BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

NAMES: SHINGIRIRAI JELINE

MUGADZA B225715B

ENOCK CHIROPA B223064B

TONY NYANDORO B225799B

ZIBUSISO NYONI B223573B

PROGRAM: MSc INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

COURSE: INTERNATIONAL GORVENANCE & DEVELOPMENT

COURSE CODE: MIR524

LECTURER: DR R. CHIPAIKE

QUESTION: Examine the reasons why the Doha development round has

taken time to be concluded

To reduce trade barriers worldwide, the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched the
Doha Development Round, also known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), in
November 2001 (WTO, 2001). As a result, trade between nations would increase, agricultural
and manufacturing markets can be opened up, and the scope of intellectual property law can
also be expanded. The Doha Round was supposed to be finished by 2005, but it started in
2001 with a lot of enthusiasm (Bout and Laborde, 2010). By 2008, negotiations had come to
a standstill due to disagreements on critical topics like agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-
tariff barriers, services, and trade remedies (ibid). After 14 years of talks, it was until 2015 in
Nairobi that the Doha Rounds finally came to an end, and it was signed (Bloomberg, 2015).
The European Union (EU), the United States (USA), and Japan are the leading developed
countries in the Doha Round. The leading and most significant emerging nations are India,
Brazil, China, and South Africa. This essay investigates the delays in the Doha development
round's conclusion.

With the creation of Doha, the WTO members vowed to give the implementation-related
concerns and issues presented by Members the utmost priority (WTO, 2001). They also
agreed to significantly reduce trade-distorting government assistance for agriculture, reduce
all forms of export subsidies, and phase them out. They also agreed to significantly expand
market access (ibid). Considering in full the unique requirements and objectives of
participants from developing and least-developed countries (about Non-Agricultural Market
Access - NAMA) (Bout and Laborde, 2010). A duty-free and quota-free market was open to
merchandise from Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

Furthermore, the Doha Round was started right after terrorist strikes on the United States on
September 11, 2001, according to Wilkinson and James (2013). The need to strengthen
multilateral businesses was realised by the global community. Free trade was viewed by
decision-makers as the best solution to poverty, which fueled terrorism. The goal of
producing a positive outcome from a development perspective, to establish a more balanced
system, as well as better support from local stakeholders in developing nations, was further
bolstered, according to Guha (2004), by this presupposition. The first deadline, however, was
missed after two ministerial conferences in Hong Kong (2005) and Cancun, Mexico (2003).
There was still no sign of significant progress despite related conversations taking place in
Paris, France (2005), Potsdam, Germany (2007), and Geneva, Switzerland (2004, 2006, and
2008). (Mbirimi, Chilala, and Grynberg, 2003). The high goals of the WTO member states
were not met ten years after the round was launched (Wilkinson, and James, 2013). Whether
the original objectives can still be achieved is still up in the air, despite some progress being
made with the Bali agreement in 2013 (Wilkinson, and James, 2013).
The Doha Round negotiations have not been resolved for long for several reasons. The
inability to reach an agreement on the special safeguard mechanism (SSM) in Geneva 2008,
which would have allowed nations to levy a special tariff on certain agricultural items when
imports rise or prices decrease, was the first major issue (Wilkinson, and James, 2013). Under
SSM, the US and EU defend their markets and productions by providing substantial
subsidies. Because of this, American farmers enjoyed relatively low production costs, which
allowed them to sell their goods for very inexpensive prices (ibid). Agriculture products from
developing nations must have their tariffs decreased, and they can only have their tariffs
raised if their imports increased by more than 40%. India disagreed with the policies despite
this since it intended to employ these mechanisms when imports of food and agricultural
products increased by 10%, however, the developed countries preferred that these
mechanisms boost imports by 40%. Millions of agricultural employees could potentially be
affected negatively by this liberalisation. Because India speaks with a loud voice on behalf of
many impoverished nations worried about the lives of millions of small farmers in
developing nations, many of which wish to protect their nascent domestic markets, many
developing nations support India's position. The Doha Round was unable to be finalised as a
result of the disagreement over the special safeguard mechanism (SSM) issue because the
United States refused to accept the safeguards suggested by India.

The fact that these negotiations insisted on an exchange is the second reason the Doha Round
was unable to be finalised. The developed nations would widen their markets to include
agricultural products from developing nations, while the developing nations would do the
same for industrial goods from developed nations (Richter, 2014). These discussions were
referred to as NAMA (Non-Agricultural Market Access). If NAMA were to be successful, it
would increase the developed countries and their transnational corporations' traditional
exporting of high-value goods and technology, increase the risk of the least developed
countries rapidly deindustrializing, and impede the industrial and technological development
of developing countries (ibid). In the meanwhile, this made it more difficult for governments
to formulate and put into practice policies that would support business for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) as part of long-term sustainable economic development and gender
parity (Wilkinson and James, 2013). Through a tariff reduction methodology that were
balance out or regulates the tariff levels among products to become more uniform, countries
agreed to increase market access obligations under NAMA (Richter, 2014). Tariffs were
reduced on a product-by-product basis, with high ones being subject to harsher reductions
than lesser tariffs. Furthermore, compared to previous rounds where countries were only
obligated to provide an average tariff drop, this was a true innovation. They were able to pick
and choose which products to lower tariffs on as a result, which allowed tariff peaks to
persist. The NAMA-promoted tariff cuts would expose industries to competition from
imported industrial goods, which is likely to impede local production and have major
consequences for the loss of millions of jobs.

A significant contributor to the Doha Round's failure to come to an end is the worldwide food
and fuel crisis. Crude oil's price rose from USD80 per barrel to USD145 per barrel in July
2008 (Richter, 2014). Between March 2007 and March 2008, the cost of wheat and rice
likewise jumped by more than 50% (ibid). After the impact, other nations that were already
unwilling to compromise on the terms of global trade were becoming even more. For
instance, the food crisis has forced India to stop exporting rice to other nations. This was due
to the excessively high price of oil, which eventually has an impact on food production. The
US, on the other hand, made an effort to promote the production of agricultural goods by
generously subsidising farmers. The subsequent oversupply of US goods on the global
market damages developing nations' domestic marketplaces (Wilkinson and James, 2013).
Additionally, lowering tariffs resulted in a decrease in the income of emerging nations. As a
result, neither the developed nor the developing world have subsidies or tariffs.

In addition, the rise of China, India, and Brazil may have contributed to the failure of the
Doha Round to conclude. Recently, China, India, and Brazil have risen to the top among
developing nations. The US is concerned that these nations will surpass it in prominence due
to their growing position in international trade. As a result, the US is unwilling to make
concessions over the Doha Round's terms since it does not want to help these adversarial
nations. Additionally, several of the participating nations did not seem to be all that
committed. It was questioned whether some nations had travelled to Cancun with a sincere
intent to negotiate during the Cancun meeting in 2003. According to some observers, a few
countries failed to compromise on their demands and only reiterated them, refusing to discuss
trade-offs (Mbirimi, Chilala, and Grynberg, 2003). The wealthy nations never committed to
aiding their less fortunate neighbours; instead, they were only concerned with maximising
their trading advantages. Developing nations imposed high tariffs to increase their profits and
safeguard their nascent economies (ibid). Due to the countries' refusal to accommodate one
another's wishes, the Doha Round was unable to be completed in the expected time.
In conclusion, the Doha Round has not been completed as of today because the majority of
the countries are more focused on their advantages than assisting another nation. Developed
nations overprotected their agricultural industries while developing nations showed less
desire in liberalising trade in industrial commodities. For instance, the most recent round of
negotiations, which took place from July 23 to July 29, 2008, collapsed due to an impasse
over agricultural import regulations. Major negotiations were not expected to begin after the
breakdown until 2009 (Wilkinson, and James, 2013). To agree on negotiation methods,
however, significant negotiations—primarily involving the USA, China, and India—were
held at the end of 2008 (ibid). However, there was no advancement as a result of these
conversations. Thus, the self-interested mentality should not exist to accomplish the core goal
of the Doha Round. As a result, it is difficult to develop a good Doha Round conclusion,
which explains why the Doha Round has not been completed in time.

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