is

comprised of destroyers and frigates, at least one of which must be fully C2
configured, with integrated logistic support. Appropriately equipped small
ships could also participate as well as MCM-SNF comprised of modern
minesweepers and minehunters with integrated command and logistic
support elements.
(2) NATO Task Group. A NATO Task Group (NTG) is comprised of cruisers,
destroyers, frigates, submarines and/or a MCM Task Unit. A NTG
represents an enhancement of an SNF in order to improve its deterrent and
presence capabilities, and consolidate its ability to operate in a hostile
environment. All frigates and larger units should, if possible, be data link
and SATCOM capable. Submarines and MPA are integral to a NTG and
larger MNMFs.
(3) NATO Task Force. A NATO Task Force (NTF) is constituted with
elements of a NTG with a large strike aircraft carrier (CV) and/or one
aircraft carrier (CVS) to provide limited air control and power projection
capabilities, MCM units and an amphibious landing force to conduct limited
operations ashore.
(4) NATO Expanded Task Force. A NATO Expanded Task Force (NETF)
consists of a full battle-capable task force with multiple CV/CVS, a full
amphibious task force, MCM units, and a full complement of multi-mission
capable escorts and submarines.
Any of the four listed forces, possessing graduated capabilities, would be available
for early activation depending on the nature of the crisis. Up to two MNMFs (at
NETF level) can be generated as Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs).14 If the situation so
demands, both MNMFs can be supported or supplemented by a third MNMF drawn
from Main Defence Forces (MDF). The MDF-MNMF would not have a Standing
Force component; it would be activated at the Task Group or higher level. However,
MDF units must be requested early enough to ensure their timely arrival in the JOA.
Other nations’ forces may then be integrated into the MNMF. Smaller groups of
maritime units are called Task Units (TU) or Task Elements (TE).
14
See Chapter 1.
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b. Area Forces. Area Forces are those maritime forces that are declared to NATO with
readiness levels appropriate to the categories of RF and MDF but not allocated to the
MNMFs. They consist of a large variety of platforms, some of which were designed
with a specialised warfare capability or for operations in a specific region. These
forces may operate both outside and inside an immediate crisis area in co-ordination
with MNMFs to provide the essential support required, ranging from independent
operations up to full integration into a MNMF. Subject to national approval, they
may be employed in any region if their capabilities are required.
0515. Force Augmentation. Depending on the overall mission and geographical factors (e.g.
shallow and/or confined sea areas), MNMFs may require augmentation by Area Forces.
Such forces can contribute unique warfare capabilities, such as inshore MCM vessels, small
combatants and/or supporting forces like submarines, Airborne Warning And Control
System (AWACS) aircraft, MPAs and shore-based ASW helicopters and maritime
recce/attack aircraft for Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO).
Section V - Command and Control of Maritime Forces

0516. The JFMCC may have OPCON/TACOM/TACON of assigned or attached forces.
TACOM/TACON of all or part of these forces can be delegated to an Officer in Tactical
Command (OTC) for each selected task force, -group or -unit. The OTC may retain
TACOM/TACON authority or he may delegate some of that authority to subordinate
commanders. The OTC is always responsible for accomplishing the mission of the force.15
The authority and delegated functions for the execution of the OTC’s policy can be
delegated to a Composite Warfare Commander (CWC).
0517. Submarine Operations. Due partly to communications limitations, submarines traditionally

operate independently of surface ships and aircraft, under the OPCON of a Submarine
Operating Authority (SUBOPAUTH) - normally based ashore. However, improvements in
submarine design and particularly communications have made it to some extent possible for
submarines to work directly for an OTC.
0518. Maritime Air Operations. Air assets assigned by the JFC to the JFMCC will be assigned
missions by the JFMCC. Ship-borne maritime air assets are assigned missions by the OTC.
All maritime air assets fall under the direction of the JFMCC, who may in turn delegate an
appropriate level of command/control to an OTC for direct support operations. C2 of
organic air assets such as ASW helicopters is retained by the platform commander. When
deemed necessary, the JFC may allocate maritime air assets to another component
commander and direct that the supporting commander provides detailed flight tasking and
mission support as necessary. Equally, non-maritime air assets allocated to JFMCC may
require tasking and support to be carried out by the supporting commander. Maritime air
forces can be tasked and controlled from a Maritime Air Operations Centre (MAOC) which
may co-ordinate all maritime air operations under its control. To synchronise effort, reduce
15
Command and control in amphibious operations is described in Section VII.
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AJP-01(B)
the possibility of fratricide and ensure the requirements of all commanders are effectively
met, maritime air operations continue to be included to the maximum extent possible on a
designated Combined Air Operations Centre’s (CAOC’s) Air Tasking Order (ATO).16
CAOCs and MAOCs must co-ordinate their respective operations to ensure the integration
of maritime air forces in the joint campaign.
0519. Delegation to Warfare Commanders. Subordinate to the OTC are three principal warfare
commanders: AAW Commander (AAWC), ASUW Commander (ASUWC) and the ASW
Commander (ASWC). Authority may be delegated to the warfare commanders to respond to
threats with assigned assets. Warfare commanders will maintain continuous liaison with
each other to ensure timely flow of mutually supporting information and to avoid mutual
interference.
0520. Formation of Functional Groups. The OTC may form temporary or permanent functional
groups within the overall task organisation, with specified functions, such as operational
deception, underway replenishment, Search Attack Unit (SAU),17 Surface Action Group
(SAG), Helicopter Attack Group (HAG) and screening duties.
0521. Delegation to Co-ordinators. Co-ordinators are asset and resource managers. They carry
out parts of the policies and tasking of the OTC and the warfare commanders. The following
co-ordinators can be designated:
a. The Electronic Warfare Co-ordinator. The Electronic Warfare Co-ordinator

(EWC) is the principal adviser to the OTC in all matters pertaining to the
employment of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums. The EWC has broad
responsibilities, which impact on the management and control of all active and
passive weapons, sensors and communications equipment. Co-ordination and
integration with the JFC’s INFO OPS plan is essential.
b. The Air Co-ordinator. The Air Co-ordinator (AC) co-ordinates air movements
within the Force Air Co-ordination Area (FACA).
c. The Air Resources Element Co-ordinator. The Air Resources Element Co-
ordinator’s (AREC’s) primary role is asset allocation and informing the warfare
commanders of the status of these assets and the results achieved by them.
d. The Helicopter Element Co-ordinator. When required, a separate helicopter

scheduling authority can be designated. However, it should be noted that the AREC
is usually concerned with own carrier-based aircraft while the Helicopter Element
Co-ordinator (HEC) is concerned with helicopters of two or more ships other than a
carrier.
16
See Chapter 7.
17
SAUs are deployed for ASW actions, while SAGs are generally used for ASUW actions.
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e. The Submarine Operations Co-ordinating Authority. The Submarine Operations

Co-ordinating Authority (SOCA) is the OTC’s liaison with the SUBOPAUTH and
assigned submarines.
f. The Mine Warfare Co-ordinator. The Mine Warfare Co-ordinator (MWC) is the
OTC’s advisor on MW matters, responsible for both the laying of own minefields
and the co-ordination of mine countermeasures.
g. Local Warfare Co-ordinators. When two or more units are in company, a local
warfare co-ordinator may be designated (as an example: for air defence a Local Anti-
Air Warfare Co-ordinator (LAAWC) could be established).
Section VI - Operations in a Maritime Mine Environment

0522. During allied joint operations conducted in a maritime environment, the use of maritime
mines by an adversary would constitute a considerable threat to the success of the operation.
The possibility of mining operations by hostile forces during a period of tension must be
considered, as well as the threat of such operations in conflict. When mining occurs, or if
there is a possibility of mining, MCM efforts are required to permit friendly naval and
merchant vessels to use the seas and to enter and leave ports in support of allied forces and
the civil population without an unacceptable risk of damage or losses due to mines. The aim
of this Section is to outline the principal factors affecting allied joint operations under
maritime mine threat, and to list the considerations which should guide commanders and
staffs in the preparation of plans and employment of joint forces, especially amphibious
forces when such a threat exists.
MCM Planning Factors
0523. The response to an adversary’s mining must be immediate, with highest priority given to the
most urgent allied objective. The maritime component commander should assess the threat
and available allied MCM assets; provide advice to the JFC and subsequently plan the MCM
operations based on the JFC’s directive. The planning sequence would be as follows:
a. Assessment of the threat.
b. Assessment of the available MCM capability against the threat.
c. Determination of the MCM objective(s).
d. Development of the concept of MCM operations, and issue of appropriate directives.
0524. The JFMCC, on receipt of a report of mining activity, should decide:
a. Whether a single mine, or the sowing of a minefield, is involved.
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b. If there is a minefield, whether an established sea route or channel is affected, and if

so, what risk it presents.
c. What immediate orders should be issued to friendly combatants and other shipping
approaching the area.
d. If a warning should be issued.
e. If a diversion should be established.
f. If adjacent ports need to be closed.
g. Whether MCM operations should be commenced at once or a delay is permissible or

desirable (e.g. in order to preserve the security of the location of the intended
amphibious operation).
h. If the JFC has sufficient forces assigned to him to deal with the threat.
i. What orders the JFC might be advised to give to the allied MCM forces.
j. What information the JFC might wish to pass to higher authorities, adjacent
commanders and national authorities concerned.
Command and Control of MCM Forces
0525. MCM forces may be assigned or attached to a joint force. The nature of the assignment or
attachment should be considered by the higher authority, taking into account the nature of
the joint operation and the area in which it is to be conducted. The JFC may request the re-
delegation of OPCON to a subordinate commander if necessary.
0526. If a MCM force is included in a joint force organisation, it would normally be placed under
TACON of the JFMCC for a specified period of time. For example, in an amphibious
operation, this would normally occur during advance force operations.
0527. When mine threat exists, Mine Warfare Planning Officers should be appointed to the joint
force headquarters Plans (J-5) staff, and appropriate MW specialists should be included in
the Operations (J-3(N)) branch.
0528. The JFC’s MCM operations directives (MCMOPDIR) would be issued by the OPCON
authority. During amphibious operations, the MCMOPDIR would normally be promulgated
by the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and MCM task orders would be issued
by the commander of the advance force.
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Section VII - Amphibious Operations

0529. An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by a naval and
landing force embarked in ships or craft – with the principal purpose of introducing the
landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile in
order to accomplish the assigned mission. This Section outlines the concept and types of
amphibious operations, and their associated command, control and planning sequence in the
context of allied joint operations.18
0530. Amphibious operations integrate virtually all types of ships, aircraft, weapons and landing
forces in a concerted joint military effort. They are arguably the most complex of joint
operations; requiring common planning at the highest level and co-ordination between the
combined amphibious task force, the landing force and supporting forces at every level.
Careful consideration must be given to the formation of task groups and command structures
to provide unity of command and economy of effort.
0531. Amphibious forces offer strategic mobility and operational manoeuvrability together with
both political and military flexibility. Such forces poised at sea pose a significant problem to
an adversary who must disperse forces to defend all possible landing beaches or maintain a
larger reserve vulnerable to attack. They can exploit the element of surprise and capitalise
upon an adversary’s weaknesses through application of the required type and degree of force
at the most advantageous time and place. Amphibious forces therefore constitute a major
force multiplier; and depending on the specified objectives, may achieve effects at tactical,
operational or strategic levels.
Types of Amphibious Operation
0532. There are 4 types of amphibious operation:19
a. Amphibious Assault. Amphibious assault is the principle type of amphibious

operation which involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
b. Amphibious Withdrawal. The amphibious withdrawal of forces by sea in naval

ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
c. Amphibious Demonstration. An amphibious demonstration is a show of

amphibious force with the purpose of influencing an enemy into a course of action
favourable to friendly forces.
18
Doctrine for amphibious operations is contained in ATP-8 and related publications.
19
Only the amphibious assault involves establishing and sustaining a landing force ashore.
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d. Amphibious Raid. An amphibious raid is a landing from the sea on a hostile, or

potentially hostile shore involving swift incursion into, or a temporary occupancy of,
an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Raids are conducted for such
purposes as:
(1) Inflicting loss or damage.
(2) Securing information.
(3) Creating a diversion.
(4) Capturing or evacuating individuals and/or materiel.
e. Others. There are operations other than warfighting which amphibious forces may
undertake.
Composition and Organisation of Amphibious Forces
0533. Amphibious Task Force Organisation. An Amphibious Task Force (ATF) is a task
organisation formed for the purpose of conducting an amphibious operation. It includes
naval forces and landing forces with their organic aviation assets; other air and fire support
resources may be included as required. The CATF is to be a navy officer, regardless of force
composition. He will be responsible for the safe and timely arrival of sea-borne forces at an
amphibious objective; landing a force in good order at the right place and time, controlling
and coordinating all air operations in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), defence of
shipping and control of ship-to-shore movement either by surface craft or aircraft.
0534. Naval Forces. The naval element of an ATF includes the CATF and his staff, assigned
amphibious shipping, and naval support elements. Naval support elements are assigned as
required. Additionally, surface combatants may be assigned to the ATF for force protection
and providing naval fire support for defence of the ATF.20
0535. Landing Force. The landing force, commanded by a Commander Landing Force (CLF),
consists of a headquarters, ground, aviation and combat support units together with their
combat service support units.
0536. Air Support. Air support can be provided by both maritime and land-based air elements
depending upon the location of the AOA although CATF may also possess organic air
assets, which may be retained for direct support. Air operations would be conducted in
accordance with the procedures in ATP-8, ATP-37 and relevant TacAir publications. The
joint use of air assets must be carefully co-ordinated.
20
Details of specific naval support elements are contained in ATP-1 Volume I and ATP-8.
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ORIGINAL
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0537. Advance Force. An advance force is a temporary organisation within an amphibious task
force, which precedes the main body to the objective area. It participates in preparation of
the objective for assault by conducting such activities as special force operations,
reconnaissance, seizure of supporting positions, MCM operations, preliminary fire support
and underwater demolition. On completion of Advance Force operations any element of the
Advance Force may be re-tasked for subsequent operations as required by CATF or the JFC
in accordance with the command and control status given by JFC.
0538. Fire Support Elements. The success or failure of an amphibious operation may depend on
the effective integration of air, naval surface fire and artillery support. Before, and in the
early states of, the assault phase, the protection of the ATF is very much a naval matter but,
once the landing force is sufficiently established ashore, control of these assets may be
transferred ashore. The provision of continuous fire support during a landing and
subsequent operations ashore is complicated and requires planning and execution by
specially trained personnel and units.
Sequence of Amphibious Operations
0539. An amphibious operation is complete within itself, although it is usually co-ordinated with
other Allied joint force operations being conducted within a JOA. It consists of a sequence
of 5 phases, some of which may be concurrent:
a. Planning. The planning phase starts on receipt of the Initiating Directive for the
operation. Planning must be conducted in some detail before any of the other phases
can start and will continue throughout the remainder of the operation. In view of the
essentially joint nature of amphibious operations, the planning process requires co-
equal planning by CATF and CLF and must be conducted concurrently and
sufficiently early in order to permit CLF to issue orders to subordinates.
b. Embarkation. The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces, with
their equipment and supplies, embark in assigned shipping in the right order/
sequence based on the amphibious landing plan.
c. Rehearsal. The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation
is rehearsed to:
(1) Test the adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operation, and the combat
readiness of participating forces.
(2) Ensure that all echelons are familiar with plans.
(3) Test communications.
d. Movement to an Amphibious Objective Area. During the movement phase,

components of an ATF move from the points of embarkation or from a forward
deployed position to the AOA. This move may be via rehearsal, staging and/or
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rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when the components of the
ATF arrive in their assigned positions in the AOA.
e. Assault. The assault phase is the period between the arrival of the major assault
forces of the ATF in the AOA and the accomplishment of the ATF mission. During
this phase, the AOA, before it is dissolved, must be prepared for follow on
operations.
0540. Termination. An amphibious operation will be terminated on the accomplishment of the

mission in accordance with the specific conditions contained in the Initiating Directive.
When CATF and CLF are satisfied that the conditions outlined in the Initiating Directive
have been met, CATF will report these facts to the designated higher authority. This
authority may then terminate the amphibious operation, dissolve the AOA and the ATF and
provide additional instructions as required, to include command arrangements and
disposition of forces. However, the naval forces and navy support elements of the ATF may
remain intact, and may continue to provide combat and combat service support to the
landing force. An alternative option on termination would be to re-assemble the task force
by re-embarking the landing force for potential use elsewhere in the allied joint force
campaign.
Amphibious Operations Planning
0541. Planning Stages. Planning for an amphibious operation is a continuous process from
receipt of the initiating directive by CATF and CLF to termination of the operation. It
requires co-equal planning by the CATF and the CLF and must be concurrent. There are 3
distinct planning stages:21
a. Initiating Directive. The initiating directive would be issued by the commander

delegated overall responsibility for the operation.
b. Basic Decisions. In this stage the options open to the ATF are considered and an
outline plan decided upon.
c. Detailed Planning. At this stage each aspect of the outline plan is developed in
detail. This results in the amphibious operation order, promulgated on JFC’s
authority by CATF.
0542. Planning Co-ordination. Amphibious operations are essentially joint in nature; therefore,
not only must they be planned in great detail but, equally important, they must also be
planned and co-ordinated jointly at all appropriate levels and be consistent with JFC’s
campaign plan.
21
Described in detail in ATP 8.
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Command and Control of Allied Joint Amphibious Operations
0543. Designation of Commanders. The Strategic Commander will designate CATF and CLF in
the Initiating Directive. The directive would specify the command relationships between
CATF/CLF and other component commanders involved in the Allied joint operations. It
would also state what command relationships are to apply following termination of the
amphibious operation. Commanders of subordinate task groups within an ATF, if they are
not named in the Initiating Directive, would be designated by CATF or CLF as appropriate.
If air forces are assigned to the amphibious operation the command relationships should be
specified in the Initiating Directive.
0544. Command Relationships during Planning.
a. The planning phase commences on the receipt of the Initiating Directive. During this
phase the necessary preparatory measures, including co-ordinated planning, are
affected. Although planning does not cease with the termination of this phase, it is
useful to distinguish between the planning phase and subsequent operational phases,
since a marked change occurs in the relationship between the commanders of the
various components at the time the planning phase is terminated and the operational
phases begin.
b. During the planning phase CATF, CLF and other commanders designated in the
Initiating Directive are on equal levels of command; CATF is responsible for the co-
ordination of planning. All basic decisions must be reached on a basis of a common
understanding of objectives and procedures and on a free exchange of information.
Any differences, which commander of the components of the ATF cannot resolve
should be referred to their common superior.
0545. Command During Operations.
a. Commencement of the Operations. At the commencement of the operational

phases, CATF assumes responsibility for the entire ATF and the operation. He is,
therefore, vested with the commensurate authority to ensure success of the operation.
b. AOA. CATF is responsible for the co-ordination of all activity within the AOA,
including that of friendly forces not part of the ATF. Where such forces are merely
in transit, CATF will exercise control of them only to the extent of preventing or
minimising mutual interference.
c. Operations Ashore. Subject to the overall authority of CATF, responsibility for the
conduct of operations ashore and for the security of all personnel and installations
located in the area of operations ashore, is vested in CLF.
0546. Consultation between Commanders. The complexity and sequential nature of amphibious
operations make it necessary for CATF, CLF and component commanders to maintain a
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continuous, close consultation during the progress of each operation. However, this
requirement in no way limits the command authority of CATF.
0547. Airspace Control During Amphibious Operations. The CATF may be designated as a
Sub-Area Airspace Control Authority (SACA) by the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) for
the duration of amphibious operations. The SACA will exercise overall responsibility for
airspace control in the designated sub-area in accordance with the promulgated airspace
control plan. The SACA remains responsible to the ACA.
Communication and Information Systems in Amphibious Operations
0548. Superimposed on the CIS within a joint force are the additional requirements for the
command of the ATF as a whole, which also requires joint nets at the tactical level.22
22
Details are in ATP 8.
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CHAPTER 6 - LAND OPERATIONS
Section I - The Concept of Land Operations

0601. The Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) in Allied joint operations functions at
the operational level, linking the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) strategy and campaign
planning to tactical execution. The JFLCC uses operational art1 to attain strategic or
operational objectives. Depending on the given authority and command and control relations,
the JFLCC must be able to shift focus, tailor the land forces, and move from one role or
mission to another rapidly and efficiently. Versatility implies a capacity to be
multifunctional, to operate across the range of military operations, and to perform at the
tactical and operational levels as directed to achieve JFC’s objectives during hostilities and
non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs).
0602. Alliance land forces may need to meet a variety of challenges depending on the operational
environment. Operations may range from local security tasks and peacekeeping, to defence
against large-scale aggression. These operations may be displaced in time and location, of
varying intensity and not be linked in any way.
0603. The purpose of this Chapter is to describe how, at the operational level, JFLCC translates
JFC’s objectives and mission orders into a sequence of tactical events aimed at fulfilling the
operational and thus the strategic objectives.
Section II - Characteristics and Capabilities of Land Forces

0604. Land forces are optimised to seize and hold terrain and should possess the capability to
manoeuvre effectively to defeat the adversary. This requires the concentration of in-place
forces and the reserves to achieve local superiority at a decisive time and place. To provide
these decisive capabilities, the basic land component of a joint force should contain armoured,
mechanised and combat aviation forces which are characterised by high levels of combat
power, manoeuvre, survivability, sustainment and mobility. Furthermore, the component
should include a flexible and interoperable CIS infrastructure, combat support and combat
service support and a capability to deny manoeuvre to the adversary. Land force manoeuvre
elements are often reliant upon air and/or maritime support.
0605. In Allied joint operations, the composition of land forces will usually be multinational. This
is essential for Alliance cohesion and for sharing risks and burdens. Multinational land forces
depend on an appropriate level of standardisation in order to operate and communicate with
each other, to support each other and to train and exercise together. Achieving operational
effectiveness in multinational formations is an integral part of effective Allied land force
operations.
1
See Chapter 2 Section IV.
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0606. Land Force Capabilities. Land forces:
a. Conduct operations across the range of military operations.
b. Conduct all arms combat.
c. Co-operate closely with friendly maritime, amphibious, air forces, special operations
forces and other components.
d. Achieve rapid concentration or dispersion of forces and fires.
e. Continuously assess and react to the adversary’s situation.
f. Interdict high priority targets together with maritime, amphibious and air forces
including special operations forces.
g. Fight a sustained, continuous day and night battle under all climatic and terrain
conditions.
h. Counter opposing forces, especially armoured forces and the low-level air threat, and
neutralise or suppress the adversary’s artillery.
i. Ensure flexible, survivable, sustainable, interoperable, deployable, secure

Communications and Information Systems.
j. Ensure flexible, survivable, sustainable, interoperable, deployable and sufficient

Combat Service Support.
k. Conduct Information Operations (INFO OPS) in conjunction with other components.
Section III - Roles and Types of Land Operations

0607. The Alliance may be required to conduct combat operations to defend its interests or to restore
territorial integrity. Such operations may require the full combat power of the Alliance and
will normally involve forces from all member nations. Land force missions normally entail
the holding of terrain, destroying enemy forces and regaining lost territory. The land force
commander needs to be able to conduct simultaneous offensive and defensive operations
utilising manoeuvre and fires to apply overwhelming combat power, achieve decisive results,
protect the force, and facilitate future operations.
0608. Land forces may be involved in non-Article 5 CROs. Such operations use the same military
forces that would be used in conflict/war and, many of the principles of armed conflict/war
apply to non-Article 5 CROs.
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Section IV - Command and Control of Land Forces

0609. The general principles of command and control are addressed in Chapter 4. Land force
operations are guided using campaign plans, operation plans, and operation orders in order to
achieve the objectives required to meet the operation/mission directive issued by the JFC.
0610. The JFLCC will exercise C2 of the forces assigned to him by JFC or by national command
authorities as appropriate. These arrangements will facilitate military operations during peace,
crisis and conflict. JFLCC staff will be organised in such a manner as to ensure the ability to
orchestrate operations across the range of military operations.
0611. A land force organisation would normally have the following staff functions and
responsibilities:
a. Command Group. The Command Group would normally consist the JFLCC, the
deputy/chief of staff and principal staff officers. Occasionally it may include high-
ranking host nation liaison officers and, in non-Article 5 CROs, senior officials from
the UN or other international organisations.
b. Intelligence Division. The Intelligence Division would normally consist of a number

of branches which manage collection efforts, produce intelligence products, provide
input to operational plans, conduct terrain analysis, provide intelligence support to
targeting, and implement counter-intelligence and security operations.
c. Operations Division. The Operations Division normally consists of a plans/future

operations branch, a current operations branch, an air operations branch, a combat
support branch, and a training branch.
d. Logistics Division. The Logistics Division is the primary adviser to the commander
on logistics matters and will translate the JFLCC’s intent into logistics policy
throughout the command. Depending on the size and complexity of the operation and
the degree to which multinational logistics operations formations and concepts are
employed, the Division could also become the co-ordinator of the multinational
logistics operations of the land forces within the command and may be reinforced by
national contributions. Alternatively a separate land force multinational logistics
command and co-ordination activity may be established which would co-ordinate with
the Multinational Joint Logistics Centre responsible for cross component
multinational logistics issues.2
e. CIS Division. The CIS Division provides advice to the JFLCC on CIS matters,
including frequency management, and must co-ordinate closely with all other
divisions to meet their CIS needs and provide input on Emission Control (EMCON)
and Restricted Frequency List management.
2
See ALP-9, NATO Land Force Logistic Doctrine.
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f. Civil-Military Co-operation Element. The CIMIC element provides civil-military

interface and civil-military advice to the JFLCC. The element exercises staff
supervision over CIMIC assets in the land force.
g. Liaison Elements. Normally, the JFLCC will establish liaison elements/officers to

facilitate the transfer of information and help to harmonise operations with all
components. The principal functions of these elements are to: provide operational
expertise on the employment of their respective forces, facilitate communication, and
represent their respective commanders. Additionally, the JFLCC should ensure that
liaison is established between the land component headquarters and the operational
units in the field, and with elements of other national components in the joint force.
Section V - Planning and Execution of Land Operations

0612. Joint operations on land may involve maritime, amphibious, land, and air forces, and such
operations may need to be co-ordinated with operations conducted by forces from non-NATO
nations. This includes planning, task-organising, deploying and employing combat and
combat support forces and co-ordination of logistic and combat service support. A realistic
appreciation of national capabilities, limitations and priorities is essential, and, with co-
ordinated planning that builds combat power rapidly, a synergistic effect can be realised
which will contribute to ending military operations quickly with minimal loss of life, reduced
resource depletion, and possibly a limitation of collateral damage.
0613. The JFC may define an Area of Operations (AOO) for land forces based on the concept of
operations and the requirements of the component commanders, which is commensurate with
the requirement for depth to manoeuvre rapidly and fight at extended ranges as illustrated in
Fig 6-1. The JFLCC would, as required, designate further AOOs within which subordinate
forces would operate.
0614. The JFC uses lateral, rear and forward boundaries to define AOOs for land forces. Such areas
are sized, shaped and positioned to enable land force commanders to accomplish their current
and planned missions while protecting deployed forces. A naval boundary may be designated
for seas adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance co-ordination and execution of naval,
amphibious and land operations.
0615. The JFLCC will usually identify an Area of Interest, greater than the designated AOO, within
which the Joint Force Land Component (JFLC) HQ staff must identify and monitor all
factors, including the activity of an adversary, which may influence current or future
operations.3
3
See Chapter 12 concerning Intelligence responsibilities.
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Boundary
FEBA
FLOT
OB
J
FEBA
FLOT
Figure 6-1 - Land Area of Operations
Land Area of Operations Control Measures. Manoeuvre is the employment of forces on the
battlefield using a combination of fire and movement to achieve a position of advantage over the
enemy in order to accomplish the mission. Co-ordination of the involved forces requires the use of
battlefield control measures which include: objectives to orient the force on the terrain or opposing
force and to identify a desired intermediate or final end-state; boundaries, to separate adjacent forces
and to establish responsibilities; axes of advance, to provide a graphical depiction of intent, orientate
manoeuvre, and de-conflict movement; and a delineation of the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)
and the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) which marks the forward positions of friendly forces
and delineates the direct fire battle area. Control measures also include fire support co-ordination
measures (see Figure 6-2).
0616. Other operational areas may be designated within which land forces may conduct operations.
These include: joint operations areas, joint special operations areas, joint rear areas and
amphibious objective areas.
Sequential and Simultaneous Operations
0617. Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles, understanding their relevance to the
higher operational plan. Operational commanders conduct major operations to achieve
operational objectives set by JFC and described in Chapter 3. Many facets of the JFC’s
campaign plan will be executed sequentially but some will be conducted simultaneously,
particularly in depth. Deployment of forces may continue well after employment begins, and
sustainment is conducted throughout.
0618. Land force operations can be both linear, with clearly defined geographical boundaries,
contiguous units, deep, close and rear operations and well-defined Lines of Communications
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(LOCs), and non-linear with no clearly defined front line and rear area. In linear operations,
emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly
forces. In non-linear operations, land forces tend to focus on assigned objectives (e.g.
destroying an opposing force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centres)
and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. The force must have the
mobility to mass at the decisive point from dispersed locations with superior combat power
and rapidly disperse again. Logistic support and sustainment of operations is considerably
more difficult in non-linear operations.
Section VI - Harmonisation/Synchronisation of Land Operations

Relationship between Offence and Defence
0619. Land force operations will normally include elements of both offence and defence. Land
force commanders apply combat power simultaneously across the depth, breadth and height
of the area of operations. To conduct such operations, land force commanders require
concentration of force in some areas by achieving economy of effort in others. During initial
operations, land forces may be required to defend while force build-up occurs. Even in
sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the land force may need to pause, defend,
resupply or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Commanders at all levels
must possess the mental agility to make rapid transition between offence and defence.
0620. Defence. Defensive operations are usually undertaken to defeat or deter a threat in order to
provide the right circumstances for offensive action. They aim to break the adversary’s attack
and destroy opposing forces to prevent the adversary achieving his aim. Throughout
defensive operations, commanders at every level must fight with imagination, energy and
aggression in order to seize or create opportunities to surprise the adversary; to attack,
destroy, disorganise and delay the opposing forces, not just at the point of immediate contact
but wherever they can be engaged throughout the AOO.
0621. Offence. Offence is the decisive form of armed conflict. Offensive operations are conducted
to defeat the enemy by the imposition of the JFLCC’s will and the application of focused
violence in order to achieve JFC’s operational and strategic objectives. Offensive operations
are characterised by audacity, concentration of combat power, speed of manoeuvre and re-
allocation of the Main Effort, rapid exploitation of weakness, effective but non-constraining
control of subordinates, maintenance of momentum and simultaneous operations throughout
the area of operations.
0622. Reserves. The maintenance and employment of reserves are critical to all land operations.
Once reserves are committed, it is vital for the JFLCC to re-constitute further reserves for
future or subsequent operations.
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Synchronisation
0623. Land commanders are directly concerned with those opposing forces and capabilities that can
affect their current and planned operations. Manoeuvre and interdiction are two key
components of joint force operations and the synergy achieved by synchronising these
components provides the land commander with the capability to both conduct current
operations and shape future operations. Potential responses to synchronised manoeuvre and
interdiction can create an agonising dilemma for the adversary. If the opposition attempts to
counter the manoeuvre, its forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If
the adversary employs measures to reduce interdiction losses, his forces may not be able to
counter the manoeuvre. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronising friendly
manoeuvre and interdiction produces significant advantages, especially at the operational
level.
o/o FSCL
FSCL
FLOT NFA FFA
RFA
o/o FSCL
FSCL
FLOT
Figure 6-2 - Synchronisation of Supporting Operations
Synchronisation of Supporting Operations. At the operational level, land operations involve the
synchronisation of supporting capabilities provided by the total force. Supporting air, land, and maritime
operations are not viewed separately but as complimentary operations designed to achieve the JFC’s
campaign objective. However, it is imperative that the efforts of all forces are co-ordinated to avoid fratricide
or attacking targets which may have an adverse affect on future operations or that have already been
successfully engaged. To facilitate rapid and effective firepower delivery, fire support co-ordination
measures include: No-Fire Areas (NFA) to protect friendly forces; Free-Fire Areas (FFA) to facilitate rapid
engagement of targets of opportunity; Restrictive Fire Areas (RFA) to facilitate future operations; and Fire
Support Co-ordination Lines (FSCLs) established by the JFLCC in co-ordination with other component
commanders. The figure also shows an agreed future position of the FSCL (o/o FSCL) which would be
effective ‘on order’.
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0624. Success in land operations can depend, in part, on the outcome of the operations of other
components, for instance, to shape the battlefield and weaken the opposing force before the
land battle is fully joined. The JFLCC will recommend targets that need to be attacked by
non-organic assets in support of land operations to the JFC through the Joint Targeting Co-
ordination Board (JTCB) - if established. Targets approved by the JFC (as advised by the
JTCB) should be included in the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List for execution by the
relevant component commander.4
0625. Forces identified by JFC for interdiction targeting could have an immediate or potentially
significant impact on the Allied land force scheme of manoeuvre. Interdiction capabilities are
used to delay, disrupt, divert or destroy the adversary’s land forces before they can be used
effectively against friendly forces.
0626. Synchronisation of joint operations within land AOOs is of particular importance. The JFC
establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the designated Joint Operations Area
(JOA), including the land AOOs. Within the land AOO, the JFLCC has the responsibility to
synchronise manoeuvre and fires in consonance with the JFC’s guidance and priorities. The
JFLCC should clearly articulate the concept of operations to those commanders who also
apply other fires within the AOO. Other component commanders must co-ordinate their
operations with the land force commander to ensure that their planned attacks do not
adversely affect the associated land force commander’s planned operations or scheme of
manoeuvre.
Joint Fire Support
0627. Fires include both lethal and non-lethal weapons effects, because both types of effects must be
synchronised to achieve synergistic results. Joint fires are fires produced during the
employment of forces from two or more components in a co-ordinated action towards a
common objective. Joint fire support consists of fires that directly support air, land, maritime,
amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and
facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. To maximise the application of
combat power, land force commanders must synchronise/integrate fires at all levels to ensure
success. Joint fire support represents a significant application of the Joint Force’s combat
power and assists land and amphibious forces to manoeuvre and control territory, populations
and key areas. Joint fire support can include the lethal or destructive operations of Close Air
Support (CAS) by fixed and rotary wing aircraft, Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS),
artillery, mortars, rockets and missiles, as well as non-lethal or disruptive operations such as
EW. Fire support may be delivered by maritime, land, air and special operations forces
against land targets, and normally has either an immediate or near-term effect on land force
operations. Joint fire support requires detailed integration and co-ordination between all
providing forces and gives JFC increased flexibility in both combat and Non-Article 5 CROs.
As with other supporting operations within the AOO, the JFLCC, as the supported
commander, exercises general direction over the supporting effort. This includes designating
4
See paragraphs 0320 and 0628-0630.
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the priorities, effects and timing of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for
co-ordination and efficiency.
Targeting for Land Forces
0628. Air interdiction target priorities within the land area of operations are considered together with
JOA-wide interdiction priorities directed by the JFC and are reflected in the apportionment
decision.5 The JFC will establish procedures through which land force commanders can
identify interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their
boundaries that could affect planned or on-going manoeuvre. These targets are identified,
individually or by category, specified geographically, and related to desired effects and time
periods.
0629. Targeting mechanisms exist at multiple levels. The JFC may establish and task an
organisation within the staff to accomplish targeting oversight functions or may delegate the
responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, the JFC may create a JTCB. If the
JFC so designates, the JTCB would be an integrating centre providing a macro-level targeting
review mechanism. This should be a joint activity, comprised of representatives from the
Joint Force Headquarters staff and all Service components of the joint force and, if required,
their subordinate units.
0630. JFC would define the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB would: review target
information, develop targeting guidance and priorities and may prepare or refine joint target
lists. During operations, the JTCB should maintain a complete list of restricted targets and
areas where Special Operations Forces (SOF) are operating to avoid endangering current or
future operations.
Air Missions and Land Operations
0631. Air power will be employed to contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives of the
Allied joint operation and may provide support for land forces.6 Air forces complement the
JFLCC’s concept of operation by:
a. Gaining and maintaining control of the air as required.
b. Conducting interdiction operations to delay, disrupt and destroy enemy land forces
before they can engage friendly land forces.
c. Providing close air support.
d. Providing electronic warfare support.
e. Providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
5
See also Chapter 7.
6
Air operations are discussed in Chapter 7.
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f. Providing air transport.
Maritime Support for Land Operations
0632. Maritime forces support land operations7 by:
a. Containing enemy maritime forces or destroying them at sea.
b. Countering enemy amphibious operations.
c. Providing a capability to mount amphibious operations.
d. Supporting Allied land forces directly by counter air and anti-surface air operations,
NSFS (ie Naval Gunfire Support and cruise missile (e.g. Theatre Land Attack
Missile)) support.
e. Supporting land operations by conducting sustainment operations.
f. Preventing an adversary’s ability to resupply from the sea.
7
Maritime operations are discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 7 - AIR OPERATIONS

0701. The Air Component Commander (ACC)1 exploits the use of air power in support of the Joint
Force Commander’s (JFC’s) campaign objectives. Air power is employed not only to gain
and maintain control of the air, but also to project military force by acting as a supporting,
supported or independent force towards the achievement of the JFC’s campaign objectives.
Joint air operations may support the activities of maritime, land and special operations force
components either by contributing assets, or by providing other support to sustain and
enhance operations. This Chapter outlines the characteristics of air power, the types of air
operations, command and control aspects plus the planning and execution of joint air
operations.
Section I - Characteristics and Capabilities of Air Power

0702. Air power possesses specific characteristics providing the ability to exploit the third
dimension above the surface of the earth. Exploitation of air power’s inherent characteristics
enables it to be brought to bear against all opposing elements in different ways:
a. Concurrent operations that are parallel air operations conducted at different levels of
operations at the same time.
b. Simultaneous operations that are co-ordinated with the manoeuvre of surface forces.
c. Autonomous operations that only involve air assets and may be distinct from theatre
operations but in support of the strategic end state.
0703. Characteristics. The inherent characteristics and capabilities of air power should be taken
into account when planning for its employment.
a. The use of air power may be rapidly escalated or de-escalated in any kind of conflict.
However, the effective use of air power is conditioned by many factors, not the least
of which are the capabilities and attributes of the air assets themselves. By virtue of
their speed and range, air assets are capable of rapidly delivering precision combat
power and presence anywhere in the world. Furthermore, the flexibility, mobility
and responsiveness of air power allow for the element of surprise across the spectrum
of conflict.
b. Those planning for the use of air power must take into account the unique
capabilities of individual types of air assets. When co-ordinated and packaged
correctly, these air assets can provide a concentration of fires.
1
As the doctrine in this chapter applies equally to the static NATO military command structure as well to CJTF
operations, generic terms such as Air Component Command vice Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) have
been used but that does not preclude the latter and similar terms being used where applicable.
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c. The use of air power may avoid the military and political liabilities that can arise
from an extended presence in a foreign country. As air power can operate without
the requirement to put troops on the ground in the area of operations, it is capable of
influencing a conflict and reducing both the risk to friendly forces and the potential
for negative international reaction. Moreover, should an extended presence in the
country be deemed essential, air power can support this presence effectively with a
comparatively smaller force.
d. The presence and readiness of air power can provide a strong deterrent element in
pre/post conflict periods and may contribute to the stabilisation of the overall
situation.
e. Air power provides the JFC with the means to take advantage of both friendly
strengths and enemy weaknesses whilst preserving his own freedom of action. In
doing so he may direct symmetrical actions where enemy forces and friendly forces
are similar (e.g. air defence v air attack) or pit its strengths against enemy
vulnerabilities (e.g. attack enemy air command, control and information architecture
and vulnerable infrastructure). More importantly, air power enables the JFC to
complement the strengths, and compensate for weaknesses, in other components to
achieve the synergy that is essential for success in the joint campaign.
Section II - Types of Air Operations

0704. Air operations, as a major contributor to Allied joint operations, seek to gain and maintain
the required level of control of the air for subsequent exploitation by friendly forces, at times
and within areas defined by the JFC. The following air operations may be conducted in
support of the joint campaign under the direction of the JFC:
a. Counter Air Operations. The aim of counter air operations is to achieve and
maintain the required degree of control of the air, which ranges from air supremacy
to local air superiority at times and within an area defined by the JFC. It may require
both offensive and defensive operations, normally divided into Offensive Counter
Air (OCA) and Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations. OCA may include fighter
sweep, fighter escort, airfield attack (including attacking aircraft on the ground) and
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) in support of attack and other combat
missions. DCA involves the employment of active air defence weapon systems such
as fighters, surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery, complemented by
passive defence measures.2 In the maritime environment, AD is part of Anti-Air
Warfare (AAW);3 it can be supported using Tactical Air Support for Maritime
Operations (TASMO) procedures.
(1) Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. SEAD is any activity that destroys,
neutralises or temporarily degrades an opponent's surface based air defences
2
Air defence details, including roles and responsibilities, are covered in Chapter 11.
3
Covered in paragraph 0512.
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by destructive and/or disruptive means4. It creates the conditions for the

success of most operations. It is not exclusively an EW function. SEAD
operations are a part of the joint and air planning processes. The integration
of SEAD into air combat operations is essential; it would rarely be used as
an isolated activity to attack air defence targets randomly.
b. Strategic Air Operations. These operations are executed at the strategic or

operational level to achieve desired strategic effects and thus are likely to be shaped
by political aims and constraints. Strategic attack is carried out against an
adversary’s Centre of Gravity (CoG) or other vital target sets including command
elements, military production assets and key supporting infrastructure. The attacks
are conducted to effect a level of destruction and disintegration of the adversary’s
military capacity to the point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to
wage war, or carry out aggressive activity.
c. Anti-Surface Force Air Operations. Anti-surface force air operations are

conducted to deprive the adversary of the military capability to occupy territory or
exploit seaspace by neutralising, delaying or destroying surface forces. They include
Air Interdiction (AI) and Close Air Support (CAS) as well as maritime Anti-Surface
Warfare (ASUW). These operations contribute to the shaping of the battlespace for
the other force components.
d. Land-Air Operations. Fundamental to a land or amphibious force commander’s

scheme of manoeuvre within his Area of Operations (AOO) will be the exploitation
of air power. Its reach, speed, flexibility and ability to concentrate force give him
opportunities to achieve surprise, shock, simultaneous actions and tempo. Within his
AOO a surface force commander is the supported commander, unless otherwise
directed by the JFC, and will designate the target priorities, required effects and
timing. The ACC may need to conduct his own air operations within that AOO (e.g.
to support counter-air or strategic objectives) but these must be co-ordinated with the
land force commander to ensure that the proposed attacks will not adversely affect
his planned operations or scheme of manoeuvre. Anti-surface force air operations
over land comprise:
(1) Air Interdiction. AI is an air operation conducted to destroy, neutralise, or

delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear
effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of
friendly forces is not required.4
(2) Close Air Support. CAS is air action against hostile targets which are in
close proximity to friendly forces and which require the detailed integration
4
AAP-6.
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of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.5 CAS may
be conducted by fixed or rotary wing aircraft.
e. Maritime Air Operations. In maritime air operations, land and sea based aircraft
work in close co-operation with naval forces to ensure the most effective use of
available air assets, with the aim of detecting, monitoring and containing enemy
forward deployment, achieving defence in depth, and seizing and retaining the
initiative. One of the primary roles of maritime air operations is to assist in the
production of the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). Joint operations help to
exploit the natural synergy between air and naval forces but, because of their far
greater speed and reach, air assets may also have to carry out independent actions.
(1) Anti-Surface Warfare. The aim of ASUW is to prevent an enemy from

effectively employing surface forces. This task can be carried out by
aircraft, submarines or surface vessels, preferably in a co-ordinated action.
ASUW covers a wide range of operations involving surveillance and
reconnaissance missions that may culminate in the targeting and attack of
enemy vessels.
(2) Anti-Submarine Warfare. The aim of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) is

to deny the enemy effective use of its submarines. Countering the submarine
threat demands an extensive range of capabilities and may involve the use of
fixed-wing Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), helicopters, friendly
submarines, surface ships or other aircraft. A skilfully conducted anti-
submarine offensive can be switched rapidly from one area to another, and
anti-submarine forces may be concentrated or dispersed within relatively
short periods of time.
Maritime air operations are not necessarily confined to dedicated maritime aircraft;
using TASMO procedures,6 many types of aircraft could be called to support
maritime operations.
f. Supporting Air Operations. Supporting air operations do not necessarily support

the air plan in isolation nor do they only involve fixed wing aircraft - increasingly
helicopters play an active role in air operations. Aircraft may be employed to
enhance operations of all types and in all environments. They also require close co-
ordination and integration and cover the following:
(1) Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Surveillance and reconnaissance

operations are designed to provide timely warning of an adversary’s
activities and threats and to detect changes in capabilities. Such operations
involve the collection of information from airborne sensors on the activities,
forces and resources of an adversary or potential adversary including
5
AAP-6.
6
Outlined in ATP 34.
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coverage of the airspace, surface and sub-surface environments. Resources

available to a joint force may include: aircraft equipped for photographic or
electronic reconnaissance, Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS), MPA, Joint Surveillance and Targeting Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or an Air defence
Ground Environment (ADGE).
(2) Electronic Warfare. Air Electronic Warfare (EW), both active and passive,
should be conducted to allow effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum
by the joint force, whilst using electronic means to determine, exploit, reduce
or prevent hostile use. Co-ordination and integration with the JFC’s
Information Operations Supporting Plan (SUPLAN) is essential.
(3) Air Transport. Air Transport operations, both strategic and tactical,
provide the speed, flexibility and mobility which allows the components of a
joint force to be rapidly deployed, re-deployed, sustained or evacuated. The
availability of sufficient air transport capacity will be of considerable
importance to the JFC’s plans.
(4) Air-to-Air Refuelling. Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) contributes to air

operations as a force multiplier by extending the range, and/or time-on-task
and flexibility of aircraft, as well as enabling a trade-off between fuel load
and weapon or payload. It allows air power to be projected over great
distances or concentrated where and when it is most needed.
(5) Special Air Operations. Special Air Operations are air activities conducted
by specially organised, trained and equipped forces to achieve military,
political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military
means. These operations are conducted during peace, crisis and conflict,
independently or in co-ordination with operations of conventional or in
support of special operations forces.
(6) Airborne Command and Control. Airborne Command and Control

platforms which may be made available to JFC include: AWACS aircraft
and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Centre (ABCCC) aircraft.
(7) Search and Rescue/Combat Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue and
Combat Search and Rescue operations are covered in ATPs 10 and 62.
Section III - Command and Control of Air Operations

0705. Unity of Command and Control over Air Effort. Given the ubiquity and flexibility of air
power, unity of command and control over air effort is best achieved when it is exercised
from the highest level. Allied joint air operations are executed independently or in support of
other components of a joint force to support the JFC’s campaign objectives. Air
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contributions may be made available in the form of forces, capabilities, systems, missions or
sorties. Their effectiveness is not least a function of the relationship between the
commander and the command and control system which has been established.
0706. The Air Component Commander. The designated ACC should: integrate air power
effectively into the overall concept of operations, allow for the fullest exploitation of air
capabilities and co-ordinate the requirements of other components which need to use air
power in support of the campaign objectives.
0707. Designation of a JFACC. For a campaign executed outside the static NATO military
command structure, the JFC would normally designate the component commander with the
preponderance of air assets and the capacity to plan, task and control joint air operations as
the JFACC. The JFC would base the decision on several factors such as: the joint force’s
overall mission, the concept of operations, the mission and tasks assigned to subordinate
commanders, the force available, the duration and nature of joint air operations, and the
degree of unity of command and control of joint air operations required.
0708. The Authority of the Air Component Commander.7 The ACC should plan and conduct
co-ordinated joint air operations using available air contributions in accordance with the
mission statement and JFC’s guidance to accomplish JFC’s overall campaign objectives.
The ACC exercises the level of control authority granted by the JFC. Irrespective of the
designation of a ACC, component commanders will normally retain the original level of
command of their organic forces granted to them by the JFC, and in particular the co-
ordination responsibility of their administrative and logistics support.
0709. The Responsibilities of the Air Component Commander. The JFC will determine the
responsibilities of the ACC. Typically these may include the following:
a. Developing, in co-operation with other component commanders, the joint air

operations plan to best support JFC’s overall campaign plan.
b. Providing an air apportionment recommendation to JFC after consulting other

component commanders.
c. Based on JFC’s air apportionment decision, provide centralised planning for the
allocation and tasking of the air contributions made available.
d. Controlling the execution of joint air operations as specified by JFC.
e. Co-ordinating Allied joint air operations with operations of other component

commanders, and forces assigned to, or supporting JFC.
f. Evaluating the results of joint air operations.
7
As per Note 1, for ACC read JFACC as appropriate.
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g. Performing the duties of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA)8 and Air Defence
Commander (ADC),9 if appointed by JFC.
h. Functioning as a supported and supporting commander as directed by JFC.
i. Gathering and interpreting intelligence (in concert with J2) to support the planning
and execution of joint air operations.
0710. JFACC Headquarters Organisation. A JFACC HQ will normally adopt a structure of

primary and special staff functions tailored to the mission. The structure could vary from a
formal A-1 to A-9 staff organisation complete with a separate and readily identifiable Air
Operations Centre (AOC), to one in which the staff would, along with other duties, conduct
the functions accomplished by an AOC but would not be so formally structured. The
JFACC HQ may be established on land or afloat depending on the nature of the crisis, the
geographical situation, the structure of forces and command and control aspects. Principal
considerations would be Force Protection, adequate Host Nation Support, Basing Rights as
well as the composition and size of the forces involved. Whether sea-based or land-based,
the organisational structure and functions for the JFACC essentially remain the same.10
Section IV - Planning and Executing Air Operations

0711. Developing the Concept of Joint Air Operations. Planning for joint air operations begins
with the mission given to the joint force. The JFC’s estimate forms the basis for determining
force components’ objectives. On the basis of the joint force mission and the JFC’s concept
of operations and the defined objectives, the ACC devises an air estimate. This estimate is
followed by the systematic formulation of a Course of Action (CoA). When the ACC’s CoA
is approved by the JFC, it becomes the basic concept of air operations. The joint air
operations plan and supporting plans detail how air power will support the JFC’s campaign.
0712. Force Management. Following Transfer of Authority (TOA) to NATO Commanders and
subject to nations’ caveats and the level of Command Authority delegated to a JFC over such
assigned forces (normally OPCON), the management of air assets is conducted within the
guidelines of the following principles:
a. Allotment. Allotment is the temporary change of assignment of air forces between

JOAs. The authority to allot assets is vested in the commander having operational
command (SC/RC).11 The process of allotment is used to provide a balance of forces
needed to achieve the objectives stipulated by that commander.
b. Apportionment. Apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total

expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air
8
See Chapter 10.
9
See Chapter 11.
10
JFACC doctrine is contained in AJP-3.3.7 (draft).
11
Except for nations which do not delegate OPCOM forces to SCs in accordance with specific agreements.
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operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. Apportionment is the
ultimate responsibility of the JFC. The ACC is responsible to the JFC for the
apportionment recommendation. In order to take full account of the overall theatre
campaign plan of the JFC, the ACC must consult and advise component
commanders, or their liaison officers, before making the apportionment
recommendation. Each component commander within the joint force will have a
supporting plan and concept of operations to support the JFC’s campaign. Therefore,
all components should provide the ACC with their requirements for air support
through their liaison elements. This basic understanding will allow for co-ordination
and de-confliction of air requirements among components and within the JFC’s staff.
c. Allocation. Allocation is the translation by the ACC of the JFC’s apportionment of

the available air assets into total numbers of sorties available for each operation or
task. Allocation explicitly takes into account the practicalities of geography and
combat role limitations. Apportionment should have taken these into account
implicitly; if it has not, then feedback will be required.
d. Targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate
response to them. 12 The outcome of this process is subsequently reflected in a re-
iterative air tasking and execution cycle, based on continuous mission analysis and
combat/operations assessment. The target development process and allocation phase
are closely inter-related; both are essential for the ACC staff to efficiently plan and
execute joint air operations. All weapons, including non-lethal weapons, are
matched to targets and an over target requirement (OTR) is derived. The prioritised
targets are inserted into a Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP). The allocation of aircraft
to match the MAAP forms the foundation of the Air Tasking Order (ATO).
e. Air Tasking Order Development. After the MAAP is approved by the ACC, the
Plans staff would prepare the joint ATO, Special Instructions (SPINS), and, if the
ACC is also the ACA, authorise the Airspace Control Order (ACO) prepared by the
Joint Airspace Co-ordination Centre (JACC) staff. Based on the JFC’s objectives,
excess sorties not required for the direct support of other components may be re-
allocated and made available for tasking by the ACC.
f. Execution. The ACC directs the execution and de-conflicts all capabilities or forces
made available for a given ATO. Units then execute the ATO as tasked,
recommending changes to the AOC as appropriate, subject to any revised
requirements by the JFC.
g. Combat Assessment. Effective campaign planning and execution require

continuous evaluation of the impact of joint force combat operations on the
12
Chapter 3 paragraphs 0319 and 0321 covers the need to co-ordinate between component commanders before targets
can be prioritised.
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adversary’s capability. CA is undertaken at all levels, and the JFC should establish a
dynamic system to support all force components.13
0713. The Force Management Process. When integrating the air assets assigned to him, the JFC
should take the following factors into consideration:
a. The objective to be achieved.
b. The legal and political constraints.
c. The nature and intensity of the conflict, the strategy being employed, and in
particular the threat, the probable types of targets, the likely response times required
and the force generation requirements.
d. The operational capabilities, limitations and security of all weapon systems, the
terrain and weather conditions.
e. The availability of logistic support.
f. Terms of assignment including any national reservations concerning the use of air
assets.
0714. Communications and Information Support. The ACC will require a reliable, responsive,
secure and highly capable Communications and Information Support (CIS) in order to co-
ordinate and integrate air planning and tasking in an area of responsibility. This includes
developing, processing and transmitting the ATO and ACO, ideally across seamless
interfaces to maritime, land and air forces involved as well as the receipt of mission, force
and base reports and requests. The CIS must be interoperable within the joint force and
supporting national elements, and between the force and any host nation forces.14
13
See paragraph 0321.
14
See Chapter 13.
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CHAPTER 8 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Section I - Definition and Range of Tasks

0801. This Chapter summarises the tasks, characteristics and principles of employment of Special
Operations Forces (SOF), and provides guidance to commanders and staffs on the essential
factors involved in the planning of special operations in the context of allied joint operations.
0802. SOF provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with a flexible, versatile, and unique
capability, whether employed alone or complementing other forces or agencies, to attain
military-strategic or operational objectives. Special operations, in contrast to conventional
operations, are generally small, precise, adaptable and innovative; they may be conducted in
a overt, covert or discreet manner.
0803. Definition of Special Operations. Military activities conducted by specially designated,

organised, trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of
employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the
full range of military operations (peace, crisis and conflict) independently or in co-ordination
with operations of conventional forces to achieve military, political, economic and
psychological objectives or a combination thereof. Political-military considerations may
require covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political
risk not associated with conventional operations.
0804. Special operations may be conducted across the range of military operations defined in
Chapter 2:
a. SOF may be employed in support of the Alliance’s military-strategic objectives and

operational objectives as directed by the JFC.
b. SOF operations would be directed at the accomplishment of high value, critical

objectives that may entail high risk but also high pay-off value.
c. Although SOF can be employed at the tactical level for a limited period of time, e.g.
on a special, high value task, these forces are limited in number, not easily
replaceable, and should not be used as a substitute for other, more appropriate forces.
d. SOF can be most effective when employed during peacetime. They can contribute
directly to enhance mutual co-operation, promote democracies, support peace
operations, establish forward presence, provide early identification and assessment of
a crisis, train friendly forces, develop military liaison.
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e. SOF may be employed in support of the Information Operations (INFO OPS)

implementation at the strategic and operational level.1
f. In crisis, SOF can provide: area assessments and an early C3 capability, complement
and reinforce political activity, support the NATO Precautionary System and military
response options and assist in the transition from peace to crisis and conflict if
necessary.
g. On operations, SOF would conduct primary tasks of special reconnaissance and

surveillance, military assistance, direct action, or a suitable combination of tasks, to
support allied joint operations to repel aggression, restore peace and assist in conflict
termination; they would also assist post-conflict activities during the transit back to
peace.
Section II - Special Operations Tasks

0805. In the context of allied joint operations, SOF conduct three principal tasks: special
surveillance and reconnaissance, direct action and military assistance.
0806. Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Special reconnaissance complements national

and allied intelligence collection assets in the Area of Intelligence Interest and systems by
obtaining specific, well defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational
significance. It may complement other collection methods where constraints are imposed by
weather, terrain-masking, hostile countermeasures and/or other systems availability. Special
reconnaissance is a human intelligence function that places ‘eyes on target’ in hostile, denied
or politically sensitive territory. Special operations forces may conduct these tasks
unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. They may use advanced
reconnaissance and surveillance techniques and equipment and/or sophisticated covert or
discreet collection methods and may employ indigenous assets. Special reconnaissance and
surveillance tasks may include:
a. Area assessment to assist the JFC’s decision-making process.
b. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations conducted in advance (in time or

geography) of operations by conventional forces.
c. Target acquisition, e.g. an adversary’s C2 systems, troop concentrations, special

weapons, lines of communication, and other military and non-military targets of
significance.
d. Collection and reporting of critical information about the movement and intent of an
adversary’s forces in or adjacent to the area of operations.
1
See Chapter 14.
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e. Location and surveillance of critical or sensitive facilities in hostile or denied

territory. Meteorological, geographic, hydrographic and post-attack reconnaissance
to support specific maritime, land or air operations.
f. Close target reconnaissance, in order to get specific target details, obtainable only by
human sources.
0807. Direct Action. In the conduct of Direct Action (DA) operations, units may employ raid,
ambush, or direct assault tactics; place munitions and other devices; conduct stand-off
attacks by fire from maritime, ground or air platforms; provide terminal guidance for
precision-guided munitions, and conduct independent sabotage. DA operations are normally
limited in scope and duration, and usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the
immediate objective area. SOF may conduct these tasks unilaterally or in support of
conventional operations; these actions are designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and
often time-sensitive operations of strategic, or operational significance. Such operations
frequently occur beyond the reach of tactical weapon systems and strike capabilities of
conventional forces. DA operations typically involve:
a. Attack on critical targets (materiel or personnel).
b. Interdiction of critical lines of communication or other target systems.
c. Location, capture, or recovery of designated personnel or materiel.
d. Seizure, destruction, or neutralisation of critical facilities or equipment.
e. Provide aviation assets, reaction teams and co-ordination facilities in support of

personnel recovery operations in denied or unfriendly territory.
f. Support operations to counter proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and key

components (personnel, equipment and facilities) of such weapons.
g. Conduct direct action against critical targets identified within the ‘information
infrastructure’ of opposing forces.
h. Direct action tasks may be conducted independently or within the context of larger
conventional operations or unconventional operations.
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0808. Military Assistance. Special operations may include the requirement to provide Military
Assistance (MA) to friendly or allied forces in peace, crisis and conflict. This assistance can
be provided directly or indirectly to a designated friendly force or to an indigenous military
or para-military force to protect their democratic society from subversion, lawlessness or
insurgency. MA operations may include:
a. Training, equipping, supporting and, if necessary, directing designated friendly

forces to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic or psychological
weaknesses.
b. Training, equipping and supporting the establishment of assisted evasion and escape
nets.
c. Training, advising and assisting host nation military and para-military forces so that
they can unilaterally assume responsibility for controlling their internal instability.
d. Supporting and advising, as needed, other member nations of a coalition or alliance

to facilitate interoperability.
e. Support peace operations by:
(1) Providing immediate technical advice and assistance in organisation,

planning, intelligence, command and control, health service, engineering and
security, during humanitarian crisis or disaster relief.
(2) Facilitating, using cultural and language skills, a co-ordinated, multinational

approach to conflict resolution through liaison teams.
0809. Characteristics of Special Operations. Special operations are marked by certain

characteristics that distinguish them from conventional operations. Special operations are:
a. Usually of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, critical targets
which offer the potential for high returns.
b. Often politico-military in nature and require understanding, oversight and full

support at Alliance/national level. They demand detailed planning and co-ordination
with other commands, services, government and non-governmental agencies.
c. Usually conducted by small teams of highly trained, mature professionals.
d. Generally dependent on responsive and specialised maritime, land and air support.
e. Usually covert or discreet in nature.
f. Frequently undertaken when the use of conventional forces is, for military or
political reasons, neither appropriate nor feasible.
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g. Reliant on surprise, security and audacity, frequently employing deception to achieve

success.
h. Usually conducted at great distance from established support bases, requiring

sophisticated communications and means of infiltration, exfiltration and support to
penetrate and recover from hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas.
i. May require patient, long-term commitment and detailed knowledge of the

conditions, languages and culture of the operational area.
j. Dependent on discriminate and precise use of force, often requiring the rapid
development, acquisition and employment of special weapons and equipment.
k. Dependent on detailed intelligence, intimate and responsive C2, thorough planning,

decentralised execution (by those who did the planning) and rigorous, detailed
rehearsal.
Section III - Principles of Employment of Special Operations Forces

0810. Although SOF often use sophisticated and unorthodox methods and equipment, the key to
success lies with the individual special operator. Therefore it is essential that the plans and
procedures that drive their employment be simple and direct so that the commander’s intent
is understood.
0811. High Value Tasks. The number of SOF are limited and they cannot rapidly expand their
numbers. They should not therefore be employed like conventional forces who rely on
manoeuvre and concentration (mass). SOF concentrate their combat power directly and
indirectly, with subtlety, at decisive times and places. Care must be taken not to fragment
the efforts of SOF against targets that are attractive but perhaps operationally or strategically
irrelevant. SOF should therefore be assigned tasks that lead directly to the accomplishment
of military-strategic and operational level objectives. The following criteria should be used
when evaluating SOF employment:
a. Appropriate. Is the mission suitable for SOF capabilities, and does it accord fully
with the Alliance’s policies and with the JFC’s objectives? Could another asset be
used? The mission must have a unique aspect that requires the special skills and
capabilities of SOF, and which renders the mission unsuitable (or less suitable) for
action by other assets.
b. Feasible. If the mission is appropriate, can it feasibly be accomplished by the SOF

assets available? Does the SOF element have the appropriate training, skills,
planning and rehearsal time, and the required linguistic and cultural background?
c. Sustainable. Are the resources adequate? Is the intelligence sufficient; is there

adequate infiltration, logistic sustainability on the ground, exfiltration, survivability
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and CIS support? Even if the target is appropriate, feasible and vulnerable to SOF, a
lack of dedicated resources may render it unfeasible to mount a special operation.
d. Justifiable. Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Commanders should
recognise the high value and limited resources of SOF and ensure that the benefits of
successful task execution are measurable and in balance with the risks inherent in the
task. Assessment of risk should take into account not only the potential for loss of
SOF units and equipment, but also the risk of adverse effects on Alliance diplomatic
and political interests should the mission fail.
0812. Access to Intelligence. Special operations must be planned in considerable detail, and SOF
rely on accurate, up to date intelligence to ensure that plans meet precisely the situation in
the intended target area. Access to timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source
intelligence is essential for a successful operation.
0813. Clear Command and Control Relationships. The principles of Command and Control
(C2) in Chapter 4 apply to SOF employment. Because of the nature of special operations, a
clear chain of command, uncluttered by additional headquarters, is essential:
a. Special operations should be directed and controlled by a Special Operations

functional component command called a Combined Joint Special Operations Task
Force (CJSOTF) consisting of special operations personnel serving in key command
and staff positions.
b. A framework nation should be designated as early as possible in the planning to

assume the task of forming and leading the CJSOTF for the duration of assigned
mission task(s). This nation should take the lead in:
(1) Preparing SOF OPLAN.
(2) Establishing a combined and joint task force staff.
(3) Determining SOF requirements.
(4) Co-ordinating SOF support.
(5) Assuming OPCON/TACOM/TACON and direct the employment of NATO

SOF in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
(6) Participating in the multinational targeting process.
(7) Establishing and maintaining liaison with appropriate NATO and non-
NATO headquarters.
(8) Provide basic support infrastructure.
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c. The security requirements of SOF demand that special care is taken to ensure that
SOF C2 is closely integrated with the C2 of the joint force through appropriate
liaison and CIS interfaces.
d. The relevant Strategic and Regional Commanders should have appropriate SOF
expertise on their staffs. These staff directorates should take the lead in:
(1) Advising the commander and staff on the feasibility capabilities, limitations
and proper employment of SOF.
(2) Providing strategic assessments.
(3) Co-ordinating and liasing between National Defence Structures and the
NATO SOF.
(4) Representing SOF in the force generation process.
0814. Mission Directives. The JFC should provide broad, but clear, mission directives to assigned
SOF that accord with the principles outlined in Chapter 4. The basic SOF concept requires
centralised planning and decentralised execution of operations. Therefore, the SOF mission
directive must allow the operational elements sufficient flexibility to react to an adversary’s
activities, and the necessary authority to adjust the SOF plan to cope with changing
conditions during the conduct of their mission.
0815. Security. Security is paramount in special operations. Planning is often compartmentalised

and planning staffs are kept small. However, SOF planning must be integrated with the
JFC’s overall campaign to ensure mutual support. Within the SOF compartmentalised
activity, information must be shared by all concerned with the planning of operations.
Intelligence, counter-intelligence, cover and INFO OPS aspects should all be integrated
throughout the planning and execution of special operations to enhance security and achieve
surprise.
Section IV - Planning Considerations in Special Operations

0816. Principle. The keystone of SOF task planning is the operational element that will execute
the task must plan the task.
0817. Early Employment. Special operations should be considered early in the JFC’s campaign
planning process. Because SOF offer combinations of unique military capabilities not
normally found in conventional forces they should be considered as a major force
component, able to support the NATO Precautionary System, the military response options
and the JFC’s objectives at all levels.
0818. Integration. SOF may be employed to gain ‘decisive points’ and to unlock the adversary’s
Centre of Gravity (CoG); in some cases, SOF may be able to gain access to and attack the
adversary’s CoG directly in order to achieve the desired ‘end-state’ or to assist in conflict
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termination. This activity means that the political implications of special operations may be
more critical than those for conventional military operations. Therefore, the JFC should
view each special operation in broad and long-term political, military, and psychological
dimensions, which may impose legal and political constraints on its execution.
0819. Security. The decision to employ SOF may hinge on the need for a rapid, low-visibility
response of limited size. Therefore, security measures, cover stories and deception must be
integrated at the first stage of operational planning.
0820. Comprehensive Planning. Prior to an employment decision, the task must be

comprehensively planned beginning with ‘action at the objective’. The plan should include
development of the profiles for infiltration, re-supply, and exfiltration of the forces.
Emphasis on pre-planning for extraction is critical because, by the time extraction is
required, the element of surprise is often lost, particularly in short-duration operations.
Specific employment parameters and co-ordination procedures should be provided by
specialist staffs and included in the relevant campaign and operation plans.
0821. Intelligence. The nature of special operations requires intelligence support that is more
detailed than that needed by non-special operations forces. Special operations require more
collection, research, analysis, and textual elaboration than most conventional tasks. The
scope of special operations requires information on the military, social, economic, political,
information and cultural dynamics of the operational area. To obtain the requisite support,
planners and operators must ensure that both alliance and national collection analysis, and
production agencies can be exploited. These intelligence relationships and interfaces must
be established in peacetime to provide support across the full range of military operations
(peace, crisis and conflict).
0822. Targeting. Special operations forces must participate as full members of the Allied
targeting process at all levels. The targeting process is essential for the co-ordination of SOF
tasks.
0823. Logistics. Special operations specific logistical support is the responsibility of the SOF
providing nation. Common usage supply items will be provided in accordance with the
established alliance procedures for the task and the agreements with the SOF framework
nation. Special operations operate throughout the JOA in small elements often apart from
normal logistical support structures. SOF, therefore, may have to establish host nation
support agreements and tailor support arrangements. Re-supply of deployed SOF elements
in remote or denied areas is planned and executed as operational tasks.
0824. Legal/Rules of Engagement. Because special operations are conducted across the full
range of military operations (peace, crisis and conflict) and are of a sensitive nature, legal
and rules of engagement issues must be considered early in the planning process. This
review should take account of the legal and political implications of all foreseeable
contingencies.
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CHAPTER 9 - LOGISTICS
0901. Effective logistic support is fundamental to the success of any campaign, and therefore must
be an integral part of all operational planning. NATO logistics encompasses the planning
and carrying out of the movement and maintenance of forces and includes the disciplines of
transportation, and medical and health services. In its most comprehensive form, it also
includes acquisition, supply and services, storage, distribution, equipment maintenance,
evacuation and disposal. In addition, the areas of infrastructure engineering and contracting
are likely to be vital to the logistic effort.
Section I - Logistic Principles and Policies

0902. Nations and NATO authorities have a collective responsibility for logistic support of
NATO’s multinational operations.1 While nations are ultimately responsible for the
provision of resources to support their forces, NATO commanders will ensure that the
logistic force structure is capable of supporting the operation, and will co-ordinate support
among contributing nations and with the host nation to ensure operational success. They
must also be given, at the appropriate level, sufficient authority over the logistic resources
necessary to enable the NATO commander to employ and sustain the forces under command
in the most effective manner. This includes the authority to redistribute logistic assets
committed by nations for the support of the joint force, under the terms and conditions
detailed in MC 319/1.
0903. Co-operation, Co-ordination, Primacy of Operations, Flexibility, and Synergy are main
principles that govern any joint and multinational logistic support planning. That is to say,
the campaign logistic support concept must meet the mission and be flexible enough to
facilitate a variety of national approaches, take advantage of national strengths and clearly
indicate that it is beneficial to both the contributing nations and NATO authorities.
Section II - NATO’s Logistic Support

0904. NATO logistic support is structured to meet the demands of a joint commander’s operational
concept in light of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept and emerging doctrines. It is
flexible, functional and designed to assist in exploiting tactical success. It also achieves
efficiencies and economies of scale resulting from the effective co-ordination of national
logistic support and integration of multinational logistics.
0905. The logistic plan, structures and procedures must be tailored to the respective forces and their
related employment options. A variety of support options and Command and Control (C2)
arrangements are available under the NATO logistic support concept, providing innovative
1
MC 319 /1 provides the complete listing of logistic principles. In AJP-4 ‘Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine’ logistic
principles and policies have been translated with an operational level focus to elaborate NATO’s logistic support
concept. Single-Service logistics doctrine covering land, sea and air operations are contained in Allied Logistics
Publications (ALP) 9, 11 and 13 respectively.
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and effectual co-operative support arrangements to meet the alliance’s logistic requirements
across the operational spectrum.
0906. Under the NATO logistic support concept a series of logistic planning conferences has been
established for the co-ordination of NATO commanders and nations logistic planning. The
logistic planning conferences must be harmonised with both operational planning and force
generation.
0907. Logistic support options for a Joint Force Commander (JFC) can range from purely national
support to multinational logistic support. The latter may encompass Lead Nation Support,2
Role Specialisation3 and/or Multinational Integrated Logistic Support. Normally, the NATO
force will be supported through a combination of the various options available. In all cases
the logistic support options used should be tailored to meet mission requirements and are to
be selected and implemented in consultation with nations.
0908. Primary considerations in development of the logistic support structure include whether it is
an Article 5 or non-Article 5 operation, the type, size and scope of the mission, and Host
Nation Support (HNS) or contracting support availability in the Joint Operations Area
(JOA). Additional considerations include the extent of involvement by International and
Non-Governmental Organisations (IO/NGOs), availability of bilateral acquisition and cross-
servicing agreements, the existence of additional requirements for rear area security, and
requirements for operating points of entry and lines of communication, or for co-ordinating
the use of real estate, contracting, and joint force level engineering.
Section III - Logistic Command and Control

0909. To co-ordinate national and multinational logistics and support a JFC’s concept of
operations, a flexible and definable logistic command and control structure must be
established. C2 activities must be organised based on the operational mission and be co-
ordinated with contributing nations to obtain support and manning for the structure. The J4
staff will typically accomplish logistic co-ordination functions. Extended co-ordination
requirements may require the augmentation of the J4 staff by designated co-ordination
elements or the establishment of a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre (MJLC) under the
direction of J4. The mission of the MJLC is to co-ordinate, on behalf of the JFC, logistic
support between the components and with National Support Elements (NSEs), Host Nations
(HNs) and NGOs (interfacing with the Civil-Military Co-operation centres) to eliminate
duplication of effort, to resolve potential conflicts, and to provide common logistic services,
where appropriate. The MJLC is also responsible for: the centralised co-ordination and/or
2
One nation assumes responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of
the multinational force and/or headquarters. Compensation and/or reimbursement will be subject to agreements
between the parties involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to co-ordinate logistics of other
nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility.
3
One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring a particular class of supply or service for all or a part of the
multinational force. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties
involved.
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management of common logistic functions and the provision of supplies and services. This
is accomplished through a variety of support options, including establishment of role
specialist and lead nation functions, and it may, on behalf of the JFC, task Multinational
Logistic Units (MLUs) if allocated.
0910. Logistic Communication and Information Systems. The logistic C2 structure must also
provide the JFC visibility over logistic implications that will impact operations. This must
include effective communications and information systems between NATO, national and
multinational logistic staffs with efficient and compatible interfaces.
Section IV - Logistic Responsibility and Authority

0911. The JFC should establish the logistic requirements and subsequently monitor and co-ordinate
the sustainment of the assigned forces. He should have multinational logistic expertise on
the staff. Organisation of a MJLC could be considered to co-ordinate logistic activities. The
JFC should promulgate the logistic arrangements for the joint force through a Force
Sustainability Statement issued as part of the operational plan; this should use the principal
headings of distance, demand, duration, casualty rates and vehicle usage. The Sustainability
Statement acts as a baseline against which participating nations can plan their logistic
support and the joint commander can assess individual contributions.
0912. SCs are authorised to conclude HNS MOU. The SC may delegate this authority to
designated subordinates as appropriate. Sending nations may then choose to accede to the
MOU. HNS rendered to allied forces and organisations will be reimbursed from either
national, shared multinational or NATO common funds, according to principles provided in
MC 334/1. In the execution of operational plans, the JFC should prioritise the HNS required
in co-ordination with the appropriate SC and host/contributing nations involved, and a
suitable organisation within the MJLC should be formed to advise the JFC on the subject.
0913. The JFC would require the authority to redistribute specified and agreed logistic assets
contributed by nations for support of the forces under their command.4 Additionally, the
JFC would require both to initiate and to participate in HNS negotiations and to redistribute
logistic resources, the authority to negotiate contract support required for the joint force
within the framework of the allocated budget.
0914. The JFC should ensure that the logistic bases and rear areas of the joint force are secure in
co-operation with the relevant Host Nation.
4
The terms and conditions for the Transfer Of Authority (TOA) over logistic resources to a NATO Commander are
defined in MC 319/1.
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Section V - Movement and Transportation

0915. The Movement and Transportation Concept for NATO is set out in MC 336/1. It establishes
NATO’s and nation’s collective and national responsibilities for movement and
transportation support and states the host nation’s role and functions:
a. NATO Commanders are responsible for initiating, prioritising, co-ordinating and de-
conflicting the deployment, transportation for re-supply, and re-deployment of their
forces. This must be done in co-operation with nations.
b. Contributing Nations have the primary responsibility for obtaining transportation

resources to deploy, sustain and re-deploy their forces. They will plan and control
the movement of national forces and national components of multinational forces.
For a multinational headquarters, a lead nation may assume equivalent
responsibilities.
c. The host nation is the ultimate authority for movement on its territory.
0916. Movement planning is part of the operational planning process. The development of
movement plans in support of NATO operations will be an iterative process and may begin
with limited military guidance or political clearance. Force planning should identify all
forces needed to fulfil operational requirements which have been established in the concept
of operations, in order to arrange the arrival of these forces into the area of operations in
accordance with the JFC’s priorities and timelines. The movement of forces in support of
the Commander’s operational plan will be co-ordinated and de-conflicted through the Allied
Movement Co-ordination Centre (AMCC) at the SC level. The movement planning results
in a multinational and de-conflicted Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP).
0917. Allied joint operations also require that the JFC fulfils a co-ordinating role in all movement
and transportation for the assigned forces in the JOA. Movement systems and the JFC’s
transportation resources, including airlift assets, must be able to respond to force deployment
and logistic support requirements set out in the operational plan.
Section VI - Medical/Health Service Support

0918. Medical/health service support is a crucial aspect of Allied joint operations and needs to be
included in the campaign plan. While logistic support principles apply to medical/health
service support, medical staffs generally face unique problems affecting the health, and
therefore the effectiveness, of multinational personnel deployed on Allied joint operations.
The overall objectives of medical/health service support are the conservation of manpower,
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prevention of disease, preservation of life and limb, and the limiting of residual physical and
mental disabilities.5
0919. Medical/health service support advisors must be appointed at all levels of command during
an operation. They are usually designated as the ‘formation surgeons’, accountable to and
with direct access to their commanders. The Theatre Surgeon, who is the Medical Advisor
to the JFC, is supported by an appropriate staff and by the Medical Co-ordination Centre
(MEDCC) of the MJLC. The requirement and staff organisation for medical representation
within the command and control structure are described in AJP-4.
0920. The provision of medical and health service support across the spectrum of multinational
force deployments should be at a standard acceptable to all participating nations and as close
as possible to prevailing peacetime medical standards.
0921. Resources and Capabilities. The resources and capabilities required to meet the tasks
above are detailed in AJP-4.10.
5
The specific principles of medical/health service support are described in MC 326/1, AJP-4 ‘Allied Joint Logistic
Doctrine’ and AJP-4.10 ‘Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine’.
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CHAPTER 10 - AIRSPACE CONTROL
Section I - The Airspace Control Concept

1001. In order to utilise the airspace within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) efficiently and reduce
the risk of fratricide, there is a need to control and manage it to achieve de-confliction
between the friendly air assets whilst allowing the maximum freedom of operation. To
achieve these aims, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) must ensure that an appropriate
system of control exists. NATO nations will remain responsible for operating their own Air
Traffic Services (ATS) and aeronautical communications systems, except where alternative
arrangements might be mutually agreed.
1002. Airspace Control System. An Airspace Control System (ACS) is an arrangement of those
organizations, personnel, policies, procedures and facilities required to perform airspace
control functions. The airspace within the designated Joint Operations Area (JOA) will be
used by all components of a joint force to conduct their missions. Airspace control should
maximise the effectiveness of all military operations by allowing the efficient, integrated and
flexible use of the airspace with the minimum of mutual interference and constraints.
1003. Airspace Control Authority. The Airspace Control Authority (ACA) is the commander
designated to assume overall responsibility for the ACS in an airspace control area.
1004. Airspace Control Area. The basic geographic element of airspace control is the Airspace
Control Area (ASC-Area). In general, the ASC-Area coincides with the designated JOA.
An ACS will operate within the ASC-area.
1005. Airspace Doctrine. The doctrine and means by which airspace control is effected in times
of crisis and war is contained in ATP-40.1 Detailed procedures for the NATO area are
contained in NATO regional airspace control plans. The basic ATP-40 doctrine and
procedures may be used to formulate airspace control plans in joint operations outside the
NATO area.
Section II - Airspace Control and Command Relationships

1006. The common use of the airspace within a JOA warrants that responsibilities of the JFACC,
ADC and ACA are closely interrelated and must be integrated in order to unite joint air
operations with joint airspace control and joint integrated air defence in support of the JFC’s
overall campaign. Therefore, the functions of JFACC, ADC and ACA may be assigned to a
1
ATP-40, ‘Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War’.
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single commander.2 If not, the functions must be clearly designated by the JFC and closely
co-ordinated.
a. The Air Defence Commander. The ADC has overall responsibility for air defence
(AD) in a JOA. Based on the air threat assessment and in consultation with
component commanders, the ADC will develop a joint AD plan and co-ordinate the
overall AD effort of the joint force by, amongst other means, issuing Weapon
Engagement Zones (WEZ) and Weapon Control Status (WCS) orders. The plan will
include: AD fighters, Ground Based AD (GBAD) systems and maritime Anti-Air
Warfare (AAW).
b. The Airspace Control Authority. The ACA is vested in a commander with overall
responsibility for the management of the airspace within the ASC-area to ensure its
safe use by all friendly and authorised neutral air assets and to support maximum
denial of enemy use of the air. In conjunction with all component commanders, he
will develop the Airspace Control Plan (ACP) and exercise his authority through
definition and activation of Airspace Control Measures (ACM) which are
promulgated in the Airspace Control Order (ACO).
Section III - Airspace Control System

1007. The principal objective of an ACS is to promote the operational effectiveness while reducing
the risk of fratricide. It is an important element in the concept of joint air operations and
enhances the JFC’s ability to employ air power. Airspace control may be achieved through
positive control using, for example, radio and data exchange facilities, or through the use of
procedures and routings within a designated ASC-Area, or through any combination of the
two methods as directed by the ACA , in the light of the operational environment.
1008. The ACS must integrate all airspace users and be flexible and responsive to changing
requirements. An ACS should comprise the establishment of personnel, policies,
procedures, systems and facilities required to undertake the airspace control functions. The
timely promulgation of ACOs to all components of a joint force in a JOA and regular
updates of its contents are crucial. Where automated systems are available for creating and
distributing ACO information, these systems should be used wherever possible to reduce
time, effort and the possibility of error.
Section IV – Key Airspace Control Considerations

1009. In summary, there are certain key aspects that need to be considered in order that ACS
objectives can be achieved:
a. The ACA must have the requisite authority necessary to plan, co-ordinate, and
organise the ACS.
2
See also Chapter 7.
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b. The ACS must support and complement the JFC’s campaign plan.
c. All airspace users should be integrated into the ACS.
d. ASC should be a major consideration across the full range of military operations.
e. ASC must allow airspace users the maximum freedom of action consistent with the
degree of risk acceptable to the JFC.
f. ASC procedures should be flexible enough to accommodate both planned and

unforeseen missions.
g. Competing requirements between subordinate commanders and/or the ACA are

resolved by the JFC.
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CHAPTER 11 - JOINT AIR DEFENCE

1101. Air Defence (AD) is defined as ‘all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness
of hostile air action’.1 AD throughout a Joint Operations Area (JOA) must be based upon
agreed doctrine from which concepts of operations, detailed plans, compatible tactics,
techniques and procedures can be derived. This will apply whether the force is required to
operate within the area of influence of an existing AD system, or where no such system
exists.
1102. As an integral part of countering air and missile threats, joint AD operations seek to achieve
the appropriate level of control of the air, and thus the protection of the force. This will be
best achieved by an integrated AD plan that serves the allied joint effort and meets the
requirements of each force component. This chapter sets out the principal features of joint
AD doctrine that may be applied to joint operations.
1103. Within the concept of operations, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should be prepared to
defend against the spectrum of air threats, including tactical ballistic and cruise missiles,
hostile Electronic Warfare (EW) systems, fixed wing aircraft, helicopters and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). This concept must also embrace the ability to counter the
adversary’s intelligence, EW, surveillance and targeting process plus command and control
systems.
Section I - Principles of Joint Air Defence

1104. The principles of joint AD are:
a. Control of the Air. There are 3 recognised levels of control of the air; these are:
(1) Favourable Air Situation. A favourable air situation is one in which the
extent of air effort applied by the enemy air forces is insufficient to prejudice
the success of friendly land, sea or air operations.1
(2) Air Superiority. Air superiority is defined as that degree of dominance in

the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of
operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given
time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.1
(3) Air Supremacy. Air supremacy is defined as that degree of air superiority
wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.1
1
AAP-6.
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b. Deny Intelligence. Deny the adversary access to operational or tactical intelligence.

This will be achieved by a joint Information Operations (INFO OPS)2 as well as the
operational and tactical counter surveillance and counter-targeting plan.
c. Obtain Warning. Put in place the means to develop, compile and disseminate the
required level of Recognised Air Picture (RAP) to support the chosen posture by
fusing strategic, operational and tactical data. The assets available and the
geographical situation, balanced against the assessed threat, will usually allow a
spread of options to counter attack. Application of military judgement will identify
an optimum posture that will support an appropriate response to an adversary’s
activity and which must be reviewed as the situation develops.
d. Defence in Depth. Dependent on the ability to achieve warning, a series of layers

should be established to engage the adversary at a chosen time or place. The amount
of warning achieved will dictate the posture or state of readiness of weapons
systems. Defence in depth is achieved by the integration of area and point defence
weapon systems. Area weapons systems are medium or long-range weapons able to
defend a wide area against targets transiting through it; point defence systems are
limited by range and are deployed to specific defended positions. Within the area
plan, the Air Defence Commander (ADC) will need to establish a number of lines of
weapon release or ‘kill lines’, which denote the positions by which the adversary’s
attack systems will need to be countered to prevent the adversary from releasing
weapons. The number of layers of defence will depend on the assets available, the
size of the defended area, the control infrastructure, the warning time necessary, the
threat direction and force disposition and the nature of the threat itself.
e. Co-ordinated AD Activity. Within a joint force Command and Control (C2)

structure, and where possible within the existing AD organisation of a host nation,
the ADC may designate subordinate commanders with responsibility for specified
regions and sectors. These regions or sectors may be exclusively over land or sea, or
they may encompass both and should be controlled by the most appropriate
authority. The commanders may be supported by both maritime and land-based
assets. Within each region or sector, procedures for the exchange of the RAP, air
battle management, weapon system co-ordination and the reduction of mutual
interference should be established. These may be achieved by positive or procedural
means, or both. Component commanders should highlight to the ADC assets of
special value in order to promote their protection. The ADC would take these
considerations into account when formulating the Air Defence plan.
f. Co-ordinated Air Operations. AD assets assist the prosecution of the total air
battle. They have the ability to minimise interference by an adversary with defensive
2
See Chapter 14.
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and offensive/support air operations and provide support to attack or support

missions probably as part of Composite Air Operations (COMAO) packages.
g. Control and Execution. The principle of centralised control with decentralised

execution ensures the maximum degree of freedom for diverse weapons systems,
especially in a hostile, reactive environment when balanced against the need to
minimise fratricide and weapons expenditure. This principle demands a
comprehensive and reliable Communication and Information System (CIS) with
adequate redundancy. Control responsibilities must be carefully defined at each
level to support a smooth and controlled flow of orders, directives and information,
and to allow all to benefit from the activities of other elements of the joint AD
structure.
Section II - Active and Passive Air Defence

1105. Joint AD encompasses both active and passive defensive measures, the balance of which will
be dictated by the operating environment.
a. Active Air Defence. Active AD operations include all direct defence actions taken
to nullify or reduce the air threat.
b. Passive Air Defence. Passive AD consists of all other measures taken to minimise
the effects of hostile air action. The requirement for passive AD recognises that
active AD measures may not be entirely successful.
Section III - Air Defence Capabilities/Components

1106. Surveillance and Identification Assets. The surveillance and identification element is
responsible for providing continuous surveillance of the assigned airspace and adjacent
areas, identifying all airborne objects, and providing the RAP to the appropriate control
centres. All available sources for surveillance and identification, active or passive sensors,
whether maritime, land-based or airborne, should act as an integrated and interoperable
system under one control structure. Target identification may be achieved procedurally by
the exclusion of friendly traffic or by allocating specific routes, by visual, electronic or
Electro-Optic (EO) means, by Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) or by other
forms of target recognition. Target recognition may be further sub-divided into co-operative
systems such as Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF), or Non-Co-operative Target
Recognition (NCTR) systems that may use techniques such as radar, profile or Doppler
return processing. If the identification or recognition facility is separated from the firing
unit, then control must include a dissemination and co-ordination facility that will function
in combat.
1107. Air Defence Weapon Systems. Within the overall AD structure, a range of weapon systems
is required, as no single system can counter the whole air threat spectrum. Weapons may be
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employed autonomously within a JOA, or co-ordinated by a centralised control system. The

AD structure might employ the concept of area/zone and point defence as part of a layered
system providing defence in depth. Land-based and maritime fighter aircraft, and Ground
Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems with long, medium and short range capabilities should
be used to complement each other and thus offset weaknesses inherent in individual systems.
AD fighters are the best means for the rapid concentration and projection of AD firepower
over long ranges and large areas. Maritime and land-based surface to air weapons can be
maintained at high states of readiness for extended periods and are capable of short reaction
times, rapid engagement and all-weather operations. Furthermore, maritime SAM systems
can maintain their high state of readiness whilst in transit, unlike their land-based
counterparts. Some weapons not primarily designed for AD may, in extremis, also have
some AD utility.
1108. Battle Management C2. All the above elements require a comprehensive control
organisation supported by C2S and data link facilities such that positive control can be
exercised through exploitation of the RAP and timely early warning information.
1109. Maritime Component. Maritime AD capabilities may include fighters, AEW, and EW
support, long or medium range surface to air missiles, possibly with a Theatre Missile
Defence (TMD) capability, Point Defence Missiles System (PDMS) and Close-In Weapons
System (CIWS). Sensors will include radar, possibly with target recognition features,
sophisticated ESM surveillance and integrated data exchange facilities. All maritime AD
systems will operate within the joint Airspace Control Plan (ACP)3 and will favour positive
control throughout a large JOA. This emphasis may change as maritime units enter inshore
waters, where connectivity difficulties and reduced warning time may make procedural
control more appropriate.
1110. Land Component. Land AD capabilities may include EW systems, long or medium range
GBAD and Short Range Air defence (SHORAD) or Very Short Range AD (VSHORAD)
systems. The deployment of SAM systems will need to be co-ordinated with the ADC to
create a fully integrated AD plan for the joint force. Weapons not primarily designed for AD
are the final layer in ground-based AD. All AD systems will operate within the joint ACP3
and will favour positive control where the RAP and facilities will support this, reverting to
procedural control where they do not.
1111. Air Component. The air capability may include fighters, AEW, and EW support, possibly
associated with ground environment, mobile or established surveillance radars, ESM and
data exchange facilities. Additionally, specific sites such as airfields may be protected by
long or medium range SAM, SHORAD, VSHORAD; Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)
systems may be deployed to protect points of strategic or operational significance. All AD
systems will be co-ordinated by the Air Component Commander/Joint Force Air Component
Commander (ACC/JFACC) and operate within the joint ACP3 which will favour positive
3
See Chapter 10.
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control where the RAP and facilities will support this, reverting to procedural control where
they do not.
Section IV - Composition of a Joint Force Air Defence System

1112. The composition of a joint force AD system should be considered in the context of the JFC’s
campaign plan. The requirements are: to support the JFC’s objectives by providing
protection for the deployment, to protect force arrival in the JOA, to support the conduct of
operations and the subsequent withdrawal of forces. In determining the structure of the joint
AD system the following factors should be considered:
a. The threat.
b. The size of the designated JOA.
c. The number, location, size and importance of areas and assets to be protected, and
the level of protection to be achieved.
d. Own weapons systems capabilities.
e. Environmental conditions in the JOA.
Responsibilities of the ADC
1113. The JFC will designate the ADC, who may be the same individual as the ACC/JFACC. The
primary responsibility of the ADC is to protect the joint force from airborne activity of an
adversary. The ADC is likely to be dual-hatted as the Airspace Control Authority (ACA).
This may involve:
a. Integration or co-ordination of the AD assets of each force component into a Joint

Air Defence Plan. This could include the co-ordination of the joint plan with host
nation AD systems and the exchange of information necessary to support civil
defence.
b. Application of the principles of AD to counter the adversary’s activity within the

constraints of Rules of Engagement (ROE) authorised by higher authority.
c. In the event that the ADC is not also designated as the ACA, it will be necessary for
the ADC to co-ordinate with the ACA to ensure that the airspace control plan best
supports AD.
d. Adoption and promulgation of common procedures for air battle management and
the reduction of mutual interference.
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Conduct of Joint Air Defence Operations
1114. The following factors affect conduct of joint AD operations:
a. Level of integration of the operations of the joint force component AD weapon

systems. AD operations should also be co-ordinated with other maritime, land and
air operations.
b. Speed and flexibility of reaction and the ability to concentrate forces against a threat.
These require:
(1) Generation and maintenance of appropriate Defence Readiness Postures

(DEFREPs) for all AD assets within the designated JOA.
(2) Early warning and surveillance of assigned and adjacent airspace by active
and passive sensors including ESM.
(3) An effective C2 capability, including an interoperable, reliable and secure

identification and CIS.
(4) Mobility and transportability of the AD system elements.
(5) Close co-ordination and co-operation between any existing AD system in the
area, AD reinforcement elements, and maritime, land and air force defence
assets.
c. Interoperability of force component weapon systems and between regional weapon

systems and the CIS of the joint force.
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CHAPTER 12 - INTELLIGENCE
1201. The purpose of Intelligence is to support political and military authorities and the planning,
execution and support of military operations in peace, crisis and conflict. This is
accomplished by the provision of timely, tailored and accurate intelligence in accordance
with NATO’s interests and policy, the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) mission and
specified Intelligence/Information requirements.1
1202. To be effective, the NATO Intelligence organisation must be supported by a broader range of
national contributions than in the past, encompassing both traditional military matters and
expanded reporting on political and socio-economic factors. Notwithstanding the required
broader approach to Intelligence, this chapter contains doctrine intended for use primarily by
commanders and staffs involved in planning and conducting operations at the strategic,
operational, and tactical level.
Section I - Principles of Intelligence

1203. Eight principles govern the organisation, production and employment of intelligence:
a. Centralised Control. Intelligence must be centrally controlled to avoid unwarranted

duplication, provide mutual support and ensure the efficient, economic use of all
resources.
b. Timeliness. The most accurate and reliable information or intelligence is useless if it

arrives too late. The tasking and reporting system must be capable of reflecting
without delay any significant changes in the situation.
c. Systematic Exploitation. Sources and agencies must be systematically exploited by

methodical tasking, based on a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and
limitations.
d. Objectivity. Any temptation to distort information to fit preconceived ideas must be

resisted.
e. Accessibility. Relevant information and intelligence must be readily available to

intelligence staffs and to appropriate users. All information must be processed,
analysed and assessed by intelligence staffs, and this includes comparison with
previously acquired data. Intelligence is of no value if it is not disseminated or
accessible to those who require it.
f. Responsiveness. Intelligence staffs must at all times be responsive to the intelligence

requirements of senior political and military authorities, the commander, subordinate
commands and other appropriate consumers as required.
1
See Glossary for definitions of Information and Intelligence.
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g. Security. Intelligence and all sources of information must be adequately protected.

This principle can be at odds with that of accessibility. The need for release needs to
be recognised and appropriate instructions for the release to non-NATO members of
NATO-led coalitions must be issued prior to the start of joint operations if delay, and
consequent risk to friendly forces, is to be avoided.
h. Reliability/Accuracy. Intelligence must be factually correct and convey the

situation as it actually exists.
Section II - The Requirement for Intelligence

1204. What the Commander Needs. The following are the commander’s requirements for
information and intelligence:
a. The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. At the outset of an

operation, possibly even prior to deployment, the commander will begin to formulate
questions to which he will require answers in order to plan and conduct operations
successfully. This applies to all branches of the staff including the Intelligence Staff.
b. Priority Intelligence Requirements. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)

encompass those requirements for which a commander has anticipated and stated in
priority order to aid his decision making during the planning and conduct of
operations.
1205. Requirements of Military and Political Authorities. Intelligence at the operational level
also supports the information needs of higher military and political authorities and thus the
political decision making process.
Section III - Intelligence Cycle

1206. The Intelligence process is conducted in accordance with the Intelligence Cycle consisting of
the following steps:
a. Direction. Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort,

issuing of orders and requests to collection agencies, maintenance of a continuous
check on the productivity of such agencies.
b. Collection. The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of

the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production
of Intelligence.
c. Processing. The conversion of information into intelligence through collation,

evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation.
d. Dissemination. The timely conveyance of information or intelligence, in an

appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it.
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1207. Direction. Direction from the JFC to the staff is usually done through the use of PIRs. The
following key activities aim to satisfy these requirements:
a. Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management. As the

name suggests, Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements
Management (CCIRM) co-ordinates collection requirements and manages
Intelligence requirements. CCIRM duties involve: developing and maintaining a
collection plan, validating, prioritising and disseminating Requests for Information
(RFI) from military and political authorities, subordinate elements and adjacent
staffs, monitoring and ensuring all collection requirements are identified in minimum
time to satisfy the command direction and guidance. It is essential that Intelligence
organisations at all levels are involved in a structured CCIRM process. This avoids
the wrong tasking of sources and ensures effective tasking of critical resources. The
Request for Information Management System (RFIMS) should be utilised to ensure
the efficient management of all Intelligence requests throughout the chain of
command for an operation.
b. Collection Plan. Intelligence collection planning is a critical function of CCIRM.

Collection plans (or Intelligence Surveillance Targeting and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) plans if applicable) allocate requirements to the tasking authorities
controlling the appropriate collection agencies/assets, some of which are under
national rather than NATO control. Requirements are disseminated widely, and co-
ordination takes place between the tasking authorities of collection agencies/assets,
to ensure those requirements are satisfied. The collection plan worksheet breaks
down each set of PIRs into a series of detailed ‘indicators’ and more detailed
Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIRs). Each agency (usually supporting
headquarters or national elements), or command managing a source, or organic
collection platform that may be capable of answering a SIR is annotated on the
worksheet. Where appropriate, the best potential collection sensor/platform to
answer any SIR will be noted. Matrices/worksheets are developed after PIRs are
approved and reviewed daily or as conditions warrant.
1208. Collection Assets. Collection is normally achieved through the agencies/commands

controlling the sources/sensors/assets capable of providing information on the requirements
detailed in the Collection Plan. The following explains the terms used:
a. A source is normally a person or a thing from which is possible to obtain unprocessed

information.
b. An Agency is an organization engaged in collecting information and/or providing

processed intelligence. Agencies are categorised by the type of source/sensor from
which the information is obtained, for example: Human Intelligence (HUMINT),
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) etc.
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c. Assets for surveillance reconnaissance and target acquisition are relevant collection
elements for the Intelligence process. The establishment of an ISTAR system,
interfacing Intelligence systems with systems controlling these assets is paramount
for an effective collection activity.
1209. Processing. Intelligence production involves the fusion of information collected under the
collection plan, generally in an All-Source Analysis Cell (ASAC). The sub-stages are
carried out systematically, but the sequence may vary depending on the nature or detail of
the information/intelligence being processed.
1210. Dissemination. Dissemination is conducted through the intelligence architecture to support

military and political authorities, relevant commanders and staffs at all levels in the planning
and execution of operations. The time factor is a critical aspect of intelligence
dissemination, but other principles governing dissemination (particularly in order to prevent
reporting overload and duplication) are: conciseness, the use of standard formats and proper,
tailored and periodic distribution. Intelligence products should be disseminated using all
available information communication systems and made available to users in directed
dissemination (push) and web-style bulletin boards (pull) systems. Dissemination of
intelligence in hard copy should be the exception. Procedures for the dissemination of
intelligence in joint operations with non-NATO forces should be decided on a case-by-case
basis.
Section IV - Intelligence Output

1211. Intelligence Estimate. The planning, execution and support of the politico-military and
political decision-making processes and of military operations have to be initially based on
the Intelligence estimate. The estimate should provide an analysis of a potential adversary’s
situation and assess his capabilities, intentions and probable courses of action. A more
detailed Intelligence estimate in the later stages of planning could be provided as the
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
1212. Situation Monitoring, Assessment and Prediction/Forecast. Monitoring of the situation

in a JFC’s Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AOIR)2 and Area of Intelligence Interest
(AOII)3 is not limited to the military posture of a nation or region, but includes monitoring
and reporting on non-military areas such as economic, ethnic and sociological factors,
political developments and personalities involved in a nation’s leadership. Dynamic, timely
assessment of developments, trends and intentions will support the politico-military and
2
AAP-6 defines AOIR as ‘an area allocated to a commander, in which he is responsible for the provision of
intelligence, within the means at his disposal’. The JFC is also likely to require intelligence from other formations as
appropriate. While Strategic Commands mainly rely on national contributions, during operations they depend heavily
on reports from the JFC’s staff.
3
AAP-6 does not define AOII; however, it is understood to be an area which surrounds and includes the AOIR. Since
this area is not entirely within the purview of the JFC and may be beyond his intelligence collection capability, it may
be necessary to obtain information and intelligence from other sources.
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political decision making process and will allow for appropriate planning and/or conduct of
operations and provide a common picture of the situation to all commanders concerned.
1213. Indicators and Warning. Intelligence must quickly be able to detect a change or changes in
a wide spectrum of indicators. Changes may be interpreted as indications that the nation or
region in which they are taking place is changing its political and/or military objectives and
is preparing to adopt an altered defence posture which may pose a risk to regional stability.
1214. Provision of Basic Intelligence. Basic Intelligence is intelligence on any subject that may
be used as reference material for planning and as a basis for processing subsequent
information or Intelligence on a subject that is normally maintained in databases and
regularly updated. The main use of basic intelligence is to set the scene at the outset of
operations.
1215. Current Intelligence. Current Intelligence is that intelligence which reflects the current
situation. It is produced in response to intelligence requirements linked to a current
operation and which refers to events at the time of the operation.
1216. Order of Battle Maintenance. Orders of Battle (ORBATs) contain traditional military data
(maritime, ground, air, logistic, etc) and non-military data (proliferation, terrorism,
environment, etc.) reflecting the wider spectrum of NATO Intelligence requirements. This
data may be available as Basic Intelligence and/or Current Intelligence data. Basic
intelligence data in this respect will be updated centrally according to MC 114/9. The
NATO Nations contribute to this agreed data published by the IMS Intelligence Division.
Current intelligence data will be maintained by NATO headquarters/CJTF Headquarters
using national intelligence contributions or Intelligence collected by forces in or close to the
Joint Operations Area (JOA).
1217. Target Intelligence. Target Intelligence (TARINT) is the intelligence contribution to the
Joint Targeting Process managed by the J3 staff. In particular, TARINT includes:
a. Targeting support, providing elements to define components of targets/target systems

and their vulnerability, with relative value. It supports operational decisions on
targeting priorities and weaponry chooses.
b. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), providing evaluation on the effects of the attacks
against specific targets
1218. Support to other Warfare Areas. Intelligence has to support a variety of other warfare
areas such as Electronic Warfare and Information Operations (INFO OPS). This support
may have major impact on the commander’s Intelligence collection plan and tasking of
agencies/commands controlling sources/assets.
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Section V - Other Intelligence Resources

1219. Depending on the nature of the operation and Commanders’ requirements, the Joint Force
Headquarters Intelligence Staff may include specialised elements to conduct or co-ordinate
the conduct of HUMINT, Electronic Warfare (EW) and SIGINT operations in the JOA.
1220. National Intelligence Cells. National Intelligence Cells (NICs) may be established at all
NATO static or deployed headquarters. NICs can assist in many vital CCIRM functions,4
they can advise on intelligence available from their own national resources and can expedite
acquisition of time sensitive operational Intelligence to the relevant Commander.
Furthermore, NICs can assist to de-conflict different nation’s collection assets.
Section VI - The Intelligence Staff

1221. In summary, the intelligence staff is responsible for the provision of timely intelligence to
meet the JFC’s intelligence and security requirements within his designated AOIR. The
intelligence staff will:
a. Develop a robust intelligence architecture (appropriate to either a peacetime or crisis

response command structure or for a command structure tailored to perform a
specific operation) for the passage of intelligence both within the joint force and to
higher, subordinate and adjacent commands by providing secure, interoperable and
highly reliable connectivity between NATO and national elements.
b. Develop a policy for the operation of the intelligence process within the joint force
consistent with NATO and national intelligence procedures.
c. In concert with the operations staff, identify the PIRs.
d. Carry out the IPB in support of JFC’s concept of operations.
e. Prepare the Force Collection Plan, including the identification of sources and
agencies outside the joint force.
f. Establish procedures for the sharing of national intelligence throughout the forces
assigned to the JFC.
g. Contribute to JFC’s INFO OPS effort.
h. Assist in the identification of the opposing force’s Centre of Gravity.
i. Provide target intelligence to support the development of target lists to match the
JFC’s requirement.
4
See paragraph 1207(a).
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Section VII - Counter - Intelligence

1222. The conduct of military operations in peace, crisis and conflict will require a J2
Security/Counter-Intelligence unit to assist the JFC to identify and counter the threat to force
security. Particularly that directed against allied personnel, facilities or equipment from
foreign intelligence services, organisations or individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage,
subversion, terrorism or organised crime. A critical Counter-Intelligence function supports
deploying forces during both peacetime and crisis operations. Counter-Intelligence units
can provide accurate and timely information relating to the threats to the deployment
operation and to the forces once they are deployed. To be effective, Counter-Intelligence
support must be addressed in the overall planning process. Counter-Intelligence units must
be provided early notification of any planned deployments to ensure that the necessary
information can be collected and disseminated.
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CHAPTER 13 - COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION

SYSTEMS
1301. A Communications and Information System (CIS) is defined as an: ‘assembly of equipment,
methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organised so as to accomplish specific
information conveyance and processing functions.’1 CIS are an integral and vital part of
military operations, and the effective employment and control of CIS resources is a
command responsibility. CIS must be deployed and maintained to achieve maximum overall
effectiveness in the employment of military forces consistent with the projected rate of
activity and scope of operations. CIS planners should be brought into the planning process
at the beginning and must interact continuously with those who will conduct operations.
1302. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) and subordinate commanders must develop operational
and technical procedures in order to provide a CIS able to cover all forces in the operation.
Section I - Communication and Information Systems Principles

1303. To achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives, CIS principles must be considered and selectively
applied throughout all phases of the campaign. Proper application of these principles will
ensure that the systems possess the essential elements that will enable them to function
effectively under a wide variety of conditions. Although this section discusses these
principles separately, it must be recognised that interrelationships and mutual effects exist.
1304. Communication and Information Systems Structure. CIS components, liaison, and
technical/logistic support will be provided between force elements and commands as
follows: senior and subordinate, supporting and supported, reinforcing and reinforced
between adjacent units as directed by the first common senior element, and by a unit gaining
an attachment. These rules may have to be followed unless a wholly interoperable
communications system is adopted in which case most of the constraints, which the above
system would impose, can be removed.
1305. Communication and Information Systems Discipline. CIS discipline refers to the control
of the flow of information from gathering, through processing and directing to reporting.
Reporting structures, standardised message text formats and reports, precedence capabilities,
pre-emption capabilities, call-sign assignments, routing indicators, minimise procedures, and
other physical and procedural measures discipline the flow of information in CIS. The
principle of CIS discipline requires prioritisation of information flow consistent with the
projected rate of activity and scope of operations.
1
This is the present AAP-6 definition. The AAP-31 definition reads: ‘Communication and Information Systems (CIS)
is a collective term embracing communication systems and information systems, those assemblies of equipment,
methods and procedures and if necessary personnel, organised to accomplish information transfer and processing
functions respectively’. Note also that AAP-31 refers to ‘communication’ in the singular whilst AAP-15 defines the
abbreviation CIS as being Communications and Information Systems.
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1306. Economy of Communication and Information Systems Employment. Economy of CIS

employment is achieved by avoiding duplication, carefully defining and controlling user
requirements and imposing strict transmission discipline. However, the emphasis on
economy of CIS employment may risk the force multiplying effects that some
communications and information systems may endow.
1307. Interoperability. The underlying concepts and broad objectives of joint operations require
that CIS be standardised as far as practical to attain interoperability. In ascending order, the
levels of standardisation are compatibility, interchangeability and commonality. Plans must
ensure that the essential standardisation requirements of all components and agencies are
specified. Compatibility is often the most practical level of interoperability that can be
achieved, which in CIS is the ability of systems to provide services and information to (or
accept services and information from) other systems, and it is absolutely essential for the
force if it is to be employed as a coherent organisation. Operations can be neither joint nor
multinational unless an interoperable CIS enables the JFC and his subordinate commanders
to exercise effective command and co-ordination between force elements. The following
prerequisites must be achieved to attain interoperability:
a. Development of joint force CIS concepts and definitions plus the creation of
common operating environments.
b. Harmonisation of the information, semantics and development of data management.
c. Provision and implementation of agreed operational, procedural and technical

standards.
d. The responsibility for delivering information and services to other force elements is
clearly stated in each commander’s mission.
e. Common training and exercises.
1308. Flexibility. Flexibility is required to meet changing situations and diversified operations
with a minimum of disruption or delay. Flexibility can be obtained by standardised
equipment and making use of alternative means. Flexible systems will allow planners to
more readily integrate all levels of CIS into plans. The connectivity that can be achieved and
maintained from flexible systems is particularly important in providing operational
contingency needs. Flexibility is a necessary adjunct to the principles of survivability and
standardisation.
1309. Information Priority. CIS have a finite capacity, so commanders at all levels must quantify
and prioritise their Information Exchange Requirements (IER).
1310. Liaison. Liaison is the contact or inter-communication maintained between elements of

military forces that ensures mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Liaison
is one of the most effective principles of all in terms of mission accomplishment and can be
enhanced by placing competent personnel, with their own CIS, with the forces employed -
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the eyes and ears for the JFC and the joint force’s CIS director. The liaison personnel should
ensure that systems function as intended and advise on corrective action as required. Liaison
personnel can react if changes in the situation require capabilities that exceed the capability
of the present system. Liaison personnel should also ensure that operational connections,
once established, are effectively maintained.
1311. Security. Electronic Information Security (INFOSEC), which encompasses

Communications Security (COMSEC) and Computer Security (COMPUSEC), 2 is an
integral element of all military CIS operations, and it must be considered, together with
personnel, document, physical and procedural security, at the earliest conceptual stages and
throughout the planning. The degree of security provided must be consistent with the
requirements of CIS users, the vulnerability of transmission media to interception and
exploitation and the reliability of COMSEC hardware and software to all users. Under
emergency conditions, the importance of speed may transcend the need for security;
however, their relative importance must be considered in the light of the prevailing
conditions.
1312. Frequency Spectrum Management. Transmission assets must be co-ordinated at strategic,

operational, and tactical levels by national, international, military and governmental agencies
and staffs. Also they must be co-ordinated with the formation of the EMCON plan and its
operation. Comprehensive management of the frequency spectrum, used for all military
purposes (not just CIS), by qualified persons should ensure the most effective use of limited
frequency assets within a joint force and between adjacent and higher authorities.
1313. Sustainability and Survivability. Sustainability of CIS is achieved by standardising

equipment, establishing standardised procedures and supervising their execution, countering
computer viruses, detecting and monitoring computer intrusion, countering electromagnetic
interference jamming and deception, and establishing effective logistic support programs.
The survivability of the systems must be such that they continue to deliver pre-defined levels
of performance despite hostile actions, natural disaster and/or any other severe calamity or
human technical fallibility. Thus some systems will require fault tolerance and distributed
databases or 100% redundancy whilst others will require reconstitution recovery capabilities.
Systems which support a critical military task may require Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
protection and be located in hardened areas; however, this may apply only to selected user
communities. The exploitation and protection of ones own CIS needs strong co-ordination
with Information Operations (INFO OPS).
1314. Timeliness. Weapon system technology makes it increasingly feasible for the time between
warning and attack to be compressed, so the processing and transmission time for warning,
critical intelligence, operation planning and execution information must be shortened
accordingly. The demand for timely communications throughout the area of operations
2
As defined in AAP-31.
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concerning C2, logistic, weather, intelligence, and administrative information requires that
the element of speed be considered during all aspects of CIS planning.
Section II - Additional Communication and Information Systems Considerations

1315. Agreement in Advance of Crisis or Hostilities. Communications agreements should be
made and regularly reviewed with allies in advance of crises or hostilities. These should
cover the principles, procedures and overall communication requirements (including
standard message formats between service components, frequency management, training and
procedures for de-conflicting frequency problems between allied and civilian organisations).
Where communications agreements have not been achieved, e.g. in the context of non-
Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, units comprising a joint force should, as directed by
the JFC, adopt the procedures of one nation.
1316. Interpreters. NATO communication doctrine is based on the use of English as the common
working language. However, in the broader context of multinational operations, interpreters
may be required at all levels in order to overcome language barriers.
Section III – Joint Force Commander’s Communication and Information

Systems Responsibilities
1317. A JFC should:
a. Ensure adequate and effective CIS support for the joint C2 structure and direct which
system(s) is to be the primary executive/operational system for the force.
b. Publish CIS plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned
mission.
c. Exercise overall management of all CIS supporting the joint force.
d. Review and co-ordinate CIS plans prepared by subordinate commands.
e. Ensure that CIS interoperability is achieved within the joint force.
f. Establish a joint frequency spectrum management plan.
g. Ensure the maintenance of information and systems security.
Section IV - Joint Communication and Information Systems Management

1318. In joint operations, successful CIS integration requires that strict technical and management
standards are imposed throughout the network. The purpose of joint communications
management is to provide centralised control and decentralised execution of the utilisation of
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communication resources consistent with the JFC’s operational requirements and changing
priorities. The purpose of joint information management is to provide centralised control of
the correct understanding of the information exchanged within and between information
systems. In the headquarters of a joint force, the CIS (J6) staff is responsible for joint
communications and information management.
1319. Where appropriate the joint force CIS (J6) staff should form a Joint Information
Communications Control Centre (JICCC). The functions of the JICCC would be to:
a. Support the JFC and the C2 facilities.
b. Exercise supervision over communication and information activities, including

frequency spectrum management and INFOSEC of subordinate commands and force
components.
c. Provide connectivity with the regional NATO and host nation’s communications
system, commercial communications and adjacent commands.
1320. The JICCC may comprise someone designated from within the staff of the following
branches: a current operations branch, an intelligence and C2W branch, an information
system support branch, a network communication branch, a headquarters support branch,
and a future operations/plans branch. Despite the creation of the JICCC, individual
responsibilities for specialist inputs to operations still rest with parent staff cells.
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CHAPTER 14 – INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Section I - Definitions
1401. The emerging NATO concept of Information Operations (INFO OPS) links the Command
and Control Warfare (C2W) military strategy with political, diplomatic, civil-military co-
operation, public information and any other Alliance activity that may affect the perception
of an adversary and any other parties involved. INFO OPS are applied as defensive and
offensive actions over a broad scope ranging from the strategic and operational levels to the
tactical and system user levels.
1402. INFO OPS are defined as ‘actions taken to influence decision makers in support of political
and military objectives by affecting other’s information, information based processes,
Command and Control Systems (C2) and Communications and Information Systems (CIS)
while exploiting and protecting one’s own information and/or information systems. There
are two main categories of INFO OPS: defensive INFO OPS and offensive INFO OPS,
depending on the nature of action involved’1.
a. Defensive Information Operations. Defensive INFO OPS are defined as ‘actions

taken to maintain access to and effective use of information, information based
processes, C2 systems and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict and to protect Alliance
information critical to achieving specific objectives’1. The conduct of NATO’s
defensive INFO OPS builds on existing NATO security policies, doctrine and
procedures to ensure that Allied information, information-based processes and CIS
are adequately protected against the effects of other’s efforts to acquire, exploit or
otherwise manipulate information to the detriment of the Alliance’s military decision
or political consultation processes and operational objectives.
b. Offensive Information Operations. Offensive INFO OPS are defined as ‘actions

taken to influence a potential adversary’s available information, information based
processes, C2 systems and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict in pursuit of specific
objectives or in reaction to a specific threat’1. The conduct of offensive INFO OPS
will be based on political guidance from the North Atlantic Council following NATO
Military Authorities’ advice depending upon a specific situation.
1403. The scope of INFO OPS actions is extremely wide and their effective application during
peacetime may avoid the need for any Alliance military action. INFO OPS are considered at
the strategic and operational levels of the Alliance but are practised at all levels. However,
the purely military application of INFO OPS is encapsulated in C2W which is defined as
‘the integrated use of all military capabilities including Operations Security (OPSEC),
deception, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Electronic Warfare (EW) and physical
destruction, supported by all source intelligence and CIS, to deny information to, influence,
1
MC 422 ‘NATO Information Operations policy’.
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degrade or destroy an adversary’s C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities

against similar actions.’2
Section II - The Fundamentals of Information Operations

1404. The application of INFO OPS can be considered at all levels of military operations - from
military strategic to tactical. INFO OPS is concerned with information objectives which a
commander seeks to achieve by his actions. It is therefore a strategy which is both
fundamental and central to a commander’s planning of military activities.
1405. The Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) campaign plan should be developed with the
recognition that his designated Joint Operations Area (JOA) and beyond is an INFO OPS
environment. INFO OPS should be employed to co-ordinate the elements of warfare
including C2W and information related activities. The focus should not be confined to C2W
but should encompass the perceptions of those who may be considering target priorities
within the JOA as well as Allies, and the wider international community.
1406. INFO OPS should be an integral part of the JFC’s campaign planning from the outset and
should indicate general operational objectives, be broad based and encompass employment
of all available capabilities - joint Service, interagency and multinational. INFO OPS
planning should be conducted starting with the JFC’s Statement of Intent. Planning should
analyse the risk of compromise, reprisal, escalation of hostilities and the uncoordinated or
inadvertent counteraction of INFO OPS by the various joint Service and/or interagency
INFO OPS capable providers that may be associated with a joint force.
1407. An appropriate steering mechanism (committee or cell) should be created to co-ordinate,

integrate and de-conflict INFO OPS activities that contribute to fulfilling the JFC's intent
(Purpose, Method, and End State) within the JOA. This mechanism should be formed from
representatives from each staff element, component and supporting agencies responsible for
integrating INFO OPS capabilities and related activities into the overall campaign plan.
Care should be taken to tailor the size and structure of the INFO OPS organisation to meet
the need of the mission and the Commander's intent. The responsibilities of this organisation
should include:
a. Determining what INFO OPS information is needed and how to get it. Identify
the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), the Priority
Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and the High Payoff Targets (HPTs). Consider the
collection assets available that meet the reporting criteria.
b. Identifying friendly INFO OPS capabilities and vulnerabilities. In addition to

friendly information systems, friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities will be
2
AAP-6.
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determined in part by the geographical area, atmospheric conditions, weather, rules

of engagement, international law, and by the adversary.
c. Determining the adversary's INFO OPS capabilities and his INFO OPS
vulnerabilities. Maintain a continuous estimate of the adversary's information
posture to support friendly INFO OPS planning and current INFO OPS.
d. Understanding how the adversary sees and portrays friendly information and
information systems. Know the adversary commander's intelligence collection,
processing, and reporting capabilities, his communications systems, key leader
personality profiles, and decision-making processes.
e. Taking measures to protect vulnerable critical friendly information nodes.

Reverse engineering the offensive INFO OPS process to determine how to counter
adversary OPSEC, deception, physical destruction, propaganda, EW and Computer
Network Attack (CNA). Identifying prevention measures like physical and
electromagnetic hardening, camouflage, air defence, etc., to protect critical
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C41) nodes.
Consider command information and public affairs actions to counter adversary
misinformation/ propaganda.
f. Organising the attack of an adversary's critical information nodes. Integrating

all assets available to the JFC and synchronising with the main operation to attack
critical adversary information nodes at the time and place of the commander's
choosing.
Section III - Non-Military Capabilities Supporting Information Operations

1408. The scope of INFO OPS is such that a commander must take account of the diplomatic civil-
military co-operation and humanitarian activities which are taking place both within the
designated JOA and elsewhere. Some of these are more correctly within the responsibility
of NATO HQ, Alliance governments or multinational organisations/agencies. Inevitably
these considerations will influence the conduct of operations. The involvement of Public
Information (PI), PSYOPS and Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) staffs in the analysis of
and planning for INFO OPS is also necessary as the result should be a closely linked strategy
to provide unambiguous signals to an adversary in support of the commander’s objectives:
a. Political Influences. Political initiatives will be conducted in concert with military

planning and operations. While the commander should ensure that military
objectives continue to remain in-line with political objectives, he should continue to
provide politicians with updated military advice in order that they can modify their
stance if necessary.
b. Diplomatic Overtures. In similar fashion to political initiatives, diplomatic

overtures could be dovetailed with certain military operations.
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c. Public Information. PI activities should be co-ordinated and synchronised with

INFO OPS.3
d. Civil-Military Co-operation. CIMIC staff need to establish relations with a variety

of civilian authorities and agencies and will be a constant source of information.
Additionally they may be able to assist planned INFO OPS in an informal manner.
Thus planning of INFO OPS needs to be co-ordinated with CIMIC staff who need to
be informed of developments.
Section IV - Military Capabilities Supporting Information Operations

1409. Physical Destruction. Total destruction of an adversary’s C2 nodes is generally not
attainable, desirable or supportable. Indeed destruction may be effective only for a relatively
short time. Given time, resources, and redundancy, the adversary will be able to recover
from any destructive activity. Because INFO OPS can often be associated with operations in
a JOA, physical destruction may be achieved through the use of air-delivered munitions,
unmanned aerial vehicles (where they exist) and special operations forces. Tactical
resources such as naval gunfire, artillery and manoeuvre forces may be useful in tactical
operations that support the INFO OPS strategy and are co-ordinated by functional or service
component commanders. Physical destruction in INFO OPS is not ‘attrition warfare’ which
is aimed at elimination of all the adversary’s nodes. The key in selecting the right weapon
mix resides in thorough co-ordination and correct identification of critical and vulnerable
nodes.
1410. Electronic Warfare. EW can degrade the performance of an adversary’s electronic and
weapon systems, warn of adversarial action, provide self-protection, locate and identify
emitters and reduce electronic fratricide.
1411. Deception. The use of deception in various guises has proven to be very effective in
military operations, and it is likely to be the INFO OPS activity that gives the highest return
for effort and resources expended. Deception is a complex art, which demands considerable
effort, a high level of security and an insight into the opponent’s way of thinking.
1412. Psychological Operations. PSYOPS has the potential to negatively affect an adversary’s
morale, instil fear and breed distrust. It also has potential for providing insights into
adversary commanders’ possible courses of action and can be used to direct other INFO OPS
activities such as deception, into areas where they are most likely to succeed.
1413. Operations Security. OPSEC reduces or denies the adversary access to friendly
information concerning Allied joint operations. It encompasses elements of military security
such as Information Security (INFOSEC) (which itself includes Communications Security
(COMSEC) and Computer Security (COMPUSEC)), Transmission Security (TRANSEC)
3
See Chapter 16 paragraphs 1612 et seq.
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and Emission Control (EMCON). OPSEC is a method for keeping an operation secure and,
as well as personnel and physical security, may involve other measures. OPSEC is a J3
responsibility to ensure compliance.
1414. All-Source Intelligence. All-source intelligence is a key supporting element in the

planning and conduct of INFO OPS. The Intelligence staff should undertake an analysis of
an adversary’s C2 structure and assess the likely effectiveness of friendly operations against
it. This is an on-going process and J2 must provide continuous support to J3 throughout the
campaign. All aspects of INFO OPS planning and execution require access to basic and
current intelligence products. To ensure this occurs, two specific aspects should be
considered:
a. Intelligence Interface. A mix of collection and fusion systems is required in order

to provide all-source, near-real-time intelligence for the JFC and tactical
commanders, and they must be integrated within a coherent intelligence architecture.
b. Intelligence Sources and Attack. An aim of INFO OPS should be to prevent

tactical considerations alone from initiating attacks on targets that are significant
sources of strategic or operational intelligence. To achieve this, it will be necessary
to establish mechanisms to ensure the collection profiles of friendly nations are
known, or can be ascertained, and to make this information available in the JOA in a
useable form. Additionally, with careful planning, an adversary can be induced to
move from secure systems to those more readily exploited. The C2W function relies
on continuous interface between J2 and J3 at the joint force headquarters, and
between the headquarters of the joint force and higher NATO formations.
1415. Communications and Information Systems. Modern CIS offer the JFC a significant
advantage over the adversary if properly used and protected. Planners should not view
communications as the only component of CIS. A CIS includes decision makers,
communications, facilities and equipment, computer support and interoperable databases.
Secure communications and data transfer should be incorporated at all locations where
planning occurs. Computer support, including automated decision aids, assists the staff in
planning and monitoring operations. Key components of computer support are the databases
that support C2W. Planners must understand how to access the relevant data and decide
what the databases can and cannot do for them. They should weigh carefully the need for
direct access to databases against the ability to ask for finished product or intelligence. The
planning staff may not have the time, manpower or expertise to build their own intelligence
picture based on the information contained in various databases. They may also need to
access databases on friendly communications maintained by the CIS staff. Knowledge of
connectivity, redundancy and hardening are useful for C2-Protect (C2-P) planning. Joint
reports and returns, where they exist, should be used to exchange data within the joint force
and between supporting organisations, using the message text formatting protocols found in
ADatP-3.
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Section V - Command and Control Warfare

1416. C2W is a military strategy for the Alliance that focuses on C2 and the decision cycle.
Simply put, C2W sets forth the precursors for gaining and maintaining the initiative. C2W
considerations may influence the JFC’s vision on how to organise the joint forces under
command and supporting staff to achieve a mission. It focuses on co-ordinating the use of
all C2W capabilities, in both space and time, to achieve decisive effect.
Command and Control Principles
1417. Military forces are highly dependent on timely and accurate information for the effective
conduct of operations. C2 systems are the means through which information flows and as
such are critical to the successful prosecution of operations. Successful C2 depends on an
uninterrupted flow of information across integrated networks consisting of the following
fundamental C2 elements:
a. Human and machine sensors.
b. Processors.
c. Decision-makers.
d. Databases.
e. The interconnecting communications systems.
1418. Each element of the C2 system is vulnerable, in varying degrees, to diverse military actions.
Actions that degrade one or more elements degrade the entire C2 system. This degradation
sets in motion a chain of events. Initially, the loss or distortion of information reduces the
situation awareness of the leadership. This, in turn, introduces uncertainty which ultimately
affects the decision making process. Poor or untimely decisions introduce doubt as to the
effectiveness of the leadership, which in turn reinforces uncertainty. The iterative effect of
constant attacks on the C2 system will lead to an adversary’s loss of the initiative, and could
ultimately result in capitulation.
1419. Success in implementing any C2W strategy stems from the concept of operations developed
by the JFC. A successful C2W strategy is both flexible and reflects the central theme of the
overall campaign plan. The co-ordination and execution of the JFC’s C2W strategy is vested
in the joint staff. Mission success will be determined, in large part, by the staff’s ability to
plan and execute co-ordinated attacks on an adversary’s C2 system and forcing a constant re-
evaluation of the estimate of the situation.
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1420. The joint staff will seek to identify all legitimate C2 targets from amongst the five
fundamental C2 elements, based on the JFC’s concept of operations. The point at which
these elements converge defines a node. C2W focuses on targets that are defined as both
critical and vulnerable:
a. Critical Nodes. A critical node is a potential target, the disruption of which will
degrade the ability to command and/or control forces or conduct effective combat
operations.
b. Vulnerable Nodes. A vulnerable node is one which is susceptible to attack. A

vulnerable node must satisfy three criteria: a weapon system or technique (any form
of offensive action) must exist which can affect the node; the weapon system or
technique must be at the commander’s disposal; and the weapon system or technique
can be brought to bear.
1421. The JFC needs to establish targeting procedures to ensure C2 targets are identified and
prioritised. The cost must be acceptable, and the JFC must be willing to commit the
resources required to achieve the desired results.
1422. Offensive and Defensive Nature of Command and Control Warfare. There are two
aspects of C2W strategy:
a. Counter-Command and Control. Counter-C2 is the offensive arm of the JFC’s

C2W strategy. It is a particularly effective, and often economical, way of reducing
an adversary’s combat effectiveness. It is applicable at all levels of command. The
primary objectives of Counter-C2 are to slow down or disrupt the tempo of an
adversary’s operations and influence the decision-making cycle and ability to
generate and employ combat power.
b. Command and Control-Protect. C2-P is the defensive arm of JFC’s C2W strategy.
Those elements of the plan that contribute to C2-P must be fully integrated into
Counter-C2 operations. Safeguarding friendly C2 systems is a fundamental
consideration, as failure to do so will likely result in loss of freedom of action and
initiative, misdirection of effort or failure of the operation.
Command and Control Warfare Organisation and Planning
1423. A separate C2W cell may be formed in a joint force headquarters at the direction of the
commander to co-ordinate all facets of implementing the C2W strategy. Since C2W is such
a broad area and involves so many military disciplines, all supporting plans must be fully co-
ordinated and mutually supporting in the operation plan.
1424. C2W planning will, in co-ordination with other staff cells: recommend priorities for
intelligence collection, support the JFC’s targeting process, make recommendations to the
commander on the execution options of a campaign plan and fully co-ordinate all input to
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the campaign plan. The C2W planning staff must bear in mind that potential targets may
also be significant sources of strategic and operational intelligence.
1425. Counter-Command and Control Planning. With respect to Counter-C2, C2W planning
should:
a. Study Joint Force Commander’s Intentions. Identify which type of Counter-C2

operations support the JFC’s intentions.
b. Identify Command and Control Targets. This requires J2 to develop a model of

the adversary’s C2 system possibly by functional area (e.g. air defence).
c. Determine the effect desired. By reference to the JFC’s plan, the C2W planning
staff need to determine what functional areas of the opponent’s C2 system should be
attacked, how long the effects should continue and where the effect should occur in
relation to the position of friendly forces.
d. Analyse Targets for Criticality and Vulnerability. Each target must then be
assessed by the C2W planners to identify which targets if degraded would have the
greatest impact on that functional area of the adversary and how vulnerable each
target is to C2W action. The synergistic effects of actions against several targets
must also be assessed to determine the timing or sequencing of any attack.
e. Prioritise targets and assign attack resources. The prioritisation of targets is a J3

function supported by J2. Staff should recommend priorities for, and methods of,
attack based on the criticality and vulnerability analysis taking into account resource
expenditure. This requires them to understand the capabilities of all force
components in terms of weapon system capabilities, EW, deception, PSYOPS and
OPSEC.
f. Determine the Effectiveness of the Operation. The planners subsequently need to

know if the desired effect or degree of degradation of the C2 target was achieved, for
how long was it degraded, and what were the adversary’s recovery actions. This
information is required to determine the need for, and to refine any follow-on
operations.
1426. Command and Control-Protect Planning. A number of steps should be taken when
developing the portion of the plan that deals with C2-Protect:
a. Identify Friendly Critical Command and Control Nodes. The planners should
first examine the JFC’s operational objectives and the methods to be used to achieve
them. They should then consider specific tasks to be accomplished and what friendly
C2 nodes will be essential to accomplishing those tasks.
b. Analyse the Nodes. The JFC should conduct an electromagnetic environment

assessment of the forces under command. The planners should next analyse the
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nodes to determine their vulnerability. This information should result in a priority

listing of C2 nodes requiring protection.
c. Recommend Options. When analysis reveals that a critical C2 node is highly

susceptible to adversary action, the planning staff should recommend options to the
JFC which could provide the required protection.
d. Review the Operation Security Plan. Operational security has a major impact on
all aspects of an operation. Each step of the process must be examined for
vulnerabilities. In this respect, the JFC’s EMCON plan is an important contributor to
the security of the force. It must be examined to ensure that a balance between
connectivity and security is maintained.
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CHAPTER 15 - DECEPTION
1501. Deception is defined as ‘those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation,
distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his
interests’. A Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) routine deception requirements may be
satisfied by the application of the OPSEC procedures. There will be situations that indicate
the need for a complementary deception plan which will form part of the overall plan. A
deception plan should be integrated by the joint commander’s operations staff, but may, for
OPSEC purposes, be distributed separately’
1502. The benefits from a well planned and executed deception are:
a. The attainment of surprise.
b. The maintenance of security.
c. Giving the JFC freedom of action to carry out the mission by deluding the adversary
as to future intentions.
d. Misleading the adversary and thus persuading him to adopt a course of action which is
disadvantageous and which can be exploited.
1503. Deception in operations can make a direct contribution to the achievement of surprise and
indirectly, to security and economy of effort; it is a factor that should be considered in all
operation estimates. Successful deception multiplies the effect of force; it is a traditional
recourse of the weak against the strong, but it should not be overlooked in situations of
favourable relative combat power. Deception can reduce expenditure of time, effort,
resources and casualties; and its psychological effects, for deceiver and deceived alike, can be
far-reaching.
1504. Despite advances in technology, the human mind, which is the target of deception, is no less
susceptible to being deceived. The increasing dependence of the human mind on automatic
processing of increasing volumes of information makes the target more vulnerable.
1505. Deception, with Electronic Warfare, Operations Security, Psychological Operations

(PSYOPS) and physical destruction is one of the five major military capabilities of Command
and Control Warfare (C2W).
Section I – Principles of Deception

1506. The principles of deception are:
a. A Clear Aim. The prime purpose of offensive deception is to achieve surprise and to
hold the initiative, at least at the local level.
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b. Centralised Control. Success depends on a high degree of co-ordination and co-

operation between staff branches in the planning, execution and monitoring of the
deception plan. Uncoordinated deception schemes can cause dangerous confusion
amongst friendly forces and can compromise the deception plan itself by revealing
disparities in activity to the adversary.
c. Preparation. Deception should be directed at a specific opposing commander and

staff, taking into account their likely reactions. Success, therefore, requires detailed
prior knowledge of the target and likely procedures. All the measures needed to
support and monitor the deception scheme must be thoroughly prepared together with
calculation of the target’s reaction to each phase, and forces should be allocated to
complete these tasks.
d. Credibility. Deception must never be seen to be incongruous or illogical; it must,

where possible, accord with the pattern of events the adversary has reason to expect.
When this is not possible, deception information that may make the adversary
suspicious must be supplied to him indirectly and in a way that he can work out the
implications for himself. Conclusions derived from deception information by
deductive analysis carry more conviction if regarded by an adversary’s intelligence
analyst as the result of his/her own astuteness.
e. Corroboration. The deception indicators must be presented to the adversary through

as many sources as possible. Confirmation from these multiple sources must not
produce too gratuitous or complete a picture as to arouse suspicion, but must be
sufficiently persuasive for him to take the bait.
f. Flexibility. Flexibility is needed to take advantage of the adversary’s reactions, both

predicted and unforeseen. In the event of a deception’s failure or partial success,
flexibility is also required either to abandon or change the deception plan without
revealing its original aim. To ensure and if necessary benefit from this flexibility,
deception plans must be continuously monitored by the controlling staff.
Furthermore, deception planning should include plans for termination. This includes
an unexpected termination plan (usually as a result of combat actions) as well as a
contingency termination plan that accounts for unforeseen events that force early
termination, such as compromise of the deception.
g. Timing. The timing of deception is crucial. The adversary must be given sufficient
time to notice, interpret and react to deception information, but insufficient time to
analyse it so thoroughly that the deception and its purpose become apparent.
Deception plans should be timed to create maximum disadvantage for the adversary at
a decisive moment in real operations.
h. Security. Even though deception entails the gratuitous release of information to an

adversary the principle of security must still be applied. Information has to be
released to the adversary in such a way that the absence of normal security rules does
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not arouse suspicions. More importantly the deceptive purpose of the information
released must be strictly concealed from him. To this end, it is necessary to restrict
access to plans and to brief on a ‘need to know’ basis. Who needs to know what about
deception is often a matter of fine judgement but it may at times be necessary to
conceal from friendly forces the true purpose of their operations. Security of real
plans is a clear corollary of deception and whenever indications of genuine activity
cannot be wholly concealed they should be discredited by implying that they are part
of an obvious deception plan.
Section II - Levels of Deception

1507. Deception, like PSYOPS, can be carried out at strategic, operational and tactical levels:
a. Strategic. Strategic deception is designed to mislead an adversary at the highest level

about the time, place, strength and nature of intended Allied joint operations. In
Allied joint operations deception would normally be planned at NATO HQ level,
taking into account the position of countries adjoining the area of operations.
b. Operational. Operational deception covers measures to mislead the adversary about

the conduct of operations. It would be planned and directed at the joint force HQ
level, and it must complement any wider C2W plans.
c. Tactical. Tactical deception incorporates all measures to mislead the adversary in the
maritime, land, air or space operating environments. Tactical deception complements
the wider C2W and Public Information (PI) plans, and should be co-ordinated at joint
force HQ and force component levels as appropriate.
Section III - Types of Deception

1508. All types of deception aim to implant a false idea in an adversary’s mind, and all deception
pre-supposes an effective counter-surveillance designed to prevent the adversary from
observing indications of genuine activity. Deception measures are categorised as either
offensive or defensive. This distinction illustrates the purpose for which the measures are
used rather than the nature of the measures themselves, some of which may be used either
offensively or defensively.
a. Offensive Deception Measures. Offensive measures are used for the active
dissemination of false evidence to an adversary in order to mislead him about future
intentions. The prime purpose of offensive deception is to achieve surprise, and to
hold the initiative, at least at local level, as a prerequisite for success.
b. Defensive Deception Measures. Defensive measures offer deception evidence to an

adversary who holds the initiative. Credible substitutes are used to divert attention
and effort away from genuine dispositions and targets. The prime purpose is to
improve security and protect own forces.
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Section IV - The Deception Target

1509. Deception is targeted against an opposing commander and staff whose decisions will lead to
the fulfilment of the JFC’s deception plan. This is the target audience that is included in
PSYOPS analysis and will likely be one of the important ‘critical nodes’ that are evaluated in
C2W planning. Targets will appear at all three levels of deception. Considerations are as
follows:
a. The Human Mind. The human mind has several tendencies which make it
susceptible to deception: preconceived ideas, wishful thinking, desire to clarify
uncertainty, tendency to filter information and the hypnotic effect of regular
information.
b. Time. No target can be deceived forever. All deception has a limited and usually
short life span before it is exposed. The sophistication required is directly related to
the length of time over which the deception has to be sustained.
c. National Characteristics. Knowledge of a target’s national characteristics is

valuable in determining its susceptibility to the deception techniques.
d. Target’s Intelligence Base. An essential part of J2’s responsibilities is to assess the

adversary’s interpretation of the evidence available to him and the deductions he may
have drawn from it.
e. Target’s Sources of Information. The sources of information upon which the

target’s intelligence staff base their advice must be identified. Those sources which
are most easily deceived should then be selected. The greater the quantity and overlap
of the target’s sources, the more difficult is the deception task.
Section V - Deception Methodology

1510. The following seven-step process should be followed when developing a deception plan:
a. Situation. (What is truth?) Determine the current situation for both friendly and
opposing forces and estimate the adversary’s course of action if no action is taken.
b. Objective. (What is the deception objective?) Determine the JFC’s

campaign/mission objectives and then settle on the deception objective that will best
support them. The deception objective will always be stated in the form of action
desired from the opposing commander in response to the deception. The adversary’s
decision-maker target must be identified during this step.
c. Perception. (What do we want the adversary to believe?) During this step the
planner determines the desired perception he wants the opposing commander to form
which will cause him to take the desired action identified in the objective.
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d. Story. (What do we tell him?) A deception story is the deceptive information that
causes the adversary to estimate the situation incorrectly. He may then make an
incorrect decision that places him at a disadvantage. Often the deception objective
can be met if the deception story merely lengthens the opposing commander’s
decision cycle. For the story to be successful it must be believable, verifiable,
consistent, executable and simple.
e. Means. (How do we tell him?) This step identifies the methods, techniques and
resources that can be used to convey or deny information to the target. A complete
understanding of the adversary’s information-gathering apparatus, decision cycle,
conceptions about friendly intent and capabilities, and the adversary’s doctrine is a
prerequisite for success.
f. Feedback. (Is anyone listening?) This step is the most difficult to develop and at the
same time the most critical to the success of the plan. The JFC requires an evaluation
of the adversary’s response to the deception plan on as near real-time basis as
possible. This feedback not only allows the JFC to determine whether the deception is
being seen and believed but, more important, whether it is being acted upon.
g. Termination. This is the most intricate step of the deception process. The graceful
termination of a deception allows the commander to protect the various means and
techniques used, and also allows him to exploit new opportunities that may arise. In
addition, a pre-planned termination option controls the potentially adverse effects of a
compromised deception plan.
Section VI - Counter-Measures
1511. In operations there is also a requirement for a counter-deception officer to work in an All-
Source Analysis or Fusion Cell of the J2 division. His/her function will be to establish the
adversary’s own deception efforts from the wealth of information entering the cell. The
following measures provide the basis for a defence: awareness, knowledge of the adversary,
an open mind, scepticism, resistance to hasty conclusions, sustained search for corroboration,
attention to anomalies, adherence to intelligence procedures, mistrust of automated
interpretation and the ‘devil’s advocate’ approach.
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CHAPTER 16 – PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1601. Psychological operations (PSYOPS) are defined as: ‘planned psychological activities
designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and
military objectives’.1 PSYOPS include Strategic Psychological Activities (SPA),
Psychological Consolidation Activities (PCA), Battlefield Psychological Activities (BPA) and
Peace Support Psychological Activities (PSPA). Target audiences may be the military or
civilian population of hostile or neutral nations, the adversary commander and staff and also
friendly military (non-NATO) or civilian populations. SPA and PCA are conducted at
national government levels and do not normally involve military forces in their execution,
NATO generally does not conduct SPA and PCA but should liaise with nations who may
wish to conduct SPA and PCA in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). At the operational and
tactical levels, BPA and PSPA normally involve military forces during both conflict and Non-
Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. BPA and PSPA, conducted by Strategic/Regional
Commands and their subordinates will not seek to target the international media, friendly
nations or forces, or civilian audiences outside the JOA. By exception, PSYOPS units may
provide support and technical assistance to non-PSYOPS activities, such as troop information
or public information, but will not be given the responsibility to address such audiences.
PSYOPS intent and activities vary with target audience.
1602. This Chapter describes the purpose and categories of PSYOPS, and provides guidance to
commanders and staffs involved in Allied joint operations on their planning and
implementation. In such operations, the primary mission of PSYOPS staff is to support the
JFC’s Information Operation (INFO OPS) activities as well as Civil Military Co-operation
(CIMIC) and special operations forces within the JOA. Therefore, it is important that
PSYOPS activities are closely co-ordinated with the entire staff. In peace support operations,
this co-ordination, particularly with Public Information (PI) as well as with other
governmental and non-governmental agencies, becomes critical to success. Co-ordination
must be effected at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to preserve credibility
and consistency of effort in the overall Allied joint campaign.
Section I - The Purpose of Psychological Operations

1603. The purpose of PSYOPS is to weaken the will of the adversary, bolster any support for allied
objectives within the opposition’s camp, and gain the support of the unsure or uncommitted
by influencing the behaviour and attitude of the adversarial audience. PSYOPS can be
categorised by their apparent source: Black, Grey and White activities reflect messages which
either purport to emanate from a source other than a true one; do not specifically identify any
source; or are disseminated and acknowledged respectively by the sponsor or by an accredited
agency thereof.
1604. PSYOPS are directed at the adversary’s military audience with the aim of lowering morale,
creating apathy, defeatism and discord and promoting dissension, subversion, uncertainty,
1
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defection and surrender. Weak points in an adversary’s political, economic, social and
military situations are identified and evaluated for importance, accessibility and vulnerability.
A co-ordinated, consistent attack is then launched at the adversary’s political, economic,
social and military situations are identified and evaluated for importance, accessibility and
vulnerability. The attack is delivered through the complementary use of various media and
must be consistent with associated PI activities (targeting, friendly and neutral audiences at a
tactical level)2 and the strategic level information plan. If planned and executed properly, the
attack will create doubt or confusion in the minds of the adversary, doubt regarding the
righteousness of their cause, competence and integrity of their leaders, the dependability of
their allies, the outcome of hostilities and, most important, the likelihood of their own
survival.
1605. Counter Psychological Operations. The aim of Counter PSYOPS is to shield audiences
from hostile messages or lessen their impact. Counter PSYOPS uses assets to analyse the
adversary’s propaganda and its effect on the friendly population and the joint force. Analysis
of propaganda source (black, grey and white), content, intended audience, media selection and
effectiveness are done using subjective and/or objective methods. Subjective methods are
based on the background, experience and judgement of the analyst while objective methods
use classification systems and statistical databases over a period of time. The analysis should
determine appropriate themes to reduce the effect of an adversary’s use of PSYOPS and
inform audiences about a JFC’s intentions. While PSYOPS forces and assets may be used in
the analysis of an adversary’s propaganda, such analysis will not be used to examine the PI
produced by friendly forces. The JFC direction and subsequent close co-ordination is
required between PSYOPS and PI staff and Troop Information activities in the employment
of counter PSYOPS techniques.
Section II - Categorisation of Psychological Operations Activities

1606. Within NATO the four categories of PSYOPS: SPA, PCA, BPA and PSPA have been
established primarily to facilitate division of responsibility between national authorities, host
nations and operational commanders. The NATO military authorities are primarily
responsible only for the conduct of BPA in combat operations and PSPA. Useful as they are
in this respect, it should be kept in mind that PSYOPS do not lend themselves easily to
compartmentalisation. In practice, there is much essential overlap among the 4 types of
activities
a. Strategic Psychological Activities. These are high level (i.e. national government
level) PSYOPS conducted in peace, crisis and hostilities and directed towards
friendly, hostile, potentially hostile or neutral audiences. Normally the objectives of
SPA are long-term and political in nature; they aim to undermine the adversary’s, or
the potential adversary’s, will to fight and to reduce the war-making capability while
2
During BPA and PSPA, PSYOPS are not conducted toward international media, friendly nations or forces, or civilian
audiences outside the area of operations.
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gaining the support and co-operation of neutral and friendly populations. Conduct of
SPA is a national responsibility.
b. Psychological Consolidation Activities. PCA, conducted in crisis and conflict are

directed at the civilian population in areas under friendly and the JFC’s control. PCA
aim to establish and maintain the JFC’s freedom of action by winning the co-operation
and support of the local population. They should be in consonance with SPA and are
a national or host nation responsibility. They should be conducted in co-ordination
with the JFC. In areas outside NATO or friendly nation’s territory or in areas without
a functioning government they may become the JFC’s responsibility.
c. Battlefield Psychological Activities. BPA are applied at the operational and tactical
level to gain advantage for a joint force and are:
(1) The responsibility of the JFC and are planned and conducted as an integral
part of combat operations.
(2) Directed at both opposing military forces and civilians under their control.
(3) Aimed at reducing the adversary’s power by eroding the morale of the troops
or the willingness of the civilians to support the adversary’s operations.
(4) Planned initially in peacetime and executed as a component of operations

after the commencement of hostilities.
(5) Planned within the framework of the JFC’s operation/mission directive and in
consonance with Alliance strategic psychological objectives.
d. Peace Support Psychological Activities. PSPA are conducted at the operational and
tactical level to assist in accomplishing the peace support mission of a joint force and
are:
(1) The responsibility of the JFC and are planned and conducted as an integral
part of peace support operations and must be closely co-ordinated and de-
conflict with PI and CIMIC operations and all other aspects of an operation.
(2) Directed at the parties in conflict and the civilian population in the area of
operations with the aim of creating a supportive atmosphere and a willingness
to co-operate among these groups.
(3) Designed to protect the joint force.
(4) Conducted in accordance with the principles of NATO Peace Support

Operations and are based on adherence to true and factual information. This
principle is closely linked with that of Transparency of Operations.
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(5) Planned within the framework of the JFC’s operation/mission directive and in
consonance with Alliance strategic psychological objectives.
Section III - Factors Affecting Psychological Operations

1607. The following factors will affect the JFC’s PSYOPS campaign:
a. Selection of Suitable Target Audiences. The primary potential targets of PSYOPS

are various adversarial military groups and factions. The scarcity of PSYOPS
resources normally necessitates careful selection of which target audiences should be
addressed. The following should be considered:
(1) The vulnerability of a particular audience to a psychological approach, ie can

they be persuaded or influenced?
(2) The ability of that audience to produce the desired response either by
themselves or in other groups.
(3) The accessibility of that audience to the various forms of the media available.
(4) The importance of a particular audience with regard to the JFC’s operation.
b. Selection and Development of Credible Themes. When vulnerable, effective and

accessible target audiences have been selected, care must be taken in the selection of
themes. There are three major considerations:
(1) Themes must be believable. To achieve this credibility, they must be based
on detailed background information and an accurate knowledge of the current
situation. In the long run, the best single assurance of credibility is respect for
the truth. NATO PSYOPS uses truthful and legitimate information to
establish credibility in the mind of the target audience.
(2) Chosen themes must support the JFC’s mission, PSYOPS objectives, and
support the cause of the joint force.
(3) Themes must urge the target audience to adopt an attitude that they are
capable of accepting and acting on. In other words, they should lead to a
course of action that seems reasonable, realistic and beneficial to the target
audience.
c. Co-ordination of Operations. PSYOPS themes will be perceived by target

audiences as expressions of national policy and Alliance policy. Any inconsistency
between themes used by different agencies or at different levels may discredit the
operation and damage the cause of the joint force. To prevent this, careful co-
ordination of PSYOPS is paramount.
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d. Timeliness. Psychological activities conducted at the correct moment will

significantly enhance or, if required, minimise the impact of operations. Conversely,
if badly timed, it may prove ineffective or actually strengthen an adversary’s cause.
The PSYOPS staff must be able to analyse the adversary’s psychological situation,
identify suitable target audiences, select themes, then prepare, co-ordinate and execute
operations as the situation develops. They must do so with the speed necessary to take
advantage of transient opportunities. PSYOPS, unlike other forms of operation,
seldom produce immediate results. Time is required for ideas to mature, or to erode
an adversary’s morale or foster co-operation among former warring factions, and
hence increase the combat effectiveness of the joint force. PSYOPS should therefore
be initiated at the earliest practicable time. Because SCs are limited to conducting
BPA or PSPA, it may not normally be possible to begin PSYOPS prior to the start of
operations. However, given that PSYOPS can be a combat preventer that can save
lives, it is always advantageous to begin operations as early as possible. When
possible PSYOPS activities should be initiated prior to the introduction of forces into
the JOA.
Section IV - Planning and Implementation

1608. High Level Approval. More than in most activities, PSYOPS require co-ordinated, high
level planning and approval. It is a fundamental requirement that PSYOPS plans should be
approved at the highest practicable political and military level. Centralised planning for BPA
and PSPA should be focused at the Regional Command level and be based on strategic
guidance from the North Atlantic Council and the Strategic Commander. Plans should
identify the adversary’s weaknesses, PSYOPS objectives, likely target audiences and suitable
themes, and provide guidance on the use of the media to reach targets. Prohibition or
limitations in any of these matters should also be stated. Once plans are complete and
approved they should be executed at every level of command. Failure to observe these
fundamental requirements may result in use of contradictory or inconsistent themes which are
easily defeated by an adversary or used to highlight divisions in the Alliance, and may even
damage the credibility of nations or the Alliance as a whole. The requirement for high-level
approval restricts to a degree the freedom of action of commanders at the operational and
tactical levels, but it is a necessary limitation.
1609. Integration. PSYOPS are an integral part of strategic, operational and tactical level
operations. Plans should be developed early and complement the overall operational plan.
The PSYOPS effort must also be integrated into all aspects of the JFC’s campaign, to include
(but not be exclusive to) Public Information, CIMIC and INFO OPS. It should be
remembered that the presence of mass media in a JOA means an overlap of information
between audiences. This overlap makes message de-confliction crucial. Care must also be
taken to anticipate and minimise any negative impact of PSYOPS actions or messages on
unintended audiences, including members of the joint force.
1610. Command and Control. Nations may place psychological operations forces under the
operational control of the JFC or a component commander for appropriate mission support. It
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is essential that all PSYOPS products (such as radio scripts or printed materials) use
consistent information, themes and symbols, necessitating a single approval process and
authority for all BPA or PSPA.
1611. Behaviour of Own Troops. The attitude and behaviour of members of the joint force have a
psychological impact on the local population in the JOA that is critical to winning any ‘hearts
and minds’ campaign. This is a command function to brief members of the joint force on the
cultural perspective of the JOA to avoid any misunderstanding and antagonism that might
alienate local people. PSYOPS teams are able to produce country briefs based on their
regional research.
Section V - The Relationship between Intelligence, PSYOPS, C2W and PI

1612. For the successful conduct of BPA, the PSYOPS staff must be fully integrated with all other
staff elements, and a close relationship must exist between them and the Intelligence staffs.
Suitable target audiences and credible themes can be selected only if backed by good
intelligence and C2W critical node monitoring. Intelligence, including that derived from the
other C2W disciplines, is essential to assessment of the effectiveness of BPA.
1613. For the conduct of PSPA, the relationship between PSYOPS and PI becomes crucial because
of a much greater degree of overlap of audiences and information. An Information Co-
ordination Committee headed by a Public Information Officer may be established to co-
ordinate all aspects of information policy and activities. Intelligence maintains its key role in
providing intelligence information and effectiveness assessment. PSYOPS and PI address
different audiences or the same audience through different conduits, but their messages must
be in harmony as audiences cannot be isolated, nor can communications be
compartmentalised. However, despite the need for a co-ordination committee, the staffs
should be kept separate to safeguard PI’s relationship with the media. Their areas of
responsibility are:
a. Public Information. PI informs the NATO public audience, through the media,
about the activities of the joint force at home and abroad. It does so by providing the
media with accurate, objective and timely information. It also deals with local media
in the JOA.
b. Psychological Operations. PSYOPS targets military/armed and civilian audiences,

dealing directly with the audience. It uses truthful information, to influence attitudes
and behaviour in support of the JFC’s mission. PSYOPS has dedicated media
capability including print, broadcasting and loudspeakers to reach its audience; the
public media is only used to disseminate strictly factual information which may form
part of the PSYOPS campaign.
1614. Much of the intelligence needed for PSYOPS may be available from Open Source Intelligence
(OSINT) and can be produced in peacetime through ‘country studies’. However,
psychological assessments are different from intelligence assessments as they use
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information/intelligence to explore the context and environment of a situation to predict

human reactions to particular influences.
1615. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is a vital source for the key information and intelligence
requirements for PSYOPS, which include:
a. Detailed information on cultural, religious, social, economic and political peculiarities

of the country and region.
b. Intelligence on the adversary’s internal divisions, e.g. ethnic and religious minorities.
c. Details of the adversary’s government and military C2 architecture.
d. Background information on popular radio/TV programmes and personalities,

periodicals and cartoons, and important holidays and historical events.
e. What target audience can manifest the behaviour required to achieve the PSYOPS
objectives.
f. The leadership structure within the target group, and which individuals hold key
positions.
g. Psychological profiles or studies to identify what influences the target group, in

particular their leaders, and the best means to manipulate perspectives to achieve
PSYOPS objectives. Much of this information can be obtained in peacetime through
national representatives in the JOA.
h. Agencies suitable for conveying messages to selected audiences and bringing

maximum psychological pressure to bear. The impact of planned PSYOPS on
individuals outside the target group, such as populations in neighbouring countries.
Assessment of the adversary’s PSYOPS doctrine and capability for propaganda and PI
activities.
1616. Psychological Operations and Civil-Military Co-ordination. PSYOPS and CIMIC staffs
are mutually supporting. PSYOPS can be used to influence the attitudes and behaviour in the
JOA; CIMIC staffs work to improve conditions that in turn would affect attitudes. The
CIMIC task involves liaison in the JOA with foreign/local government, UN and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO) in order to:
a. Co-ordinate use of local manpower and resources.
b. Create infrastructure support.
c. Conduct civic ‘Hearts and Minds’ projects involving logistics, engineers and medical
teams.
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PSYOPS, or their assets, should be used directly to gain support of civilians for CIMIC
missions and to publicise CIMIC activities and successes. Additionally or alternatively,
PSYOPS, targeted in support of operations, may enhance the confidence of the local
population and thus facilitate CIMIC operations. Many CIMIC operations are themselves
effective PSYOPS, and it is therefore essential that CIMIC and PSYOPS are co-ordinated.
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CHAPTER 17 - ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1701. Military forces make extensive use of the Electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for
communications, weapon systems, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, platform and
force protection and other military uses. Characteristically, emissions within this spectrum do
not respect the artificial boundaries and borders that separate nations or forces, nor do they
honour any other geographic, political or military boundaries. As a consequence, any
commander engaged in any form of military operation should strive to dominate the use and
exploitation of the EM spectrum within a Joint Operations Area (JOA). The purpose of this
Chapter is to describe the factors affecting EW and its divisions in Allied joint operations, and
to expand on its application to Information Operations (INFO OPS).1
1702. Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as: ‘military action to exploit the EM spectrum which
encompasses the search for, interception and identification of EM emissions, the employment
of EM energy, including Directed Energy (DE), to reduce or prevent hostile use of the EM
spectrum and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces’.2 EW has three divisions:
a. Electronic Warfare Support Measures. Electronic Warfare Support Measures

(ESM) is ‘that division of EW involving actions taken to search for, intercept and
identify EM emissions and locate their source for the purpose of situational awareness
and immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information required for
immediate decisions involving Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), Electronic
Protective Measures (EPM) and other tactical actions’.2
b. Electronic Countermeasures. ECM is ‘that division of EW involving actions taken

to prevent or reduce an adversary’s effective use of the EM spectrum through use of
electromagnetic energy’.
c. Electronic Protective Measures. EPM is ‘that division of EW involving actions

taken to ensure effective friendly use of the EM spectrum despite the adversary’s use
of EM energy’.
EW involves active (detectable) and passive (covert or non-detectable) measures. ESM is

passive; ECM and EPM may involve both.
1703. EW is an integral part of all military operations and is a key component of INFO OPS. EW
facilitates the estimate and decision making process; contributes to management and
operational control; protects armed forces against hostile actions and avoids unintentional EM
interference of friendly emitters. EW measures can be permanent or limited in time.
Although largely defensive in nature, some EW measures can, if a commander wishes, be
used to attack adversary systems.
1
As outlined in Chapter 14.
2
MC 64/8.
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1704. Operations in the EM spectrum are of concern to all commanders and their staffs.
Commanders should be assisted by EW specialists who are trained to exploit the EM
spectrum and are normally employed in an Electronic Warfare Co-ordination Cell (EWCC).
Commanders have the capability to attack an adversary’s C2 systems, thereby creating
uncertainty and degrading opposition’s C2 capability. The EWCC contributes to the
protection of friendly C2 systems by providing information or intelligence on neutral or
hostile emitters, and by taking steps to minimise the adversary’s use of EW against friendly
forces. Thus EW is a major contributor to a Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) Command and
Control Warfare (C2W), Counter-C2 and C2-Protect strategy. 3
Section I - Electronic Warfare Support Measures

1705. ESM activities are associated with efforts to detect, identify and exploit the characteristic
signatures of EM emissions. This exploitation can yield valuable information on an
adversary’s use of the EM spectrum. ESM operations detect, identify and exploit intentional
emissions such as radio, radars and other sensors, or unintentional emissions such as those at
infra-red frequencies made by, for example, an exhaust plume.
1706. Use of ESM Information. Information gathered by ESM operations is used for immediate
threat recognition, for developing threat databases and may also contribute to the JFC’s
intelligence collection.4 ESM collection effort is characterised as follows:
a. It can be used in peace, crisis and war. Its use in peacetime is essential to build up an
EW database for operations, such as the NATO Emitter Data Base (NEDB).
However, NATO and national rules govern the transfer of ESM information.
b. It is one of the few tactical information-gathering systems which has the potential to
provide surveillance to the limit of JFC’s Area Of Intelligence Responsibility (AOIR).
Most ESM provide all-weather, day/night, long range information-gathering systems
at the operational and tactical levels.
c. It provides information, in support of ECM operations and EPM, on an adversary’s

capabilities.
d. It is passive, except for its organic C2 systems.
e. It is capable of exploiting a variety of EM emissions depending on the capabilities and

purpose of the ESM equipment.
1707. ESM Target Acquisition. ESM direction finding techniques may have the accuracy to
provide target acquisition data sufficient for modern smart weapons or area weapons
3
As described in Chapter 14.
4
See also Chapter 12.
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employment. Where this is not the case the direction finding accuracy will often be sufficient
to cue other reconnaissance, surveillance or target acquisition sensors.
1708. ESM Cueing. ESM provides the cueing for ECM operations. When terrain is a
consideration, ESM has the further advantage of affirming that an acceptable transmission
path exists between the ECM platform and the target system.
1709. Platform and Force Protection ESM. ESM is used in conjunction with other sensors and
countermeasure devices to support the protection of platforms and ground facilities. This is
particularly true for airfields, communications and logistics sites, ships, aircraft and
helicopters and is becoming more prevalent on land force vehicles.
Section II - Electronic Counter Measures

1710. ECM are the offensive arm of EW. With the introduction of new technology, ECM systems
are moving beyond the traditional roles of jamming and deception. DE weapons will add a
new destructive or neutralisation dimension to the electronic battlefield, and bring with them a
need for careful co-ordination. EW platform and force protection devices can seriously
degrade the effectiveness of an adversary’s target acquisition, tracking and weapon homing
systems, and thereby contribute to the survivability of the JFC’s resources. However, use of
ECM will be constrained by ROE. ECM has three sub-divisions: electronic jamming,
electronic neutralisation and electronic deception.
1711. Electronic Jamming. Electronic jamming is ‘the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or

reflection of EM energy with the object of impairing the effectiveness of electronic devices,
equipment or systems being used by an adversary’. Jamming can be carried out from a
number of platforms using a wide variety of techniques. Jamming is detectable and hence can
be classified and located by an adversary. In addition, it can cause unintentional interference
in friendly electronic systems. Jamming:
a. Must be authorised and controlled by J3 on behalf of JFC. Specific Rules of

Engagement (ROE) may limit the options for jamming.
b. Must be co-ordinated with all other operations or offensive actions.
c. Must be co-ordinated with J2 and J6 to determine the effects of jamming on

ESM/Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection activities.
d. Has the potential to cause interference to friendly electronic systems, and for this
reason its use is co-ordinated by means of the Restricted Frequency List (RFL).5
e. May be employed regardless of ROE or requirements for consultation when it is

essential for self-protection.
5
See paragraph 1730 et seq.
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Electronic Neutralisation
1712. Electronic neutralisation (EN) is ‘the deliberate use of EM energy to either temporarily or
permanently damage enemy devices which rely exclusively on the EM spectrum’. In the
future, EN could be brought about as a result of a DE weapon depositing sufficient EM
energy on a target to render it, its electronics, or both, useless. The use of lasers to damage or
destroy sensitive optical viewing devices is an example. Use of lasers is normally
characterised by the requirement for line-of-sight and the nearly instantaneous effects.
1713. DE systems can pose a risk to friendly forces; as a consequence, safety must be considered
and great care must be used when employing such systems. Their use may also be limited by
existing or planned protocols such as the 1980 Geneva Protocol on Prohibition on the Use of
Laser and Blinding Weapons (Protocol IV). DE systems will have applications in close
combat line-of-sight engagements, so their employment must be co-ordinated in the same way
as conventional direct fire weapons.
Electronic Deception
1714. Electronic Deception (ED) is ‘the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption or
reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an adversary or
his electronic systems’. The primary use of ED is for platform or area defence against non-
communications systems by using a variety of techniques including:
a. Flares, repeaters and false target generators to produce deceptive transmissions.
b. Imitative techniques to replace the emission of radars, navigational aids or

communication devices.
c. Chaff and other reflectors to create false targets.
d. Radar-absorbent material, protective paints and coatings to reduce radar cross-

sections.
e. Other energy-absorbing or dissipating material, protective paints and coatings to

reduce Infra-Red (IR) signatures.
1715. ED can also be used to assist with military deception, principally against communications
systems. Therefore ED should be considered during the development of any deception plan.
The EW staff, as directed by J3 and assisted by J2 and J6, plans and integrates ED into the
overall Deception plan. ED may cause an adversary, by the manipulation, distortion or
falsification of electronic transmissions, to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. ED is
particularly effective when:
a. An adversary relies heavily on the use and exploitation of EM emissions.
b. It is fully integrated into the overall deception plan where appropriate.
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1716. To be effective, the ED transmissions must be received by the adversary. Equally clearly the
intent to deceive must not be discovered. ED requires detailed planning, co-ordination and
execution. It should be used carefully and in full knowledge of its potential and weaknesses.
Section III - Electronic Protective Measures

1717. EPM comprise those actions that ensure friendly effective use of the EM spectrum despite an
adversary’s use of the same spectrum. Other than those measures designed and built into
electronic systems, EPM is a command responsibility, exercised as follows:
a. Defining passive and active measures for electronic systems, and the guidelines for
their use in accordance with existing NATO Precautionary System (NPS) measures
and ROE.
b. Developing proficiency through instruction and training which places emphasis on the
measures available, the NPS and ROE in force, and tactical requirements in a hostile
EW environment.
1718. Protective Measures. To minimise an adversary’s opportunity for successful ESM and ECM
operations, it is necessary to:
a. Regularly brief the EW threat to force personnel.
b. Provide training for key staffs in the recognition of opposing force EW, and
appropriate EPM responses.
c. Ensure that electronic system capabilities are safeguarded during exercises, work-up
and pre-crisis training by avoiding the use of detectable EPM.
1719. Passive EPM. Passive EPM are ‘undetectable measures, such as operating procedures and
technical features of equipment, which are meant to ensure friendly effective use of the EM
spectrum’. Passive EPM include, but are not limited to, the following actions:
a. Use of reduced power, brevity of transmissions, and directional antennas.
b. Careful positioning of C2 resources to reduce the risk of detection and to degrade the
accuracy of direction-finding.
c. Use of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and less susceptible communications

means to counter jamming and deception.
d. Use of EMCON procedures.
e. Use of technical measures which affect the design of electronic equipment.
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1720. Active Electronic Protection Measures. Active EPM are ‘detectable measures, such as
altering transmitter parameters as necessary, to ensure friendly effective use of the EM
spectrum’. These may include the use of spread spectrum, frequency hopping, agility or
diversity, change of modulations, the use of jittered or staggered Pulse Repetition Frequencies
(PRF) and changing or modulating power outputs.
1721. Emission Control. EMCON is defined as the ‘selective control of EM emissions thereby
influencing the adversary’s exploitation opportunities’. The aim can be twofold:
a. To minimise the adversary’s detection of emissions and exploitation of the

information so gained, or
b. To reduce EM interference thereby improving sensor performance.6
It is an important contribution to the JFC’s C2W strategy. It is multi-spectral and therefore

must be co-ordinated fully in all staff cells and rigidly enforced throughout the joint force.
The staff of an EWCC would assist in producing the EMCON plan.7
Section IV - Electronic Warfare Capabilities

1722. Each component of a joint force’s EW capability contributes in different ways to a joint
campaign. However, all components possess the following generic capabilities:
a. Conducting ESM operations, which include electronic surveillance, target acquisition

and may include possible contributions to intelligence collection for tactical purposes
within a component commander’s area of interest.
b. Conducting ECM operations in support of an operations plan or as a matter of

platform or force protection.
c. Contributing to the electronic order of battle of a joint force.
d. Assisting in the co-ordination of EPM for the joint force as a whole.
e. Providing an EWCC as the focal point for all EW operations.7
f. Co-ordinating the EW activities of all components of the joint force to optimise those
capabilities in a synergistic manner, while minimising ‘electronic fratricide’.
1723. Maritime Component. The maritime component of a joint force will contribute to ESM and
ECM operations within the maritime area of operations adjacent to, and in littoral regions
within a JOA because EW is an integral part of all maritime operations. This support is
enhanced when the force is supplemented by aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
6
MC 64/8 ‘Electronic Warfare in NATO’.
7
See Section V.
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This component should provide maritime EW expertise and advice for the JFC within the
EWCC.
1724. Land Component. The land component of a joint force can contribute to all EW operations
within the land component commander’s area of interest. Its capability is dependent on the
terrain, positioning of EW resources, EW equipment capabilities and the location and altitude
of the target. The employment of Army aviation resources or UAV significantly improves the
overall capability. This component provides land EW expertise and advice for the JFC within
the EWCC.
1725. Air Component. The air component of a joint force may contribute to ESM and ECM
operations throughout a JOA. The capabilities of air EW units are directly related to their
operational flexibility, and greatly improve overall electronic surveillance, targeting and
intelligence collection activities. This component provides air EW expertise and advice for
the JFC within the EWCC.
1726. Contribution of Electronic Warfare to the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. EW can
make a significant contribution to a Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) operation,
which is conducted as an element of offensive counter air operations to improve the
survivability of offensive air missions and supporting air operations. Early application of
SEAD operations are likely against sensors, fusion and filter centres, C2 nodes and weapon
guiding systems. EW measures have a central role in these activities which include:
a. Location and parametric analysis of adversary sensor systems.
b. Programming of defensive aids sub-systems, Radar Warning Receiver (RWR),

jamming pods, chaff and flare dispensers.
c. Programming of anti-radiation missiles.
d. Force protection.
e. Mission planning.
f. Nodal analysis of air defence structure and destruction or suppression of the critical
nodes.
Section V - Role of the Electronic Warfare Co-ordination Cell

1727. The EWCC is the JFC’s mechanism for co-ordinating EW resources within a JOA. It should
be established as an integral part of the joint force headquarters J3 staff, at whatever level is
deemed appropriate, to provide an effective means of co-ordinating all EW activities
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by the joint force. The EWCC may exercise control of EW assets as directed by the JFC. The
EWCC staff requires ready access to:
a. J3 to co-ordinate EW requirements to fulfil JFC’s objectives.
b. J2 for reaction to changing intelligence requirements, and its All Source Analysis Cell
(ASAC) for awareness of the current intelligence picture and related technical aspects,
and for co-ordination of GUARDED frequencies.
c. J8 for guidance.
d. All members of the J3 INFO OPS organisation for co-ordination of effort.
e. J6 for co-ordination of the RFL, EMCON planning and Meaconing, Intrusion,

Jamming and Interference (MIJI) incidents.
1728. The staff of the EWCC should include representatives from each nation and service providing
EW resources in support of the joint force. To function effectively, the EWCC must have
access to a secure area for the handling of sensitive intelligence material. To this end it
requires approved automatic data processing hardware and software systems together with
secure voice, facsimile and other data systems to provide access to EW units and the EWCCs
of superior, subordinate and adjacent headquarters.
1729. The EWCC’s primary responsibility is the efficient management of EW resources on behalf of
the JFC. The EWCC staff must:
a. Collect and process information relevant to the conduct of operations.
b. Actively contribute to INFO OPS and participate in the C2W strategy.
c. Maintain comprehensive databases for:
d. The electronic order of battle.
e. RFL.
f. Military and civil emitters.
g. EW equipment capabilities and vulnerabilities.
h. Evaluate EW-related information and analyse data.
i. Report information to members of the staff, to subordinate units and the next superior
level of command.
j. Update EW procedures for flanking, reinforcing and allied formations.
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k. Make recommendations on EW ROE.
Restricted Frequency List
1730. Fundamental to the responsibilities of the EWCC is the development of a RFL in co-
ordination with the Operations, Intelligence and CIS staffs. The RFL maps EM spectrum
usage within the designated JOA, and therefore is essential to all phases of operational
planning.
1731. The RFL is vital to the prevention of unintentional interference and assists in optimising the
use of limited EW resources. The list should continually be updated by the staffs who will
have specific knowledge of operational frequency requirements for offensive and defensive
EW, SIGINT and C2 links.
Electronic Warfare Planning
1732. The EW planning process begins with the JFC’s concept of operations, from which an EW
concept of operations and plan is developed by the EWCC which also supports the C2W
strategy. The EWCC, in consultation with J2, assists in fulfilling the JFC’s information
requirements with the resources at their disposal.
1733. The EWCC, in conjunction with J3, then develops supporting annexes to operations plans,
orders and instructions. Co-ordination at all levels is essential to the effectiveness of the joint
EW planning process.
Electronic Warfare Mutual Support
1734. The joint and combined nature of EW requires that Electronic Warfare Mutual Support
(EWMS) be established to ensure that EW information resources, capabilities and assistance
can be exchanged. Since EM emissions are not limited by geographical or military
boundaries, and do not recognise service demarcations, EWMS will provide the organisation
and procedures for exchanges. These will be between Allied nations and with NATO
commands, and between superior, subordinate and flanking formations in all NATO
operations.
1735. EW information must be transferred rapidly to optimise the use of limited EW resources, and
to contribute to C2W planning and activities. The exchange of EW data between forces
acting in the land, air, maritime and amphibious environments will be facilitated by the use of
agreed EW data bases such as the NEDB, and by the mutual development of JOA specific
data bases, such as Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) data bases and the RFL.
1736. Electronic Warfare Mutual Support Plans. If not already in existence, EWMS plans must
be developed early in a crisis and be fully integrated into operational plans. They must be
continually updated.
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1737. Electronic Warfare Mutual Support Co-ordination. Where established, the EWCC is
responsible for EWMS. In other cases, Electronic Warfare Liaison Officers (EWLOs) should
be appointed to co-ordinate EWMS requests and responses. Where assets of another nation
are assigned to an allied or NATO formation, EW Points Of Contact (POC) should be
established with adjacent formations and higher and subordinate headquarters for planning
purposes, whether EW resources are held or not. A national EW POC should be identified
and promulgated for each allied nation assigning forces to joint forces or NATO commands.
1738. Electronic Warfare Mutual Support Procedures. Detailed information exchange

procedures should be included in the appropriate annexes of contingency plans, generic plans,
Allied Publications, and SOPs.
a. The exchange or retention of adversary information data elements or other adversary

information must be handled in accordance with the provisions of MC 101 and MC
298 (Titles classified) when they are used for, derived from or reveal traffic or
cryptographic analysis, special analytic techniques or covert sources.
b. In crisis and in hostilities, the adversarial force information data elements set out in
MC 64 may be exchanged in accordance with appropriate NATO EW information
exchange procedures. Information of a perishable nature concerning current tactical
operational plans, locations and actions, obtained from ESM may be exchanged in
accordance with the procedures set out in MC 298.
1739. Electronic Warfare Mutual Support for Electronic Support Measures. EWMS activities
that should be considered under the ESM function include the exchange of information related
to a commander’s intelligence priorities and target characteristics taking into account:
a. The usefulness of some overlap;
b. The need for each formation to monitor priority targets; and
c. The need to maintain flexibility.
d. The identification of exploitable adversary emitters (including communication nets).
e. Frequencies to be protected.
f. Mutual exchange of EW information leading to common EW data bases.
1740. Electronic Warfare Mutual Support for Electronic Counter Measures. EWMS activities
that should be considered under the ECM function include the exchange of information
related to:
a. Emitter data and other parameters of potential targets.
b. The selection of appropriate action (electronic jamming or electronic deception).
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c. Minimising mutual interference caused by ECM by exchanging joint/combined RFL

details.
d. Authorisation for initial use of ECM.
e. Exchange of results of ECM activities.
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CHAPTER 18 – OPERATIONS SECURITY

1801. The scale and thoroughness of the Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition (RISTA) capabilities of modern forces, insurgent groups and terrorist
organisations are well documented and formidable. These capabilities may be used against a
joint force wherever it may be deployed and whatever the military scenario, throughout the
range of operations. Moreover, an intelligence attack may be mounted by a non-belligerent
power or force for its own use or to provide support to an ally or friend. An adversary’s
knowledge of the joint force’s operation or its plans or force capabilities would negate
surprise and may ruin the operational plan. An adversary’s knowledge of the joint force’s
vulnerabilities would be even more damaging. It is vital that such details are denied to the
adversary by the application of Operations Security (OPSEC) and, where appropriate,
deception.
1802. OPSEC is defined as ‘the process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate
security, using active or passive means, to deny to the enemy knowledge of the dispositions,
capabilities and intentions of friendly forces’.1
1803. There is a relationship between OPSEC and deception. OPSEC aims to prevent an adversary
from identifying friendly dispositions, capabilities and intentions, whereas deception aims
deliberately to present a false picture. An OPSEC plan need not, therefore, include
deception; conversely, a deception plan must include OPSEC to hide the reality and assist in
presenting a false picture to the adversary. Thus there is a synergy between OPSEC and
deception: while OPSEC denies information to an adversary, deception fills that void with
information tailored for the consumption of the opposition.
1804. The Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) staff should formulate an OPSEC plan at the earliest
opportunity, where possible prior to deployment of a joint force. In doing so, the planners
should take into account the possible deterrent effect of a force deployment. Also, the
movement of major forces necessary at the operational level cannot, in most instances, be
concealed. It may be necessary, therefore, to achieve a balance between the OPSEC and
deception elements within the plan.
1805. The importance of OPSEC, as one of the five major military capabilities of C2W (and thus
Information Operations), was highlighted in Chapter 14. This Chapter expands the C2W
aspect of OPSEC to describe the factors affecting the planning and application of joint
operations.
Section I - Principles of Operations Security

1806. OPSEC is a force-wide process which addresses the overall security of a joint operation in
the light of the adversary’s known or suspected RISTA capabilities.
1
AAP-6.
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1807. Each joint operation should be examined from the adversary’s viewpoint. It is essential that
the operation is examined in its entirety, including rear area activity, lines of communication,
maritime, land, air and space operations and all their related CIS and logistic networks. An
OPSEC plan can be effected only through a co-ordinated effort by commanders, staffs and
force components, and through the use of a combination of OPSEC measures. OPSEC is
equally important during force rehearsals and other preparatory activities.
1808. As it is not possible to conceal every military action in support of a joint operation, OPSEC
should concentrate on those activities that could indicate the existence of an impending
operation or reveal any vulnerabilities. These aspects or indicators are referred to as
Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs).
1809. The JFC’s staff should apply the following principles of OPSEC:
a. Adversary’s Viewpoint. An OPSEC assessment should be conducted from the

adversary’s viewpoint. The key to identifying critical information is to determine
what can be deduced from a particular event or piece of information, hence the
importance of protecting EEFIs. Where there is more than one adversary, care must
be taken to conduct an assessment from each of their points of view as the value of
an EEFI may vary from one adversary to another.
b. Critical Information. OPSEC assessments must identify those critical items of

information, activities and weapons/equipment which the adversary could use to
predict, disrupt or defeat joint force operations. It is not, however, a process to
ensure protection of all information.
c. Co-ordination at the Highest Level. The OPSEC plan must be co-ordinated at

operational level. Distribution of OPSEC assessment results should be restricted to
the JFC and key members of the staff on a ‘need to know’ basis, as general
dissemination could result in individual units taking their own OPSEC measures
independently, to the detriment of the overall plan. Individual units should only take
OPSEC measures on explicit orders from the JFC. National authorities of all
contributing nations are to be included in the co-ordinating process in an early stage
to ensure compliance with overall objective. All legal implications must be
considered thoroughly.
d. Comprehensiveness. OPSEC must address all aspects of a joint operation. These

include timings, administration, logistics, communications and movement, for all
elements of the joint force.
e. Timeliness. Assessments of vulnerability must be made before, or early in the

operation planning process. OPSEC cannot successfully be imposed after an event,
as it is difficult to determine what may have been compromised and what remedial
measures are required.
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f. Appropriateness. An accurate assessment of both friendly indicators and the

adversary’s RISTA capabilities is necessary. Measures must be appropriate to the
joint operation. Measures to counter an exaggerated capability can divert much-
needed assets from the operation itself.
g. Acceptability. OPSEC measures must, as far as possible, appear to the adversary to

be part of normal operations; they must not in themselves draw the adversary’s
attention. OPSEC measures may be part of a deception plan but if necessary,
deception measures may need to be incorporated into the OPSEC plan to disguise
certain OPSEC measures.
h. Flexibility. The OPSEC plan must be capable of change at very short notice, and
should be continuously reviewed to take account of events and to pre-empt new
threats. The plan must include contingency elements to cover developments as the
operation proceeds, and provide for counter-compromise action.
i. Systems Analysis. OPSEC should examine the security of co-ordinated programmes

and procedures. Static or isolated installations, documents, equipment and/or events
should be included in the OPSEC plan only when they form or contribute to EEFIs.
Otherwise they should be addressed in force standing security measures.
1810. OPSEC is the JFC’s responsibility, and it is a function of J3 the joint force headquarters.2 A
staff component within J3, with assistance from other staff branches, should be made
specifically responsible for OPSEC, either as a dedicated cell or jointly with their other
functions. The OPSEC staff’s task would be to act as the overall monitoring and reporting
point for OPSEC matters.
Section II - Operations Security Measures

1811. The OPSEC plan will consist of a number of force-wide measures, together with specific
measures (often imposed for a limited time only) for individual units, equipment,
installations or areas. The measures selected will be governed by the requirement of each
aspect or indicator and whether it needs to be protected or controlled.
1812. Each measure should be assessed against the anticipated threat from the adversary’s RISTA
capability, as well as the physical threat from special operations forces, agents and
sympathisers. To ensure a systematic and thorough review, OPSEC measures should be
considered under the following headings:
a. Active Measures. Active measures to disrupt or destroy the adversary’s RISTA

capability include:
(1) Increased air defence effort against imagery intelligence platforms.
2
See Annex 4A.
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(2) Increased military activity to counter reconnaissance patrols, etc. If the

adversary is thought to possess ‘smart’ (terminally guided) munitions,
particular attention should be given to sites potentially suitable for opposing
teams equipped with laser target markers.
b. Command and Control Warfare. C2W might employ ECM and direct attack
against command elements, including intelligence staffs and other intelligence
production assets.
c. Deception and Psychological Operations. At the operational and strategic level,

where movement of large formations cannot be effectively concealed, deception is
likely to form an integral part of the OPSEC plan. Similarly, PSYOPS can be used
to influence the adversary’s perceptions of friendly moves and intentions.
d. Defensive Measures. Defensive OPSEC measures include:
(1) Personnel Security. Personnel security includes the risk to individuals from
subversion and terrorism; also the controls to limit movement, e.g. curfews,
out-of-bounds areas and guards, and to prevent contact between military
personnel and potential opposition sympathisers.
(2) Physical Security. Physical security covers the barriers, e.g. locks, walls,
wire and fields of fire, created to deny access to classified or sensitive
documents, equipment, military bases and sensitive areas, and to defeat or
prevent physical attack.
(3) Document Security. All documents should be protected in accordance with

their classification. Distribution of documents containing EEFI should be
limited to those with a need to know, and delivery means assessed for risk.
(4) Camouflage and Concealment. Camouflage and concealment can assist in

defeating surveillance from ground or air. The threat from satellite
surveillance platforms must also be considered; their orbits and surveillance
‘windows’ should be provided by the joint force headquarters to field
commanders.
(5) Information Security. Information Security (INFOSEC) encompasses

policies and procedures for identifying, controlling and protecting
information from unauthorised disclosure.
(a) Computer Security. Computer Security (COMPUSEC) refers to the

protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorised access
and exploitation of friendly computer systems.
(b) Communication Security. Communication Security (COMSEC )

refers to the protection resulting from any measures taken to deny
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unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived

from telecommunications, or to ensure the authenticity of such
telecommunications. Includes crypto security, transmission security,
emission security and physical security of COMSEC materials and
information.
1813. If there has been a compromise or failure of an OPSEC measure, and countermeasures are
not practicable, or no measure can be implemented to meet a particular RISTA threat, the
JFC has three options:
a. Ignore the Compromise. If the operation has reached a stage when the adversary is
unable to influence its course, the JFC may agree that the compromise or failure of
OPSEC can be ignored.
b. Accept the Risk. If friendly forces are irretrievably committed, or a phase of the
operation is vital and cannot be altered, the JFC may accept the risk associated with
the OPSEC compromise or failure.
c. Change Plan. If the above stages have not been reached, the commander should re-
evaluate the situation and change plans accordingly.
Section III - The Operations Security Process

1814. The OPSEC process is executed in five stages:
a. Identification of Critical Information:
(1) Preliminary Assessment. The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

(IPB) and the Intelligence Estimate should include an outline assessment of
the opposition’s RISTA capabilities, both within and outside the Joint
Operations Area (JOA). Key information/intelligence requirements include:
(a) Capabilities of adversary to collect/process/analyse information.
(b) Intelligence (in particular Signals Intelligence and Human

Intelligence (HUMINT)) on the adversary’s intelligence objectives.
(c) Factors, such as cultural bias, that could influence the adversary’s
interpretation of intelligence gained.
(d) Assessment of the adversary’s Counter-C2 capabilities, to allow

C2W planners to prioritise targeting and C2-Protect measures.
(e) Counter-intelligence on the security threat posed by agents of foreign

intelligence services.
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(f) HUMINT, e.g. from counter-intelligence, interrogation of prisoners

of war or captured agents on the effectiveness of friendly OPSEC
plans.
(2) Joint Force Commander’s Estimate. Assessment of the adversary’s

RISTA capability guides the JFC when determining the Estimate as to which
general joint force activities the adversary is likely to detect. The JFC would
include OPSEC as a factor in the Estimate and provide guidance to the staff
as to which aspects of the plan can or should be disclosed as a contribution
to deterrence or deception, and which aspects must be protected. These may
be specifically stated as the JFC’s OPSEC Requirements in the same way as
his/her Intelligence Requirements.
(3) Identify Essential Elements of Friendly Information. J3, in conjunction

with J2, identifies the EEFIs within the JFC’s plan. This part of the process
would also identify the specific indicator, e.g. vehicles/equipment and
activities within the EEFIs.
(4) Operation Security Estimate. When necessary the JFC may direct that a
separate OPSEC Estimate be prepared for specific major or critical
operations.
b. Analysis of Threats. J2, having identified the EEFIs and their associated key
equipment or vehicles, should assess in detail:
(1) What the adversary is already likely to know or have deduced, given a
perceived collection capability.
(2) The adversary’s capability to detect the EEFIs.
c. Analysis of Vulnerabilities. Following the threat analysis, possible OPSEC

measures are identified to protect the EEFIs. The most desirable measures provide
the necessary level of protection at the least cost to operational effectiveness. Plans
can be changed, e.g. by alteration to timings, force location etc, if part of the joint
operation is compromised.
d. Selection of Operations Security Measures:
(1) Determine Impact. J3 staff analyse:
(a) The impact of an OPSEC measure on operational effectiveness.
(b) The probable risk to the operation’s success if the measure is not
implemented or unsuccessful.
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(2) Determine Protection. J3, with other staff and specialist advice, e.g.
meteorological/oceanographic, engineer/terrain analysis, PI, and taking into
consideration factors such as ground, weather, local population and media
activity, determine what should be protected and what may remain
unprotected, and at what risk.
(3) Selection of Operations Security Measures. J-3, in conjunction with J2

and J6, determine the appropriate OPSEC measures and recommend them to
the JFC for approval. The interaction of the OPSEC measures is checked to
ensure that protection of one piece of critical information does not
compromise another. The JFC, before giving the final approval, would be
briefed on the proposed OPSEC measures and any operational penalties they
might incur. Where protection is not possible, or where information may
already have been compromised, changes to the plan or deception measures
may be initiated. Some information may be deliberately disclosed if it
supports a deception plan and does not jeopardise the operation.
e. Application of OPSEC Measures:
(1) Produce OPSEC Plan. The OPSEC plan is produced, normally as an

Annex to the Operation Plan, although key measures, such as the OPSEC
objectives and EMCON may be included in the Operation Plan’s main body.
Monitoring and reporting procedures for OPSEC breaches should be
included in the plan. The OPSEC plan may need to be produced and
distributed as a series of separate Appendices for security reasons.
(2) Responsibilities for Implementation. Implementation of measures in

accordance with the OPSEC plan is the responsibility of commanders at all
levels. At the operational and component HQ levels, dedicated OPSEC staff
should be appointed to co-ordinate implementation.
(3) Evaluation. The OPSEC plan is continuously re-evaluated by J3 and J2 as

the operation progresses. The latter monitor the intelligence input to assist
the former determine the effect of OPSEC measures. J3 act as the central
monitoring and reporting point for OPSEC, and may task friendly assets to
monitor the OPSEC plan, e.g. for COMSEC breaches.
(4) Suspected Failure of an Operations Security Measure. Whenever the

failure of an OPSEC measure is suspected, the JFC must be informed
(through J3) to allow him to consider modification to the operation plan. J3
reviews the OPSEC plan as the JFC’s priorities change, or when an OPSEC
measure fails. The following factors should be considered:
(a) Previously unknown capability of opponent’s RISTA systems.
(b) Developments in the adversary’s RISTA capability.

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(c) Disclosures by prisoners of war or the media.
(d) Breaches of security/ disclosures by members of the joint force.
(e) The stage of the operation - are one or more of the protagonists
irrevocably committed to a particular course of action?
(f) If the adversary becomes aware of the operation’s details, does he

have the ability to influence its course at that stage?
(5) Protection of Operations Security Measures. Distribution of OPSEC

evaluation results should be restricted to prevent compromise.
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CHAPTER 19 - OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL OR

CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT
Section I - New Risks

1901. Despite sustained efforts in the field of arms control, there is firm evidence of a continuing,
world-wide proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons and their
associated means of delivery. At the same time, the expanding global distribution of nuclear
and chemical industries and materials opens up increasing possibilities of the release of toxic
materials into the environment as the result of neglect, collateral damage or malicious
misuse. A risk is now recognised from deliberate or accidental release of Low Level
Radiation (LLR), Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM) and similar hazards by Releases Other
Than (NBC) Attack (ROTA) which may influence operations. Accordingly, joint operations
must be planned, conducted and supported against a background of a continued risk of
ROTA, and of the employment of NBC weapons by hostile forces and terrorists.
1902. The aims of this chapter are to outline the principal factors affecting joint operations in a
NBC environment and in dealing with ROTA. It also lists the considerations that should
guide commanders and staffs in the preparation of plans and employment of a joint force in a
NBC or ROTA environment.
Section II - NBC Defence Planning Factors

1903. Intelligence. A current, comprehensive and accurate intelligence assessment of the NBC
threat in a Joint Operations Area (JOA) is essential. This must include statements of the
categories of weapons (i.e. N, B and C) available to opposing forces, the specific
characteristics of any B and C agents in the opponent’s inventory and the possible means of
delivery. The assessment should also incorporate judgements of the likely adversary’s
intentions in regard to the employment of NBC weapons, plus evidence of the opposition’s
concept of use. Information is also required on those aspects of the local topography and
meteorological conditions in probable areas of use which may affect the hazard presented by
the use of NBC weapons, especially the downwind travel of radiation or toxic agents. When
applicable, the intelligence information must include details about the possible sources for
low level radiation, toxic industrial chemicals and risks of ROTA. Intelligence efforts must
also be directed towards the cataloguing of industrial facilities and material stockpiles whose
damage or misuse might result in the emergence of toxic hazards.
1904. Capabilities and Availability of Equipment:
a. A joint force should have the following NBC defence capabilities:
(1) NBC surveillance and detection means, including Point, Remote and Stand-
off detectors.
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(2) Immediate, operational and thorough decontamination.
(3) Individual protection.
(4) Mobile and transportable collective protection, where possible, for command
posts, communication centres, medical facilities, rest and relief facilities and
NBC protected vehicles.
(5) NBC warning and reporting of NBC attacks and hazards and adequate
automated data processing equipment in accordance with ATP-45.
(6) Medical countermeasures.
b. The degree of protection afforded by individual and collective protection equipment

must be considered along with the degradation of combat effectiveness that its use
could engender in individuals and units.
c. When dealing with ROTA, NBC defence experts as well as the Environmental
Health and Hygiene experts and medical staffs of the joint force should be involved
to offer detailed advice and specialist equipment
1905. Sustainability. A joint force should be self-sustainable in NBC defence. Each individual
and unit should be equipped and trained in accordance with requirements for reaction forces
and with STANAGs 2352 and 2150. Specialist units, with detection systems,
reconnaissance, survey and decontamination capabilities should be available to the JFC and
component commanders to provide early warning and detection and enable hazard
avoidance.
1906. Commanders’ Judgement. Commanders at all levels will have to judge what specific
actions and activities they can order to achieve their objectives, allowing at the same time a
reasonable safeguard against hazards presented by ROTA or an adversary’s use of NBC
weapons. They must be aware of the degradation in performance which results from the
wearing of NBC Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) for protracted periods, and the
hazards of body fluid loss in hot or humid conditions. Physical and psychological isolation
and problems of personal recognition may cause difficulties in exercising command
functions, and communication equipment will become more difficult to use. During Non-
Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, commanders have particular responsibility to avoid
the exposure of individuals to NBC risk, but, if this is not possible, to minimise the exposure
to the lowest degree possible. In these circumstances, the Commander may have to seek
direction on the application of legal peacetime exposure guidelines.
Section III - Operational Considerations

1907. Threat Levels. The JFC should keep the NBC threat and ROTA hazards under constant
review, and provide an up-dated threat assessment as the situation dictates, so that
subordinate commands can implement protective measures as required. In Non-Article 5
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Crisis Response Operations (CROs), special attention should be paid to LLR and TIM
hazards. This will ensure that the joint force is properly prepared to meet the NBC hazards
whilst avoiding unnecessary degradation of operational performance.
1908. Reconnaissance, Reporting and Warning. A joint force should implement reconnaissance
and marking procedures in accordance with STANAGs 2002 and 2036. The force should
establish and use the standardised NBC meteorological reports and warning procedures laid
down in STANAG 2103/ATP-45 and Bi-SC Reporting Directive Volume IV:
a. It is essential to have responsive communication means for timely reporting and

warning of NBC attacks and hazards. If possible, automated systems should be used
by all participating nations, including the host nation. The NBC warning and
reporting organisation must be established in accordance with STANAG2103/ATP-
45. When the situation, the threat, the designated JOA, and the composition of
forces are known, common warning and reporting requirements should be defined
and exercised.
b. Reporting via the chain of command, via the lateral warning links and, in case of
Non-Article 5 CROs, to national agencies is important to allow early consideration,
at the political level, of appropriate responses. Additionally, early identification of
the type of agent will allow commanders to confirm the validity of in-place defence
measures, make necessary adjustments and provide the medical service with
information they require to establish appropriate prophylactic (i.e. preventive) and
treatment measures. In case of first use of unknown agents, the sampling and
identification procedures are to be used as described in AEP-l0.
1909. Operations in Areas with NBC or ROTA Hazards. Operations in areas with actual NBC
or ROTA hazard should be avoided if the mission can be accomplished from outside the
hazard. If it is necessary to continue operations in a ROTA or NBC hazard area, persistent
hazard areas are more dangerous than vapour hazard areas. Longer operations in any hazard
will require access to collective protection for rest and relief and all operations in a persistent
hazard area will require decontamination. The primary countermeasure against
contamination is avoidance; it will reduce, and sometimes eliminate, the need for protection
and decontamination. Avoidance measures include:
a. Passive defence measures, e.g. dispersion, covering of materiel, overhead cover or

collective protection.
b. Surveying and marking of contaminated areas.
c. Performing identification of sampled B/C agents.
d. Reporting and warning of contamination.
e. Relocation or re-routing to an uncontaminated area.
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1910. Air Operations in NBC or ROTA Hazards. Air operations may be within the hazard area.
Generally, it will not be practicable to transfer operations to another base outside the affected
area in response to a short-term hazard. Dispersal would directly affect readiness and
aircraft turn-round times. When operating under NBC conditions, the launch rate for air
missions will be markedly reduced. Aircrews are particularly vulnerable to performance
degradation when operating in NBC conditions and special measures need to be taken for
their protection. Aircrew NBC equipment and procedures require a high standard of user
training and crews are subject to physiological degradation in these conditions.
1911. Contamination. Contamination presents two options:
a. Move. Faced with prolonged exposure to persistent contamination, the commander

should examine the possibility of moving out of a contaminated area, as directed by
the higher formation. Decontamination will be required before occupying a clean
area.
b. Remain in Place. If the contaminated position cannot be vacated, operations have to

continue in place. In this case, the mission may have to be limited in time and scope,
toxic-free protected working environments and rest and relief areas should be used
whenever possible, and further exposure to the hazard limited by the employment of
immediate and operational decontamination measures.
1912. Orders. The use of NBC weapons, or risk of exposure to ROTA, will instantly and radically
alter the conditions for operations; because of this, orders must give subordinate
commanders maximum flexibility of action so that they can act independently and adjust
their plans to meet changing situations.
Section IV - Combat Service Support Factors

1913. Commanders will have to take into account a number of combat service support factors in an
NBC environment, especially in the fields of supply management, transport and
medical/health service support.
1914. Supply Management:
a. It will be vital to prevent the contamination of supplies in storage and during

movement to front-line units, and to avoid the issue of contaminated stocks.
Procedures to be followed are contained in ALP-9.
b. During combat operations under the conditions of NBC warfare, the possibility of
large-scale destruction and contamination of stocks will have to be considered in the
operational planning.
c. Maintenance and repair of equipment will take longer and may require
supplementary decontamination even after thorough decontamination and could
prove impossible when IPE has to be worn.
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1915. Transport. The impact of the use of NBC weapons or ROTA on the transportation system
of a joint force must be recognised, and movement plans must be flexible to allow for short-
notice avoidance of contaminated or hazard areas, including the use of alternate Airports of
Debarkation (APODs) and Seaports of Debarkation (SPODs), as required. Host nation co-
operation and mutual assistance between national support elements will be important.
1916. Medical/Health Service Support. Handling of casualties will be made more difficult in
cases where conventional and NBC casualties become contaminated, either immediately or
during the evacuation process. Medical/health service support elements may have to work
within contaminated areas; they should, therefore, be provided with mobile and transportable
collective protection systems, or arrangements must exist for their decontamination and
immediate evacuation. ROTA conditions will require a specific knowledge of the accepted
exposure levels to e.g. low-level radiation and toxic industrial materials. In all military
operations, there will be a particular need to maintain records of individual exposure to NBC
and ROTA hazards to allow properly targeted long-term medical aftercare.
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CHAPTER 20 - CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION
Section I – Introduction
2001. The Strategic Concept. Civil-military co-operation is not a new phenomenon within
NATO. Traditionally, however, it was seen as presenting little more than a logistic
challenge. NATO’s operations beyond its own domestic borders, on territory devoid of fully
functioning civil institutions or effective infrastructure, present different and more complex
challenges. Changes to the environment in which NATO might potentially operate have led
to the development of a new Strategic Concept (SC 99).1 This recognises a much wider
range of threats to international security than existed hitherto. In addition to continuing to
provide for collective defence, the Concept states that the Alliance must stand ready ‘to
contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management,
including crisis response operations’. The Strategic Concept goes on to state:
‘The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both
governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the
success of operations.’
Indeed operations have underlined the requirement to co-ordinate activities with national
and local governments as well as both International Organisations (IOs) and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). CIMIC supports the Commander in achieving this.
CIMIC is a command responsibility.
2002. The Civil-Military Dimension. CIMIC is applicable to both Article 5 Collective Defence
and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs). In both scenarios commanders are
increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic,
environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations.
Furthermore, commanders must take into account the presence of large numbers of
international and non-governmental organisations with their own aims, methods and
perspectives, all of which may have to be reconciled with those of NATO. Challenges will
be enhanced by the presence of the media and the expectations of both the international and
local communities. Therefore effective relationships with a wide range of civilian
organisations as well as local populations, governments and military forces will be essential
in future conflict resolution. These relationships will include integrated planning
mechanisms at the strategic level. CIMIC is the Commander's tool for interfacing with the
civil environment and for establishing and maintaining these relationships.
1
Articulated in MC 400/2 ‘MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance strategy’.
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Section II - Definition and Application

2003. Definition. CIMIC is defined as:
The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO
Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well
as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.
2004. Application. CIMIC implies neither military control of civilian organisations or agencies
nor the reverse. It recognises that:
a. The military will normally only be responsible for security related tasks and for
support to the appropriate civil authority - within means and capabilities - for the
implementation of civil tasks when this has been agreed by the appropriate military
commander in accordance with the OPLAN and the mandated civil actors, if
applicable.
b. In exceptional circumstances, the military may be required to take on tasks normally

the responsibility of the mandated civil actors. These tasks will only be taken on
where the appropriate civil body is not present or is unable co carry out its mandate
and where an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise. The military should be
prepared to undertake, when requested by the cognisant civil authority and approved
by NATO, such tasks as are necessary, until the mandated civil actors are prepared to
assume them.
c. Responsibility for civil related tasks will be handed over to the appropriate civil
actors as soon as is practical and in as smooth a manner as is possible.
d. The military will often require access to local civilian resources. In such
circumstances, every effort will be made to avoid adverse impact on local
populations, economies, environment, infrastructure or the work of the humanitarian
organisations.
e. All practicable measures will be taken to avoid compromising the neutrality and
impartiality of humanitarian organisations.
Section III - Principles

2005. The principles of CIMIC are precepts that influence the conduct of CIMIC across the
spectrum of conflict. They fall into two broad categories:
a. Principles Governing the Military Direction of Civil-Military Co-operation.

These principles guide the internal military processes, which enable the development
of a CIMIC support plan and regulate its execution.
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b. Principles Governing the Civil-Military Relationship. These principles offer

guidance on the establishment and maintenance of effective civil-military
relationships with civil actors.
2006. Principles Governing the Military Direction of Civil-Military Co-operation.
a. Mission Primacy. NATO conducts CIMIC activities in support of a military

mission. In turn, however, the latter will have been derived from a political strategic
objective and is therefore unlikely to conflict with the objectives of most of the
civilian organisations working in an area of operations. Nonetheless, only the
commander can decide how far military resources will be committed to CIMIC tasks.
Indeed, additional tasks should not be assumed without an assessment of the resources,
in co-ordination with civilian agencies, and the prioritisation of military tasks. Nor
should any local CIMIC tasks that might compromise the theatre level CIMIC effort or
the overall mission be undertaken by subordinate commanders.
b. Command Direction. The direction of CIMIC activities is the responsibility of

commanders at all levels. Only through unity of authority and integration of effort at
all levels can peace be achieved and transition to stability realised. Commanders
should be aware of the impact of military operations on the civil environment and the
impact of the civil environment on their operations. They must be able to prioritise
and direct CIMIC activities in such a way that military effectiveness is maintained
without adding unnecessarily to civil hardship or compromising civil objectives.
c. Economy. Commanders must seek to minimise the use of military assets and
maximise the use of civil resources. Care must be taken not to deplete the latter
beyond that needed to sustain the civil population. Low-level CIMIC activities are
often carried out in circumstances where the civil population faces an inadequate
infrastructure and widespread shortages of essential goods and services. Military
resources are finite and care must be taken to preserve military capability; only the
minimum required to achieve the military aim should be used in support of the civilian
population or civilian organisations. Commanders must guard against creating long
term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government,
IOs or NGOs. Once provided, withdrawal or reduction of resources could be difficult
as it may strain civil-military relations, retard the growth of civil authority, and may
cause lasting damage to public confidence in the military force.
d. Concentration. Assets available for CIMIC are likely to be limited, therefore they
should be concentrated on those tasks that are most likely to lead to mission success.
Concentration has the advantage of improving civilian perceptions of the Joint Force
and demonstrating its determination to act in the civil interest. Dissipation of assets,
on the other hand, will result in minimal impact on the population and the mission,
and runs the risk of unnecessarily prolonging the achievement of the desired end-
state.
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e. Humanitarian Obligations. Commanders have a legal responsibility to comply

with international legal statutes concerned with armed conflict and the law of war.
Legal staff will advise the Commander on these matters. However, in addition to
fulfilling these legal requirements, commanders should always seek, within the
constraints of the mission, to reduce the effect of military operations on non-
combatants. This is fundamental to building mission legitimacy. The use of military
force, with few exceptions, entails human suffering which, subject to the Law of War
and Rules of Engagement, should be relieved whenever possible and wherever it is
found. Human rights of individuals and groups must be respected and protected in
compliance with international law and the Law of Armed Conflict.
2007. Principles Governing the Civil-Military Relationship.
a. Cultural Awareness. A sustained sensitivity towards civil customs and ways of life
is of fundamental importance to all missions. In a politically sensitive environment a
thoughtless violation of a local law or custom can create a highly unfavourable news
event and seriously undermine the mission’s chances of success. The military must
acquire a sound understanding of local culture, customs and laws. CIMIC plays a
vital role in ensuring cultural awareness of the forces through education.
b. Common Goals. Once a relationship has been established, it will usually need to be
maintained, and whenever possible strengthened in order to survive disagreement,
setback, compromise and even threats from third parties. Although those operating
within a JOA may have different immediate interests, common goals shared by
NATO forces and civilian organisations must be established and recognised. Both
Article 5 Collective Defence and non-Article 5 CROs take place in rapidly changing
environments where decision-making processes must be streamlined and responsive.
Each participating organisation must understand the political and resource
commitments required. This understanding forms the basis of civil-military co-
operation and commitments are made in anticipation of achieving objectives and not
in meeting deadlines.
c. Shared Responsibility. The ethos, structure and working practices of the civil
organisations and agencies with which NATO military forces must co-operate is
extremely diverse. The analysis of common goals must lead to an agreed sharing of
responsibilities in order to establish and maintain a durable and mutually beneficial
relationship. CIMIC must establish co-ordination measures and transition
mechanisms with the civilian organisations as soon as possible in order to avoid
misunderstandings and define their respective roles and responsibilities.
d. Consent. Because a military organisation does not ultimately require consent to

function, its crucial importance in CIMIC matters can be overlooked. Every effort
must be made to secure and retain the willing co-operation of civil actors with whom
the allied force deals; coercion may have a similar effect to consent, but it achieves
poor results and will not endure. Loss of consent can occur suddenly, for reasons
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that seem trivial and commanders must be prepared to expend time and energy in its
pursuit and retention.
e. Transparency. Successful CIMIC activities require the mutual trust and confidence
of all those involved in an operation. CIMIC work should be transparent,
demonstrating competence, capability and resolve in order to win the trust and
confidence of all elements of the civil environment. Tension between political,
military, humanitarian and other components of a civil-military relationship will
inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding at times. These tensions will be
aggravated by political bias, media inaccuracy or distortion and poor
communications. Transparency is vital in preventing and defusing such potentially
volatile situations because it instils trust, increases confidence and encourages mutual
understanding. CIMIC personnel will be a valuable source of local information and
will be advocates of the military cause, but they will rapidly become ineffective if
used for intelligence gathering or as a means of communicating inaccurate
information. It must be recognised that information obtained by military means
cannot always be shared with civilian organisations and authorities. CIMIC staff
must work closely with intelligence assets to obtain the most accurate information
that may be passed to the civilian organisations in time to be effective. Much of this
information, such as refugee movements, given to the civilian organisations and lead
agencies may assist the commander greatly by allowing the appropriate civilian
agency to react in a timely manner while minimally diverting military resources.
Such information allows the civilian agencies to tailor themselves to the developing
situation and prevents the military from unnecessarily expending its resources or
from becoming unnecessarily entrenched in an operation. Specific rules and
arrangements to declassify military information should be made in advance.
f. Communication. Effective communication with civil authorities, agencies,

organisations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and co-operation. The
differences between military and civilian organisations require an investment in time
and understanding to overcome. Most civilian organisations with which the military
will deal will, to a large extent, pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take
the view that co-operation with the military and independence is mutually exclusive.
The key to minimising these difficulties is to maintain open and constant
communication. Clear and effective measures to establish and maintain these
communication channels through CIMIC sources and possibly CIMIC centres with
appropriate civil actors should be developed to avoid potential disruptions and
misunderstandings. As civilian organisations continue to arrive throughout the
operation, they should be encouraged to adapt to the established system.
Section IV - Tasks
2008. Background. CIMIC plays an important role across the spectrum of conflict. It aims to
establish a stable environment within which the mission may be completed more easily.
Indeed a force may be at least partially dependent on civilian institutions and the population
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for resources and information, and rely on civil authorities to provide security in certain
areas. It may be impossible to gain full freedom of action and movement without the co-
operation of these civil authorities. Furthermore, simply establishing and maintaining good
relations with the local population and authorities might be sufficient to deny the same
advantages to hostile or potentially hostile forces. CIMIC personnel will also play a central
role in the assessment of the immediate needs of the local population and the capabilities of
both the local government and other civil actors. These assessments will be key to
operational planning, meeting immediate local needs, achieving stabilisation and in
designing a plan for a smooth transition to full civilian authority.
2009. General. The application of CIMIC differs between Article 5 Collective Defence and non-
Article 5 CROs. Not only will the nature of the immediate environment be different but
also, so will the relationship between the military and civilian organisations and authorities.
Nevertheless there are a number of operational level tasks, carried out by CIMIC staffs, which
form the framework within which tactical tasks are conducted and which are common to all
operations. These tasks can be grouped into 3 distinct but overlapping stages: pre-operational,
operational and transitional.
2010. Pre-Operational Stage. At the earliest opportunity, CIMIC staff will help prepare the Joint
Force to deal with the civilian conditions it will meet in the JOA. This will involve:
a. Planning. CIMIC staff prepare the CIMIC input to the campaign/OPLAN, usually
Annex W. They will also ensure that factors relating to the civil dimension are
incorporated into all aspects of planning. Inputs will be based, where possible, on
reconnaissance and detailed assessment. The latter will include:
(1) Political and cultural history.
(2) The state of national and local government.
(3) Public administration and services.
(4) The economy.
(5) The needs of the civilian population.
(6) Population movement.
(7) The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of IOs and NGOs.
(8) The media.
b. Advice to the Commander.
c. Training and Education. Training and education will be conducted for

commanders and their staff as well as those filling dedicated CIMIC posts.
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2011. Operational Stage. The core CIMIC task throughout operations is to secure effective civil-
military co-operation in support of the Commander's mission. To do this, relations with a
wide range of civil bodies will have to be established and maintained. Although many of
these relations will already exist, the requirement for new ones will arise. These will be
identified through the continuous assessment process. Underpinning this co-operation are
six activities:
a. Communication. Effective co-operation is only possible if there is constant

communication at all levels. This may prove difficult due to the absence of effective
communications infrastructures and any reluctance on the part of civilians to enter
military establishments; however, it will be critical. The Commander is likely to be
in regular contact with local political leaders and the heads of mandated IOs and
main NGOs. Equally, liaison officers are likely to be deployed to the latter. It is just
as important that CIMIC staff, particularly at Joint Force level, retain a proactive
relationship with their counterparts in these organisations.
b. Information Exchange. CIMIC functions as a civil-military information exchange.

Civilian sources will often provide information of operational relevance. Subject to
security considerations, it is likely to be of mutual benefit to pass information in both
directions.
c. Co-ordination. Given differing mandates, cultures and perspective, there will be an

ongoing requirement to co-ordinate activities to ensure that congruent long-term
goals are not compromised. Equally, at Joint Force level, there will be a need to co-
ordinate individual formation or national CIMIC activities.
d. Facilitating Agreements. CIMIC staff will facilitate the drafting of any formal
agreements or Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) required to underpin civil-
military co-operation.
e. The Conduct of CIMIC Activities. CIMIC activities may have to be conducted to

fill any vacuum in the provision of services or facilities required to meet the
immediate life sustaining needs of the local population and/or to ensure the stability
and long-term sustainability of the society within the JOA. This vacuum will have
arisen due to the mandated civilian authorities' or the International Community's
temporary inability to fulfil these needs. Any activities of this nature will be
performed within limitations and capabilities and will be conducted within the
context of a plan for transition of such responsibilities to the mandated authorities.
Donors for some activities may have to be identified.
f. Assessments. All the above activities will be carried out on the basis of continuous
assessments. These will include the scale and nature of any civil related vacuum and
the identification or adjustment of workable milestones on the path towards transition
of civil responsibilities.
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2012. Transitional Stage. The transitional stage sees the hand-over, in as smooth and seamless a
manner as possible, of civil related activities to the proper, mandated authorities.
2013. Specific Environments. In addition to the above CIMIC tasks, there will be others that fall
out of the particular operational environment.2
Section V – Staff Relationships and Organisation

2014. Staff Relationships. CIMIC is a commander’s responsibility. It competes for resources and
priority in the same way as all other command functions. In the same way as reconnaissance
or intelligence, the major part of CIMIC activity is carried out by troops under the control of
the operations staff. Therefore, although the primary staff focus for CIMIC is likely to lie
within J9, CIMIC activities will be closely monitored by and staffed through J3.
2015. Organisation. The conduct of CIMIC requires three physical elements; staff to plan and
advise the commander, a CIMIC group to conduct CIMIC activities and, where applicable,
functional specialists. These are further described as follows:
a. HQ staff. The size and specific organisation of the CIMIC staff within HQs is a
function of the NATO mission. This function is often undertaken within the J9
division of the staff. The CIMIC staffs are not necessarily themselves specialists with
skills applicable in a civilian environment. However, they must be trained
operational staff officers who understand CIMIC principles and procedures and the
environment in which they will operate and understand the workings of NGOs and
IOs. They must be capable of explaining military requirements to civilian
organisations and vice versa. They must be able to carry out accurate assessments
and provide practical advice to the commander. Above all, they must have the
experience and credibility to work closely with all other staff to ensure that civil
related factors are integrated into all plans.
b. CIMIC Groups. A CIMIC Group is a CIMIC unit that may deploy into the JOA or
Region as part of a national contingent or which may be assigned under Operational
Control (OPCON) of a JFC or a Land Component Commander. In the latter case it
may be national or multi-national in its composition. It will have trained and
exercised using the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) required to conduct
CIMIC activities such as assessments and the establishment of CIMIC centres. It
may comprise a Group HQ, a HQ company and a number of CIMIC support
companies capable of supporting the chain of command throughout the JOA or
Region. The Group's primary task is to support the chain of command in carrying
out CIMIC activities. It is likely to contain or be able to call upon expertise in the
following areas:
(1) Civil Administration.
2
These are covered in detail in AJP-9 ‘CIMIC Doctrine’.
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(2) Civil Infrastructure.
(3) Humanitarian Aid.
(4) Economic and Commercial Structures.
(5) Cultural Affairs.
c. Functional specialists. Functional specialists are employed to carry out specific

tasks that have been identified through the assessment process. Again, their number
and area of expertise will vary according to both need and availability. They will
only be employed for the duration of the specified task. These specialists may be
either military or civilian. The terms under which the latter are employed will be
determined by the legal requirements of the donor nation. However, they must be
under readiness states that enable them to deploy when required. CIMIC groups are
likely to contain a number of military personnel capable of carrying out specific
CIMIC functional activities. Nations have sources of functional specialists who
together may provide a pool of expertise.
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CHAPTER 21 – PUBLIC INFORMATION
Section I - Definition
2101. Public Information (PI) is defined (AAP- 6) as: ‘information which is released or published
for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their
understanding and support’. The PI function provides the primary means for commanders at
the strategic, operational and tactical levels to inform the public through the news media of
military activities and issues. PI and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) staff must be
aware of each other’s aims in order to avoid conflict.
2102. PI has an important - at times crucial - role in mission success. Media reporting and
perceptions can have profound impact on public opinion; the commander must ensure that
planning and execution of military operations fully considers public implications. The
commander must anticipate and be prepared to support news media coverage of almost every
aspect of the operation. Failure to accommodate the news media will not stop reporting; it
will simply increase misinformation and rumours, and lead to under reporting of NATO
accomplishments and policy positions.
2103. This Chapter describes the aim and key principles of military PI; and provides guidance to
the Joint Force Commander (JFC), subordinate commanders and staffs on PI planning and
implementation. It also describes factors affecting the PI function, as well as responsibilities
at all levels of command.
Section II - Public Information Principles and Public Release Policies

2104. The aim of PI is to ensure the most complete, accurate, and timely availability of information
about the activities of the joint force for both first-hand and after-the-fact reporting by the
news media, consistent with operational security, troop safety, and privacy of the members
of the force.
2105. PI principles derive from the fact that NATO is an alliance based on democratic institutions,
and its existence ultimately depends on the understanding and support of the nations’
citizens which it serves. PI’s general goal is to increase public knowledge and promote
public understanding of NATO military missions, roles, capabilities and its resolve to
contribute to the stability of Europe. In joint force operations, PI’s specific goal is to
increase public knowledge and promote further understanding of the mission among all key
audiences, including troop contributing nations and populace of the area affected.
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2106. Underlying principles that help achieve this mission and goal apply across the continuum of
operations from peace to conflict. They include:
a. PI is a command responsibility. The PI function at each level of command directly

supports the commander. It may not be further delegated or subordinated to any
other staff function.
b. Timely and accurate information should be made available so that NATO’s public
and news media may assess and understand the facts about the Alliance, its defence
strategy, and ongoing joint operations.
c. Information is not to be classified or otherwise withheld to protect NATO military

organisations or personnel from criticism or embarrassment.
d. Information should be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect

operational security, force safety, or individual privacy rights.
e. PI operations need to be co-ordinated and synchronised with Information

Operations.1
2107. Although much information about Alliance operations is releasable, most of it is not
normally of interest to the public - particularly during routine peacetime operations.
Therefore, the commander must determine what information should be publicly released,
and establish release priorities. The Public Information Officer (PIO) can assist and advise
on general policies for information release. These include:
a. Passive Public Information Policy. A passive PI policy encompasses most of the

issues present in the day-to-day military operating environment. The passive policy
means that the military organisation may not promote routine issues as ‘news’;
however, it may respond appropriately to legitimate media queries about them.
b. Semi-Active Public Information Policy. A semi-active PI policy applies to issues

for which the media in general is likely to have a passing interest, or which would
probably cause public questions. Examples include unusual troop movements,
changes in senior leadership, decisions that impact on the public, etc. A semi-active
policy alerts potentially interested media to the situation - normally through news
releases or media advisories - and dictates that the military command will
aggressively follow-up on resulting media interest by responding to queries or
providing further information as needed.
c. Active Public Information Policy. An active PI policy is applied only to issues or

events forecast to provoke significant and broad media interest. Examples include
1
See Chapter 14.
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major field exercises, actual deployment and employment of military forces, force
‘open houses’ or ‘media days’, etc. The active policy means the command will take
strenuous effort to encourage media interest in the activity, or to promote its public
policy on specific issues.
Section III - The Operational Environment and Public Information

Assumptions
2108. NATO’s military operational environment has changed dramatically over the past decade; at
the same time, significant technological and philosophical changes also characterise
operations of the world’s major news media. Technologically, media outlets are capable
now of placing their representatives at any newsworthy location very rapidly without
reliance on military assistance, and equipping them with communications that allow them to
report immediately and unimpeded to a potentially worldwide audience. Philosophically, the
competitive nature of the media and an increasingly international audience cause them to
invest great resources to cover a news story fastest and first, with decreasing regard for
national security or policy allegiances.
2109. While specific media environments will be situation dependent, the following is likely for
scenarios involving mounting and employing any significant joint force:
a. It will attract major international media interest, which will be particularly intense
both in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and at mounting locations during the initial
stages of the operation.
b. Media interest will wane over time, particularly as the mission continues
successfully, but can quickly intensify again at major phase points, particular
conflicts or incidents, and on culmination of the operation.
c. Large numbers of media - international to local - will already be present upon arrival
of the joint force. Many of these media representatives will be logistically self-
sustaining, with their own transport and communications resources. They will be
able to report from the JOA rapidly and independently.
d. Media reporting will largely dictate the public’s perception of a joint force and thus
public support for the mission.
2110. Just as the media environment affects command planning and operations, the NATO political
environment also impacts. The JFC should assume:
a. That information release authority of planning for a joint force operation, prior to
NAC formal approval to execute the operation, will be retained at the Strategic-
Political levels. He should anticipate a passive PI policy at the operational and lower
levels during initial operational planning, and possibly up to approval for mission
execution.
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b. That following NAC approval, an Active PI policy for the operation in general at all
NATO military levels in the chain of command will be in effect.
Section IV - The Joint Commander’s Public Information Role

2111. A pro-active, effective and efficient PI function provides the commander with the best
opportunity for public understanding of the mission of the joint force. Complete integration
of PI into all operational planning is essential for successful construction and
implementation of the commander’s PI efforts, to run in consonance with the operational
campaign.
2112. It is important to the success of an allied joint operation that the PI plan is established prior
to the start of the operation. The PI goals and activities will normally be reflected in the
commander’s operation/mission directive. The JFC should include situation-specific PI
policies and procedures in the overall campaign plan and implement them further through
mission directives and orders to subordinate commanders. The JFC is also responsible for
ensuring that assigned forces comply with Alliance PI policy directives.
2113. Specifically, the JFC should:
a. Develop operational plans that establish responsive PI organisations and structures;

and provide dedicated personnel, facilities, equipment, transportation and
communications assets to facilitate the aims of the PI staff. As these resources will
probably have to be in the JOA before or at the very start of a deployed operation,
deployment plans must assign a high priority for moving PI assets.
b. Plan to support news media from the earliest stages of any operation. Commanders
will ensure that reporters are granted access to all unclassified activities, including
combat operations. The personal safety of correspondents is not a reason for
excluding them from such situations.
c. Develop operational PI policy and guidance that recommends policy approaches (i.e.
active, semi-active or passive) for significant phases or activities, proposes major
news statements, and provides operational-level responses to anticipated media
queries.
d. Conduct a full range of PI activities - including planning, media relations, internal or

‘troop’ information for assigned forces, and news media analysis of the JOA press -
consistent with prevailing higher headquarters guidance, release authority, and
operational security requirements.
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2114. The following guidelines should be used as the basis for PI planning and operations in major
NATO exercises or actual deployments:
a. Open and independent reporting is normally the principal means for the media to
cover NATO military operations. The use of ‘media pools’ or other military
limitations to news access will be used sparingly and then only as appropriate for
specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is
limited.
b. The primary method of controlling classified information, and safeguarding

operational security and troop safety, is ‘security at the source’. Military personnel
in contact with the media are responsible for safeguarding classified information and
protecting force security.
c. Journalists covering operations will be registered with the joint force headquarters to
establish their bona fides and assist them in their story coverage.
d. Journalists should be provided access to all major military units assigned to a joint
force. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
e. Military PI personnel may act as liaisons and facilitators for the press, but should not
interfere with the reporting process.
f. The standards for success in joint force/media relations are truthfulness and
credibility.
Section V - Public Information Planning and Operations

2115. The JFC should be advised and assisted on all PI matters by a dedicated senior NATO PIO
and designated PI staff within the joint force headquarters. The PIO will help to prepare and
execute all elements of the JFC’s PI responsibilities.
2116. Planning by the PI staff should also include procedures for disseminating information to the
units of the joint force, and to the military and internal civil audiences remaining at the
forces’ home stations.
Section VI - Public Information Staff Organisation

2117. Specifics of a PI staff organisation will vary with the operational mission, but in any event
will include the functions of:
a. PublicInformation Leadership and Advice. A senior NATO officer will serve as

the JFC’s PI advisor and oversee all PI functions within the purview of the JFC. The
Chief PI Officer (CPIO) would require immediate access to the JFC on PI issues.
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b. Planning. Planning would be required, to ensure synchronisation of the JFC’s PI

staff with PI elements of other international actors in the JOA.
c. Resources. Staff effort would be required to identify requirements and solutions for
PI operations.
d. Internal information. Staff would need information about the forces assigned to the
operation.
e. News Analysis. News analysis to collect and provide media reporting specifics and
trends.
f. Media Operations. Media operations to include both the dissemination of

information to the media, and to support other media efforts to report on the joint
force. This will usually be the largest of the PIO’s subordinate functions, and will
often entail establishment of at least one major Press Information Centre (PIC), and
potentially other PICs or press liaison offices within the JOA.
(1) The PIC would require dedicated staff, telephonic, photographic and perhaps
even video communication links with NATO strategic and political levels,
and regional headquarters as appropriate, in order to meet the requirements
of potential television, radio and press observers during operations.
(2) The PIC facility must be able to accommodate large modern press
conferences or media briefings, with audio-visual support, translation and
transcription, and set and lighting considerations. Private adjacent areas will
be needed to prepare senior Principals, and to work one-on-one with various
media. The main PIC should be located near the joint force Headquarters.
(3) Attention should be paid to the provision of suitable mobile

communications, transportation, security, and methods for secure
communications. Provision for national PI liaison officers should be
considered, to communicate with national government HQs on PI issues.
(4) The PIC would likely be the site for the joint force Internet Public Home
Page (if appropriate), and dedicated operators and maintainers would be
needed to establish and update the site.
g. Public Information Representative at Joint Operations Cell. PI should provide

watch duty officers at the JCF’s command post - and perhaps at subordinate
command sites - to interface with other staff on current operational issues.
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Section VII - Other Public Information Planning and Operational

Considerations
2118. Public Information Guidance. Public unity of all NATO levels and elements is central to
mission success. Development and dissemination of NATO-approved PI Guidance (PIG)
ensures that all PI and policy are in consonance before the public.
a. PIG conforms to operations security and privacy requirements of members of the

force. Regular update and communication of the PIG among all participating
organisations is critical to maintain ‘one voice’ on current developments.
b. Commanders and their PI spokespersons at the tactical and operational levels are
most likely to deal with detailed information about joint force involvement,
capabilities and immediate actions and objectives. The strategic level will generally
be concerned with issues of overarching policy and political considerations.
Approved PIG serves as a key source document for all levels.
c. Ideally, initial PIG development begins with the JFC who is in the best position to
recommend public information policy, draft appropriate statements, and identify
issues of interest to external and internal audiences. PIG with strategic or political
overtones will be approved at Strategic Command level.
2119. News Media Access. Commanders must understand that the media will require wide-
ranging access to operations in order to report fully on the allied joint operation.
Establishment of PICs or other PI facilities is only the initial step in educating and
communicating with the media. The communications challenge is complicated by limited
resources that often restrict transportation, communications, logistics support, and the
number of trained PI personnel at the time and location of maximum news interest.
Therefore, planning must include provisions for support of the news media with widely
dispersed units - away from established PI offices - and their handling by military officials
without formal PI backgrounds. The lack of a trained PI escort should not, by itself, be used
as a reason for a commander to decline supporting the media.
2120. Operations Security. As noted earlier, Operations Security (OPSEC) is fundamental to PI

planning and conduct. The PIO’s inclusion in all significant operations planning will help
insure that sensitivities are properly identified, and appropriate PI guidance formulated. For
information which is merely time-sensitive - that is, information which can be released upon
the point of mission execution - consider establishing media ground rules that allow media to
be included in the activity, while delaying reporting to a pre-specified time. The commander
will balance OPSEC concerns with news coverage requirements; force members will
practice security at the source.
2121. Training and Exercises. All operational exercises and joint training in preparation for the
operation should include adequate PI participation. Failure to include the PI staff in
exercises or training could result in serious deficiencies at the point of actual mission
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execution. It is essential that all key PI personnel be trained and familiarised with tasks
involved in the allied joint effort. Further, the PIO will be responsible for conducting further
training of senior joint force members with PI goals and requirements.
2122. Staff and External Public Information Co-ordination. Upon the establishment of the
JOA, the JFC assumes responsibility for all NATO PI activities. The JFC’s CPIO should
conduct co-ordination and activities that will help harmonise all joint force information
accessible to the public through a variety of forums.
a. The best method to ensure themes and messages are consistent across the joint force
staff and with subordinate levels is to provide the CPIO with chairmanship of a
cross-functional committee that would meet routinely to co-ordinate development
and dissemination of joint force public policy and goals. Membership should include
operations, intelligence, legal, political affairs, PSYOPS, and Civil Military Co-
operation representatives, and others who may have a role in public communications
issues.
b. To aid co-ordination of all international community PI efforts within the JOA -

particularly for peace support or humanitarian efforts - the CPIO should also
establish an inter-agency working group, and proffer invitations of membership to
the PI functions of international organisations and non-governmental organisations
operating in the area. This group would meet regularly to exchange views and help
harmonise information issues.
2123. Evaluating Public Information Feedback. Success of the PI effort is inextricably linked to
over-all mission success. While PI, properly done, cannot guarantee mission success, an
inadequate PI role may be a significant factor in its failure. Two key ways help commanders
evaluate the success and credibility of the PI effort. The first is objective assessment of
general news media tone in reporters’ dealings with the command. The second is continuous
assessment of media end products and available public opinion polls. These reviews help
evaluate the accuracy of media reporting and gauge the editorial tone communicated to the
public. PIOs will assist commanders to review all feedback sources available to improve the
effectiveness of the commander’s PI process.
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CHAPTER 22 - NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE

OPERATIONS
2201. The doctrine for Allied joint operations in this publication is aimed primarily at the
planning, conduct and support of combat operations. Combat operations would normally be
mounted to counter a threat posed by an identified adversary and to defeat him by military
means. However, the Alliance Strategic Concept approved by NATO Heads of State and
Government in Washington 23 April 1999 highlighted the reliance the Alliance places upon
conflict prevention and crisis management. Additionally, the document introduced non-
Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO) as a spectrum of operations with which to
safeguard the freedom and security of Alliance members through political, civil and military
means. Non-Article 5 CRO can be described as multifunctional operations that encompass
those political, military and civil activities initiated and executed in accordance with
international law, including international humanitarian law, contributing to conflict
prevention and resolution, and crisis management in pursuit of declared Alliance objectives.
2202. Non-Article 5 CRO are the Alliance’s contribution to effective crisis management. The aim
is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. Non-Article 5
CRO are intended to respond to such crises, to include the containment of hostilities, in a
timely and co-ordinated manner where these crises could either affect the security of NATO
nations, or threaten stability and lead to conflict on the periphery of the Alliance. Threats
and opposing elements may not be easily identified and the potential operation may involve
civilian, political and humanitarian bodies and agencies.
2203. This Chapter seeks to offer guidance on how the doctrine in previous chapters normally
used to guide warfighting can, with a different emphasis or modification, be applied to non-
Article 5 CRO.
Section I – An Overview of Crisis Response Operations

2204. Non-Article 5 CRO cover the entire spectrum of NATO military operations and related
activities not encompassed by Article 5 Collective Defence. However, unlike Collective
Defence operations, there is no automatic commitment of forces for non-Article 5 CRO, and
it is likely that they will be conducted with Partner and/or other non-NATO nations. Non-
Article 5 CRO range from support operations that are primarily associated with civil
agencies through operations in support of peace to Alliance combat operations. In the
framework of a NATO-led operation, Alliance forces could additionally assume extraction
operations, and tasks in support of disaster relief and of humanitarian, search and rescue or
non-combatant evacuation operations, although evacuation of nationals remains a national
responsibility. Operations that involve the use of military force or the threat of force include
military action ranging from sanction and embargo enforcement to military combat
operations. Furthermore, experience has shown that in addition to the availability of
specialised units for a particular task, the military, because of its organisation, capabilities
and ability to deploy rapidly, could be called on, in exceptional circumstances, to contribute
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to tasks which are the responsibility of a mandated civil actors. Such tasks could run from
public security, engineer support for municipal services to border security/control. Given
that non-Article 5 CRO may be as demanding and intense as Article 5 operations, NATO
forces need to be trained, equipped and supplied to accomplish the range of tasks mentioned
in this paragraph.
Political Control
2205. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. The Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) also plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability,
enhancing co-operative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe.
NATO has offered to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own
procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UNSC or the
responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.
All NATO non-Article 5 CRO will be under the political control and strategic direction of
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and will be initiated by a NAC Initiating Directive and
executed in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law. Non-
Article 5 CRO are politically sensitive and complex and demand close co-operation and co-
ordination between the highest political and military bodies within the Alliance and close
consultation with Partners when they are involved.
2206. The operational environment in which non-Article 5 CRO are likely to take place can range
from permissive to hostile and will be influenced by the perception of the local population
and local organisations, as well as the activities carried out on behalf of the International
Community. The complex, political and public nature of CRO should not be
underestimated; however, these characteristics are exacerbated by the fact that the Joint
Operations Area (JOA) may not be defined by clearly delineated boundaries and frontiers.
Similarly, due to the difficulty of predicting how the situation may develop, a non-Article 5
CRO may lack clear guidance on the end-state and criteria for success.
Principles of Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
2207. The principles for the conduct of joint and multinational campaigns, as described in previous
chapters, apply to the conduct of non-Article 5 CRO. Furthermore, given the wide range of
tasks within the non-Article 5 CRO spectrum, a different emphasis may be required for each
campaign. The judgement of those responsible for planning and executing a mission will
temper the weight and the application of the normal generic principles. An understanding of
the relationships between these principles is essential for the effective management of civil-
military interactions and the achievement of the desired end-state. The specific application
of the commonly accepted doctrinal concepts and principles as they are applied to non-
Article 5 CRO are described below:
a. Objective. Every campaign must be directed towards an attainable end-state. In a

joint and multinational campaign, involving many civilian organisations and
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agencies, military strategic objectives may be milestones along the way to achieving
the desired political end-state or an element of that end-state.
b. Perseverance. The achievement of the desired political end-state of non-Article 5

CRO will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives. The pursuit
of short-term military success should be balanced against the longer-term social,
economic and political consequences.
c. Unity of Command. Unity of command, based on NATO principles and

arrangements for command and control, is a non-negotiable principle within NATO.
d. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort recognises the need for a coherent approach to a
common objective between the various military contingents and between the military
and civilian components of any operation. Co-operation between military and civil
elements requires continual military interaction with a large number of International
Organisations (IOs) and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
e. Credibility. A NATO-led force must be credible. A force must respond with

professional bearing and swift, effective reactions to incidents. Establishing
credibility is essential for building confidence and a co-ordinated Information
Operations plan will be one of the elements in achieving this. While a force should
not appear to pose a direct threat as long as compliance exists, there must be no
doubt that a force is fully capable of carrying out its responsibilities and has the will
to coerce if required to do so.
f. Transparency of Operations. The mission and concept of operations as well as

political/military end-states must be readily understood and obvious to all parties and
agencies. Achieving a common understanding will remove suspicion and mistrust.
Information should be gathered and communicated through open sources wherever
possible. While transparency of operations, including media access, should be the
general rule, it must be balanced against the need to ensure the security of the
mission and its members.
g. Security. Force protection is a command responsibility in all-military operations. In

the NAC’s Initiating Directive, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should be given
specific responsibilities for the protection of certain civilian components involved in
his JOA. Force protection needs to be taken into account when planning the size and
composition of the force and when drawing up military plans, orders and Rules of
Engagement (ROE).
h. Flexibility. The successful conduct of a non-Article 5 CRO involves the

management of change and the eventual transition to a stable environment. Within
the OPLAN and the constraints of the ROE, the JFC should be given maximum
operational flexibility, and the forces should be able to adapt and move from one
activity to another at short notice and with the minimum of outside assistance. A
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NATO-led force needs to be balanced and independent in terms of skills,

capabilities, equipment and logistics.
i. Promotion of Co-operation and Consent. The promotion of co-operation and

consent amongst the parties are pre-requisites for many non-Article 5 CRO. Before
execution, any military force activities, which may result in a loss of consent, should
be carefully balanced and assessed against the long-term objectives of the operation.
This may be achieved through careful co-ordination of national agendas, and
enhanced consultation and co-operation.
j. Impartiality. Where the nature of the mission allows, operations should be

conducted impartially without favour or prejudice to any party. Effective
communications and transparency of operations are key to maintaining an even-
handed approach.
k. Use of Force. The potential use of force affects every aspect of a mission and
requires continual review to achieve the mission. In all cases, the use of force must
be in accordance with the provisions of International Law, including international
humanitarian law, and the politically approved amplifying guidance attached to the
ROE.1 Only the minimum necessary force should be used.
l. Mutual Respect. In many non-Article 5 CRO, the respect in which an AJF is held
will be a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the local
population and recognised authorities. Through a UN mandate, Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFA) or other special agreements, the AJF may enjoy certain
immunities related to its duties. Notwithstanding this, its members must respect the
laws and customs of the host nation and must be seen to be doing so. The JFC
should also ensure the same principles are recognised and implemented amongst the
different national, cultural and ethnic elements within the formations which make up
the force. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of
discipline exercised through controlled and professional behaviour on and off duty.
m. Freedom of Military Movement. Freedom of military movement is essential for

the successful accomplishment of any non-Article 5 CRO. The mandate and the
ROE must allow the AJF to remain free at all times to perform its duties throughout
the designated mission area without interference from any of the local factions.
Experience indicates that various factions will often try to impose local restrictions
on freedom of movement. These restrictions must be firmly and swiftly resolved
initially through negotiation, but if necessary, through more vigorous and resolute
action up to and including the use of force.
n. Legitimacy. The legitimacy of the operation will be a crucial factor for drawing
support within the international community, contributing nations and the involved
1
See also paragraph 2218.
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parties, including the civil community. The participation of Partners and other non-
NATO countries in a NATO-led campaign would broaden the basis of international
support. It is therefore necessary that non-Article 5 CRO are executed in accordance
with all applicable international law, including the principles of the UN Charter.
Accusations against the AJF, which could compromise its legal position, can be more
easily refuted if the force’s intentions and activities are made clear and are
transparent to the international community and involved parties.
Section II – Operational Considerations

Readiness
2208. The nature of the crises, which CRO are intended to counter, can result in prolonged
political negotiations involving ‘brinkmanship’ where the stakes are raised and lowered
leading to escalation and de-escalation of response and contingency planning and a delay in
any military response. The ability of the International Community to react with resolve and
in a timely manner is key to success in conducting a CRO. This ability depends on a rapid
international political and military decision making process and the availability of
appropriate military forces. Such forces need to be held at high readiness and either be
deployable by strategic lift, or be forward deployed.
Participation
2209. A nation’s level of interest in a non-Article 5 CRO may vary in relation to its national
strategic interest in the operation. Therefore, national commitment to provide forces will
vary accordingly and will affect the force generation process. In the case of non-Article 5
CRO, the principle of consensus remains valid; however, once consensus is achieved, it is
each member state’s prerogative to decide on a case-by-case basis whether they will commit
forces and/or capabilities to the operation or not and what level of forces they may commit.
2210. When planning non-Article 5 CRO, initially only forces under the purview of NATO will be
considered as the basis for force generation; however, Partners and other non-NATO Troop
Contributing Nations (NNTCNs) will be considered as soon as authorised. Their
participation is likely to be determined on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with
modalities established for NNTCN’s participation in non-Article 5 CRO as approved by the
NAC.
Command and Control
2211. The OPLAN will specify clear command and control arrangements. The SC will issue,
upon receipt of NAC’s Execution Directive, the Activation Order (ACTORD) message for
the operation to all participating nations, which initiates release of national forces and
transfer of authority (TOA) to the applicable Strategic Commander (SC), as well as
authorising the deployment of NATO forces. To ensure the properly co-ordinated
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deployment of forces to the JOA, nations should authorise TOA of all national participating
military forces at the moment these forces arrive in the JOA.
The Estimate
2212. While the military estimate should evaluate the potential for opposition, unless the
environment is hostile, the categorisation of potential opponents as the ‘enemy’ could
adversely affect the conduct of the military mission.2 Normally, in a campaign there is one
designated adversary and one Centre of Gravity (CoG) per level of operation. However, in a
CRO, there may not be a clearly designated adversary. Experience has shown that the
identification of more than one CoG per level of operation (including those of 3rd parties
such as NGOs) may be appropriate, and, in some cases, a CoG may need protection rather
than being neutralised or destroyed as is common in conventional (i.e. warfighting) military
doctrine.
Intelligence
2213. In many emerging crisis situations, the most demanding and critical NATO intelligence task
will be to provide strategic warning of emerging security risks and to support co-ordinated
political, diplomatic and military operations to restore stability and frame enduring political
solutions. During crisis management and intervention, decentralised intelligence gathering
and reporting will culminate in centralised, authoritative, dynamic assessments to ensure
that politico-military authorities and Strategic Commanders share a common situational
understanding. Operational and tactical commanders will also need correlated intelligence
to orchestrate fast moving, highly complex operations.
2214. In order to facilitate effective and timely planning, the NAC should be requested to
authorise the conduct of intelligence activities no later than the approval of the Council
Initiating Directive. This will enable the appropriate SC and the designated subordinate
HQ(s) to conduct intelligence and establish liaison with the appropriate agencies to ensure
co-ordination in the mission area as soon as practical including logistics and sustainment.
The development of proper plans will depend on the ability of the designated commander
and his principal staff officers to observe and accurately assess conditions within the JOA.
This should at all times take account of the cultural and ethnic environment, the history of
the region and the political and civil objectives and their place in the agreed division of
responsibility.3
Civil-Military Co-operation
2215. The interaction between the AJF and the civil environment in which it operates is crucial to
the success of operations, and it is one of the most difficult challenges that NATO
commanders at all levels will face. Successful CIMIC requires effective interaction between
2
Guidance on planning campaigns including the estimate process is at Chapter 3.
3
Further guidance on Intelligence can be found in Chapter 12.
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the AJF and civil actors including international, national and non-governmental
organisations and agencies within the JOA. The parameters for this co-operation will,
ideally, be set between NATO and these organisations and agencies; however, ultimately,
co-ordination can only be achieved by continuous consultation and liaison. Some of these
organisation and agencies have permanent directives and agendas of their own which may
conflict with the JFC’s main effort. Implementation of a civil plan in response to a crisis
may be dependent on the AJF providing a stable and secure environment for its
implementation. The JFC should ensure coherence of CIMIC and CIMIC activities which,
in turn, should be co-ordinated with other activities throughout the JOA. It will be
important that, where possible, military and civil actors identify and share common goals.
Such goals, consistent with political guidance, should be integrated at an early stage in the
planning of the campaign.4
Information Operations
2216. The nature of non-Article 5 CRO highlights the critical importance of Information
Operations (INFO OPS). Successful INFO OPS may avoid or minimise the need to conduct
military operations and they should be considered as an essential tool in the success of non-
Article 5 CRO and applied from the very early stages of any potential crisis situation.5 The
aim of INFO OPS is to maximise the synergy of effort and, more importantly, to avoid any
potential harm that could be caused by separate independent activities, operating at different
levels, each unaware of the implications of their activities on the other or on NATO’s
overall objectives. Therefore INFO OPS should be planned at the strategic and operational
levels but practised at all levels.
Media Implications
2217. Non-Article 5 CRO will be conducted under close observation by the media and the publics
of NATO member countries as well as Partners and population in the crisis area. The pace
and capabilities of news reporting have evolved into instant, real-time coverage of military
operations. Media images and words can have a profound effect on policy decisions at the
highest level, as well as influencing public support, and the behaviour and attitude of local
populations. Actions by individuals at the lowest level can attract media and political
interest. This creates a need for a public information policy and sound planning at all levels
but it also offers the opportunity to make full and proactive use of the media to maintain
public support. It requires an appropriate attitude and demands rapid communications and
reporting through all levels of command. Public information is a continuous effort, which
can contribute to the early defusing of a potential crisis and needs unity of effort within the
Alliance and between other participating organisations.6
4
Further guidance on CIMIC can be found in Chapter 20.
5
MC 422 ‘NATO Information Operations Policy’ focuses on the need for continuous planning and co-ordination of
related political and military capabilities outlined in Chapter 14.
6
Further guidance on Public Information can be found in Chapter 21.
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Rules of Engagement
2218. A non-Article 5 CRO will be under close political control and generate close scrutiny by the
media thus there is a vital requirement for the development of suitable ROE for each
campaign. ROE provide political direction, within legal parameters, and guidance to
commanders at all levels governing the use of force. ROE will normally be developed as
part of the OPLAN which should result in a suitable set of ROE being available prior to the
beginning of the campaign: however, the JFC needs to re-assess the requirement on arrival
in his JOA and should submit specific ROE requests through the NMA for approval by the
NAC. The nature of non-Article 5 CRO can mean that the range of ROE needed may be
more complex than those granted for traditional combat operations. The procedures for
requesting, authorising and implementing ROE are contained in MC 362. In order to
maximise military effectiveness, it is crucial that multinational forces under NATO
command operate under the same ROE if possible. The NAC must be informed if national
restrictions are to be applied.7
Use of Force
2219. Every element of a military force has the inherent right to use force for self-defence. The
precise amount of force to be used is a tactical decision by the local commander based on
the threat assessment and in accordance with the ROE. Any use of force must balance the
requirements of the situation with potential strategic, operational and tactical consequences.
When used, force should be precise, timely, appropriate and proportionate. In every case,
recourse to the use of force should be aimed at resolving and defusing a situation, not
escalating it. The unnecessary use of force will adversely affect the credibility of the
organisation, leading potentially to escalation in the level of violence throughout the JOA.
Additionally, it may lead to the possible failure of the mission.
Logistics and Host Nation Support
2220. As is normally the case within NATO, Nations bear the responsibility for the logistic
support of their forces allocated to non-Article 5 CRO either individually or by co-operative
arrangements. The effectiveness of national logistic support may be improved by the
establishment of a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre (MJLC)8 which would be
responsible for centralised co-ordination and/or management of common logistic functions.
This may be accomplished through a variety of support options including the establishment
of Multinational Integrated Logistic Units. Host Nation Support (HNS) may reduce the
amount of logistic forces and materiel required to sustain and re-deploy forces. HNS will be
provided on the basis of national legislation, priorities and restrictions. In the context of a non-
Article 5 CRO, all nations that provide transit support to NATO-led forces are Host Nations
(HNs).
7
Further guidance on ROE may be found at Chapter 3 Section VI.
8
See Chapter 9.
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Faction Liaison and Joint Military Commissions
2221. In non-Article 5 CRO, commanders at all levels may need to communicate with their
counterparts in the local armed forces and the various paramilitary organisations present in
the region. This communication may be in the form of issuing directions for the conduct of
day-to-day implementation of the terms of any agreement, which forms part of the force’s
mission. Establishing a Joint Military Commission (JMC), Faction Liaison Office (FLO), or
participating in Joint Civilian Committees (JCC) may further facilitate this liaison.
Section III – Peace Support Operations

2222. Operations in support of peace are recognised in MC 327/2 as an aspect of non-Article 5
CRO; however, such operations are normally known as Peace Support Operations (PSO).9
They are conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised
organisation such as the UN or the OSCE, involving military forces and diplomatic and
humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or
other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as
conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief.
2223. Strategic Context. The international community responds to complex emergencies within
a broad spectrum of activities and according to the dimension of the crisis. These response
options, which need the authority of a relevant legal basis, could range from humanitarian
aid to the application of military force. Initially, more pacific responses may be co-
ordinated under the auspices of the UN or other organisations such as the OSCE. Should the
response requirements escalate and need the deployment of a credible and capable military
force, that option may be delegated to an existing military alliance such as NATO or a
coalition of willing states or a combination of both. Some development and relief agencies
may have been operating in the area of the JOA for several years before the crises, and they
will often play an important role as operations develop in an incremental and ad hoc fashion.
The success of a PSO is largely dependent upon the support of the local population, their
authorities where they exist, and the co-operation of the parties in conflict together with the
international community. The military task, in this context, will be to create the necessary
secure conditions, and to provide support as necessary, so as to enable civilian agencies to
address the underlying causes of the conflict and thus generate a self-sustaining peace.
2224. Authority. For a PSO, NATO will normally be invited to act in support of an
internationally recognised organisation such as the UN10. The authority and parameters for
the operation will then be issued in the form of an Initiating Directive which should provide
a clear political end-state. The Initiating Directive should establish:
a. Legitimacy of the operation.
9
AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations.
10
See paragraph 2205.
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b. Nature of the operation.
c. Strategic Objectives and political/military end-state.
d. Strategic Mission and Tasks.
e. Freedoms, constraints and restraints.
f. ROE guidance.
g. Expected duration (if possible).
h. Logistics and key supporting aspects.
i. CIMIC mechanisms.
2225. Principles of Peace Support Operations. The principles for CRO, as described in
paragraph 2207 above, apply to the conduct of PSO. In addition, the distinct nature of PSO
requires further consideration of a number of principles that need particular interpretation
and/or emphasis. In particular, ‘Impartiality’, ‘Consent’, and ‘Restraint in the Use of Force’
must be considered as basic doctrinal concepts that guide military activity in the conduct of
Peace Support Operations. An understanding of the relationship between these concepts is
essential for the effective management of civil-military interactions and the achievement of
the desired political end-state. The application of the doctrinal concepts and principles are
described in the following sub-paragraphs:
a. Impartiality. An aid to understanding impartiality is to view it from two related

perspectives: on the one hand as a guide to the conduct of the Peace Support Force
(PSF), and on the other hand as a perception of the belligerent parties. The conduct
of a PSF should always be impartial and even-handed; if force is used against a
particular party, it should only be because of what that party is doing (or not doing)
in relation to the mandate/agreement between the parties, rather than who they are.
This may be described as principled impartiality, in sharp contrast to a simply neutral
stance. The use of force, even when applied in an even-handed and impartial
manner, is unlikely to be perceived as such - especially by any party that persistently
transgresses. An analogy can help to relate impartiality to the conduct of operations:
the impartial status of a legal system is not compromised because it only punishes the
guilty, though that may not be the perception of a persistent criminal.
b. Consent. It is helpful if consent, like impartiality, is viewed from two perspectives.

First, as a determinant of the conduct of the PSF itself - the emphasis that the PSF
gives to the promotion and maintenance of consent; and second, from the perspective
of the parties and indigenous population. Judgements concerning the level of
consent should be made with reference to time and space: time as in the permanence
or fragility of consent; and space, horizontally across all elements of the population
and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict. Whilst there may
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be consent at the strategic level (by virtue of national or party commitments to a

peace agreement), at the tactical level there may be local groups who disagree
violently with their leaders, and who may be hostile to the PSO. This may result in
non-compliance by (para-) military elements of one or more of the parties, including
(for example) attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of the PSF. In the
aftermath of an inter-state conflict the degree of consent should be relatively clear cut
and agreed in a peace plan by the disputing States. In the event of an intra-state
conflict or civil war, the warring factions may be difficult to differentiate from the
general population, making judgements concerning consent highly problematic.
Consent from the warring factions may be minimal and amount to nothing more than
a phoney tolerance of the operation, while the rest of the population may be
desperate for intervention and assistance. Should the level of consent be uncertain,
and the potential for opposition exists, it would be prudent to deploy a force capable
of enforcing compliance and promoting consent from the outset.
c. Restraint in the use of force. Restraint should always be exercised when applying
force in PSO. The appropriate and proportional level of force in relation to the aim
must be used. The degree of force necessary may be defined as the measured and
proportionate application of force sufficient to achieve a specific objective.
Authoritative limits on the circumstances in which, and the ways and means by
which, force may be used may be established in the mandate/agreement between the
parties as well as by international law, domestic law of the force providers and, in
certain circumstances, Host Nation law. They will be reflected in the NAC’s
Initiating Directive and in approved ROE. The mere demonstration of the resolve
and capability to use force may be all that is necessary.
Section IV - Other Operations and Tasks

2226. Operations and tasks referred to in this section are often conducted by national military
forces. However, in the framework of a NATO-led campaign, Alliance forces could
conduct tasks in support of humanitarian operations, disaster relief, search and rescue, non
combatant evacuation operations (evacuation of nationals remaining under national
responsibility) extraction operations, military aid/support to civil authorities and operations
that involve the use of military force or the threat of force including military action ranging
from sanction and embargo enforcement to military combat operations. They could be
conducted by NATO forces, on a case-by-case basis, if so agreed and directed by the NAC,
or they could be conducted within a bilateral, or multinational context.
Support of Humanitarian Operations
2227. A humanitarian operation is defined as a mission conducted to alleviate human suffering,

especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable, or possibly
unwilling, to provide adequate support to the population. In the framework of a NATO-led
campaign, Alliance forces could assume tasks in support of a humanitarian operation. It
may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian
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organisations. Such operations may be in response to earthquake, flood, famine, and

radioactive, biological or chemical contamination. They may also be a consequence of war
or the flight from political, religious or ethnic persecution. In conflicts where one side
deliberately obstructs the delivery of supplies to its opponents in the conflict, the need for
enforced delivery of aid to provide for basic human rights must be weighed against the
dangers of intervention and politicising aid. The two principal sub-categories of
humanitarian operations are: assistance for refugees or displaced persons and humanitarian
assistance.
Support of Disaster Relief
2228. Disaster relief is closely linked with humanitarian operations. The disaster could be man-
made or caused by nature. Emergency relief concerns the sustainment of the means to
safeguard life and requires very rapid reaction particularly where extremes of climate are
encountered. NATO forces (i.e. the Standing Naval Forces) may be in the area as a result of
another unrelated exercise or operation and could be diverted by direction of the NAC or
Military Committee; however, because of the need for speed, it is likely that immediate
reaction will be provided unilaterally by nations.
Search and Rescue
2229. Search And Rescue (SAR) is ‘the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialised
rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at
sea’.11 Most nations are signatories to the Chicago convention of 1947 on International
Civil Aviation, and the International Convention on Maritime SAR of 1979, and, under
these conventions, have agreed to adhere to overall policies, procedures and minimum
standards in SAR. The operational aspects of this responsibility are discharged by nations,
each nation being responsible for SAR within an area, or a number of areas, called Search
and Rescue Regions (SRRs) in which SAR operations are controlled by Rescue Co-
ordination Centres (RCCs). In times of peace, SAR procedures and the provision of
facilities remain a national responsibility. In time of conflict or for a specific NATO
operation, the existing SAR organisation would continue to be used, whenever possible.
However, NATO commanders are responsible for the planning and conduct of local SAR
for forces under their command. Such SAR operations would be conducted in conjunction
with local RCCs in accordance with the doctrinal guidance contained in ATP-10. Local
SAR procedures should take into account such factors as: weather; terrain; SAR craft
range/performance; threat to own forces; survivor contact; the availability of tactical support
aircraft; and established national procedures and facilities in the SRR(s) within which the
operation is being conducted.
11
AAP-6.
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Support to Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
2230. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) are defined as operations conducted to

relocate (to a place of safety) non-combatants threatened in a foreign country. Generally a
force committed to a NEO should have the capability to provide security, reception and
control, movement and emergency medical support for the civilians and unarmed military
personnel to be evacuated. Normally, Alliance forces would only support a NEO in the
framework of a NATO-led operation and that support would not include the evacuation of
nationals which remains a national responsibility (however, nations could conduct a NEO
for their nationals on a bi- or multi-national basis using extant NATO doctrine). NEO can
be characterised by the environment in which they are conducted.
2231. Permissive. A NEO conducted in a permissive environment would most commonly occur
following a natural disaster or civil unrest. Under these conditions no resistance to
evacuation is expected. In such circumstances there will be Host Nation (HN) consent and
most likely Host Nation Support (HNS) for the evacuation of those wishing to leave.
Although military resources are unlikely to be required to provide security, they may be
needed for logistic support such as emergency medical treatment and transport. Military
staffs will monitor and evaluate the situation closely and plan for a range of contingencies,
including a deteriorating situation and descent into a less permissive environment.
2232. Uncertain. A NEO conducted in an uncertain environment would most commonly occur
following an insurrection, when the HN government does not have effective control of the
territory and/or population in an area containing potential evacuees. There are often
elements, armed or unarmed, organised or disorganised, that create a climate of insecurity
and a threat to potential evacuees. Under these circumstances, the HN government has
effective control of the majority of its security forces and is not expected to interfere with
the conduct of an operation. However, HNS is less likely to be available or reliable.
Planning for an operation conducted in an uncertain environment must anticipate the
possibility of escalation to a hostile environment.
2233. Hostile. A NEO conducted in a hostile environment would most commonly occur when the
HN civil and military authorities have lost control or ceased to function altogether. Such
circumstances might include a general breakdown of law and order. Potential evacuees may
be directly targeted and their lives increasingly threatened. The HN’s security forces cannot
be expected to support, and may even obstruct, the operation. In such an environment
NATO forces must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies.
Extraction Operations
2234. Extraction operations may be described as missions where a NATO force covers or assists
in the withdrawal of a UN or other mission from a crisis region. A force committed to an
extraction operation should have similar capabilities to those required for by a force
operating in support of a NEO.
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2235. An Extraction Operation may be conducted in an uncertain or hostile environment.12 In

general these conditions are similar to those pertaining in the case of a NEO. In a hostile
environment, a loss of consent for the presence of a UN or other mission could occur or the
HN government may not have effective control of the territory in question. Under these
circumstances, planning must anticipate the need for a NATO Extraction force.
Military Aid/Support to Civil Authorities
2236. Military aid/support to civil authorities embraces all those military activities that provide
temporary support to civil communities or authorities, when permitted by law, and which
are normally undertaken when unusual circumstances or an emergency overtaxes the
capabilities of the civil authorities. The formation of policy and the general co-ordination of
civil emergency planning is undertaken by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
(SCEPC), supported by an International Staff Element - the Civil Emergency Planning
directorate of the Infrastructure, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning Division. SCEPC
co-ordinates and guides the activities of various planning boards and committees which are
fora for consultation on national plans for all aspects of the protection or assistance of the
public in an emergency. In an emergency with which some Alliance members wished to be
involved, NATO HQ and Commands could provide co-ordination in the mobilisation of
forces and resources to assist a nation that had specifically desired such help.
Enforcement of Sanctions and Embargos
2237. In broad terms, the enforcement of sanctions and embargos is designed to force a country to
obey international law or to conform with a UN Security Council Resolution (SCR).
Sanctions generally concern the denial of supplies, diplomatic, economic and other trading
privileges, and the freedom of movement of those living in the area of sanctions. Sanctions
may be conducted partially against a particular party, or impartially, in the context of a PSO,
over a wide area embracing all parties. Examples are maritime intercept operations and the
enforcement of ‘no-fly’ zones.
12
It is unlikely that an extraction operation would be needed in a permissive environment.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

administrative control
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organisations in respect to administrative matters such as
personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate
or other organisations. (AAP-6)
allied joint publication

A publication of joint interest containing doctrine applicable to NATO-led multinational forces, conducting operations
involving more than one Service. It is used by Commanders of Allied joint forces, their subordinate commanders and
staffs. (AJODWG 98 & 00)
alliance
The result of formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which
further the common interests of its members. When the word ‘alliance’ is written with a capital ‘A’ (‘Alliance’), it
refers specifically to NATO. (AJODWP 97) See also coalition; combined; multinational.
amphibious objective area

A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control, within which is located
the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure
accomplishment of the amphibious task force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea,
air and land operations. (AAP-6)
area of influence
A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support
systems normally under his command or control. (AAP-6)
area of intelligence interest

That area concerning which a commander requires intelligence on those factors and developments likely to affect the
outcome of his current or future operations. (AJODWP 96) See also area of intelligence responsibility.
area of intelligence responsibility

An area allocated to a commander in which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence, within the means at his
disposal. See also area of interest; joint operations area; area of responsibility. (AAP-6)
area of interest
The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of
influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto. See also area of operations; area of
responsibility. (AAP-6)
area of operations
An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally,
an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size
for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. (NATO AGREED –
NATO Terminology Conference Plenary 2002)
area of responsibility
The geographical area assigned to each NATO strategic command and to each regional command of Strategic
Command Europe. See also joint operations area. (AAP-6)
Glossary-1
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
assign
1. To place units or personnel in an organisation where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or
where such organisation controls administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or
greater proportion of the functions, unit or personnel.
2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or
relatively permanent. See also attach. (AAP-6)
attach
1. To place units or personnel in an organisation where such placement is relatively temporary. Subject
to limitations imposed in the attachment order, the commander of the formation, unit, or organisation
receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree of command and control thereafter as he does
over the units and persons organic to his command. However, the responsibility for transfer and
promotion of personnel will normally be retained by the parent formation, unit, or organisation.
2. To detail individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary,
i.e., attach for quarters and rations, attach for flying duty. See also assign. (AAP-6)
battle damage assessment

In the course of an operation, the timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of own
military force. (AJODWG 98)
battlefield psychological activities

Planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of combat operations and designed to bring psychological
pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians under enemy control in the battle area, to assist in the achievement of
operational and tactical objectives. (AAP-6)
campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical
area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6)
centre of gravity
Characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its
freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (AAP-6)
civil-military co-operation
The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including
the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and
agencies. (AAP-6)
civil-military co-operation activity

Military activity intended to support the achievement of a military mission by pursuing an objective which is the
responsibility of a civil actors, or civilian activity intended to support the achievement of a civil aim by assisting in the
pursuit of a military objective. (AJODWG 01)
civil-military co-operation operation

A military operation the primary intention and effect of which is to support civil actors, the effect of which is to assist in
the pursuit of a military objective. (AJODWG 01)
combined
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of more than one nation
participate. See also multinational. (AAP-6)
Glossary-2
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
combined joint task force

A Combined Joint Task Force is a multinational (combined) and joint task force, task-organised and formed for the full
range of Alliance’s military missions, which Commander Combined Joint Task Force commands from a multinational
and joint headquarters. The joint task force may include elements from non-NATO troop contributing nations. (MC
389/1) See Joint Force Commander et seq for definitions of component commanders.
command
1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of
military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing
about a particular action.
3. A unit, or units, an organisation, or an area under the command of one individual.
4. To dominate by a field of weapon fire or by observation from a superior position.
5. To exercise a command.
See also full command; operational command; tactical command. (AAP-6)
command and control warfare

The integrated use of all military capabilities including operations security, deception, psychological operations,
electronic warfare and physical destruction, supported by all-source intelligence and communication and information
systems, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary’s command and control capabilities while
protecting friendly command and control capabilities against similar actions. (AAP-6)
command of the sea

The freedom to use the sea and to deny its use to an adversary in the sub-surface, surface and above water
environments. (AAP-6)
commonality
The state achieved when the same doctrine, procedures or equipment are used. (AAP-6)
communications and information system

Assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organised so as to accomplish specific
information conveyance and processing functions. Also referred to as CIS; see also command, control and information
system. (AAP-6)
compatibility
The suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific conditions to fulfil relevant
requirements without causing unacceptable interactions. (AAP-6)
concept of operations
A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission.
(AAP-6)
conduct of operations
The art of directing, coordinating, controlling and adjusting the actions of forces to achieve specific objectives. (AAP-6)
Glossary-3
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
control
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations
not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or
part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. See also administrative control; operational control; tactical
control. (AAP-6)
co-ordinating authority
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for co-ordinating specific functions or
activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the
same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but
does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should
attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall
refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (AAP-6)
course of action
In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and
from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6)
decisive point
A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or in
the information environment. (AAP-6)
direct action
A short-duration strike or other small-scale offensive action by special operations forces or special operations-capable units
to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage to achieve specific, well-defined and often time-sensitive results.
(AAP-6)
doctrine
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but
requires judgement in application. (AAP-6)
electromagnetic spectrum
The entire and orderly distribution of electromagnetic waves according to their frequency or wavelength. The
electromagnetic spectrum includes radio waves, microwaves, heat radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays,
electromagnetic cosmic rays and gamma rays. (MC 64/8).
electronic countermeasures
That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary’s effective use of the
electromagnetic spectrum through the use of electromagnetic energy. There are three sub-divisions of electronic
countermeasures: electronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic neutralisation. (AAP-6)
electronic deception
In electronic countermeasures, the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of
electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an adversary or his electronic systems.
(AAP-6)
electronic intelligence
Intelligence derived from electromagnetic non-communications transmissions by other than intended recipients or users.
(AAP-6)
electronic jamming
The deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy, with the object of impairing the
effectiveness of hostile electronic devices, equipment, or systems. (AAP-6)
Glossary-4
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
electronic neutralisation
In electronic countermeasures, the deliberate use of electromagnetic energy to either temporarily or permanently
damage adversarial devices which rely exclusively on the electromagnetic spectrum. (AAP-6)
electronic protective measures

That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to ensure effective friendly use of the electromagnetic
spectrum despite the enemy’s use of electromagnetic energy. There are two subdivisions of electronic protective
measures: active electronic protective measures and passive electronic measures.
active electronic protective measures

Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters as necessary, to ensure effective friendly use of
the electromagnetic spectrum.
passive electronic protective measures

Undetectable measures, such as those operating procedures and technical features of equipment, to ensure
effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (AAP-6)
electronic warfare
Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of
electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent
hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces. (AAP-6)
electronic warfare support measures

That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to search for, intercept and identify electromagnetic
emissions and locate their sources for the purpose of situational awareness and immediate threat recognition. It
provides a source of information required for immediate decisions involving electronic countermeasures, electronic
protective measures and other tactical actions. (MC 64/8) and (AAP-6)
Note: AAP-6 definition does not include phrase ‘situational awareness and’.
emission control
Selective control of emitted electromagnetic emissions thereby influencing the adversary’s exploitation opportunities.
The aim can be two-fold: to minimise the enemy’s detection of emissions and exploitation of the information so
gained, or to reduce electromagnetic interference thereby improving friendly sensor performance. (MC 64/8) and (AAP-
6)
Note: AAP-6 definition differs from MC 64/8 but not updated since 1994.
end-state
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has
been achieved. (AAP-6)
fires
The effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons. (AJODWG 98)
Glossary-5
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
fire support co-ordination line

Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or amphibious force commander to denote co-
ordination requirements for fires by other force elements which may affect the commander’s current and planned
operations. The fire support co-ordination line applies to fires of air, ground or sea weapon systems using any type of
ammunition against surface or ground targets. The establishment of the fire support co-ordination line must be co-
ordinated with the appropriate commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against surface or ground targets short of
the fire support co-ordination line must be conducted under the positive control or procedural clearance of the
associated land or amphibious force commander. Unless in exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking
targets beyond the fire support co-ordination line must co-ordinate with all affected commanders in order to avoid
fratricide and to harmonise joint objectives. Note: In the context of this definition, the term ‘surface targets’ applies to
those in littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations. (AAP-6)
full command
The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of
military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used
internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or
coalition commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning
forces to NATO, assign only operational command or operational control. See also command; functional command;
operational command; tactical command. (AAP-6)
functional command
A command organisation based on military functions rather than geographic areas. See also area command; command.
(AAP-6)
health service support

All services provided directly or indirectly to contribute to the health and well-being of patients or a population.
(AAP-6)
host nation support

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO
organizations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation’s territory. (AAP-6)
information
Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence. (AAP-6)
information operations
Actions taken to influence decision makers in support of political and military objectives by affecting other’s
information, information based processes, command and control systems and communications and information systems
while exploiting and protecting one’s own information and/or information systems. There are two main categories of
information operations: defensive information operations and offensive information operations, depending on the nature
of action involved. (MC 422)
intelligence
The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile
forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the
product and to the organisations engaged in such activity. (AAP-6)
interchangeability
The ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfil the same requirements. (AAP-6)
interdiction
An action to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can be used effectively against
friendly forces. (US Jt Pub 3-0)
Glossary-6
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
interoperability
The ability of Alliance Forces and, when appropriate, force of Partner and other nations to train, exercise and operate
effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks. (AAP-6)
joint
Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations in which elements of at least two services participate.
See also combined. (AAP-6)
joint force commander

A general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise command authority or operational control over a joint
force. (AJODWG 98).
For the purpose of joint operations, component commanders may be appointed as follows:
joint force air component commander

A commander, designated by the JFC or higher authority, who would be responsible for making
recommendations to the JFC on the employment of air forces and assets, planning and co-ordinating air
operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The joint force air
component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the
designating commander.
joint force land component commander

recommendations to the JFC on the employment of land forces and assets, planning and co-ordinating land
operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The joint force land
component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the
designating commander.
joint force maritime component commander

recommendations to the JFC on the employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and co-ordinating
maritime operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The joint force
maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned
by the designating commander.
joint force special operations component commander

recommendations to the JFC on the employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and co-
ordinating special operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him. The
joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions
and tasks assigned by the designating commander.
joint operations area

A temporary area defined by a NATO strategic or regional commander, in which a designated joint commander plans
and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. (AAP-6)
Note: It is defined in co-ordination with nations and approved by the North Atlantic Council or the Military Committee
as appropriate, in accordance with NATO’s Operational Planning Architecture. A joint operations area and its defining
parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and may
overlap areas of responsibility. See also area of responsibility; operational level of war. (AAP-6)
Glossary-7
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
line of operation
In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity. See also
campaign; centre of gravity; decisive point; operation. (AAP-6)
mission
1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task. (AAP-6)
multinational
Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of more than one nation
participate. See also combined. (AAP-6)
national command
A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of, a specific nation. It may or may not be placed
under a NATO commander. See also command. (AAP-6)
national commander
A national commander, territorial or functional, who is normally not in the Allied chain of command. (AAP-6)
national component/contingent
Any national forces of one or more services under the command of a single national commander, assigned to any
NATO commander. (AAP-6)
non-combatant evacuation operation

An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety.
(AAP-6)
NATO assigned forces
Forces in being which nations agree to place under the operational command or operational control of a NATO
commander at the declaration of a specific stage, state or measure in the NATO Precautionary System or as prescribed
in special agreements. (AAP-6)
NATO joint sub-regional commander

A joint commander at the third level of the NATO military command structure. (AAP-6)
NATO military authority

Any international military headquarters or organization covered by the Protocol on the Status of International Military
Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, (called the Paris Protocol) and any other military authority to
which the NATO Council has applied the provisions of the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, National Representatives and International Staff (called the Ottawa Agreement) by virtue of the said
Agreement. (AAP-6)
NATO regional commander

A commander at the second level of the NATO military command structure, responsible for the planning and execution
of all Alliance military activities/matters, including:
a. In Strategic Command Europe, delegated responsibilities in his designated region and beyond as directed;
b. In Strategic Command Atlantic, delegated responsibilities within the Strategic Command Atlantic area of
responsibility and beyond as directed. (AAP-6)
Glossary-8
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
objective
An aim to be achieved. (AJODWG 98)
operation
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the
process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the
objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6)
operation order
A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the co-
ordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)
operation plan
A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually
based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate
commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation `plan’ is usually used instead of `order’ in
preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal,
and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)
operational art
The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design,
organisation, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (AJODWP 96)
operational command
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to
reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of
itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a
commander. (AAP-6)
operational control
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific
missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or
assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the
units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6)
operational level of war

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic
objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (AAP-6)
operations security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the
enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6)
peace support psychological activities

Planned psychological activities conducted as an integral part of peace support operations, designed to create a
supportive atmosphere and a willingness to co-operate among the parties in conflict and civilian population in the area
of operations, to protect the force and assist in the achievement of mission objectives. See also psychological
operations, strategic psychological activities. (AAP-6)
psychological operations
Planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and
military objectives. See also battlefield psychological activities, peace support psychological activities, psychological
consolidation activities, strategic psychological activities. (AAP-6)
Glossary-9
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
psychological consolidation activities

Planned psychological activities in crisis and war directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly
control in order to achieve a desired behaviour which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of
the supported commanders. (AAP-6)
readiness
Note: In English, ‘readiness’ is a generic term covering ‘readiness state’ and ‘readiness time’. (AAP-6)
readiness state
The measure of the capability of forces at a given point in time to execute their assigned missions. (AAP-6)
readiness time
The time within which a unit can be made ready to perform the tasks for which it has been organized, equipped and trained.
This time is amplified or measured by indicators of the unit’s current personnel, materiel and training state. It does not
include transit time. (AAP-6)
sea control
The condition that exists when one has freedom of action within an area of the sea for one’s own purposes for a period
of time in the subsurface, surface and above water environments. (AAP-6)
sea denial
Preventing an adversary from controlling a maritime area without being able to control that area oneself. See also
command of the sea; sea control. (AAP-6)
standardization
The development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the required
levels of compatibility, interchangeability or commonality in the operational, procedural, materiel, technical and
administrative fields to attain interoperability. See also commonality; compatibility; interchangeability; interoperability.
(AAP-6)
strategic level of war

The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and
deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. (AAP-6)
strategic psychological activities

Planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war which pursue objectives to gain the support and co-operation
of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to
wage war. See also psychological operations. (AAP-6)
Glossary-10
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
support
The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force. (AAP-6)
The term ‘support’ has the following sub-sets:
associated support - In naval usage, operations in which a designated unit operates independently of a
specified force or group, but is tasked to provide contact information to, receive intelligence from and, if
authorised, to co-operate and co-ordinate operations with the supported force. Tactical control of the unit
remains with the assigning authority who co-ordinates tasking and movement of the unit in response to the
requirements of the supported force commander. (AAP-6)
direct support
1. The support provided by a unit not attached to or under the command of the supported unit or formation,
but required to give priority or formation.
2. In maritime usage, operations related to the protection of a specific force by other units; normally under
the tactical control of that force. (AAP-6)
in support of - Term designating the support provided to another unit, formation or organization while
remaining under the initial command. (AAP-6)
supported commander
A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and
who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. See also supporting commander.
(AAP-6)
supporting commander
A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan.
See also supported commander. (AAP-6)
supporting plan
An operational plan prepared by a supporting or subordinate commander to satisfy the requirements of the supported or
superior commander. (AJODWG 00)
sustainability
The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.
(AAP-6)
tactical command
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the
mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6)
tactical control
The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or
tasks assigned. (AAP-6)
tactical level of war

The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned
to tactical formations and units. (AAP-6)
Glossary-11
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
Glossary-12
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
The Glossary contains abbreviations and acronyms commonly used in joint and combined operations. It is
not exhaustive and a more comprehensive list of abbreviations is contained in AAP-15.
AAP Allied Administrative Publication

AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling
AAW Anti-Air Warfare
AAWC Anti-Air Warfare Commander
ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Centre
AC Air Co-ordinator
ACA Airspace Control Authority
ACC Air Component Commander
ACE Allied Command, Europe
ACLANT Allied Command, Atlantic
ACM Airspace Control Measures
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACP Airspace Control Plan
ACS Airspace Control System
ACTPREP Activation of Pre-Deployment
ACTORD Activation Order
ACTREQ Activation Request
ACTWARN Activation Warning
AD Air Defence
ADC Air Defence Commander
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AF Amphibious Force/Augmentation Forces
AI Air Interdiction
AJODWG Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group
AJP Allied Joint Publication
ALP Allied Logistic Publication
ALSS Advanced Logistics Support Site
AOO Area of Operations
AOA Amphibious Objective Area
AOII Area of Intelligence Interest
AOIR Area of Intelligence Responsibility
AOR Area of Responsibility
AREC Air Resource Element Co-ordinator
ASAC All Source Analysis Cell
ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare
ASUWC Anti-Surface Warfare Commander
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
ASWC Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander
Abbreviations-1
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
AT Air Transport
ATF Amphibious Task Force
ATO Air Tasking Order
ATP Allied Tactical Publication
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
BDA Battle Damage Assessment

BPA Battlefield Psychological Activities
C2 Command and Control

C2CS Command and Control Communications Systems
C2IS Command and Control Information Systems
C2-P C2 Protect
C2W Command and Control Warfare
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
CA Combat Assessment
CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre
CAS Close Air Support
CATF Commander Amphibious Task Force
CCC Capabilities Co-ordination Cell
CCIRM Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
CCLF Commander Combined Landing Force
CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation
CIS Communications and Information System
CIWS Close-In Weapon System
CJPS Combined Joint Planning Staff
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CLF Commander Landing Force
CMS Civil-Military Support
CNA Computer Network Attack
CoA Course of Action
CoG Centre of Gravity
COIN Counter Insurgency
COMAO Composite Air Operations
COMCJTF Commander Combined Joint Task Force
COMPUSEC Computer Security
COMSEC Communications Security
COP Contingency Operation Plan
COS Chief of Staff
CPIO Chief Public Information Officer
CRO Crisis Response Operation
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSBM Confidence and Security-Building Measures
Abbreviations-2
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
CWC Composite Warfare Commander

DA Direct Action
DCA Defensive Counter Air (also referred to as Air Defence (AD))
DDP Detailed Deployment Plan
DE Directed Energy
DEFREP Defence Readiness Posture
DPC Defence Planning Committee
ECM Electronic Countermeasure

ED Electronic Deception
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EM Electromagnetic
EMCON Emission Control
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
EN Electronic Neutralisation
EO Electro-Optic
EPM Electronic Protective Measure
ESM Electronic Warfare Support Measure
EW Electronic Warfare/Early Warning
EWC Electronic Warfare Co-ordinator
EWCC Electronic Warfare Co-ordination Cell
EWMS Electronic Warfare Mutual Support
FACA Force Air Co-ordination Area

FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FFA Free Fire Area
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops
FLS Forward Logistic Site
FORCEPREP Force Preparation
FPB Fast Patrol Boat
FSCL Fire Support Co-ordination Line
GBAD Ground Based Air Defence

GOP Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning
HAG Helicopter Attack Group

HEC Helicopter Element Co-ordinator
HNS Host Nation Support
HoM Head of Mission
HPT High Payoff Target
HUMINT Human Intelligence
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
Abbreviations-3
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
ICRC International Committee for the Red Cross

IER Information Exchange Requirements
IFF Identification Friend or Foe (see also SIF and SSR)
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
IMS International Military Staff
INFO OPS Information Operations
INFOSEC Information Security
IO International Organisation
IOM International Organisation for Migration
IPE Individual Protection Equipment
IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IRF Immediate Reaction Forces
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance
JAOC Joint Air Operations Centre

JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JICCC Joint Information and Communications Control Centre
JIPTL Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List
JITL Joint Integrated Target List
JOA Joint Operations Area
JRA Joint Rear Area
JRCC Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre
JSRC Joint Sub-Regional Command
JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
JTCB Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board
LAAWC Local Anti-Air Warfare Co-ordinator

LLR Low Level Radiation
LOC Lines Of Communications
MA Military Assistance
MAAP Master Air Attack Plan
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence System
MAOC Maritime Air Operations Centre
MAS Military Agency for Standardisation
MC Military Committee
MCM Mine Countermeasures
MDF Main Defence Force
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operations
MIJI Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming and Interference
MJLC Multinational Joint Logistic Centre
Abbreviations-4
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
MNLC Multinational Logistic Centre

MNMF Multinational Maritime Force
MOU Memorandum Of Understanding
MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MRO Military Response Option
MW Mine Warfare
MWC Mine Warfare Co-ordinator
NAC North Atlantic Council

NAEW NATO Airborne Early Warning Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NCS Naval Control of Shipping
NCTR Non-Co-operative Target Recognition
NEDB NATO Emitter Data Base
NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NETF NATO Expanded Task Force
NFA No Fire Area
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIC National Intelligence Cell
NMA National Military Authorities / NATO Military Authorities
NPS NATO Precautionary System
NSE National Support Element
NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support
NSTN/MHS Naval Shore Telegraph Network/Message Handling System
NTF NATO Task Force
NTG NATO Task Group
OCA Offensive Counter Air

OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control (also used to denote the NSTN /MHS)
OPLAN Operation Plan
OPSEC Operations Security
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OTC Officer in Tactical Command
OTR Over Target Requirement
PANDA Personnel and Administration

PCA Psychological Consolidation Activities
PDMS Point Defence Missile System
PI Public Information
PIC Press Information Centre
PIG Public Information Guidance
Abbreviations-5
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
PIO Public Information Officer

PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements
POC Point of Contact
POL Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants
POW Prisoner of War
PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency
PSF Peace Support Force
PSO Peace Support Operations
PSPA Peace Support Psychological Activities
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
PVO Private Voluntary Organisation
RAP Recognised Air Picture

RC Regional Command
RCC Rescue Co-ordination Centre
RF Reaction Forces
RFI Request For Information
RFIMS Request For Information Management System
RFL Restricted Frequency List
RMP Recognised Maritime Picture
ROE Rules of Engagement
ROEREQ ROE Request Message
ROEIMPL ROE Implementation Message
ROTA Release Other Than (NBC) Attack
RR Re-attack Recommendation
RRF Rapid Reaction Forces
SACA Sub-Area Airspace Control Authority

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SAG Surface Action Group
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SAR Search and Rescue
SAU Surface Attack Unit
SC Strategic Command
SCEPC Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee
SCR Security Council Resolution
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHORAD Short Range Air Defence
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIR Specific Intelligence Requirement
SLOC Sea Lines Of Communications
Abbreviations-6
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
SNF Standing Naval Force

SOCA Submarine Operations Co-ordinating Authority
SOF Special Operations Force
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOR Statement of Requirements
SPA Strategic Psychological Activities
SPINS Special Instructions
SR Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance
SRR Search and Rescue Region
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
STO Survival to Operate
SUBOPAUTH Submarine Operating Authority
SUPLAN Subordinate Plan
TACOM Tactical Command

TACON Tactical Control
TARINT Target Intelligence
TASMO Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations
TIM Toxic Industrial Material
TLAM Theatre Land Attack Missile
TMD Theatre Missile defence
TOA Transfer of Authority
TRANSEC Transmission Security
TU Task Unit
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN United Nations
UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Fund
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
VSHORAD Very Short-Range Air Defence
WCS Weapon Control Status

WEA Weapons Effects Analysis
WEU Western European Union
WEZ Weapon Engagement Zone
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Abbreviations-7
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
Abbreviations-8
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS
The following bibliography shows the Allied Publications (APs) and other principal documents
related to the relevant Chapter, and is provided to guide the reader to a source of detail concerning
the Chapter's contents. In general, the list includes only ratified and promulgated publications. It
should be noted that APs are identified by the number in the short title of the original edition (e.g.
ATP-8); editions which have suffix letter (e.g. ATP-8(A)) are not identified as such except where
the publication's title has been changed.
Chapter 1
MC 317/1 - The NATO Force Structure
MC 324 - The NATO Military Command Structure
MC 389/1 - MC Policy on NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force Capability
MC 400 - MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept
Bi-SC Directive 80-80 - Joint C2 within the NATO Military Command Structure
Chapter 2
ATP-35 - Land Force Tactical Doctrine
Chapter 3
MC 66/1 - Rules for Interrogation, Intervention and Engagement for Air Defence Forces
of Allied Command Europe in Peacetime
MC 133 - NATO’s Operational Planning System
MC 192 - Rules of Engagement for NATO Forces Operating in a Maritime Environment
MC 193 - Rules of Engagement for the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land)
MC 319 - NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics
MC 362 - NATO Rules of Engagement
AJP-3.3 - Joint Air and Space Operations
SCs' Concept of Maritime Operations
Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning
Chapter 4
MC 348 - NATO Command and Control Warfare Policy
ATP-44 - Electronic Warfare (EW) in Air Operations
ATP-51 - Electronic Warfare in the Land Battle
CJPS - Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters Doctrine (3rd Draft)
Reference-1
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
Chapter 5
MC 317/1 - The NATO Force Structure
MC 400 - MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept
ATP-1 - Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures
ATP 2 - Allied Naval Control of Shipping Manual
ATP-4 - Allied Naval Gunfire Support
ATP-6 Vol I - Mine Warfare - Principles
ATP-6 Vol II - Mine Countermeasures Operations, Planning and Evaluation
ATP-8 - Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
ATP 18 - Allied Manual of Submarine Operations
ATP-24 - Mine Countermeasures - Tactics and Execution
ATP 28 - Allied Anti-submarine Warfare Manual
ATP-31 - NATO Above Water Warfare Manual
ATP-34 - Tactical Air Support to Maritime Operations
ATP-36 - Amphibious Operations Ship-to-Shore Movement
ATP-37 - Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations
ATP-38 - Amphibious Reconnaissance
ATP-39 - Amphibious Embarkation
ALP-11 - Multinational Maritime Force (MNMF) Logistics
AXP-5 - NATO Experimental Tactics and Amplifying Tactical Instructions
SCs' Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS)
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
ATP-10 - Search and Rescue
ATP-26 - Air Reconnaissance Intelligence and Reporting Nomenclature
ATP-27 - Offensive Air Support Operations
ATP-34 - Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations
ATP-40 - Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War
ATP-41 - Airmobile Operations
ATP-42 - Counter Air Operations
ATP-49 - Use of Helicopters in Land Operations
ATP-53 - NATO Air Transport Policies and Procedures
ATP-56 - Air-to-Air Refuelling
SHAPE - JFACC Concept & HQ Doctrine
Chapter 8
MC 437 - NATO Special Operations Policy
Reference-2
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
Chapter 9
MC 55/3 - Readiness and Sustainability Factors
MC 319/1 - NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics
MC 326 - Medical Support, Precepts and Guidance for NATO
MC 334/1 - NATO Principles and Policies for HNS Planning
MC 336/1 - A Movement, Transportation and Mobility Management Concept for NATO
ALP- 4.2 - Land Forces Logistic Doctrine (ALP-9)
ALP- 4.3 - Air Forces Logistics Doctrine and Procedures (ALP-13)
ALP-11 - Multinational Maritime Force Logistics
ALP-12 - Guidance for the Planning and Preparation of HNS Agreements/Arrangements
AJP-4 - Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine
Bi-SC Directive 80-3 - Logistics
ACE Directive 85-8 ACE Medical Support Principles, Policies and Planning Parameters
Maritime Medical Planning Guidance for NATO (MMPG)
Chapter 10
ATP-40 - Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War
Chapter 11
MC 54/5 - The NATO Tactical Sub-Concept for Land and Maritime Air Defence
ATP-34 - Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO)
ATP-42 - Counter Air Operations
SACEUR 10000 1D, AIRCENT 10000 1D
STANAG 2929- Airfield Damage Repair (ADR)
Chapter 12
AD 65-3 - Counter Intelligence Policy in ACE (CISACE)
AIntP-1 - Intelligence Doctrine
AIntP-2 - Security Doctrine
AIntP-3 - Military Intelligence Data Management and Exchange Concept
Chapter 13
AC/317/SEC/91/9 - Tri-MNC CIS Concept

ACP-176 NATO Supp-1 - NATO Naval and Maritime Air Communications Instructions
and Organisation
STANAG 5048 - The Minimum Scale of Communications for the NATO Land
Forces - Requirements, Principles and Procedures
Chapter 14
MC 422 - NATO Information Operations Policy
MC 348 - NATO Command and Control Warfare Policy
Reference-3
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
Chapter 16
MC 402 - NATO Psychological Operations Policy
Chapter 17
MC 64/8 - NATO Electronic Warfare Policy
MC 67/4 - NATO Precautionary System
MC 101 - Title Classified
MC 298 - Title Classified
ATP-44 - Electronic Warfare in Air Operations
ATP-51 - Electronic Warfare in the Land Battle
Chapter 18
ATP-8 - Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
Chapter 19
ATP-1 Vol I - Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures
AEP-10 - Handbook for the Sampling and Identification of Chemical Warfare Agents
ATP-45 - Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting
and Warning of Associated Hazards
ALP-9 - Land Forces Logistic Doctrine
STANAG 2002 - Warning Signs for the Marking of Contaminated or Dangerous Land Areas
STANAG 2083 - Commanders' Guide on Nuclear Radiation Exposure of Groups
STANAG 2103 - Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks
STANAG 2150 - NATO Standards of Proficiency for NBC Defence
STANAG 2352 - NBC Defence Equipment Operational Guidelines
STANAG 2889 - Marking of Hazardous Areas and Routes Through Them
STANAG 2984 - Graduated Levels of NBC Threat and Associated Protection
Chapter 20
MC 336 - NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support
MC 343 - NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations (IDRO)

MC 319 - NATO Principles and Policy for Logistics
MC 411/1 - NATO Military Policy on CIMIC
AJP-9 - NATO CIMIC Doctrine – draft
Bi-SC CIMIC Functional Planning Guide
NATO Directive AD 60-70 - Contracting
Reference-4
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
Chapter 22
MC 327/2 - NATO Military Policy for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
MC 362 - NATO Rules of Engagement
Bi-SC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations
Reference-5
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
Reference-6
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Effective Pages Page Numbers
Original i thru xiv
Original 1-1 thru 1-10
Original 3A-1 thru 3A-6
Original 3B-1 thru 3B-2
Original 3C-1 thru 3C-2
Original 3D-1 thru 3D-2
Original 4A-1 thru 4A-4
Original 4A1-1 thru 4A1-4
Original Glossary-1 thru Glossary-12
Original Abbreviations-1 thru Abbreviations-8
Original Reference-1 thru Reference-6
Original LEP-1 thru LEP-2
LEP-1
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)
LEP-2
ORIGINAL
AJP-01(B)

NATO Allied Joint Doctrine Guide

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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION NOTICE ROUTING

1. AJP-01(B), ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE, is available in the Navy Warfare Library. It is

Navy Warfare Library Custodian

Navy Warfare Library publications must be made

Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian

Change Date Effective By Whom

0006. This edition differs from AJP-01(B) Ratification Draft 1 as follows:

a. Following the promulgation of MC 389/1 ‘MC Policy on NATO’s Combined Joint

e. The amphibious section in Chapter 5 has undergone another revision.

f. MC 411 concerning Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) has undergone revision

0007. If it is to be useful, AJP-01(B) has to be a living document and be amended accordingly.

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE AJP-01(B)

Chapter 2 - Principles of Allied Joint Operations

Chapter 3 - Employment of Allied Joint Forces

Chapter 4 - Command and Control in Allied Joint Operations

Chapter 5 - Maritime Operations

The Concept of Maritime Power 5-1

Chapter 6 - Land Operations

Chapter 7 - Air Operations

Chapter 8 - Special Operations

Chapter 10 - Airspace Control

Chapter 11 - Joint Air Defence

Chapter 13 - Communications and Information Systems

Chapter 14 - Information Operations

Chapter 16 - Psychological Operations

Chapter 17 - Electronic Warfare

Chapter 18 - Operations Security

Chapter 19 - Operations in an NBC Environment

Chapter 20 - Civil-Military Co-operation

Chapter 21 - Public Information

Chapter 22 - Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

Glossary of Terms Glossary-1

CHAPTER 1 - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALLIANCE'S

Section I - The Security Environment

Section II - Roles of Alliance Forces

Section III - Command and Control of Alliance Forces

0109. In detail, the NATO Military Command Structure is composed of:

a. Strategic Commands. There are two Strategic Commands (SCs):

(1) Allied Command Atlantic. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)

(2) Allied Command Europe. Allied Command Europe (ACE) commanded by

c. Sub-Regional Commands. Within ACE there is a mix of geographically dispersed

JSRCs also provide expertise on matters such as geography, climate, operational

d. Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters. Employed as an integral part of

0110. Operational Areas.7

a. Areas of Responsibility. The two SCs have permanently designated Areas of

‘The geographical area assigned to each NATO strategic command and to

‘A temporary area defined by a NATO strategic or regional commander, in

c. Area of Operations. Within a JOA, a joint commander may designate Areas Of

Section IV - Forces of the Alliance

reinforcement of IPF in the event of an Article 5 operation as well as rapid reaction

National Assignment of Forces

a. Fully Integrated. Fully integrated forces are based on a 'proportional shares'

b. Bi- or Multi-national. Bi- or multi-national formations may be established on the

c. Framework Nation. Forces based on a Framework Nation are commanded by an

Section V - Combined Joint Task Force Concept

b. Facilitate operations in concert with Partners and other non-NATO nations in

would issue an Activation of Pre-Deployment (ACTPRED) message to initiate deployment

a. CJTF HQ. A CJTF HQ is a deployable, multi-national, multi-service HQ of

b. Combined Joint Force Component Commands. A CJFCC comprises a HQ, an

c. Assigned Forces. Subordinated to the CJTFCCs are mission tailored forces

agreed procedures.15 When non-NATO nations provide forces in support of Alliance