As was indicated, proponents of the heuristics-and-biases approach characterize mistakes in reasoning as

disparities between people's judgements and probabilistic standards. This definition is based on the traditional
concept of rationality, which can be found in the previous sentence. However, evolutionary psychologists argue
that these principles of logic are not required nor sufficient to arrive at logical conclusions in a world full of
unknowns. Only in certain circumstances are normative theories and the norms they prescribe relevant to
humans (Gigerenzer, 2006, p. 118; 1991, p. 86; Over, p. 5). This particular focus on the "ecology" of reason
These writers, in keeping with the tradition established by Simon's Bounded Rationality (1956), place a strong
focus on the link between mind and environment and disagree with the heuristics-and-biases approach's notion
of "cognition in a vacuum." In particular, given that the process of evolution has been responsible for shaping
the human mind, Gigerenzer (1994) and Cosmides and Tooby (1996) suggest that researchers should present
problems in a more "ecological" way; that is, in a way that is analogous to the natural evolutionary environment
in which humans have developed. They urge that in such a setting, probabilistic information be phrased in terms
of natural frequencies, such as "X will happen 3 out of 20 times," rather than percentages. For example, "X will
happen 3 out of 20 times" (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1994; 2006, p. 119).

This idea, known as the frequentist hypothesis, has led a number of evolutionary psychologists to rethink some
of Kahneman and Tversky's most well-known reasoning tasks in terms of the natural frequencies that occur in
the world. For instance, Fielder (1988) suggested a frequentist solution to the Linda issue, which he formulated
as follows:

There are one hundred individuals that suit the description that Linda provided. What percentage of them are:

a) bank tellers

b) Tellers at banks who are also involved in the feminist cause

The conjunction fallacy was greatly decreased in this version of the experiment, just as Fielder expected it
would be: just 22% of participants evaluated (b) more likely than (a) (Fielder, 1988, as quoted in Gigerenzer,
1991, pp. 91–92). Cosmides and Tooby (1996) ran a frequentist version of Casscells, Schoenberger, and
Grayboys' medical diagnostic problem, and they reported findings that were even more striking than those
previously given. In contrast to the results of the original study, their interpretation of the issue resulted in 76%
of the individuals providing the appropriate Bayesian response. It seemed that base-rate neglect was no longer
an issue (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996, pp. 21–22). Obviously, these results do not contradict the ones that were
obtained by the technique that focused on heuristics and biases; nevertheless, they do demonstrate that people's
inductive procedures include components of the calculus of probability. On the other hand, they are intended to
receive information about frequencies as their input and make frequencies as their output. The untrained mind,
in a manner similar to that of the frequentist school, makes a distinction between frequencies and individual
occurrences (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996, p. 5; Gigerenzer, 1991, p. 104). In addition, and most significantly,
these findings show that exercising sound judgment in uncertain circumstances involves more than just using a
formula from traditional logic or probability theory in a mechanistic manner. Before arriving at a conclusion,
intuitive statisticians are required to investigate the problem's background or substance (Gigerenzer, 2006, p.
119; Newell, 2013, p. 610– 613).