A Thesis

Entitled
The Role of Semantics in Prohibiting the Acquisition of a Native-like Semantic Competence:
Understanding Why ‘Jason Hit Tommy’ and Why ‘Tommy Was Hit by Jason’ by
Zachary R. L. Dickey
As partial fulfillment of the requirements for
The Bachelor of Arts Degree with Honors
In Linguistics and Jessup Scott Honors College Degree
______________________________ Dr. Melinda Reichelt, Thesis Advisor
______________________________ Dr. Melissa Valiska Gregory, Honors Advisor
The University of Toledo DECEMBER 2013

Abstract
In second language acquisition, semantics assumes a heightened position of importance in regards to
achieving target levels of competence. That being said, assuming that the target competence is equal to
a native-speaker’s, a non-native speaker will never fully reach a native like level of semantic competence.
Pulling data from various articles on semantics in SLA, I argue that because of the interaction between
language, thought, and cultural reality, the semantics of the L1 will affect the acquisition of the semantics
in the L2.
The ways that L1 semantics can affect L2 semantics is an area of interest in both cognitive and generative
linguistics. The importance of semantics in cognitive and generative linguistics is vastly different:
semantics has a minimal role in the generative grammar but a maximized role in cognitive linguistics.
Research from both perspectives is valuable to evaluate semantics at the lexical and syntactic level. On
the lexical side, Lardiere’s (2009) form/feature mapping research shows that when features from the L2
are not a part of the L1—or coded differently—the acquirer will be hampered in regards to the specific
feature. This is echoed by Lowie and Verspoor (2004) with their investigation of lexeme/lemma interaction
in the acquisition of English prepositions in Dutch speaking learners. For syntax, Ionian et al (2008) shows
that the verbal phrase strategies of the L1 can greatly affect the L2, especially when the two languages
exhibit great differences in strategies. Athanasiadou (2004) illustrates that the way an L1 structures its
temporal phrases and situates them in time is extremely difficult to reconceptualize to the temporal
systems of the L2. Although some of the L2 learners studied
Often showed a near native level of competence, no study found a non-native speaker who equaled a
native level of semantic competence.

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Acknowledgements
First and foremost I want to thank Dr. Melinda Reichelt for advising me and guiding me through this
extensive process. I also want to thank Dr. Melissa Valiska Gregory for never letting the pressure choke
anyone in ENGL 4900, just letting it make it hard to breathe a little. Thank you to my parents, Brett and
Pam; thank you to Hillary. And thank you to my roommates and best friends for letting me use their names
in my examples.
Finally, I want to individually acknowledge Dr. Heather Blakemore. She was the first linguist I ever talked
to and she sold me on it. She is the single biggest influence on my collegiate career. The only reason that
I am so passionate about this subject and linguistics in general is because of Dr. Blakemore. I promised
her that I would include her in the acknowledgements of everything published with my name on it and
here is my first shot.

Table of Contents
Abstract. 1
Acknowledgements. 2
Table of Content. 2
List of Abbreviations. 3
I. Introduction. 3
II. Semantics in Generative and Cognitive Linguistic. 4
A. Generative Linguistics. 5
B. Cognitive Linguistics. 6
III. Research and Theories on Semantics in Second Language Acquisition. 8
A. Generative SLA Research and Theories. 10
B. Cognitive SLA Research and Theories. 12
IV. The Effects of the Relationship between Semantics and Thought 17
V. Conclusion 21
Works Cited 22

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List of Abbreviations
L1 . . . . . . . First Language
L2 . . . . . . . Second Language
SLA . . . . . Second Language Acquisition UG . . . . . . . Universal Grammar

I. Introduction
The main function of human language is to communicate the real world to each other. Whether spreading
gossip, indicating the location of a food source, admonishing children or debating over who bought the
last round, language is the medium through which all of these acts are conducted. The relationship
between language and the rest of the human experience is too strong to be separated. Language conveys
thoughts but language can also impact thinking.
The way in which the meanings of words, phrases, and syntactic structures are coded into language is the
basis for semantic study. No languages have perfectly identical systems of interpreting the real world
through language. The way in which a native language relates to the speakers’ thinking can never fully be
stripped away. When acquiring a second language (L2), the first language (L1) semantics will affect the
process. Any effects of the L1 semantics on the L2 semantics will cause a non-native speaker to fall short
of a native target level of semantic comprehension.
Since some linguists have a habit of using their own definitions of terms, the following are the definitions
I am using for these terms. The first is native speaker; for the context of this paper, a native speaker is any
speaker who began acquiring a language before the age of eight and uses the language as their main
communicative medium—this includes bilinguals. L1 and L2 are also important to define. I use L1 to refer
to the learner’s native language—in the case of bilinguals, their bilingual status will be stated. L2 will be
used to mean any language being acquired after the native language(s), I will not use L3, L4, etc. without
explicitly indicating if a language is a learner’s L3.
Linguists have debated at length over the innateness of human language. The generative tradition, headed
by Noam Chomsky, posits that every human brain has the ability to acquire any language because the
human brain has a separate linguistic processor called the universal grammar (UG). Linguistic knowledge
and real world knowledge interact on a minimal level. Cognitive linguistics, on the other hand, does not
attempt to separate linguistic and real world knowledge. Instead, language is studied as a major factor of
cognition. Language is the medium through which humans conceptualize, categorize and comment on

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their reality. Language is the strongest aspect of culture and the only way humans comment on the world
around them. The way in which language is used to covey the real world affects how the speakers conceive
the world around them.
Whether studying language from a generative or cognitive perspective, semantics is an important area of
study. Generative linguistics takes a minimalist position on the role of semantics in language. They posit
that semantics is used as a means of interpreting the syntactic structure; cognitive linguistics assigns
semantic meaning to every part of language. The role of semantics is the same in first languages and
second languages. Generative studies on semantics in second language acquisition (SLA) focus on the
mapping of features onto linguistic forms and how L1 semantic features, selected or unselected from a
finite universal set, affect L2 semantic feature acquisition. Cognitive linguistics assumes a maximized role
of semantics in language. Cognitive studies on semantics in SLA focus on development, usage, and the
relationship between the systems of conceptualization of the L1 and L2.
The maximized role of semantics in language allows for the study of meaning at not only the lexical level,
but also the syntactic level. Syntactic structures can carry as much meaning as the individual lexical items
used to make them up. Not only do the semantics of the lexical item have to be acquired and
comprehended, the semantics of the syntax and how it interacts with the lexical items must be acquired
and comprehended as well. Differences in the semantics of and L1 and L2 indicate differences in the
conceptualization of the event being described and therefore differences in how that event is thought
about. When acquiring a second language, the system of the L1 semantic conceptualization will affect the
L2 in a way that will not allow for a native level of semantic comprehension to be acquired.

II. Cognitive and Generative Linguistics and Semantics

The way semantics works within a specific language framework, and therefore theories on SLA, directly
relates to how the framework treats language as a whole. Generative linguistics assumes a minimal role
of semantics, which relates to the minimalist tendencies of generative grammar. Cognitive linguistics
assigns a maximized role of semantics in language that mirrors the role given to language in the cognitive
experience. Understanding the way semantics relates to generative and cognitive linguistics respectively
facilitates an analyses of SLA research done from both perspectives, in the following section.

A. Generative Linguistics

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Generative linguistics began as a short book written by Noam Chomsky and has become the inescapable
standard of linguistic study. Revolving around syntactic structures, Chomsky’s theories rely on an assumed
finite and universal genetic linguistic capacity in all normal human brains. Chomsky developed a mode of
linguistic thought similar to that of math. The knowledge of how a mathematical operation works, for
example multiplication, allows for any numbers to be plugged in and multiplied. For language, the
operational knowledge of syntactic structures allows the speaker to “’generate novel sentences in [their]
language” (Denham & Lobeck, 2010, p.18). The pillars of generative grammar are a wholly syntactic
underlying structure. Additionally, generative grammar posits that human language is housed in UG which
functions independently of the rest of the brain and, because of the UG, there is universality and finiteness
of language. Generative grammar accepts the idea that an utterance first is realized as a syntactic
construction that is altered by morphology, semantics and pragmatics, and phono tactics. The UG,
accessed by a language acquisition device, is entirely dedicated to language computing and nothing else,
keeping linguistic knowledge and world knowledge separate. Although revolutionary in its original place
and time, the concepts of a generative grammar are being challenged with great frequency by linguists
who acknowledge the difficulty in separating language from other cognitive processes.
The 1963 paper titled “The structure of a semantic theory” by Katz and Fodor modified structuralize
semantics to fit a generative model of language (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 101). From this model of semantics
in relation to UG, Noam Chomsky incorporated semantics into “...Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965)
the so-called Standard Theory of generative grammar” (Geeraerts, 2010, p.109). By doing this, Chomsky
seemingly violates an important part of generative grammar, which is the separation of real world
knowledge from linguistic knowledge.
The reason why bridging the gap between linguistic and real world knowledge can prove troublesome for
generative grammar is because, within a given language, the least universal portion is word meaning.
Word meanings are influenced by many external factors and vocabulary is often fluid and never
completely fixed. A current example of the fluidity of vocabulary is the evolution of tweet. Less than a
decade ago, tweet was a sound usually associated with birds. With the emergence and popularity of
Twitter, tweet, as a noun, can indicate a microblog entry of 140 characters or less; the verbal form, to
tweet, has nothing to do with sound, but rather the composition of the aforementioned microblog entry.
The difficulty of pinning down word meanings in a given language caused generative grammar theorists
to adopt a restricted role for semantics. Referred to as Interpretative Semantics, this theory posits, “the
basic structure of a sentence is a syntactic one, and that semantics only comes in as an interpretation of
those syntactic structures” (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 109). This is in contrast to the initial theory, confusingly

5
called Generative Semantics, that the underlying sentence structure is a fusion of semantics and syntax.
Accepting Interpretative Semantics in generative grammar instead of Generative Semantics marks an
important split that eventually gives birth to cognitive semantics.
Between Interpretative and Generative Semantics, Interpretative Semantics is the more restrictive. It
limits the role of semantics to the interpretation of underlying syntactic structures, which is in line with
standard UG theories. Generative Semantics, on the other hand, is less restrictive and allows the role of
semantics to permeate into the syntax. Some Generative Semantics proponents argue that the underlying
structure of a sentence is semantic while others argue that it is a semantics/syntax hybrid. Clearly, the
syntax-first nature of generative grammar theory fits the minimalistic role given to semantics; however,
this devaluing of semantics confines the relationship between language and the real world. Thus,
Generative Semantics aims to maximize the role of semantics in linguistic theory.
The choice by Chomsky to accept the restrictive Interpretative Semantic framework into generative
grammar marks a turning point for cognitive linguistics and cognitive semantics. In response to
Interpretive Semantics in generative theory, a model of language that placed maximal importance on
semantics and the real world was established following the tradition started by Generative Semantics.
Cognitive linguistics embraced the maximized role of semantics in language. Since language is a part of
the entire human cognitive experience, meaning will be assigned to every aspect of language.

B. Cognitive Linguistics
Cognitive linguistics is the alternative to theories centered on around a generative grammar. Developing
alongside with cognitive psychology, sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences, cognitive
linguistics often draws on theories from these fields of study and applies them to language. In regards to
my argument, cognitive linguistics provides the most clear cut hypotheses that can explain the difficulty
a non-native speaker faces when acquiring an L2. Rather than emphasizing universals in human language,
cognitive linguistics explores language in the entire human cognitive experience; “universal” experiences
could lead to cross-linguistic similarities, but cognitivists do not see this as indicating linguistic universals
but rather shared experiences. Swain and Deters (2007) offer a critical insight on the role of language in
the cognitive experience:
Through language, defined as the use of speaking and writing to mediate cognitively complex activities,
an individual develops cognitively.... The act of producing spoken or written language is thinking in
progress and is key to learner’ understanding of complex concepts. (p. 822)

6
This means that language and thinking are congruent processes, and therefore cognition has a direct
relation to language.
The central concept of cognitive linguistics is that language is essentially “a structured inventory of
conventional symbolic units” (Langacker, 1987, p. 73 as cited in Achard & Niemeier (Eds.), 2004, p. 1). This
structured system of symbolic units serves as a medium through which a speaker’s conceptual structures
of the world are conveyed. The totality of the human experience shapes cognitive conceptualizations of
reality, organizing, delineating, and relating influences from all senses. Dirven and Verspoor (1998)
present the following in regards to language and cognitive conceptualization:
The conceptual world consists, amongst others, of conceptual categories, which are far richer than the
system of linguistic [symbols]. A great many, but by no means all, of the conceptual categories give rise to
linguistic categories. Linguistic categories not only enable us to communicate, but also impose a certain
way of understanding the world. (p.1)
The context that contains a language exerts huge influence on the meaningful signs in that language. A
linguistic environment void of automobiles but ripe with reindeer would not need to categorically
delineate between a truck, car, van, sedan, etc. but would delineate heavily between types of reindeer.
Applying this to the field of SLA, it is easily discernible that a learner with a L1 that is weak in a category
that is strong in an L2 will have difficulty acquiring the nuances of the linguistic signs in the category.
By maximizing semantics to all aspects of a language, semantic value is assigned to individual lexical
entries and entire syntactic structures. If language is a communicative system of abstracted symbols used
to communicate real world concepts, then every aspect of language is a symbol of something. Therefore,
a grammatical sentence like Jason hit Tommy is more than standard syntax, it has conceptual-semantic
value in that it is the prototype for a simple transitive sentence: Agent-Verb-Patient. Prototypes and
prototype theory are essential aspects of cognitive semantics and will be discussed in length later on.
Semantics is extremely important in cognitive linguistic theory because of its maximized role.
The respective role of semantics in both the generative and cognitive traditions extend to the realm of
SLA. Cognitive linguists examine SLA holistically, placing importance on the context, usage, and
relationship between language, thought, and development. These aims, alongside the maximized role of
semantics, show that the cognitive tradition does not try to separate linguistic knowledge from real world
knowledge—like generative grammar—but rather embraces their interrelation. Generative SLA theories
rely on the assumed universality of language, arguing that SLA is a process of remapping semantic features
on to new forms and resetting parameters from the L1 to those appropriate for the L2. The minimal role
of semantics is maintained in the sense that semantics only affects the interpretation of the syntactic

7
structure. The research to follow will show that semantics is crucial to the process of SLA and can cause
learners to fall short of a native-like target level of acquisition.

III. Research and Theories on Semantics in Second Language Acquisition A. Generative SLA
Research and Theories
The role given to semantics in SLA theory depends on whether the researcher is assuming generative or
cognitive frameworks. Generativist SLA researchers maintain the minimalist role of Interpretative
Semantics in their research. On the other hand, cognitivists accept a larger role of semantics in their
research. Donna Lardiere, a generativist researcher, examines the role of semantic features in an L2 and
how it relates to the learner’s L1 semantic features in a limited way. She studies how a learner with a
universal set of available features maps the L2 features on to L2 forms. If an L2 feature is unselected in
the learner’s L1, the feature will present difficulty for the learner. In a cognitive approach to SLA, rather
than concluding that there was a mismatch in selected features, the data from Lardiere’s research would
conclude that there was a mismatch in the semantic conceptualization between the L2 and L1.
All of Lardiere’s form-feature mapping research assumes that the semantics of a language is applied after
the underlying syntactic structure is processed, following the tradition of generative grammar. The
Feature Assembly Hypothesis is the generative theory researched by Lardiere. The pillars of the hypothesis
are
...that there is a universal set or inventory of linguistic features available.... Not all languages make use of
all the features in this universal set; therefore, the [learner’s] acquisition task is to select only that subset
of features actually detectably deployed in the particular language(s) being acquired. (Lardiere, 2009, p.
174)
The Feature Assembly Hypothesis employs the concept of a universal set of features that are present in
every standard human brain. Some of the universal features that Lardiere mentions specifically are [±wh],
[±past] and [±definite] (Lardiere 2009, p. 174). A given language then selects specific features, leaving the
others unused. To analyze these features, researchers like Lardiere follow Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic
Metalanguage paradigm. Although technically a hallmark of Nonstructural Semantics—which lies
somewhere between the Interpretational Semantics of generative grammar and cognitive semantics—
“[Natural Semantic Metalanguage] assumes that there exists a universal set of semantic primitives that
may be discovered by defining words through a process of reductive paraphrase” (Geeraerts, 2010, p.
126). The major flaw of this assumption is that reducing lexical definitions to so-called semantic primitives
is tricky and often inaccurate.

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The goal of reductive paraphrasing to discover semantic primitives is to establish a natural code of
features that can be applied cross-linguistically. The benefit of using semantic primitives is that they avoid
circular definitions of a given word. Circularity in definitions is an issue with many dictionaries; word A is
defined in terms of word B, which in turn can be defined by word A. per reductive paraphrasing, a word
can be refined to its most basic semantic features.
For semantic primitives to be helpful in cross-linguistic analysis, Goddard’s Strong Lexicalization
Hypothesis must be accepted. This hypothesis states, “Semantic primitives, then, to the extent that they
are indeed universal, should be lexicalized in all languages of the world” (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 128).
Although it offers a convenient framework for linguistic analysis, the universality of theories associated
with generative grammar make many assumptions about human language that are easily criticized. Two
semantic primitives assumed by Natural Semantic Metalanguage are before and after. This means that all
languages have a lexical or morphological component that situates an action as occurring before or after
another action. However, linguists have argued that languages like Yukatek Maya do not have any
lexicalized representation of these primitive features (Geeraerts, 2010, p. 133). If any language does not
lexicalize a primitive feature at all, then it is inherently not primitive. Additionally, these mismatches in L1
and L2 semantic features and how they are assembled can cause a non-native speaker to fall short of a
native-like target level of acquisition, even when assuming a minimal role of semantics.
Contrastive feature analysis in SLA is the basis of Lardiere’s view of semantics. Lardiere (2009) discusses
English, Korean, and Mandarin Chinese speakers’ usage of accurately assembled L2 lexical items as an
example of feature assembly. She argues that the data from the studies she cites. Lardier states:
Assembling the particular lexical items of a second language (L2) requires that the learner reconfigure
features from the way these are represented in the first language (L1) into new formal configurations on
possibly quite different types of lexical items in the L2. (p. 173)
This frames the discussion of the research data. The data comes from various studies of plural markings
in a learner’s L2. By selecting data from languages with different morph syntactic plural marking
strategies, Lardiere is able to discuss the effects of languages with small overlap in plural marking features
and those without any. The similarity of an L2 feature to an L1 is a major factor in the ability of a learner
to fully acquire and map that feature. Addressing data on native English speakers’ accuracy in using the
Korean plural marking –tul, Lardiere notes “...there is an opportunity for missteps [in acquisition] if the
lexical semantics of a selected lexical counterpart in the L1 does not exactly match that of the L2” (p. 209).
For example, a specific native Korean structure that indicates the use of –tul that has no similar structure
or conceptualization in English would cause errors in acquisition.

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This observation leads into the role of semantics in SLA within a minimalist theory. In the minimalist view,
the semantic interpretations of a syntactic construction rely on the features of each lexical item’s
functional category. Extending this to Lardiere’s observation, if a L2 functional category contains features
that comprise a different functional category in the L1, the learner will be hindered in remapping these
different features. The universal set of features selected, per Chomskyan UG theory, are not always
packaged together the same way in all languages. The differences in the selected features of the L1 and
L2 and how either language packages them, therefore, point toward issues in L2 acquisition that could
cause the learner to fall short of the native-like target of semantic comprehension.
The syntax-first perspective of generative grammar places great importance on syntactically informed
semantic meaning shifts. These syntactically-driven meaning shifts can cause conceptual dissonance and
issues in acquisition when the semantic shifts are different than any found in the L1. From a cognitive
perspective, the semantic shifts are all related back to a central concept and therefore a difficulty in
comprehending the shift indicates an issue in acquisition. Slabakova and Montrul (2008) studied the
effects of aspectual shifts on the semantic compression of English by learners from various L1’s.
The use of coercive phrases—specific syntactic constructions that signal specific changes in
interpretations of telic verbs—can cause an override of certain features of the verbal phrase in creating
its temporal and spatial relations. Slabakova and Montrul found that even the highest level of L2 learners
were unable to reach even near-native levels of comprehension or acceptance of aspectual shifts caused
by these phrases. The inability to reach the target level of comprehension indicates some inquisitional
issue with the semantic effects of coercive phrases. Perez-Leroux, et al. (2008), investigates the ability of
non-native speakers of Spanish to realize and accept constructions that exhibit atypical properties based
on coercive phrases. Like Slabakova and Montrul, Perez-Leroux, et al. found that the non-natives were
significantly lower in ability than native speakers and exhibited an inability to accept a specific tense in
coerced contexts where native speakers did. This shows that the semantic effects were not being
comprehended by the non-native speakers. Both of these studies used L2 speakers with varied L1s and
found that no matter how similar the L1 is to the L2 the level of semantic comprehension was not native-
like. The specific tense that the participants in the Perez-Leroux, et al. study had the most difficulty with
was the habitual imperfect tense, which was not similarly coded in any of the participants L1s’. The
different between the L1 and L2 seems to be the cause for the issues with coercive phrases. Again, the
data here shows a lack of native- like semantic comprehension, which suggests some issues in acquisition.
The semantic effects of verbal raising do not actually change the interpretation of the verb itself, but
rather the entire contextual syntax. The various ways that languages raise verbs syntactically are not cross-

10
linguistically universal. In order to understand the semantic effects of verbal raising the uninterpretable
features of verbs must be acquired by the learner. When a learner’s L1 diverges from the L2 in verb raising
strategies, a conflict occurs in acquiring the L2 semantic effects Hawkins et al. (2008) researched the
effects of verbal raising on non-native learners of Spanish. Using a test that allowed participants to
“accept”, “reject”, or “be indifferent” toward interpretations of sentences with verbal raising, this study
discovered that although the learners of Spanish can distinguish between the difference in phrases with
verbal raising, those without, and some additional semantic effects, they were not able to reach a native-
like level. L2 speakers of languages with the greatest difference in verb-phrase strategies from their L1
had the most difficulty. This study not only continues the argument that a L1 that diverges from an L2 will
cause a learner of the L2 issues in acquisition, it also shows that a native-like level of comprehension does
not mean a total lack of comprehension. That being said, Diaz, et al. (2008) implies that an inability to
accept native constructions can suggest an incompatible semantic-concept relation in the L2 because of
the L1. Diaz, et al. (2008) also makes the observation that the more similar a L1 is to the L2, the more likely
the learner is to have a higher level of comprehension and accuracy in production. The influence of the
semantics of the L1 permeates through the acquisition process of the L2, causing conceptual mismatches
or making conceptual distinctions that the L1 does not. This inevitably causes a non-native speaker to fall
below the target level of semantic comprehension.
Taking the research from the above section and assuming a maximized role of semantics rather than a
minimal role yields conclusions somewhat different than those found by the generativist researchers.
Lardiere (2009) investigated the acquisition of a morph syntactic feature in Korean. Rather than assuming
that the participants tested failed to match native levels of comprehension due to the Korean feature
being unselected in the L1, a maximized role of semantics would suggest that the issues arise from
conceptual differences between the L1 and L2. The same is true of the research presented by Slabakova
and Montrul (2008), Perez-Leroux, et al. (2008) and Hawkins, et al. (2008). The following research will
expand the influence of the L1 in the L2 acquisition process. Shedding the assumption that there is a set
of universal features in every human’s brain allows linguists to look at the salient features of an individual
or group’s experience.

B. Cognitive SLA Research

The cognitive tradition maximizes the role of semantics, extending it to syntactic structures along with
lexical entries. By doing this, cognitivists accept that a given syntactic structure has semantic meaning as
do the individual lexical items. For example, a passive sentence like Tommy was hit by Jason indicates that

11
the speaker emphasizes the recipient of the action, Tommy, and removes the impact of the agent, Jason.
The reason why the speaker highlights Tommy may be that he deserved to be hit; the speaker may
deemphasize Jason because Tommy was not the intended target or perhaps, after the incident, Tommy
made a big deal of a small situation. At the center of the ideals of cognitivism is the relationship between
language, thought, and development. Applying these to the influence of the L1 on the acquisition of the
L2 shows that the way that an L1 categorizes human experience for communication directly affects the
acquisition of the L2. This is especially true when the L1 and L2 differ greatly on a given lexical item,
syntactic structure, etc. The maximal role of semantics in cognitive frameworks associates semantic value
at the phonological, morph-lexical, and syntactic properties of a language, which therefore allows a
greater influence of the L1 semantics on L2 semantic acquisition.
As outlined in the first section, language in the cognitive linguistic tradition is a system of symbolic units
used for commutation. What gives these symbols meaning is the relation between the form and what is
represented, a symbolic link. Dirven and Verspoor (1998) explain: “The term symbolic as used in linguistics
is understood in the sense that, by general consent, people have ‘agreed’ upon the pairing of a particular
form with a particular meaning” (p. 2). This is extremely important to state; a word only has its meaning
if speakers have agreed upon it. For instance, if I started using freaky to mean entertaining as an adjective,
it would only become part of the language if this link was generally agreed upon, used, and then
conventionalized. The concept of the symbolic nature of language is extremely important in analyzing the
relationship between the real world, language, and cognition. Each language has a different sign system,
assigning semantic value in different ways. The arbitrary nature of a sign system is unavoidable and the
relationship between language and thought cannot be replicated congruently in two unrelated languages.
In a cognitive and symbolic view of language, the way real world information is linked to linguistic form
differs greatly from language to language based on a number of factors. One specific linguistic category
where there is great cross-linguistic variation is prepositions. Comparatively speaking, English has a very
elaborate and definite preposition system, which can cause some learners of English great difficulty. Lowie
and Verspoor (2004) examine Dutch learners of English in regards to their proficiency with the English
preposition system. Specifically, Lowie and Verspoor investigate what factors are most important when
acquiring a specific system in an L2. They found that when a conceptual distinction is made in an L2 when
it is not made in an L1, the learner will have the greatest difficulty in acquisition (p. 86). In Dutch, both
between and among are realized by the single preposition tussen. This means that while English explicitly
delineates when Y is between X and Z from when it is among them, Dutch treats both concepts as
equivalent. This is also true of English over/above and from/of in relation to Dutch boven and ven,

12
respectively. These terms presented the greatest challenge for the participants studied to accept and
produce accurately and in native contexts. This suggests that the symbolic categorization of an L1 greatly
influences the L2.
Not only did Lowie and Verspoor (2004) discover issues with different conceptual delineations, but also
in frequency and familiarity. For familiarity, the L1-L2 similarity argument from above pops up again: when
a L2 lexical item is similar to an L1 it is easier to acquire (p. 77). This is especially true for phonologically
similar terms like Dutch and English on which are cognates. The opposite of this is also true, phonologically
similar words with different meanings will cause issues in acquisition. For example, in Spanish, to attend
is asistir and to assist is atender (unless they are transitive verbs, in which case the meanings switch to
being similar to English). These “false- cognates” are tricky to acquire accurately. As for frequency, English
prepositions that are not frequent caused the Dutch speakers to revert to L1 knowledge to attempt to
comprehend the utterance (p. 89). For the most part the learners relied on symbolic— phonological or
orthographic—similarity when trying to comprehend the unknown preposition. Thus, the learners were
more likely to make errors with these prepositions than others. This study shows the multitude of factors
that influence acquisition. The importance of semantics is also shown because of the levels at which
semantics can influence and be influenced. The semantics of the L1 clearly can influence the acquisition
of the L2.
On the basic lexical level, cognitive semantics examines two main components: the lexeme and the
lemma. Lemmas are abstractions of the semantic and syntactic information while lexemes are
orthographic/phonological symbols. Lemmas and lexemes exist in a one to one relationship where the
lemma informs the lexeme; however, this does not mean that all lemmas are exclusive with no overlap or
that a lexeme can only relate to a single lemma—a good example is the lexeme ring which symbolically
represents a lemma of its verbal senses and a lemma of its nominal senses. An interesting property of
lemmas is presented by Lowie and Verspoor (2004), “Although different lemmas may share conceptual
representations, no two lemmas in the mental lexicon can refer to a identical set of conceptual
representations” (p. 78). This property indicates that in a given language there are no perfect synonyms,
as shown by answer and respond to. Although they can be substituted for each other in nearly all contexts,
there is a major conceptual distinction between I answered the phone call and I responded to the phone
call. The former takes place after the phone call was received and missed, the later occurs during the
reception of the phone call. A L1 that does not make a conceptual distinction between concepts that are
distinct in a L2 will cause a learner to have issues acquiring, using, and comprehending the distinction in
all possible contexts.

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The lexeme/lemma framework for lexical cognitive semantics is similar to the signifier/signified model of
semiotic relations presented by Ferdinand de Saussure (Koerner, 1973). The difference between
lexeme/lemma and signifier/signified is that the lemma is not a language specific entity of semantic
knowledge; but rather, is a mental category of knowledge that is accessed by both the L1 and L2 lexeme
to which it correlates. Using the Dutch/English example from above, the Dutch speakers have a single
lemma that correlated with the lexeme tussen. This lemma represents the semantic knowledge of the
preposition, its various image schema and other nuisances. When the Dutch speakers begin to acquire
English, the L1 lemma that correlates with tussen is now applied to both L2 lexemes between and among;
inevitably creating a lexeme/lemma mismatch because Dutch does not have a distinction while English
does. According to Lowie and Verspoor (2004), the L1 lemma is copied as an L2 lemma that applies to
both English lexemes. Remember, however, that a lemma may only apply to a single lexeme; otherwise
there would be linguistic redundancy which is not possible in a native speaker. As the Dutch speakers
continue to acquire English, the usage of between and among begins to modify the copied lemma into
two more distinct lemmas, one that applies to between and another to among. The important point here
is that the L2 lemma is rooted in the semantics of the L1 and not in the L2. This causes the non-native
speaker to have semantic information from the L1 as a part of th semantics of the L2; therefore, when the
L2 lexeme activates the L2 lemma, some of the L1 lemma will be activated as well, meaning the non-native
speaker will not be able to achieve a purely native-like semantic acquisition.
The essence of the lexeme/lemma distinction can be applied to phrasal semantics similarly as it is in lexical
semantics. At the verbal phrase level, the tense, aspect, and transitivity of the verb may indicate certain
semantic information in the L1 that is not present in the L2. Take for example the difference between
Amanda hates Hillary and Hillary is hated by Amanda. The first construction assigns agency of the hatred
to Amanda and indicates that Hillary is the recipient of hate; however, the second construction—although
representing the same event—degrades the agency of Amanda and increases the role of Hillary in the
action of being hated. If an L1 does not delineate an active/passive construction or if it assigns a more
dramatic degradation of agency in the passive, there will be an issue in comprehending the subtly of the
two constructions, thus creating an inability to reach the target native level of semantic comprehension.
The importance of the lemma in a cognitive view of language is that it is not a simple box of knowledge,
similar to the features assigned to a lexical item as presented by Lardiere (2009), but rather it contains
specified and unspecified semantic information. The unspecified information is often what causes non-
natives the most difficulty. This is especially true when examining conceptual categories. Athanasiadou
(2004) studied the conceptual category of temporal phrases in English and how their unspecified semantic

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information affects their use in non-native speakers. The way that temporal relations are coded into a
language relies heavily on metaphoric extension to physical domains (p.196). The way that language
represents time is often in directly relation to the importance of the abstract concept of time. In English,
there is a common metaphor of ‘time as money’. This metaphor creates an unspecified tangibility to the
concept of time. Time can be wasted, spent, saved, invested, lost, etc. If a verb can be applied to money,
it can be applied to time. For example: Don’t waste my time, I spent my time watching TV, Tell me how
you saved so much time. This indicates the metaphoric extension of abstract time to physical money. If
an L1 does not make the same relation of time to a physical domain then the metaphor of ‘time as money’
would cause extreme difficulty in acquiring English semantics? Conceptual relations and metaphoric
extensions therefore mark another area where a non-native speaker may fall short of a native target level.
The influence of the L1 lexeme is also important to note. Lagrou, et al. (2012) researched, among other
things, the effects of the L1 phonology and phonotactics on accessibility of the L2 lexicon. They found that
even when the L2 is the task-appropriate language as indicated by the context of the sentence, lexemes
that are phonetically similar in the L1 and L2 can cause activation of the L1 lemma. Largrou et al. (2012)
conclude,
[A high-constraining sentence context] does not prevent activation of lexical representations [lemmas] in
the non-target language, not even when these representations do not meet these semantic restrictions
(the critical stimuli were Interlingua homophones and there only have form overlap across languages). (p.
516)
This indicates that the similarity of a L2 lexeme to a L1 lexeme causes conflict in semantic comprehension,
regardless of the appropriateness of the L1 lexeme’s semantics (lemma). Interestingly, differences in L1
and L2 lemmas’ create difficulty in acquisition of a native target level of semantic comprehension but
similarities between L1 and L2 lexemes also cause the learner to fall short of the target. This is important
because it underscores that the relationship between the L1 and L2 in all areas of linguistic study affects
the acquisition of the L2.
The semantics of a language are crucial to the ability to accurately use and comprehend the language.
Acquiring a native-like level of semantic comprehension means that the acquirer must be able to
accurately use and comprehend semantic nuances in L2 native contexts. Although L2 learners can come
extremely close to a native level, there are still many ways that the L1 can be influential on the L2. Lardiere
(2009) illustrates that when a L2 has semantic features that are not selected in the L1, the acquisition of
those features will be difficult and often prohibits even a near-native level of semantic comprehension.
Slabakova and Montrul (2008) show that the verbal system of the L1 affects L2 learners’ ability to accept

15
syntactic constructions that native speakers accept. Although Lardiere (2009) and Slabakova and Montrul
(2008) are examples of generativist research, their conclusion are telling when studied assuming a
maximized role of semantics in language. The differences between L1 and L2 are therefore not due
universal features that have been selected or unselected, but rather they come from differences in
conceptualization. Examining the lexeme/lemma relationship in regards to SLA, Lowie and Verspoor
(2004) and Largou et al. (2012) highlight the effects of the L1 on the L2 can be seen on both the lexeme
and lemma levels. Throughout this section, it was shown that the relationship between L1 and L2
semantics permeates all levels of linguistic study and causes non-native speakers to fall short of a native
level of semantic comprehension.
IV. The Relationship between Semantics and Thought
Language and thought have always had strong ties in theoretical terms. If language is a medium of
conventionalized signs through which human’s covey their thoughts, ideas, and comments about their
reality, then what effects does that reality and now it is thought about have on the language? It is certainly
not the case that language precedes thought; however, there is an important relationship between
language and thought. Rather than thought being directed by language or language simply being a tool to
covey already formed thoughts, the two work—and develop—hand in hand.
A language will reflect many things about the culture that contains it and the way in which speakers
conceive and categorize the reality around them. Things that are important to survival, religion, family,
diet, etc. will be heavily coded into the language and if something else is less relevant to the speakers it
may not be coded at all. In this way, thought is influencing the language: whatever is salient will be coded
in the language. On the other hand, the semantics of a language are fluid and shift as speaker’s needs
change. In regards to SLA, a L1 may reflect a reality that is vastly different than the L2’s, with different
conceptual categories, semantic distinctions, and verbal forms. These differences are at the root of
inquisitional difficulty.
Published in 1956, Benjamin Whorf’s Language, Thought and Reality presented an influential and
incredibly controversial concept of the influence of language on thought. In short, Whorf argued that
language dictated thought. This concept, called linguistic relativity, posited that the categorical
distinctions of a given language directly affect how a speaker of that language conceptualizes the world.
Referred to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis despite the fact that Edward Sapir and Whorf did not publish
anything together nor present their concepts as a hypothesis, the controversy over linguistic relativity
stemmed from its language first stance. Even the most radical cognitivist takes issue with placing cognitive
conceptualization at the hands of language, which is the upshot of the strong Whorfian stance. The weak

16
stance is much more digestible and influential. Weak applications of linguistic relativity have shown that
there is a relationship between real world conceptualization and linguistic conceptualization. These
studies show that the way a speaker categorizes objects in the real world relates to the conceptual
categories of their native language (Dirven & Verspoor, 1998, p. 140). This is not to assume that the
linguistic categories are dictating the real world categorization, but rather, cognitive development and
linguistic development go hand in hand. This can cause issues in the acquisition of a second language
because of the vast differences possible between the way that the L1 and L2 conceptualize and code real
world information linguistically.
Another important theory on the relationship between language and thought is Eleanor Rosh’s prototype
theory of conceptualization. It states that within a given category, certain members will be better
exemplars of that category based on their salient features. Every category has a set of features of which
each member must exhibit enough to be included; the member with the most important salient features
is taken to be the prototype (Geeraerts, 2010, p.185). Geeraerts (2010) provides a detailed overview of
important aspects of prototypically,
First, prototypical categories exhibit degrees of typicality; not every member is equally representative for
a category. Second, prototypical categories exhibit a family resemblance structure, more generally, their
semantic structure takes the form of a radial set of clustered and overlapping readings. Third, prototypical
categories are blurred at the edges. Fourth, prototypical categories cannot be defined by means of a single
set of criterial (necessary and sufficient) attributes. (p.187)
These aspects are important for understanding how the real world and linguistic conceptual
categorization interact. The first feature above related to the idea that, with in the category of furniture,
chair is better representative than, say, floor lamp; the third feature indicates that, if floor lamp is at the
edge of the category of furniture, it may mark a transition between furniture and electronics. The second
feature shows that each member of a category bears some resemblance to some of the others, but not
necessarily equal resemblance to all; the fourth feature shows that the common features of all members
of a conceptual category are not enough to delineate what the category is. All of these concepts are
specific to each language and to the conceptual categories already present within that language. Due to
the vast differences possible between languages in regards to conceptual categories and salient features
within each category, the conceptualizations of the L1 will influence the acquisition of the L2’s
conceptualization system.
The development of cognitive functions that coincide with linguistic development highlights the link
between language and thought and supports the idea that difference languages conceptualize the world

17
differently with different salient features. Gopnik (2001) presents data from a study of Korean, and English
speaking toddlers’ categorization of blocks of various shapes and colors and verbal reasoning strategies.
The study revealed that the Korean toddlers used a system of categorization that was not similar to the
system used by the English speaking toddlers. The system that the toddlers used reflected how the
pertinent conceptual categories in their respective language. This means that the English toddlers
grouped together the blocks by size first, mirroring the conventional NP big red circle rather than by color
which would be coded in a non- standard NP red big circle. When the toddlers were talking about the task,
the Korean toddlers used more complex verbal forms than the English toddlers; however, the English
toddlers used more complex nominal phrases. In a later study with the same group of children,
administered once the children had reached the age of 3, showed that each group used about the same
number of complex verbal and nominal phrases although they still categorized the shapes using the same
system. The interesting part about the complex verbal and nominal phrase results is that in a brief study
of adult spoken problem solving strategies, speakers of Korean used more verbal phrases than English
speaking adults but the English adults used more nominal phrases. All of this information taken together
indicates a direct link between the development and usage of thought and the development of cognition.
Let’s say that in the future, the children from the above research decide to learn the other language as a
second language. Per the data and arguments presented in the previous section, these children would
have difficulty in acquiring the parts of the L2 that are most different from the L1. One of the native Korean
speakers may miss a semantic nuance of a particular nominal phrase form because it is not congruent
with any part of her L1. This is not to say that she may never comprehend or accurately produce this form
in native contexts but simply the possibly that falling short of a native target level of semantic
comprehension cannot be reached exists.
The issue of saliency and prototypically is extremely important to analyzing the role of semantics in SLA.
Returning to Rosh’s theories, a language is greatly influenced by the world around it. All lexical entries and
syntactic constructions exist on a continuum based on their salient features and relation to the prototype
of the given category. Examining the prototypically of transitive verbs in English, it could be assumed that
a verb that requires an agent and patient and clearly indicates a change of state of the patient could be
prototypically transitive hit is a prime example. If transitive verbs like hit are the prototype, verbs that
require three participants, like send, or do not clearly indicate the patient’s change of state, like love,
would be less prototypically transitive. Send requites three participants to create a grammatical utterance
(Gus sends Kris a letter); love does not clearly indicate a change of state in the patient (Kris loves Michelle).
Both of these verbs are considered to be transitive and related to hit, but their features are less

18
prototypical. Additionally, send has senses where it does not require three participants, which only
complicates things further. When an L1 and L2 exhibit different syntactic or lexical prototypes with
different salient features, the L2 system will not be the same as a native speaker.
The process of acquiring an L2 requires learners to conceptualize the world in the terms of the L2. This is
not to say that the learner must think exactly like a native speaker; however, a similar system of
conceptual categorization must develop. During this process, the learners may make overgeneralizations
of centralized concepts. If the prototypical English determiner is the, it may be overgeneralized and used
in contexts where it is not the appropriate determiner. This can be exacerbated if the L1 does not have a
determiner system like English or lacks determiners all together. As shown in the discussion of English
transitive verbs, this can be extended to syntactic constructions. Using the verb send as an example, there
are many senses of a given lexical item, which also exhibit varying levels of prototypically. Assuming that
prototypical send requires three participants, the sense of send in the construction Gus sent a letter would
be less prototypical, although still technically grammatically correct. Gus sent a letter also contains much
semantic information that overrides the prototype. The verb is in the past tense, which may be the cause
of the less-prototypical two participant construction. Also, because the conventional construction of send
requires three participants, it may be assumed that an unspecified recipient is semantically understood in
the construction (Gus sent (Kris) a letter). The prototype and exceptions of all sense of a given lexical item
or syntactic construction must be acquired in order to truly have a native-like level of semantic
comprehension.
Jarvis and Pavlenko (2008) examine, amongst other things, the positive and negative effects of the
similarity, or lack there-of, between and L1 and L2. In terms of learner perception, when an L1 and L2 are
assumed to be similar, the learner will be more confident and receptive during early stages of acquisition.
When the L1 and L2 are perceived to be vastly different, the learner may face issues caused by this
perception, regardless of the actual linguistic similarity. Jarvis and Pavlenko also address the impact of L1
semantics on the L2 especially in regards to lexicosemantic transfer. They argue that during earlier stages
of acquisition, learners may use an authentic L2 word in a way that appropriates its meaning based on L2
and L1 semantic information. This can work the other way as well, where a learner may use an L1 word in
a way that is appropriate based on the semantics of the L2 and not the L1 (p. 75). These observations
relate back to the concepts of the lexeme and lemma presented earlier. The relationship between
meaning and form is the center of semantic study and similarities, or lack there-of, between an L1 and L2
affects the inquisitional process of the L2. Whether this is a positive or negative affectation depends on
various factors including, but not limited to, phonological similarity, perceived similarity, congruent

19
syntactic constructions, and ultimately semantic similarity. Divergence or negative convergence—like
false-cognates or conceptual delineations—in any area of the L1 and L2 can cause the learner to fail to
acquire a native-like semantic comprehension
V. Conclusion
Semantics simply is the relationship between meaning and form. Generative and cognitive linguistics have
vastly different views on the role of semantics in linguistic theory. Generative linguistics views the role of
semantics as occurring after the syntactic structure is realized. In this way, semantics is a tool of
interpretation, leading to the concept of Interpretative Semantics that is accepted as a part of the
generative grammar. The role of semantics in generative grammar is minimized because of its
interpretational status. In cognitive linguistics, the role of semantics is maximized to the point where all
areas of linguistic inquiry are affected by semantics. In other words, every part of a language has semantic
value. Syntactic structures have semantic value along with the lexical items and morphological aspects of
the construction. The role semantics plays in a given linguistic tradition is extended to its role in SLA.
Generativist SLA researchers examine the concepts of form/feature remapping and parameter resetting
in the inquisitional process. Assuming a universality of language and its features allows these researchers
to posit that when an L1 and L2 have selected, bundled, and mapped features differently, issues in
acquisition will arise. This not only relates to lexical items, but to syntax as well. When an L2 has
parameters for verbal forms, aspects, tenses, etc. that have not been set in the L1, learners will have
issues with those specific constructions. Although many inquisitional difficulties are presented by
generative grammar in regards to contrastive analysis, the universality of language and semantic features
indicates that the necessary linguistic information for every language in use is present in every human
brain and, in some way, can be accessed and reset. This leaves many questions about inquisitional issues
unresolved.
Turning to cognitive linguistics and SLA research, a greater emphasis is placed on the entirety of the
cognitive experience than on universal linguistic knowledge. The interaction between speakers and the
world around them has a direct link to that speaker’s language, its forms, lexical items, and conceptual
distinctions. When acquiring an L1, a learner is not only acquiring syntax and lexical items, they are
entering into a language with its own specific categorizations and conceptualizations about the world.
Although two native speakers of English may disagree on what species of bird is the most birdy, they will
agree on what features that species has to make it an exemplar of what is bird. This may not be the case
for a non-native speaker, who brings the conceptualizations and salient features of their L1 categories to
the table when acquiring the L2. The differences in conceptualization are at the heart of inquisitional

20
issues in regards to semantics. The L1 semantics will affect the acquisition and usage of L2 semantics in
such a way that does not allow a non-native speaker to reach a native-like level of semantic
comprehension.
Just because a non-native speaker cannot reach a target native level in regards to semantic acquisition
does not mean that this is a negative. The non-native speaker has two distinct conceptualizations of the
world through which they can communicate. The influence of the L1 can facilitate acquisition in areas of
similarity, whether actual or perceived, and can hamper acquisition in areas of dissimilarity. Additionally,
similarity is not always a facilitating factor. Languages often have false-cognates or similar semantic
information coded and bundled in ways that are incongruent with the L2 system. Taken together, the
cognitive experience used to shape the L1 and about which the L1 mediates communication is different
than that of the L2. When it comes to semantics—or more generally, meaning—the differences between
the L1 and L2 can cause learners to fall short of acquiring a native-like target level of acquisition.

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