Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo vs Judge Bonifacio B Bercacio

Facts

Complainant, Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, claiming to be a co-owner of an undivided interest of

a certain parcel of irrigated riceland situated in Albay went to the office of Judge Bercacio to verify
the matter. This property was the object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo
Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios in favor of Alfredo Ong and acknowledged before
Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, as ex-officio notary public, on January 25,
1972.
Complainant informed respondent judge that the vendors owned only one-third undivided portion of
the property and that she and other cousins of hers owned two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio
advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo Ong.

Complainant then requested the judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow them to
redeem the property and for that purpose she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be used
to pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of P3,500.00, and sent a letter to
Alfredo Ong who did not answer. A complaint was filed on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First
Instance of Albay (Civil Case No. 4591) entitled: "Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, et al., plaintiffs, versus
Maximo Balibado et al., defendants" for "annulment of sale of real property and redemption with
damages." This complaint was prepared on February 26, 1972 by "Eligio R. Berango & B.B.
Bercacio & Ass." as counsel for the plaintiffs, with Eligio R. Berango signing the complain

During the pendency, complainant asked respondent judge of the money in verbal and letter
requests. Respondent did not respond which prompted the complainant to seek the assistance of a
lawyer Atty. Madrid and thereafter an urgent motion was filed praying respondent judge to be
directed to consign in court the amount demanded by complainant which respondent finally complied.

As the foregoing letter elicited no reaction from the Judge, complainant Mrs. Añonuevo sought the
assistance of a lawyer in the person of Atty. Rodolfo A. Madrid who accordingly wrote to respondent
on March 16, 1973, giving the lattera final period of grace within which to return the sum of
P3,500.00, otherwise proper measures would be taken to protect the interests of his client.

Issue
W/n respondent judge is guilty of the administrative complaints for engaging in the practice of law
and failure to return promptly money deposited to him.

Ruling
Respondent judge violated the Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides
that municipal judges after office hours engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the
practice of law and also Circular No. 37 of the Secretary of Justice dated prohibiting Municipal Judge
shall to engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients

Respondent was found to have

-given legal advice to complainant
-accepted the P3500 for purposes of redeeming complainant's property
-wrote a letter to Alfredo Ong in behalf of complainant

Thus rendering private practice as a lawyer

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings
but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving of legal
advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from
engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of possible use of the power and influence of
his office to affect the outcome of a litigation where he is retained as counsel.

Also Respondent's failure to return the amount of P3,500.00 to herein complainant upon her demand
is highly reproachable.

Despite his contentions of keeping the money for the intention of having it ready at the time for
payment to Alfredo Ong. Respondent did not act in good faith. When complainant herein made
demands on him, verbal as well as written, to return the money, he should have immediately turned
it over to complainant to forestall or erase any possible suspicion that he had spent it; or he could
have deposited it in court. Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio was found guilty for the administrative
complaints and is suspended from office for a period of six (6) months effective immediately.
ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN v. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO., GR No. 46396, 1939-09-30

Facts:

The Visayan Rapid Transit Co. and the Negros Transportation Co., Inc., during the time the legal
services are claimed to have been rendered by the petitioner, were operating automobile lines in the
Province of Occidental Negros.

The respondent, Nicolas Concepcion, was... at the time the president, general manager, and
controlling stockholder of these two transportation companies. In January, 1933, Concepcion
engaged the professional services of the petitioner, who was then a law practitioner in the City of
Manila, The employment was for the... purpose of obtaining the suppression, reduction and refund of
certain toll rates on various bridges along the line operated by the respondent transportation
companies

At the time of the employment of the petitioner, it appears that the respondent transportation
companies had paid the sum of P89,816.70 as toll charges.The herein petitioner accordingly took
steps to obtain first... the suppression, and later the reduction of toll rates on said bridges and also
the refund of P50,000 of toll charges already collected by the Province of Occidental Negros "upon
authority of the Insular Auditor, concurred in by the Department of the Interior" the provincial board
refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally collected from the Visayan Rapid Transit Company, Inc.,
and the Negros Transportation Company, Inc., said amount to be applied to future payments for tolls
by said companies.As a result of this reduction of tolls, the... respondents have been benefited with
an economy of P78,448 for every eighteen months.He claimed in the lower court the sum of P20,000.
The trial court awarded him P10,000. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced this amount to
P3,500.

Issues:

the reasonable compensation to which he is entitled,

Ruling:

Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely administrative and did not
require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains that these services were
rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results to his... clients.

Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a lawyer shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the extent of... the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer * * *."

The following are the circumstances to be considered in determining the compensation of an

attorney: the amount and character of the services rendered; the labor, time, and trouble involved;
the nature... and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; the
responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy,
or involved in the employment, the skill and experience called for in the performance of... the
services; the professional character and social standing of the attorney; the results secured; and
whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may
properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent than when it is... not. The financial
ability of the defendant may also be considered not to enhance the amount above a reasonable
compensation, but to determine whether or not he is able to pay a fair and just compensation for the
services rendered, or as an incident in ascertaining the... importance and gravity of the interests
involved in the litigation.

The services of the petitioner in this case were not limited to the preparation and filing with the
authorities concerned of the petitions Exhibits A and B and other papers submitted in evidence, for
he appears to have had various conferences with the Secretary of Public

Works and Communications, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Labor and the Insular
Auditor, and had otherwise taken steps to secure the objectives of his clients. The importance,
merits and value of professional services of a lawyer are measured not alone by... his work taken
separately, but by his work taken as a whole.

"It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client.

* * * That is to say, as long as the plaintiff was honestly and in good faith trying to serve and
represent the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for his services

The amount of the professional fees to be paid to the petitioner had not been fixed, but the intention
and promise to pay him is evidently shown by the records in this case. And in any case, whether
there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation... which lawyers should
receive for their professional services.

it is obvious that as a result of the reduction of the rates of the tolls of the bridges in the said
province, the respondents were benefited with an economy of P78,448. The refund to the said
corporations of the amount of

P50,000 is a great relief and enhancement of their business. Facts and circumstances considered,
we are of the opinion that the reasonable compensation of the petitioner is P7,000, deducting
therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280... which the petitioner had already received.
Cayatano vs Monsod

Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments. Commission
on Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination. Cayetano opposed and challenged the
nomination and the subsequent confirmation of the Commission because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod
worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo)

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of
COMELEC.
RULING:

Yes, Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position. The case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation
in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them
in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.”

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law”, particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with the grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. After passing the Bar, he worked in his father’s law office. Monsod
also worked as an operations officer for World Bank Group (1963-1970). Upon his return to the
Philippines, he worked as Chief Executive officer of Meralco Group, and subsequently rendered
service to various company either as legal and economic consultant or as chief executive officer. He
also served as former Secretary General (1986), and National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987), as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as
Chairman of Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-

entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer- legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Tejan vs Cusi

FACTS:

In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo Tajan, he was required by
respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the
practice of law for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual
averments which petitioner knew were false.

“The records and the transcript of stenographic notes of Misc. Case No. 2968 of this Court show that
you prepared and/or caused to be prepared a verified petition for issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7312 in favor of Vicente Calongo, alleging therein
as grounds therefor, "That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate was lost by the herein petitioner in his
house in Mati, Davao; That in spite of the diligent search of the aforesaid title, the same could not be
found and is therefore now presumed to be lost," and had the petition signed by Atty. Justo Cinco,
when you know very well that the owner's duplicate copy has always been in the custody of
Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares of the Municipality of Kapalong to whom the same was
entrusted by Vicente Calongo”

Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on December 7, 1967 denying the
material averments of respondent Judge's letter and explaining the circumstances under which he
prepared the aforementioned petition. Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority
on his own motion to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or suspension of attorneys
because jurisdiction thereon is vested exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in
courts of first instance.

ISSUE:

WON courts of first instance has jurisdiction to hear and determine the disbarment or suspension of
attorneys.

RULING:

Yes. Section 38 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court states that, “Court of Appeals or a Court
of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last
preceding section, and after such suspension, such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.”

The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal profession stems from the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to engage
in that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice. An attorney-at-law is
an officer of the court in the administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the
Court for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him. His
admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the
right conferred, is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears
by acts of misconduct, that he has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed upon him, his
right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege
accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals and the
Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend members of the bar.
Alcala vs De vera
FACTS:
`Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case.
On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala. On April 19, 1963, respondent
Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he failed to inform his clients of the judgment
against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to complainants' house to serve a writ of
execution issued in said case. Totally caught by surprise, Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the
trial court and inquired for the status of case 2478. The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated
July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that the case was decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the
decision was received by respondent attorney on April 19, 1963, and that since no appeal was
taken, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.
That was the only time when Alcala learned that he lost. And because of Atty. De Vera’s
failure to inform him of the adverse decision, the period within which Alcala can appeal his case
had already lapsed. As a result, Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De Vera to collect
damages as he averred that he sustained damages due to Atty. De Vera’s negligence. The
court however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to damages. Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment
case against Atty. De Vera.
Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de Vera with gross negligence and malpractice: 1) for
having maliciously and deliberately omitted to notify them of the decision in civil case 2478
resulting in the deprivation of their right to appeal from the adverse judgment rendered against
them; and 2) for respondent's indifference, disloyalty and lack of interest in petitioners' cause
resulting to their damage and prejudice.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because he fails to update his client on one status
of the case.
RULING:
NO.
Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had been remiss in his
duties as counsel for Alcala because he failed to update him on the status of the case, however,
it appears that Alcala did not sustain any damage because of such negligence. But this is not to
say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will only serve as a
mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera was guilty of simple
negligence and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De Vera’s failure to notify his
clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to the client’s
interest expected of Atty. De Vera under the lawyer’s oath.
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is rather intended to protect
the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable, and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
This purpose should be borne in mind in the exercise of disbarment, and the power should be
exercised with that caution which the serious consequences of the action involves.
The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study. It is a lifetime
profession. By years of patience, zeal, and ability, the attorney may have acquired a fixed
means of support for himself and family of great pecuniary value, and the deprivation of which
would result in irreparable injury
In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the client to collect
damages from the negligent lawyer
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, s. HON.
NICANOR J. CRUZ,
FACTS:
On April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against
Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical in-juries, respectively,
and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 inthe then Municipal Court of
Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law studentsof the U.P.
College of Law where, as part of the curriculum of the university theywere required to render
legal assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Le-gal Aid. Thus, in August 1979,
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent
Fiscal Leodegario C, Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and re-spondent
judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscaland disallowed the
appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prose-cutors in said criminal cases.
Issue
Whether or not Malana and Lucila can represent their friend Cantimbuhan despitebeing senior
law students
HELD:
Yes. A non-member of the Philippine Bar—a party to an action is authorized to ap-pear in court
and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant maybe aided by a friend or
agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First In-stance, now Regional Trial Courts, he
can be aided only by an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections4 and 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to deter-mine who shall be the
private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when heobjected to the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila.
The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition. What thefiscal can do, if he
wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the privateprosecutor's participation, whether
he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. Onthe other hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private
prosecutor, with its approval,will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and
control Further,
We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a
case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be al-lowed to appear as
private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trialfiscal
HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
LABOR ARBITER ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, public respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN, private respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant” and received
basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually
increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the corporation
informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980 because of his
alleged failure to perform his duties well.

Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that
Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this
present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner corporation
and Aban.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to his former or
a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without
qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible,
the petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination benefits in addition to the above
stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.

A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or
even of the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or
not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of
selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the
presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to
control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be
the decisive factor.

In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the petitioner,
dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees and also assisted
the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees which is not act of a
lawyer in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed that petitioner has the power to
hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over Aban by
defining the duties and functions of his work which met the four standards in determining
whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship.
RENE P. RAMOS
vs
MOISES R. RADA
A.M. No. 202 July 22, 1975
FACTS:
Moises R. Rada, a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II, is
charged with a violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII. On December 15, 1972, he
was extended an appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation, thru its president, Jimmy
Tang, as a representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in Camarines Norte
which were foreclosed by the corporation. Rada accepted the appointment and discharged his
duties as administrator.
It is not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties of the position of administrator
has at all impaired his efficiency as a messenger; nor has it been shown that he did not observe
regular office hours.
ISSUE:
Whether Rada violated the civil service rule prohibiting government employees from engaging
directly in private business?
RULING:
YES.
Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting government employees from engaging
directly in a private business, vocation, or profession or being connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without written permission from the head of the
Department. But, indubitably, also, his private business connection has not resulted in any
prejudice against the Government service. Thus, his violation of the rule of the lack of prior
permission is a technical one, and he should be meted no more than the minimum impossable
penalty, which is a reprimand.
Canon 1 “A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.”
Beltran vs Abad
FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has not been
admitted to the Philippine Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was
fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217).
He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO
CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the
respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in
Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury. The Report also
reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S.
Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his
association with the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures
therein, denied that he filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied
that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said trial court.
According to him, he was in Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only explanation he
could give regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been
effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he (respondent) was still illegally
practicing law. As to the motion for examination and analysis of respondent's signature, the
Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to prove his defense, sought the assistance of
the National Bureau of Investigation to compare respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits
with the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter
signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and testimonial
evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is
still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.
ISSUES: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.
Whether or not Atty. Jacobe liable in his collaboration with the respondent.
HELD: No. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The
right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment and even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of the court.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without license.
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute
his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs.
17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict.
Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five
Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he
shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
Yes. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar. in good
standing. A lawyer shall not assist anyone who is not a member of the Bar to practice law in this
country. Thus, he must not take as partner or associate in his law firm a person who is not a
lawyer, a lawyer who has been disbarred and a lawyer who has been suspended from practice
of law. The lawyer who assists in an unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is
subject to disciplinary action. Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10)
days from notice why he should not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in the
practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.
Legal Ethics: Good Moral Character
Bacarro vs Pintacan
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral turpitude and immorality.
Complainant gave birth to a baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan; that because of
respondent's betrayal, her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress and anxiety; and,
that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member of the Bar. On the other
hand, respondent maintains that even admitting the truth of complainant's allegations, the
circumstances of their relationship with each other, does not justify him for disqualification to the
practice of law.

Issue:
WON respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a case involving his good
moral character
Holding:
Yes, the court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that respondent has legally
recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own,
and has undertaken to give financial support to the said child, We hold that he has realized the
wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. But he must be
admonished that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among
others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie
Bacarro Pinatacan.

Ratio:
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must
be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral
standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to
admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest
and to possess good moral character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen" He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only
for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than
just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations.
FACTS:
Diao vs martinez
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao
(Diao) was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination for lacking of the required pre-legal education prescribed
by the Department of Private Education, as a requisite for taking the bar examination. The
matter was investigated by the Solicitor General and found out that Diao did not complete his
high school training and never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A.
diploma therefrom
ISSUE: Whether or not Diao should be admitted to the practice of law profession
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission
having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he
hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential.
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days.
Guarin v. Atty. Limpin, A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015.
A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
In filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
of the CPR. Moreover, in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr.
de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the Corporation despite the
rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty.
Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR
FACTS:
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter
as President of One Card Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. On
August 11, 2008, he resigned and transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI),
another corporation under Legacy Group, filed with SEC a General Information Sheet (GIS) for
LCI which identified Guarin as its Chairman of the Board of Directors and President. Mired with
allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, LCI applied for voluntary
dissolution on December 18, 2008.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President
of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he
elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any notice
of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He has never
accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the
Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply
with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for
voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in
good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting
held on March 3, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR
“A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest. Immoral and deceitful conduct.”
“A lawyer shall not councel or abet the activities aimed at defiance of the law or al
lessening confidence in the legal system.”
RULING:
YES. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR. Members of the
Bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek
exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives
in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
There is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is ineligible to
hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company, It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin
filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of the LCI in the GIS. Thus, in filing a GIS that
contained false information, Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Moreover, in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los
Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the Corporation despite the rules
enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin
has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR