OFFICE OF NAVAL STRATEGIC STUDIES M AY - J U N E 2 0 1 9

3 | Maritime Security, 6 | Maritime Security, 9 | Naval Defense 12 | Military History: 15 | Philippine

Regulations, and
Enforcement:
Is ‘Peace through
Conservation’ Possible in the
South China Sea?: Insights on
Functional Cooperation and
Environmental Governance
Regulations, and and Military Trends:
Enforcement: Eyes in the Water: The Race
to Develop Underwater
One Global Ocean, Our Drone Technology and
Shared Responsibility: its Implications for the
On the Challenges of Philippines’ Maritime
Ocean Governance Security
Fort Drum, the National Security:
‘Concrete Battleship’ Civil-Military
in Manila Bay: Operations (CMO)
Memorialization and Strategies: Realities
Strategic Lessons and Development
Issues
The StratJournal is a bi-monthly publication of the Office of Naval Strategic Studies
devoted to strategic, national, regional, and international issues, and developments
that have significant impact on maritime security and naval defense.

About US: The Office of Naval Strategic Studies (ONSS) is one of the research
institutions of the Philippine Navy primarily mandated to examine the dynamics
of the strategic and policy environment and the developments in military affairs
in order to provide sound and research-based recommendations for the PN
Command. The Office provides avenues and platforms for open and constructive
discussions on prevailing and evolving defense and security issues to broaden
perspectives, and cultivate a culture of strategic thinking in the PN.

Is ‘Peace through Conservation’
Possible in the South China Sea?:
Insights on Functional Cooperation
and Environmental Governance
By: Joseph Mari I. Fabian
Functional cooperation
in the South China
Sea can be pursued
through cross-sectoral
collaboration in the
environmental aspect
of the dispute, a less
sensitive area which can
be a point of convergence
among claimants.
The ‘Spratly Islands
Marine Peace Park’ and
‘Red Sea Marine Peace
Park’ are examples of
initiative which promote
functional cooperation
as a means of territorial
dispute management.
ST RATJOU RNAL M AY - JUNE 2 01 9
The South China Sea dispute
has been predominantly
viewed from the lens of
geopolitics, with an undue
focus on ‘who gets what’ over
a portion of the Earth’s surface
as determined by international
competition. This comes at
the expense environmental
dimension of the dispute,
which has since been relegated
to matters of low politics:
concerns that are, arguably,
‘not vital to the survival of
the state’. However, once the
irreversible environmental
destruction of the South
China Sea fully reveals its
P HOTO: Greg Asner
MARITIME SECURITY,
REGULATIONS, AND
ENFORCEMENT
This column tackles relevant
developments in maritime
security, including shifts in the
politico-security environment.
Trends in maritime regulations and
enforcement are also discussed in
this column.
ugly face, it is only a matter of
time that we are left with no
choice but to recalibrate our
priorities as maritime nations
(given we still have the luxury
of such choice by that time).
The consequences are not
reserved to claimant states;
global ecology, and all that we
derive from it for our national
survival, are at stake. As Garret
Hardin, author of the Tragedy
of the Commons (1968)
notes, contests over oceans
“bring species after species
of fish and whales closer to
extinction.”1 The remarks are
still instructive today.
3

This grim reality drove
environmental champions
to push for a more ‘eco-
centric’ way of territorial
dispute management. For
instance, Switzerland-
based International Union
for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) proposes a ‘Spratly
Islands Marine Peace Park
in the South China Sea’
which promotes joint marine
scientific research and
environmental management
among rival claimants.2 The
UN Environmental Programme
also spearheaded in the 2000s
functional cooperation in the
SCS by convening countries
to pursue marine conservation
and resource mapping in the
contested waters. Despite
the glaring lack of support for
this initiative, the ‘greens’ are
commendable for elevating
this functional cooperation
through environmental
governance in the SCS as a
way forward. A sovereignty-
driven mindset misses so much
of the bigger picture.
A sea under siege
The biggest loser in the SCS
dispute is the environment. An
ecosystem comprising 1500
species of sponge, 600 and
3000 species of coral and fish,
respectively, the South China
Sea has produced 16.6 million
tons of aquatic protein in the
last few years alone, providing
a viable source of food and
livelihood to all populations
dependent on its marine
wealth.3 It also consistently
ranks 4th among the world’s
most prolific fishing zones,
given its ideal conditions for
4 O F F I C E O F N AVA L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S
marine life, and provides a
sanctuary to seabirds and
turtles which rest, breed, and
winter in its islands.4 However,
the SCS conflict has placed
all this biodiversity in peril,
where rival claimants ramp
up their fishing activities not
only to secure access to a food
source, but to legitimize their
claims. Fishing, which should
be a purely civilian exercise,
has since been weaponized
to express a strong political
statement on sovereign
control (similar to hydrocarbon
exploration). Depleting
resources are rampaged,
open waters are militarized,
ultimately inflicting heavy
stress on an already fragile
ecosystem that is crucial to
global food security.
Cr it ique
The nation-states’ view of
the environment in purely
utilitarian terms has led to the
legitimization of its destruction
to satisfy political and
economic ambitions. ‘Global
commons’ (i.e., the common
heritage of mankind) such
as the world’s oceans have
been appropriated where only
those powerful enough get
privileged access to its bounty.
Furthermore, the geopolitics
of territorial disputes puts a
premium on resource control
to secure strategic leverage
over competitors. This has
made cooperation even harder
because it accentuates the
notion that these waters
have clear lines of authority
determined only by militarily
superior states. The SCS
dispute has been a victim to
this framing, where ecology is
mere afterthought to power
politics and sovereignty.
Functional cooperation
through environmental
governance is proposed to
overcome this fixation.
Functional cooperation
through environmental
governance as a trust
builder
Functional cooperation takes
place more at the sectoral
level rather than the national
to go beyond sensitive
questions on sovereignty.
As Borton (2018) comments,
functional cooperation
allows participants to be “less
concerned with sovereignty
and politics than with collecting
and analyzing scientific data,
which contributed to civil
and relatively uncontroversial
collaboration.”5 The ‘Spratly
Islands Marine Peace
Park’ initiative reflects the
functionalist track whereby
environmental stakeholders
transcend their national
affiliations and work around
the common language of
science. Supreme Court Senior
Associate Justice Antonio
Carpio echoes this when he
supported the creation of an
international marine peace
park where all claimants
‘suspend their claims for 50
to 100 years’ to allow reefs
damaged due to reclamation
activities to heal over. This
also induces the conversion of
militarized facilities into marine
research and eco-tourism
facilities which benefits all.6 It
is a ‘win-win solution’ Carpio
adds, and ‘nobody loses face’
since standing claims are
simply set aside in favor of
collectively governing what is
common to all of us.
Functional cooperation
models in the environment
exist in other parts of the world
where we can take notes from.
Israel and Jordan resolved
their political differences
over the Red Sea through the
establishment of the ‘Red Sea
Marine Peace Park’ (RSMPP)
program. Environmental
representatives from both
countries identified their areas
of functional cooperation,
which interestingly, reflect
similar proposals for managing
the SCS dispute:
Protect natural coastal
and marine habitats,
particularly coral reefs;
Improve sea water quality;
Prevent water pollution
from marine and land
sources;
Develop oil spill emergency
response efforts and
preparedness. 7
This is compelling proof that
the environment can be a
point of convergence despite
politically charged differences
between claimants. It is also
worth noting that all claimants
in the dispute are parties to the
United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
While this international treaty
provides clarifications on
sensitive maritime entitlement
issues, it also supports
functional cooperation
through environmental
governance as reflected in
Part XII of the document,
calling for the ‘PROTECTION
AND PRESERVATON OF THE
ST RATJOU RNAL M AY - JUNE 2 01 9
MARINE ENVIRONMENT’ MARITIME SECURITY, REGULATIONS,
and Part XIII on ‘MARINE AND ENFORCEMENT
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH’, all
of which are anchored on
international cooperation.8 <https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
Part XIII, Sec. 3, Art. 247 environmental-law-review/blog/
supports ‘Marine scientific environmental-ramifications-of-
research projects undertaken the-south-china-sea-conflict-vying-
by or under the auspices of for - reg i onal- d ominanc e - at-the-
international organizations.’ environments-expense/>.
Environmental functional 4
Ibid.
actors such as the Marine
Science Institute (PH), Nha
5
Supra note 1.
Trang Oceanography Institute
6
Billones, Trisha. “Carpio suggests
(VN), and akin regional research turning Spratlys into ‘marine peace
bodies are most suited to lead park.” ABS CBN News. 14 July 2016.
this noble endeavor. Ultimately, Web. 8 May 2019. <https://news.
the promise of achieving peace abs-cbn.com/news/07/14/16/carpio-
through conservation in the
suggests-turning-spratlys-into-marine-
South China Sea lies in our
collective will to seriously peace-park>.
preserve this global patrimony
7
Peace and Biodiversity Dialogue
for generations to come. Initiative. “Red Sea Marine Peace
Park.” Convention on Biological
END NOTES: Diversity. 2017.
8
United Nations Convention on the
1
Borton, James. “As nations fight for
Law of the Sea.
control, South China Sea coral reefs
.
are dying in silence.” South China
Morning Post. 29 December 2018.
Web. 4 May 2019. <https://www.
scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/
asia/article/2179756/nations-fight-
control-south-china-sea-coral-reefs-
are>.
2
Albano, Patricia. “Peace through
Conservation: The South China Sea.”
Shark Research, University of Miami.
26 February 2018. Web. 4 May 2019.
<https://sharkresearch.rsmas.miami.
edu/peace-through-conservation-the-
south-china-sea/>.
3
Georgetown Environment Law
Review. “Environmental Ramifications
of the South China Sea Conflict:
Vying for Regional Dominance at the
Environment’s Expense.” Georgetown
Law. 12 July 2018. Web. 4 May 2019.
5

One G lobal Oce an, Our Sh ared
Res pons ibil i ty: O n the C h a l l en ges
of Oce an Governance
By: Precious Denzel Navarro
Overexploitation of our
oceans is already bringing
great harm and irreversible
damages to the marine
environment.
Effective ocean governance
would require an
internationally‐agreed set
of rules and action plans,
principles-based regional
initiatives, and integrated
national policies for such a
framework to succeed.
6 O F F I C E O F N AVA L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S
SOU R CE : B ato ngba ca l a nd B aviera (201 3)
The ocean is indispensable
in addressing many of the
world’s imminent challenges.
Healthy oceans are essential
to humankind, both as a pillar
of global food security, and as
an engine of economic growth.
Nonetheless, while our seas
hold immense potential for
society’s development, they
are also under increasing
risk of degradation due to
enhanced economic activity
and the destructive effects of
climate change. The resources
in the sea are finite, with
certain fish populations, for
MARITIME SECURITY,
REGULATIONS, AND
ENFORCEMENT
This column tackles relevant
developments in maritime
security, including shifts in the
politico-security environment.
Trends in maritime regulations and
enforcement are also discussed in
this column.
example, already classified
as overexploited due to
unrestrained fishing through
the years.1
We use the term “commons”
to describe resources which
are freely available for public
use but limited in supply.2
The overexploitation of our
maritime commons, such as
through illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing, and
the consequent discharge of
pollutants into the sea, bring
great harm and irreversible
damage to an already fragile
marine environment. Protecting
global commons such as the
oceans entails cross-sectoral
collaboration among its
stakeholders in the maritime
sector. This ambitious plan of
global ocean governance would
be a futile exercise if only a
limited number of countries
capitalize on its potential, while
others continue to aimlessly
exploit the marine environment
for their self-serving ends.3
Ocean Governance: A
Fragmented Concept
U n d e r t h e U N C LOS?
By far, the most comprehensive
attempt to govern the world’s
oceans is the formulation
of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). However,
despite being in effect for
three decades, critics point
out that the UNCLOS is
ineffective as it lacks legally-
binding instruments – the
document only contains “soft
laws” with no real enforcement
mechanisms. In particular,
some parties often disregard
its recommendations on ocean
governance and fall short of
coordinating their policies
across sovereign jurisdictions
when it does not serve their
national interests.4 Much as
the UNCLOS represents a
remarkable achievement in
international law, this complex
treaty and its ocean governance
regimes are not without serious
limitations.
The UNCLOS’ zonal approach
to ocean governance divides the
ST RATJOU RNAL M AY - JUNE 2 01 9
various parts of the oceans into
jurisdictional zones: territorial
sea, exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), continental shelf, and
high seas. While these maritime
zones determine the rights and
obligations of state parties, this
may be a major contributing
factor to states’ fragmented
approach because of such
delineations. To illustrate, fish
populations do not recognize
boundaries as they move
across seas. Toxic chemicals
travel with sea currents far
beyond the extent of an EEZ.5
Moreover, manifestations of
climate change such as ocean
acidification affect all marine
areas equally and across all
zones6, regardless of which
state has jurisdiction over
affected areas. The UNCLOS
falls short in considering the
greater consequences of the
transboundary nature of these
maritime security issues, and
their effect on all state parties
and the high seas.7
The Convention also does not
spell out a “sufficiently coherent
obligation to steward” marine
resources.8 While Article 192
of the UNCLOS cites states’
duty to “protect and preserve
the marine environment”, it
does not detail how marine
resources are to be used,
nor determine, for instance,
fishing quotas, leading to the
collapse of domestic fisheries.9
The “too general” character
of the Convention leaves
its provisions open to wide
interpretation such as granting
states unhampered authority
in their respective EEZs.10 Due
MARITIME SECURITY, REGULATIONS,
AND ENFORCEMENT
also to the lack of initiative,
states struggle to craft their
national policies which
acknowledge the transborder
nature of maritime issues –
from transnational crimes,
protection of depleting fish
stocks, and establishment of
regulations for offshore gas and
oil drilling.11 It is likewise of no
help that increased cooperation
among State Parties is inhibited
due to issues of overlapping or
contested sovereignty over the
oceans.12
The UNCLOS also maintains
a delicate balance vis-à-vis
states’ economic interests.13
Article 193 provides states
with “the right to exploit their
natural resources pursuant to
their environmental policies
and in accordance with their
duty to protect and preserve
the environment”. The
maximum sustainable yield
concept (which pertains to
the highest possible yield that
can be routinely taken from a
stock without significant effect
in the reproduction process14)
in Article 119 supports this
strong economic dimension of
the UNCLOS.15
Furthermore, despite the
multitude of UNCLOS-
attached bodies, the effective
governance of the oceans
continues to experience
implementation problems. For
one, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), which lays
7
down the rules for international stakeholders to follow through MARITIME SECURITY, REGULATIONS,
commercial shipping, is with initiatives promoting AND ENFORCEMENT
relatively slow in enacting this approach to ocean
policies that respond to other management. An “integrated,
maritime issues despite its precautionary, and ecosystem-
11
Ibid
success in decreasing ship based” approach is important
12
Supra note 4.
pollution. This includes ballast to arrive at a common
13
Supra note 7.
water discharge and transport consensus despite varying
14
Ricker, William. “Computation and
of invasive species from one interests.20 More importantly, Interpretation of Biological Statistics
part of the world to another.16 this entails cross-sectoral of Fish Populations.” Ottawa: Depart-
Recourse to the International collaboration that is guided ment of the Environment, Fisheries and
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea by sound scientific knowledge Marine Service, 1975.
(ITLOS), on the other hand, of the ocean’s ecosystems
15
Supra note 7.
is only as reliable as member and the sustainable use of the
16
Supra note 4.
states’ consent to be bound by marine environment.21 Nations
17
Ibid.
its judgments. Moreover, the must seek a common ground
18
Pyc, Dorota. “Global ocean govern-
International Seabed Authority towards informed stewardship ance.” International Journal on Marine
(ISA), which is responsible and innovative use of global Navigation and Safety of Sea Trans-
for the use and distribution maritime resources through portation, 10.1, 159-162, 2016. Trans-
of raw materials on the sea national and international Nav, DOI: 10.12716/1001.10.01.18.
floor, suffers from intense legal frameworks that treat
19
Supra note 7.
pressure to favor the interests the world’s oceans as a shared
20
Supra note 18.
large commercial entities.17 cause.
21
Ibid.
Ultimately, the refusal of some
states to recognize the UNCLOS END NOTES:
and its attendant regimes
undermines its potential as the 1
World Ocean Review. “Sustainable
world’s main framework for
use of our oceans – making ideas work.”
ocean governance.
2015. Web. 29 April 2019.
2
Ibid.
Need for a Holistic and 3
Ibid.
integrated Approach 4
Council on Foreign Relations. “The
global oceans regime.” 2013. Web. 29
Effective ocean governance
April 2019.
requires an internationally‐ 5
Supra note 1.
agreed set of rules and action 6
Ibid.
plans, principles-based regional 7
Tladi, Dire. Ocean governance: A
initiatives, and integrated
fragmented regulatory framework.
national policies for such
2011. Web. 03 May 2019.
a framework to succeed.18 8
Barnes, Richard. “The Convention on
Notwithstanding, despite
the Law of the Sea: An effective frame-
its limitations, the UNCLOS
work for domestic fisheries conserva-
provides room for the
tion?” The Law of the Sea: Progress and
development and evolution
Prospects. Eds. David Freestone, Rich-
of this envisioned ocean
ard Barnes & David M. Ong. Oxford
governance framework.19 The
University Press, 2006.
most critical step begins with 9
Supra note 1.
the serious political will of all 10
Supra note 7.

8 O F F I C E O F N AVA L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S
 C h i n a ' s te st i n g of u n d e r water gliding dro nes in the S o uth China S ea
Eyes in the Water: The Race to Develop
Underwater Drone Technology and
its Implications for the Philippines’
Maritime Security
By: Kirk Patrick S. Pablo
The development of
Autonomous Underwater
Vehicles (AUVs) can
potentially open new
realities in warfare, given
its propensity to challenge
conventional means of
naval power
With China ramping up
its research on these
technologies, the prospect
of China using this to
enforce its claims in the
West Philippine Sea can
be a serious threat to
Philippine national security
ST RATJOU RNAL M AY - JUNE 2 01 9
With the Indo-Pacific region
becoming a strategic playing
ground between regional and
global powers such as China
and the United States, its
apparent ‘dronification’1 has
been observed by strategists
and academics as an unfolding
strategic reality. As an emerging
technology in its own right,
autonomous underwater
vehicles (AUVs) have been
increasingly used by major
states to improve their capability
to mount deterrence and wage
war in the maritime domain, as
well as ‘striate’2 these spaces for
P HOTO: SCM P
NAVA L D EF ENSE AN D
MI L I TA RY TR ENDS
This column covers
developments in naval
strategies, trends, and
revolutions in naval military
technology affecting the
Navy’s role in the security
realm.
the benefit of their own naval
forces vis-à-vis ensuring the
integrity of their determined
boundaries. Areas such as
intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief
(HADR), as well as kinetic
missions are also experiencing
increased dronification,
given breakthroughs in real-
life applications from this
technology.
Due to the ‘smoothness’3 of
maritime spaces, it is likely
that AUVs will experience
9
greater utilization especially in
disputed regions such as the
West Philippine Sea because of
its capacity to project maritime
power in such sensitive areas.
Its relatively small size, stealth
capabilities, and decreased
need for personnel in its
operations create a neutral
zone in determining its status,
rendering these platforms the
ultimate surveillance machine.
With such characteristics, we
can argue that AUVs, if wielded
by enemies, can be a threat to
national security considering
its ability to navigate highly
strategic areas and spaces
that cannot be reached by
conventional means. This then
serves as a challenge for the
Philippine Navy to upgrade its
own set of maritime capabilities
to counter such threats, and
produce/procure its own
autonomous underwater
systems.
‘Drone Powers’
The United States and China
have, for years, been developing
autonomous underwater
vehicle technology as an added
measure to exert influence in
the maritime arena. Being at the
forefront of these technological
developments, both states
are in a rush to employ such
systems to ensure the pursuit
of their respective national
security interests. In fact, they
have been deploying unmanned
subsurface technology at such
a fast rate, with the United
States Navy activating in 2017
an unmanned underwater
squadron,4 and with the US
10
DoD entering into $800 million
contract for underwater drone
R&D with defense contractors.5
A year earlier, China tested new
underwater drones in the South
China Sea, and Beijing claims
that this breakthrough could
reveal and track the location
of enemy submarines.6 These
developments understandably
bear great implications for the
Philippines at they take place in
close proximity to the country’s
waters. Amidst these emerging
security threats, it is imperative
that the PN seriously develop its
technological capabilities at this
front. Due to the conventional
nature of some of its naval
assets, the acquisition of these
cutting-edge technologies will
greatly augment the PN’s ability
to respond, and in the long run,
establish credible deterrence
in its own maritime domain
to prevent opportunistic
actors from compromising its
territorial integrity. The ability
of unmanned underwater
systems to complete the
common maritime operating
picture provides the PN the
necessary ability to know when
and where to deploy its assets,
given the intermodal nature of
naval warfare.
China’s Underwater Drone
Development: A Looming
Threat?
In emphasizing China’s
development of its own
unmanned underwater
technology, the question lies
in our ability to ensure the
integrity of our determined
boundaries as a maritime
O F F I C E O F N AVA L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S
NAVAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY TRENDS
nation. Existing conventional
technologies could be of great
help in responding to traditional
security threats, yet again, the
development of autonomous
underwater systems drastically
changes the reality of power
projection and warfare at
sea. Its ability to engage
conventional forces in an
asymmetrical manner with swift
and effective responses leaves
the PN at a disadvantaged
position; the Navy’s desire to
beef up its traditional assets
may in fact give potential
adversaries the incentive to go
after these assets if they see
the opportunity.
The novelty and massive
potential of AUVs as a
strategic asset lies in its ability
to transcend the capacities
of existing platforms. For
example, China’s HN-1, an
unmanned underwater drone
under development, can
mimic the natural mobility of
a fish and emit almost zero
acoustic signature. Coupled
with advanced sensors, a low
acoustic signature, as well
physical qualities that mimic
marine life,7 an AUV of this kind
can easily evade conventional
means of detection by
unknowing targets while
undertaking surveillance and
even combat operations. The
repercussions of this for a
developing fleet such as the
Philippine Navy means that
the use of traditional means
of detection and identification
could be of little help – even
illogical –because of the high-
precision and fast results
orientation such systems which
conventional platforms will find
difficult to counter.
The apparent lack of
understanding and appreciation
for AUVs can easily leave
us vulnerable to intrusions,
and ultimately, attacks
from potential adversaries.
Completing the common
operating future requires a
real-time link between the
battlespace and operational
forces, which is crucial in the
ability of a military to act on its
own initiative. This also entails
controlling both the dimensions
of time and space, which can all
be done with the help of such
systems. Hence, from an end-
user’s perspective, we need
to understand and capitalize
on the strategic potential of
unmanned underwater systems
to prepare us for the future of
sea combat as it will be decisive
in who gets to tip the balance
of naval power today.
END NOTES:
1
The normalization of the use of drone
technology and its ability to permeate
the technopolitical dimensions of hu-
man life.
2
“Striation” means a series of ridges,
furrows, or linear marks. Also, it is a
way for an entity to define the limits
of its boundaries and area of control,
which in this context, the exertion of
technopolitical control by claimant
states in a certain geopolitical area.
3
This is to describe the nature of the sea,
wherein its vastness and lack of features
ST RATJOU RNAL M AY - JUNE 2 01 9
remove certainties and distinctions rela- NAVAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY TRENDS
tive to the conditions we see in cities and
roads. Hence, to describe that the sea
is ‘smooth’ is to accept its fluid nature,
thus creating the need to define bound-
aries and spaces that can determine the
extent of state control.
4
Ziezulewicz, Geoff “How underwater
drones will change the Navy’s sub game”
The Navy Times (August 3, 2018) Re-
trieved from https://www.navytimes.
com/news/your-navy/2018/08/03/
how-underwater-drones-will-change-
the-navys-sub-game/.
5
Doornbos, Caitlin “$800M underwa-
ter drone contract signals Pentagon's
growing interest in unmanned tech”
Stars and Stripes (August 6, 2018) Re-
trieved from https://www.stripes.com/
news/800m-underwater-drone-con-
tract-signals-pentagon-s-growing-inter-
est-in-unmanned-tech-1.541222.
6
Chen, Stephen. “Why Beijing is speed-
ing up underwater drone tests in the
South China Sea” South China Morn-
ing Post (July 26, 2017) Retrieved from
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/
policies-politics/article/2103941/
why-beijing-speeding-underwater-
drone-tests-south-china.
7
Goldstein, Lyle “Meet the HN-1,
China's New AI-Powered Underwa-
ter Drone” National Interest (July
15, 2018) Retrieved from https://
nationalinterest.org/feature/meet-hn-
1-chinas-new-ai-powered-underwater-
drone-25706.
11

Fort Drum , t he ‘Co nc rete
B attle sh ip’ in M anila B ay:
Me m o r ia l i zati on an d
St rate gi c Lesson s
By: Patrick John F. Mansujeto
The concrete island of
Fort Drum is one of the
harbour defences that
were constructed by the
Americans in 1910 to
defend Manila Bay and the
capital city.
Fort Drum was a product
of an American study
about the Battle of Manila
Bay during the Spanish-
American War.
The historical significance
of Fort Drum more than
merits its conservation and
memorialization.
12
P HOTO: E x plo ra .ph | Kris de Jesus | O NSS
Located in the middle of
Manila Bay near the island of
Corregidor is an odd-looking
concrete island with big rusty
guns on top. This is Fort Drum,
one of the harbour defences
that were constructed by
the Americans to defend
Manila Bay and the capital
city.1 The Americans noticed
the absence of a credible
harbour defence when they
defeated the Spaniards
during the Battle of Manila
Bay. When they already
O F F I C E O F N AVA L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S
MILITARY HISTORY
This column looks into history to
understand and articulate present
naval doctrines and maritime
realities. It is also dedicated in
further enriching discussions on
Philippine naval history.
consolidated their colonial
rule in the Philippines, the
Board of Fortification chaired
by William Howard Taft
recommended constructing
fortification and defence
facilities in Manila Bay.2 Fort
Drum was part of the Harbour
Defence of Manila and Subic
Bays, together with Fort Mills
(Corregidor), Fort Hughes
(Caballo Island), Fort Frank
(Carabao Island) as well as Fort
Wint (Grande Island, Subic).3
The construction of Fort
Drum started in April 1909
under the US Army Corps
of Engineers in what was
known as El Fraile, Island.4
It was named after US Army
Brigadier General Richard
C. Drum who died while the
fort was under construction.
The island is located midway
the coast of the province of
Cavite and Corregidor Island.
It was levelled and the fort
was designed like a battleship,
earning it the nickname
“concrete battleship” or
“unsinkable battleship”. Its
armament included two
14-inch M1909 guns each
with two turrets that were
specifically designed for
the fort. Since most forts in
Manila Bay were completed
only before the advent of
air power, it is only in Fort
Drum that anti-aircraft guns
were installed. The lack of
anti-air craft guns in other
fortifications would have dire
consequences later on.
Along with other fortifications
in Manila Bay, Fort Drum saw
action during the Japanese
invasion of Manila at the
onset of World War II in the
Pacific. The fort suffered
bombardment from Japanese
airplanes that destroyed most
of the constructions above it,
including the communication
tower. However, the big
guns survived and even fired
against the Japanese landing
force in Corregidor. Together
with Corregidor, Fort Drum
surrendered to the Japanese
on May 6, 1942. A Japanese
regiment was stationed on
the fort but it was never
ST RATJOU RNAL M AY - JUNE 2 01 9
repaired. During the American MILITARY HISTORY
liberation campaign, the fort
was bombed which resulted
of Rody Koshar, “nations
to a big fire that lasted for
developed their sense of
several days. After the war,
history with reference to
despite all the bombing and
specific and tangible objects”.6
burning, most of Fort Drum
A number of historians already
remained intact including
established the significance
its big guns and other metal
of material objects such
components.
as artefacts, monuments,
and memorials as central to
After the war, Fort Drum was
nation building and national
neglected in the middle of
remembering.7 It is precise
Manila Bay. People travelling
to say that material objects
via ferry to and from Manila
have played a crucial role in
have no idea of the importance
the production of memory of
of this concrete battleship in
various nations.8 In addition,
Philippine history. Unlike the
public monuments are also
island of Corregidor which is
important in the preservation
maintained as historical site,
and continuity of national
Fort Drum never received any
memory. Fort Drum is a place
preservation and conservation
of memory for the different
effort from the government.
periods as well as continuity
There are also no government
of Philippine history. It is part
agencies that provide security
of the national memory that
for the fort. This led random
looks back at the massive
metal scrappers to scavenge
infrastructure building and
its metal implements, which
material advancement during
further contributed to its
the so called benevolent
degradation. Due to its
colonial rule of the Americans.
proximity to the coast of
Not least, it is also a place
Ternate, Cavite, anyone with a
of memory for the national
boat can go to the island and
trauma that the Philippines
practically do whatever they
suffered during World War II.
want.
In preservation and
The historical significance
memorialization of Fort Drum,
of Fort Drum more than
people who are personally
merits its conservation and
connected to its should
memorialization. Memorials,
likewise never be forgotten.
monuments and shrines or
Memorials are not only the
what Piere Nora called as
embodiment of collective
“place of memory or lieux
and public memories, but also
de memoire” are tangible
personal and private ones.9
evidence of Philippine history
Surviving veterans from
which Filipinos can see,
both the United States and
feel and hear.5 In the words
Japan should be reached out
13
to so their stories be heard.
Contacting the families and
descendants of those who
lost their lives on the island
is also an important step.
A day of remembrance can
be held at Fort Drum where
these people and the public
can attend and participate. By
holding this kind of solemn
activity in the fort, the place
will be a sacred monument
that helps in formation of
national memory and nation-
building.10
Quite frankly, there are
also strategic lessons that
the Philippine Navy can
learn from the preservation
and conservation of Fort
Drum. Naval planners and
strategists will learn that Fort
Drum was the product of an
American study about the
Battle of Manila Bay during
the Spanish-American War.
14
The Americans surmised that MILITARY HISTORY
their easy victory was due to
the lack of harbour defence
constructed by the Spaniards 565,568, 567, 569, 753-754
to defend Manila. Although 2
IBid
Manila still fell during the 3
US Army Corps of Engineers. Coast
Japanese invasion, the guns Defences of Manila and Subic Bay.
of Fort Drum contributed a .(Washington:U.S. Government
lot in the delayed surrender Printing Office, 120) Form 7
of Corregidor. Hence, the
4
Ibid
Philippine Navy could look
5
Nora Pierre. Realms of Memory:
into past wars and conflicts Rethinking the French Past, Vol
for insights on how they 1. (United Kingdom: Columbia
can protect Manila from any University Press, 1996)
threat that emanates from the
6
Rodell,Magnus, J. “Monuments and
sea. Perhaps, the Philippine the Places of Memory”. Memory Work:
The Theory and Practice of Memory ,
Navy can also look into history
Kitzmann Andreas, Mithander, Conny
for guidance in its strategy
and Sundholm, John (eds). Frankfurt
against the range of present
am Main: Peter Lang, 2005) 109
challenges that it faces in its 7
Ibid
maritime domain. 8
Ibid, 106
END NOTES:
9
Ibid, 105
10
Ibid 109
1
United States Army. Engineers of the
Southwest Pacific, 1941-45, Volume
1.(Washington:U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1947) 562-563,
P HOTO: Wildbo a rpublishi ng
O F F I C E O F N AVA L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S
Civil-Military Operations (CMO) PHILIPPINES NATIONAL
SECURITY
Strategies: Realities and This column discusses the

Development Issues developments in internal security

efforts in realizing sustainable
national security. It also discusses
By: LT EMMANUEL C ABSALON PN national initiatives such as the
pursuit of peace processes, anti-
terrorism operations, and HADR
operations and civil military
operations.
“Although it is proper that our soldiers must be prepared to perform their
role in the military defense of the country, it is necessary that today, they accomplish missions that the
must also participate in the more immediate and vital defense of the civilian authorities alone may
nation against poverty, ignorance, disease, and injustice.” not be able to achieve such
– Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos as in disaster response and
search and rescue missions.
The Armed Forces of the operations have undergone In its efforts to defeat internal
Philippines (AFP) has long some changes through the threats, it has learned that
been posing itself as a partner years such as how the AFP tries purely military solutions are
in nation building. Nowadays, to defeat internal threats like not enough to cap-off the
you will see a lot of banners, the spread of radical ideologies proliferation and influence of
advertisements, magazines, that oftentimes result to these threats.
and other publications that national security threats.
showcase the AFP’s expanded What sparked Civil
role in Philippine society. The The diverse roles that AFP has Military Operations?
AFP, through Civil-Military to perform primarily stems
Operations, does its part in from its inherent capability and The Communist and Moro
nation-building and countering capacity. It has the man power, Insurgents1: To address the
insurgent ideologies. Its CMO logistics, and the leadership to

ST RATJOU RNAL M AY - JUNE 2 01 9 15

Moro conflict in Mindanao,
the AFP came up with
Sala’am, a program that
captures the cultural and
religious sensibilities of the
Mindanaoans. Precisely, it
recognizes the Moros have
been disenfranchised of their
ancestral lands when the system
of land titling was introduced
by elites. It also recognizes the
sanctity of Islamic religious
rites, and the Shariah Law’s
significance to the Moro’s way
of life.
The New People’s Army (NPAs),
the armed branch of the CPP,
became a national security
threat when they started
demanding “revolutionary
taxes” from people and
raiding vital government
facilities. Given these rebels
take advantage of peasants
in the countryside to incite
their dissent towards the
government, the AFP makes
an effort to counter their
propaganda. It conducts
medical missions and “pulong-
pulong” (small gatherings) of
people in affected areas to
emphasize the government is
a partner in progress, and to
clarify allegations of military
abuse. Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan strategy
Roles of the AFP: Besides
traditionally fighting the
nation’s wars, the AFP has
played a crucial developmental
role in nation-building.2 During
Martial Law in the time of
President Marcos, the AFP
was not only used to address
the internal threats, but it also
took on economic and political
roles – replacing civilian
authorities in conflict-stricken
places in Mindanao, as well as
administering government-
16
owned and controlled
corporations and serving
as a judiciary arm. During
President Corazon Aquino’s
administration, the roles of the
military were toned down.
The post-EDSA 1986
revolution saw the AFP started
transforming into a non-
traditional military institution.
Come the time of President Fidel
V. Ramos, it started cleaning its
tarnished image during martial
rule and embarked on “winning
back the hearts and minds”
of Filipinos. When President
Gloria Arroyo was at the helm
of Malacañan, the military’s
involvement in development
tasks were deepened as they
were tasked to implement
development programs and
subsequently. created the
National Development Support
Command which placed all
engineering battalions under
one umbrella. It was during
such time that the catchphrase
was “farm-to-market roads”
used, and the areas around the
country were subdivided into
white areas and red areas.
The AFP’s 2009 strategy called
Internal Peace and Security
entails a two-pronged approach
in CMO. First, it utilizes a
“whole-of-nation” approach
to elicit a concerted effort
among stakeholders. Secondly,
it employs the “human security
approach” wherein it puts the
people’s welfare at the center
of its operations. It recognizes
the wide spectrum of human
security such as human
dignity, access to economic
opportunities, education, food,
shelter, and health. Notable in
this concept is that it does not
O F F I C E O F N AVA L S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S
PHILIPPINES NATIONAL SECURITY
differentiate between national
security with human security,
recognizing that these two are
complementary.
Military and Civilian
Interactions
Personally, I am an advocate of
Civil Military Operations and
I believe that the AFP should
strengthen its non-traditional
roles. CMO instills nationalism
in our soldiers because they
experience civilian interaction
at a whole new level because
they perform roles that have an
immediate effect on the people
they serve. However, there
are also some criticisms that
the AFP may have focused too
much on non-traditional roles
and that we have neglected its
core competence: warfighting
and defending the state from
traditional security threats.
Notwithstanding, the
military’s involvement in
counterinsurgency and
developmental tasks introduces
important nuances. For one,
it establishes competitive,
complementary or collaborative
relationships with civilian
agencies. Cultural sensitivity
and rapport with local leaders
become a premium because the
armed forces are embedded in
the community.
Colonel Dencio S. Acop in his
paper entitled “Assessing the
Expanded Role of the AFP in
Nation-Building” notes that
adopting the non-traditional
type of military enables drastic
and long-term reforms in
nation-building. However,
it also opens up a Pandora’s
box with various unknowns
and potentially uncontrollable
variables that may lead to
worsening the problem instead
of solving it.
CMO and a Development
Manager’s Perspective
CMO has been used to win
people’s trust so that they can
learn to have faith in the military,
especially the government, to
fulfill its mandate. In such case,
the AFP becomes a catalyst
for positive change by bridging
the people to the government
and other non-government
organizations (NGOs) to address
developmental challenges
in different communities. In
this sense, development in its
sincerest and truest form must
be implemented. However,
some studies remark that
the military tends to apply
a militaristic solution (not
necessarily through armed
means) to address development
gaps. This can be a problem
to CMO efforts because
development work with military
objectives seldom works.
For instance, military units
sometimes think that a
project or two as part of a
CMO campaign will suffice
to build trust in a particular
community. However, changes
in commanders and operational
tempo leave these projects
(whether in partnership with
the local government units or
NGOs) unmonitored for their
results, or worse, short-lived.
To be a true partner in national
development, the military
should engage in development
work, but there must be regular
ST RATJOU RNAL M AY - JUNE 2 01 9
evaluation of its impact on PHILIPPINES NATIONAL SECURITY
the community. Our dole
outs (projects or other civil military operations devoid of
affairs activities) are not bad any political goals or affiliations,
per se. However, it is better if one that would ultimately
we do things with “more than benefit all Filipinos.
good intentions”.5 It would
be better if the military helps
END NOTES:
communities not because
they might be exploited by 1
Chalk, Peter; Rabasa Angel; Rosenau
insurgent ideologies but rather
, William; Piggott, Leanne;. (2009).
because we genuinely want to
Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast
uplift their lives for the long
Asia. RAND National Defense
term. Seeing development
work from the lens of military Research Institute. Arlington, Virginia,
operator and not through the USA.
lens of a development manager
2
Acop, D. S. (2006). Assessing the
obstructs the true essence of Expanded Role of the Armed Forces
CMO. This is a challenge to the of the Philippines in Nation-Building.
AFP because it is not its primary Asia Pacific Social Science Review, 131-
mandate. 152.
3
More Than Good Intentions is a book
Nonetheless, the AFP can never published by Dean Karlan and Jacob
depart from its non-traditional Appel in 2011 that is about reducing
roles. Given the multi-faceted poverty by looking at the real impact
challenges the country faces
of poverty alleviation projects on poor
today, the AFP’s role in civil
communities.
military operations should have
a development goal in mind
rather than a purely military
purpose. While the military’s
projects may see changes of
command and OPTEMPO,
this should not hinder it from
pursuing genuine civilian
About the Author
LT EMMANUEL C ABSALON PN is a graduate of Philippine
Military Academy Class of 2009. He is also a graduate of
the Civil-Military Operations Officers Correspondence
Course and has been involved in CMO from 2010-2014.
He is likewise a graduate of the Master in Development
Management program of the Asian Institute of Management
and is a recipient of various CMO-related military awards
(Sagisag ng Ulirang Kawal and Gawad Sa Kaunlaran) as
well as commendations from various civilian stakeholders.
Currently, he is assigned to the Naval Air Group of the PN.
17
EDITORIAL BOARD
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LT ARCHIE C GRAPA PN
ASSOCIATE EDITOR

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the Philippine government.

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