PEOPLE V.

JANSSEN

Facts

On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Reverend Father H. Janssen, a Catholic
parish priest of the municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in the marriage registry, which was done.
On December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.

As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the defendant-appellant to marry them before that
date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued the following dispensation on December 29, 1928
authorizing the solemnization of the marriage as long as there are no legal impediments to the marriage. On January 4, 1929,
the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, gave the authority to solemnize marriage. By virtue of the above-quoted
dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on January
6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S. del Rosario

ISSUE
Whether or not appellant violated violated section 2 of Act No. 3412,

HELD
The law does not impose upon priests or ministers of religion the duty In holding that it is the duty of the accused to inquiring
into and determining the residence of the contracting parties before solemnizing marriage. It is sufficient to know that the
license has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has
complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or religion whose rules and
practices require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said proclamation be made during ten days, unless said
rules or practices so require.

G.R. No. L-31763 December 27, 1929

 
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,  plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. JANSSEN,  defendant-appellant.

Facts:
This case is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Antique convicting H. Janssen of a violation of
section 2 of Act No. 3412. Pedro N. Cerdea and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Reverend Father H. Janssen, a Catholic
parish priest of the municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in the marriage registry which was done.
Three proclamations were published prior to the marriage, the third proclamation having been dispensed with by a
competent ecclesiastical authority, the Bishop of Jaro. The municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued the authority to
solemnize marriage and 2 days later, by virtue of the dispensation, and in view of said authority of the
municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdea to
Juana S. del Rosario.

Issue:
1. Whether or not, Reverend Father H. Janssen has violated section 2 of Act No. 3412?
2. Whether or not, it is the duty of the priest to inquire into and determine the residence of the bride before solemnizing
marriage.

Held:
1. The law simply says that if the marriage takes place in a church whose rules and practices require proclamation, the license
applied for shall at once be issued, and it does not say that the proclamation required by said church is to be made during ten
days.
2. The law does not impose this duty upon priest or ministers of religion. It is sufficient to know that the license has been
issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with
his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.

Rationale: 1. When a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or religion whose rules and practices require proclamation or
publicity, it is not necessary that said proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or practices so require
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, -versus- GLORIA GOO ABBAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 183896 • January 30, 2013 • Third Division • VELASCO, JR., J.
Civil Law │ Persons and Family Relations │ Marriages │ Void Ab Initio

A marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license. Here, the marriage
between Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage license should be declared null and void.

FACTS:

Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, decided to stay in the Philippines two (2) years after meeting Gloria Goo
Abbas, a Filipina. While Syed was staying at the house of Gloria’s mother in Manila, Gloria’s mother
arrived with two (2) men. Syed underwent a “ceremony” as a requirement for his stay in the Philippines.
They signed a document, which Syed learned later on was a “marriage certificate”. Upon investigation,
Syed discovered that the marriage license was procured in Carmona, Cavite, where neither Syed nor Gloria
resided. Likewise, the marriage license was issued under a different name, and that no marriage license was
ever issued for Syed and Gloria per certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Syed and Gloria should be declared void ab initio based on the lack
of marriage license.

RULING:

Yes. As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or
the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage
are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Art. 35. The
following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those solemnized without a license,
except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

A marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license. Here, the marriage between
Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage license should be declared null and void. A certification
issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. The certification likewise enjoys the presumption of regularity, and such
presumption may only be rebutted upon proof of the claimant that no diligent search was made or that the
certification did not categorically state that no such marriage license was made or found. In this case, not
only did Gloria fail to explain why she procured a marriage license in Carmona, Cavite, where neither
party resides. There is also proof that diligent search was made by the Municipal Civil Registrar to find
Syed and Gloria’s marriage license since they were able to trace the marriage license written at the
marriage certificate, albeit registered in another couple’s names.

MS. FLORITA PALMA and MS. FILIPINA MERCADO, Complainants, vs. JUDGE GEORGE E.
OMELIO,
Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 4, Davao City),
JUDGE
VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 2, and Clerk of Court MA. FLORIDA C.
OMELIO,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Office of the Clerk of Court, both of the Island Garden City of SamaI,
Respondents. Present: SERENO, * C.J., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** DEL CASTILLO ***
JARDELEZA, and
TIJAM,JJ.
2017-08-30 | A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 (Formerly A.M OCA IPI No. 08-3003-RTJ)
FIRST DIVISION Marriage – Effect of Irregularity in marriage ceremony
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Administrative Complaint

Facts:
Spouses Echevarrias requested Judge Omelio to solemnize the marriage of their son Julius, and since they
wanted a beach wedding, he suggested that they see Judge Murcia whose court has jurisdiction over the
Island Garden City of Samal. On February 28, 2008 Judge Murcia solemnized the marriage affixing his
signature Omelio in the marriage certificate instead of his name. Moreover, there is no signature of the
witnesses undersigned in the marriage contract. And as Clerk of Court, Mrs. Omelio had not duly collected
the marriage solemnization fee of P300.00 for the said wedding. The following night Echevarrias
requested Judge Omelio to "reenact the wedding for purposes of picture taking and posterity," and the
judge acceded to this request facilitate the reenactment.
On July 8, 2007, a self-proclaimed fixer, Mercado, sent an e-mail regarding an alleged "marriage scam"
and other illegal activities in Davao City perpetrated by Judges Omelio and Ferraris. On March 17, 2008, a
certain Fiorita Palma (Palma) also sent an email alleging that Judge Omelio demanded monetary
consideration in exchange for solemnizing the marriage of a certain Echevarrias.
Because of this, the Office of the Court Administrator investigated and found out the said wedding was
not in the record book of all marriages solemnized, and that the respondents violated Administrative
Order No. 125-2007 (AO 125-2007).

Issues:
Whether or not the judges are administratively liable for contracting a highly irregular solemnization of a
marriage

Ruling:
Yes. The respondents are guilty of violating the AO 125-2007 which provides for the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary and laid down the rules ''to enable the
solemnizing authorities of the Judiciary to secure and safeguard the sanctity of marriage as a social
institution.
They violated Sec. 3, when the marriage was solemnized not in the court but in the beach without a
written request sworn statement to this effect; Sec. 4, when Judge Omelio did not personally appear
before the marriage and failure to ascertain if there is compliance with the essential and formal requisites
of marriage under the Family Code; Sec. 6, when the marriage was solemnized without the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age; Sec. 7, when Judge Murcia affix his signature as Omelio instead
of his name; Sec. 18, for failure to collect the P300 solemnization fee; Sec. 19, for failure to issue a receipt
for the said fee. Thus, respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage.
As a judicial officer, she is expected to know the law on solemnization of marriages. ‘A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law; he [or she] must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly,
judges, by the very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect in the performance of
their duties.’
"A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a solemnizing officer." Both Judge Murcia and
Judge Omelio were remiss in this regard.”
Notably, during the pendency of this administrative matter, CoC Omelio passed away; hence the
complaint against her should be dismissed.
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against respondent Clerk of Court Florida C. Omelio, Municipal Trial
Court
in Cities, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte, is DISMISSED. Respondent Judge George E.
Omelio,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City, Davao del Sur, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
FINED
in the amount of P40,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of his accrued leave credits.
Respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Island Garden City of
Samal,
Davao del Norte, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in the amount ofP40,000.00.
SO

FABIAN PUGEDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS,

assisted by her husband ANGEL SANCHEZ, CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband
 VICTORIANO SALVADOR, GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA
VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, TEOFILO PUGEDA
and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband RAMON PORTUGAL, Defendants-Appellants.

Placido C. Ramos and Fortunato Jose for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.

Jose T . Cajulis, Miguel F . Trias and Carlos T . Viniegra for all other defendants-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. CONJUGAL PROPERTY; FRIAR LANDS ACT; TRANSFER TO THE NAME OF A WIFE, UPON
HER HUSBAND’S DEATH, OF A CERTIFICATE OF SALE ISSUED UNDER THE FRIAR LANDS
ACT DOES NOT AFFECT CONJUGAL NATURE OF THE LANDS PURCHASED. — The provision of
the Friar Lands Acts to the effect upon the death of the husband the certificate of sale is transferred to the
wife is merely an administrative device designed to facilitate the documentation of the transaction and the
collection of installments, and does not produce the effect of destroying the character as conjugal property
o the lands purchased and converting them into paraphernal property. The case of Arayata v. Joya, 51 Phil.
654, is not applicable to the case at bar because it refers to the superior rights of the widow recognized in
Section 16 of Act No. 1120 over transfers made by the husband which have not been approved by the
Director of Lands.

2. PARTITION; MERE FAILURE TO REGISTER DEED OF PARTITION NOT OF ITSELF PROOF

THAT IT WAS NOT DECREED; PARTITION PRO INDIVISO. — The fact that the partition was not
registered and that the properties were not actually partitioned due to the neglect of the parties is not of
itself proof that it was not made where a project of partition and judicial approval thereof was presented.
Adjudications may be made pro indiviso without actual division or partition of the properties among the
heirs.

RESOLUTION

LABRADOR, J.:

This resolution concerns a motion for the reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court. The main
argument in support of the motion is that the lots not fully paid for at the time of the death of Miguel Trias,
which lots were, by provision of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120), subsequently transferred to the
widow’s name and later paid for by her out of the proceeds of the fruits of the lands purchased, and for
which titles were issued in the name of the widow, belong to the latter as her exclusive paraphernal
properties, and are not conjugal properties of her deceased husband and herself. In our decision we laid
down the rule that upon the issuance of a certificate of sale of the husband of a lot in a friar lands estate,
purchased by the Government from the friars, the land becomes the property of the husband and the wife,
and the fact that the certificate of sale is thereafter transferred to the wife does not change the status of the
property so purchases as conjugal property of the deceased husband and wife. The reason for this ruling is
the provision of the Civil Code to the effect that properties acquired by husband and wife are conjugal
properties. (Art. 1401, Civil Code of Spain). The provision of the Friar Lands Act to the effect that upon
the death of the husband the certificate of sale is transferred to the name of the wife is merely an
administrative device designed to facilitate the documentation of the transaction and the collection of
installments; it does not produce the effect of destroying the character as conjugal property of the lands
purchased. Hence, the issuance of the title, after completion of the installments, in the name of the widow
does not make the friar lands purchased her own paraphernal property. The said lands, notwithstanding a
certificate of sale, continue to be the conjugal property of her deceased husband and herself.
chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

The case of Arayata v. Joya, Et Al., 51 Phil 654, cited by the movants, is not applicable to the case at bar
because it refers to the superior rights of the widow recognized in Section 16 of Act No. 1120 over
transfers made by the husband which have not been approved by the Director of Lands. As a matter of fact
the syllabus is said case is as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Widow’s rights. — The widow of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands acquired by the
Government has an exclusive right to said lands and their fruits from her husband’s death, provided that the
deceased has not conveyed them to another during his lifetime and she fulfills the requirements prescribed
by the law for the purchase of the same." cralaw

virtua1aw library

A minor ground for the reconsideration is that the decision of Judge Lucero, having been set aside by the
Court of Appeals, could not be affirmed by Us. The setting aside of the said decision was due to the fact
that newly discovered evidence was found regarding the partition of the estate of the deceased. The setting
aside of the decision was not aimed or directed at the judge’s ruling that the properties acquired by the
husband during his lifetime from the friar lands estate were conjugal properties of the husband and the
wife.

The third ground raised is that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer. One of the arguments adduced in favor of the claim of the movants that the properties in
question, which were acquired during the lifetime of Mariano Trias, were never partitioned is that,
according to the records of the Register of Deeds and according to the friar lands agents, the alleged
partition of the said properties as conjugal properties of the deceased Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer
had not been registered in said offices. The failure to make the registration is perhaps due to the neglect of
the heirs. The fact, however, remains that the exhibits presented in Court, especially Exhibit "3-Trias" and
Annex "E", which are the project of partition and the approval thereof, cannot be ignored by this Court.
The neglect of the parties in not actually partitioning the properties does not argue in favor of the fact that
partition was not actually decreed. Adjudications may be made pro indiviso without actual division or
partition of the properties among the heirs.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the judgment rendered declared final.
So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo, Regala, Makalintal and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., took no part.

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND JOHN DESANTIS NERI,

PETITIONERS VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY
BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, RESPONDENT (FIRS
DIVISION, G.R. NO. 178221, O1 DECEMBER 2010)

THIS CASE IS ABOUT LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE. BIRTH CERTIFICATE

STATING THAT ONE’S PARENTS WERE MARRIED ESTABLISHES THE PRESUMPTION
THAT INDEED THEY WERE MARRIED.

READ THE FULL TEXT OF THE DECISION IN jabbulao.com under the category RECENT
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

DIGEST:

FACTS:

 
RODOLFO DIED. HIS BROTHER FILED AT RTC PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION. ANONUEVO  ET AL INTERVENED. THEY SAID THEIR MOTHER
SYLVIA  WAS DAUGHTER  OF ISABEL AND JOHN. BUT AT THE TIME OF RODOLFO’S
DEATH, THEIR GRANDMOTHER ISABEL  WAS THE LAWFUL WIFE OF RODOLFO BASED
ON A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. RODOLFO’S BROTHER  OPPOSED THEIR
INTERVENTION BECAUSE THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA STATES THAT ISABEL
AND JOHN  WERE MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE TO RODOLFO WAS
NULL AND VOID. ANONUEVO ET AL HOWEVER ARGUED THAT THE ENTRIES IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA COULD NOT BE USED AS PROOF THAT ISABEL AND
JOHN WERE INDEED MARRIED. FURTHER, SUCH  STATEMENT OF MARRIAGE IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS JUST TO SAVE FACE AND IS CUSTOMARY.

ISSUE:

CAN ANONUEVO ET AL  INTERVENE?

RULING:

NO. THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL STANDING TO INTERVENE. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE

OF SYLVIA WHICH SHOWS THAT ISABEL AND JOHN  WERE MARRIED IS SUFFICIENT
PROOF THAT INDEED THEY WERE MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE TO
RODOLFO IS VOID SINCE AT THAT TIME ISABEL WAS STILL MARRIED TO JOHN.
BEING NOT MARRIED TO RODOLFO, ISABEL AND HER DESCENDANTS HAVE NO SHARE
IN THE ESTATE OF RODOLFO.

WHILE A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS CONSIDERED THE PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF A

MARITAL UNION, IT IS NOT REGARDED AS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF
MARRIAGE.[1][47]  JURISPRUDENCE TEACHES THAT THE FACT OF MARRIAGE MAY BE
PROVEN BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE. [2][48] 
HENCE, EVEN A PERSON’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN HIS PARENTS. THE REASON
“FACE SAVING/ CUSTOMARY” IS WITHOUT MERIT. THE COURT CANNOT TAKE
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A FOLKWAY.

The ruling of the Court:

PEREZ, J.:

XXXXXX

The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit.  We agree with the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was
the legal spouse of Rodolfo.  The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that
Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel and
John Desantis was adequately established.  This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage
certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.[3][47]  Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.[4][48]  Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.[5][49]

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of marriage
between Isabel and John Desantis.  As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that
Isabel and John Desantis were “married” and (b) that Sylvia is their “legitimate” child.[6][50]  In clear and
categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis.

Pursuant to existing laws,[7][51] the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight.  They are presumed to
be true.  Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the
facts attested.[8][52]  In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful
statements made only in order to “save face.”[9][53]  They urge this Court to take note of a “typical” practice
among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by
them is legitimate.  That, the Court cannot countenance.

           The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not
diminish the probative value of the entries.  This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do,
simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact
followed.  It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which they
based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly
appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis. 
Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was
married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void
ab initio.

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior marriage
was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo.  Clearly, an
intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified.  We
affirm the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

          Costs against the petitioners.

          SO ORDERED.